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How to Renew Transatlantic Relationsin the 21st CenturyMarcin Zaborowski aa Polish Institute of International AffairsPublished online: 30 Mar 2011.

To cite this article: Marcin Zaborowski (2011): How to Renew Transatlantic Relations in the 21stCentury, The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 46:1, 101-113

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How to Renew Transatlantic Relationsin the 21st Century

Marcin Zaborowski

Transatlantic relations are not what they used to be. Gone are the days when the

EU and the US could deliver the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe

and stop the Balkan wars. The elections in Ukraine are the latest confirmation that

the ‘westernisation’ of Eastern Europe is now in full reversal. NATO is bogged

down in Afghanistan and divided over its strategy and unequal burden-sharing.

Indeed, the Alliance’s very existence may be on the line. The West has managed to

demonstrate unity of purpose on the objective of preventing Iran and North Korea

from going nuclear but it has not succeeded in delivering a change in the position

of these states, both of which continue to advance their programmes. The EU and

the US also failed to achieve a meaningful outcome in the climate change con-

ference in Copenhagen.

Transatlantic relations suffered major damage during the presidency of George

W. Bush. The former president was anathema to the Europeans and, though

cooperation with EU governments improved during his second term, the relation-

ship was on life-support throughout his presidency. The election of Barack Obama

was heralded as marking a reversal of this negative trend and talk about a new era in

transatlantic relations was plentiful both in Washington and in Brussels in 2009.

There is no doubt that Obama has been extremely successful in bringing about

a sea-change in America’s image in Europe. The expectations in Europe were so

high that in October 2009 Barack Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize even

though he had barely spent any time in office and had no foreign policy achieve-

ment to record at that point.

Despite this change in perceptions, with Obama’s administration at half term, a

palpable mood of disappointment can be detected on both sides of the Atlantic.

The Americans are complaining that the administration got little help from the

Europeans in closing Guantanamo (which the Europeans had demanded), in

Afghanistan (where few additional troops from Europe were committed) and

Marcin Zaborowski is Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs. Email: zaborowski@pism.pl.The author would like to thank Atila Eralp, Giovanni Grevi and Kerry Longhurst for their most helpfulcomments on an early draft of this paper.

The International Spectator, Vol. 46, No. 1, March 2011, 101–113 ISSN 0393-2729 print/ISSN 1751-9721 online� 2011 Istituto Affari Internazionali DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2011.549757

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in dealing with the global economic crisis. The Europeans complain about the lack

of consultation on the administration’s new foreign policy initiatives – such as the

commitment to nuclear disarmament announced in Prague, the Cairo speech and

the ‘reset’ in Russia relations – or about the insufficient push on climate change and

the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The Europeans are also deeply uneasy about

Washington’s growing infatuation with the G2 idea and the possibility that the US

might consider replacing the transatlantic link with other privileged partnerships,

in particular with China. These developments strongly suggest that the cause of

transatlantic discord in recent years was not just the personality of President Bush,

and therefore that the relationship will not be ‘mended’ overnight just because the

Europeans have the US President they wanted.

It is argued here that the two essential sources of the current predicament are the

changing balance of world power and inadequate structures of transatlantic coop-

eration. The relative weight of the US–EU relationship in the 2000s is considerably

inferior to what it was in the 1990s and the rise of new powers, primarily China,

India and Brazil, will increasingly mean that the US will choose to do deals with

these powers either with or without consulting the Europeans, just as it did in

Copenhagen. Little can be done about this, at least not in the short term. The

Europeans will just have to live with a United States that does not always accord

them the same privileged status that they were used to.

But the arrangements on which transatlantic cooperation rests, NATO–EU and

US–EU relations, may and should be reformed to obtain better results from their

combined resources. In the following, some practical recommendations are offered

on how to achieve this.

Transatlantic relations at Obama’s half term

Obama’s first year in office was full of major foreign policy initiatives that were

designed to mark a clear departure from the approach of his predecessor. The

president called for complete nuclear disarmament in Prague, he delivered a

ground-breaking speech in Cairo in which he reached out to the Muslim world

and in Ghana he spoke about good governance and smart development assistance.

He promised to close Guantanamo and decided to try most terror suspects in civil

courts. He announced a ‘reset’ of relations with Russia and attempted (unsuccess-

fully) to avoid conflicts in relations with China. Even in Afghanistan, where

Obama’s liberal critics accuse the president of continuing the policy of the Bush

administration, he applied a new approach that places the protection of the civilian

population at its heart.1

1 Vasconcelos and Zaborowski, The Obama Moment.

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These new policies by and large were consistent with the views expressed by

European public opinion and a number of European governments. For years,

the Europeans called on President Bush to close Guantanamo, they criticised

his ‘war on terror’ approach as antagonising the Muslim world and accused him

of returning to the Cold War by renouncing the ABM treaty and making insuffi-

cient progress on nuclear arms reduction with Russia.

Yet, perhaps surprisingly, the initiatives embarked upon by President Obama

during his first years in office were not always enthusiastically received in

Europe. The decision to close Guantanamo was certainly welcomed, but

European governments were slow in helping out to accommodate the detainees,

sometimes arguing that the US had created the problem so it should deal with it –

for example, in Germany.2 Obama’s Prague speech on nuclear disarmament

annoyed the French government, whose attachment to the nuclear deterrent con-

tinues unabated.3 The Cairo speech in which Obama expressed his understanding

of the use of religious symbols in public (such as the Muslim headscarf and veil)

antagonised European secularists and the French government, which remains fier-

cely opposed to the wearing of overt religious symbols in public. The president’s

endorsement of Turkey’s EU membership was strongly criticised by those European

governments that are against Turkey’s accession but even some pro-Turkey govern-

ments were surprised that the president chose to speak on an internal European

matter in such a public manner before the Turkish parliament.4

Central and Eastern Europeans were taken aback by the Russia reset policy,

which led to the cancellation of the missile defence project in Poland and the

Czech Republic and Washington’s scaling down of its former support for NATO

enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia. Most European governments resented the

way in which they were pushed by Washington to ramp up their troop contribu-

tions in the military campaign in Afghanistan, which is deeply unpopular with

their publics.

In February 2010, the White House announced that the President would not

attend the annual EU–US summit, which was subsequently cancelled. This deci-

sion launched a flurry of speculation about the president’s seeming disregard for

the EU and even a possible crisis in EU–US relations. This development took place

against an increasingly complicated domestic environment for President Obama.

More recently, in November 2010, the Democrats were soundly defeated in the

mid-term Congressional elections, which means that Obama’s reform agenda is

in serious danger. This suggests that for the rest of his term the Obama

2 J. Dempsey, ‘‘U.S. Asks Germany to Take 10 Guantanamo Inmates’’, New York Times, 3 May 2009.3 ‘‘Desarmement: l’Elysee s’agace des ‘lecons’ d’Obama’’, Le Figaro, 9 April 2009.4 ‘‘Sarkozy se dit ‘d’accord’ avec Obama sur la liberte du port du voile islamique’’, Le Monde, 6 June 2009.

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administration will be even less inclined to deal with European sensitivities. At the

same time, as the economic crisis in Europe continues, the EU itself is also more

likely to turn inwards and be less prepared to engage in the areas of the US’ primary

interests, for example, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

To be sure, EU–US relations are in better shape now than they were in 2008 or

at any other point during the Bush presidency. Why then is there this mood of

disappointment both in the US and the EU? There are three essential reasons

for this. Firstly, after eight years of the Bush presidency expectations of change

were extremely high, perhaps too high. Secondly, the transatlantic convergence

did not deliver a breakthrough in any major area during Obama’s first two

years. Thirdly and most importantly, transatlantic cooperation is underpinned by

outdated ideology and structures that are either underdeveloped (EU–US) or

dysfunctional (EU–NATO).

Transatlantic cooperation in a multipolar world

The core idea at the heart of transatlantic relations is that of solidarity, which

rests on a convergence of interests, common history and cultural and ideological

proximities. The origins of the United States and its constitutional foundations

were the product of the European enlightenment and America was largely built

by European emigrants. In the 20th century, Europe was saved from the scourge

of fascism and communism by America. The US protected Europe through

NATO, it was crucial to Western Europe’s post-war reconstruction and the

ending of the Cold War, and it encouraged European integration. Mutual links

and affinities run very deep and are truly unique in a global context.

The value of this relationship is indisputable but its relative efficiency in deliver-

ing results is another matter. Clearly the relationship was effective during the

Cold War and arguably in the 1990s, during the so-called unipolar moment.

But with the emergence of new powers and the rise of multipolarity the exclusive

focus on the health of transatlantic relations is both outdated and untenable.

China is now the biggest holder of US government debt, it is already the

world’s third biggest economy and on the way to becoming the second. Brazil

and India are also growing rapidly, defying the global economic crisis and emerging

as the new pillars of the world economy. Another giant, Russia, was deeply affected

by the crisis and lacks the dynamism of China or India, but its massive crude

energy reserves and its status as a nuclear superpower ensure that it will remain

a vital actor.

The changing structure of the international order means in practice that a trans-

atlantic consensus on, say, sanctioning Iran or Sudan or even on the Balkans is far

less meaningful today than it would have been in the 1990s. This has led some

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observers to posit that, while indispensable, transatlantic relations are no longer

sufficient in ensuring global peace and security.5

But, in reality, even these assessments may prove too optimistic since it is no

longer apparent that a transatlantic consensus is, in fact, still indispensable. For

example, during Obama’s first year there were instances when the US was reaching

a global deal with the major developing powers while Europe was either margin-

alised or even excluded. The climate change conference in Copenhagen would

probably not have happened without the EU having fiercely lobbied for it and

there is little doubt that the European agenda was more progressive than that of the

US and other powers. However, the final deal was reached between the US and

major developing economies with the EU not even present at the final negotiations.

The other example is the disarmament negotiations, which are driven by the US

and Russia, while Europe is put in the (untenable) position of either following or

obstructing President Obama’s initiative. In none of these cases has Europe been

indispensable and this trend is only likely to grow in the future.

This suggests that the real dilemma is no longer to ensure that the transatlantic

link will continue to set the agenda in world affairs. That moment has passed and

all indications (demographic and economic) suggest that it will not come back any

time soon. Hence, the real issue that the Atlanticists are faced with is how to make

sure that this relationship remains relevant. There is a consensus on both sides of

the Atlantic that the EU and the US need to improve the way they cooperate with

each other. There are, however, various ways to go about this. So far, the US has

concentrated its efforts on working with select European states that are considered

either favourable to US goals (Bush) or the most powerful in Europe (Obama).

The first approach delivered the ‘coalition of the willing’ during the war in Iraq,

but it split the Europeans and antagonised Germany and France until the end of

the Bush Presidency. The Obama administration has chosen to privilege relations

with the so-called EU3 – France, Germany and the UK – which, when compared

with Bush, is less ideological and more realist, yet equally ineffective. There is a

fierce debate inside the EU on the merits of leadership by big member states

(EU3 or EU6 – UK, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland), which is, under-

standably, opposed by smaller member states and some of the EU institutions

(for example, the Commission). By choosing to privilege the EU3, the Obama

administration became a part of this debate with negative implications for its

relations with smaller European states (the majority of which are in the EU) and

with the most powerful EU institution. In addition, if the Obama administration’s

focus on the EU3 was meant to deliver more substantial European help

in Afghanistan and other areas to which the US attaches priority (which the

administration’s officials claimed to be the case), so far it has failed to do so.

5 Hamilton and Burwell, ‘‘United States and Europe in a G20 World’’.

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Bilateral relations will naturally continue as a vital component of America’s

approach to transatlantic relations as long as the EU does not evolve into a state,

which will not happen any time soon. But this continuing bilateralism of

Washington should be accompanied by a robust strategy towards the EU as

whole. This would require some serious reform of the existing institutional

arrangements in EU–US relations and between the EU and NATO. In the

second instance, the key to effective cooperation are relations with Turkey.

EU–NATO relations and Turkey

For the United States, NATO represents the primary institution for interacting

with Europe. For some Europeans this is also true but others would prefer to act

via a bilateral US–EU format. In any case, given the growing role of the EU in the

security and foreign policy realms, it is essential for the health of transatlantic

relations that the two organisations, EU and NATO, ‘get on’ well with each

other. Given that 21 of the 27 members of the EU also belong to NATO, it

should follow that this would be easy and that the two organisations would have

a natural partnership. Alas, this is not the case.

Ever since the emergence of the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy

(ESDP) in 1999, the EU–NATO relationship has been problematic and since

the 2004 EU enlargement to Cyprus (which is in dispute with a NATO

member, Turkey) it has been practically dysfunctional. The creation of ESDP

was never welcomed by NATO, which perceived it as competition and argued

that it could lead to an unnecessary duplication of the member states’ resources.

Those NATO members that are not EU members (non-EU NATO allies) were

worried that they might suffer discrimination.

At the time that the ESDP was inaugurated, there were also clear lines of division

between member states with regard to these arguments. France wanted an auton-

omous ESDP, which would become an alternative to NATO. The UK agreed to

ESDP but wanted to preserve the supremacy of NATO, and a non-EU NATO ally,

Turkey, was squarely hostile towards the EU security project. Crucially, the position

of the US fell between those of the UK and Turkey. Washington did not welcome

ESDP, but it was prepared to tolerate it under certain conditions. These were stated

by then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright when she outlined the doctrine of the

‘three Ds’ – no decoupling, no discrimination of non-EU allies and no duplication

of NATO.

Eleven years after the inception of ESDP – which, with the entry into force

of the Lisbon Treaty, has been renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy

(CSDP) – some of these past lines of division have become blurred, but some have

not and have become even starker. On the positive side, there is greater convergence

inside the EU itself regarding the aims of CSDP and the US position has become

more cooperative and less conditional. After ten years, it has become clear that

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CSDP operations are not in competition with NATO but are complementary to it.

The vast majority of CSDP operations have been civilian (17 out of 22 up to 2010)

and many have taken place in those areas where NATO would not or could not

operate, such as Georgia, the Palestinian territories or Africa.

In the meantime, the positions of some key states have also evolved. In 2009,

France rejoined NATO’s integrated military command, which in effect means that

Paris no longer sees the EU security structures as a potential alternative to NATO.

At the same time, some staunchly Atlanticist members of the EU, such as Poland,

have embraced a stronger CSDP and are now in favour of greater autonomy from

NATO, as well as the idea of developing the EU’s own planning headquarters for

its civilian and military operations. The UK has retained its NATO-first policy,

although the idea of pooling and sharing resources among EU member states,

the UK and France in particular, is also gaining currency in London. The US

also welcomed a stronger CSDP; in fact, it is contributing to the current EU

mission in Kosovo. It is now expected that, if presented with a unified EU position,

the US would drop its opposition to the idea of an EU civilian-military HQ, which

it objected to in the past.

However, the dispute between Turkey and the EU has shown no sign of abating

and, since the enlargement to Cyprus in 2004, it has effectively paralysed

EU–NATO cooperation. As a NATO member, Turkey can and does block all

Alliance missions planned in cooperation with the EU. As a result, with the

exception of the mission in Bosnia, wherever NATO and the EU have missions

in the same theatre they do so with no formal agreement regulating their coopera-

tion. This has considerable implications on what the EU can do and consequently

what its added value might be for transatlantic relations, for example, in

Afghanistan, where the EU mission operates without the protection of the

NATO force. As things stand at the moment, with Turkey rejecting the possibility

of an EU–NATO agreement, it is unlikely that the EU will be able to provide more

help in Afghanistan, even though it is willing to do so, at least on the civilian side.6

There are two aspects to the EU–Turkey dispute: there is a formal-institutional

aspect and a political one. On the formal level, Turkey argues that EU–NATO

relations have been regulated by the Berlin-Plus agreement which, according to

Ankara, stipulates that NATO must be consulted and that it retains first right of

refusal when the EU wishes to launch an operation with its cooperation. The EU

argues that this applies only to military operations and not to civilian ones, such

as the EU missions in Kosovo or Afghanistan. The EU enlargement to Cyprus has

resulted in further institutional difficulties, since Nicosia has no formal relations

with NATO (unlike other neutrals, Cyprus is not involved in the Partnership for

Peace with NATO) and is involved in a bitter dispute with Ankara. Consequently,

6 Peral, ‘‘EUPOL Afghanistan’’.

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Turkey refuses to discuss serious security matters in the existing NATO–EU frame-

works as long as Cyprus is present, which in effect means a breakdown of formal

communication between the two organisations.

None of these formalities would have mattered, had it not been for the political

disagreements between the EU (or rather some parts of it) and Turkey. Ankara is an

official candidate for EU membership but, as things currently stand, there is very

little chance of Turkey acceding to the EU any time soon. The membership

negotiations are now stalled and the present French and German governments

openly oppose Turkey’s membership bid. These sentiments are deeply resented

in Turkey where support for the once popular goal of joining the EU has fallen

below 50 percent.

Turkey’s grievances may seem petty, but behind them loom larger issues: the

unresolved Cyprus question, the EU member states’ ambivalent attitude towards

Turkey’s bid to join the EU and the sense that Turkey is being excluded on the basis

of cultural prejudices. Some of these grievances are justified, some less so; however,

what is clear is that Turkey will continue to block EU–NATO cooperation as long

as it feels that its issues are not addressed. At this point, many experts conclude that

the entire matter is hopeless because Turkey’s bid to join the EU will remain

controversial and there will not be a quick solution to the Cyprus issue. But it is

a mistake to assume that nothing can be done.

The Turkish issue is certainly extremely difficult, but it is not hopeless and an

answer may lie in a transatlantic deal whereby the US leans on Turkey and the EU

shows more inclusiveness towards Ankara. The EU and the US must also dedicate

more attention to helping resolve the Cyprus issue. In the past, the US exerted

a significant influence on Turkey in getting it to accept the development of ESDP

and the use of NATO assets by the EU. It is true of course that since then, and

especially since the war in Iraq, the US’ influence on Turkey has waned.

President Obama’s overtures towards Ankara – evident during his April 2009

visit – began to help reverse the growth of Turkish anti-Americanism. But the

subsequent passage, on 4 March 2010, of the resolution by the Foreign

Relations Committee of the US House of Representatives, calling on Ankara to

recognise the mass killings of Armenians during the First World War as genocide,

re-ignited tensions in US–Turkish relations and endangered this fledging momen-

tum. Yet, as long as the White House is successful in lobbying against the adoption

of this resolution by Congress the matter should have no long-term political

implications. Most importantly, while there has been a resurgence of anti-

American sentiment in Turkey in recent years, the governing elite and the army

continue to see relations with the US as a cornerstone of Turkish security.7

Europeans should support strong US–Turkish relations, rather than be upset

7 Larabee, Troubled Partnership: US–Turkish Relations.

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about the US President’s expression of America’s support for Turkey’s bid to join

the EU. America must rebuild Turkey’s trust and this is in Europe’s interest as well.

Separately, the EU must show more inclusiveness towards Turkey. While the EU

is unlikely to enlarge to Turkey soon for its own political reasons, there is no reason

why Ankara should not be included more in some EU policies, and especially

CSDP, beforehand. Some concrete propositions to this end are outlined in the

concluding part of this article.

EU–US relations

The majority of issues that top the transatlantic security agenda today, such as Iran,

the Middle East Peace Process, Russia and climate change, are dealt with in a

bilateral EU–US context that does not involve NATO. Even in Afghanistan, the

primary area of NATO operations, there is scope for bilateral EU–US cooperation,

especially on the civilian side. This shows how important bilateral EU–US relations

have become. Yet, despite this, as far as security issues are concerned, this bilateral

relationship functions very much on an ad hoc basis, it has very few permanent

and workable structures and those in existence are ill-adapted to the realities of

the 21st century.

Today, the only formal arrangements underpinning the relationship are those

that were put in place by the transatlantic partnership agreement of 1995; of these,

the annual EU–US summit is the most important. However, it is becoming

increasingly clear – especially in light of the fact that President Obama declined

to attend the summit that was scheduled to take place in February 2010, with the

result that it was subsequently cancelled – that the existing set-up is no longer

useful. The annual EU–US summits are grand but largely empty diplomatic occa-

sions with the 27 heads of EU member states and US President all present and

photographed around the table. Rather than being a forum for a strategic dialogue,

the summits turn out to be an opportunity for every single EU state – no matter

how small – to express its position to the president of the US. For example,

Obama’s first meeting with the EU, on 5 April 2009 in Prague, lasted only

90 minutes, 30 of which were taken up by Obama’s speech alone. It is hardly

surprising in this context that the president, who visited Europe six times during

his first year, decided to skip the following summit.

To continue to manage the relationship on the basis of an agreement from 1995

does not take account of the fact that the EU has in the meantime become a

different actor. In 1995, the EU had 15 members compared to today’s 27 and it

did not have security and foreign policy dimensions. There were no ESDP missions

and there was no question of EU–NATO relations. The transatlantic security

agenda was dealt with in the contexts of NATO or bilateral EU–US relations,

which were almost entirely dominated by trade and economic issues. The main

transatlantic security challenges in 1995 concerned the Balkans, which today

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represent a minor part of what we are dealing with. In short, as far as security issues

were concerned, the meaning of the 1995 arrangements was symbolic: to lay the

basis for regular meetings of the leaders, but with no real expectation of serious

business being done within this framework. What is needed today, instead, is a

practical set-up that moves EU–US cooperation along a certain route to concrete

results.

How to revitalise the relationship?

Transatlantic institutions, whether in the context of EU–NATO or EU–US rela-

tions, are not fit to deal with new realities, both global and internal. The transat-

lantic agenda is fuller – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, the Middle East and the

Balkans – while the instruments are the same as in the 1990s. The EU is a very

different actor, it deploys missions abroad and its diplomatic capacities are con-

sistently growing. To establish a working relationship between the EU and NATO

and to make the EU’s contribution to burden-sharing more effective, two crucial

steps must be taken: the EU must enhance its operational capacities and it must

become more embracing of Turkey.

The experience of the last ten years shows that in order to lead its missions

effectively the EU needs its own headquarters for civilian and military operations,

without which its capacities to deploy missions will remain severely hampered.

The current mechanism, with the EU relying on the planning capacities of the

UK, France or Germany, is no longer sufficient.8 National planning capacities are

not adequately equipped to deal with multinational and multilingual forces.

For example, the current naval operation, Atalanta, has clearly demonstrated the

limits of relying on national planning capacities, as did the former EU operations

in Congo.9

The EU should offer Turkey an associate status in CSDP. Before ESDP emerged,

Turkey was an associate member of the Western European Union (WEU) and, due

to the fact that it was very active in this role, it was essentially a de facto member

of the WEU. This status was taken away from Turkey with the demise of the WEU

and the emergence of ESDP and, rather understandably, Turkey resents this.

Nowadays Turkey is still the largest third-country contributor to ESDP operations,

especially in the Balkans, but it enjoys no particular rights. It is only fair

that Turkey’s rights should reflect its contributions, not least because Turkey is a

candidate for EU membership. A mechanism based on this principle should be

considered as part of a package that would allow Turkey to overcome its hostility

to EU–NATO cooperation.

8 Italy and Greece have also offered their planning capacities, but so far they have not been tested.9 Simon, Command or Control?, 81.

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While NATO remains the central transatlantic security institution, more and

more business between the EU and the US is being done on a bilateral basis.

However, while the need for a proper EU–US dialogue is increasingly apparent,

this is still conducted on the basis of an outdated arrangement with summits as its

focal point. Past experience shows that summits are no longer appropriate as the

main platform of the bilateral EU–US dialogue and, as such, should not be held

periodically as a diplomatic occasion but only when a common agenda calls for

such a meeting.

When summits are called for, the EU should not be represented by all

27 member states but by the President of the EU Council, the High

Representative for CFSP Catherine Ashton, and a chair of the EU Presidency.

When the occasion demands broader participation from EU member states, the

President of the Council should choose those states that are most relevant for the

issues under discussion. For example, when Russia and the EU’s eastern neighbour-

hood are discussed, Poland, Germany and Sweden should be invited, and when

the Mediterranean region is being dealt with, Italy, Spain, France, Greece and

Portugal should attend. Most importantly, the agendas of the summits must be

focused on delivering results, not dialoguing.

More routine business should be conducted between the EU High

Representative/Vice President of the Commission and the Secretary of State on

the US side, who should co-chair a Transatlantic Political Council, a new body set

up to deal exclusively with political and security matters. The Council would meet

at least every six months.10 Regular and structured cooperation, headed by the EU

foreign policy chief and the US Secretary of State and aided by technical teams,

should be able to clear a plethora of issues that never get thoroughly addressed

at the current summits. The existing Transatlantic Economic Council needs to be

revamped to become more result-oriented.

Relations between US and EU lawmakers are a neglected part of transatlantic

cooperation. In theory there is a Legislative Dialogue (LD) between the US

Congress and members of the European Parliament. But in reality this arrangement

does not work, not least because there is no interest in it in the Congress. This is for

two reasons: firstly because Congress has yet to be convinced that the European

Parliament wields real power and, secondly, because the Congressmen do not like

the format that excludes national parliamentarians from EU member states with

whom they often have established relations. The LD could have more traction if

the European part of the committee were to include national parliamentarians – for

example the chairs of foreign relations committees – from the EU troika presiden-

cies alongside the relevant MEPs. In addition, the chairs and ranking members

10 The idea of the Council was proposed in a report by Millan Mon issued and adopted by the ExternalRelations Committee of the European Parliament. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXTþIM-PRESSþ20090223IPR50187þ0þDOCþXMLþV0//EN

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of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations should be invited to participate

in some parts of the EU–US summits and the meetings of the Transatlantic

Political Council.

The ideas presented above draw on notions that are being discussed in the

transatlantic community. There is a certain transatlantic divide in this debate,

with American experts favouring informality in working arrangements and the

Europeans opting for new institutions.11 However, there is a basic consensus

among both groups that the existing arrangements are unsuited for current realities

and basically unsustainable.

Conclusion

The transatlantic link remains a unique relationship. Together the EU and the US

comprise a population of 800 million people, their economies amount to 60

percent (at the PPP rates) of global output and their combined intellectual

resources (academic excellence, publications, patents) as well as their military

strength are, and will for some time remain, unrivalled. As repeatedly stressed

here, there is no denying that the balance of power is shifting eastwards, but

other powers still have a long way to go before they can even approximate the

relative importance of the West. Nevertheless the efficiency of the transatlantic link

in delivering results has been declining and is now well below the level of the

1990s. It does not have to be this way. What is needed to sustain this relationship

is some new thinking on the evolution of the global system, greater openness to

Turkey and institutional reforms.

The EU and the US should become more inclusive. The US seems to have

adapted better than the EU to the changing reality of the new global order.

Few in Europe accept that the EU is over-represented in global bodies, such as

the IMF, World Bank, UN Security Council or even the G20. It is becoming

imperative that the EU accept its diminished weight and make room for the

emerging powers. At the same time, the US should make a greater effort to consult

with the Europeans about its global initiatives. A vast majority of the Europeans

agree with the principles outlined in the Prague and Cairo speeches or the Russia

reset policy, but their perception of these initiatives and policies has been adversely

affected by the US’ lack of consultation with them. This was particularly apparent

during the Copenhagen conference, which left a bitter aftertaste for the Europeans.

The EU and NATO have been vastly successful in securing peace and prosperity

in Europe during the Cold War and in promoting peace beyond Europe after 1990.

But the two organisations relate poorly to each other and as a result do not obtain

the best possible outcome from their combined resources. The US and the EU

11 For example, see Zaborowski, ‘‘Organizing a More Strategic U.S.-EU Partnership’’ and Ries,‘‘An American Perspective’’.

112 M. Zaborowski

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must consider creative new ways for establishing a good working relationship that

moves beyond symbolism and is focused on delivering results. An inclusive policy

towards Turkey is in the strategic interests of both the EU and the US. Associating

Turkey more closely with EU security structures is a necessary first step in turning

the anti-Western tide in Turkey and unblocking EU–NATO relations.

During the Cold War and the 1990s, the strength of the transatlantic alliance

derived from common values, an ability to adapt to changed circumstances and an

inclusive attitude. Today we are facing a very different world with different threats

and challenges, but the recipe for success remains the same.

References

Hamilton, D., ed. Shoulder to Shoulder: Forging A Strategic U.S.–EU Partnership. Washington DC:

Johns Hopkins University Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2010.

Hamilton, D. and F. Burwell. ‘‘The Setting: The United States and Europe in a G20 World’’.

In Shoulder to Shoulder: Forging A Strategic U.S.–EU Partnership, edited by D. Hamilton.

Washington DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2010.

Larabee, S. Troubled Partnership: U.S.–Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change.

Santa Monica: RAND, 2010.

Peral, L. ‘‘EUPOL Afghanistan’’. In European Security and Defence Policy: The First 10 Years

(1999–2009), edited by G. Grevi, G.D. Helly and D. Keohane. Paris: European Union

Institute for Security Studies, 2009.

Ries, C. ‘‘Organizing a More Strategic U.S.–EU Partnership: An American Perspective’’. In Shoulder

to Shoulder: Forging A Strategic U.S.–EU Partnership, edited by D. Hamilton. Washington DC:

Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2010.

Simon, L. Command or Control? Planning for EU Military Operations. EU-ISS Occasional Paper

no. 81. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2010.

Vasconcelos, A. and M. Zaborowski, eds. The Obama Moment: European and American Perspectives.

Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2009.

Zaborowski, M. ‘‘Organizing a More Strategic U.S.–EU Partnership: A European Perspective’’.

In Shoulder to Shoulder: Forging A Strategic U.S.–EU Partnership, edited by D. Hamilton.

Washington DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, 2010.

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