HPGHumanitarianPolicy Group
Supporting resilience in difficult places A critical look at applying the ‘resilience’ concept in countries where crises are the norm
Simon Levine and Irina Mosel
March 2014
HPG Commissioned Report
About the authors
Simon Levine and Irina Mosel are researchers with the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).
Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Kathleen White for valuable early help in our research and thinking, and to Rachel Slater and Margie Buchanan-Smith for helping to stimulate our thinking on the problem of resilience in difficult places as this paper was being prepared. Many people working in development and humanitarian action gave very generously of their time, knowledge and ideas in interviews. Thanks too to Barbara Kobler, Sebastian Wigele and Hanna Maier for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Particular thanks to BMZ for funding the study, and to GIZ for its constructive engagement. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of ODI, BMZ or GIZ.
Humanitarian Policy GroupOverseas Development Institute203 Blackfriars RoadLondon SE1 8NJUnited Kingdom
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© Overseas Development Institute, 2014
Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce materials from this publication but, as copyright holders, ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. This and other HPG Reports are available from www.odi.org.uk/hpg.
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Introduction 1
Whatdoes‘resilience’mean? 3
Whathas‘resilience’meantinpractice? 5
3.1Resilienceframeworks 5
3.2Resilienceandtheaidbureaucracy 5
3.3Resilienceprogramming 7
3.4Learningandresilience‘metrics’ 9
Whatneedstobedone? 11
4.1Refocusinginternationalaidtoprioritisehelpingtopreventpeople 11
fallingintocrisis
4.2Linkingemergencyanddevelopmentpolicyandinterventions 11
4.3Incorporatingafuture-lookingperspectiveintopoliciesandprogrammes 12
4.4Improvingtheimpactofpoliciesandprogrammingonthelives 13
ofvulnerablepeople
4.5Findingnewparadigmsforlonger-termsupportinprotracted 14
andrecurrentcrises
Ensuringresiliencestaysmeaningful:avoidingthepitfalls 17
5.1Genericresilienceinterventionsfordifficultcontexts 17
5.2Ignoringlessonsfromthepast 17
5.3Genericresilienceindicators 18
5.4Rethinkingrisk 19
5.5Unrealisticexpectations 19
Makingprogress 21
References 25
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Contents
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1Introduction
Policymakersandaidactorshavebeengrapplingfordecadeswiththequestionofhowtobettersupportvulnerablepeopleaffectedbyprotractedorrecurrentcrises,andhowtodeliverlong-termsupporttoreducechronicpovertyorvulnerabilityinplaceswhereemergencyreliefisfrequentlyrequired–andwherewhatareoftenconsideredtheprerequisitesfor‘normal’developmentareabsent.Thispaperreferstothesesituationsas‘difficultplaces’,bothbecausethepeoplelivingtherefrequentlyfacedifficultiesinachievingevenaminimallevelofresilience,andbecausetheyarethemostdifficultenvironmentsforthoseconcernedwithsupportingpeople’sresilience.Therecentshiftofattentiontowards‘buildingresilience’hasprovidedanewbannerfordiscussionsabouthowtoengageinprotractedcrises,orincountrieswithrecurrentcrisesandathighriskofcrisis,inwaysthatgobeyondsupportformeetingimmediateneeds.
ThispaperhasbeencommissionedbytheGermanFederalMinistryforEconomicCooperationandDevelopment(BMZ)tolookatthechallengesofsupportingresilienceinsituationswhereitisnecessarytothinklonger-term,butwherethestabilityandstronggovernancewhichareconsiderednecessaryfortraditionalmodelsof‘development’areabsent.TheGermangovernmenthasdevelopedastrategyforengagementin‘situationsoffragilityandprotractedcrises,duringperiodsofrecoveryandincountriesthatareparticularlyexposedtonaturalhazards’(BMZ,2013b:5).Itusesthelabel‘transitionaldevelopmentassistance’(TDA)forthisassistance,whichcanworkinparallelwithhumanitarianassistance,followitor,asitsnameimplies,beusedduringahoped-fortransitiontomoretraditionalmodalitiesoflonger-termdevelopment.ThemainaimofTDAinthesesituationsisexplicitly‘tohelpstrengthentheresilienceofindividuals,localcommunities,civilsocietyactorsandstateinstitutions’(ibid.).
Thepaperlooksathowresilienceisbeingtakenforwardintheinternationalaidsector,andthenathowbestadonorcansupportresilience-building.Paradoxically,althoughresilienceseemstobean
objectiveparticularlyappropriate(indeed,necessary)tothesituationsforwhichTDAisintended(conflict,fragility,protractedorrecurrentcrises),muchofwhathasbeenwrittenaboutresilienceassumesmuchmoreidealconditionsasitsprerequisite,andsocannotusefullyinformthoselookingforapracticalwayforwardinsuchsituations.Onestudy(Bahaduretal.,2010)findsthatthemostcommonlyidentifiedrequisitesforpeopleorcommunitiesbeingresilientwere:ahighlevelofdiversityineconomicopportunities;communitieshavingavoiceinrelevantpolicyprocesses;effectivedecentralisedandflexiblegovernanceandinstitutions;andahighdegreeofsocialandeconomicequity.Theseidealsaresofarfromtherealitiesofdifficultplacesthatitishardtoarguethattheyareusefulevenasaguideinsettingadirectionfordesiredchange.Thiswouldleadtotheconclusionthatresilienceisprobablynotarelevantobjectiveinmanydifficultplaces.Frankenbergeretal.(2012:9)israreinmakingthisexplicit:
There will be certain situations – such as those where formal government remains fragile or absent and/or those experiencing ongoing violent conflict – where resilience building may be impossible unless and until basic minimum conditions are present.
Thisconclusionsitsuneasilywithwhatcouldbecalledthe‘political’caseforresilience.TheGermangovernment’sdevelopmentpolicyinthecontextofconflict,fragilityandviolence(BMZ,2013a:7)arguesthatconflict,fragilityandviolenceare‘centralchallengesofdevelopment policy’[emphasisadded],asitisinotherrecentpolicydocumentsfromtheEuropeanCommission(EC)(EC,2012a)andtheUKDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)(Ashdown,2011;DFID,2011a).Itispreciselythiskindofdevelopmentinthesekindsofcircumstancesthatisbeingcalledforinthecallforattentiontoresilience(seee.g.BMZ,2013b;Ashdown,2011andmanyothers).Canitreallybeunfeasibletosupportpeople’sabilitytocopeintheveryplaceswhereresilienceismostneeded?
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Oneside-effectoftheincreasingattentiononresiliencehasbeenaplethoraofframeworksdescribingorexplainingit–andsomedegreeofconfusionaboutwhatbuildingresilienceactuallymeans,letalonehowbesttoachieveit.Despitetheoftenfraughtdiscussionsoveritsdefinition,‘resilience’hasasimplemeaning:theabilitytoabsorborresistastressorshock,andtorecoverfromit.Thewordhasbeenappliedinmanydisciplines(psychology,ecology,physics,sport,economics),tomanyentities(healthservices,livelihoods,eco-systems,footballteams,bankingsystems)andinrelationtomanystressesandshocks.Innormalparlancethewordpresentsfewproblems,butironicallyaperceivedneedtofindamore‘academic’or‘scientific’definitionthatcouldgivecertaintyandclarityhasmoreoftenbeenasourceofconfusionandmisinterpretation.
Althoughmostdefinitionsofresiliencerefertotheabilityofsystemstofunctioninthefaceofdisturbancesorhazards,thispaperusesresiliencetotalkaboutpeople.Mostdefinitionsfocusontheamountofdamageorlosssufferedbythe‘system’afterashock,andthespeedatwhichsomenotionofnormality(usuallytakenasthestatusquoante)isregained.Whateverformofwordsisused,theconceptofresiliencehastoincludeconsiderationofthefollowingelements:
• Exposure:theseverityoftheproblemsthatpeopleface,andthelikelihood(risk)thattheywillbehitbythem.
• Vulnerability: howbadlytheywillsufferiftheyareaffectedbytheproblem.
• Coping and adapting:1thedifferentthingsthatpeopledowhenhitbyproblemstomitigatedifficultyorsuffering–theirabilitytomaintainanacceptablelevelofwell-beinginthefaceofproblems.
• Recovery:people’sability,overtime,toreturntotheirpreviouslevelofwelfare,followingaproblem.
Thispaper,too,arguesthatresilienceshouldnotmerelybeusedinrelationtohowmuchislostasaresultofashockorstress,butmustalsoberelatedtothedegreeofsufferingthatpeoplehavetoendureasaresult.Peopleareresilienttothedegreethattheyavoidfallingintounacceptablelivingconditions.Theideathataminimumthresholdofwell-beingiscentraltoresilience–i.e.thatarichpersonisoftenresilienteventhoughtheymaylosealotmorethananun-resilientpoorpersoninthefaceofthesamethreat–hassomehowbeenexcludedfrommostcommonlyuseddefinitionsofresilience,lostperhapsintheattempttofindamore‘scientific’definition.
Themeaningofresilienceiseasilyunderstandableinindicatingageneraldirectionofwhatneedstobedone.Likemostusefulwords,itisnotascientificconceptdefinedbyaneatmathematicalequation.Attemptstoturnitintoonewillinevitablyleadtomisunderstandingandconfusion–buttheyareunnecessary.Weneedtobearinmindthevariousconceptsrelatedtoresilience(risk,coping,thresholds,vulnerability,etc.)andthendecideineachsituationwhichonesarecritical.
2 Whatdoes‘resilience’mean?
1 Copingreferstowhatpeopledointheshortterminabnormalcircumstances.Ifsuchbehaviourbecomespermanentthenpeoplewillhaveadapted–andwillpresumablyfindanewsetthingsthattheycandointhefaceofadversity.Thiswillbetheirnewcopingbehaviour.
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Althoughthewaysinwhichtheresilienceagendawillchangeaidpracticearestilldeveloping,anditisfartooearlytojudgewhatlong-lastingimpactitwillhave,fourareaswherechangesarebeingtalkedaboutandplannedareemerging.Theseareasofattentionare:theframeworksfordiscussingthetaskofresilience-building;reformoftheaidbureaucracytosupportresilience;programingspecificallyforresilience;andestablishingametricsofresiliencebywhichitcanbemeasuredandimpactcanbeassessed.
3.1Resilienceframeworks
Muchattentionhasbeendevotedbyaidorganisationstodevelopingframeworksforthinkingortalkingaboutresilience.Bypresumingthatthechallengeswhichneedaddressingundertheheadingofresilienceneedanewconceptualframework,thereisanimplicitsuggestionthatresilienceisanewanalyticalchallenge,presentinganewsetofissuestobeanalysed.Onthewholetheseframeworkshavenothelpedtointroduceclarity,andtheyhavesometimesconflatedcharacteristicswhicharenotonlydifferentbutmayevenbemutuallyexclusive;theyalsoriskmaskingsomeofthekeyquestionsforanalysisbecausetheyhavetriedtopindownahighlyamorphousconceptthatcanbeappliedinsomanywaystosomanykindsofentitiesinsomanysituationsinsomanyfields–withoutnecessarilymaintaininganyunchanging‘quintessential’coreofmeaning.Asaresult,frameworkshaveriskedmakingithardertohaveasensiblediscussionaboutpeople’sresilience(seeBox1).
Insomecases,frameworkshaveevenbeenmisleading:theyhaveriskedconfusionabouttherelationshipbetweenemergencyreliefandlonger-termdevelopment
supportthattheresilienceagendaissupposedtoimprove;2theyhaveimpliedunreasonablepossibilitiesasgoals(e.g.theideathatresilientpeoplebecomebetteroffthemoreshockstheysuffer(DFID,2011b));theycanundermineanalysisofinequalitywithinsocietyasadeterminantofvulnerabilitybyseeingresilientindividualsasthebuildingblocksandnecessaryconditionforhavingresilientcommunities(e.g.TANGO,2012)–infact,communitieseverywherecanderiveresiliencebytheirabilitytomaintainsomeoftheirmembersinextremevulnerability;or,asdiscussedabove,theycreateadescriptionofresiliencethatistooremovedfromrealitytoprovideaguidewhenworkinginrealsituations.
Thispaperdoesnot,therefore,discussframeworksfurther,savetomakethepointthatresilienceinanyparticulardomainisbestanalysedthroughframeworksthatexplaintheworkingsofthosedomains,e.g.livelihoodresilienceisanalysedusinglivelihoodsframeworks,nutritionalresiliencethroughnutritionalframeworksandtheresilienceofbankingsystemsthroughbankingandfinancemodels.
Overtimeempiricalstudieswillhopefullyprovidenewinsightsaboutwhathelpsmakesomepeoplemoreresilientindifferentcircumstances.Suchstudiesaretakingplace,justasempiricalstudiesonvulnerabilityhavebeenundertakenformanyyears.Progressinunderstandingisincremental,though,andsuddenconceptualbreakthroughsortheoreticalrevolutionshavenottakenplace.
3.2Resilienceandtheaidbureaucracy
Resiliencehashadthemosteffect,andthemostpositiveimpact,ininfluencingthinkingaboutthebureaucracyofinternationalaid.Manyaidactorsseeresilienceasofferinganotheropportunitytoaddressthedisconnectionbetweendevelopmentand
3 Whathas‘resilience’meant inpractice?
2 Mostresilienceframeworksmakenoreferencetohumanitarianaid(e.g.Oxfam,FAO,PracticalAction,TulaneUniversity,TANGO),althoughitisgenerallystatedthathumanitarianactionhasaroletoplayinbuildingresilience.
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emergencyaid.ThehighlyinfluentialHumanitarianEmergencyResponseReview(Ashdown,2011)turnedthehumanitarianchallengearoundandmadedevelopmentprogress(nationalandinternational
policies,aid,etc.)responsibleforensuringthatpeopleareabletocopewhenproblemsoccur.Forthistohappen,developmentthinkingmustbeinformedbyanunderstandingofhowpeoplefallintocrisis–whoisvulnerable,when,whereand,themostneglectedquestion,why.Developmentpractitionerswouldthushavetocollaboratewithcolleaguesresponsibleforemergencyresponseintwoways:theirunderstandingofwhatneedstobedonewouldhavetobeshapedbyananalysisofthecrisis;anddevelopmenteffortswouldhavetobetargetedatthesamepeoplewhoaremostofteninneedofemergencysupport.
Oncedevelopmentstrategiesareshapedbythinkingaboutcrises(orvulnerabilityandresiliencetocrises),itthenbecomesnecessaryforthisunderstandingtoworktheotherway:emergencyactorsneedtounderstandhowrelieffitsintoandisguidedbyalonger-termstrategy.(Suchademandforjointanalysisisalsomadebyothers,e.g.Frankenbergeretal.(2012).)Thiscannotofcoursehappenaslongasdevelopmentstrategiesaremissinginactionincrises-proneareas.Theargumentthatdevelopmentpolicyshouldbedeterminedbycrises,whichbecameamajorcatalystfortheresilienceagenda,overlapswiththecaseforrethinkingLinkingRelief,RecoveryandDevelopment(LRRD)–anLRRDagendathatisnotjustaboutemergencyrelieftryingtofindexitstrategiestolinktolong-termstructures,butisagenuinely‘two-wayLRRD’.(SeeSection4belowandMoselandLevine(2014)forafullerdiscussionofone-andtwo-wayLRRD.)
Smallstepscanrepresentamajorparadigmshift.TheECalsoseessuchlinksasacentralissueinimprovingaid.Itsresiliencepolicy(EC,2012a)andthefollow-upActionPlan(EC,2013)bothstresstheneedforacommonanalyticalapproachtoemergencyanddevelopmentsupportthatmakesresilienceacommonreferencepointforbothhumanitariananddevelopmentactors,andcallforjointplanningprocessestodevelopbothkindsofsupport.Suchjointplanninghastakenplaceinsomecountries.SeniorofficialsattheUSAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)ranexercisesincountryofficeswherestaffmappedtheirdevelopmentandemergencyspending.Thevisualdemonstrationofthealmosttotallackofgeographicaloverlapbetweenthetwospokeforitself,andwillhopefullyleadtochangenotjustinthegeographicaldistributionofaid,butalsoinhowaidprofessionalsthinkabouttheirwork.
3 Manyauthorshavedescribedorexplainedresilienceusinggraphsshowingsomeideaofwell-beingontheyaxisandtimeonthexaxis.Examplesrangefromthemostpictorialorsketched(e.g.DFID(2011b)),throughtheillustrative(e.g.MitchellandHarris(2012))tothemathematical(e.g.BarretandConstas(2013)andRenschleretal.(2010)).
4 SeeforexampleRenschleretal.(2010).
Althoughtheconceptofresilienceasawholeisreceivingagreatdealoftheoreticalattention,someoftheareaswheretheoreticalattentionismostneededarebeingskatedoverandevenmaskedbydefinitionsortheoriesthathidethequestionsfromscrutiny.Someoftheissueswhichneedanalysinginanygivensituationbutwhicharebeingobscuredbyframeworksinclude:
• Therelationshipbetweenriskandresilience(whenisrisktobeavoided,andwhataretheopportunitycostsofavoidingit?).
• Howfarispeople’sabilitytowithstandashockrelatedtotheirabilitytorecoverfromit?Isitrighttoequate(asmostresilience‘graphs’3andsomedefinitionsdo4)aquickerrecoverywithasmallerlossinthefaceofshocks?
• Ifnot,whenisitbettertoinvestinoneratherthantheother?Howdowebestjudgewhenitisbettertoinvestintheabilitytoresistshocks,ratherthaninanewstrategythatwouldavoidthoserisks?
• Whatistherelationshipbetweenhumanitarianactionandresilience-building?Although‘integratedresilienceprograms’arecalledfor(e.g.Frankenbergeretal.,2012),istheaftermathofadisastertherighttimetomakestructuralchanges?
• Resilienceisaqualityascribedtocommunities,systemsandhouseholds.Whatistherelationshipbetweenthese?Domoreresilientcommunitieshavefewervulnerablepeople?Whichshouldbetheobjectiveofinternationalaid?
Box1:Whatismissingintheresiliencetheories?
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Otherdonorsarealsothinkingaboutthesameproblemsandtryingdifferentapproaches.BMZ’suseofaspecialfundingstreamwithinTDA,whichseekstobridgethegapbetweendevelopmentcooperationandhumanitarianaid,hasbeendiscussed.Withafocusonresilienceasaguidingprinciple,itisspecificallythoughtofasamedium-termengagement(uptofouryears)insituationsofchronicorrepeatedemergency,withflexibleandadaptableimplementationmodalities.DFIDistestingdifferentapproaches,includingtheuseoflong-term(currentlyfour-year)humanitarianprogramminginprotractedcrises(supportedinYemen,theDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC),Ethiopia,Sudanand,shortly,Somalia)andanewfundingstreamwhichintegratesconcernsaboutchronicvulnerabilitytocriseswiththeadditionalvulnerabilitiesexpectedtobecreatedbyclimatechange.
Anothercommonthemerunningthroughresiliencediscussionsistheneedforgreaterflexibilityinprogrammingandaidmanagement.Thefirsttargethasbeenflexibilityinthescaleofinterventions,with‘flexing’becomingthenewtermforanincreaseinthescaleofaprojectinthefaceofanimminentcrisis.Moreattentionwillalsobenecessary(especiallyindifficultcountries)onflexibilityinthesenseofbeingallowedtoadaptinterventionsascircumstanceschange.Thisrequirementisapplicabletoaidgenerally,particularlyincountriesin‘transition’orotherwiseatriskofcrisis.Itistooearlytoexpectconcretechangesinthebureaucraticsystemsofaidwhichcansatisfythecompetingneedsforflexibilityandaccountability,butthefactthatthisissocentralonsomanyagendasisamajoropportunity.
Resiliencehasbeenspokenofinformallyasbeing‘acombinationofDRRandsustainabledevelopment’.DRRhadbecomeartificially–andproblematically–restrictedtonaturaldisastersandpurelytechnicalinperspective;resilienceoffersanopportunitytorevisittheconcernsofDRR,butwithalensthatincludesthepolitical,socialandeconomicaspectsofsustainablelivelihoodsthinking.Therearethose5whogofurtherandexplicitlyunderstandresiliencetoincludetheabilityoftheinternationalcommunitytorespondearlierandmoreeffectivelytocrises(ofwhateverkind),makingemergencypreparedness(andnotmerelyDRR)aningredientinresilience-building.
3.3ResilienceprogrammingAlthoughamaindriverforthinkingaboutresiliencewastheconvictionthatdevelopmentaidshouldtrytopreventpeoplefallingintocrisis(i.e.anobjectiveofaid strategies),‘resilience-building’isincreasinglybeingusedasaspecifictechnicalobjectiveofaidprojects.Somedonorshavecreatedfundsspecificallyintendedfor‘resilience-building’,evenifthissitsuneasilywiththeideathatsupportingresilienceentailsbreakingdownbarriersbetweenfunds,communitiesofpracticeandbureaucracies.Althoughformanytheresilienceagendaisexplicitlyaboutinter-disciplinarity,mostresilienceinitiativesandprogrammeshavefocusedonlivelihoods.‘Resilienceprogramming’isnotwidelyusedtorefertoeffortstoensurethatbasicservicesareresilienttocrises.DFIDhaslaunchedamajorfundforclimatechange‘resilience’,whichexplicitlyencouragesDRRapproachesaimedprimarilyatresilience.
Resiliencebudgetsarestillintheirinfancy,buttheyarelikelytospread.TheEuropeanUnion(EU)isincreasinglyadoptingthelanguageofresilienceinitsprogramming,butthisislargelyarephrasingoffoodsecurityobjectivesratherthana‘new’setofobjectives.6DFID’sConflict,HumanitarianandSecurityDepartment(CHASE)haslaunchedseparatetendersforfour-yearprogrammesinSomaliaforlivelihoodsprojectsandresilience-building,thoughitisnotclearthatthedistinctionwillinfactbemaintained.USAIDlaunchedarequestforproposalsfora‘Sahelresiliencelearning’programmeinJune2013withthegoalofpromoting‘theadoptionofprovenresilience-enhancingtechnologiesandinnovations’(USAID,2013).Thisdocumentendorsedmethodologiesformeasuringresilience,whichsuggeststhatthedirectionofresilienceprogrammingwillincreasinglybebasedonobjectivesandassessmentcriteriaderivedfromtheoreticalresilienceconstructs.
Theaidsectorasawholehasnotyetarrivedatanyconsensusonhowbesttobuildorstrengthenresilience,andindeedmostagencieswouldhesitatetoclaimthattheyhavetheanswer.Anumberoftendencies,togetherwiththeirimplicitassumptions,canhoweverbeidentified.Someorganisationscontinuewiththesameprogrammingthattheyhavebeenusingforyears,relabelledas‘resilienceactivities’.Thisprobablydeserveslesscriticismthanitreceives,
5 SeeforexampleHarris(2013),Manyena(2006),UNISDRandWMO(2012).
6 TheEUCommunicationonResilienceiscalledThe EU Approach to Resilience: Learning from Food Security Crises.
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ifitisbelievedthattheresilienceagendadoesnotintroduceanewobjectiveoranewanalyticalconcept,butusesanewlanguagetocallforarefocusingofaid(i.e.politically,nottechnically).Thedangercomeswhenactivitieswhichcouldconceivablysupportresilienceinparticularsituationsarethenbelievedtobeinherently‘resilienceenhancing’wherevertheyoccur.Sincethelistofactivitieswhichcouldimprovepeople’sassets,production,humancapitalandmarketaccessisalmostlimitless,almostanythingcanbecalledresilience-building.(Onedonordrewupalistof73distinctprojecttypes,rangingfromfunctionalliteracythroughiodisingsalttosupportingmicro-savingsgroupsin‘anattempttocategorizeandorganizelogicallyallofthedifferenttypesofactivitiesthatcanbeimaginedtobuildresiliencetochronicdroughtandconflictintheSahel’.)Interventionsarethenjustifiedbytheircategorisationasresilience-buildingratherthanbyreferencetoaparticularproblemorsituationalanalysis.
Aslightlydifferenttendencyhasbeentocallverybroadlyformajorresilienceinitiatives,butwithoutcommittingtoanyspecificapproach,forinstancetheEU’sSupportingtheHornofAfrica’sResilience(SHARE)initiativeandtheGlobalAllianceforResilience(AGIR).Thereasonforthisisabeliefthatthechallengeofresilienceisnotinherentlyanewonefordevelopmentaid,anddoesnotneedanyparticularlynewsolutions–justgreaterresolvetodowhatwealreadyknowhowtodo.Althoughwewouldarguethatitiscorrectthatthechallengeisnotatallnew,itdoesnotfollowthatwethereforeknowhowtomeetit.Theresiliencedebateisitselfrootedintheconvictionthataidhasforyearsbeenfailingtopreventpeoplefromfallingintocrisis,andnotmerelybecauseinadequateresourceshavebeendevotedtothetask.Thevaguenessindescribingwhatistobeaccomplishedandhowisthereforeworryinginthatitmayreinforce,oratleastpermit,analysisandprogrammingbyassumption–thekindoflist-makingdescribedaboveasabasisforinterventions.Thislegitimisesdesigningandfundinginterventionswhicharenotclearlybasedonin-depthanalysisofpeople’sspecificsituation.
Thebeliefthatweknowwhatworksisstrong,althoughdifferentpeopleororganisationsputtheirfaithindifferentapproaches.Somerelyontechnicalsolutionssuchasdrought-tolerantseedsandsmall-scaleirrigation(e.g.USAID).Otherslooktolessproveninterventionsbeingadvancedindependentlyofanyresilienceobjectives.Forexample,boththe
EU(EC,2013)andUSAID(USAIDandRockefellerFoundation,draft,July2013)havelaunchedactionplansonresiliencewhichhaveinsuranceasakeycomponent.Itisstriking,though,thatneitherdocumentexplainshowandwhereinsurancemightwork,orevenwhichkindsofinsuranceshouldbeusedandforwhom.
TheWorldBankand,withWorldBankloans,severalgovernmentsinAfricaareincreasinglylookingtopublicworksprogrammes(PWP)asavehicleforcreatingeconomicassetsandprovidingshort-termemploymentforlargenumbersofpeople.TheWorldFoodProgramme(WFP)isinvestingsimilarlyinPWP,thoughmoreoftenthroughemploymentpaidin-kindwithfood.Althoughthiswasnotoriginallyanagendaemanatingfromresilience,itisnowbeinglinkedtoit(WFP’sfoodforassetssupporttothesemi-aridpartsofUgandaisnowbeingdescribedas‘resilienceoriented’).Thisisparalleledbyincreasingattentiontosocialprotection,forinstancebyDFIDandincreasinglybytheEU,andthelanguageof‘graduation’fromsafetynetsorsocialprotectionisperhapsbeingseenasasynonymforachievingresilience.
Thelinkbetweensocialprotectionandresilienceisintuitive,butnotentirelysimple.Socialprotectionissometimesseenasacomponentofresilienceandsometimesasavehicle for buildingresilience.Thedistinctionisimportant.Theformerviewacceptsthatpeopletargetedbysocialprotectionmayneverbeabletoachieveindependentresilience.However,iftheycanrelyonsupportintimesoftroubletheycanenjoy‘dependentresilience’,butonlyifsocialprotectionisrights-basedandreliable(andgenuinelyfreespeoplefromdependencyorexploitation).Themorecommonthinkingbehind‘socialprotection-typeapproaches’seessupportasenablingtargetedrecipientstobuildpersonalorcommunityassetstothepointwheretheyachieve‘independentresilience’.Arecentunpublishedreviewfoundthattheseprogrammesoftenhadunrealisticexpectations,offeringrelativelysmalltransfersovertooshortatermtoachievetransformativechange.
Anothercommonapproachtoresilience-buildingistostressthewayinwhichinterventionsorpoliciesaredevelopedandimplemented,ratherthantheirtechnicalcontent.Manyagenciesbelievethatmulti-sectoralapproachesareessentialforsupportingresilience,onthegroundsthatthechallengeswhichpeoplefacetendtoaffecttheminlotsofways,andhencethereisaneedtoaddressthechallenges
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holistically.However,whateverthemeritsorotherwiseofmulti-disciplinaryorholisticapproaches,thereisnoclearreasonwhytheyhavebeenspecificallylinkedtoresilience.Itmaywellbethatimportantcontributionscanbemadeinhelpingpeoplebecomemoreresilientbyaddressingonesinglechallengethattheyfaceratherthantryingtorespondstoalloftheirchallengesatthesametime.Thisoughttobetreatedasanempiricalquestionratherthanadefiningcharacteristicofresilienceapproaches.
Thesameappliestocommunityparticipation,whichisoftentakentobeessentialforflexibilityandresilience-building(see,forexample,theapproachofwww.reachingresilience.org;IFAD(2013);andtheWorldBank’sCommunity-DrivenDevelopment(CDD)approaches).Participationhaslongbeenadvocatedwithinsustainabledevelopmentcircles,butthelinkswithresiliencearenotclear(evenifparticipationandflexibilityarebothvalidprinciplesforaidagencies).Participatoryapproachesmayinfactleadexternalactorstofocusundulyonthecommunitiesorhouseholdswhoseresilienceistobesupported–possiblyunderplayingtheimportanceofaddressingstructuralcausesofvulnerability,whichmayliefaraway.
Amoreencouragingtendencyisagrowingrecognitionthatthereisuncertaintyastohowbesttosupportresilience,andabeliefthatinnovation,differentkindsofprogrammingandlearningareneeded.Thismayslowlybereplacingthemorewidespreadassumptionbehindmajorinitiativesthatweknowhowtosolvetheresilienceproblem.Thereisaneedtounderstandfarmoreabouttheimpactofinterventions(disaggregated,quantified,contextuallyunderstoodandassessedyearsafteraninterventionceases),anditistobehopedthatattemptstolearnwillbebroad-basedandnotstraitjacketedbyresilienceframeworksornewtheoreticalresilienceindicators.
Ingeneral,so-called‘resilienceprogramming’isstilltoonewtoassesswhetherornotaclearbodyofworkwillemerge,andmostcurrentinitiativesarebasedonoldapproachestofoodsecurity,earlyresponseandDRR.However,thoughafreshtakeonoldproblemscanbeusefulinbringingnewenergytothechallenge,thereisadangerthatthismakesitlesslikelythatthinkingandprogrammingwillbegroundedinahistoricalperspectiveandlessonslearnedfrompreviousexperience.Themostimportantshiftinattentionasaresultofthefocusonresilienceisneitherinthecontentormodalityofprogrammingitself,
butratherinhowprogrammingisdesigned.Severalactors,includingtheECandsomedonors,havecalledformuchgreaterproblemandsituationalanalysistounderpininterventionsandpolicy.Inpart,thisisacallfordevelopmentandemergencyagencies,departments,ministriesandofficestoworktogetheronanalysis,butbyimplicationthisisextendedtoincludetheneedforanalysisfromseveralperspectives:political,economic,political-economy,conflict7(asappropriate).Itishardtoexaggeratetheimportanceofashiftinemphasisawayfrominterventionsbasedonneedsassessmenttowardsonesderivedfromin-depthproblemanalysis.Thisisprobablythesine qua nonofgenuineprogressinsupportingresilience.
3.4Learningandresilience‘metrics’
Twoparallelprocessesmayhaveasignificantimpactonhowresilienceisunderstood,programmedandfinanced.Thereisabroadmovementwithintheaidsectortotiefundsincreasinglyto‘results’aspartofvalueformoney.Thisdepends,ofcourse,onagreedwaysofdefiningandmeasuringresults.Therehasbeengrowingattentionondevelopingmethodologiesformeasuringresilience,andselectingparameterswhichcanserveasindicatorsorcomponentsofresilience.TheFoodandAgricultureOrganisation(FAO)hasledworkonquantifyingresilience;DFIDandUSAIDhavebothchampionedthevalueformoneyjustificationforresilience,andDFIDhassupportedworkaimedatquantifyingthis.VariousNGOsarealsoadvancingmethodsforquantifyingresilienceortheimpactoftheirresilience-buildingwork(e.g.MercyCorps,Oxfam).Althoughitistooearlytosaywhatimpactquantificationwillhaveinsettingtheagendaonresilience-building,itislikelytobesignificant.Whetherornottheinfluenceispositivewilldependverymuchonwhatapproachesbecomesindustrystandards.
Afulldiscussionoftheconceptualandmethodologicalproblemswiththecreationofaresiliencemetricisbeyondthescopeofthispaper,andiscoveredinLevine(2014).Theneedformuchbetterunderstandingandassessmentoftheimpactof
7 BasedontheBMZstrategyDevelopment for Peace and Security(BMZ,2013a),alldevelopmentinterventionsinfragilestatesrequireacontextanalysisthatdealswithconflict,violenceandfragility.
�0 Supportingresilienceindifficultplaces
interventionsandpoliciesisnotinquestion.However,thiscannotbeachievedbyconstructingsomeabstractentitycalled‘resilience’,creatingalistofitsvariousprerequisitesorcharacteristicsandthencountinghowmucheachofthesechangesovertime.Thisattempttocreateauniversal,genericwayofquantifyingresilienceremovessomuchofwhatisimportantaboutwhatneedstobeassessed–whattheparticularconstraints(andopportunities)areforspecificpeopleinanysituation,andhowfarthisischanging.(SeealsoUSAID/DFID(2012)ontheneedforcontext-specificmonitoring.)Twoexamplesillustratewhythisiscountertocommonsense.
First,theassumptionthatanyprogressoncharacteristicsofresilienceistobecountedequallyassumesthattherearenothresholdsbelowwhichprogressisnotuseful.Infact,buildinghalfadamdoesnotprovide50%ofresilienceagainstaflood:itprovidesnoprotectionatalluntilthedamiscompleteandhighenough.Progressonresiliencemustbeanalysed,notsimplymeasured,againstwhatisseentobeenoughforpeopletobeabletocope.
Second,genericmeasureswouldallowaresiliencescoretoincreasewhicheverofthegenericcomponentsofresiliencewerealtered,regardlessofwhetherornottheywererelevanttotheparticularthreatthatpeoplefaced.Forexample,theresiliencescoreofpeoplelivingnearariverwiththethreatoffloodingcouldbeimprovedequallybygivingthemlivestock,byprovidingthemwithahealthcentre,bygivingthemanextrayear’sschoolingorbyimprovingfloodcontrolmeasures.Itseemsobviousthatwhichonecontributestotheirresilienceshouldbederivedfromananalysisoftherisksthattheyfacedandtheirdifferentoptionsforfacingthem.Thisisnottoassumethattherecanonlybeonestrategyinthefaceofrisk(intheexampleabove,investingineducationtogetajobintownorinvestinginlandthatcanbeirrigatedforcommercialhorticulturemaybemoreusefulthanflooddefences).Diversityofsolutionsdoesnotcontradictthe
argumentthatindicatorsofprogressinresiliencecanonlybedeterminedforaspecificpopulationgroupinaparticularcontext,andthattheywilldependonthechoseninterventionanditsaccompanyingprogrammetheory(seeSection4.3).
Ithasbeenarguedthatanapproachtomonitoringandquantifyingimpactwhichlooksonlyatcomparingchangesinsituationinthesamecontextovertimeabandonstheattempttoquantifyresilienceinwayswhichallowcomparisonstobemadefromoneplacetoanother.Thereplymustbetoquestionwherethisdemandforcross-situationalquantitativecomparisoncomesfrom,or,moreprecisely,whythisdemandisbeingmadeof‘resilience-building’whenithasnotbeenmadeinmostothersectorsbefore.Verylittlegoodassessmentoftheimpactoflivelihoodinterventionsiscarriedoutandimpactmonitoringisstillinitsinfancyinthissector,eventhoughtheconceptsareclear,thetoolsarewellunderstoodandtheindicatorsare(relatively)straightforward.Evenifthedemandforcross-situationalmeasurementsofresiliencemadesense,itwouldbestrangetoplaceademandon‘resiliencebuilding’thathasneverbeenplacedonothersectors.Forthoseactuallyworkinginthefield,themostimportanttaskistorefinewaysofanalysingsituationsofrisksothatcontext-specificindicatorscanbeidentifiedandmonitored–indicatorswhichareactuallyusefultothosedesigningandimplementingpoliciesandinterventions.
Therelativelylimitedcontributionsofarof‘resiliencethinking’inhelpingtoimproveaiddoesnotmakethetasklessrelevantorlessimportant.Thefocus,though,shouldremainonwhattheconstraintsare–whethertheconstraintsfacingvulnerablepeople(orinstitutionsandsystems),ortheconstraintsfacingtheaidsystemsintendedtohelpthem.Itisnotbychancethatthegreatestprogresshasbeenmadeintryingtoreformtheaidsystem:theresilienceagendahelpsgatherpoliticalwilltoaddressinganareawheretheproblemsandneedswerealreadywellidentified.
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Thecoreconcernbehindthecallforresilience,ithasbeenargued,istheneedtotargetdevelopmentsupportatthosewhoaremostatriskoffallingintocrisis.Fivebroadandinter-relatedareaswhereprogressisneededcanbeidentified,allofwhicharegenerallyvalid,butwhichhaveparticularresonancefordifficultplaces.
4.1Refocusinginternationalaidtoprioritisehelpingtopreventpeoplefallingintocrisis
Thisistheprimarychallengeforsupportingresilience:mobilisingthefullweightofpoliticalandeconomicresourcesthatdevelopmentactorscanofferintheinterestsofpeoplemostvulnerabletocrisis.Theprimaryimportanceofthisprinciplefordifficultplacesispreciselytoargueformorelong-term‘development-style’aidforthesecontexts.Twoparticularchallengesaredetailedhere,onthecontentandthepoliticsofresilience.
Thetaskofsupportingtheresilienceofspecificvulnerablegroupsindifficultcircumstancessuchasconflictsisdiscussedbelow.Thereisalsothelarge-scaletaskofaddressingthechronicpovertyandexposuretoriskoflargepopulationsinareasoftheworldsuchastheSahelandtheHornofAfrica.Aprojectapproachcannotbesufficientforsuchamacro-scaleendeavour.Solutionsareneededthatcanworkatscale.Partialmeasuresmayormaynotbestepsonthepathtowardsresilience:someconceptionoftheoveralltaskisneededinordertoguideindividualcomponentsofthatendeavour.Thishassofarbeenabsentfromthelargerinternationalinitiatives(e.g.SHARE,AGIR),whichhavenotprovidedarealroadmapordestinationforresilience-buildingefforts.However,onlywhenthisisdonecanaidprogrammesbeassessednotbywhattheydoandhowmuchtheyspend(outputs),butbyreferencetotheirplacewithinabiggerpicture,makingclearhow,andhowmuch,theycontributetoanoverallstrategy.
Thechallengethenwillinvolvedevelopmentagenciesacquiringdifferentsetsofskillsandexpertise:
understandingprocessesofvulnerabilityatmicro-level,aswellashowmacro-economicconditionscreateenablingenvironmentsfromwhichsomecanbenefit;andunderstandinghowpoliciesandinterventionsplayoutinpractice,oftenincontrasttotheirstatedtrajectoriesortoeconomictheory.Inmostcountrieswherethereisextremevulnerability,someofthecauseslieingovernanceandalackofpoliticalwillorinterestinmarginalisedgroups–orevenanactivedesiretomaintaintheirmarginalisation.Manycountriesreceivingaidfavourinvestmentinhigh-potentialareas.Thecurrentdevelopmentconsensus,aroundagreementssuchasParisandBusan,isthatdevelopmentagendasshouldbesetbynationalgovernments.Therehashoweverbeenlittlediscussionofpossibletensionsbetweensupportingtheresilienceofthemostvulnerablecitizensandsupportingthenationalpoliciesoftheirgovernmentsthatmaybepartlyresponsibleforunderminingpeople’sresilienceinthefirstplace.
4.2Linkingemergencyanddevelopmentpolicyandinterventions
Thereisnoobviousconsensusastowhetherdevelopmentsupportandemergencyreliefshouldbethoughtofasoneormanagedseparately.Thereisequallynoconsensusovertheextenttowhichdifferenttoolsandstructuresshouldbeusedforthetwosituations.Oneofthemainjustificationsformaintainingsomedistinctionisthatemergencyorhumanitarianreliefissupposedtobegivensolelyonthebasisofneedandinapoliticallyneutralway:fewwouldarguethatdevelopmentsupportcanbesoapolitical,orthatcomparativeneedistheonlybasisfortargetingit.Whateveristhoughtaboutthedifferencesbetweenhumanitariananddevelopmentaction,though,thereislittleargumentthatmuchmorecollaboration,interactionandsynergyisneededbetweendevelopmentandemergencysupport,orthatincountriesfacingfrequentorcontinuousemergenciesajointanalysisbydevelopmentand
4 Whatneedstobedone?
�� Supportingresilienceindifficultplaces
humanitarianagenciesandspecialistsisnecessarytoensurethatdevelopmentaidandpolicyisbasedonanunderstandingofhowsomepeoplefallintocrisis,andthatcrisisresponsewillbeplannedwithabiggerandlonger-termpictureinmind.Indifficultplaces,thisessentiallymeansthatallassistance,howeveritisfundedandadministered,shouldbebroughtunderasingleanalyticalandstrategicumbrellacoveringbothlonger-termandshort-termperspectives.
The‘LRRDproblem’hasbeenidentifiedanddiagnosed,andourdiscussionoftheproblemandhowtoaddressitiscontainedinacompanionpaper.8ProgressonmakingLRRDarealityhasbeenlimited.MoselandLevine(2014)lookattheneedforwhatcouldbecalled‘two-wayLRRD’,wherereliefanddevelopmentaremutuallylinkedorintegrated,ratherthanthinkingonlyoflinkinginoneway,emergencyreliefhandingovertodevelopment.Reliefanddevelopment,andanyotheraidcategoriessuchasTDAorrecovery,mayexistatthesametimeinthesameplace,usingdifferentmodalitiestoaddressdifferentproblemsortakeadvantageofdifferentopportunities–buttheyshouldbeconceivedholisticallyaspartofacompletestrategy.
Thedifficultiestoachievingthisareprincipallybureaucratic.Developmentspendingrarelyhasasitsprimaryobjectivethecreationofconditionsthatpreventcrises(seeabove).Thisisbothamoralproblemabouttheuseofaidresources,andalsoapracticalonebecause,intheabsenceoflonger-terminitiatives,itisimpossibletofindsensibleexitstrategiesforshort-termreliefefforts.Agenciesinvolvedinemergencyreliefthusfindthemselvesforcedtouseofteninappropriatetoolsandshort-termfundingtorespondtochronicneedsbecausetheycannotfindanacceptablewayofwalkingaway.Chronicproblemshavetobediagnosedinemergencyterms(i.e.focusingonsymptomsandneeds)–butreliefcannotbringchronicneedsbelowacceptablethresholds.SuchasituationwasclearlyseeninHaiti,wherethreeyearsaftertheearthquakechronicpovertyandgrosslyinadequatehousingconditionscontinuedtobepresentedasaproblemof‘displaced’peopleinordertojustifyanemergencyresponse(UNOCHA,2013).
4.3Incorporatingafuture-lookingperspectiveintopoliciesandprogrammes
Resilience,asalatentcapacitywaitingtoberealised,seemsintrinsicallytoincludeinitselfthefuture,andpeople’sfutureresponsestochangingcircumstancesandevents.Changecomesfromfactorssuchasglobalisation,urbanisationanddemographicandtechnologicalchanges,allofwhichwillalmostcertainlyaffectmostpeople’slivesinthecomingdecades,aswellasclimatechange–andagrowingrecognitionoftheimportanceofclimatechangeamongdevelopmentactorshasbeenakeydriverinpromotingtheimportanceofforward-lookingperspectivesinpoliciesandprogrammes.Thewaysinwhichtheseforceswillshapepeople’sliveswilldependultimatelyonpolitics,institutionsandtheplayingoutofrelationshipsofpower(seeListerandPain(2004)forexamplesfromAfghanistanofchangesinmarketconditionsdrivenbypowerandpoliticsratherthanbyeconomicortechnicalchange).Rapidprogressinimprovingtheabilityofaidtobeforward-lookingispossibleontwolevels:intheanalysisbehindtheformulationofdevelopmentstrategies;andintheirimplementation,byensuringthatdevelopmentpolicyandinterventionssupportpeople’sownabilitytodealwithunknownfutures(or,tousethecurrentjargon,their‘adaptivecapacity’).
Adaptivecapacitymeanspeople’sabilitytomakeandrealisewell-informeddecisionsinthefuture.Adaptivecapacityisimportantinalldevelopmentsituations,butitisespeciallycriticalindifficultplaces,whicharetypicallyrapidlychangingsituations,wheretheabilitytocopewithchangeiskey–andwherepeoplemaynotbeabletorelyonothers(e.g.theirstate,elites)withoutexploitation.Supportingadaptivecapacityisslowerandmoredifficultthantransplantingnewtechnologiesorprovidingassets,anditneedsverydifferentskillsfromtheonestechniciansgenerallypossess.Itwillthushavesignificantimplicationsforstaffingandresources.Forexample,farmoretime(i.e.farmoreresources)isneededtoundertakemeaningfulparticipatoryprocesses,whichhavetobeconductedbystaffwithskillsinsocialanalysisandfacilitation,ratherthanstaffwhoseinstinct(andtraining)is
8 Thepaper(MoselandLevine,2014)wasalsocommissionedbyBMZ.
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toimmediatelyoffertechnical,expertadvice.Atahigherlevel,supportingadaptivecapacityandmakingthesocialandinstitutionalrealitythekeyfocusofattentionmeansdevolvinggreaterdecision-makingauthoritytostaffwhoareexpertsinthecontext,whereasthispower(andthecorrespondingremuneration)isinmostcasesconcentratedinthehandsofstaffwithageneralistexpertise,andexperiencefrommanycontextsisvaluedabovedetailedexperienceofone.(SeeLudietal.(2012)forafullerdiscussionoftheimplicationsoftakingadaptivecapacityseriouslyfordevelopmentprogramming,fundingandstaffing.)
4.4Improvingtheimpactofpoliciesandprogrammingonthelivesofvulnerablepeople
Animprovementinthequalityofaiddependsinpartonanimprovementinthequalityofprogrammes.Itisfrequentlypossibletoseesimplyfromananalysisofaprojectdesignthatthestatedobjectivesdonotmatchproposedactivities.Thisismostoftenbecausethenecessarylinkbetweenthetwo,andtheanalysisoftheproblemandoftheproposedintervention,ismissingorsuperficial.Untilprogrammingisobligedtobe
Twoexamplesmayoffersomecluesastowhat‘good’resilienceprogramminglookslikeindifficultplaces.
Inpost-earthquakeHaiti,oneNGO,Architectesd’Urgence,wasworkingoncommunityneighbourhoodplanninginsuburbswhichhadnoofficialexistence.AswithmuchofPort-au-Prince,noplanningpermissionhadbeengrantedforanydevelopmentandtheformallegalstatusofthelandwasprobablyimpossibletountangle.Localresidentsexplainedhowtheirunofficial(or,inthelocalauthority’sterms,illegal)statuswasamaincauseofvulnerability,underminingtheirsecurityoftenureandconstrainingaccesstoservices.TheNGO’sresponsewassimple:aspartoftheneighbourhoodplan,housingnumberswereallocated.Residentshadsmallmetalplatesmadewiththeirnumber,whichquicklybecameasemi-officialaddress.Althoughthelegalstatusoftheirneighbourhoodhadnotchanged,residentsfeltatransformationintheirabilitytonegotiatewithlocalauthoritiesanddefendtheirrightsovertheirproperty.Thehousenumberallocationwasasmallpartofaprojectandbroughtnochangeinpeople’sassetorskillsoranydirecteconomicbenefit.Itdidnotsolvealltheirproblems–butitradicallyreducedwhattheyfeltwasoneoftheirmainsourcesofvulnerability.
IntheNubaMountainsofSudan,recurrentconflicthasbeenaconstantinpeople’slives.Theylivewiththeconstantthreatofhavingtoflee–quickly,forextendedperiodsandwithfewifanyexternalsourcesofsupport.Whenpeoplehavetoflee
highupinthemountainsfindingfoodishard,andlivestock(goats)hadtobeleftbehindbecausetheycouldnotwithstandthecoldconditionsathigheraltitudes.Asimpleinterventionintroducedadifferentbreedofgoatspecificallychosenforitsabilitytosurvivethecold,allowingpeopletotakewiththemsomemeansofsurvivalwhentheyfled.Acultureofmutualassistancemeantthatthenewgoatbreedscouldbeeasilymultipliedandshared.
Dothetwoprojectshaveanythingincommon?Neitherwasdesignedasaresilience-buildinginitiative.Neitherattemptedtosolvealloftheproblemspeoplefaced.Neitherwasmeanttobereplicable.InNuba,theactualassettransferwassmall,anditcertainlydidnotmakepeopleanyricher;inHaiti,peoplereceivednothingatall.Inboth,theinterventionswerebasedonaverygoodunderstandingoflocalsocialdynamicsandtheirimportance.Neitherinterventionbotheredwiththeusual‘shoppinglists’thatpeoplepresenttoNGOs:instead,people’srealsituationwaswellunderstood.Perhapsasaresult,neitheroftheprojectsfittedclearlyintoadiscrete‘sector’(werethegoatsinNubaalivelihoodoraprotectionproject?).
Perhapsthesecretofgoodresilienceprogrammingisdoingsomethingsmart,basedongoodanalysisofpeople’sproblemsandopportunitiesandgoodunderstandingofthelocalsocialandpoliticalsystem,anddesignedtogivethehelptoletpeopledothethingsthattheywouldliketodoforthemselves.
Box2:‘Whatdoesagoodresilienceprogrammelooklike?’
�� Supportingresilienceindifficultplaces
underpinnedbyananalysisofasatisfactorylevel,muchaideffortwillcontinuetohaveminimalimpactonthelivesofthosewhomostneedit.Suchanalysismustbeassophisticatedinlookingattheproposedsolutionasattheproblemstobeaddressed.Muchprogrammingisbasedonanaïvebeliefabouthowaprojectwillplayoutinstitutionally,failingtotakeintoconsiderationthewayinwhichresourcesandpowerarecontested–andthatthepeoplewhoseresilienceneedsbuildingarepreciselythosewiththeleastabilitytocontest.Thisrequirementistrueinallsituations,butismostcrucial–andhardesttodowell–indifficultplaces.
4.5Findingnewparadigmsforlonger-termsupportinprotractedandrecurrentcrises
Genericprogrammingisnotappropriateforacategoryofcountries(i.e.thedifficultones)withnothingincommonexceptpreciselythefactthattheyshareunpredictabilityandlong-termcrises.Indeed,BMZ’sTDAfundforsuchcountrieshasbeenpredicatedontheneedforflexibilitybecausestandardmodelsfordeliveringaidareunlikelytobeappropriate.Thatsaid,certainbroadprinciplescanbeofferedonhowtoworkinthesecountries.
Achoiceisoftenpresentedbetweenworkingthroughthestateorignoringthestateandengaginginsteadindirectservicedelivery.Thedichotomyisfalseintwodirections:manypossiblerelationsarepossiblewithstatesandgovernments;andtherearemanyotheractorsbesidesthestateandtheaidagencywhichcanbeinvolvedinaidinterventions.Engagingwiththestateisalwaysimportant,butthestateisnevertheonlyviableornecessaryinterlocutor,especiallywhereitispartytoaconflict.Insuchcases,adialoguemuststillbeheld,andrelationssought,withdifferentpartsofcentralandlocalgovernment(whicharerarelymonolithic)evenwhenthisisnotconsideredthebestwayofdeliveringassistanceeffectivelyormostfairly.Insuchsituations,manyotherinstitutionsandentitiesmaybeimportantpartners,alliesortargets.
Vulnerabilityanalysisshouldrevealwhereconstraintstopeople’sindependenceandabilitytocopecomefrom–andwhereopportunitiesforexpandingtheiragencylie.Thismayrelatetothemarket,other
membersofthecommunity,sourcesofinformation,institutionsofjustice(formalorinformal)orfinancialservices.Aidagenciesdonotneedtotakeresponsibilityfortacklingconstraintsdirectly:societyisalwaysaconstantfluxofprocessesandstrugglesbetweeninstitutionsandbetweenpeople,anditisnecessarytoidentifywhichofthesecanbestbesupportedandhow,inordertoachievetheobjectivesoftheintervention.
Problemsinmostofthecountriesunderdiscussionwillnotbesolvedeveninthenextdecadeormore,soamuchmorelong-termviewisnecessary.Thismayincludebothalong-termstrategy(of20years
Therearenoeasygeneralisationsaboutthecollectionofcountriesvariouslycalled‘fragile’,‘conflict-affected’orin‘protractedandrecurrentcrises’.However,whereconflictatsomelevelhasbeenpersistent,itisoftentobeexpectedthat,eveninpost-conflictrecovery,someorallofthefollowingconditionsmaybefound.
• Thestateisweakand/orofcontestedlegitimacy.
• Governanceispoor–corruptionisrife,politicsservetheinterestsofthoseinpower.
• Institutionsareweak.• Manypeopleareverypoor.• Theeconomyoffersfewopportunitiesfor
mostpeople(buthighrewardsforafew).• Theeconomyislargelyinformal–perhaps
evenwithastrongillegaleconomy.• Lawandorderisinsufficientorisoften
arbitrary.• Peoplefeelinsecure,andsohaveshort-term
horizons.• Itisdangeroustobethere.• Peopleareoftendisplaced,localsocial
normsandorderhavebeendisrupted.Theseare,ofcourse,theconditionswherewecanleastexpectprojectstofollowpredictedtrajectories,resourcestobedistributedandusedinaccordwiththewishesoftheproject–andwhereitishardesttoknowwhatisgoingonortobeabletodoanythingaboutit.
Box3:Whatdoweknowaboutdifficultplaces?
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ormore9)forlong-termchangeandalonger-termcommitmenttosupportforimmediateorshort-termproblems.Itiscurrentlydifficultfordonorstoplanbeyondafour-yearhorizon.
Theneedforflexibilityindifficultplaceshasbeenstressedfrequently(seeaboveandMoselandLevine(2014)).Operationalagenciesargueformorebureaucraticflexibilityfromdonorssothatprogrammescanadapttounpredictableneeds.However,thechallengeisnotonlybureaucratic.Decision-makersneedtoknowhowcontextsarechangingandwhatadaptationsinpolicyorinterventionsareneededasaresult.Thechallengeistohavetherightmanagementskills,investmentinawarenessandeffectiverelationshipsbetweenthedifferentactorsinaproject(donor,operationalagency,government,localinstitutions,localpopulation).Adonorshouldideallynotmerelyallowflexibilitybutdemandit–activitieswhichhavebecomeinappropriateshouldobviouslynotcontinuetobefunded.
Flexibilityiscurrentlyconstrainedbytheverylogicofprogramingandevaluation.Thecommoncurrentpracticeisforsuccessandimpacttobejudgedbyreferencetotheproject’s objectives.Ifthebeneficiarypopulationhasotherpreferencesandusesthelearningorinputsofferedbyaninterventioninordertomeettheirownpriorities,thisresultsinanineffectiveprojectaccordingtothemostcommondefinitions10of‘effectiveness’.Thisisparticularlyinappropriatefordifficultplaces,wherepeople’sprioritiesandopportunitiesareevenmorediverseandchangingthannormal.
Theneedforbetteranalysishasalreadybeenstressed.Apartfromanytechnicalandeconomicappraisals,asanabsoluteminimumalldevelopmentinterventionsshouldbebasedonadocumentedanalysisthatexplains:
• whypeoplesufferastheydo;• whattheirworldmaylooklikeinseveralyears’
time;• whattheyaretryingtodotoovercomethe
constraintstheyface;
• howtheirscopeformakingchoicescanbeincreased;
• whatispreventingthis;• whatinfluencesorsourcesofpowercanbe
harnessedtosupporttheagency;• whatdifferentinterventionsandpolicychanges
havebeentriedinthepast;• whatimpactthesehavehadondifferentpeople
andwhy;• whatpossiblemeasurescouldbetaken;and• howthesearelikelytoplayoutinpractice.
Itisraretofindanydocumentationofsuchananalysis.
Indifficultplaces,conflictandpolitical-economyanalysiswillbeespeciallyimportant,withaneedforassophisticatedananalysisoftheproposedsolution(e.g.politicalrealities,institutionalcapacityandthepowerbalancearelikelytoaffectimpact,includinghowaidmaybedivertedorco-opted)asfortheproblem.Thegeneralstandardofanalysiscannotbeimprovedbytrainingalone.Itisnecessaryalsotocreateademandforanalyticalcapacity,whichwillhappenonlywhengood-qualityanalysisisessential.Atthemoment,Mowjee(2013)’sobservationonemergencyrelief,that‘currentlytherearenoincentivesinthehumanitariansystemtoprovidethemostappropriateresponse’,isequallytruefordevelopmentinterventions.
Theprocessleadingtosuchanalysisalsorequiresfurtherscrutiny.Toooftenthechoiceofinterventionisbasedonsuperficialparticipation(seeLevineetal.(2011),particularlypp.32–33),with‘community’meetingsleadingtothecollectionofashoppinglistofrequests.Adifferentkindofengagementisneeded,onewhichinvolvesbuildingunderstandingandtrustoverlongertimespans,andinvolvesdifferentskillstofindoutwhatpeoplehavetosay.Thisrequiresgreaterinvestmentindevelopingtheskillsetneededtogainthisunderstanding,andawillingnesstofinancethetimeneededtoimplementtheprocess.
Thereisstilladominantaidparadigmthatconflictscreatepovertybyerodingresources,andthatthiscanbecounteredbyprovidingorreplacingassets,whichwillmakepeoplemoreresilient.Theimplicationsofpouringresourcesintothesekindsofsituationsareeasilyimagined;certainly,ifdoneatall,itneedsdoingwithgreatcare.Morecanoftenbeachievedby
9 TheWorldDevelopmentReport2011(WorldBank,2011)estimatesthatchangeinpost-conflictcountriestakesatleast30years.
10SeeforexampletheDACCriteriaforEvaluatingDevelopmentAssistance(OECD,1991):‘Effectiveness:ameasureoftheextenttowhichanaidactivityattainsitsobjectives[emphasisadded].Thisremainstheindustrystandard(e.g.ALNAP,2013).
�� Supportingresilienceindifficultplaces
thinkingofthepoliciesandinstitutionswhichshapewhathappenstopeople’sassetsovertime,wheretheygetthemfrom,howtheyareusedortradedandhowandwhytheybecomedepleted.Thecontrastcanbeseenintwoapproachesthathavebeenusedtotacklewidows’vulnerabilitytoland-grabbinginpost-conflictUganda.Oneorganisationpurchasedalargeareaoflandtoresettlelandlesswidows.Anotherchosetoworkwithlocalandnationalinstitutionsoflandjustice,bothformalandinformal,totrytoincreasetheirabilitytoadministerjustice.Regardlessofthedangersofcreatingacommunitymadeupentirelyofwidows,orthedangersofencouraginglandgrabbingbecausesomeoneelsewouldsimplytakecareof‘theproblem’,oneisbasedonmeetingtheneedsofafewdirectlychosenvulnerableindividuals,whiletheothercouldbedescribedasbuildingtheresilienceofallwidowsbyhelpingtocreateasituationwheretheyaresecureontheir
ownland.Needsassessment,asopposedtoproblemanalysis,oftenleadstoresourceprovision,ratherthanresilience-building.
Theexpectationsofmostexternalactorsneedtoberadicallyscaleddown.Donor-fundedprojectsareunlikelytoendconflictorpovertyormakepeopleresilienttoallthechallengestheywillface.Thisdoesnotmakethemirrelevant.Realismmeanshavinglessambitiousobjectives,beingmoremodestabouttheabilityofexternalactorstoeffectchangeontheirownandbeingmuchmoreopenaboutthedegreeofriskthatmustberun.Currently,externalactorsareusuallyfarmorerisk-aversethanthepeoplewhomtheytrytohelp.Agreaterwillingnesstoexperimentwithmodalitiesandinterventionsthatmayormaynotworkwouldbepossibleifcombinedwithbetterinvestmentinlessonlearning(toknowwhatisnotworking)andgreaterflexibility(tochangeit).
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Theprevioussectiondescribedsomeoftheimportantprogresswhichtheresilienceagendacanhelpbringabout.Althoughperfectsolutionstoproblemsshouldneverbeexpected,therearenoinsurmountablechallengestoachievingatleastadegreeofimprovementonallthefrontsdescribed.Severalpastinitiativeshavetriedtosolveexactlythesameproblemsasthosebeingdiscussedyetagainintheresilienceagenda(e.g.UN,2000).Inordertoavoidgoingroundincirclesagain,itisworthlearningfrompreviousattemptsatchangeandkeepinganeyeonsomeofthepitfallswhichwillneedtobeavoided.
5.1Genericresilienceinterventionsfordifficultcontexts
Eventhoughitiswidelyacceptedthatinterventionscannotsimplybeappliedasblueprints,itseemssensibletoestablishsomebroadlessonsabouttheinterventiontypesthathaveshownthebestresultsinsuchsituations.Unfortunately,thereisatendencyforbroadlessonstoquicklybecomestandardprogramming.Thisisindeedalreadyhappeninginresilience-building.Therearetworeasonstobecautiousaboutgenericprogramming.
Thefirstisthatconvincingevidenceforthechangesbroughttopeople’slivesfromspecificprogramminghassimplynotyetbeenpresented.Thisishardlysurprising,giventhatoutcomemonitoringhasonlyrecentlystartedtobegivenseriousattention,andtherehasbeenverylittleassessmentofthecontinuedimpactofinterventionsintheyearsaftertheircompletion.Thesecondreasonforcautionfollowsfromthelogicingroupingtogethercountrieswhereemergenciesarefrequentorrepeated,andwhereunderlyingproblemsneedtobetackledatthesametimeasinternationalsupportisneededtohelpmeet
immediateneeds.Thereisaplausiblejustificationforcreatingaseparateadministrativecategoryofaidfordifficultplaces,toestablishaidmodalitieswithgreaterflexibilitytofundneedsinalonger-termway,andgreaterroomformanoeuvreinrelationshipswiththestate.
However,thisfallswellshortofsuggestingthatthereisanycommoncontent toprogramminginsuchcountries,beyondsomehigher-levelprinciplessuchasflexibility.Therearegoodreasonsforthinkingthatthereisprobablylesshomogeneityindifficultplacesthanamonganyothergroupofcountries,preciselybecausethesearethecountrieswherenormal‘rules’ofgovernance,societyandmarketsaremostlikelytohavebrokendown(seeBox3).Allaidshouldbetailoredtothespecificneedsandthecultural,politicalandeconomiccontextofacountryorregion,butthediversityandcomplexityofdifficultplacesmakeitevenmoredifficulttosharelessons–or,rather,toknowhowtodrawandapplylessons.
5.2Ignoringlessonsfromthepast
Previousattemptstotacklesomeofthesameproblemsbeingreaddressedunderthelabelofresiliencehavenotbeensufficientlysuccessful,anditisessentialthatthelessonsofexperiencearetakenonboard.Relabelingthechallengeas‘resilience’isleadingsometoseethisasabrandnewideawithoutprecedent.That,atleast,istheonlyconclusionpossiblefromthemarkedlackofattentiontoananalysisofthelessonsofrecenthistory.Forexample,amajorattempttolearnlessonsfromthe2000UNstrategyfor‘theeliminationoffoodinsecurityintheHornofAfrica’(UN,2000),whichclearlyhasnotyetmetitsobjectives,shouldsurelybethefirststepbeforelaunchinganInter-AgencyPlanofActionfortheHornofAfrica(IASC,2011),oraplanforSupporting
5 Ensuringresiliencestays meaningful:avoidingthe pitfalls
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HornofAfricaResilience(EC,2012b).Ananalysisisstillneededcoveringbothtechnicallessonsandthepoliticalexperiencesofpreviousinitiatives,bothnationallyandwithininternationalinstitutions.Rebrandingfoodsecurityasresiliencehashadverypositiveeffectsincreatinganewandmuchwiderpoliticalandaidcoalition.However,pastexperienceremainsasourceofrelevantlearning,evenwhenthelanguagethatitusedwasdifferent.
5.3Genericresilienceindicators
Aidbureaucraciesjustifiablydemandaccountability,notonlyforactivitiesimplementedbutalsoforimpactsachieved.Theseaccountabilitydemandswillbeevenstrongerindifficultplaces,preciselybecausethedemandsofflexibilitymeanthatsupportcannotsimplyconsistinrollingoutapre-agreedsetofactivities.
Thereisastrongimperativeintheaidsectortowardsaccountabilitybasedonassessingimpactandvalueformoneybyestablishingindicatorsofprogresstowardsresilience.Developingspecificindicatorsforanypolicyorinterventioninordertoassessandunderstanditsimpactsiscritical.However,thetendencytoseekgenericinterventionsisparalleledbyastrongdemandforgenericindicatorsofresilience.Asdiscussedabove(Section3.4),thedangerofprogrammingdesignedtomaximiseresiliencescoresratherthanhelppeopleindifficultsituationsmustbeguardedagainst.Goodimpactmonitoringisneededthatstartsfromaclearanalysisofvulnerabilityandresilienceandagoodunderstandingofhowchangecanbebroughtabout(whatsomecallthe‘programmetheory’;seee.g.FunnelandRogers(2011)).Waysmustthenbefoundtocontinuallyassesswhetherornotthisprogrammetheoryisworkingbyassessingwhatishappeningineach‘link’ofthechainthatleadstothedesiredimpact.
Attemptstomonitorimpactoftencomeupagainsttworelatedproblems:lackofadequatebaselinesandmanyotherchangeshappeninginthearea(‘confoundingvariables’)thatmakeitdifficulttofindstatisticalconnectionsbetweenwhataprojecttriedtodoandfinaloutcomes.Theseproblemsarecompoundedfurtherinthecaseofinterventionsdesignedtosupportresiliencebecausethereisnoconsensusaboutwhatexactlyshouldbecountedasa‘resilienceoutcome’.Infact,evenifitwerepossibletomonitorinthisway,itwouldnotbeveryusefulasitmaytellushowmuchimpactwehad,butwewouldlearnnothingaboutwhyorthemechanismsbywhichitcameabout.
Theproblemscanbelargelyavoidedbygoingbacktotheanalysiswhichunderpinnedthedesignoftheprojectinthefirstplace.Thisshouldmakeclearwhattheconstraintstopeople’sresilienceare,howtheyoperatedandthemechanismsbywhichtheinterventionproposedtoaddressthem.Eachofthesestepsorlogicallinkscanbemonitored,usingqualitativeandoftenquantitativetechniques.
Forexample,theprovisionofirrigationpumpsmaybeseenasawaytopreventregularacutemalnutritioncausedbyseverefoodshortageswithrepeatedrainfailures.Thelogicalchainhasmany
links.Outcomesdependupon:thepumpsfunctioning(repairs,fuel,etc.);waterreachingthefields(irrigationdesign,maintenance);thedistributionofwaternotexcludingthosewhofacethehighestriskofmalnutrition(themaintargetgroup);thetargetgrouphavingtheability(i.e.time,skills,othernecessaryinputs)toreceiveyieldswhichoutweighanyopportunitycostsofpracticingirrigatedagriculture;adequatemarketaccessandconditionsallowingenoughincometomakeadifference;theuseofthatincometobenefitthoseatriskofmalnutrition(e.g.children);allofthismakingenoughdifferencetopreventmalnutrition;andmanymore,includingthebasicassumptionthatthecauseofmalnutritionhasbeenadequatelyidentifiedinthefirstplace.Thelinksinthechainarethusamixtureofphysical,agronomic,institutional,economic,socio-political,nutritionalandevengender-relatedfactors.Inordertounderstandhowaninterventioniscontributingtoresilience,eachoftheselinksandeachoftheseperspectivesshouldbeincorporated.Eachoftheselinkscanthenbeassessedandalsoquantifiedtounderstandhow muchchangeishappeningand why.Thiscanonlytakeplaceifthereisgooddocumentationofproblems,contextualanalysisandprogrammetheory.Currently,thisisalmostneveradequate.
Box4:Monitoringthelengthoftheimpactchain
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5.4RethinkingriskTheresilienceagendahasemphasisedtheimportanceofrisk(e.g.MitchellandHarris(2012))inalldevelopmentplanning.Resiliencemodelsarebroadlybasedontheideathatreducingrisk(orexposuretohazards)issynonymouswithincreasingresilience.Thismayleadtodevelopmentpolicyandaidwhichismoreriskaverse,inthesensethattheypromotelow-riskchangesinpeople’slives.However,seekingtoreduceriskmustbeseenintwootherdimensions.Thereisaneedtoassesshowfaritispossibletoescapepovertywithouttakingrisks.Interventionsintendedtomaintainpeoplewithintheircurrentlivelihoodstrategies(thoughwithahigherormorereliableincome)maydiscouragethemfromtakingthenecessarystepstoescapepovertyandachieveresilience,andyetmanyresilienceprogrammesaimtodopreciselythis.11Itisverydifficultwithouthindsighttoknowwhentransformationalchangeisaworthwhileriskandwhichkindoftrajectoryismaladaptive.Second,assessingpeople’sresiliencebylookingattheirexistingriskexposuremustbetemperedbytherecognition(discussedabove)thatrisk-freesecuritymaybethepricethatpeoplehavehadtopayforsurvival.ItispreciselytheenforcedavoidanceofriskthatcreatesaFaustianbargain(Wood,2003)wherebypeoplecanonlyguaranteetheirsecuritybyforegoingactions
whichwouldleadthemoutofpovertyortogreaterindependence.
5.5Unrealisticexpectations
Evenifthereismoreattentiontoresilienceinaidspending,betterprogrammingandevenanincreaseinoverallinternationalaid,vulnerabilityisnotgoingtodisappear.Thisisleftunrecognisedinsomeoftheresiliencerhetoric,e.g.thatoncewehavebuiltresiliencepeoplewillevenbeableto‘bounceback’andbecomeevenbetteroffafter(orbecauseof?)ashock(DFID,2012b).Unrealisticexpectationsmatterfortworeasons.Someofthepoliticalmomentumbehindresiliencecomesfromabeliefthatsupportforresiliencewillbringdownthefuturecostsofemergencyresponse.Thisexpectationissettingresilienceupforfailure;whenemergencycostsarenotseentobequicklyreduced,thereisadangerthatpoliticalsupportwillrapidlyerode.Second,overlyoptimisticexpectationshaveledtoinsufficientdiscussionoftheresourceimplicationsof‘achievingresilience’,andinsufficientanalysisofhowmuchcanactuallybeachieved.Itcannotbeassumedthatwhateverisdonewillbeofsomebenefit:therehastobeaclearobjectiveandroadmapatscale.Itisoftensaidthattheresiliencediscourseisbuiltonpositivity,incontrasttothenegativityofafocusonvulnerability.Thereisanunderstandabledesiretoremainoptimisticandtohavehighaims:thisdesireshouldnotcasthard-headedrealismasnegativityorcynicism.
11Forexample,peoplehavetoremainonunviablefarmsintheirvillagesinEthiopiainordertoreceivehelpfromthesafetynet,arguablydis-incentivisingtheirmovementtourbanareas–whichwouldconstitutearisk,butformanytheonlyaccessibleescapeintoresilience.
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6 Makingprogress
Section4discussedfivebroadareaswherechangeisneededinhowaidisconceived,organisedanddeliveredinordertomakeamoremeaningfulcontributiontosupportingtheresilienceofpeopleinplacesaffectedbyprotractedandrecurrentcrisis,inconflictsandinrecovery.Aidagencieshaveamoralresponsibilitytodotheirbesttounderstandwhatthepeopleinthesesituationsmostneedandhowthatcanbestbearranged,andthentoorganisethemselvesandtheiraidinwayswhichcandeliverthis.Anumberofconclusionscanbedrawn.
Thinking about ‘resilience’.Theword‘resilience’isbeingusedtospeakaboutmanythings,andthereisatendencytoover-theorisewhatshouldbesimpleandtounder-theorisewhatiscomplex.Itisimportanttorememberthatthebannerofresiliencehascreatedimportantpoliticalmomentumbehindoldproblems(reshapingtheemergency–developmentseparation,findinganewaidparadigm,retargetingaidonthosemostpronetocrisis,etc.).Thismustbewelcomedandtheopportunitymustbeexploitedtothefullestextentpossible.Ifanewjargonisusefulforachievingthis,thenthereisnoprobleminusingitaslongasitdoesnotcreateconfusionorthebeliefthatabrandnewideahasbeencreated.Theanalyticaldemandsofaidplanninghavenotchanged:weneedtounderstandhowandwhydifferentpeoplearevulnerable,theconstraintsontheirindependentagency,opportunitiesforsupportingchange,thepowerrelationsthatmaintainvulnerabilityandthatcouldpotentiallyprovidesomewayoutofit,andhowthepoliticaleconomyislikelytoshapetheoutcomesofanyintendedintervention.Resilience,therefore,emphasises,butdoesnotchange,theneedforgoodunderstandingofproblemsandsituations.
Understanding the impact of interventions on resilience.Theunpredictablecontextsunderdiscussioninthispapermakeitevenmoreimportanttounderstandinrealtimethewaysinwhichpeople’slivesarechangingandhowanyinterventioniscontributingtothatchange.Eachinterventionneedstobecapableofconstantmodification;widerlessonlearningcanonlybeachievedasmoreandmoreevidenceisbuiltup.Thejargonofresiliencecannotbe
allowedtodistractattentionfromanotheroldneed:formonitoringthatgoesbeyondcountingoutputsandwhichanalysesnotjustwhatchangeshavehappened,butalsohowtheyhavehappened.Resiliencere-emphasisestheneedtolookatdimensionsthathavebeengiventoolittleattention,suchaswhatchoicespeoplefeelabletomakeandwhatconstrainsthemfrommakingotherchoices,theimplicationsfortheirfutureofmakingthosechoicesandthenatureoftherisksthattheyrun.
Targeting aid on resilience.Oncemonitoringisprovidingenoughevidenceonhowaidisaffectingpeople’sabilitytocopewithhardship,thisrapidlyneedstobecomethemainpoliticaldimensionbywhichanoverallaidprogrammeisevaluated.Progressdemandsthatthisisnotdelayedbytryingtosetinstonethetechnicaldetailsofhowsuchevaluationtakesplace.Itisasecondarymattertoworryabouthow(forexample)tocombinethenumberofpeoplereached,theirrelativeneeds,whichkindsofprogresshavebeenmadeandtowhatdegreeandwhichkindsofriskremain.Suchquestionscanbedealtwithovertimeandshouldnotdistractattentionfromthepoliticalgoalofrefocusingaidonhelpingtoreducethelikelihoodthatthosewhoaremostvulnerabletocrisisfailtocopewhentheyencounterdifficultiesinlife.
Resilience in difficult places.In‘transitions’thereisaneedtothinkdifferently,butthereisnosetofrecipesthatcanbecalled‘resilience-building’,andnosetofruleswhichcansubstituteforhumanjudgementateachandeverystage.Basicprinciplesforworkinginunpredictableandpoliticallychargedsituationsshouldbeapplied,includingbuildinginmoreflexibility,longer-termengagement,morerisk-takingandmuchbetterlearning.Theseinclude:
• anopennesstoworkingwithawiderrangeoflocalinstitutions;
• amoresophisticatedbreakdownof‘government’andanabilitytochoosethepartsofgovernmentalorstateagencieswithwhomrelationshipscanbehelpful;
• opennesstoagreaterrangeofrelationships;• moreemphasisonsupporttoadaptivecapacity;
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• focusingonimprovingpeople’slinkstoinstitutionsotherthanaidagencies;
• ensuringthatallcapacity-buildingstartsfromananalysisoftheconstraintstofunctionality(i.e.eschewinggeneric‘capacity-buildingactivities’);
• makingsurethatimprovingthelivesofvulnerablepeopleistheobjectiveofanycapacity-building,notimprovingthefunctioningoforganisationsorinstitutionsforitsownsake;and
• workingacrossthewholespectrum,fromimmediaterelieftolonger-termdevelopment,andformingrelationshipswiththosewhoalsoworkacrossthespectrum.
Building resilience with or against entrenched processes?Resilienceisseenbothasatransformationalagendaandonethatmakespeople’slivesmorerobustwithintheircurrentsystem.Likewise,aidagenciesneedtounderstandandwherepossibleworkwithinexistingpolicyandinstitutionalprocesses,andyetwherenecessaryandpossiblealsochallenge,providealternativesandbringtransformationtothesestructuresandprocesses.Thereisoftenatensionbetweenworkingtomaximiseacceptabilityandstrivingfortransformation,anditmayseemunhelpfultosuggestthattheonlyprincipletofollowistobeawareofthechoiceandtousejudgement.However,ensuringthatattentionisgiventothinkingaboutthistensionanddocumentingtherationaleforwhatevercourseofactionischosenwouldbeamajorstepforward.
A bureaucracy for resilience?Fewaidagenciesopposeflexibilityinprinciple,butthecurrentaidbureaucracydoesnotfacilitateit.Projectsaredesigned,managedandmonitored(intheoryatleast)accordingtologframes.Projecteffectivenessisoftendefinedasthedegreetowhichaprojectreacheditspredeterminedobjectives.Thiscreatesatensionwhenneeds,possibilitiesandoptimalwaysofinterveningareunpredictableandchanging.Logframes,asusedinpractice,reinforcetheideathatdeviationsfromaplanareassociatedwithprojectfailure,andriskisassumedtobehypotheticalonly,ratherthanbeingintegratedaspartoftheoverallinterventiondesign.Theneedforflexibilitydemandsthatoperatingagenciesareheldtoaccountforthedegreetowhichtheywerecapableofadaptingtheiroriginalplans–i.e.flexibilityshouldbeacontractualobligationandnotoptional.Onlythencaninterventionsalsotakeanattitudetoriskthatmatchesthatofthepeoplewithwhomtheywishtowork.Inorderforaccountabilitytobepossible,bothforimpactand
foruseoffunds,newcontractualarrangementswillhavetobedeveloped.Althoughthiswilltaketime,itneedstostarturgently.
Learning for resilience.Lessonlearningthatgoesbeyondtryingtofindreplicableblueprintsisnoteasyandneedsasizeablebodyofevidence.Increasedemphasiswillbeneededonestablishingcollaborativeeffortstofindouthowinterventionsaffectpeople’slivesandtheirresiliencetofuturedifficulties.Thiswillneedtogobeyondtheworkofanyoneagencyordonor.Currentlearningconsortiahavearoletoplay,butthisisnotthesameascreatinganopensourcebodyofevidencethroughacollaborativeeffortthatisnotonlysector-wide,butalsoincludesacademicsandexpertsfromoutsidetheaidsector.Althoughnoonedonorcancreatethisalone,thereisaresponsibilityoneveryagencytoplayaroleinhelpingthistohappen.AnyEuropeandonor,forexample,canmostusefullysupportthisthoughtheEU,i.e.takingtogetherboththeEUmemberstatesasindividualdonorsandtheofficesoftheEuropeanCommissionitself.Together,thesedonorsandtheirrespectivepartnersconstituteacriticalmassformakingprogress.TheEC’sActionPlananditsCommunicationonResiliencebothprovideapegonwhichtohangthiseffort,andsomeindividualEUmemberstateshaveexpressedinterestinsupportingthis.
Staffing for resilience.Resilience-building,inparticularinthecountriesunderdiscussionhere,demandsaveryhighlevelofsocialandpoliticalanalysisofthelocalsituation.Thecurrentstaffingofaidagenciesismoregearedtotechnicalabilities.High-levelmanagerialdecision-makers,oftenexpatriates,aremoreathomediscussingbroadconceptualideaslikeresiliencethanstaffontheground.Thechangessuggestedinthispaperwillcreateademandforgreaterinvestmentinrecruitingandretaininghigh-qualitystaffwhoareexperiencedinaspecificplaceorcountry.Staffwillneedafargreaterrangeanddepthofskillsinordertousenewmodalitiesforensuringthegenuineparticipationinanalysisofthepeoplewhoselivesinterventionsareintendedtobenefit,movingbeyondthesimplereportingbackof‘communitymeetings’withacollectionofprojectrequestsand‘shoppinglists’.Suchachangeinstaffingprofileschallengesthecurrentinequalitiesbetweengeographicalgeneralists(predominantlyexpatriate)andlocalspecialists(predominantlynationalstaff).Gainingarichunderstandingtakestimeandthattimeneedstobepaidfor,testingboththetimetablesandbudgetsofaid,whereexcessiveworkloadsandunrealistic
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timeframesdonotpermitthinkingtime.Thischallengecanonlybemetthroughexplicitpolicydecisions.
Theremayberoomforadonor,actingasathirdparty,tosupportanalysisbycreatinganalyticalcapacityasa‘publicgood’,tobeavailabletothoseworkinginsomeparticulardifficultplace.Thereareanumberofexpertswhoarehighlyexperiencedinparticularcountriesandwhoseunderstandingofcrisis,recoveryandrecurrentcrisisinthosecountriesoverdecadesshouldbeanecessaryinputintoanyanalysisanddecision-making.However,normalcareerprogressionmeansthat,astheseexperts(whethernationalsorexpatriate)becomemoreexperienced,theyarelesslikelytobeworkingindifficultplaces.Staffturnovermeansthatpreviousexperienceislosttothoseworkingintheareawhousuallywillnotevenknowaboutpeoplewhowentbeforethemandonwhomtheyoughttobeabletocall.Thereisthusnomechanismformakingpeoplewithalongstandingexpertiseinaparticularareaavailableforconsultationwhenneeded.Solutionstothiscanbefound.Withcurrentcommunicationstechnology,‘virtualanalyticalhubs’canbecreatedas
anopenaccessresource,freelyavailableforsupportinganybody’sdecision-making.Practicalstepscouldbeginimmediatelyonpilotingdifferentmodelsforsupportinganalysishubsinoneortwocountrieswithalonghistoryofintervention(e.g.Niger,Sudan,DRC).
An aid system for resilience.Itishopefullyclearfromtheprecedinganalysisthattherecommendationhereisnottocreateaseparateaidsystemforbuildingresilience.However,achievingprogressinallofthedirectionssuggestedabovewillrequiresomefundamentalchangesatsystemlevel,i.e.notonlyatthelevelofindividualaidagenciesbutalsoinrelationshipsbetweenaidactors.Inordertoachievethis,agenciesneedtothinkofthemselvesnotonlyasindividualactorstryingtooptimisethewaytheywork,butalsoassystemplayersactivelytryingtoshapethewayinwhichotheragenciesbehaveandrelatetoeachother.Someofwhatisrecommendedherecannotbeachievedbyanyagencyworkinginisolation.However,thatdoesnotabsolveagenciesfromplayingtheirpartinhelpingtobringaboutchangeatthismuchwiderscale.
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