Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 128845 June 1, 2000INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE),petitioner,vs.HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC.,respondents.KAPUNAN,J.:Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.1wphi1.ntPrivate respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.1To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:a. What is one's domicile?b. Where is one's home economy?c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?2Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.1avvphi1These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take the risk of deviating from a promising career path all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land. The new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's family, effective means of transportation, allowance for the education of one's children, adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality after his term: that he will eventually and inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after along period in a foreign land.The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education.3When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International School Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members"4of the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires.5The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires.The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth to tell, there are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires.6The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find applications in the present case. The international character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and different cultures, among the student population.We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel which system is universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice them to render their services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the international market.Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the local hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require parity in other terms and conditions of employment which include the employment which include the employment contract.A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and professional compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with Appendix C hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers from abroad, under terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted international practice.Appendix C of said CBA further provides:The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS) salary schedule. The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of system displacement and contracted status of the OSRS as differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the status of two types of employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.7We cannot agree.That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution8in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.International law, which springs from general principles of law,9likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of equity,10i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable.11The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,12the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,13the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,14the Convention against Discrimination in Education,15the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation16 all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.The Constitution17specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.The Constitution18also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code19provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.20Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes21the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,supra, in Article 7 thereof, provides:The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;x x x x x x x x xThe foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.22This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires.23The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay."Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of services." InSongco v.National Labor Relations Commission,24we said that:"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,"25"to afford labor full protection."26The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.27These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.28Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.1avvphi1We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law."29The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status.30The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.31It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.SO ORDERED.Puno and Pardo, JJ., concur.Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.Ynares-Santiago, J., is on leave.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. Nos. 153524-25 January 31, 2005RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA,petitioners,vs.HON. ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as Head of the Office of the Ombudsman, HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Military, P/INS. JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2 ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1 ALFREDO B. ALVIAR, JR., PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B. CARDENAS, PO1 JOSEPH A. BENAZA, SPO1 FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO PAREL,respondents.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of the Ombudsman in its finding of lack of probable cause made during preliminary investigation. And, yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored practice of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations by our prosecutory bodies absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion on their part.Petitioners, thru a special civil action forcertiorari,1contend precisely that the public respondents herein officers of the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of detained persons) against private respondents herein, members of the Philippine National Police stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur.From the respective pleadings2of the parties, the following facts appear to be indubitable:1. On or about8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001(a Sunday and the day before the 14 May 2001 Elections3), petitioners were arrested without a warrant by respondents police officers for alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition;2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal. revolver (a crime which carries with it the penalty ofprision correccionalin its maximum period) and for violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the Commission on Election Resolution No. 3328 (which carries the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one [1] year but not more than six [6] years);3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal. revolver with ammunition;4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos Sur, Police Station. It was at the Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista was identified by one of the police officers to have a standing warrant of arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;5.The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001(Monday and election day), petitioners were brought to the residence of Provincial Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a "Joint-Affidavit" against them was subscribed and sworn to by the arresting officers. From there, the arresting officers brought the petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutors Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at about 6:00 p.m. the "Joint-Affidavit" was filed and docketed;6.At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria was releasedupon the order of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista was brought back and continued to be detained at the Santa Police Station. From the time of petitioner Sorias detention up to the time of his release,twenty-two (22) hours had already elapsed;7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was brought before the MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner Bista posted bail and an Order of Temporary Release was issued thereafter;8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with petitioner Bistas arrest for alleged illegal possession of firearms.At 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day (15 May 2001), an information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-S, was filed against petitioner Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in the afternoon, informations for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No. 2268-N, respectively, were filed in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;9.On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No. 4413-S.He was detained for 26 days.10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents.11. After considering the parties respective submissions, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered the first assailed Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 dismissing the complaint for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code for lack of merit; and12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria was arrested without warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. Neither is it in dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only be detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints or information having been filed with the proper judicial authorities.The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the 12-18-36 periods. With respect specifically to the detention of petitioner Soria which lasted for 22 hours, it is alleged that public respondents gravely erred in construing Article 1254as excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in the computation of the periods prescribed within which public officers should deliver arrested persons to the proper judicial authorities as the law never makes such exception. Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any attempts at interpretation.5Public respondents, on the other hand, relied on the cases ofMedina v. Orozco, Jr.,6andSayo v. Chief of Police of Manila7and on commentaries8of jurists to bolster their position that Sundays, holidays and election days are excluded in the computation of the periods provided in Article 125,9hence, the arresting officers delivered petitioners well within the allowable time.In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to petitioner Bista, petitioners maintain that the filing of the information in court against petitioner Bista did not justify his continuous detention. The information was filed at4:30 p.m. of 15 May 2001but the orders for his release were issued by the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on08 June 2001. They argued that based on law and jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the prosecutor within the period fixed by law, the arresting officer must release the detainee lest he be charged with violation of Article 125.10Public respondents countered that the duty of the arresting officers ended upon the filing of the informations with the proper judicial authorities following the rulings inAgbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military,11andPeople v. Acosta.12From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident that public respondents did not abuse their discretion in dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint against private respondents.Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.1awphi1.ntThe abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.13No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public respondents. Their disposition of petitioners complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of thin air as it was properly backed up by law and jurisprudence. Public respondents ratiocinated thus:As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is concerned, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a "no-office day." (Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while it appears that the complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak of.14Indeed, we did hold inMedina v. Orozco, Jr.,15that . . . The arresting officers duty under the law was either to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is that he was not released. From the time of petitioners arrest at 12:00 oclock p.m. on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the information against him for murder actually was in court, over 75 hours have elapsed.But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election day) was also an official holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information and search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of commitment prepared. And then, where to locate and the uncertainty of locating those officers and employees could very well compound the fiscals difficulties. These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the very first office day following arrest.And, inSayo v. Chief of Police of Manila16--. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the information has already been filed in Court, public respondents acted well within their discretion in ruling thus:In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention.The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001 (Annexes "G" and "I", Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar Bista) but he was released from detention only on June 8, 2001, on orders of the RTC and MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur (Annexes "J" and "K", Complaint-Affidavit). Was there a delay in the delivery of detained person to the proper judicial authorities under the circumstances? The answer is in the negative. The complaints against him was (sic) seasonably filed in the court of justice within the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law as discussed above. The duty of the detaining officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaints. Further action, like issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial authority (People v. Acosta [CA] 54 O.G. 4739).17The above disposition is in keeping withAgbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military,18wherein we ordained that . . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the position of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have no choice but to defer to the Office of the Ombudsmans determination that the facts on hand do not make out a case for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.l^vvphi1.netAs we have underscored in numerous decisions --We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We are mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal.Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much the same way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.19(Emphasis supplied)WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 and the Order dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.SO ORDERED.Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO,petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES,respondents.The City Attorney for petitioners.The Solicitor General for public respondent.VITUG,J.:The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.1Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park".2On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls,sari-saristores, andcarinderiaalong North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR.4On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private respondents' stalls,sari-saristores andcarinderia,5the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest."6A motion to dismiss,7dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other things, that:1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;xxx xxx xxx3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a certain business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance.8During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case to the courts.On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business."9On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved).10In an Order,11dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls,sari-saristores andcarinderiadespite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.On 1 March 1991,12the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to dismiss, in this wise:Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.13The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.In an Order,14dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.Hence, this recourse.The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however, in our resolution16of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580."17The petitioners pose the following:Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; andc) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment,18through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.The petition has merit.The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987Constitution.19It was formally constituted by then President Corazon AquinoviaExecutive Order No. 163,20issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights.21The powers and functions22of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to (1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body.23This view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cario v. Commission on Human Rights,24the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate,i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:Human rightsare the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .Human rightsinclude civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and social services.25Human rightsare the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.26(Human rightsinclude all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27Human rightsare rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable.28The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the Philippines,"29observes:But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human rights and also because civil and political rights have been determined by many international covenants and human rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if wecover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw the line?MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human rights advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished this right against torture.MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are other violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.xxx xxx xxxMR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of governments regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts of that.MR. BENGZON.Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human rights?MR. GARCIA.No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.xxx xxx xxxMR. RAMA.In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with human dignity.So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights.Is that the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?MR. SARMIENTO.Yes, Madam President.MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively:1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.xxx xxx xxxThe PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should,in order to make the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion.The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the term"human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of which we are signatory.MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in that other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like "convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the convention.As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?MR. GARCIA.Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this provision freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations.So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an international instrument.MR. GUINGONA. I know.MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social rights.MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen has specified.MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.xxx xxx xxxSR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and oppressed.Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre and the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be independent.I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it.And I think we should concentrate only on civil and political violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we will not receive any response. . . .30(emphasis supplied)The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violationsinvolving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).The term "civil rights,"31has been defined as referring (t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.32Political rights,33on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenshipvis-a-visthe management of government.34Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation."35In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls,sari-saristores andcarinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursedvis-a-visthe circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls,sari-saristores andcarinderiaof the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. InExport Processing Zone Authority vs.Commission on Human Rights,36the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino, explained:The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any appropriate agency of government.37The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack oflocus standion the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.38Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that.39WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.Separate OpinionsPADILLA,J.,dissenting:I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and desist order to maintain astatus quopending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation; that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which the CHR intents to investigate.In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls,sari-saristores andcarinderiasas well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posingprima faciea case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-63345 January 30, 1986EFREN C. MONCUPA,petitioner,vs.JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR, FERNANDO GOROSPE, AND JOSE CASTRO,respondents.Lorenzo M. Tanada, Jose W. Diokno and Joker Arroyo for petitioner,GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:As early as 1919, in the leading case ofVillavicencio v. Lukban(39 Phil. 778, 790), this Court ruled:A prime specification of al application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. ...This latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas-corpus has, in law, remained undiminished up to the present. The respondents' contention that the petition has become moot and academic must necessarily be denied. Efren C. Moncupa may have been released from his detention cell. The restraints attached to his temporary release, however, preclude freedom of action and under theVillavicencio v. Lukbanrule warrant this Court's inquiry into the nature of his involuntary restraint and our relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal.Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at the corner of D. Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa D. Tuazon was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained. On April 23, 1982, on the allegation that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and eight (8) other persons.After two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force Makabansa Investigation Group and second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of Quezon City, it was ascertained that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33.Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one, for illegal possession of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of Quezon City. Against the other accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as amended. Significantly, the petitioner was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, it is significant that his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. And yet, the petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower court.Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of petitioner's detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to the petitioner. However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on orders of the Minister temporary of National Defense with the approval of the President. The respondents stated. "Since the petitioner is free and no longer under the custody of the respondents, the present petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar cases.The issue to be resolved is whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the petitioner's temporary release.It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him. These are:1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila.2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also required in case petitioner wants to change his place of residence.3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not "participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to the interest of national security."4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives.The petitioner argues that although admittedly his temporary release is an improvement upon his actual detention, the restrictions imposed by the respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.The petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render the instant petitioner moot and academic but that "it merely shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed by the respondents."We agree with the petitioner.The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.InVillavicencio v. Lukban,the women who had been illegally seized and transported against their will to Davao were no longer under any official restraint. Unlike petitioner Moncupa, they were free to change their domicile without asking for official permission. Indeed, some of them managed to return to Manila. Yet, the Court condemned the involuntary restraints caused by the official action, fined the Mayor of Manila and expressed the hope that its "decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from Megal encroachment."In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic. Other precedents for such a conclusion are not wanting.The decision inCaunca v. Salazar(82 Phil. 851) states:An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, from to choose one's residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illigally deprived of liberty by deprived or physical coercion.InTibo v. The Provincial Commander(85 SCRA 564), this Court ruled:Although the release in the custody of the Deputy Minister did not signify that petitioners could once again enjoy their full freedom, the application could have been dismissed, as it could be withdrawn by the parties themselves. That is a purely voluntary act. When the hearing was held on September 7, 1978, it turned out that counsel for petitioner Bonifacio V. Tupaz could have academic in a hasty manner when he set forth the above allegations in his manifestation of August 30, 1978, for Attorney Jose C. Espinas, who appeared for petitioners, while conceding that there was such a release from confinement, also alleged that it was conditioned on their restricting their activities as labor union leaders to the premises of the Trade Unions of the Philippines and ABSOLUTE Services, presumably in Macaraig as well as the Ministry of labor. As the voting was to take place in the business firm in Bataan, the acts set would nullify whatever efforts they could have exerted. To that extent, and with the prohibition against their going to Bataan, the restraint on liberty was undeniable. If so, the moot and academic character of the petition was far from clear.More recently, we had occasion to rule squarely on whether or not a temporary release from detention renders the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. As in this case of Moncupa, the petitioners inToyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al,G.R. No. 69270, October 15, 1985, were temporarily released from detention. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the petitioners had been temporarily released and their case had, therefore, become moot and academic. The petitioners insisted, however, that their case may be considered moot and academic only "if their release would be permanent." In ruling for the petitioners, we said:Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a number of cases. But the instant case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer is the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners being merely 'temporary' it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent jurisdiction. We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of men principle. Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic and elementary that it needs no elaboration.In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the restraints on the petitioner's freedom of movement should not be lifted.WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner are declared null and void. The temporary release of the petitioner is declared ABSOLUTE. No costs,SO ORDERED.Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin De la Fuente, Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur.Aquino, C.J., took no part.Plana, J., I reserve my vote.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 180291 July 27, 2010GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as PRESIDENT and GENERAL MANAGER of the GSIS,Petitioners,vs.DINNAH VILLAVIZA, ELIZABETH DUQUE, ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ, RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA THERESE B. GRACIA, PILAR LAYCO, and ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA,Respondents.D E C I S I O NMENDOZA,J.:This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the August 31, 2007 Decision1of the Court of Appeals(CA),in CA-G.R. SP No. 98952, dismissing the petition for certiorari of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) assailing the Civil Service Commission's Resolution No. 062177.THE FACTS:Petitioner Winston Garcia(PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents Dinnah Villaviza, Elizabeth Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B. Gracia, Pilar Layco, and Antonio Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in Administrative Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials, III, D, (1, c, f) in relation to Section 52A (3), (20), Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), in accordance with Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987, committed as follows:That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together with some employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises;x x x x x x x x xThat some of these employees badmouthed the security guards and the GSIS management and defiantly raised clenched fists led by Atty. Velasco who was barred by Hearing Officer Marvin R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from appearing as counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees;That respondent, together with other employees in utter contempt of CSC Resolution No. 021316, dated 11 October 2002, otherwise known as Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened some employees and disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during office hours.2This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office memorandum dated May 31, 2005, by the Manager of the GSIS Security Department (GSIS-SD), Dennis Nagtalon. On the same day, the Manager of the GSIS Investigation Unit (GSIS-IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a memorandum to each of the seven (7) respondents requiring them to explain in writing and under oath within three (3) days why they should not be administratively dealt with.3Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together with two others, submitted a letter-explanation to Atty. Barbo dated June 6, 2005. Denying that there was a planned mass action, the respondents explained that their act of going to the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after learning that their former union president was there. Aside from some of them wanting to show their support, they were interested in that hearing as it might also affect them. For her part, respondent Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining that she had a scheduled pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed her immediate supervisor about it, attaching a copy of the order of pre-hearing. These letters were not under oath.4PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against each of the respondents, all dated June 4, 2005. Respondents were again directed to submit their written answers under oath within three (3) days from receipt thereof.5None was filed.On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of the charges and meting out the penalty of one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.On appeal, the Civil Service Commission(CSC)found the respondents guilty of the lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and reduced the penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were not denied their right to due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Instead,x x x. The actuation of the appellants in going to the IU, wearing red shirts, to witness a public hearing cannot be considered as constitutive of such offense. Appellants' (respondents herein) assembly at the said office to express support to Velasco, their Union President, who pledged to defend them against any oppression by the GSIS management, can be considered as an exercise of their freedom of expression, a constitutionally guaranteed right.6x x xPGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.7The CA upheld the CSC in this wise:The Civil Service Commission is correct when it found that the act sought to be punished hardly falls within the definition of a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. The petitioners failed to prove that the supposed concerted activity of the respondents resulted in work stoppage and caused prejudice to the public service. Only about twenty (20) out of more than a hundred employees at the main office, joined the activity sought to be punished. These employees, now respondents in this case, were assigned at different offices of the petitioner GSIS. Hence, despite the belated claim of the petitioners that the act complained of had created substantial disturbance inside the petitioner GSIS' premises during office hours, there is nothing in the record that could support the claim that the operational capacity of petitioner GSIS was affected or reduced to substantial percentage when respondents gathered at the Investigation Unit. Despite the hazy claim of the petitioners that the gathering was intended to force the Investigation Unit and petitioner GSIS to be lenient in the handling of Atty. Molina's case and allow Atty. Velasco to represent Atty. Molina in his administrative case before petitioner GSIS, there is likewise no concrete and convincing evidence to prove that the gathering was made to demand or force concessions, economic or otherwise from the GSIS management or from the government. In fact, in the separate formal charges filed against the respondents, petitioners clearly alleged that respondents "marched to or appeared simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Mssrs. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter surreptitiously entered the GSIS premises." Thus, petitioners are aware at the outset that the only apparent intention of the respondents in going to the IU was to show support to Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, their union officers. The belated assertion that the intention of the respondents in going to the IU was to disrupt the operation and pressure the GSIS administration to be lenient with Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, is only an afterthought.8Not in conformity, PGM Garcia is now before us via this Petition for Review presenting the following:STATEMENT OF THE ISSUESIWHETHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL MAY APPLY SUPPLETORILY THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DENY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT AND FAILURE TO FILE ANSWER, WHERE THE RESPONDENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS DID NOT FILE ANY RESPONSIVE PLEADING TO THE FORMAL CHARGES AGAINST THEM.IIWHETHER THE RULE THAT ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS CANNOT BE EQUATED WITH DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL SENSE AUTHORIZES AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL TO CONSIDER IN EVIDENCE AND GIVE FULL PROBATIVE VALUE TO UNNOTARIZED LETTERS THAT DID NOT FORM PART OF THE CASE RECORD.IIIWHETHER A DECISION THAT MAKES CONCLUSIONS OF FACTS BASED ON EVIDENCE ON RECORD BUT MAKES A CONCLUSION OF LAW BASED ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF A DOCUMENT THAT NEVER FORMED PART OF THE CASE RECORDS IS VALID.IVWHETHER FURTHER PROOF OF SUSBTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE OPERATIONAL CAPACITY OF AN AGENCY, DUE TO UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES AND WITHIN OFFICE HOURS, IS REQUIRED TO HOLD THE SAID EMPLOYEES LIABLE FOR CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE PURSUANT TO CSC RESOLUTION NO. 021316.VWHETHER AN UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF TWENTY EMPLOYEES, LASTING FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR DURING OFFICE HOURS, INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES AND WITHIN A UNIT TASKED TO HEAR AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, TO PROTEST THE PROHIBITION AGAINST THE APPEARANCE OF THEIR LEADER AS COUNSEL IN THE SAID ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUA