+ All Categories
Home > Documents > Human Rights Watch: Syria

Human Rights Watch: Syria

Date post: 14-Apr-2018
Category:
Upload: margafret
View: 230 times
Download: 0 times
Share this document with a friend

of 16

Transcript
  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    1/16

    ATTACKS ON GHOUTAAnalysis of Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria

    H U M A N

    R I G H T S

    W A T C H

  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    2/16

    SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH i

    AttAcks on GhoutA

    AnAlysis of Alleged Use of ChemiCAl WeApons in syriA

  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    3/16

    ii ATTACKS ON GHOUTA SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS W

    AttAcks on GhoutAAa A U Cca Wa sa

    september 2013 | isbn: 978-1-6231-30534

    Copyright 2013 Human Rights WatchAll rights reserved.Printed in the United States o AmericaISBN: 978-1-6231-30534Cover design by Raael Jimenez

    Human Rights Watch is dedicated to protecting the human rights o people around the world.We stand with victims and activists to prevent discrimination, to uphold political reedom,to protect people rom inhumane conduct in wartime, and to bring oenders to justice. Weinvestigate and expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable. We challengegovernments and those who hold power to end abusive practices and respect internationalhuman rights law. We enlist the public and the international community to support the cause

    o human rights or all.

    Human Rights Watch is an international organization with sta in more than 40 countries,and oces in Amsterdam, Beirut, Berlin, Brussels, Chicago, Geneva, Goma, Johannesburg,London, Los Angeles, Moscow, Nairobi, New York, Paris, San Francisco, Tokyo, Toronto, Tunis,Washington DC, and Zurich.

    For more inormation, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org

    Maps .................................................................................................................iv

    Summary ............................................................................................................ 1

    Methodology ...................................................................................................... 1

    I. The August 21 Attacks on Ghouta ......................................................................4

    Moadamiya, Western Ghouta ..........................................................................4Zamalka, Eastern Ghouta ................................................................................7

    Death Toll ..................................................................................................... 13

    II. Identcaton o the Weapons Used n the Attacks ...........................................15

    III. Identcaton o the Nere Agent Used n the Attacks .................................... 16

    IV. Responsblty or the August 21 At tacks........................................................20

    Syrian Government Forces Responsibility or the Attacks ................................20

    V. Syra and Chemcal Weapons Under Internatonal Law .....................................21

  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    4/16

    iv ATTACKS ON GHOUTA SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS

    !I

    !

    !

    RepublicanGuard Base(Brigade 104)

    !

    4th ArmouredDivision Base

    Moadamiya

    Zamalka

    MarkazDarayya

    Sahnaya

    Hajar

    Aswad

    Duma

    Harasta

    Ayn Tarma

    Babella

    Jaramana

    Maliha

    KafrBatna

    Arbin

    Qudsiya

    CentralDamascus

    KafarSoussa

    Jow ba r

    Al- Kab oo n

    Barza

    Hamish

    BustanAl Nou r

    Quasioun

    Mashrou3Dummar

    PresidentialPalace

    MazzehAi rp or t

    Mazzeh

    !

    Centre dEtudeset de RecherchesScientifiques (CERS)

    At Tal l

    Az-Z abd ani

    Darayya

    Duma

    Qatana

    5

    M1

    7

    110

    M1

    M1

    7

    Source: Esri, i-cubed, USDA, USGS, AEX, GeoEye, Getmapping, Aerogrid, IGN, IGP, and the GIS User C

    Projected launch zone of the 140mm rocket identied near the

    Rawda Mosque, based on a mini-mum re range of 3.8 km and a

    maximum range of 9.8 km.

    Rocket impact zone

    Opposition

    contested area

    Oppositioncontested area

    Rocket imact zonein Zamalka and

    Ayn Tarma

    MAP OF CHEMICAL WEAPON IMPACT ZONES INWESTERN AND EASTERN SUBURBS OF DAMASCUS

    Government military bases

    Data Sources: HRW, NASA, USGS, ESRI, NGA, Wikimapia, Open Street Map, Google

    and the Zamalka Local Council.

  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    5/16

    vi ATTACKS ON GHOUTA SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS

    Summary

    This report details two alleged chemical weapons attacksin Syria on the opposition-controlled Damascus suburbs

    o Eastern and Western Ghouta, located 16 kilometersapart, on the morning o August 21, 2013. The attacks

    killed hundreds o civilians, including large numbers o

    children. Human Rights Watch analyzed witness accountso the rocket attacks, inormation on the likely source o

    the attacks, the physical remnants o the weapon systemsused, and the medical symptoms exhibited by the victims

    o the attack as documented by medical sta.

    Our investigation nds that the August 21 attacks were

    likely chemical weapons attacks using a surace-to-sur-ace rocket system o approximately 330mm in diam-

    eterlikely Syrian-producedand a Soviet-era 140mmsurace-to-surace rocket system to deliver a nerve agent.

    Evidence suggests the agent was most likely Sarin or

    a similar weapons-grade nerve agent. Three local doc-tors told Human Rights Watch that victims o the attacks

    showed symptoms which are consistent with exposure tonerve gas, including suocation; constricted, irregular,

    and inrequent breathing; involuntary muscle spasms;nausea; rothing at the mouth; fuid coming out o noses

    and eyes; convulsing; dizziness; blurred vision; and red

    and irritated eyes, and pin-point pupils.

    The evidence concerning the type o rockets and launch-ers used in these attacks strongly suggests that these are

    weapon systems known and documented to be only in the

    possession o, and used by, Syrian government armedorces. Human Rights Watch and arms experts monitoring

    the use o weaponry in Syria have not documented Syrianopposition orces to be in the possession o the 140mm

    and 330mm rockets used in the attack, or their associatedlaunchers.

    The Syrian government has denied its responsibility orthe attack, and has blamed opposition groups, but has

    presented no evidence to back up its claims. Based on theavailable evidence, Human Rights Watch nds that Syrian

    government orces were almost certainly responsible or

    the August 21 attacks, and that a weapons-grade nerveagent was delivered during the attack using specially de-

    signed rocket delivery systems. The scale and cnature o the two attacks; against opposition-h

    the presence o government-controlled potent

    ing sites within range o the targets; the patterrecent alleged chemical weapon attacks aga

    sition-held areas using the same 330mm rocksystem; and the documented possession o th

    and 330mm rocket systems able to deliver chem

    ons in the government arsenalall point towagovernment responsibility or the attacks.

    Human Rights Watch has investigated alternat

    that opposition orces themselves were respothe August 21 attacks, and has ound such clai

    in credibility and inconsistent with the evidenc

    the scene. Claims that the August 21 deaths wby an accidental explosion by opposition orc

    dling chemical weapons in their possession sistent with large numbers o deaths at two lo

    kilometers apart, and documentation o rocket

    the sites that morning, as evidenced by witnessthe damage visible on the rockets themselves

    impact craters.

    methodology

    Without physical access to Eastern and WesteHuman Rights Watch interviewed by Skype ro

    22 to September 6 more than 10 witnesses and

    o the August 21 attacks, and 3 doctors who resthe attacks. Human Rights Watch also reviewed

    video and photo ootage rom the scene o tincluding high-resolution images obtained dir

    a source who photographed and measured components ound in the Eastern Ghouta attac

    ducted a detailed analysis o the weapon rem

    tured in such ootage.

    Human Rights Watch asked Keith B. Ward, Phpert on the detection and eects o chemic

    agents, to review the clinical signs revealed by

    hospitalized victims o the attacks, the victims described by medical workers on the scene, a

    AynTarma

    AlZiniya

    Erbeen

    Zamalka

    Hazeh

    KafarBatna

    MAP OF THE MM CHEMICAL ROCKET IMPACT LOCATIONS IN

    ZAMALKA NEIGHBORHOOD

  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    6/16

  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    7/16

    4 ATTACKS ON GHOUTA SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS

    From a review o a video o an expendedrocket motor ound on the street next to

    the Rawda Mosque in Moadamiya, HumanRights Watch has identied one o the rock-

    ets ound in the Moadamiya attack as a So-

    viet-era surace-to-surace 140mm rocket,known as the M-14.8 A separate video shot

    on August 27 shows UN inspectors mea-suring and photographing this rocket mo-

    tor, which conrmed the remnants lengthand width correspond with the dimensions

    o the Soviet 140mm rocket motor.9 The

    rst video clearly shows the 10 venture (ex-haust nozzles) and electric contact plate o

    the rocket, which is a unique identicationcharacteristic o the Soviet-made 140mm rocket, as well

    as the actory markings on the casing o the rocket, mak-

    ing the identication denitive. The 179 actory markingson the rocket reer to the soviet-era Factory 179 in Novo-

    sibirsk, one o the largest producers o artillery and rock-ets during the Soviet period, and a known manuacturer o

    the 140mm M-14 rocket.

    The expended rocket motor visible in the videos repre-

    sents only part o the delivery system and not the weap-ons payload. To date, no visual evidence o any type o

    intact or expended 140mm rocket warhead has been iden-tied in videos shot in the areas o the August 21 attack.

    The 140mm rocket is documented in standard reerencematerials as being present in the Syrian governments

    weapons arsenal. Designed in the 1950s, the Soviet Uniontranserred 200 BM-14 launchers,10 the most common

    launcher or 140mm rockets made by the Soviet Union, toSyria in 1967-1969, presumably along with stockpiles o

    8 The rocket is visible i n the ollowing YouTube video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nymy8r0Kcag (accessed September 9, 2013).9 [UN examines the remains o a missile in the area o chemicalGota], August 27, 2013, video clip, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6mOLULcrcVs$ (accessed September 9, 2013).10 The BM-14 launcher is the most common or 140mm rocketsthat were made by the Soviet Union. Other types o launchers existas does the possibility o improvising eld expedient launchers, asVietcong orces did during the Vietnam War.

    ammunition including 140mm rockets, accord

    database on arms transers maintained by the

    International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).11

    According to a declassied US munitions catalstandard international reerence materials pu

    Janes,13 only three warheads were produced rockets:

    M-14-OF high explosive-ragmentation;

    M-14-D smoke containing white phosphoru

    A chemical warhead containing 2.2 kilogram

    Based on witness statements describing the im

    rockets and the absence o rocket remnants otypes o injuries consistent with an attack u

    11 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, A

    ers Database, www.sipri.org/databases/armstransersreport or Syria or the period 19502012, generated on A2013.12 US Deense Intelligence Agency and US Army Intellig

    Ammunition Data and Terminal Eects Guide -- Eurasian Countries, DST-1160Z-126-92, March 5, 1992, partially dand released to Human Rights Watch via FOIA request.13 Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Wil liams, eds., Janestion Handbook 1997-1998 (Surrey, UK: Janes InormationLimited, 2008), pp. 544-45.

    I. the auguSt 21 attackS on

    ghouta

    On the morning o August 21, 2013, dozens o videos be-

    gan appearing on YouTube channels associated with theSyrian opposition showing large numbers o dead people,

    the victims o what the opposition claimed was a chemical

    weapons attack. The ootage also showed many hospital-ized victims who seemed to be suering rom symptoms

    rom such an attack. Large numbers o dead animals, in-cluding sheep, dogs, cats, and wild birds, were also vis-

    ible in the videos uploaded by the activists.

    As more details became available, it bec ame clear that the

    attack had aected two separate opposition-controlleddistricts in Damascus Suburbs governorate, located 16 ki-

    lometers apart. According to local residents, the Zamalkaneighborhood in Eastern Ghouta was struck by rockets

    at some time between 2 and 3 a.m., and the Moadamiya

    neighborhood in Western Ghouta was struck by rockets atabout 5 a.m., shortly ater the completion o the Muslim

    morning prayer.

    Victims consistently showed symptoms including suoca-tion; constricted, irregular, and inrequent breathing; in-

    voluntary muscle spasms; nausea; rothing at the mouth;

    fuid coming out o noses and eyes; convulsing; dizziness;blurred vision; and red and irritated eyes, and pin-point

    pupils. According to an expert review o the available ev-idence, the symptoms exhibited by the victims are con-

    sistent with exposure to a nerve agent such as Sarin. As

    discussed in part III. below, Sarin has been used in atleast one previous chemical attack in the Syrian confict.

    Moadamya, Western Ghouta

    In Moadamiya in Western Ghouta, a witness who arrived

    on the scene shortly ater rockets struck an apartment

    building next to the Rawda Mosque, told Human RightsWatch what ollowed ater the rocket struck. His account

    directly linked the rocket strike to deaths associated withthe alleged chemical attack in the area:

    One rocket hit around 5 a.m. We were prayingin the mosque near the turbi area 400 meters

    away [rom the strike site]. We heard the strikeand went to the site to help the wounded. We

    thought it was a regular rocket but when we got

    there someone was screaming Chemical! Chemi-cal! The rocket ell in the rst foor o a our-story

    apartment building. Everyone in the building diedin their sleep. It didnt cause a lot o destruction...

    It made an opening in the wall. Ater the person

    was screaming, people covered their aces, withshirts dunked in water. We didnt smell any thing,4

    but people were ainting. I covered my ace witha shirt dunked in water and was rescuing people

    and taking them to the medical centerI anyoneentered the building where the rocket ell they

    would aint.5

    The witness identied a rocket as the weapon he saw on

    the scene ater the strike.6

    He told Human Rights Watchthat in the days ollowing the strike, the United Nations

    Mission to Investigate Allegations o the Use o Chemical

    Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (the UN Mission) vis-ited the site, examined the remnant, and took it with them,

    presumably or urther analysis.

    A second witness who works or the Moadamiya mediacenter told Human Rights Watch that he counted seven

    rockets that ell in two areas o Moadamiya during the

    early morning o August 21.7 He told Human Rights Watchthat our rockets impacted next to the Rawda Mosque,

    and the other three in the area between Qahweh Streetand Zeytouneh Street, which he identied as being ap-

    proximately 500 meters to the east o the Rawda Mosque.

    According to the witness, all o the rockets were o thesame type, identied by Human Rights Watch as a Soviet-

    produced 140mm rocket (see opposite page).

    4 In its pure orm, Sarin is a clear, colorless, tasteless and odorlessliquid. See Centers or Disease Control and Prevention, EmergencyPreparedness and Response: Facts about Sarin, at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/sarin/basics/acts.asp.5 Human Rights Watch Skype interview with witness in Moadamiya,August 22, 2013.6 The rocket is visible in the ollowing YouTube video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nymy8r0Kcag (accessed September 9, 2013).7 Human Rights Watch Skype interview with member o Moadamiyamedia center, August 22, 2013.

    A declassed reerence drawng rom Ordatao the Soet-produced 140mm rocket, whchcan carry a warhead contanng 2.2 kg o Sarn.

  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    8/16

    6 ATTACKS ON GHOUTA SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS

    attack on Moadadiya on August 21 represents the rst

    known appearance o the 140mm rocket, which has notbeen documented in use in the current Syrian confict. Hu-

    man Rights Watch is not aware o any inormation indicat-ing that opposition orces are in possession o the 140mm

    rocket, and its associated launching system.

    Zamalka, Eastern Ghouta

    Human Rights Watch documented the use o apparent

    surace-to-surace 330mm rockets in Zamalka, Eastern

    Ghouta on August 21. We ound no evidence o any use othe 140mm rocket system used in the Moadamiya attack

    in Eastern Ghouta.

    syria-incendiary-weapons-used-populated-areas; Syria: Evidence

    Shows Cluster Bombs Killed Children, Human Right s Watch newsrelease, November 27, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/27/syria-evidence-shows-cluster-bombs-killed-children-0; Friendso Syria: Push to End Indiscriminate Shelling, Human RightsWatch news release, February 24, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/02/24/riends-syria-push-end-indiscriminate-shelling;

    ICBL publicly condemns reports o Syrian orces laying mines, Hu-man Rights Watch news release, November 2, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/11/02/icbl-publicly-condemns-reports-syrian-orces-laying-mines.

    Witness statements and inormation including

    tions o rockets ound in the area provided by ists, as well as satellite imagery locations that

    location in the videos, have allowed Human Rigto conrm at least our strike sites in Zamalk

    least eight 330mm rockets struck on August 21

    likely to be a complete account o the number used in the attack.16

    Two rockets struck al-Mahariq Street, o

    Ghazal building and the other on Mehbuilding;

    One rocket struck the Bostan neighborhooal-Tahoun street;

    16 Human Rights Watch Skype interview with a membe

    civilian council, September 4, 2013.

    explosive or incendiary payloads, Human Rights Watch

    believes there is little possibility that the rocket could

    have been carrying high explosive or incendiary pay-loads. Given the large number o casualties, this leaves a

    chemical agent warhead as a strong remaining possibility,which would be consistent with the symptoms displayed

    by the victims.

    According to declassied reerence guides, the 140mm ar-

    tillery rocket has a minimum range o 3.8 kilometers anda maximum range o 9.8 kilometers.14 Two witnesses told

    Human Rights Watch that the August 21 rocket attack ontheir area came rom the direction o the Mezzeh Military

    Airport and the nearby Syrian 4th Armored Division base,

    which are located respectively our kilometers and veto seven kilometers rom the site o the attack, and thus

    within the range o possible launching sites. The projected

    14 US Deense Intelligence Agency and US Army IntelligenceAgency, Ammunition Data and Terminal Eects Guide - - EurasianCommunist Countries, DST-1160Z-126-92, March 5, 1992, partiallydeclassied and released to Human Rights Watch via FOIA request.

    likely launch zone or the 140mm rocket impact near the

    Rawda Mosque encompasses multiple Syrian governmentmilitary bases, training acilities, surace-to-air missile

    sites, the 4th Armored Division base, as well as the east-ern section o the Mezzeh Military Airport.

    Human Rights Watch has closely monitored the types omunitions and weapons used in the Syrian confict, and

    has extensively reported on unlawul use o weapons bySyrian government orces, including heavy 240mm mor-

    tars against populated areas, antipersonnel mines, indis-

    criminate air-dropped bombs, at least six types o clustermunitions, incendiary weapons against civilians, and

    indiscriminate tactical ballistic missiles.15 However, the

    15 See or example: Cluster Munitions: Syria Use Persists, Hu-

    man Rights Watch news release, September 4, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/04/cluster-munitions-syria-use-persists;

    Syria: Ballistic Missiles Killing Civilians, Many Children, HumanRights Watch news release, August 5, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/04/syria-ballistic-missiles-killing-civilians-many-children; Human Rights Watch, Death rom the Skies, April 10, 2013,http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/04/10/death-skies; Syria: A rmyUsing New Type o Cluster Munition, Human Rights Watch newsrelease, January 14 , 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/14/syria-army-using-new-type-cluster-munition; Syria: IncendiaryWeapons Used in Populated Areas, Human Rights Watch newsrelease, December 1 2, 2012, http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/12/

    The 140mm Soet-produced rocket motor ound at the ste othe Moadamya alleged chemcal weapons attack. The rocket scapable o carryng a 2.2kg Sarn warhead.Source http://www.youtube.com/watch?=nymy8r0Kcag

    A Member o the UN Msson measurng and photogra140mm Soet rocket motor ound at the ste o the Malleged chemcal weapons attack. The 140mm rocket o carryng a 2.2kg Sarn warhead.Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?=6mOLULc

  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    9/16

    8 ATTACKS ON GHOUTA SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS

    ell or had an impact but they were dead on theground. Ater around 40 minutes rescuing people,

    I started eeling my body aching. I was eeling

    weak and unable to move. Then my eyes startedhurting me and headache started. There was no

    smoke but there was a smell... I told my riend thatI have to go to the hospital. He put me in a car and

    drove away I remember very well when we let

    al-Mazraat in my riends car, I saw a dog crossingthe street. I shouted to my riend to be careul not

    to hit him but beore I nished my sentence thedog by itsel collapsed on the ground.

    The same witness also conrmed to Human Rights Watch

    that he had videotaped and uploaded a large number o

    videos taken at the hospital o the wounded and dead. 18

    A second witness shared with Human Rights Watch sev-eral videos o remnants o the weapons used in the al-

    Mazraat area on August 21. The videos show the same

    330mm rocket type.

    The member o the Zamalka media center also shared withHuman Rights Watch videos and pictures he took o rockets

    in the al-Mahariq strike site aected during the August 21attack. The remnants in these videos are also 330mm rock-

    ets. On August 29 he visited the al-Mahariq strike site and

    photographed a 330mm rocket he ound there and whichhe believes had been used during the August 21 attack.

    In the proceeding days, when the UN chemical weaponsinspection team visited Zamalka, he took several videos o

    other 330mm rockets ound at the al-Mahariq site, as they

    were being examined by the UN weapon inspectors.

    The 330mm surace-to-surace rocket that appears to be as-sociated with the August 21 attack on Eastern Ghouta is o

    a type not listed in standard, specialized, international ordeclassied reerence materials. It is a rocket type that has

    not been documented beore the outbreak o the current

    Syrian confict, although it has been documented in a num-

    18 The witness conrmed to Human Rights Watch that he video-taped and uploaded the ollowing videos: http://youtu.be/R6na2UF-HN9Y; http://youtu.be/6qLJ3ixwv r8; http://youtu.be/xB2spW5JpI;http://youtu.be/rldBJJecBnM; http://youtu.be/WHU-KA0iP3k; andhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WHU-KA0 iP3k (accessed Sep-tember 9, 2013).

    ber o other attacks on opposition held areas in tprior to the Eastern Ghouta at tack, including at l

    tack in which opposition activists claimed the g

    had carried out an alleged chemical attack (see

    Human Rights Watch has obtained precise meaor the dimensions o the warhead rom a local

    Eastern Ghouta, and these measurements dete

    the estimated volume o nerve agent inside thewould be approximately 50 to 60 liters, compa

    liters or the warheads designed or the 140mPrior to each attack, the warhead o the 330m

    would have to be lled with the 50 to 60 literagent, a dangerous process that is normally con

    specialized teams wearing protective gear to p

    posure to the chemical agents. Human Rights Waware o any inormation that the opposition o

    ever possessed the amounts o chemical weanecessary to deploy such rockets, or that they p

    expertise needed to ll the warheads without

    exposure to the deadly nerve agent.

    Using the measurements and high-resolutioprovided by the Eastern Ghouta activist, Hum

    Watch has been able to reconstruct the charo the 330mm rocket. Detailed measurements

    resolution photographs provided directly by an

    Eastern Ghouta allowed Human Rights Watch todiameter o the rocket as approximately 330mm

    nicant because these dimensions are compatibIranian-produced 333mm Falaq-2 launcher, or cl

    and derivatives thereo.19 Iran is believed to b

    country in the world to produce rocket launch333mm category. Videos have appeared show

    orces using the Falaq-2 launching system to laappears to be versions o the 330mm rockets, al

    launches seen in the video occurred during daare thus unrelated to the August 21 nighttime at

    19 See the brochure extract rom Irans Deense Industrnization on the Falaq-2 launcher and its FL2-A rocket, avaNic Jenzen-Jones, Alleged CW Munitions in Syria Fired FrFalaq-2 Type Launchers, post to The Rogue AdventurerAugust 29, 2013, http://rogueadventurer.com/2013/08/2cw-munitions-in-syria-red-rom-iranian-alaq-2-type-lau(accessed September 6, 2013).20 Nic Jenzen-Jones, Alleged CW Munitions in Syria FirFrom Iranian Falaq-2 Type Launchers, http://rogueadve

    Two rockets struck next to the Hamza mosque, onejust next to the mosque and the other close to the

    nearby al-Kamal banquet hall;

    Three rockets struck the al-Mazraat neighborhood

    next to the al-Tawq mosque and next to the elemen-tary school.

    None o the witness accounts describing the impact o therockets, and none o the images o the rocket remnants or

    the reported injuries sustained at the scene are consis-tent with an attack using high explosive or incendiary pay-

    loads, as there are no visible traumatic injuries on any othe victims or large impact craters visible at the scene o

    the rocket impacts. High-explosive payloads would have

    caused severe physical injuries to the victims and leavelarge impact craters, while incendiary weapons cause se-

    vere burns on the victims, and leave behind a distinctiveburn scar where they strike. Based on the lack o evidence

    o a high-explosive or incendiary attack, and symptoms o

    victims that are consistent with a chemical attack, Human

    Rights Watch believes that the 330mm rockets ound at

    the sites were used in the alleged chemical attack.

    A member o the Zamalka media center told Human RightsWatch that he visited the scene o one strike in the al-Maz-

    raat area o Zamalka just ater the attack. 17 He said:

    On August 21, I was in the media oce when

    around 2 to 3 a.m. my riends called to say thatrockets had hit Zamalka. When I heard that, I went

    to the eld hospital in al-Mazraat neighborhood

    Ater around 30 minutes rockets hit the al-Maz-raat area. When the explosion hit I heard a very

    low sound, it was like the sound o a helicopterbuzzing, and not the sound o explosion I went

    outside the eld hospital and started running to-wards the explosion site. I didnt reach the explo-

    sions site because I saw injured people on the

    ground and people screaming and running in alldirections I remember I went into one house and

    saw a man with his wie on the ground. The housewas not destroyed. It was not where the rocket

    17 Human Rights Watch Skype interview with member o media

    center, September 4, 2013.

    A Member o the UN nspecton team photographng a 330mmrocket ound at the al-Maharq strke ste.Source: http://youtu.be/MmP6wPdTIUM

  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    10/16

    10 ATTACKS ON GHOUTA SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS W

    (c)

    a) Front plateof warheadand b) fuzeand explosivecharge(estimated)

    e) Chemical agent warhead -Capacity estimated at 50-60 literswith f) central tubing

    g) Plug or valvewith unidentifiedfunction

    (m) Motornozzle

    (k) Stabilizingfins and (l) ring

    c) Thick metalblast plate

    1550mm (rocket motor)

    120mm

    650mm (Est. 1050mm length for HE variant)

    2200m (Est. 2600mm length for HE variant)

    330mm350mm

    (b)

    (c)

    (d)(g)

    (d)

    (i) Rocket motor

    (m)

    (k)

    (k)

    (l)

    (m)

    (d)

    h) Filling plug (not present

    on HE rocket variant)

    (c)

    (d)

    d) Thin, exterior wall ofwarhead, designed to peel offallowing the dispersal of thechemical agent

    (f)

    (h)

    (h)

    j) The chemical variant of the330mm rocket is identifiedwith red numbers. The highexplosive (HE) rocket variantis numbered in black

    (j)

    (e) Chemical agent

    (a)

    Photographs courtesy of Eliot Higgins of Brown Moses blog http://brown-moses.blogspot.ch

    (a)

    (c)(i)

    (d)

    (c)

    (f)

    (g)

    (h)

    (g)(l)

    DIAGRAM OF MM CHEMICAL ROCKET VARIANT

    THIS DIAGRAM OF THE MM CHEMICAL ROCKET VARIANT IS DRAWN TO SCALE, BASEDON INFIELD MEASUREMENTS OF SURVIVING ROCKET COMPONENTS COLLECTED FROMIMPACT SITES IN THE ZAMALKA NEIGHBORHOOD OF DAMASCUS FOLLOWING THE ATTACKSON THE MORNING OF AUGUST , .

  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    11/16

    12 ATTACKS ON GHOUTA SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS W

    animals nearby, otherwise uninjured and showing signs o

    exposure to a nerve agent.

    No evidence has been produced that opposition orces are

    in possession o the 330mm surace-to-surace rocketsand their associated launchers. The only documented at-

    tacks using this weapon syst em in Syria have been against

    opposition-held areas and targets. The Syrian governmentis known to possess the Iranian Falaq-2 333mm rocket

    launching system, as several videos have emerged on so-cial media allegedly showing Syrian government orces

    ring the 330mm rockets rom truck-mounted 333mmlaunchers, although no videos have emerged rom the

    nighttime August 21 attack.26

    26 Nic Jenzen-Jones, Alleged CW Munitions in Syria FiredFrom Iranian Falaq-2 Type L aunchers, http://rogueadventurer.com/2013/08/29/alleged-cw-munitions-in-syria-red-rom-iranian-alaq-2-type-launchers/.

    Death Toll

    Because the August 21 attacks took place in tw

    areas o Ghouta, and owing to the chaos resultin

    large number o casualties, it is dicult to estabcise death toll. The areas aected do not have

    hospitals, and rely on several small, badly suppground clinics to provide medical assistance. Ac

    the doctors interviewed by Human Rights Wasmall medical clinics were overwhelmed by th

    o victims, and many o the dead were never

    the clinics and thus not registered. According toSans Frontires, at least 3,600 persons were

    symptoms consistent with exposure to neurotoat three hospitals it supports in the area in the

    hours ollowing the attacks.27

    27 Mdecins Sans Frontires, Syria: Thousands Suer

    The rocket is o a non-aerodynamic design and possessesa novel spin stabilization mechanism located just above

    the nozzle. The non-aerodynamic design o the rocket in-

    dicates that the rocket would be relatively short rangedand not capable o accurate targeting.

    The consistency in the design o these rockets suggests

    that they were locally but industrially produced, and ap-

    parently designed to be deployed with the Iranian 333mmlaunchers or derivatives thereo. While Human Rights

    Watch cannot establish where the rockets were manuac-tured, their basic design and unique size matching the Ira-

    nian rocket launching system suggest a Syrian industrialorigin. The production o a weapon specically designed

    to deliver chemical weapons would be a violation o the

    1993 Convention on Chemical Weapons, o which only vecountries, including Syria, are not parties.

    While a separate, high-explosive warhead version o the

    rocket appears to exist based on attacks in other areas,

    three design dierences appear to distinguish the sus-pected chemical weapon type rom the suspected high-

    explosive type: videos and photos o the weapons romattacks in Syria show that the chemical weapons variant

    has an additional plug or aperture on the payload (used toll the container with chemical agent prior to ring); the

    high-explosive type measures at least 400mm longer; and

    the chemical weapons variant appears to be numbered inred numbers (with one documented rocket numbered 900,

    suggesting a signicant number o the rockets were pro-duced), while images o the high-explosive variant con-

    sistently show that it has black numbering, perhaps or

    ease o identication. All o the 330mm rocket remnantsidentied by Human Rights Watch in the Eastern Ghouta

    Zamalka attack are o the suspected chemical weaponsvariant, with red numbering, a shorter-sized warhead, and

    an additional ll plug.

    Most signicantly, the design o the payload o the rock-

    ets ound at the scene o the Eastern Ghouta August 21 at-tack strongly indicates that it is compatible, and perhaps

    specically designed, or the delivery o chemical agents.The payload o the rocket consists o a large, thin-walled

    com/2013/08/29/alleged-cw-munitions-in-syria-red-rom-iranian-alaq-2-type-launchers/.

    container, capable o holding 50 to 60 liters o chemicalagent which is loaded into the payload via a plughole, and

    a small central tube with a suspected bursting charge at

    the ront, rupturing the thin-walled container and distrib-uting the vaporized chemical agent.

    The 330mm rocket has appeared in its high-explosive orm

    in previous attacks around Damascus. The high-explosive

    version o the 330mm surace-to-surace rocket appearsto have been used in the Daraya suburb o Damascus on

    January 4 , 201321 and in Khalidiya, in Homs governorate,on August 2, 2013. Opposition orces blamed both attacks

    on the Syrian government, although Human Rights Watchcould not independently conrm this allegation.22

    On August 5, 2013, opposition activists lmed what ap-pears to be the remnants o the chemical weapons-carry-

    ing variant (with the extra ll plug visible23

    as well as thered numbering system)24 o the 330mm rocket in the Adra

    suburb o Damascus, in what they alleged was a chemi-

    cal weapons attack by Syrian government orces.25 WhileHuman Rights Watch could not independently conrm the

    allegations that Syrian government orces were respon-sible or the August 5 `Adra attack, the videos do show

    the remnants o suspected chemical weapons-deliveryvariant o the 330mm rocket, as well as dead and dying

    21 [Flash important one o the rockets that ell tonight aya],January 4, 2013, video clip, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5DznRyIQ1js(accessed September 6, 2013).22 Unidentied Rocket or Missile in Khalidiya, Homs August2nd 2013, August 6, 2013, v ideo clip, YouTube, http://youtu.be/0eIrXubJAgE (accessed September 6, 2013).23 [Rocket, which was carrying chemical materials and showsaround the dead animals afer chemical attack], August 5, 2013,video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLcqi_dE-9SU (accessed September 6, 2013).24 Unidentied Munitions Linked To August 5th Adra ChemicalAttack, August 22, 2013, video clip, YouTube, ht tps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0lzUvozF1c (accessed September 6, 2013).

    25 [Rocket, which was carrying chemical materials and showsaround the dead animals afer chemical attack], August 5, 2013,video clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YLcqi_dE9SU (accessed September 6, 2013); Brown Moses, Unidenti-ed Munitions Linked To August 5th Adra Chemical Attack, Au-gust 22, 2013, video cl ip, YouTube, htt ps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0lzUvozF1c (accessed September 6, 2013); Brown Moses,

    Unidentied Munition Linked To August 5th Adra Chemical Attack[2], August 22, 2013, v ideo clip, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tzhhhv3uHio (accessed September 6, 2013).

    Ths handout photo proded by Shaam News Networbodes o ctms o an alleged chemcal weapons attGhouta, Syra, on August 21, 2013. 2013 Assocated

  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    12/16

    14 ATTACKS ON GHOUTA SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS W

    II. IdentIfIcatIon of the

    WeaponS uSed In the attackS

    Human Rights Watch analyzed publicly posted YouTube

    videos rom the attacked areas as well as higher-reso-lution images o weapon remnants provided by a local

    activist in Eastern Ghouta, and identied and analyzed

    two separate surace-to-surace rocket systems that arebelieved to be associated with the delivery o chemical

    agents.

    By directly contacting the activists who videotaped anduploaded the videos o the attack available on YouTube,

    Human Rights Watch has been able to veriy the reliability

    o the videos, and conrmed that they were lmed in theaected area. In the case o Eastern Ghouta, a local ac-

    tivist provided Human Rights Watch with high-resolutionphotographs and measurements o the 330mm rocket

    components. UN inspectors were also videotaped inspect-

    ing some o the same rocket remnants during their on-sitevisit, urther conrming that the rockets are located at the

    scene o the attacks.

    The rst type o rocket, ound at the site o the EasternGhouta attacks, is a 330mm rocket that appears to have

    a warhead designed to be loaded with and deliver a

    large payload o liquid chemical agent. The second type,ound in the Western Ghouta attack, is a Soviet-produced

    140mm rocket which according to reerence guides has theability to be armed with one o three possible warheads in-

    cluding a warhead that was specically designed to carry

    and deliver 2.2 kilograms o Sarin.30

    Our analysis does not exclude the possibility that addi-tional weapons delivery systems were used in the Eastern

    and Western Ghouta attacks that have not yet been identi-ed and analyzed. However, the two analyzed by Human

    Rights Watch are the only known rocket systems identied

    as associated with the attacks, according to local activistswho have closely inspected both the aected areas.

    30 Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Janes Ammuni-tion Handbook 1997-1998 (Surrey, UK: Janes Inormation GroupLimited, 2008), pp. 544-45.

    In the hours ater the August 21 attacks, locauploaded several videos o the remnants o ro

    said were collected rom some o the sites o t

    including some showing remnants apparenwhere they struck on the ground.31 In addit

    graphs taken by local activists including somthe scenes o the attack, appear to show the re

    rockets used in the attacks.32 By directly con

    activists responsible or uploading the videoRights Watch has been able to obtain precise

    tions where some rocket remnants were oundused satellite imagery to match the locations se

    videos to precise map locations.

    Because the areas in Ghouta where the alleg

    cal attacks occurred were shelled by Syrian gorces prior to and ater August 21, it is dicul

    sively determine i the two types o rockets ideSoviet 140mm rocket and the 330mm rocket o

    origin, were the ones used in the attacks. How

    activists say that they only ound the remnantrockets in the hours ater the attacks o August

    beore.

    In addition, none o the rocket remnants revpeared to contain high explosive or incendiary (

    substances such as white phosphorus) payloa

    ing to local activists and doctors as well as pubable videos o the dead and wounded, none o t

    31 [Serious one rocket, which was carrying toxic gasescaused the massacre in Medmah Sham] August 25, 201clip, YouTube, http://youtu.be/nymy8r0Kcag, (accessed S6, 2013); [A chemical rocket that did not explode in a locwas targeted with chemotherapy in the Eastern Ghouta],2013, video clip, YouTube, http://youtu.be/kllhsgFrgN0 (September 6, 2013); [Chemical rocket that landed on Eaand witness testimonies o the surviv ors], August 22, 20clip, YouTube, http://youtu.be/Pc6xL-N65M, (accessed S2013); [The truth o what happened - an eyewitness o tho the chemical in East Ghouta], August 22, 2013, video Tube, http://youtu.be/h2uBpDxAoJA, (accessed Septem

    [One o the rockets dropped on chemical Zamalka area aAugust 21, 2013, video cli p, YouTube, http://youtu.be/16(accessed September 6, 2013).32 See: Brown Moses, August 21st Chemical Attack, gphotographs, August 24, 2013, http://imgur.com/a/1nzition o photographs collated by Brown Moses accessed S6, 2013);, Images o rockets which delivered poison to cus, ITV, August 25, 2013, http://www.itv.com/news/20images-o-rockets-which-delivered-poison-to-damascusSeptember 6, 2013).(ITV).

    Human Rights Watch has collected the names o 80 in-dividuals believed to have been killed in the August 21

    strikes in Moadamiya in Western Ghouta. Two sources

    told Human Rights Watch that 103 people were killed inthe Moadamiya attack.28

    Because the attack on Eastern Ghouta involved a much

    larger aected area, and several small clinics where vic-tims were brought, a total death toll is more dicult to

    establish. A member o the Zamalka media center, stated

    during an interview with Human Rights Watch on Septem-ber 4, and in a separate interview with local journalists on

    Neurotoxic Symptoms Treated in Hospitals Supported by MSF, Au-gust 24, 2013.28 Syria: Witnesses Describe Alleged Chemical Attacks, HumanRights Watch news release, August 21, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/21/syria-witnesses-describe-alleged-chemical-attacks.

    the same day, that the local council in Zamalka had regis-

    tered the ull names o 734 pers ons who were killed during

    the attack in Zamalka neighborhood. 29

    29 Human Rights Watch Skype interview with member o Zamalkamedia center, September 4, 2013; [Chairman o the local council inthe port Zamalka in Ghouta campaign will not die], September 3,2013, video c lip, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IT4R14LHNZM&eature=youtu.be (accessed September 6, 2013).

    Ths handout photo proded by Shaam News Network showsbodes o a baby and two chldren, ctms o an alleged chem-cal weapons attack on Ghouta, Syra, on August 21, 2013. 2013 Assocated Press

  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    13/16

    16 ATTACKS ON GHOUTA SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS W

    the large number o videos that were taken o the victims

    o the August 21 attack.

    The videos showed that several o the younger victims ex-hibited cyanosis, a bluish coloring on their ace, especially

    around their eyes and mouth, which is consistent with su-

    ocation or asphyxiation. The suocation was likely eithercaused by excessive secretion o mucus and fuids in the

    lungs and air passages, or damage to the part o the ner-vous system that supports breathing, or both. A majority

    o adult victims in these videos also show signs o exces-

    sive secretions o fuids or mucus rom the mouth andnose. Several o the patients shown in the videos were ex-

    periencing involuntary muscle spasms or convulsions. It issignicant that there was no obvious indication o bodily

    trauma or excessive blood loss.

    These observations are consistent with reports rom wit-

    nesses, doctors, and the international aid organizationMdecins Sans Frontires (MSF).33 For example, three lo-

    cal doctors told Human Rights Watch that residents a-

    33 Mdecins Sans Frontires, Syria: Thousands Suering romNeurotoxic Symptoms Treated in Hospitals Supported by MSF, Au-gust 24, 2013, http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cm?id=7029 (accessed September 7, 2013).

    ected by the attacks consistently showed clinincluding suocation; constricted, irregular,

    quent breathing; involuntary muscle spasms; the mouth; fuid coming out o noses and ey

    sions; red and irritated eyes and pin-point pupil

    In addition, they report that victims complaineddizziness, and blurred vision.

    The clinical signs we observed on the videos and

    and symptoms o the victims commonly reporteare not consistent with injuries due to explosi

    sions, ragmentation, or incendiary devices. No

    consistent with exposure to chocking/pulmonmatory, incapacitating, vesicant/blister, or a

    blood agents. Rather they are a strong indicatiovictims were exposed to a toxic organophosph

    ical agent (a nerve agent) which acts by inh

    zymes necessary to the proper unctioning o thsystem. This class o chemicals includes the

    sustained by the dead and injured rom the attacks ap-pear to be the result o high explosive or incendiary weap-

    ons. In both the Eastern and Western Ghouta attacks,witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch described

    how large numbers o persons died without any type o

    traumatic injury in the immediate vicinity o the strikes in-volving the identied rockets.

    III. IdentIfIcatIon of the nerve

    agent uSed In the attackS

    The precise identication o the specic chemical agent

    used in the August 21 attack requires the collection osamples rom weapon remnants, environmental samples,

    and physiological samples rom those directly or indirectlyexposed to the chemical agent. Subsequent specialized

    analyses o these samples can reveal the specic agent

    itsel or the reaction or degradation products character-istic o a specic agent. The UN investigative team has

    collected such samples, and will issue its ndings aterthe completion o its investigation. In the absence o such

    testing, Human Rights Watch can only make a preliminary,indirect, circumstantial identication o the chemical that

    was likely used in the Ghouta attacks.

    Human Rights Watch has sought technical advice rom Dr.

    Keith B. Ward, a respected expert on the detection and e-ects o chemical warare agents, who has reviewed rst-

    hand and second-hand reports rom local residents, the

    clinical signs and symptoms described by doctors, and

    A stll mage rom a YouTube deo uploaded by oppostonactsts ollowng the August 21 alleged chemcal attackshows a ctm o the attack rothng rom the nose and mouth,a medcal condton assocated wth exposure to nere agentssuch as Sarn.Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?=AqCDSq_BXKo

    A stll mage rom a YouTube deo uploaded by oppoststs ollowng the August 21 alleged chemcal attacmedcal staf attemptng to restran a ctm who appebe undergong asculatons (noluntary muscle spasconulsons), a medcal condton assocated wth exnere agents such as Sarn.Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?=5SZIbB

  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    14/16

    18 ATTACKS ON GHOUTA SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS W

    Le Monde newspaper, Laurent Van der Stockt, was ex-

    posed to what he believed was a chemical weapon attackwhile in Jobar in April 2013.35 In laboratory tests conducted

    upon his return to France, he tested positive or exposureto Sarin. Sarin was thus a likely agent to have been used

    in the Jobar attack, and is consistent with the symptoms

    experienced by those exposed to the agent during the Au-gust 21 attacks on Ghouta.36

    Other samples collected by the Le Monde team rom sites

    o suspected chemical attacks in the Jobar and Ghouta ar-

    eas also tested positive or Sarin in June 2013.37 During thesame April trip, the Le Monde journalists also collected

    21 hair, blood, urine, and clothes samples rom victims osuspected chemical weapon attacks in Jobar and Ghouta

    35 Kareem Fahim, Still More Questions Than Answers on Ner ve

    Gas in Syria, June 10, 2013, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/world/middleeast/still-more-questions-than-an-swers-on-nerve-gas-in-syria.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessedSeptember 9, 2013).36 Jean-Philippe Rmy, Des analyses conrment lampleur delusage de sarin en Syrie, Le Monde, June 28, 2013, http://www.lemonde.r/proche-orient/article/2013/06/28/des-analyses-conr-ment-l-ampleur-de-l-usage-de-sarin-en-syrie_3438187_3218.html(accessed September 6, 2013).37 Ibid.

    neighborhoods o Damascus and had the samp

    by the Centre Dtudes du Bouchet, a French specializing in the analysis o samples o nucl

    cal, and biological agents. Thirteen o the samp

    positive or exposure to Sarin gas, while the ples tested inconclusive.38

    38 Ibid.

    common pesticide Malathion, but the severity and extento the clinical signs and symptoms coupled with the large

    death toll that resulted rom the attack strongly suggeststhat a much more toxic chemical warare nerve agent was

    used in the attack.

    Syria is believed to possess at least two nerve agents,

    Sarin and VX, in signicant quantities.34 Sarin is a toxicbut non-persistent nerve agent. Exposure is usually due

    to inhalation, and the agent rather quickly degrades anddisperses into atmosphere. The agent VX is both more

    persistent and 5 to 10 times more toxic than Sarin. Expo-

    sure and death by VX is caused by inhalation or by skin,

    34 See, or example: David E. Sanger, Andrew W. Lehern, andRick Gladstone, With the World Watching, Syria Amassed NerveGas, September 7, 2013, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/world/middleeast/with-the-world-watching-syria-amassed-nerve-gas.html?pagewanted=all (accessed September 7,2013).

    conjunctival, and mucosal absorption. There are reports

    that people were able to visit the sites o the attacks aew hours post attack and to handle remnants o rockets

    associated with the attacks without suering signs andsymptoms o exposure to nerve agent. This suggests that

    the nerve agent involved is more likely to be the less per-

    sistent and less toxic agent, Sarin, rather than VX.

    Thus while our ndings cannot be conclusive without lab-oratory analyses o environmental and physiological sam-

    ples, the large number o victims o the attack, the clinical

    signs and symptoms that characterized both the victimsand, later, the medical workers who treated the victims,

    and the act that areas near attack sites were apparentlysae to enter soon ater the attack, all strongly suggest

    that the attack involved an organophosphate chemicalmore toxic that the pesticide Malathion, and was most

    likely a toxic but non-persistent chemical warare nerve

    agent, such as Sarin, which Syria is believed to possess.

    The use o Sarin in these latest attacks would be consis-tent with its apparent use earlier in Syria. There is labora-

    tory evidence that Sarin gas has been used in previous

    attacks allegedly carried out by Syrian government orces,including an earlier attack in Ghouta. A photographer or

    A stll mage rom a YouTube deo uploaded by opposton ac-tsts ollowng the August 21 alleged chemcal attack showssheep allegedly klled durng the attack. The presence o deadanmals, ncludng brds, dogs, cats, and lestock, s urtheredence o a chemcal attack.Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?=eF4GF1ysNm8&eature=share&lst=UUdqy0MJox2GUa_9R_ILNbGQ

    A stll mage rom a YouTube deo uploaded by oppotsts ollowng the August 21 alleged chemcal attacchld ctm o the attack rothng rom the mouth and(blush colorng o the ace, especally around the lpby sufocaton or asphyxaton due to the buld-up o and luds n the lungs), a medcal condton assocatexposure to nere agents such as Sarn.Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?=xTKTl4

  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    15/16

    20 ATTACKS ON GHOUTA SEPTEMBER 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS W

    v. SyrIa and chemIcal WeaponS

    under InternatIonal laW

    Syria is not among the 189 countries that are party to the

    1993 Convention on the Prohibition o the Development,Production, Stockpiling, and Use o Chemical Weapons

    and on their Destruction.39 However, Syria is a party tothe 1925 Geneva Gas protocol, which bans the use in waro asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and o all anal-

    ogous liquids, materials or devices.40The use o chemicalweapons is also prohibited as a matter o customary inter-

    national humanitarian law, or the laws o war.41

    The prohibition on the use o chemical weapons applies to

    all armed conficts, including so-called non-internationalarmed conficts such as the current ghting in Syria. The

    International Criminal Tribunal or the ormer Yugoslavia,in the Tadic case, stated there undisputedly emerged a

    general consensus in the international community on the

    principle that the use o [chemical] weapons is also pro-hibited in internal armed conficts.42 In 1977, during a de-

    bate in the First Committee o the United Nations GeneralAssembly, Syria supported a complete ban on chemical

    weapons.43

    39 Convention on the Prohibition o the Development, Production,Stockpiling, and Use o Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction,Paris, January 13, 1993, Doc. CD/CW/WP.400/Rev. 1, http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.ns/Treaty.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=9D3CCA7B40638EF5C12563F6005F63C5 (access September 7,2013).40 Protocol or the Prohibition o the Use o Asphyxiating, Poison-ous or Other Gases, and o Bacteriological Methods o Warare,Geneva (Geneva Gas Protocol), J une 17, 1925, http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.ns/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=58A096110540867AC12563CD005187B9. Syria ratied the Geneva GasProtocol in 1968.41 International Committee o the Red Cross, Henckaerts, Doswald-Beck, eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2005), rule 74.42 International Criminal Court or the ormer Yugoslavia, Tadiccase, Interlocutory Appeal, October 2, 1995, sec. 120.43 Syria, Statement beore the First Committee o the UN GeneralAssembly, UN Doc 1/C.1/32PV.15, Sept. 30, 1977, pp. 11 and 16.

    Iv. reSponSIbIlIty for the

    auguSt 21 attackS

    Syran Goernment Forces Responsbl-ty or the Attacks

    The evidence examined by Human Rights Watch stronglysuggests that the August 21 chemical weapon attacks on

    Eastern and Western Ghouta were carried out by govern-

    ment orces. Our basis or this nding is:

    The large-scale nature o the attacks, involving atleast a dozen surace-to-surace rockets aecting

    two dierent neighborhoods in Damascus country-

    side situated 16 kilometers apart, and surrounded bymajor Syrian government military positions.

    One o the types o rockets used in the attack, the

    330mm rocket system likely Syrian produced, whichappear to be have been used in a number o alleged

    chemical weapon attacks, has been lmed in at least

    two instances in the hands o government orces. Thesecond type o rocket, the Soviet-produced 140mm

    rocket, which can carry Sarin, is listed as a weaponknown to be in Syrian government weapon stocks.

    Both rockets have never been reported to be in the

    possession o the opposition. Nor is there any oot-age or other evidence that the armed opposition has

    the vehicle-mounted launchers needed to re theserockets.

    The August 21 attacks were a sophisticated military

    attack, requiring large amounts o nerve agent (each

    330mm warhead is estimated to contain between 50and 60 liters o agent ), specialized procedures to load

    the warheads with the nerve agent, and specializedlaunchers to launch the rockets.

    Ths handout photo proded by Shaam News Network shows ayoung ctm o an alleged chemcal weapons attack on Ghouta,Syra, recuperatng n a hosptal on August 22, 2013. 2013 Assocated Press

  • 7/29/2019 Human Rights Watch: Syria

    16/16

    hrw.org

    (cover photo) Bodies of victims of a

    suspected chemical attack on Ghouta,

    Syria on Wednesday, August 21, 2013.

    AP Photo/Shaam News Network


Recommended