Human Security, Sustainable Equitable Development Security, Sustainable and Equitable Development:...

Human Security,Sustainable

and EquitableDevelopment:

research for a fairer world

Foundations for Canada’sInternational Policy

NSI Paper on the International Policy Review

January 2005

The North-South Institute



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Foundations for Canada’sInternational Policy

NSI Paper on the International Policy Review

January 2005




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The North-South Institute is a charitable corporation established in 1976 to provide professional,policy-relevant research on relations between industrialized and developing countries. The Institute isindependent and cooperates with a wide range of Canadian and international organizations workingin related activities.

The contents of this document represent the views and the findings of the author alone and notnecessarily those of The North-South Institute’s directors, sponsors or supporters or those consultedduring its preparation.

The North-South Institute would like to thank the International Development Research Centre forproviding financial support to help produce this document.

While the principal author of this paper is Roy Culpeper, NSI President, a number of NSIResearchers also participated: Stephen Baranyi; Chantal Blouin; John Foster; Heather Gibb; Bill Morton; Kristiana Powell; Rudi Robinson; Luigi Scarpa de Masellis; Viviane Weitzner; andAnn Weston. The North-South Institute is grateful for comments by Gerry Helleiner on an earlier draft.The Institute, of course, bears full responsibility for the final version.

Managing Editor: Lois Ross

Design and Layout: Green Communication

© The North-South Institute/Institut Nord-Sud, 2004

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National Library of Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Culpeper, Roy, 1947-Human Security, Sustainable and Equitable Development: Foundations for Canada’s International

Policy — NSI paper on the International Policy Review / Roy Culpeper.

Includes bibliographical references.ISBN 1-896770-66-5

1. Economic development--International cooperation. 2. Developing countries--Economic conditions. 3. Canada--Foreign affairs. I. North-South Institute (Ottawa, Ont.) II.Title.

HD82.C778 2004 338.9 C2004-902412-4

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1H U M A N S E C U R I T Y , S U S T A I N A B L E A N D E Q U I T A B L E D E V E L O P M E N T …

ContentsExecut ive Summary 2

Int roduct ion 3

Deve lopment Cooperat ion Po l i cy 7

Mult i la tera l Re form 14

Fair and Inc lus ive Globa l i za t i on 18

Peace and Secur i ty 24

Canada-US Relat ions 29

Implement ing the Framework 32

Annexes :

Annex 1: The Millennium Development Goals 34Annex 2: Excerpt from the Millennium Declaration 36

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1. In the world of the 21st century, the achievement of human security through

sustainable and equitable development will be increasingly fundamental to

foreign policy, international peace, and global commerce. Therefore, a clear set

of development objectives must underpin our international policies in all other

areas—diplomacy, defence and commerce.

2. Together, the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals

(MD/MDGs) present a comprehensive set of objectives towards which various

instruments of international policy—diplomacy, defence, trade and investment,

and development cooperation—should work together.

3. The Prime Minister should publicly embrace the Millennium Declaration

and the Millennium Development Goals as Canada’s vision of the kind of

world Canadians desire and must work towards—one in which human dignity,

justice and peace are upheld universally. He should communicate this vision

to the Canadian public and seek the support of Canadians in helping to

achieve the goals.

4. To operationalize this vision, the federal government should

commit to embodying the Millennium Declaration and the

Development Goals in the strategic priorities and plans of all

departments and agencies. It should also commit to working

closely with provincial and municipal governments, with the

private sector and with civil society to incorporate the

MD/MDGs into their missions, mandates and action plans, so

that the commitment becomes one of the whole of Canada.

5. The Government of Canada should introduce legislation

clearly defining sustainable and equitable development

as the fundamental objective around which international

policy must be coherent, and report regularly to

Parliament on Canada’s contributions and achievements

under the legislation.

6. The Global Affairs Cabinet Committee, and a

parallel committee in Parliament, should regularly

discuss Canada’s contributions and establish Canada’s

own roadmap toward achieving the MD/MDGs over

the next decade.

Executive Summary

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Canada can and must play a much more active role inhelping to bring about a world of greater humansecurity, peace and development. Canadians expectmore of their country and their leaders. They lookback with pride at the passionate engagement offormer Prime Ministers Lester Pearson and PierreTrudeau in the cause of world development andpeace. Canadians also believe they are “at home inthe world” in ways quite distinct from that of citizensof the United States. While they understand theimportance of maintaining a strong and positiverelationship with their neighbour, they are preparedto part ways on critical international issues, such asthe war in Iraq.1

A coherent and consistent policy requires thearticulation of a set of clear objectives and decision-making machinery to deal with inconsistencies andtradeoffs that inevitably will arise. But most of all itrequires vision and leadership from the head ofgovernment—the Prime Minister—who mustpersuade Canadians in all parts of the country, andthe various levels of his own government, to worktogether on a set of common objectives. Withoutstrong leadership and direction from the PrimeMinister, there is a natural tendency for governmentdepartments and agencies, and different levels ofgovernment, to pursue narrower objectives, whichcan sometimes be at cross-purposes.

The Prime Minister and his government mustcommunicate such a vision, with energy andconviction, to Canadians. He must convinceCanadians that this undertaking requires the whole ofCanada, not just the federal government, much lessjust the Canadian International Development Agency(CIDA). The vision may best be communicated withthe help of non-government and civil society organi-zations, and with the support of the private sector.Our multiculturalism is an asset in this regard: there is

room for much greater collaboration with thediaspora of many nations and cultures that havetaken root in Canada.

International policy must adapt to the realities ofa post-9/11 world. There has been a fundamentalshift in international relationships since the terroristattacks on New York and Washington. The notion of“security” has profoundly changed. For better orworse, foreign aid, international commerce, andrelations between and among developed and devel-oping countries are influenced by the new reality.Canada’s international policy must also adapt to thisnew reality, but without compromising the values andinterests that are fundamental to Canadians.

Furthermore, diplomatic relationships and militarystrategies that evolved during the bipolar era of theCold War have now metamorphosed into the so-called war on terrorism. However, while conflict andinsecurity are particularly widespread throughout thedeveloping world, inflicting considerable misery onlarge numbers of people caught in violence, theytypically do not generate a “terrorist threat” againstthe industrial countries. Moreover, as both the Israel-Palestine conflict and the war in Iraq havedemonstrated, conventional warfare does not lenditself well to the fight against terrorism, let aloneestablish a durable peace. In this paper, we argue thatachieving international peace and security mustfundamentally be linked to enhancing humansecurity, which in turn is related to sustainable andequitable development. Further, we argue that inter-national policy must enhance human security byreducing poverty and inequality, affirming humanrights and political freedoms, strengtheningdemocracy, and making peace durable.

The four major pillars of international policy—diplomacy, defence, commerce (i.e. trade andinvestment) and development—are related to each

1 Jennifer Welsh, At Home in the World: Canada’s Global Vision for the 21st Century. Toronto: Harper Collins, 2004, pp. 33-34.

IntroductionIn the world of the 21st century, the achievement of human security through sustainable and equitable developmentwill be increasingly fundamental to foreign policy, international peace, and global trade. The basic contention of thispaper is that a clear set of development objectives must underpin all our international policies.


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other in a seamless web. To understand why develop-ment is so fundamental to international policy, wemust first consider the case of the world’s poorestcountries—most of which are in sub-Saharan Africa.Their chronic poverty limits most kinds of interna-tional relationships to those based on multilateral orbilateral development assistance—unless suchcountries happen to present commercial opportu-nities or threats to local or international peace (moreon this below). Thus, where there are few other

linkages, as in the case of the poorest

countries, development cooperation provides

the primary basis for international policy.Second, as countries experience economic and

social development, diplomatic and commercialrelations tend to intensify while aid relationshipswane. In most middle-income countries, developmentcreates broader international policy linkages throughtrade, investment and the flow of migrants.

Third, development must now also be recognizedas fundamental to “defence”, that is, to peace andsecurity. Viewed not simply as a matter of economicgrowth, but as a broad process of societal andpolitical transformation, development frees peoplefrom political, social and economic constraints, whilefreeing them to lead longer, more capable andfulfilling lives.2 Lack of development in the poorestcountries, and unbalanced development in middle- orhigher-income countries, is often manifested in theviolation of basic human rights, political and socialrepression, as well as widespread economic depri-vation. Moreover, inadequate or unbalanceddevelopment is a threat not only to the security ofindividuals, but increasingly to local and internationalpeace as well. Civil strife is most common in weak orfailed states, which can also be breeding grounds forterrorism. However, terrorism is even more frequentlybred in states marked by deep inequalities, theabsence of basic human rights, and political andsocial repression. Development in this broad

sense, therefore, not only leads to the

reduction of poverty, more political freedom,

and greater affirmation of human rights, but

also lays the foundation for more durable peace

and security within and among countries.

Finally, it is true that relationships among high-income countries, that is, members of theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD), are not themselves driven bydevelopment issues, but rather are largely determinedby trade and investment issues (e.g. Canada’ssoftwood and mad-cow disputes with the US).However, since September 11, 2001, it is also clearthat such bilateral issues have been overshadowed bymajor differences among OECD countries (particularlybetween the US and others) on the appropriateresponse to the threats of international terrorism andweapons of mass destruction, most evidently in thesharp divisions over the war in Iraq. Differences overthese geopolitical issues, in the view of this paper, arefundamentally rooted in differences of approach tothe problems of insecurity in developing countries(including the Middle East and the Islamic world).

Given the fundamental nature of the relationshipbetween development on the one hand and defenceand commerce on the other, it therefore makes agreat deal of sense to articulate a clear set of over-arching development objectives around whichinternational policy should be coherent.

Fortunately, such a set of development objectivesalready exists. During the 1990s, the United Nations(UN) convened meetings on the environment anddevelopment, gender, social development, humanrights, and population issues. The outcomes of thesemeetings were codified in the form of time-bounddevelopment goals. By the year 2000, considerableconsensus had emerged around the world on thesegoals. A special summit of world leaders was held inSeptember at the UN General Assembly in New York,which led to the adoption of the MillenniumDeclaration and a series of Millennium DevelopmentGoals (MD/MDGs; see Annexes).

The first seven goals relate to fundamental objectivesfor developing countries, beginning with the goal ofat least halving extreme poverty and hunger by theyear 2015. The remaining six are oriented towardsocial, economic and environmental objectives, suchas the achievement of universal primary education,gender equality in schooling, and the reduction ofmaternal and infant mortality. The eighth and final

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2 Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books, 2000.



goal speaks primarily to the role and responsibilitiesof developed countries in helping to achieve thefirst seven goals in partnership with the developingcountries.

The MDGs are arguably imperfect. They containno reference to the importance of human rights orfreedom from conflict as preconditions for equitableand sustainable development and their genderequality goals represent a retreat from the worldcommunity's aspirations as set out in the BeijingPlatform for Action. However, the MillenniumDeclaration, the overarching statement of purpose byworld leaders in which the MDGs are embedded,contains clear commitments to conflict preventionand to upholding human rights. Given these caveats,the Millennium Declaration and the

Development Goals present a comprehensive

set of objectives toward which various instru-

ments of international policy—diplomacy,

defence, trade and investment, and devel-

opment cooperation—could work in concert.

However, as discussed further in this paper in thesection on Development Cooperation Policy, it isimportant to note that it will be very challenging toachieve the MDGs over the next decade, particularlyin the poorest countries. Therefore, it is necessary tomaintain realistic expectations about the effort andtimeframe needed to achieve the MDGs in thosecountries.

Since the Millennium Summit, bilateral develop-ment agencies, including CIDA, and multilateralorganizations, including the UN, the World Bank, theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) and the regionaldevelopment banks, have endorsed both theDeclaration and the MDGs and have incorporatedthem into their strategic priorities and operationalplans. There is an ongoing monitoring (“roadmap”)exercise undertaken by the United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) and the WorldBank to assess the extent to which the MDGs arebeing achieved in individual countries and globally. Amajor international review of progress toward the2015 targets is scheduled for 2005.

However, endorsement of the Declaration andthe MDGs has not gone far beyond the organizations

whose mandates are primarily focused on developingcountries. For example, in Canada, among federaldepartments and agencies only CIDA has adoptedthe MDGs as part of its policy priorities. There is verylittle recognition, let alone endorsement, of theMDGs in other federal departments and agencies.There is also little recognition among the Canadianpublic of the MDGs. This is not surprising since therehas been little attempt by the federal governmentsince the Declaration was signed by Prime MinisterJean Chrétien in September 2000 to communicate itskey messages, including the MDGs, with theCanadian public.

How would endorsement of the MD/MDGs workin practice for departments and agencies other thanCIDA? ¨ For the Department of International Trade, the

new policy framework would require Canada toincorporate the MD/MDGs into its bilateral andmultilateral trade policies and negotiations.Accordingly, it would require much greater flexi-bility in Canada’s negotiating positions oninternational trade rules,at the World TradeOrganization (WTO), in the Free Trade Area of theAmericas (FTAA) discussions, and in bilateral tradenegotiations, diverging from the reciprocal normof “equal rules for all countries” to allow devel-oping countries more policy space and muchlonger timeframes (e.g. through special and differ-ential treatment) to adjust to international normsand disciplines, in order to foster povertyreduction, economic and social development,3 orderogations from those rules.

¨ For the Department of Foreign Affairs, it wouldrequire building on the human security initiativeson which the department has recently exercisedleadership, helping to bring about the LandminesTreaty and the International Criminal Court. Yetthe Department needs to go beyond its currentnarrow framework of “peace, order and goodgovernment” to embrace the economic and socialdimensions of conflict prevention and peace-building. It will have to broaden its perspectiveand support human development, as well ashuman security.

3 The opening of the Canadian market to least-developed countries in 2003 pursuant to the Kananaskis G-8 Summit is an example of an initiative already taken.


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¨ For the Department of National Defence, it wouldrequire contributing to growing needs of theinternational community for the capacity and thewill to provide protection to vulnerable popula-tions threatened by armed conflict. This maymean developing niches in peacekeeping,protection, and enforcement of international law,as mandated by the UN. Military procurementshould be directed toward meeting humansecurity and development objectives and shouldcontribute to peacekeeping and humanitarianprotection operations. The government’scommitment to train 5,000 new peacekeepers is awelcome step forward. The challenge is to ensurethat this new brigade contributes to UN or UN-authorized operations and is not selectivelydeployed on geopolitical initiatives.

¨ The Department of Finance (and, to a lesserextent, the Bank of Canada) has a key role ininternational policy, both outwardly, in itsstewardship of Canada’s participation in theInternational Financial Institutions, and domesti-cally, through allocating resources to CIDA andother international departments and agencies inthe budget process. Moreover, its importancegoes far beyond allocating resources domesticallyand externally, since the department and itsMinister are leading actors in the internationalpolicy dialogue on development, principallythrough the International Monetary Fund, theWorld Bank and membership in bodies such asthe G-7, G-10 and G-20. International debate hasintensified on development policies (known in the1990s as the “Washington Consensus”) articulatedin these bodies, such as economic liberalizationand privatization, and their impact on developingcountries. For their part, critics of the WashingtonConsensus have emphasized the need for develop-ment policies that are differentiated amongdeveloping countries (rather than “one size fits all”),genuinely “owned” by the developing countries,and that actually serve to reduce poverty andmeet the other MDGs. Accordingly, the

Department of Finance must help articulate apolicy framework compatible with the MD/MDGsat the IMF, World Bank, and in finance ministers’forums, such as the G-7 and G-20.

These considerations, along with the currentInternational Policy Review, make a compelling casefor the following strategy:¨ The Prime Minister should publicly embrace the

Millennium Declaration and the MillenniumDevelopment Goals as Canada’s vision of the kindof world Canadians desire and must worktowards—one in which human dignity, justiceand peace are upheld and universally evident,rather than conspicuously absent. He shouldcommunicate this vision to the Canadian publicand seek the support of Canadians in helping toachieve the goals.

¨ To operationalize this vision, the federalgovernment should commit to embodying theMillennium Declaration and the DevelopmentGoals in the strategic priorities and plans of alldepartments and agencies. It should also committo working closely with provincial and municipalgovernments, with the private sector and withcivil society to incorporate the MD/MDGs into theirmissions, mandates and action plans, so that thecommitment becomes one of the whole of Canada.4

¨ The Global Affairs Cabinet Committee, and aparallel committee in Parliament, should regularlydiscuss Canada’s contributions, and establishCanada’s own roadmap, toward achieving theMD/MDGs over the next decade.


4 In so doing, Canada would be in the company of Sweden where the government has introduced legislation to ensure that the MD/MDGs inform the policies and actions of all ministries,and has engaged in a dialogue with the private sector and civil society which has resulted in explicit commitments by a large number of organizations to the MD/MDGs.



a) Objectives and Principles of Canadian Aid Policy

At the outset it is worth repeating that developmentcooperation (or aid) policy is no longer the only inter-national policy channel linking Canada to thedeveloping world. Policies governing internationaltrade and private foreign investment, along with thepolicies emanating from the World Bank and the IMF,are now far more important to the emerging marketsand the more advanced developing countries in Asiaand Latin America. At the same time, foreign aidremains the pre-eminent policy instrument, particularlyfor most of the world’s poorest countries, predominantlyin sub-Saharan Africa.

Foreign aid at best is a catalyst, not a

substitute, for the local efforts of people and

governments. If it is successful, ultimately foreign aidis self-liquidating—the need for external supportdwindling and eventually disappearing altogether.That being said, foreign aid can be critical to addressthe issue of poverty in the poorest countries. Morethan other policy instruments, it can directly tackle theconstraints and obstacles to enhancing the welfare ofthe poor. Working with governments, civil society andthe private sector in developing countries, foreign aidcan help create the social and physical infrastructurenecessary to support sustainable livelihoods for thepoor, through building and maintaining health clinics,enhancing the capacity of ministries of education andrural extension departments, or through investing inroads, electric power and telecommunicationsnetworks. To a certain extent, it can also help createjob and income opportunities, although ultimatelythese opportunities must be generated by investmentin developing countries themselves.5

In terms of the overarching framework proposedin this paper, aid can be a vital instrument forhelping to achieve the first seven MillenniumDevelopment Goals, in partnership with developingcountries and with other donors.6 The first of theMDGs aims to eradicate extreme poverty andhunger. The next six MDGs aim to achieve universalprimary education, ensure gender equality in schoolenrolment, reduce infant and maternal mortality,halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and malaria,and ensure environmental sustainability. While thesegoals are directed particularly to the developingcountries, they should also be central to Canada’s aidprogram, as implied by the eighth MDG, which callsupon developed countries to work with developingcountries to achieve the first seven goals.

At the same time, it is important to note boththat aid is not a panacea for vanquishing poverty andachieving the other MDGs, and that the probability ishigh that the MDGs will not be achieved in many ofthe poorest countries. While more rapid povertyreduction is strongly related to higher economicgrowth, the impact of aid spending on the rate ofeconomic growth is the subject of considerabledebate.7 In many countries, particularly in Africa, itwill take more than foreign aid, even at dramaticallyhigher levels, to achieve the rate of growth neededto halve poverty by the year 2015 (MDG 1).Moreover, it is unlikely that the doubling of officialdevelopment assistance (ODA) advocated in somequarters will materialize. (An additional US$50 billionin aid per year is thought by some to be the effortrequired to achieve the MDGs.8)

5 See the March 2004 Report of the UN Special Commission on the Private Sector and Development, co-chaired by Prime Minister Paul Martin and former Mexican President ErnestoZedillo.

6 See Jeffrey Sachs, “Doing the sums on Africa,” The Economist, May 20, 2004.

7 See Timothy Besley and Anthony Burgess, “Halving Global Poverty,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17:3 (Summer 2003), 3-22; in the same issue of JEP, William Easterly, “Can ForeignAid Buy Growth?” (23-48).; William Easterly, Ross Levine, and David Roodman, “Aid, Policies, and Growth: Comment” in American Economic Review 94:3 (June 2004), 774-780. Theseauthors take issue with the conventional view, propounded by World Bank researchers Craig Burnside and David Dollar, in “Aid, Policies and Growth”, American Economic Review 90:4(September 2000), 847-868, that aid has a positive impact on growth in countries with “good policies”. Even if this were the case, the issue is whether growth would be high enough (inexcess of seven per cent) to have a significant impact on poverty reduction. Others have suggested that aid actually does stimulate growth whether or not recipients follow “good policies”as defined by Burnside and Dollar. See Hansen, H. and F. Tarp, “Aid Effectiveness Disputed,” in F. Tarp (ed.), Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learned and Directions for the Future.London: Routledge (2000).

8 For example, the Zedillo Panel report for the Monterrey Conference.

Development Cooperation Policy


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Such considerations lead to the conclusion thatgreater realism is required in regard to

achievement of the MDGs in many of the

world’s poorest countries over the next decade.

Nevertheless, the maximum possible effort to increaseforeign aid should still be mounted (more on thisbelow). However, it is important that expectations berealistic, particularly on the part of the public, as towhat is likely to be achieved, and to avoid theperception of “failure” to reach the MDGs in much ofthe developing world, which may underminecontinuing donor efforts that will be needed longafter the year 2015.9

Finally, two fundamental principles should informCanada’s development cooperation program:10

¨ The principle of domestic ownership over develop-ment strategies and policies. As a donor country,Canada should be listening to, not telling, aidpartners about their needs.

¨ The principle of country diversity. There are nouniversal blueprints for development; eachcountry must adopt strategies compatible withtheir circumstances and capabilities.

b) MeansWithin these overarching objectives of the MDGs,Canada should concentrate its aid program amongfewer countries and fewer goals or sectors. Canada’sODA resources are relatively modest. In terms ofabsolute expenditures, Canada is the sixth largestdonor (after the US, Japan, Germany, the UK andFrance) contributing about three per cent of totalODA from OECD countries. However, Canada istypically not among the top six or even top 10donors to any developing country, with the exceptionof some of the small Caribbean island states. This ispartly because historically Canada has had one of themost widely dispersed aid programs among OECDdonors, spreading 70 per cent of its ODA among 30 countries until 2002-03, when nine “countries of

focus” were chosen.11 However, the intent was not toterminate aid to all except these nine countries, butrather to concentrate incremental growth principallyin those countries. The effect of that decision will beto increase the concentration of the aid program onlyvery gradually.

Greater concentration makes sense for thefollowing reasons. First, official development assistanceshould be earmarked for the world’s poorest countries.Too much foreign aid is allocated to the moreadvanced developing countries, and not enough tothe poorest. In the case of Canada’s aid program, lessthan one-fifth is allocated to the UN’s list of 49 LeastDeveloped Countries (LDCs).12 However, there aresigns that priorities are shifting in the direction of thepoorest countries. By fiscal year 2003-4, althoughCanada’s top 10 recipients of ODA included suchmiddle-income countries as Iraq and China, six of thenine “focus” countries—five in Africa plusBangladesh—were on the list.13

Second, by allowing greater depth and scope ofengagement in fewer countries, concentration lendsitself to improved aid effectiveness and enhancedresults. For example, the reduction in the spread ofHIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases (MDG 6) willrequire a considerable investment in a number ofinitiatives over a period of many years, throughsupport for education, affordable medicines, prophy-lactics, and better-equipped and staffed clinics(among other things). The actual needs will vary fromcountry to country over time. Greater concentrationwill deepen understanding of the developmentchallenges faced by particular countries, and shouldallow more flexibility and continuity so that aid canbe provided when, how and where it is most needed.

Third, to help bring about greater developing-country ownership, donors are shifting from aproject-based approach to a program-basedapproach. Traditionally, donors have been keen toplant national flags on projects, featuring equipment


9 See Michael A. Clemens, Charles J. Kenney, Todd J. Moss, “The Trouble with the MDGs: Confronting Expectations of Aid and Development Success,” Working Paper 40, Center for GlobalDevelopment (May 10, 2004).

10 These are elaborated in Roy Culpeper et al, “Architecture without blueprints: Opportunities and challenges for the new prime minister in international development policy,” InternationalJournal, Autumn 2003, 667-700.

11 The nine focus countries are, in the Americas: Bolivia and Honduras; in Africa: Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania; in Asia, Bangladesh.

12 North-South Institute, Canadian Development Report 2004, Statistical Annex, Table 4.

13 Canada’s top 10 bilateral aid recipients, in descending order in 2003-04 were Iraq ($121 million); Afghanistan ($99 million); Ethiopia ($70 million); Bangladesh ($66 million); China($47 million); Mali ($46 million); Ghana ($43 million); Tanzania ($43 million); India ($40 million); and Mozambique ($37 million). Source: “CIDA: Key Facts” (mimeo, October 2004).



or goods made in the donor country, designed anddelivered by donor-based experts. Now, donors areincreasingly helping to build capacity in the agenciesand organizations of the developing country, bytraining and recruiting local experts, in order tosupport projects and policies articulated in therecipient country’s own development strategy.Greater country concentration, along with moreuntying of aid, both as to sources of procurement anduses, will help to reinforce domestic ownership.

Finally, there are potentially great benefits forrecipient countries. Aid coordination among fewerdonors would be easier, reducing the administrativeburden and transaction costs of managing aid. Itwould also be easier for donors to structure their aidprograms around national priorities, reinforcingdomestic ownership.

That being said, the question remains as to howCanada should focus its aid program. To begin with,the poorest countries should be given highest priority,even though widespread poverty exists in countriessuch as India and China (neither of which is an LDC).Because these countries are expected to experiencerapid economic growth, most projections for the nextdecade indicate that China and India will succeed inreducing poverty by at least one-half (i.e. achievingMDG 1 nationally). Aid should be focused primarilyon the poorest countries in Africa. As mentioned,Canada’s decision to select nine countries of focus (sixof which are in sub-Saharan Africa) was such that itwill not result in a rapid reallocation to thesecountries, or involve the termination of aid to middle-income countries. CIDA has taken steps in thisdirection in its Sustainable Development Strategy for2004-06, by indicating it will end its bilateralprogramming in Thailand and Malaysia. Canada

should wind up its bilateral aid program, in a

transparent and consultative manner, in other

countries that no longer are among the

poorest, within three to five years. At the same

time, Canada should commit the bulk of its

bilateral aid resources, perhaps 80 to 90 per cent,

to the countries on which it will focus the aid

program.14

Canada should also safeguard its aid resources forits core development objectives and not reallocate aidto support the “war on terrorism”. After theSeptember 11 attacks, a huge amount from the aidprogram—amounting to some $900 million over theperiod 2001-2008—has been allocated to Afghanistanand Iraq alone. These two countries are now Canada’stwo top aid recipients. In contrast, annual bilateralallocations to each of CIDA’s “countries of focus” varybetween $10 million and $40 million. And the“Canada Fund for Africa”, unveiled with great fanfareat the 2002 G-8 Summit at Kananaskis, appropriatedonly $500 million in additional funding for Africa overthe next five years.15 (Although a case is made in thispaper for a larger aid program in Afghanistan, itshould be clearly oriented toward equitable andsustainable development, and be on a par with otherkey countries of focus.) Unexpected and extra-

ordinary allocations, such as those to Iraq and

Afghanistan, should be financed from sources

outside the regular aid budget, which should be

“ring-fenced” to prevent it from being under-

mined in this way.

It is also worth asking whether the nine countriesof focus are the “right” ones, or whether nine is the“right” number. On the latter question, nine may beexcessively restrictive. A larger number may allow agreater diversity among countries without unduedispersion of the bilateral aid program. If Canada’s aidis wound up in middle-income countries it should

be possible to expand the number of countries

of focus to about 20. These should give priority

to African countries, by adding up to nine

countries from that region, but could also

include additional countries in Asia and the

Americas. It is suggested that in the Americas,Haiti—the only country in the western hemisphere onthe UN’s list of 49 Least Developed Countries—beadded to the list, since Canada has made acommitment to provide significant support to that

14 Much of the remaining 10 to 20 per cent could be concentrated on middle- and lower middle-income countries, such as those of the Caribbean, which have long-established relation-ships with Canada, but whose needs are not very large. A small amount should also be retained for Canada Funds administered by Canadian embassies and high commissions for localsmall projects. As well, Canada’s program should not be overwhelmingly dedicated to government-to-government aid. There should also be ample scope for local project initiativesundertaken by NGOs and civil society, which should not be confined to the same list of priority countries as government-to-government aid.

15 However, CIDA’s Sustainable Development Strategy for 2004-06 indicated that by the end of 2005, 60 per cent of bilateral programming in Africa would be concentrated in 10 countries, with average monetary ceilings increasing from $14 million to $54 million per annum.


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country over the long term. In Asia, Afghanistan, alsoa Least Developed Country, should be added to thelist, for similar reasons.16

In concentrating bilateral aid among fewercountries, Canada also has to be cognizant of similarchoices made by other donors. Several donors maychoose to concentrate their aid program among thesame or a similar set of countries, leading to thepossibility of a surfeit of aid and absorptive problemsin those countries, while there is a deficiency of aid inothers. Canada should press for greater coordinationamong donors, both through the OECDDevelopment Assistance Committee (DAC), and atthe recipient country level, to avoid such an outcome.

The dilemma of “too many donors supportingtoo few recipients” is, in fact, quite likely becausedonors now use similar allocation criteria in selectingamong potential recipients. This has resulted fromWorld Bank analysis, which suggests that aid is mosteffective in countries with sound economic policiesand good institutions.17 Unfortunately, many of thepoorest countries, which need aid the most, have notyet established such a “good” policy environment,often because they are fragile or failed states dealingwith or emerging from conflict. Along with otherdonors, Canada needs to define more clearly its

role in such countries, in order both to help

them become more robust states and put in

place the longer-term foundations for equitable

and sustainable development.

There does appear to be a growing desire, amongDAC donors including CIDA, to concentrate at leastpart of their aid in a selected number of fragile states.However, coordination among donors remains poor.For example, there are no criteria or mechanisms toensure that all donors do not exit a particular devel-oping country at the same time, leaving it totallywithout external support.

Within the chosen countries of concentration,Canada could also focus on sectors of activity.However, a sectoral focus must not primarily meantying Canadian aid to the procurement of Canadiangoods, services or expertise. Canadian goods and

expertise should be made available where these arecompetitively priced (for example, Canada has agreedto provide generic drugs at affordable prices forHIV/AIDS patients) and are compatible with the recip-ients’ stated needs. By tying our aid—and Canada hastraditionally had one of the most highly tiedprograms—over the long term, we undermine globaluntying and discourage the procurement of Canadiangoods and services with others’ money. A sectoralfocus may also restrict program flexibility in particularcountries, which may need support for sectors otherthan those supported by Canada. This is even morelikely to be the case if all donors support similarsectors, as they often do. Finally, it may underminecountry ownership by predetermining the sectors inwhich countries are eligible for Canadian assistance.In short, Canada can and should provide leadershipon critical sectoral issues, such as on the HIV/AIDSpandemic (see Box), without restricting its activities tothose sectors.

Finally, there is an important role for theDepartment of Finance, as Canada’s key interlocutorin the policy dialogue with developing countriesthrough the World Bank and the IMF. While theMillennium Declaration and MDGs represent keydevelopment objectives, achieving them will notsimply require more ODA, but more specifically ahigher and sustained rate of economic growth,broadly shared (i.e. growth that benefits the poor). Asmentioned, additional ODA may not be enough toraise the growth rate to threshold levels of six to eightper cent thought necessary for significant povertyreduction. At least as important are developingcountries’ economic policies—macro- and micro-economic policies and structural policies (e.g. tradeand capital-account liberalization).

Over the last four years, such policies have beenarticulated in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers(PRSPs), which are drafted by developing countryofficials but vetted and approved by the World Bankand the IMF. Despite their name, PRSPs have attractedcriticism because they are not typically designed witheither growth or poverty reduction as an objective21.

16 By 2002-03, Afghanistan was in any case the top recipient of CIDA bilateral aid, receiving almost $115 million, compared to $50 million in the case of the second-largest recipient,Bangladesh. There is far less reason for Canada to be providing massive support to Iraq, which is not an LDC and should not be given priority in the allocation of Canada’s bilateral aid.Obviously, Iraq’s reconstruction needs are enormous, but these should be provided through multilateral channels.

17 Assessing Aid: what works, what doesn’t, and why. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.



Some policies advanced in PRSPs may indeed haveconstrained growth and with it the potential forpoverty reduction. Since individual developingcountries face quite different opportunities andconstraints, a “one size fits all” economic model is

unlikely to produce desired growth or povertyreduction outcomes. Since the Department ofFinance plays the lead role on these issues by virtueof its responsibility for Canada’s membership in theBretton Woods organizations, it seems essential that a

The Face of Death and Action for Life

Deaths from HIV/AIDS continue at more than 9,000 per day, two-thirds of which are in sub-

Saharan Africa. Given access to treatment and care, these deaths are avoidable. While positive

steps have been taken by the Canadian government, they must be followed up with even more

courageous initiatives.

Canada has moved to provide lower-cost pharmaceutical products to least-developed and developing

countries (Bill C-9). The process of negotiating the legislation took months and, a year after the

initiative began, implementation is still pending.

NSI has proposed Canadian leadership in building an international consortium to provide

affordable generic drugs to all countries requiring them.18 We believe the government could make

a singular contribution to Africa in particular, the Millennium Development Goals and humanity

in general by taking this initiative. To do so it will have to set aside resistances on the part of

transnationals and link with potential allies in India, Brazil and elsewhere.

Such an initiative should be combined with enhanced investment in ongoing health systems

in least-developed and developing countries and multilateral leadership to radically up-scale

donor investment in public health systems. We have worked with the government in

detailing these and related initiatives in human security, which would make for a

more coherent and effective policy.19 The government has increased funding to

UNAIDS 3 x 5 program and to the Global Fund, but this must be followed up with

further significant increases in funding.

The government must act to bring its trade and multilateral financing policy in

line with the overall objective of saving and prolonging lives. Developing countries

must be supported in resisting US and transnational corporate pressure to limit

or erase their policy space to design intellectual property provision which

enhance the right to health in their jurisdictions. Canadian diplomacy, both

multilaterally in the WTO and bilaterally with developing countries and the US,

must act to this end. Further, Canada must oppose and fight to reform IMF and

other International Financial Institution policies which subvert health and

human rights objectives by pressing for reduced investment in public health

and related services.20 Canada should work through the Commission on Human

Rights and other bodies to ensure that respect for the human right to health is

never made subsidiary to the claims of trade, investment or intellectual

property regimes.

18 John Foster and David Garmaise, Meeting the Challenge: Canada’s Foreign Policy on HIV/AIDS, with a Particular Focus on Africa, Ministerial Council on HIV/AIDS, September 2003

19 John W. Foster, HIV/AIDS, Human Security and Canadian Foreign Policy, Workshop Report. NSI-INS. 2004.

20 ActionAid International USA, et al, Blocking Progress: How the Fight Against HIV/AIDS is Being Undermined by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Washington, September,2004.

21 See Ricardo Gottschalk, “The Macroeconomic Policy Content of PRSPs: how much pro-growth, how much pro-poor?” theme paper prepared for NSI project on Economic Policy Choicesfor Poverty Reduction, June 2004.



coherent policy approach is developed, involvingboth CIDA and Finance. The aim would be tostrengthen CIDA’s inputs to decision-making

at the WB and IMF to ensure that economic

policies adopted through PRSPs, and more

generally through the policy dialogue, do in

fact facilitate growth and poverty reduction,

reflect the diversity of developing country

circumstances and needs and are consistent

with the principle of ownership.

What does all this mean for the future of CIDA,Canada’s development agency? The position of thispaper is that CIDA should remain independent,

with full departmental status. Its Minister

should continue to have full ministerial rank,22

rather than (as in the recent past) be a State

Secretary reporting through the Minister of

Foreign Affairs. The principal reason is that as anindependent department CIDA would have greaterability to coordinate and deliver the policy frameworkproposed in this paper, particularly if it is given alegislative mandate to do so. In contrast, this paperopposes the idea of folding CIDA into theDepartment of Foreign Affairs, because of thetendency of that department to emphasize short-termexigencies (including security issues and the “war onterrorism”) over long-term sustainable and equitabledevelopment.

c) Aid VolumeCanada must increase the volume of its aid. Duringthe 1990s, and particularly after the budget cuts of1995, the Liberal government massively cut back theaid program. Proportionately, cuts to aid were greaterthan in any other program, including defence. Thesecuts led one observer to conclude that Canada had“lost its place in the world” in this period.23

By the end of the decade, cuts to the aidprogram had ceased. However, it was not until 2002that Prime Minister Chrétien signalled that theGovernment of Canada would rebuild the aidprogram. A commitment was made to growth in theprogram at an annual rate of eight per cent for the

remainder of this decade. This commitment wasreaffirmed by Prime Minister Martin after he tookoffice.

While this commitment is welcome, the eight percent rate is not adequate. By the end of the decade,under reasonable assumptions Canada’s ODA/GNIratio (effort relative to our ability to pay) will barelyreach 0.35 per cent, only one-half of the longstandinggoal for donor countries of 0.7 percent first articulatedby Prime Minister Pearson and advocated by the UN.Reaching the 0.7 per cent goal at a growth rate ofeight per cent would take about 18 years, assumingGNI growth at the average annual rate (2.75 per cent)of the last 25 years. Therefore, Canada should

commit to increasing the rate of growth of its

aid program to between 12 and 15 per cent

annually, which would enable us to reach the

0.7 per cent goal by the year 2015.

d) Debt Relief for the Poorest CountriesIn 1997, the G-7 industrial countries launched a debtrelief initiative for the heavily indebted poor countries(HIPC), which was further enhanced in 1999. Whilethe HIPC initiative did provide relief to somecountries, the result for other countries was simply tolower their scheduled debt-servicing payments to thelevel of their previous actual payments, and a fewcountries ironically will be paying more than theiractual payments.24 Additionally, some donor countrieshave not delivered on funding commitments to payfor debt relief.

Servicing the overhang of excessive debt imposessignificant opportunity costs on debtor countries,unable to meet vital needs for social and physicalinvestment. In other words, excessive debt is anobstacle to the achievement of the MDGs. Muchdeeper debt relief for the poorest countries is clearlyin order, a fact recognized by G-7 finance ministerswho appeared to be considering various options fordebt cancellation in late 2004. At the same time,there are growing concerns that unless appropriatemeasures are put in place, poor countries may againaccumulate unsustainable debts and face further

22 The Minister for International Cooperation was given full ministerial rank after the June 2004 election.

23 Andrew Cohen, While Canada Slept: How we lost our place in the world,” Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2004.

24 See UNCTAD, Least Developed Countries Report 2002: Escaping the Poverty Trap. Geneva, 2002, p. 209.



crises in the future. Accordingly, the World Bank andIMF have proposed a “debt sustainability framework”which principally seeks to provide more grants, ratherthan soft loans, through the World Bank’s affiliate, theInternational Development Association (IDA).

Genuine “debt sustainability” will require morethan cancellation of existing debts and the provisionof grants through IDA. It will require coordinatedaction by bilateral donors (in the form of more grantaid rather than new loans) and private creditors, aswell as development and poverty reduction strategiesthat actually achieve their targets.25 Canada hasplayed a leadership role in calling for the forgivenessof all bilateral debt owed by HIPCs, has cancelleddebt owed by seven countries26 and has frozen thedebt payments of five others27 under the CanadianDebt Initiative of December 2000. Canada should

now press for a more sweeping debt sustain-

ability framework to help ensure that the

development prospects of the poorest

countries, and the achievement of the MDGs, are

not compromised by a further build-up of debt.

e) Knowledge for DevelopmentLast but not least, the cultivation and dissemination ofknowledge will be central to the emerging multi-sectoral and inter-departmental involvement in globaldevelopment issues. This will require investment inresearch—the creation of substantive knowledgeacross a range of development issues, buildingknowledge-based networks, and enhancing thecapacity to use, adapt and create knowledge forsustainable development at the local level in devel-oping countries.28 Through the InternationalDevelopment Research Centre (IDRC), Canada hasfor 30 years made a singular contribution in all thesedomains and has demonstrated world leadership inmany instances. Indeed, IDRC’s capacity-buildingactivities have generated substantial goodwill forCanada, as individuals participating in IDRC projects

have gone on to assume prominent positions in theircountries and elsewhere. Ironically, that contributionis acknowledged more outside Canada, among themany developing country beneficiaries of IDRC’sprograms, than in Canada. The federal governmentshould not only build on the base of IDRC in comingyears, but also integrate its knowledge results andnetworks into the policy and programmingframework of key departments and agencies. For allthese reasons, IDRC should also be given assurancethat its share of the overall aid envelope will at leastbe maintained.

25 See Nihal Kappagoda and Nancy Alexander, “Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries,” paper prepared for the G24 Technical Group Meeting September 27-28, 2004.(Ottawa: The North-South Institute).

26 Benin, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Senegal and Tanzania

27 Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Rwanda and Zambia.

28 Strong, Maurice F., Connecting with the World: Priorities for Canadian Internatioinalism in the 21st Century. A Report by the International Development Policy Research and Policy TaskForce. Ottawa: IDRC (November 1996).



For more than half a century, Canada has been in theforefront of multilateral cooperation. Indeed Canadawas an architect of the postwar multilateral order. TheCanadian delegation (including individuals, such asLouis Rasminsky) played an important role at the1944 Bretton Woods conference establishing the IMFand World Bank, and Lester Pearson’s celebratedintervention during the Suez Crisis helped to establishthe UN’s role in maintaining international peace. In1948, Canada was also one of the 23 founders of theGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), theforerunner of the World Trade Organization. GATT’sfirst Director General was a Canadian, Dana Wilgress.

Canada continues to be a particularly active multi-lateral player, with memberships in a large number oforganizations and with a high profile in several. Forexample, Canada has been a relatively vigorousmember of the regional development banks (the African,Asian, and Inter-American Development Banks) and agenerous contributor to their soft-loan funds.Canada’s multilateral activism also manifests itself indiplomacy, in the UN General Assembly and its variouscommittees, when it is a member of the SecurityCouncil, and in the various specialized organizations.

Canada’s interest in multilateral organizations isconsistent with its long-standing aim of establishingand maintaining a rules-based international order andwith its scope as a middle power. The possibility ofleveraging its influence through such organizationsenables Canada to reach far beyond what it canachieve through bilateral initiatives alone.

Multilateral institutions contribute a significantportion of global resources allocated to internationalcooperation. In recent years, between 20 and 25 percent of the world’s official development finance hasflowed through multilateral organizations.29 Keyamong these are the International FinancialInstitutions (particularly the multilateral developmentbanks and funds) and the UN family of developmentagencies.

Three multilateral organizations determine theeconomic policy framework, or the “rules of thegame,” within which most countries must work. TheIMF and the World Bank (created in 1944), alongwith the World Trade Organization (created in 1995as a successor to the General Agreement on Tariffsand Trade, established in 1948), shape the globalrules for macroeconomic and structural policies, suchas trade and investment. Unfortunately, there isconsiderable asymmetry in the way the internationalrules are applied. The most powerful countries (partic-ularly the US) have considerable policy autonomy torun budget or current-account deficits, or to adopttrade-distorting policies. Smaller and poorer countries,on the other hand, are obliged to avoid such deficitsand abide by trade policy commitments if they wishto remain on good terms with the global multilateralorganizations and world markets.

Of course, a central mission for the UN is theprevention of war and the maintenance of interna-tional peace. Its performance in that regard has beencompromised by the events of the last decade, fromits failures to halt the genocide in Rwanda and ethniccleansing in the former Yugoslavia, to the stalemate inthe Security Council over the US-led invasion of Iraq.In the period shortly after the invasion, some voicesproclaimed the demise of the UN and the collectivesecurity arrangements underpinning the post-1945world order. Subsequently, when it became evidentthat Iraq lacked weapons of mass destruction, and asthe occupation forces became increasingly mired infighting insurgencies in central and southern Iraq, theadvantages of the UN’s approach became clear.

The demand for “reform” of the multilateral insti-tutions has been a hardy perennial for at least adecade. In 1994, on the 50th anniversary of theBretton Woods Institutions (the IMF and World Bank),many NGOs campaigned for their closure under theslogan, “Fifty years is enough!” Other civil societyorganizations have sought to influence multilateralinstitutions through greater involvement in their

29 OECD, The DAC Journal 2003 Vol.4 No. 1 (Development Cooperation 2002 Report), Paris.

Multilateral Reform



decision-making process. For their part, officials ofindustrial member countries have also clamoured formultilateral reforms, but usually with the clear aim ofimproving their effectiveness (or “value for money”).30

Developing countries have increasingly called for agreater voice in their governance, particularly withinthe International Financial Institutions.

Multilateralism as a facet of international relationsis as yet in its infancy. Aside from the inter-warLeague of Nations (which failed) and the InternationalLabour Organization (founded in 1919, which stillexists), most of today’s multilateral organizations aresix decades old or less. After proliferating in the 1960sand 1970s, the last two decades have been a periodof consolidation among the multilaterals. However,multilateral organizations must continue to changeand adapt to evolving global circumstances as well asto the changing circumstances among membercountries. In other words, the work of multilateralreform will never be complete.

A particularly strong challenge, not just to multi-lateral reform, but to the very future of multilateralism,is posed by the unilateralist tendencies of the Bushadministration in its first years. Unless the US revertsto its traditional stance as a supporter of multilater-alism (albeit as “first among unequals”), multilateralcooperation will be weakened and the benefits ofmultilateral reform are likely to be eroded.

How should Canada address the agenda formultilateral reform? And how would its efforts relateto the overarching policy framework suggested in thispaper? Reduced to its essentials, the demand formultilateral reform comprises two related clusters ofissues: [ 1 ] the need for greater effectiveness andpolicy coherence in and among multilateral organiza-tions; and [ 2 ] changes in governance that wouldlead to greater representativeness, accountability,coordination and consistency in and among themultilateral organizations.[ 1 ] With respect to the issue of effectiveness, as inthe case of international policy at the national level,the starting point must be greater clarity of purpose

among multilateral organizations. What are, or shouldbe, the fundamental objectives common to all multi-lateral organizations? Not only do the MillenniumDeclaration and the MDGs provide a usefulframework, they are also a framework that mostmultilateral organizations have already endorsed. Thatbeing the case, the issue is whether and how organi-zations, individually and collectively, are workingtogether toward these objectives. In other words, thequestion is to what degree is there policy coherenceamong the multilateral organizations around theMillennium Declaration and the MDGs?

Canada’s efforts to enhance multilateral

policy coherence would be reinforced by

greater coherence among federal departments

involved in international policy. Certain depart-ments have specific responsibility to oversee the workof particular multilateral organizations. For example,the Department of Finance is responsible for theWorld Bank and the IMF; Foreign Affairs, for severalagencies of the United Nations; International Trade,for the WTO; and CIDA, for regional developmentbanks and UN agencies not overseen by ForeignAffairs. Canadian commitments under internationalhuman rights and gender equality conventions areaffected by, and certainly should inform, the actionsof these multilateral institutions. Thus, instructionssent by Finance to the Executive Director representingCanada at the International Monetary Fund should beinformed by or, at least, consistent with theMillennium Declaration and MDGs. So, if the IMF isurging policy measures on a member country (e.g.cutting health expenditures to eliminate a deficit) thatwould undermine its efforts to reduce infant andmaternal mortality and reverse the spread ofHIV/AIDS, Canada would urge that alternatives beconsidered to avoid this outcome.

Some multilateral organizations, such as the IMFand the WTO, will be more challenging than otherswith this approach, particularly those that do notemphasize “development” issues.

30 There is an extensive official literature. A 1992 World Bank report, “Effective Implementation: Key to Development Impact” (otherwise known as the “Wapenhans Report”) stimulatedconsiderable debate which culminated in a 1996 Development Committee Task Force Report on the Multilateral Development Banks, “Serving a Changing World.” Two years previouslythe Bretton Woods Commission, a U.S.-based private-sector organization, issued a report on the international financial institutions, “Bretton Woods: Looking to the Future.” In addition,individual member countries or groups of members have commissioned a number of reports on multilateral organizations, for example the Nordic UN project, which published a seriesof reports on the funding and operations of the UN and its agencies, and the U.S. Meltzer Commission on the IFIs which reported to Congress and the Treasury Department in 2000that “the IMF and World Bank group are largely failing in their mission to address world poverty and economic stability and need major overhaul.”



[ 2 ] It is clear that the governance structure of keymultilateral organizations does not adequately reflectthe realities of today’s world. For example, thestructure of the UN Security Council still favours thevictors of World War II, with permanent seats (andveto rights) for the United States, China and Russia,as well as for the UK and France (the P-5). It wouldmake more sense for the European Union to have oneseat on the Council. If permanent, veto-carrying seatsare to remain a feature of the Security Council, otherplausible claimants include Japan, with the world’sthird largest economy, and India, the world’s secondmost populous state (and a nuclear power).

The same issue arises in the Bretton Woodsorganizations, where the relative voting positions ofcountries such as China, India, Brazil and Mexico areanachronistically low in comparison with relativelysmall industrial countries, such as the Netherlandsand Belgium. European countries are generally over-represented on the Executive Boards of the WorldBank and IMF, where they control over one-third ofthe seats. These organizations allocate their resourcesalmost entirely to developing countries, yet theirgovernance is dominated by the industrial countries.31

The principal casualties of the outmoded gover-nance structures at the UN and the Bretton Woodsorganizations are their credibility and legitimacy. Thisin turn undermines their effectiveness as global insti-tutions. Unfortunately, there are no easy solutions. Itis difficult to see why or how any P-5 country wouldwillingly give up its privileges or its relative status inthe Security Council, or allow other countries to gainequal privileges. Similarly, the most powerful membersof the Bretton Woods organizations (including theEuropean countries) have resisted changes that wouldreduce their relative status and influence.

Meanwhile, developing countries have rediscoveredthe clout they can wield if they act collectively in amultilateral setting. At the WTO, the formation ofcoalitions helped to consolidate developing countryopposition and to shape the course of the tradenegotiations. Alongside the “Group of 20” (whichincluded several large developing countries, such as

China, India, Brazil and Egypt, and whose initialmembership accounted for 51 per cent of the world’spopulation), the larger G-90 grouping of mainlyAfrican countries and LDCs contributed to effectivelyending the discussions at the Cancun Ministerialconference in September 2003.

Canada can help bring about needed reform byfirst acknowledging and advocating the need forchange. But how should the global organizationschange? It would be consistent with the overarchingpolicy framework of this paper, if a principal objectiveof multilateral reform is a greater role for developingcountries in the governance of multilateral organiza-tions. This includes not only the large developingcountries, such as India and China, or middle-incomecountries, such as Brazil and Mexico, but even moreso the poorest countries, which tend to be margin-alized in all the global organizations.

One possibility for advancing the reform of multi-lateral organizations would be to convene a group ofheads of government from both North and South, aswith the Group of 20 finance ministers after the Asianfinancial crisis in 1998 (not to be confused with theG-20 bloc of developing countries that coalesced atCancun.32) The advantages of creating such a bodywould include, first, providing a forum for informaldiscussion on pressing world issues, much like the G-8(and its predecessor the G-7) has done since the late1970s. Second, by including most of the world’spopulation and most of its economic capacity, thebody could be said to be broadly representative whilelimiting its membership to a size—far less than the190 nation-states of the entire world—in whichmanageable discussions could take place.

The disadvantages of such a body include the factthat, unless it effectively replaced the G-8 club ofindustrial countries, it could easily become an “outercircle” of countries with the G-8 constituting the“inner circle”, where key discussions are held. Thewillingness of G-8 members to wind up in favour of aG-20, which includes developing countries, seemsunlikely. If the G-8 did not wind up—given the significant costs and growing cynicism attached to its

31 Another model, in which developing countries actually hold a majority of the voting power, is presented by such regional development banks such as the Inter-American Development Bank.

32 G-20 members include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi-Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States, and the European Union.



annual summits—the need for and effectiveness of aG-20 as well as a G-8 meeting annually is questionable.Furthermore, while they may occasionally be able tobreak international deadlocks on certain issues, suchinformal bodies can never substitute for the formalmultilateral organizations, with their operationalmandates to support development and peacebuildingactivities. Finally, if it were to replicate themembership of the G-20 finance ministers, the groupwould exclude the world’s poorest countries. Giventhe urgent challenges faced by the poorest countries,their absence would be a significant omission.

On balance, the advantages of a Leaders’ G-20seem to be limited, if the key objective is to reformthe multilateral organizations. A better option wouldbe to work with members in each organization toimprove its effectiveness and governance. One way ofimproving effectiveness is to enhance the role andindependence of internal evaluation offices, whichcan spotlight weaknesses to be remedied, as well asstrengths to be replicated and built upon. As togovernance, Canada should press to improve the

representation of developing countries, particu-

larly in the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs),

and to give greater voice to civil society organiza-

tions in multilateral organizations generally.

A particularly contentious issue in both theBretton Woods organizations is the selection processfor the chief executive. In the World Bank, the estab-lished tradition is that the US selects a candidate, aUS citizen chosen by the administration in power,who is then ratified by the membership. At the IMF,the tradition has been to elect a European citizenchosen among the European countries. The processeffectively eliminates the candidacy of nationals frommost countries, including those from developedcountries, such as Canada and Japan, and from alldeveloping countries. At the IMF, there is at least somecompetition among European countries vying for theirown nationals, but there was also evidence (duringthe election of Germany’s Horst Köhler in 2000) thatthe US plays a role in approving the Europeans’ choice.

The selection process is not inscribed in thecharters for either Bretton Woods organization. Whilethere may have been a rationale for the tradition untilthe 1970s when the US and Europe dominated themembership, that is no longer true today. Canada

should work with other members to replace this

archaic tradition with a more transparent

selection process, open to candidates from any

member country.

Canada should also press for:¨ Greater policy coherence between the UN and the

BWIs, e.g. by integrating the ILO’s core labourstandards into the work of the World Bank andthe IMF

¨ Making the World Bank/IMF approved PovertyReduction Strategy Papers supportive of theMillennium Declaration and MillenniumDevelopment Goals

¨ An adequate volume of financing to achieve theMDGs through new international taxes (such asthe Tobin tax, which is being implemented inBelgium) or through other mechanisms such asthe International Financing Facility proposed bythe UK Treasury.

In its own dealings with multilateral organiza-tions, Canada should strive more for awhole-of-government approach, by including depart-ments and agencies with a vital interest when certainpolicies come before the multilateral organizations.For example, when the World Bank recentlyundertook its Extractive Industries Review, theDepartment of Finance took the lead role for Canada,with support from CIDA and Natural ResourcesCanada. Other departments with policy interests, forexample Foreign Affairs and International Trade, aswell as Environment Canada and Indian Affairs, werenot included but should have been.



Debate about the costs and benefits of globalization—and the balance between them—has raged on forseveral years. However, there is considerableagreement that the costs and benefits of globalizationare poorly distributed, with the world’s poorercountries, and poorer segments of the population inmost countries, not receiving a proportionate share ofbenefits (in the way of income, employment or otherbenefits, such as skills) or bearing a disproportionateshare of costs (through loss of income or employmentor market share). In other words, while globalizationmay help to bring about economic growth, it is notevenly distributed: it does not lead to equitablegrowth. As well, persisting gender inequalities inaccess to productive resources constrain the ability ofpoor women to adjust to changing markets, withmajor implications for sustainable growth.

There is also considerable agreement that thepolicy framework in which globalization evolvedduring the 1980s and 1990s—known as the“Washington Consensus”—failed to bring aboutgrowth with equity largely because it refused toacknowledge that there are winners and losers fromglobalization, and that the losers are not necessarilyable to take advantage of the opportunities presentedby globalization in the form of new markets orproductive opportunities.33 An increasing focus on theneed to attack poverty during the 1990s led to policyprescriptions aimed at increasing opportunities for thepoor through investments in education and atprotecting them with social safety nets against theadverse impacts of globalization.

In the latter half of the 1990s, however, it becameevident that such palliative measures to help the poorwere not enough. The central prescriptions of theWashington Consensus—rapid economic liberalizationof goods and capital markets—increasingly came intoquestion. The fallout from the Asian financial crisis of1997-98 was particularly severe for the poor, largelybecause weak regulatory institutions (overseeing the

financial sector) did not anticipate and were notprepared to deal with the volatility to which theirfinancial markets were now exposed. A widely drawnconclusion was that rapid liberalization of capitalmarkets, without the institutional infrastructure inplace to regulate capital movements, should beavoided. More generally, it was recognized that the“speed and sequencing” of economic liberalizationneeds to be paced commensurately with each devel-oping country’s ability to manage the economic shiftsand possible turbulence that might ensue.

In the global trade negotiations called the “Doharound”, the same issues surfaced as at the Cancunministerial meeting in September 2003. Many devel-oping countries were not prepared to accept theagenda being urged upon them by industrialcountries, including the introduction of an agreementto liberalize foreign investment and to replace the“spaghetti” pattern of bilateral investment treatieswith a coherent global policy framework. Developingcountries also demanded more concessions on thepart of industrial countries, particularly in their highlyprotected and subsidized agricultural sectors.

However, it would be premature to conclude thata “post-Washington Consensus” has emerged. Such aframework would assume that there is agreement ona policy framework universally beneficial for andapplicable to all countries, with the proviso that somecountries need time to build up their institutionalinfrastructure to be able to implement and managethe policies effectively and equitably.

Critics of such a position34 would argue that thereare no universally valid comprehensive (one-size-fits-all) policy prescriptions. These critics argue that itmay be more appropriate for some countries to adoptsome liberalization policies but reject others, for theforeseeable future. To give two examples: first, it maybe preferable for poor countries to protect theiragriculture sector, even though industrial countriesliberalize theirs, in order to help underpin the viability

33 Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski and John Williamson, eds., After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America. Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics,March 2003.

34 Such as Dani Rodrik and Joseph Stiglitz.

Fair and Inclusive Globalization



of domestic food markets and the livelihoods ofpeasant farmers, who often constitute the majority ofthe population. Second, complete liberalization of thecapital market may not make sense for many devel-oping countries, which might protect themselvesfrom financial turbulence with certain restrictions onshort-term inflows and on long-term outflows.

Indeed, there is now considerable agreement thatdeveloping countries must exercise “ownership” overtheir economic and social policies if those policies areto be sustainable. A large part of the reason for thefailure of the policies of the Washington Consensuswas that they were typically adopted under pressureand duress. A country in crisis would apply to theWorld Bank and/or the IMF for financial assistance,which would be granted under certain conditions—notably, the adoption of policies of “structuraladjustment” (in the 1980s) or “reforms” (in the1990s). Such policies frequently involved cutbacks orretrenchment and inflicted hardships on segments ofthe population (leading to the demand for“adjustment with a human face”). Governmentsadopting such policies were often lauded by theBretton Woods organizations for their “politicalcourage” in getting their populations to take“tough medicine”.

However, the adjustment or reform measureswere not always appropriate for the specific circum-stances, and were typically eased once the financialassistance had been fully disbursed. Moreover, there isfrequently a conflict between short-term stabilizationand long-term development measures. As suchepisodes became repeated, it became clear that,unless there is broadly-based political support foreconomic and social reform, the pressure of externalfinancing tied to policy changes is unlikely to workover the longer term. In other words, if policy reformsare to be sustained and succeed, the government andthe country as a whole have to take ownership of anyreforms without any external pressure. This conclusionwas drawn first and foremost by the World Bank andthe IMF and broadly shared among donor countries.

Once the centrality of country ownership overeconomic and social policies is acknowledged, itfollows that there must be room for countries to take

ownership over policies that diverge from the“mainstream” approach to economic liberalization,and, accordingly, that there should be acceptance ofgreater diversity among the policies that countries arewilling and able to “own”. This, in turn, requiresallowing greater political space for each country toarticulate and implement policies that are appropriateto its circumstances and institutional abilities. Putotherwise, fair and inclusive globalization requiresthat developing countries should not only have

time to adopt liberalization policies as their

institutional capacities permit, but also be

given the political space to diverge from those

policies. In other words, the principle of

country ownership implies another principle,

namely that there be space for diversity in

development strategies and, further, that the

trade and investment policies of developed

countries accommodate that space.

Such an approach has clear implications formacroeconomic and structural policies. Globalizationand particularly the liberalization of capital marketsseverely compress the ability of most countries (otherthan the US) to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal andmonetary policy. Thus, capital inflows, whichgenerally stimulate economic booms, tend to triggerexpansionary fiscal and monetary policies, intensifyingthe boom; while capital outflows, which precipitatedownswings, trigger restrictive policies, acceleratingthe downswing. Moreover, counter-cyclical macroeco-nomic interventions may simply exacerbate theunderlying problem. For example, sterilized inter-vention leading to higher interest rates during a surgeof capital into the economy may attract even greatershort-term inflows, while lower interest rates duringoutflows may accelerate capital flight. One way ofrestricting capital mobility (particularly for short-termcapital, which tends to be the most destabilizing) isthrough “market-friendly” measures such as thereserve requirement (in effect, a tax), as imposed byChile and some other countries on short-term capitalinflows. However, even more restrictive measures,such as the temporary freeze on capital outflows, asimposed by Malaysia during the Asian crisis, can helpto contain the crisis.35

35 The IMF itself now recognizes the need for greater caution in capital-market liberalization, and the need for strengthening domestic financial institutions before opening capital marketsto the world.



With respect to trade and other structural policies(e.g. investment and privatization), there are alsogrounds for derogations from the basic principle of“equal rules for all countries”, rich or poor. Atpresent, the principle of “special and differentialtreatment” (S&DT) exists under the rules of theGATT/WTO primarily for the poorest countries, toallow them greater time to adopt agreementsreached under the multilateral trade negotiations.However, among trade officials of most industrialcountries the presumption is that S&DT is aquestionable provision in the trade rules, one thatshould be restricted to the poorest countries.According to this view, the sooner developingcountries are able to adapt to the international disciplines of trade, the better they will be able tocope with the global trading environment.

Historical and more recent evidence provides littleoptimism that a “fast track” to trade liberalization isbest for countries undergoing protracted social andeconomic transformation. Indeed, most of today’sindustrial countries (the US, Europe) built up theirproductive sectors thanks to decades of protectionistand interventionist policies. Trade and capital accountliberalization have come relatively recently to theindustrial countries—mostly in the last threedecades—in a process that has taken a century ormore of development. The East Asian “tigers”, fortheir part, relied on export promotion (in some casesinvolving state subsidies and other kinds of support)and undervalued currencies rather than on “freetrade” and “sound exchange rate policy” to achievehistorically unprecedented growth rates from the1960s until the 1990s.

Besides international trade, foreign directinvestment (FDI) is increasingly emphasized ineconomic liberalization programs, and to supplementan inadequate flow of ODA. Its potential payoffsinclude employment and income creation, economicdiversification, human resource development, andnew sources of tax revenue. In other words, bothtrade and FDI can contribute, directly or indirectly, topoverty reduction and the other MDGs.

In the case of FDI, however, developing countries(particularly the poorest) face significant challenges in

realizing such potentials.36 Poor countries are typicallyin a weak bargaining position with respect to multi-national firms, the purveyors of FDI. Growingcompetition for FDI among developing countries hasled to favourable tax or other treatment. Moreover,FDI tends to flow to better-off urban areas rather thansectors (agriculture) or regions (rural areas) home tomost of the poor. In the poorest countries, asubstantial proportion flows into resource extraction,particularly oil, gas or minerals. Unfortunately,dependence on natural resources has not been kindto developing countries, which have experienceddevelopment failure, plunging per capita incomes,corruption, authoritarianism and violent conflict. Veryoften there is a direct relationship between resourceexploitation and these outcomes. A North-SouthInstitute study questioned whether resourceexploitation does in fact contribute to poverty reductionand the other MDGs, taking into account its sometimesdestructive social and environmental impacts.Indigenous peoples are particularly vulnerable,because they are typically not well equipped tonegotiate with resource extraction firms (see Box).

No internationally binding legal framework yetexists to govern the conduct of multinational corpora-tions. Instead, “corporate social responsibility” andvoluntary codes of conduct have been promoted byconscientious firms and business associations. The UNlaunched its Global Compact in July 2000, a voluntaryinitiative aimed at integrating human rights, labourstandards and environmental priorities into participatingcompanies’ operating policies and procedures.Canadian firms are conspicuously under-representedin the Compact: out of 1,739 companies that havejoined the Compact worldwide, only 16 are Canadian.

A strong case can be made for a universal,mandatory and enforceable code of corporatebehaviour rather than the voluntary approach of theGlobal Compact. Canada should advocate the

development of such a code, and work with

Canadian firms to adopt binding standards for

corporate responsibility in their dealings in

developing countries.

To sum up, fair and equitable globalizationrequires country ownership of development policy.

36 See Canadian Development Report 2004. Investing in Poor Countries: Who Benefits? Ottawa: The North-South Institute 2004.



These considerations lead to the conclusion that theworld financial and trade regime must acceptdiversity of development strategy and the right ofevery country to protect their institutional arrange-ments, so long as they do not seek to impose theirmodel on others. Trade should be viewed as a meansto development, rather than as an end in itself. Themandate and policies of the global institutions, suchas the WTO, should then be to manage the interfacebetween different systems rather than to reduce

national institutional differences. The objective of theinternational trade regime should not be to increasemarket access for all countries at the same time, butto let different national economic systems prosperside by side.37

Thus, developing countries could press industrialcountries for greater market access in the agriculturalsector, while continuing to protect elements of theirown agricultural sector.38 The development of theagricultural sector is fundamental to the achievement

Including the Voices of the Poorest of the Poor

Fair and inclusive globalization requires a far stronger voice for those living with the direct

consequences of development projects spearheaded by Canadian companies, or financed with

Canadian taxpayers’ dollars.

Canadians have been key players in facilitating large-scale development projects, such as oil and

gas, mining and hydroelectricity that have the potential to severely disrupt the livelihood and

cultural systems of the rural poor, particularly those of Indigenous peoples. While the outcomes for

a country might appear to be a net contributor to economic growth, this accounting more often than

not disregards the social, environmental, cultural and health costs, and the regressive distributional

impacts.

Far more policy attention and coherence is required to ensure that Canadian interventions abroad

– whether to facilitate revisions of mining codes, provide political insurance for companies, or

develop hydroelectricity – adhere to the principles of sustainable development and

uphold the rights of those living directly with the consequences.

The right to be heard and appropriately included in decision-making is the central

focus of a collaborative project between the North-South Institute and Indigenous

and Afro-descendant partners in Colombia, Guyana, Suriname and Canada. Phase I

(2000-2002) focused on the mining sector and resulted in a variety of recommendations

relevant to Canada, including that consultations with affected communities must lead

to their free, prior and informed consent if a project is to go ahead on ancestral

lands. Phase II (2004-07) will include other natural resources activities in addition

to mining, and focuses on capacity-strengthening for communities and opening

dialogue with other relevant actors at the national and international levels –

including Canadian companies and government officials. The ultimate goal is to

influence policy and practice so these are more aligned with Indigenous and

Afro-Colombian processes, aspirations and rights.

“Indigenous peoples need to come together…and work together and see how best we can – in a

very respectful manner, and a very friendly manner – get the governments to listen to us and to

show them that, yes, we can contribute to development, but that they do have to listen to our

views as well and allow us to participate in decision-making…”

– Tony James, President of the Amerindian Peoples Association, Guyana

37 Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, London: Anthem Press, 2002; Dani Rodrik, “The Global Governance of Trade as if Developmentreally Mattered.”, New York: United Nations Development Programme, October 2001.

38 Rodrik, ibid.



of the MDGs because so many of the world’s poordepend on agriculture and the rural economy fortheir livelihood. Moreover, in many countries, particu-larly in sub-Saharan Africa, women are more engagedthan men in cultivation and livestock rearing, so thatan improvement in the returns to agriculture can be amajor contributor to greater gender equality.

Finally, current debates on globalization aregenerally about the movement of goods, services andcapital between countries and about the policies thatexpedite or restrict such movements. They are rarelyabout the movement of people,39 despite the fact thatinternational migration takes place on a significantscale, including migration from South to North.Moreover, migration flows can have a much morebeneficial impact on both sending and receivingcountries than either trade or international investment.

While much has been written about the “braindrain” of skilled people from South to North, reality ismore complex, and there are arguments to be madein favour of a “brain gain”. Many developingcountries cannot absorb all their highly-skilledindividuals in their fields of specialization, leavingthem under- or unemployed. From the viewpoint ofsuch individuals, emigration to a developed countrymay represent a rational and better choice, if they areable to find employment in their professional fields. Itmay also represent a better choice for their country oforigin if they remit a portion of their earnings.Unfortunately, many do not find employment in theirprofessional fields, resulting in underemployment intheir adopted country. However, this could still be abetter choice for the migrants than remaining under-employed in their country of origin.

There are also a number of complex issuesrelating to the migration of less skilled people fromdeveloping to developed countries. As is the case withtheir more skilled compatriots, there are both “drain”and “gain” factors at play. Countries of origin areobviously deprived of emigrants’ labour—and oftenthey are the most active and productive members ofthe labour force. Countries of destination, on theother hand, benefit from a supply of labour forminimum- or low-wage employment for which local

workers are not available. Less-skilled migrants clearlymake a rational choice if their minimum-wageearnings in their adopted country substantially exceedtheir previous incomes, and the sending countriesbenefit from workers’ remittances which are nowquite substantial worldwide.40

However, what distinguishes the migration of lessskilled workers is that their movements are oftenillegal but allowed. As a result, such workers are oftenvulnerable to exploitation and abuse by employersand others, without any recourse to the protection ofthe law.

A fairer and more inclusive globalization wouldintegrate the movement of peoples into the interna-tional policy framework. It would overturn theperverseness of current rules on migration, so thatskilled people are encouraged to stay where they areneeded most, while unskilled people are allowed tomigrate to countries and regions where better oppor-tunities await them. Canada should review itsimmigration policies in this light, particularly:¨ by avoiding the recruitment of health-care profes-

sionals from developing countries with health careshortages

¨ by employing professional immigrants in fields oftheir specialization and expertise

¨ by making better use of the diaspora in aidfinanced projects and aid policy formulation

¨ by expanding programs such as Canada’sSeasonal Agricultural Workers’ Program, whichadmits a limited number of relatively unskilledworkers to Canada on a short-term basis to workin the farm sector (see Box).

39 Although interest in workers’ remittances (from North to South), which have grown substantially in recent years, has attracted growing attention as an untapped source of capital fordevelopment.

40 These amounted to US$90 billion in 2003.



The Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program

The Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) is managed by Human Resources and Skills

Development Canada and Citizenship and Immigration Canada in cooperation with agricultural

producers and the governments of Mexico and the Commonwealth Caribbean.

Agriculture is a vital component of the Canadian economy. Traditionally, there is a critical shortage

of suitably qualified Canadian seasonal workers available in sufficient numbers when needed to

plant, maintain, and harvest horticulture crops. SAWP was created in 1966 to respond to this

shortage by providing a supplementary source of seasonal labor. The program allows for the

organized entry and exit of Commonwealth Caribbean and Mexican migrant workers to work for up

to eight months in specific agricultural commodity sectors. Currently, farmers in Ontario, Quebec,

New Brunswick, British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Prince

Edward Island participate in SAWP.

SAWP’s two main objectives are to contribute to the improvement of Canada’s economic

prosperity by ensuring that horticulture crops are planted and harvested in a timely

manner and to provide full-time seasonal (temporary) wage employment for

Caribbean and Mexican migrant farm workers and their families back in Mexico and

the Caribbean. The program thus provides economic benefits for Canadians and for

the migrant workers and their families. In the 2002 season, a little more than 18,500

migrant workers and their families benefited under the program.

The North-South Institute (NSI) conducted the first comprehensive study on SAWP

between 2002 and 2003. The study found that, overall, SAWP has been a

tremendous economic success story for Canada, Mexico, and the Caribbean over

the past 40 years. However, the study also found that there were facets of SAWP’S

management, farm employment, and rural community engagement that need to

be addressed to further enhance SAWP’S economic benefits for both farm

employers and the migrant workers. In this regard, the study made a number of

practical recommendations that would significantly strengthen the program by

addressing these issues, while building further on those areas that were found to

be working satisfactorily in terms of the program’s two main objectives. The

reports and recommendations can be found on the NSI website: www.nsi-ins.ca



a) Peacebuilding, conflict prevention andstate failure41

In the 1990s, peacebuilding efforts in a few countriessuch as El Salvador and Mozambique, driven for yearsby brutal conflict, could claim some major achieve-ments. At the same time, the decade of the 1990switnessed atrocities in Rwanda and in the formerYugoslavia. In Rwanda, the international communitystood by and did virtually nothing to stop the genocideof 800,000 Tutsis and some of their supporters. InBosnia and Kosovo, the international communityultimately took action, but not before a large numberof innocent people were killed, maimed or raped.

As a result of these episodes, the paradigm ofinternational peacebuilding underwent a steadyevolution during the decade. Earlier variantscomprised internationally mediated negotiationsbetween key parties to the conflict, supported byinternational verification and peacekeeping, andfollowed by reconstruction initiatives aimed atbuilding a liberal democratic state and market-basedeconomy. By mid-decade, the horrors of Rwanda andthe former Yugoslavia gave rise to a more robustvariant of this liberal peacebuilding paradigm arguingthat it is sometimes necessary for the internationalcommunity to go beyond the posture of external“honest brokers” and use military force to protectcivilians in war-torn societies and to lead the recon-struction effort.

The “robust liberal” paradigm was articulated bythe Canadian-initiated International Commission onIntervention and State Sovereignty in its December2001 report, The Responsibility to Protect.42 Ironicallythe commission’s report was published just after theterrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which in turnled to the US-led invasions of Afghanistan and (18months later) Iraq. Suddenly the pretext to intervenefor humanitarian reasons had given way to an older,more traditional pretext for invasion, namely topromote or protect the national interest of theinvaders. In the case of both Afghanistan and Iraq,

the official objective of intervention was to prosecutethe “war on terrorism”. Other motivations for theinterventions in Afghanistan and Iraq include controlover strategic natural resources (particularly oil) andthe promotion of regime change in the Middle Eastby replacing authoritarian leaders with democraticallyelected governments. Although both invasions havebeen followed by reconstruction initiatives by theoccupying forces, it seems clear that such interven-tions were not principally motivated by the liberaland humanitarian objectives that are central to TheResponsibility to Protect.

As a result, the case for intervention today, evento protect populations subject to civil conflict andviolence on a large scale, has become clouded by the“war on terrorism”. Foreign intervention, particularlyif led by the US, even if prompted by humanitarianobjectives, can be suspected of ulterior motives—inparticular, the geostrategic objectives of the US. Aprominent example is the humanitarian catastrophein Darfur, western Sudan, where more than 50,000people have been killed with the acquiescence of theSudanese government in Khartoum because of acampaign for greater local autonomy. That govern-ment and other critics are accusing those threateningintervention that their real objective is control overSudan’s oil resources and escalation of the Bushadministration’s “crusade” against Islamic countries.

Given developments after September 11, it istime for new thinking on how to prevent local andregional conflicts and what kinds of peacebuildingefforts are more likely to be fruitful in the long term.It is crucial that bridges be built between the short-term exigencies of establishing peace and thelonger-term needs to engender sustainable andequitable development. Research on how to bridgepeacebuilding and development policy is urgentlyneeded (see Box). The overarching policy frameworkproposed in this paper provides insights for a newapproach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding:

41 See Stephen Baranyi, “Reconstruction, Deconstruction, or Sustainable Peace?” in The North-South Institute’s Review, Fall-Winter 2003-04.

42 Published in Ottawa by IDRC.

Peace and Security



What Kind of Peace is Possible?

International development agencies have long recognized that it is essential to link humanitarian

responses and postwar reconstruction programs with longer-term strategies to address the under-

pinnings of armed conflict – and prevent the recurrence of wars. Much has been invested in

mainstreaming a “culture of prevention” into development and diplomacy. Yet these advances fall

far short of what is needed. There continues to be inadequate support for long-term, transformative

peacebuilding activities in key areas like rural development. What progress had been made in

linking peacebuilding to longer-term poverty reduction strategies is also imperilled by the post-

9/11 preoccupations with current crises and immediate, security-focused responses.

The North-South Institute has worked extensively on long-term peacebuilding and struc-

tural conflict prevention through its research on land policies. That work has shown

that even where peace accords contain commitments to increasing access to land and

other assets for the rural poor, as they do in El Salvador and Guatemala, change agents

do not receive the coherent support needed to bring these reforms to fruition – thus

fuelling new cycles of violence.

Through the “What Kind of Peace is Possible?” project, NSI and its partners are now looking

at how enduring gaps between short-term and longer-term peacebuilding could be

bridged in Afghanistan, Guatemala, Haiti, Mozambique, the Palestinian Territories and

Sri Lanka. We are working to identify options for more sustainable approaches to

peacebuilding, particularly in the realms of democratic governance and economic

development, at the local level. By 2005, this project will yield policy recommenda-

tions for selected local and national actors in each country. It will also yield policy

recommendations for international agencies. These recommendations will be shared

in a series of briefs and through policy dialogue in each country, including Canada.

¨ Sustainable development and sustainable

peace are intimately interrelated. Conflictsare more likely to arise, and more difficult toresolve, where there are deep inequalities inincome and ongoing poverty and stagnation.Therefore, conflict prevention and peacebuildinginitiatives should always be complemented withsustainable and equitable development strategiesand, at the very least, ensure that developmentstrategies do not exacerbate inequities (forexample, through structural adjustment or liberal-ization policies that impact adversely on thepoor). Similarly, since deep inequalities aretypically entrenched, a very long time horizon(perhaps decades) is necessary to address themthrough economic, political, and social transfor-mation. Haiti is a good example, illustrating howthe failure of sustainable and equitable devel-opment is a fundamental contributor to political

instability and civil conflict, and vice-versa.Frequent foreign interventions to resolve conflicthave not successfully addressed the underlyingdevelopment failure.

¨ Domestic ownership is crucial. No amount offoreign intervention, no matter how appropriate,is a substitute for “made-at-home” solutions thatare broadly supported by the domestic populace.

¨ Multilateral and regional approaches to

intervention must be nurtured. As the short-comings to the unilateralist intervention in Iraqbecome increasingly evident, the importance ofthe UN as the world’s pre-eminent peacekeeperwill again come to the fore. In some cases,regional organizations may be in a better positionto respond to crises than the UN. In Africa, theAfrican Union has intervened in Burundi and hasoffered to do so in Sudan in the case of the Darfurupheaval. In Latin America, the OAS played an



important role in helping to mediate a politicallyvolatile situation surrounding the referendum onthe recall of President Hugo Chavez. In order tobe more effective, such regional organizations(and their member countries) need financial,political, material and other support from theinternational community. Canada shouldstrengthen its financial and political support of theprotection and conflict prevention capacities ofselected regional organizations, particularly theAfrican Union.

Canada is also involved in international debateson how to respond to state failure through meansother than military intervention. In recent years theOECD Development Assistance Committee and theWorld Bank have argued that it is essential to remainengaged in countries where the state is collapsing orsystematically failing to meet core obligations to itscitizens. In such circumstances, it is important fordonors to coordinate enhanced analysis and morefinely-targeted programming, which shouldencompass support for governance reforms and forsocio-economic activities, particularly essential servicesto the poor. The DAC and World Bank suggest thatimposing orthodox macro-economic and fiscal reformon countries already under stress can aggravate theirproblems. Above all, they underline the importance ofintegrated approaches to state failure, and of policycoherence.43 They also suggest that it is frequentlynecessary to take risks in countries under extremestress in order to be helpful.

These policy prescriptions pose significantchallenges to Canada and other OECD countries.They pull us in a different direction from the currentaid effectiveness agenda, which suggests that aidshould be focused on countries where need and“good policies” intersect.

If Canada is to rise to this challenge, it will haveto develop a clear policy for an integrated, whole-of-government approach to failed states. That policyframework should encompass support for governanceand socio-economic programming over the long term.Delivering on the policy will require CIDA to enhanceits capacity for conflict analysis and coordination with

other donors, its field presence in priority countries,as well as its monitoring and evaluation of conflict-sensitive programming. It will require deepercoordination with other departments—particularlyFinance, Foreign Affairs, Defence and the SolicitorGeneral—to ensure that their activities are coherentwith long term conflict prevention objectives.Delivering on this policy will also require significantfunds. The idea of creating a $100 million-per-yearpeace and security fund, currently under consider-ation by the government, seems sensible, althoughthe amount is unlikely to be adequate. Yet manyquestions remain about the policy framework that willguide this fund: whether Foreign Affairs has theintegrated perspective necessary to lead itsmanagement, whether funds would be focused onlong-term engagement in a few countries like Haiti(where need, strategic importance and Canadianinterests intersect) or whether it would be dispersedover the many countries in which there is a need forconflict prevention.

b) The Middle East CrucibleCanada must fundamentally re-think its policiestoward the Middle East—including both its positionon the Israel-Palestine conflict and its policies towardthe Arab world. For the most part, Canada’s positionsare often driven by US policies that are biased towardIsrael and against the Palestinians while, at the sametime, supportive of repressive Arab regimes in SaudiArabia and Egypt, among others. There is also a needfor renewed movement towards reform in Palestineitself. As such, Canada should support efforts todemocratize the Palestinian Authority, increase trans-parency and accountability, and lay the foundationsfor a viable economy that can re-absorb the millionsof unemployed youths whose desperation fuelsviolence.

Much of the animosity in the Islamic (and particu-larly the Arabic) world is undoubtedly fed by thedeepening conflict between Israel and Palestine, byperceptions and the reality of US support of Israel,and by Israeli intransigence toward the Palestiniansand the rest of the world. Israel, with the support ofthe US, has rejected a number of Security Council

43 Stephen Baranyi, “What kind of peace?” July 2004.



resolutions over the last 35 years calling for a returnto its pre-1967 borders. More recently, the spread ofpermanent Israeli settlements built in the West Bank,and the “security fence” built by Israel beyond the1967 borders, have further expropriated lands in thePalestinian territory, evoked anger among Palestiniansand Arabs, and criticism from countries around theworld. The aggressive tactics of the Sharongovernment in Israel, with its policy of inflictingseveral-fold retribution on Palestinians for eachterrorist attack, have further elevated grievances.

That is not to say that resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict will put an end to Islamic terrorism,but it would certainly undermine (and eventuallyterminate) support for terrorism in Palestine, andundermine it in the Arab world. Even more important,it would address a major (or the major) threat toworld peace today. The next conflagration betweenIsrael and its Arab neighbours has the potential ofinvolving nuclear weapons, which would havecatastrophic consequences for the whole world.

Canada should maintain a balanced position

on the Israel-Palestine conflict. Canada should

condemn the spread of Israeli settlements in

the West Bank and the erection of the security

fence to engulf more land in the Palestinian

territory, and the perpetration of violence by

both sides. Canada should work with others

toward a two-state solution in which Israelis

and Palestinians can live in peace and harmony

with each other and their neighbours.

At the same time, it is clear that much of theimpetus for Islamic fundamentalism emanates fromtwo Arab countries: Saudi Arabia and Egypt.44 SaudiArabia, a corrupt and feudal regime, has become aclient state of the US; in return for military protectionand political support, the Saudis have facilitated asmooth flow of petroleum and have acted to stabilizeoil markets. Under cover of this relationship, theSaudis have nurtured Wahhabi fundamentalists andallowed them to promulgate their creed throughmadrassas (Islamic schools) throughout the Islamic

world. The rise to power of the Taliban in Afghanistanwould not have been possible without support fromWahhabi clerics in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi influenceon US policy has been deepened by the considerablelargesse of the Saudi regime provided for US politi-cians, academics, and opinion leaders.45

In the case of Egypt, the most populous Arabstate, a different dynamic has prevailed ever since theassassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. Hissuccessor Hosni Mubarak has overseen an increasinglyrepressive and unpopular regime in Egypt. The quies-cence of Egypt towards Israel has resulted in generouseconomic and military support from the US, whichhas, in turn, served to entrench Mubarak’s power,while development has sorely languished. Manyamong the poor in this country of 70 million, at theheart of the Arab world, feel their government doesnot respond to their needs. However, the middle classalso feels disenfranchised. As a result, support forfundamentalism has grown in many quarters ofEgyptian society. Mubarak has responded throughrepression, even against legitimate and peacefulvoices of dissent, apparently boosting rather thanarresting support for the fundamentalists.46

Underlying these policies is the presumption thatany autocratic regimes in the Arab and Islamic worldthat profess support for the US in particular and theWest more generally should be diplomatically,economically and militarily rewarded. Similar thinkingduring the Cold War led to support of such anti-Sovietleaders as Mobutu, Pinochet, and indeed, at one time,Saddam Hussein. While the short-term merits ofsupporting “enemies of one’s enemies” regardless oftheir intrinsic nature may be debated, in the longerterm, such an uncritical approach is self-defeating.

A fundamental rethinking of Canadian

policies toward regimes in the Arab and Islamic

world is required, based on sustainable and

equitable development, and on the establish-

ment or strengthening of human rights and

democratic governance,47 consistent with the

overarching framework proposed in this paper.

44 It is no coincidence that most of the September 11 hijackers came from Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

45 Robert Baer, Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold our Soul for Saudi Crude. New York: Three Rivers Press, 2003, 31-60. See also Craig Unger, House of Bush, House of Saud. NewYork: Scribner, 2004.

46 Noah Feldman, After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003, p. 162 ff.

47 Support for moderate Islamists is compatible with support for human rights and democratic governance. See Feldman, op. cit., and Stephen Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: The Houseof Sa’ud from Tradition to Terror. New York: Doubleday, 2002.



48 Sen. Robert C. Byrd, Losing America: Confronting a Reckless and Arrogant Presidency. New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2004, 112-115.

Canada should distance itself from US policies

where these are at odds with such an approach.

The case of Iraq demands particular attention.The longer the US-led occupation remains, the moreremote are the chances of lasting peace and stabilityin that country. Moreover, in the lawlessness spawnedby the invasion and occupation, Iraq has become abreeding-ground for Islamic terrorists. This is a grimirony, in view of the fact that there had been no linksbetween the Saddam Hussein regime and Al Qaeda,leading many to the conclusion that the Iraq war hasactually made the world more unsafe than it was withSaddam in power.

Canada should press for a rapid withdrawal

of US and coalition forces from Iraq and their

replacement with a security force under UN

command. Canada should also support and help

monitor early elections to ensure a genuinely

representative and democratic Iraqi

government takes power as soon as possible.

c) Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)The Bush administration’s proposal to initiate aprogram of ballistic missile defence, ostensibly toprotect the homeland against weapons of massdestruction launched from such states as Iran orNorth Korea, has stirred considerable controversyboth inside and outside the US. A number of experts,including former US military officers, have criticizedBMD on account of its huge expense and on thegrounds of its highly questionable effectivenesstechnically. Meanwhile, on-the-ground securitymeasures to boost security at airports, ports, borders,and nuclear plants, and to increase US capacity todeal with future attacks similar to those of September11, or with chemical and biological attacks, havebeen criticized as dangerously underfunded.48

Furthermore, BMD has the potential to spark anew nuclear arms race, as other countries respond byinvesting in similar military technology. It also couldlead to the weaponization of space. The much greateropportunity cost of such a new arms race is theincreasing neglect of sustainable and equitable devel-opment, which ultimately is the best guarantor ofhuman security around the world.

Despite all these shortcomings, some Canadiansfeel that Canada should have a seat at the table asthe US implements BMD, since the system will bedeployed to intercept incoming missiles overCanadian air space. Others feel that, notwithstandingBMD’s questionable efficacy, participation wouldbring important technological and industrial spin-offsto Canada.

The position of this paper is that there are

so many profound and intrinsic flaws in the

BMD proposal, including re-igniting the arms

race and the huge opportunity costs it repre-

sents for genuine global security, peace and

development, that Canada should refuse to

participate and indeed express its objections to

the proposal.



Canada’s bilateral relationship with the United Statesis clearly of overarching significance. The frameworkproposed in this paper for Canada’s internationalpolicy, based as it is on the Millennium Declarationand Development Goals, does not seem useful toprovide guidance for relationships among developedcountries, particularly at the level of details. However,such relationships must now be situated in a broadercontext, namely that of the geopolitical strategy ofthe US, the world’s only superpower.

The bilateral relationship between Canada and itsgiant neighbour is largely based on political andeconomic ties, and built on a foundation of peace andfriendship going back at least a century. Today, the tiesof friendship spring from shared liberal anddemocratic values; a huge and growing volume ofbilateral trade and investment—the largest betweenany two independent countries in the world;thousands of family relationships spanning the border;a common language (with Anglophone Canada);many cultural similarities; and a considerable andcontinuous flow of cross-border tourism. The Canada-US economic relationship, it should be emphasized, isin the interest of the US as well as Canada.

There have always been trade disputes betweenthe two neighbours, including those currentlyaffecting Canadian softwood lumber and beefexports. Without denying the seriousness of suchissues to the affected Canadian producers andregions, given the huge volume of unrestricted tradebetween the two countries, these problems must beconsidered relatively minor bilateral irritants. Inthemselves they cannot be said to have significantlyundermined the overall Canada-US relationship.

However, geopolitical developments since theterrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001have had a profound impact on its bilateralrelationship with Canada—and for that matter, with allof America’s traditional allies. A major turning pointwas the Bush administration’s insistence on going towar against Iraq in May 2003, in the face ofopposition from many other countries and, according

to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in violation of theUN Charter.49 In so doing, the US clearly posed achallenge to the postwar world order, with its funda-mental underpinnings of multilateral cooperation, andthe principles of nonaggression and collective security.

Apprehensions about the course of US foreignpolicy have been heightened, inter alia, by lack ofevidence of an Iraqi link to the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, the failure to discover Iraqi weapons ofmass destruction (the pretext for the invasion),thousands of casualties suffered by innocent Iraqisduring the war and subsequent occupation, theprospect of continuing or escalating civil strife withthe transition to Iraqi self-rule, the questionable legitimacy of the US-appointed Iraqi transitionalgovernment, and the willingness of the US to overlookthe Geneva convention in its deplorable treatment ofits prisoners of war taken in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Equally, there is cause for concern over the Bushadministration’s clear bias in the Israel-Palestineconflict in favour of the Sharon government, with itsproclivity toward military rather than diplomaticsolutions. The US posture in the Middle East alsoreveals blatant disregard for efforts through the UNand by others toward a lasting peace, and demon-strates indifference to the opposition in the regionand in much of the rest of the world to US and Israelipolicies. All this makes any resolution of Israel-Palestine conflict much more problematic and distant,and seriously undermines the prospects for peace andstability in the Middle East more generally.

In this larger geopolitical context, Prime MinisterChrétien’s decision in May 2003 that Canada wouldnot join the US-led coalition against Iraq marked acrucial watershed in the Canada-US bilateralrelationship. While this decision was supported by alarge majority of Canadians, some critics construedMr. Chrétien’s decision as intrinsically “anti-American.”Others, who may have opposed the war against Iraq,felt that Canada is now so dependent on the US, thatCanada has “no choice” but to support the war, atleast tacitly. Yet others, who advocate building much

49 “Iraq war illegal, says Annan,” BBC News, UK edition, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3661134.stm.

Canada-US Relations



closer economic ties with the US, including a customsand currency union, would align Canadian foreignpolicy more closely with that of the US to reinforcethose ties.

It is worth noting that Canada’s decision not tosupport the US coalition in Iraq has a significanthistorical precedent in the 1960s and 1970s. Canadadid not support the Vietnam War. Indeed PrimeMinisters Pearson and Trudeau spoke publicly againstthe war, as did many traditional allies of the US. Thereare other, perhaps less dramatic examples of Canadataking a different position on international policyissues. Unlike the US, Canada has recognized and hashad an active relationship with Cuba under the Castroregime. Similarly, Canada was a leading advocate ofthe International Criminal Court and of theLandmines Treaty.

Moreover, despite these differences, the twocountries have managed to agree to intensify bilateraleconomic ties in the 1960s through the Auto Pact, inthe 1980s through the Canada-US Free TradeAgreement, and in the 1990s through the NorthAmerican Free Trade Agreement. In other words,history suggests that it has been possible for the twocountries to maintain or strengthen their economiccooperation but differ occasionally on importantforeign policy issues. While disagreements on keyissues have been the exception, the point is they haveoccurred without undermining the overall bilateralrelationship.

In any event, the terrorist threat from Islamist andother groups could be present for some time, withthe possibility of further strikes against the US andother industrial countries. The question is whether thecampaign against terrorism is best waged throughconventional warfare, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, orthrough other means.

It is in this context that the Canada-USrelationship should be placed within the policyframework suggested above. If long-term, equitableand sustainable development and durable peace is tobe the foundation for Canada’s international policy,this policy framework should also be used to judge USglobal policies and, therefore, whether Canada is

prepared to support those policies. The Canadian

position should be based on whether US

policies are consistent with Canada’s own policy

framework. The issue is not whether Canadian

policy is pro- or anti-American. Rather, the

important issue is whether the policies of the

US are helping to bring about a more equitable,

peaceful and sustainable global order. If they

are not, Canada has an obligation to raise its

voice and challenge our neighbour to change

course both for its own sake and for that of the

world.

If Canada hews to such an independent course inits international policies, it is possible there may berepercussions in the form of sanctions or constraintsimposed by the US that would seriously injure theCanadian economy and Canadian livelihoods.However, in addition to the fact that Canada opposedthe Vietnam War without undermining (indeed, whiledeepening) its bilateral relationship, the fact that theBush administration has not sought to retaliateagainst Canada because of its refusal to join thecoalition against Iraq suggests this is only a remotepossibility. Nonetheless there may be ways of parryingpotential US retaliatory urges on those occasionswhen Canada challenges American policies. This canbe done by emphasizing how Canada co-operateswith those aspects of American policy with whichCanada agrees, or complements it with actions thatare seen to help the US.

For example, when it declined to join the UScoalition against Iraq, Canada committed to step upthe level of its peacekeeping and reconstructionefforts in Afghanistan. In so doing, Canada iscontributing to equitable, sustainable and peacefuldevelopment in a country that obviously did harbourterrorists, including those involved in the September 11attacks. Canada also made a large financialcommitment to the reconstruction of Iraq.50 Theseefforts indicated that, although Canada did notsupport war against Iraq, it was willing tocomplement the US war against terrorism throughvery different means.

50 The huge size of the commitments made to Afghanistan and Iraq is an issue discussed above. These were the largest commitments ever made to individual countries (Iraq is notone of the world’s poorest countries) through Canada’s aid program, prompting criticisms that scarce aid funds are being diverted to security and the war against terrorism.



Furthermore, Canada has also cooperated withUS authorities in a broad range of anti-terrorist activ-ities, from greater coordination and sharing ofintelligence, to harmonization of border and“Homeland Security” measures.51

In summary, this paper suggests a three-prongedapproach for Canada’s position on US global policiesto ensure consistency with Canada’s internationalpolicy framework:¨ Complementarity—by strengthening

equitable, peaceful and sustainable devel-

opment through Canada’s aid program and

peacekeeping efforts

¨ Cooperation—on legitimate intelligence and

police work to counter terrorism

¨ Challenge—on those occasions when the US

acts to undermine prospects for equitable,

peaceful and sustainable development.

Canada’s bilateral relations with the US will alsobe affected by its decision on whether to participatein the Bush administration’s plan for ballistic missiledefence (BMD). This issue is considered above underPeace and Security.

51 However, the Maher Arar case also suggests caution on such cooperative endeavours to ensure that they are consistent with Canadian laws, and the Charter of Rights andFreedoms, as well as international norms of human rights. In other words, Canada should desist from intelligence cooperation with the US where it entails violations of the humanrights of those under surveillance or detention.



Soon after being sworn into office in December 2003,Prime Minister Paul Martin announced the creation ofa new Cabinet Committee on Global Affairs, which hehimself chairs. The formation of this committee is aptand timely, given the government’s aim of achievinggreater coherence in Canada’s international policy.The committee, which represents all the key

international departments with one

conspicuous exception, can spearhead the

strategy and many of the recommendations

called for in this paper.

Conspicuously missing from the Global AffairsCommittee is the Minister of Finance who should bean active member. The Department of Finance is akey player on international policy for all the reasonsmentioned in this paper. This point was corroboratedwhen Finance Minister Ralph Goodale accepted aninvitation by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair to join theUK-sponsored Commission on Africa, focusing on thatcontinent’s development challenges, that will reportto the G-8 Summit in 2005.

That said, the government must go beyond

the initiatives that can be taken by Cabinet

under existing policies, by introducing new

legislation. Such legislation would provide a

more directive, and publicly visible, statutory

framework for the new policy directions

suggested in this paper.

A very relevant precedent now exists in Swedenin the form of Bill 2002/3:122—which is entitled,“Shared Responsibility: Sweden’s Policy for GlobalDevelopment.” The main theme of this legislation isinternational policy coherence. The goal of theSwedish government under this legislation is tocontribute to equitable and sustainable development,

in all policy areas—trade, agriculture, environment,security, migration, and economic policy, amongothers. The focus of this bill is on poor people andpoor countries. The policy will contribute to theachievement of the Millennium Development Goals.In so doing, it calls for collaboration with actors in allsectors of society, including public authorities at thenational and local levels, civil society, the privatesector, and the trade union movement. Under thislegislation, in September 2004 the Swedishgovernment presented its first annual report toParliament on progress and outcomes achieved withregard to implementation of the policy.52 Similarobjectives were laid out in two White Paperspublished by the UK in 2000.53

It is recommended that, in designing a

coherent international policy for Canada, the

government closely examine both the Swedish

legislation and the broader program of action

initiated by the Swedish government, involving

civil society and the private sector, as well as

local governments, toward the achievement of

sustainable and equitable development.

52 The Bill is available on the Ministry for Foreign Affairs website at: www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/574/a/24520;jsessionid=aXO2hkV6blhe

53 UK Department for International Development, “Eliminating World Poverty: a Challenge for the 21st Century,” and “Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation Work for thePoor.” Available on the DfID website at www.dfid.gov.uk. The UK’s International Development Act 2002, described as “an Act relating to the provision of assistance for countries outsidethe United Kingdom; to make provision with respect to certain international financial institutions and the Commonwealth Scholarship Commission; and for connected purposes,” is nar-rower in its scope, focusing primarily on development assistance, than the Swedish development bill, which aims at policy coherence across the whole of government.

Implementing the Framework





Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable developmentinto country policies and programmes and reversethe loss of environmental resources

Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people withoutsustainable access to safe drinking water

Target 11: By 2020, to have achieved a significantimprovement in the lives of at least 100 millionslum dwellers

25. Proportion of land area covered by forest26. Ratio of area protected to maintain biological diversity to surface

area27. Energy use (kg oil equivalent) per $1 GDP (PPP)28. Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) and consumption of

ozone-depleting CFCs (ODP tons)29. Proportion of population using solid fuels30. Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved

water source, urban and rural31. Proportion of urban population with access to improved sanitation32. Proportion of households with access to secure tenure (owned

or rented)

GOAL 7: Ensure environmental sustainability

GOALS AND TARGETS

(from the Millennium Declaration)

Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion ofpeople whose income is less than one dollar a day

Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion ofpeople who suffer from hunger

INDICATORS FOR MONITORING PROGRESS

1. Proportion of population below $1 (PPP) per day a

2. Poverty gap ratio [incidence x depth of poverty]3. Share of poorest quintile in national consumption4. Prevalence of underweight children under-five years of age5. Proportion of population below minimum level of dietary energy

consumption

Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)

GOAL 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boysand girls alike, will be able to complete a full courseof primary schooling

6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education7. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach grade 58. Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds

GOAL 2: Achieve universal primary education

Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondaryeducation preferably by 2005 and to all levels ofeducation no later than 2015

9. Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education10. Ratio of literate females to males of 15-24 year-olds11. Share of women in wage employment in the nonagricultural sector12. Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament

GOAL 3: Promote gender equality and empower women

Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, theunder-five mortality rate

13. Under-five mortality rate14. Infant mortality rate15. Proportion of 1 year-old children immunised against measles

GOAL 4: Reduce child mortality

Target 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015,the maternal mortality ratio

16. Maternal mortality ratio17. Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel

GOAL 5: Improve maternal health

Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse thespread of HIV/AIDS

Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse theincidence of malaria and other major diseases

18. HIV prevalence among 15-24 year old pregnant women19. Condom use rate of the contraceptive prevalence rate b

20. Number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS c

21. Prevalence and death rates associated with malaria22. Proportion of population in malaria risk areas using effective

malaria prevention and treatment measures d

23. Prevalence and death rates associated with tuberculosis24. Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and cured under

directly observed treatment short course (DOTS)

GOAL 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases


Target 12: Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable,non-discriminatory trading and financial system. Includes a commitment to good governance, devel-opment, and poverty reduction – both nationallyand internationally

Target 13: Address the special needs of the least developedcountries. Includes: tariff and quota free access forleast developed countries' exports; enhancedprogramme of debt relief for HIPC and cancellationof official bilateral debt; and more generous ODAfor countries committed to poverty reduction

Target 14: Address the special needs of landlocked countriesand small island developing States. (through theProgramme of Action for the SustainableDevelopment of Small Island Developing States andthe outcome of the twenty-second special session ofthe General Assembly)

Target 15: Deal comprehensively with the debt problems ofdeveloping countries through national and interna-tional measures in order to make debt sustainable inthe long term

Target 16: In co-operation with developing countries, developand implement strategies for decent and productivework for youth

Target 17: In co-operation with pharmaceutical companies,provide access to affordable, essential drugs indeveloping countries

Target 18: In co-operation with the private sector, makeavailable the benefits of new technologies,especially information and communications

Some of the indicators listed below are monitored separately forthe least developed countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked countriesand small island developing States.

Official development assistance33. Net ODA, total and to LDCs, as per centage of OECD/DAC

donors’ gross national income34. Proportion of total bilateral, sector-allocable ODA of

OECD/DAC donors to basic social services (basic education,primary health care, nutrition, safe water and sanitation)

35. Proportion of bilateral ODA of OECD/DAC donors that isuntied

36. ODA received in landlocked countries as proportion of their GNIs37. ODA received in small island developing States as proportion of

their GNIs Market access38. Proportion of total developed country imports (by value and

excluding arms) from developing countries and LDCs, admittedfree of duties

39. Average tariffs imposed by developed countries on agriculturalproducts and textiles and clothing from developing countries

40. Agricultural support estimate for OECD countries as percentageof their GDP

41. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade capacitye

Debt sustainability42. Total number of countries that have reached their HIPC

decision points and number that have reached their HIPCcompletion points (cumulative)

43. Debt relief committed under HIPC initiative, US$44. Debt service as a percentage of exports of goods and services45. Unemployment rate of 15-24 year-olds, each sex and total f

46. Proportion of population with access to affordable essentialdrugs on a sustainable basis

47. Telephone lines and cellular subscribers per 100 population48. Personal computers in use per 100 population and Internet

users per 100 population

GOAL 8: Develop a global partnership for development

GOALS AND TARGETS

(from the Millennium Declaration)INDICATORS FOR MONITORING PROGRESS

The Millennium Development Goals and targets come from the Millennium Declaration signed by 189 countries, including 147 Heads of State, in September 2000(www.un.org/documents/ga/res/55/a55r002.pdf - A/RES/55/2).The goals and targets are inter-related and should be seen as a whole. They represent a partnership between the developed countries and the developing countriesdetermined, as the Declaration states, “to create an environment – at the national and global levels alike – which is conducive to development and the elimination ofpoverty.”a For monitoring country poverty trends, indicators based on national poverty lines should be used, where available.b Amongst contraceptive methods, only condoms are effective in preventing HIV transmission. The contraceptive prevalence rate is also useful in trackingprogress in other health, gender and poverty goals. Because the condom use rate is only measured amongst women in union, it will be supplemented by anindicator on condom use in high risk situations. These indicators will be augmented with an indicator of knowledge and misconceptions regarding HIV/AIDS by15-24 year-olds (UNICEF – WHO).

c To be measured by the ratio of proportion of orphans to non-orphans aged 10-14 who are attending school.d Prevention to be measured by the % of under 5s sleeping under insecticide treated bednets; treatment to be measured by % of under 5s who are appropriately treated.

e OECD and WTO are collecting data that will be available for 2001 onwards.f An improved measure of the target is under development by ILO for future years.




II. Peace, security and disarmament 8. We will spare no effort to free our peoples from thescourge of war, whether within or between States,which has claimed more than 5 million lives in thepast decade. We will also seek to eliminate thedangers posed by weapons of mass destruction.9. We resolve therefore:• To strengthen respect for the rule of law in interna-

tional as in national affairs and, in particular, toensure compliance by Member States with thedecisions of the International Court of Justice, incompliance with the Charter of the United Nations,in cases to which they are parties.

• To make the UN more effective in maintaining peaceand security by giving it the resources and tools itneeds for conflict prevention, peaceful resolution ofdisputes, peacekeeping, post-conflict peace-buildingand reconstruction. In this context, we take note ofthe report of the Panel on United Nations PeaceOperations and request the General Assembly toconsider its recommendations expeditiously.

• To strengthen cooperation between the UN andregional organizations, in accordance with theprovisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

• To ensure the implementation, by States Parties, oftreaties in areas such as arms control and disar-mament and of international humanitarian law andhuman rights law, and call upon all States toconsider signing and ratifying the Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court.

• To take concerted action against internationalterrorism, and to accede as soon as possible to allthe relevant international conventions.

• To redouble our efforts to implement ourcommitment to counter the world drug problem.

• To intensify our efforts to fight transnational crimein all its dimensions, including trafficking as well assmuggling in human beings and money laundering.

• To minimize the adverse effects of UN economicsanctions on innocent populations, to subject suchsanctions regimes to regular reviews and to eliminatethe adverse effects of sanctions on third parties.

• To strive for the elimination of weapons of massdestruction, particularly nuclear weapons, and tokeep all options open for achieving this aim,including the possibility of convening an interna-tional conference to identify ways of eliminatingnuclear dangers.

• To take concerted action to end illicit traffic in smallarms and light weapons, especially by making armstransfers more transparent and supporting regionaldisarmament measures, taking account of all therecommendations of the forthcoming UnitedNations Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Armsand Light Weapons.

• To call on all States to consider acceding to theConvention on the Prohibition of the Use,Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, as wellas the amended mines protocol to the Conventionon conventional weapons.

10. We urge Member States to observe the OlympicTruce, individually and collectively, now and in thefuture, and to support the International OlympicCommittee in its efforts to promote peace and humanunderstanding through sport and the Olympic Ideal.

Excerpts from the Millennium Declaration



V. Human rights, democracy and goodgovernance

24. We will spare no effort to promote democracyand strengthen the rule of law, as well as respect forall internationally recognized human rights and funda-mental freedoms, including the right to development.25. We resolve therefore:• To respect fully and uphold the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights.• To strive for the full protection and promotion in all

our countries of civil, political, economic, social andcultural rights for all.

• To strengthen the capacity of all our countries toimplement the principles and practices ofdemocracy and respect for human rights, includingminority rights.

• To combat all forms of violence against women andto implement the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination against Women.

• To take measures to ensure respect for andprotection of the human rights of migrants, migrantworkers and their families, to eliminate theincreasing acts of racism and xenophobia in manysocieties and to promote greater harmony andtolerance in all societies.

• To work collectively for more inclusive politicalprocesses, allowing genuine participation by allcitizens in all our countries.

• To ensure the freedom of the media to performtheir essential role and the right of the public tohave access to information.


55 Murray, Suite 200, Ottawa Canada K1N 5M3 Tel.: 613.241.3535Fax: 613.241.7435 Email: [email protected]: www.nsi-ins.ca


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