Humean Scepticism as an Alternative in the …...Humean Scepticism as an Alternative in the...

HumeanScepticismasanAlternativeintheTraditionalMoralRealismand

MoralAnti-RealismDebate

by

CourteneyCrump

AthesissubmittedtotheFacultyofGraduateandPostdoctoralAffairsin

partialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeof

MasterofArtsin

Philosophy

CarletonUniversityOttawa,Ontario

©2018,CourteneyCrump

ii

Abstract Traditionally,therealismandanti-realismdebatewithinmetaphysicshas

beenrestrictedtoadichotomybetweenrealismandanti-realism.Thisdichotomy

tricklesdowntomorespecificareaswithinthedebate.Oneoftheseareaseffected

bythetraditionalrealismandanti-realismdichotomyismoralrealismandmoral

anti-realism.Thisthesisfocusesonmoralrealismandmoralanti-realism,and

showsthatrestrictingthedebatetoonlymoralrealismandmoralanti-realismisa

falsedichotomy.Itdoesthisthroughprovidinganalternativeoptiontothetwo

traditionallygiven:HumeanScepticism.Thegoalofthisthesisistoarguethat

HumeanScepticismisaviablethirdoptioninthemoralrealismandmoralanti-

realismdebate.Thisthesisdemonstratesthatscepticismshouldsometimesbe

takenseriouslyandacknowledgedinsomedebatesthatithastraditionallybeen

excludedfrom.

iii

Acknowledgements

TheyearsofmyMaster’sdegreehavebeenastressfulrollercoasterfullof

highsandlows,andIwouldnotbewhereIam,orwhoIam,todaywithoutthe

followingpeople.

Tostart,Iwouldliketothankmyco-supervisorsDr.GordonDavisandDr.

MelissaFrankelforthehourstheyputintohelpingme,andforsuchquickfeedback

turnaroundtimes.IwouldalsoliketothankDr.AnnieLarivéeforallhersage

advice,andDr.ChristineKoggelforherclearfeedbackandguidanceduringthe

ResearchSeminar.Thisthesisalsowouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthe

DepartmentofPhilosophyAdministrator,SandraKirkpatrick,andtheDepartment

ofPhilosophyGraduateAdministrator,KristopherWaddell.Ihavesaidthismany

times,butIwillsayitagain:SandyandKrisareliketheparentsofthedepartment,

keepingusallorganized.

Secondly,Iwouldliketothankmycohort,andtheCarletonUniversity

DepartmentofPhilosophy.ThemembersofmycohortandIexperiencedalot

together,andtheyallgaveconstructivefeedbackduringtheResearchSeminarand

duringdiscussionsconcerningourthesesoutsideofclass.Morespecifically,Ineed

tothankBrandonSmithandRebeccaRobbforalwaysbeingwillingtolendanear,

andforhelpingtokeepmegrounded.

Thirdly,Iwouldliketothankmyparents,andfriendsoutsideofacademia.

Myparentshavesupportedmethroughoutmylife,andcontinuetodoso(nomatter

howlongIstayinschool).Myfriendsoutsideofacademiahaveremindedmethat

thereisalifeoutsideofacademia,andthatIneedtoenjoyittolivemylifetothe

iv

fullest.Iwouldliketoextendaspecialthankyoutotwoofmybestfriends,Victoria

MabieandRogerKorth,forstickingwithmethroughthickandthin.Iknowthe

stressofmyMaster’sdegreeandmyworkloaddidnotalwaysmakemethefriendI

shouldhavebeen.

Last,butdefinitelynotleast,Iwouldliketothankmydog,Charlie—even

thoughhecannotreadthisorunderstandwhyIamthankinghim.Thereisnothing

quiteliketheunconditionalloveofacompanionanimal.Hemademegooutsideand

getfreshairwhenIwasfeelingoverwhelmedanddepressed,andIdonotknow

whatIwouldhavedonewithouthim.

v

TableofContentsAbstract.......................................................................................................................................iiAcknowledgements...............................................................................................................iiiTableofContents.....................................................................................................................v1.LiteratureReview...............................................................................................................1

1.1.Introduction.............................................................................................................................11.2.Realismvs.Anti-Realism....................................................................................................51.3.MoralRealismvs.MoralAnti-Realism…...................................................................131.4.Quasi-Realism…...................................................................................................................201.5.“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology”byRudolfCarnap...............................251.6.Pyrrhonian,Academic,orMethodologicalScepticism?......................................271.7.Naturalism..............................................................................................................................341.8.Hume:Realist,Anti-Realist,orSceptic?.....................................................................411.9.AnInterpretationofHume’sPhilosophy..................................................................44

2.Chapter….............................................................................................................................57

2.1.Introduction….......................................................................................................................572.2.HumeanScepticisminATreatiseofHumanNature….........................................582.3.HumeanScepticisminAnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding........722.4.Hume’sMoralPhilosophy................................................................................................782.5.Hume’sMethodinAnEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals..............862.6.TheMoralRealismandMoralAnti-RealismDebate:HumeanScepticismasanAlternative................................................................................................................................902.7.PotentialImplications.......................................................................................................95

Bibliography...........................................................................................................................97

1

1.LiteratureReview1.1.Introduction

WhileIamfascinatedbymetaethics,Ihavediscoveredthatitisquite

unpalatableformanypeople.So,whenIdecidedtowritemyMaster’sthesis

onmetaethics,Istruggledtothinkofawaytomakemythesisinterestingtoa

wideraudience.IhopethatIcanmakemetaethicsinterestingandaccessible—

ifonlyforthedurationofmythesis.Iamnotsurewhy,butAncientGreek

philosophyisthefirstthingthatjumpedintomymindwhileIwasconsidering

howbesttoapproachthetopicofmythesis.Uponfurtherreflection,itseemed

tobeorganictostartwiththebeginningoftheWesternPhilosophical

Tradition,andthentracetheconceptualframeworktoHumeandEarly

Modernphilosophy.

Tobeginthemetaethicaljourneyofmythesis,Iwillgiveaquotefrom

oneofPlato’sdialogues.Mygoalinthisintroductionistostartwitha

conceptionofknowledge,workmywaytowardsmetaphysics,andthenfinally

gettometaethics.IntheTheaetetus,Plato’sSocratessaysat160e,

Sowefindthevarioustheorieshaveconvergedtothesamething:thatofHomerandHeraclitusandalltheirtribe,thatallthingsflowlikestreams;ofProtagoras,wisestofmen,thatmanisthemeasureofallthings;andthatofTheaetetusthat,thesethingsbeingso,knowledgeprovestobeperception.Whataboutit,Theaetetus?Shallwesaywehavehereyourfirst-bornchild,theresultofmymidwifery?Orwhatwouldyousay?1

Towhich,TheaetetusrepliestoSocratesinapositivemanner:indeedthisishisfirst-

born‘child’.Knowledgeisperception,accordingtoTheaetetus,andeachperson

perceivesthingsdifferently.Thiscanbeseenasarelativisticunderstandingof

1Plato,Theaetetus,inCompleteWorksofPlato,ed.JohnM.Cooper,trans.M.J.Levett

2

knowledge,andthedialoguegoesontotrytoshowthatitisafalseunderstandingof

knowledge.

WhatIfindinterestingisthatknowledgeofcold,onthisunderstandingof

knowledge,isbasedonthesubjectiveperceiverfeelingcold—samegoesforheat,

andmultipleotherphysicalsensationsandobjects.Itcouldbesaidthatour

knowledgeofphysicalsensationsandobjectsismind-dependentinthesensethat

ourknowledgeofthesethingsisdependentonusperceivingthem.Plato’sSocrates

goesonintheTheaetetustoargueforadifferentunderstandingofknowledgethatis

notmind-dependent.Socratestriestoleadustoalessrelativeunderstandingof

knowledgethat,itcouldbeargued,ismind-independent—i.e.notdependentona

perceiverperceivingit.Forexample,theconceptsof‘love’and‘beauty’canbe

thoughtofasabstractforms—unchangingandcontainingtheperfectionofthose

concepts.

Forme,thecontemplationofwhatknowledgeisthroughoutthedialogue

leadsawayfromthedialoguejustbeingaboutknowledge,andmovestowards

contemplationsofwhatthereisintheworld(i.e.ontology).Contemplating

perceptionssuchasseeing‘whitesnow’or‘abrowntable’quicklydevelopinto

contemplatingmoreabstractconceptssuchas‘love’,anddebatingwhetherthese

abstractconceptscanbeperceivedinthesamewayasthe‘whitesnow’or‘abrown

table’.Questionslike,“Doesthis[insertabstractconcept]existintheworld?”

absolutelyfascinateme.And,sothediscussionisnotjustaboutknowledge,butis

alsoaboutmetaphysics—or,perhapsmoreaccurately,whatwecanknowaboutthe

natureofmetaphysics.

3

Movingintomorecontemporarymetaphysicallanguage,thediscussion

becomescentredonrealismandanti-realism.Realism,looselyconstruedwhen

contemplatingabstractconcepts,canbeseenasstatingthatabstractconceptsare

mind-independent.SomerealistsgoasfarasPlato,andstatethatnotonlyarethese

abstractconceptsmind-independent,butthattheyalsoexistintheworld—evenif

therewasnopersontheretoperceivethem.Anti-realism,then,istheoppositeof

realism.Itgenerallystatesthatabstractconceptsaremind-dependent,and

potentiallycontingentonhumanbeings.

Mythesisisonthisrealismandanti-realismdebate,or,Ishouldsay,whatI

seetobeafalsedilemma.Mythesislooksattherealismandanti-realismdilemma

fromwithinamoralcontext,andsoIamparticularlyinterestedinthestatusof

moralfacts(orclaims,orpropositions)andwhethertheyaretruth-apt(ornot).

Therefore,thetopicofmythesis,mostgenerallyconstrued,ismetaethics.More

specifically,thetopicofmythesisisdealingwiththetraditionalmoralrealismand

moralanti-realismdebateinmetaethicswhiledenyingthatwemuststaywithinthis

dichotomytofindanswerstometaethicalquestions.TheprimaryquestionIaskis

this:aremoralrealismandmoralanti-realismtheonlyoptionsopentous?My

answerisno.Iproposethatscepticism,morespecificallyHumeanScepticism,isa

thirdoptionavailable.

ThereasonwhyIcallthetraditionaldebateafalsedilemmaisbecause,even

asfarbackasPlato,thescepticalpositionwasnottakenseriously,and,foratleast

2500years,thedebatehasbeenstructuredassolelyabackandforthbetween

realismandanti-realism.ThebigissuethatIfindstartlingisthat,eventhough

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argumentshavebecomemorecomplicatedandfine-tuned,realismandanti-realism

havenotreallyprogressedoverthepast2500yearsofthedominantWestern

PhilosophicalTradition.Ithinkthatthisshowsthedilemmatobegettingus

nowhere.So,Iproposethattakingascepticalpositionconcerningtheontological

statusofmoralfacts(orclaimsorpropositions)mightbeanalternativetothe

traditionaldichotomy,andcouldpotentiallyhelpthedebatealong.

AsImentioned,IthinkthatHumeanScepticismcouldbethissceptical

alternative.Isay‘Humean’ratherthan‘Hume’s’,because,asisthenormwithHume

scholarship,nooneagreesonanyoneinterpretationandIhaveaparticularwayof

readingHume.MyinterpretationofHumeattributestohimamoreancientwayof

understandinghisscepticism.ThewayIseeHumeanScepticismismoreinlinewith

aparticularAncientGreekunderstandingofscepticismasepochēoragnostic(i.e.the

suspensionofjudgement).Thisisincontrasttothemorecommonunderstandingof

scepticismasamethodologicaltool(forexample,Descartes’useofscepticisminhis

MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy).

MythesisfocusesonHume,hisscepticism,hisnaturalismasmethodological,

andareadingofHumeasakindofconsequentialist.Istresstheimportanceof

interpretingHume’snaturalismwithinthecontextofhisscepticisminordertohelp

keephisphilosophycohesive,andIthinkasimilarapproachcanbetakenwhen

consideringconsequentialisminHume’smoralphilosophy.Thegoalistoshowthat

HumeanScepticismisatruethirdoptioninthemoralrealismandmoralanti-

realismdebate,andtogiveanaccountofamoraltheorythatmayworkwell

consideringHume’sscepticalapproachtometaphysics.Ithinkthatitisimportantto

5

demonstratethatanormativeethicaltheorycanfunctionwhilemaintainingan

ontologicallyscepticalposition,becauseitdemonstratesthatscepticismis

somethingtotakeseriouslyandthatitdoesbelonginthemoralrealismandmoral

anti-realismdebate.

InthewordsofsomeoneIconsidertobewise,obviouslynotme(andIdare

saynotPlatoeither),

[A]llknowledgedegeneratesintoprobability;andthisprobabilityisgreaterorless,accordingtoourexperienceoftheveracityordeceitfulnessofourunderstanding,andaccordingtothesimplicityorintricacyofthequestion.2

Knowledge“degenerates”intoprobability.Probabilitydoesnotgetyoucertainty.

Youcannotbecertainofrealismoranti-realism,soitwouldseemthatyoualso

cannotbecertainofmoralrealismormoralanti-realism(sincetheyjustoffera

morespecificcaseofrealismandanti-realism).Whynotremaintrulysceptical,and

takeanagnosticstance?

1.2.Realismvs.Anti-Realism StuartBrockandEdwinMaresbegintheintroductionoftheirbookRealism

andAnti-Realismwiththefollowingsentences,

Questionsabouttheultimaterealityofthingssometimesseemlikesillyquestionstonon-philosophers,buttophilosopherstheyarequestionsoftheutmostimportanceanddeepestsignificance.Itisnoteasyorstraightforwardtoknowwhensomecontentiousrealmofentitiesisreal,ortounderstandandappreciatewhatisatissuebetweenthoseoneachsideofthedispute.3

2DavidHume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,eds.DavidFateNortonandMaryJ.Norton(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),1.4.1.3StuartBrockandEdwinMares,RealismandAnti-Realism,inCentralProblemsofPhilosophy,ed.JohnShand(MontrealandKingston:McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress,2007),1.

6

Iwillmakeastrongstatement,andassumethatthevastmajorityofpeopletakefor

grantedthattheexternalworldisReal4anddonotquestionparticularaspectsor

domainsinthe,potentially,externalworld.Mostpeople,ornon-philosophersas

BrockandMarescallthem,takeforgrantedthatthechairoverthereReallyexists.

Theappliedphysicistthinksthatcertainnaturallawsgoverntheexternalworld,and

areReal.ThebiologistbelievesthatthecellstheyarestudyingareReal.The

mathematicianmightthinkthatnaturalnumbersareReal.Questioningwhether

somethingReallyexistsintheworldonthesurfaceseemslikesomethingthatdoes

notneedquestioning—afterall,sometimeswejustneedtoliveourlives(andthat

canbehardenoughwithoutquestioningwhethercertainfactsorentitiesReallydo

exist).

But,whenwehaveamomenttoreflect,andthinkaboutwhatwethinkis

Real,questionsdobegintoarise.Perhapsquestionsaboutwhetherourperceptions

areaccurateaccountsoftheRealworld.Canwetrustthatoureyesightisnot

deceivinguswhenwemakeeverydaymistakeswhenjudginghowfaranobjectis

fromus?HowmuchoftheRealworlddoweactuallyperceive?Now,consider

numbers.DonumbersexistintheRealworld?Wecanalsoconsiderwhethermoral

factsexistintheRealworld.Doesthemoralfact,‘Itiswrongtokill,’existintheReal

world?Perhapsitisthephilosopher’sjobtoquestionsuchthingsinrelationto

metaphysics,morespecificallyontology,buttheseabstractquestionsendup

affectingbeliefandbeliefcanaffectthewayweliveourlives.Abstractmetaphysical

4WhenIusethewordRealwithacapital“R”,Imeanmind-independentlyrealintheontologicalsense(i.e.thatsomethingexistsintheexternalworld,andisnotconstructedbymentalstatesorisnotmind-dependent).

7

questionsendupbeingofimportance,andthousandplusyeardebatesoftenstem

fromthem.

WhiletherearemanydifferentsubsectionsofthedebateconcerningtheReal

world,theoverarchingdichotomyhashistoricallybeenbetweenrealismandanti-

realism.Realistsandanti-realistshavedebatedeachothersinceHellenistictimesin

theWesternPhilosophicalTradition,andthedebateisfarfrombeingresolved.The

realistsattacktheanti-realists(andviceversa),andboththerealistsandanti-

realistsdebatedefinitionsandintricacieswithintheirowncamps.Definitionsand

thefine-tuningofargumentsarefarfrombeingsettledforbothrealismandanti-

real-ism,butIthinkitisimportanttogiveadefinitionforboththesetermsinorder

togivecontexttothedebatethatIamtryingtosituatemyselfwithin.

IthinkthatBrockandMares’generaldefinitionofrealismisagoodplaceto

start,

Realismaboutaparticulardomainistheconjunctionofthefollowingtwotheses:(i)therearefactsorentitiesdistinctiveofthatdomain,and(ii)theirexistenceandnatureisinsomeimportantsenseobjectiveandmind-independent.Letuscallthefirstthesisthe“existencethesis”andthesecondthesisthe“independencethesis”.5

BrockandMaresadmitthatthisdefinitionisnotwithoutcontroversy,6butitwill

workfinetogiveageneraldefinitionthatallowsunderstandingofwhatismeant

whenIusethewordrealism.7Intheirdefinition,BrockandMaredistinguish

betweenfactsandentitieswhenitcomestothe“existencethesis”.Theydothisto

5BrockandMares,RealismandAnti-Realism,2.6Ibid,3.7Iacknowledgethatothersmayusedifferentdefinitions—thisisfinebecausethebasicinformationthatthisdefinitiongivesusispresentinmanyotherdefinitionsofrealism.

8

distinguishbetweenthosewhomightberealistsaboutfactsfromthosewhomight

berealistsaboutentitieswithinaparticulardomain.Oneexamplethattheyuseto

showthisis,“Onemightbelieveitisafactthateverythingthatgoesupmustcome

downwithoutbelievingingravitationalfields[…].”8Inthisexample,Icouldbelieve

inafactwithoutassertinganythingabouttheentitiesorpropertiesofadomain.So,

Icanbearealistaboutfacts,butnotbearealistaboutanentity(orentities)ofa

domain(andviceversa).

Thesecondthesisoftheirdefinitionisthe“independencethesis”.Thisthesis

statesthatthefactsorentitiesfromthefirstthesisare,insomeway,objectiveand

mind-independent.Objective,inthisunderstanding,meansuniversal(andnot

subjective),andmind-independentmeansthattheyexistinsomewayinanon-

reliantrelationshipwithahumanmind(orminds).Thissecondthesiscangoasfar

astoassertthatthefact(s)orentity/entitiesinagivendomaincanexistintheReal,

externalworld,butitdoesnothavetogothisfar.Somerealistsarecontentjustto

saythatafactorentityisobjectiveandmind-independentwithoutasserting

anythingaboutthestatusofsaidfactorentityintheRealworld—asIsaidabove,

thereisnoconsensuswhenitcomestodefiningrealism.

Defininganti-realismisjustasdifficultasdefiningrealism,because,again,

thereisnoconsensus.Youcouldjustsaythatanti-realismistheoppositeofrealism,

butthatisdifficulttofigureoutgiventhelackofconsensuswhenitcomesto

realism.Theantithesisoftheabovedefinitionofrealismcouldlooksomethinglike

denyingtheexistencethesis,denyingtheindependencethesis,ordenyingboth.An

8BrockandMares,RealismandAnti-Realism,2.

9

anti-realistcandenythatthereare“factsorentitiesdistinctiveofthat[particular]

domain,”theycandenythethesisthatthesefactsorentitiesofaparticulardomain

areobjectiveandmind-independent,ortheycandenyboththesetheses.

SimonBlackburngivesamoredetaileddefinitionofrealismintheOxford

DictionaryofPhilosophy,ThirdEdition(though,stillalongthelinesofBrockand

Mare’sdefinitionofrealism),

Arealistaboutasubject-matterSmayhold(i)thatthekindsofthingsdescribedbySexist;(ii)thattheirexistenceisindependentofus,ornotanartefactofourminds,orourlanguageorconceptualscheme;(iii)thatthestatementswemakeinSarenot*reducibletootherkindsofstatement,revealingthemtobeaboutsomedifferentsubject-matter;(iv)thatthestatementswemakeinShave*truthconditions,beingstraightforwarddescriptionsofaspectsoftheworldandmadetrueorfalsebyfactsintheworld;(v)thatweareabletoattaintruthsaboutS,andthatitisappropriatefullytobelievethingsweclaiminS.9

Blackburnthengoesontoexplainthatthereare“differentoppositions”thatcan

takeissuewithone(ormore)ofanyoftheaboverealistclaims,

*EliminativiststhinktheSdiscourseshouldberejected.Scepticseitherdeny(i)ordenyourrighttoaffirmit.*Idealistsand*conceptualistsdeny(ii),*reductionistsdeny(iii),while*instrumentalistsand*projectivistsdeny(iv).*Constructiveempiricistsdeny(v).Othercombinationsarepossible,andinmanyareasthereislittleconsensusontheexactwayarealist/anti-realistdisputeshouldbeconstructed.10

Blackburninterestinglylumpsanti-realismandscepticismtogetherinhislistof

oppositionstotherealistclaimshementionsfirst,whichisproblematic.11ThoughI

9SimonBlackburn,“realism/anti-realism,”intheOxfordDictionaryofPhilosophy,ThirdEdition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),404.10Ibid.11Thiswillbecomemoreclearinsection1.6.“Pyrrhonian,Academic,orMethodologicalScepticism?”But,Iwillbrieflyaddresswhygroupinganti-realistsandscepticstogetherisproblematichere.Someformsofscepticismareusedasamethodortool,andcanbegroupedwitheitherrealismoranti-realism.Otherformsofscepticismremainagnostic,andcannotbegroupedwitheitherrealismoranti-realism.

10

takeissuewithaspectsofthismoredetaileddefinition,itgivesfurtherinsightinto

theintricaciesoftherealism/anti-realismdebate—andshowswhyitisdifficultto

givedefinitionsofrealismanditsantithesis.

Iwouldliketogiveanexampletohighlightabitofthetensionbetweenthe

realistsandtheanti-realistswhenitcomestotheontologicalstatusoffactsor

entitieswithinaparticulardomain.Iwillgiveanexampleconcerningpure

mathematics.JamesNicholsondefinespuremathematicsinTheConciseOxford

DictionaryofMathematics(FifthEdition)asfollows,

Theareaofmathematicsconcerningtherelationshipsbetweenabstractsystemsandstructuresandtherulesgoverningtheirbehaviours,motivatedbyitsintrinsicinterestoreleganceratherthanitsapplicationtosolvingproblemsintherealworld.Muchmodernappliedmathematicsisbasedonwhatwasviewedasveryesotericpuremathematicswhenitwasdevised.Forexample,matrixalgebraisnowthecornerstoneofvideo-gametechnologies,computer-aideddesign,etc.12

Startingwiththisdefinition,Ithinktwodifferent,thoughtraditional,ideascould

emerge:onerealist,theotheranti-realist.Therecouldbeamathematicianwho

worksonmatrixalgebrawhoisarealistaboutmathematics.Duetothepractical

applicationofmatrixalgebra,themathematiciancouldbelievethatmatrixalgebra

existsintheRealworld,mind-independently.Therecouldalsobeapure

mathematicianwhostrictlyworksinpuremathematics,andonlyworkswithinthe

abstractrealmofpuremathematics(anddoesnotworkonanypracticalapplication

ofpuremathematics).Thismathematiciancouldbelievethatnumbers,saynatural

12JamesNicholson,“puremathematics,”inTheConciseOxfordDictionaryofMathematics,FifthEdition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),http://www.oxfordreference.com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/view/10.1093/acref/9780199679591.001.0001/acref-9780199679591-e-2307.

11

numbers,areconstructedandmind-dependent,andthereforewouldbeananti-

realistaboutnaturalnumbers.Bothmathematiciansworkonpuremathematics,but

holddifferentviewsabouttheontologicalstatusoffactsorentitieswithinthat

domain.

JesseM.Mulderinhispaper“WhatGeneratestheRealism/Anti-Realism

Dichotomy?”,saysthatonewayofexpressingthedisagreementbetweenrealistsand

anti-realistsis

[that]realistsurgethattheirtheoriesdescribetheworldasitmind-independentlyis,whereasanti-realistsarguethattheverycategoriesemployedinsuchpurporteddescriptionsare,afterall,ourowncategories,andhencethattheveryideaofamind-independentrealityintherealist’ssenseisdeeplymistaken.13

So,inthecaseofthetwomathematicians,therealistmathematicianwhoworkson

matrixalgebramightthinkthattheirworkonmatrixalgebradescribestheworldas

itReallyis,mind-independently;whiletheanti-realistmathematicianmightthink

thatnaturalnumbers,orevenmatrixalgebra,arejustmind-dependentdescriptions

basedon“ourowncategories.”

Sofar,thedebatehasbeenbetweenrealismandanti-realism,andagood

questiontoaskis‘Whatcauses,orforces,thisdichotomy?’Itdoesseemoddthat

realismandanti-realismhavebeenthefocusedonoptionsforthousandsofyears

(withintheWesternphilosophicalcanon).Muldersuggeststhatwhatcausesthis

dichotomyhastodowith“[…]findingskepticismunsatisfactory,”

[W]ecaneitherbecomerealistsbutbeatalossastohowwecanadjudicatebetweenhighlydivergentrealistmetaphysicaltheories,orwecanadmitourallegedinabilitytodiscoverthenatureoftheworldasitisinitselfandmakedo

13JesseM.Mulder,“WhatGeneratestheRealism/Anti-RealismDichotomy,”Philosophica84(2012):57.

12

withtheanti-realistrestrictionofourknowledgetotheworldasitisforus—whichinturnquicklyleadstoseriousissues,suchasacommitmenttotheideaofareality-itselfthatisdeniedanycontent,thatagainmotivatesareturntorealism.14

Itisthisviewthatscepticismisunsatisfactorythatspursthedichotomybetween

realismandanti-realism,accordingtoMulder.Thescepticismhastodowith,touse

Mulder’slanguage,“theworldasitisinitself.”Themetaphysicalscepticthinksthat

wecannotknowwhetherourperceptionsof‘theworldasitisinitself’(orReal,

externalworld)areaccuraterepresentationsornot,andsothescepticsuspends

theirjudgementabout‘theworldasitisinitself.’Mulderthinksthatscepticismis

unsatisfactoryfortherealistandfortheanti-realistinseparateways.Therealist

takesissuewiththesceptic’sclaimthat“we[cannot]justifyknowledgeoftheworld-

in-itself,”andtheanti-realisttakesissuewiththesceptic’sclaimthat“truth

involve[s]correspondencewiththeworld-in-itself.”15

Thescepticalmetaphysicalpicture,accordingtoMulder,lookssomethinglike

wecannotjustifyknowledgeoftheRealworldandtruthcorrespondstotheReal

world,sothereforewecannothavetruth.16Therealist’sclaimisthatwecanjustify

knowledgeoftheRealworld(andhavetruthcorrespondtotheRealworld),andthe

anti-realists’claimisthattruthcorrespondswith“theworldasitisforus”(andso

truthdoesnotcorrespondtotheRealworld—buttoourperceptionsoftheReal

world).17Idotakeissuewiththisunderstandingofscepticism(whichwillbecome

moreclearinsections1.6,2.2,and2.3),butitdoesseemtobeanaccurateaccountof

14Ibid,71-72.15Ibid,71.16Ibid.17Ibid,72.

13

whathasforcedthetraditionaldichotomybetweenrealismandanti-realism.The

realistandtheanti-realistbothbelievethat,insomeway,metaphysicalscepticism

(asdescribedbyMulder)isproblematic;theyjustdisagreeonhowitisproblematic.

1.3.MoralRealismvs.MoralAnti-Realism

Onesubsection,ordomain,withintherealismandanti-realismdichotomyis

moralrealismandmoralanti-realism.GeoffreySayre-McCordsaysinthe

introductiontoEssaysonMoralRealism,

[…]thedebatebetweenrealistsandantirealistsisdeepandimportant.Itaffectsourontology,epistemology,andsemantics.Andinethics,itmakesasignificantdifferencetoourunderstandingofwhat(ifanything)isvaluable,toouraccountofmoraldisagreement,andtotheimportanceweplaceonmoralreflection.18

GiventheimportanceSayre-McCordplacesontherealismandanti-realism

dichotomy,particularlyinreferencetoethics,itmakesitexceptionallypertinentto

clarifythedichotomyasitrelatestomoralrealismandmoralanti-realism.

Therefore,itisimportanttodefinewhatismeantbymoralrealismandmoralanti-

realism,andgiveanexampleforeach.

IwillstartbygivingSayre-McCord’sdefinitionsforrealismandanti-realism,

but—duetohowbroadtheyare—Iwilladdmoreclarifyingdefinitions.Sayre-

McCorddefinesrealismasfollows,

Whereveritisfound,I’llargue,realisminvolvesembracingjusttwotheses:(1)theclaimsinquestion,whenliterallyconstrued,areliterallytrueorfalse(cognitivism),and(2)someareliterallytrue.Nothingmore.19

18GeoffreySayre-McCord,“Introduction:TheManyMoralRealisms,”inEssaysonMoralRealism,ed.GeoffreySayre-McCord(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1988),2.19Ibid,5.

14

Thesethesespertaintotruth-aptness,andwhatismeantisthataclaimcanbetrue

orfalseinreferencetowhatIhavebeencallingtheRealworld(i.e.thereis

somethingintheexternalworldthatmakestheclaimtrueorfalse).Hethendefines

anti-realism,

Correspondingly,therearetwowaystobeananti-realist:embraceanon-cognitivistanalysisoftheclaimsinquestionorholdthattheclaimsofthedisputedclass,despitetheirbeingtruth-valued,arenoneofthemtrue(say,becausetheyallshareafalsepresupposition).20

Here,Sayre-McCordismainlyalludingtoEmotivism(andrelatedtheories)and

ErrorTheory.Emotivistsarenon-cognitivistswhileErrorTheoristscanbeclassified

ascognitivistswhobelieveintruth-aptness(butdonotthinkthattruthvalues,like

trueorfalse,correlatetotheRealworld—orthattheyalwayscorrelatetotheReal

worldfalsely).Thisisanarrowaccountofanti-realism,butdoesalludetotheissues

ananti-realistmaytakeissuewith(inthisdefinitionofrealism).Thenon-cognitivist

(i.e.Emotivist)wouldtakeissuewiththesis(1),andtheErrorTheoristwouldtake

issuewiththesis(2).

InhisbookMoralRealism:ADefence,RussShafer-Landaugivesamore

specificdefinitionofmoralrealismaswellasgivingexplicitdefinitionsof

cognitivismandnon-cognitivism.Shafer-Landauinitiallysaysthat“[realists]

endorsetherealityofadomainanddosoinoppositiontoconstructivists.Realismis

sometimescontrastedwithconstructivismbyinvokingtheclaimthat,forrealists,

moralityismind-independent.”2122Though,hesaysthatthisisalackingdefinition

20Ibid.21RussShafer-Landau,MoralRealism:ADefence(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),15.

15

whenitcomestomoralrealism.23Hesubsequentlygoesontogiveamorecareful

definitionofmoralrealism,

ThewayIwouldprefertocharacterizetherealistpositionisbyreferencetoitsendorsementofthestance-independenceofmoralreality.Realistsbelievethattherearemoraltruthsthatobtainindependentlyofanyperspective,inthesensethatthemoralstandardsthatfixthemoralfactsarenotmadetruebyvirtueoftheirratificationfromwithinanygivenactualorhypotheticalperspective.Thatapersontakesaparticularattitudetowardaputativemoralstandardisnotwhatmakesthestandardcorrect.24

“Stance-independence”is,forShafer-Landau,awayofarticulatingthatthereisan

aspectof“something’srightnessoradmirability[depending]cruciallyonanagent’s

attitudes,”but“thedependence[…]isnotafunctionofwhatanyonehappensto

thinkofit.”25So,thereisanaspectofmind-dependence(givenmoralitybeingagent-

based),butthetruthofmoralclaimsthemselvesisnotdependentonanyone

particularagent(inthisway,theyaremind-independent).

Thisdefinitionofmoralrealismhighlightsthecognitiveaspectofit.And,on

thecognitivetheme—generallyconsideredinlinewithrealism(thoughsomeanti-

realists,likeErrorTheorists,arecognitivists)—mostsimplyput,cognitivismisthe

viewthatafact(orclaimorproposition),likeamoralfact(orclaimorproposition),

canbetrueorfalse.26Shafer-Landausaysofcognitivism,

[A]viewiscognitivistifitallowsforacentralclassofjudgementswithinadomaintocountasbeliefs,capableofbeingtrueorfalseinvirtueoftheirmoreorlessaccuraterepresentationofthefactswithinthedomain.Moralrealism

22By“constructivists”/”constructivism”here,Shafer-Landaumeansanti-realists/anti-realism.23Ibid.24Ibid.25Ibid.26Or,‘truth-apt’—cognitiviststhinkthatclaims,orfacts,leantowardstruth(orfalsity),evenifnoclaims,orfacts,endupbeingultimatelytrue(orfalse).

16

satisfiestheseconditions.Realistsseemoraljudgementsasbeliefs,someofwhicharetrue,andtrueinvirtueofcorrectlyreportingmoralfacts.27

Inotherwords,amoresophisticatedrenditionofmyverysimpledefinitionof

cognitivism.MypointinquotingShafer-Landau’sdefinitionofcognitivismis

becauseitveryexplicitlybiasescognitivismtowardsmoralrealism,andthisisnot

somethingthatisnecessarilyagreeduponwithinthemetaethicalliteratureonmoral

realismandmoralanti-realism.28Shafer-Landau’sbiaseduseofcognitivismin

contrasttootherheldviewsoncognitivismreinforcesthatthereisnoagreedupon

definition.Thisconstantdisagreementisareoccurringthemethroughoutall

domainsofrealismandanti-realism.

Gettingbacktodefinitions,Shafer-Landaudefinesmoralanti-realism,or

whathecalls“constructivism”,moregenerallyas

[…]theideathatmoralrealityisconstitutedbytheattitudes,actions,responses,oroutlooksofpersons,possiblyunderidealizedconditions.Inshort,moralrealityisconstructedfromstatesoractivities(understoodverybroadly)undertakenfromapreferredstandpoint.29

Thisistomeanthatmoralrealityfortheanti-realistisnotstance-independent(i.e.a

complicatedwayofsayingthatmoralrealityfortheanti-realistisnotobjective).He

associatestheconstructivist(anti-realist)viewwithnon-cognitivism,andstates

that,accordingtonon-cognitivism,“therearenomoralfactsortruths.”30So,Shafer-

27Shafer-Landau,MoralRealism:ADefence,17.28Thisiscontroversial.AsIhavepreviouslysaid,ErrorTheoristscanclaimtobecognitivists.But,also,viewssuchasSimonBlackburn’squasi-realismmightchallengetheideathatonlyErrorTheoristanti-realistscanbecognitivists(thereforecognitivismshouldnotbesostronglyassociatedwithrealism).29Shafer-Landau,MoralRealism:ADefence,14.30Ibid,18.

17

Landauclaimsthatfortheanti-realisttherearenomoralfactsortruths(i.e.that

moralclaimsfortheanti-realistcannotbetruth-apt).31

NowthatIhavegivensomepossibleunderstandings(i.e.definitions)of

moralrealismandmoralanti-realism,Ithinkitwouldhelptonotonlyclarifythe

views,butalsothedivide,bygivinganexampleofamoralrealisttheoryandan

exampleofamoralanti-realisttheory.Iwillstartwithanexampleofamoralanti-

realisttheorybeforegivinganexampleofamoralrealisttheory(thereasonwhyI

havechosenthisorderwillbecomemoreapparentonceIhavearticulatedthe

theories).

Themoralanti-realisttheoryIhavechosenasanexampleisGilbertHarman’s

theorythathearticulatesinhisbookTheNatureofMorality:AnIntroductionto

Ethics.Harman’smainpositionisthatethicsisrelative(i.e.hesupportsmoral

relativity),andheisananti-realistconcerningethics.Toshowthis,heusesthe

differenceinobservationbetweenphysicsandethics.Harmansays,

Theobservationofaneventcanprovideobservationalevidencefororagainstascientifictheoryinthesensethatthetruthofthatobservationcanberelevanttoareasonableexplanationofwhythatobservationwasmade.Amoralobservationdoesnotseem,inthesamesense,tobeobservationalevidencefororagainstanymoraltheory,sincethetruthorfalsityofthemoralobservationseemstobecompletelyirrelevanttoanyreasonableexplanationofwhythatobservationwasmade.32

Oneoftheexamplesthatheusestoshowthisdifferenceinobservationisthe

differencebetweenascientistobservingaproton’svapourtrailandyoujudgingthat

childrensettingacatonfireiswrong.Inthecaseofthescientist,theirobservation

31Again,Irecognizethatthisiscontroversial.32GilbertHarman,TheNatureofMorality:AnIntroductiontoEthics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1977),7.

18

ofthevapourtrailseemstoexplainwhattheyareobserving.Inthecaseofyou

judgingthatchildrensettingacatonfireiswrong,yourjudgmentisbasedonbelief

thatdoesnotseemtodirectly,orindirectly,explainwhatyouareobserving.Inthe

caseofscience,thereseemstobedirectobservationofevents(ortheRealworld)to

justifyatheory(orforcetheadaptionofatheory).Inthecaseofethics,itseems

completelybasedonbelief,andnotobservation.

Harmangoessofarastosaythatethicsisnotonlynotbasedondirect

observation,butalsonotbasedonindirectobservation.Hedoesthistowardsthe

endofhisintroductionbyintroducingmathematics.33Hesaysthatmathematicscan

indirectlysupportphysics,andthereforeobservation,butethicsdoesnotseemto

evenbeabletodothis.

IncontrasttoHarman,NicholasL.Sturgeonarticulatesamoralrealistviewin

hispaper“MoralExplanations”.34Sturgeon’smainprojectinthispaperistodeny

thatHarman’stheoryleadstothekindofmoralscepticismthatHarmanthinksit

does(somethingmorealongthelinesofmoralanti-realismthanmoralscepticism).

SturgeonthinksthatHarman’sbasicviewactuallyleadstoSturgeon’sownkindof

moralrealism.Sturgeonisanethicalnaturalist(inhistypeofmoralrealism),but

onethatthinksthatmoralclaimsarenotnecessarilyreducibletophysicalclaims

(sincehethinksthatwedonothavelanguageforallphysicalclaims,moralclaims

couldactuallybedescribingphysicalthings).And,eventhoughmoralclaimsarenot

necessarilyreducibletophysicalclaims,moralclaimsstillfactorintoour

33Ibid,9-10.34NicholasL.Sturgeon,“MoralExplanations,”inEssaysonMoralRealism,ed.GeoffreySayre-McCord(Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1988),229-255.

19

explanationoftheworld.Sturgeonwrites,“…Ishallarguethatmoralfactsdofit

intoourexplanatoryviewoftheworld,andinparticularintoexplanationsofmany

moralobservationsandbeliefs.”35

Sturgeonthengoesontosay,“…itseemsplausibletocitemoralfactsaspart

ofanexplanationofnonmoralfacts,andinparticularofpeople’sformingthemoral

opinionstheydo.”36Sturgeon’semphasisisnotona‘perfect’moraltheorythat

existsindependentlyofus(asisthefocusofsomemoralrealists).Surgeonthinks,

[If]ourmoraltheoryweresomehowhopelesslymistaken,butallthenonmoralfactsremainedexactlythesameastheyinfactare,then,sincewedoacceptthemoraltheory,wewouldstilldrawexactlythemoralconclusionsweinfactdo.[…][W]eshoulddenythatitfollowsthatmoralfactsplaynoroleinexplainingourmoraljudgments.37

ForSturgeon,evenifthereisapossibilityofourmoraltheorybeingwrong,thisdoes

notmeanthatweshouldthinkourmoraltheoryisgenerallymistakenandwe

shouldstillthinkthatourmoraltheoryis“roughlycorrect”.38Thereisnoreason,

accordingtoSturgeon,todoubtourmoraltheorysomuchastothinkthatitis

completelywrong.39So,wecanuseourmoraltheorytomakejudgmentsabout

eventsandpeople’scharacters.

SturgeonisreactingtoHarman,andthisdifferenceofinterpretationover

particulardetailswithinthemoralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate

emphasizesthediscordthroughoutrealismandanti-realismmoregenerally.There

35Ibid,236.36Ibid,243.37Ibid,251.38Ibid,253.39Ibid,253.

20

seemstobelittleagreementevenonwhichfeaturesarerealistandwhichfeatures

areanti-realist.Thishasencouragedanumberofphilosopherstoattempttocreate

ameta-physicaltheory,orametaphysicaltheoryconcerningmoralityormoral

claims(i.e.ametaethicaltheory),thatattemptstosolvetheapparently

irreconcilableargumentsbetweenrealismandanti-realism.Oneoftheseattempts

isSimonBlackburn’squasi-realism.

1.4.Quasi-Realism

BeforeoutliningBlackburn’squasi-realism,Iwouldliketomakehis

metaphysicalpositiononthenatureofethics(ormoralfacts,claims,etc.)more

clear.Blackburnsaysofhisowntheory,

Thistheoryisvisiblyanti-realist,fortheexplanationsofferedmakenoirreducibleoressentialappealtotheexistenceofmoral'properties'or'facts';theydemandno'ontology'ofmorals.Theyexplaintheactivityfromtheinsideout—fromthenaturallyexplicableattitudestotheformsofspeechthatcommunicatethem,challengethem,refinethem,andabandonthem,andwhichsomisleadtheunwary.40

Blackburnisananti-realistaboutethics—sothoughhecallshisviewquasi-realism,

heisnotarealist.And,whilehistheoryisdifferentfromotheranti-realisttheories,

itisnotanalternativetothetraditionalmoralrealismandmoralanti-realism

debate.41Heusesaspectsofrealisminaninternal(touseCarnapianlanguage)42

way,andthisiswhyhecoinshisviewquasi-realism(theCollinsPocketReference

EnglishDictionary,CanadianEditiondefinesquasias“seemingly,resemblingbutnot

40SimonBlackburn,“HowToBeanEthicalAnti-Realist,”inEssaysinQuasi-Realism(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1993),175-176.41Iwouldliketoclarifythatmystandardforanalternativeoptionneedstobeeitheroutsideofmoralrealismandmoralanti-realism,orneedstonotpartakeinthemoralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate.42Thiswillbecomeapparentinthenextsection,1.5,onRudolfCarnap’spaper“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology.”

21

actuallybeing”43).But,hedoesnotthinkthattherearemoralfactsthatexistinthe

world(completelymind-independentlyorobjectivelyinthesenseofShafer-

Landau’s“stance-independence”).Hethinksthatmoralfacts,orclaims,aremind-

dependenttoanextent(whichisseeminglyananti-realistpositionontheontology

ofmoralfacts).

Connectingthisbacktothedefinitionsofmoralrealismandmoralanti-

realismwillmakeBlackburn’spositionmoreexplicit.Themoralrealistbelievesthat

therearemoralfacts,andthatthesemoralfactscanbeverifiedastrueorfalse(in

someobjectiveor“stance-independent”way).Traditionally,moralanti-realism

deniesthemoralrealistviewinsomeway(forexample,theycandenythatmoral

factscanbeverifiedastrueorfalse).Blackburn’squasi-realismdoesnotdenythat

moralfactscanbetrueorfalse,butitdoesdenythatmoralfactsareobjectivein

eitheramind-independentor“stance-independent”way.

Onp.169,ofhispaper“HowToBeAnEthicalAnti-Realist,”Blackburngives

thefollowingexample,

Wecansumupthiscontrast[betweenspatialperceptionandethicalstances]bysayingthatalthoughtheteleologyofspatialperceptionisspatial,theteleologyofethicalcommitmentisnotethical.Thegoodofspatialperceptionistoberepresentative,butthegoodofethicalstancesisnot.44

Blackburnisdemonstratingthecontrastthat,thoughhethinksthatspatial

perceptioncorrespondstosomethingthatexistsintheworld,hedoesnotthinkthat

moralfacts(orclaims,orstances)correspondtosomethingthatexistsintheworld.

43CollinsPocketReferenceEnglishDictionary,CanadianEdition,s.v.“quasi.”44Blackburn,“HowToBeanEthicalAnti-Realist,”169.

22

Heis“visibly”ananti-realistwhenitcomestomoralfacts,becausehethinksmoral

factsaremind-dependent.

BlackburngoesontoexplainamoralrealistpositionheassociateswithJohn

McDowellandDavidWiggins.Hesaysthattheirpositionhassomesimilaritiestohis

ownprojectivism(quasi-realism),butthattheydifferinthatMcDowellandWiggins

think“thatsentimentshavesomethingtodowithourcapacitytomakeethical

judgements,”and“yet[want]toretaina‘perceptual’andcognitiveplaceformoral

opinion.”45ThistiesintoBlackburn’stalkaboutspatialperceptionbeingforspatial

representationinthe‘real’world,whileethicalstancesarenotforethical

representationinthe‘real’world(i.e.theydonotrepresentsomethingtangiblein

theworldoutsideofthemind).

Blackburnfoundshismoralanti-realistview,quasi-realism,onakindof

naturalismandonprojectivism.HisnaturalismbeingwhatIwouldhaveattributed

toempiricism:everythingcanbeexplainedthroughscience(i.e.thenatural,physical

world).Hisprojectivismismorecomplicated.Blackburnthinksthat“a‘projective’

theorycanbedevelopedtogiveasatisfyingwayofplacingourpropensitiesfor

values.”46Hedoesnotgointoverymuchdetailbywhathemeansby“‘projective’

theory,”but,fromtherestofthepaper,Ithinkhemeansthathumanbeingshave

natural(referringbacktothenaturalism)reactionsandthatthesereactionsare

attitudes(orattributes,oremotions).Theseattitudestowards(oragainst)

45Ibid,170.46Ibid,167.

23

somethingarenaturalandethical.Theyaretheprecursortorationalreflection(i.e.

whatwebaseourrationalreflectionon).

Therefore,Blackburnisananti-realist,butnotarelativist.He’sananti-

realist,becausehethinksmoralfacts(ormoralpropositions,claims,etc.)areour

attitudes(notsomepropositionthatexistsindependentofthemind).He’snota

relativist,inpart,duetohisnaturalism.FromwhatItakehispositiontobe,he

thinksthatwehavenaturalreactions(orverdicts)tothingsandthisisnecessarily

so.Hesays,insupportofmyunderstandingintheprevioussentence,“Theexistence

oftheverdict,ofcourse,dependsontheexistenceofthosecapableofmakingit

[…].”47HegoesontouseHumeanmetaphysicstounderpinthisnaturalnecessity—

naturalnecessityisnaturalregularitybasedonourformingofdispositionstowards

expectation.48

WhileBlackburnusesnaturalismaspartofhisquasi-realism,itisnotmeant,

atleastnotin“HowToBeanEthicalAnti-Realist”,tomeanthatourlanguageis

reducibletoordirectlydescriptiveofthenaturalstateofphysicalaffairs.

Blackburn’snaturalismistogroundthathumanshaveevolvedtohavecertainmoral

reactionsorattributes.Moralfacts,forBlackburn,requirethefurtherstepof

reflectingonthesemoralreactionsandattributes,andsoarenotnecessarily

descriptiveofthephysicalstateofaffairsintheworld.Thefurtherconditionof

quasi-realism,projectivism,addsthatwethenprojectourmoralreactions(or

attributes)ontotheworldmakingthemcontingentonus(humanbeings),and

attributesoftheRealworld.47Ibid,178.48Ibid,179.

24

Inanefforttobecharitabletoquasi-realismanddifferentiateitfrommoral

realismandmoralanti-realism—andprobablyexplainpartlyhowitgotitsname—

quasi-realismdrawsonpartsofbothofSayre-McCord’sdefinitions,whichIthink

emphasizesthatthereissomethingoffaboutthetraditionalmoralrealismandanti-

realismdebate.Theviewshavetraditionallybeensplit,butBlackburn’squasi-

realismhighlightsthatthisisproblematic.Quasi-realismabidesbytheseaspectsof

moralrealism:“(1)theclaimsinquestion,whenliterallyconstrued,areliterallytrue

orfalse(cognitivism),and(2)someareliterallytrue.”49But,itisalsocontingenton

humanbeingsandournaturalevolutionarybiologicalreactionstothings,and

“embrace[s]anon-cognitivistanalysisoftheclaimsinquestion”50makingitvery

muchananti-realisttheory.Quasi-realismincorporatingaspectsofbothmoral

realismandmoralanti-realismmayseemcontradictory,butitisnot.Itisamoral

anti-realisttheoryonitsfoundation,butthendevelopsaninternal(or

epistemologicalorcognitive)theorythatresemblesrealismafterwereflectonour

moralreactionsandmakeourmoralreactionsintomoralfacts(orclaims).

Perhapsquasi-realismhighlightsthatthetraditionalmoralrealistandmoral

anti-realistdebatehasfailedtocapturewhatisreallygoingonwhenwemakemoral

claims.Itmightnotmatterwhatourbeliefsareonthemetaphysicallevelofrealism

andanti-realism.Whatmattersiswhatwecanshowonaninternal(or

epistemological)levelthatitisherethatwecanseewhetheramoralclaimistrueor

false—itisherethatmoralclaimsgettheirmeaning.

49Sayre-McCord,EssaysonMoralRealism,5.50Ibid,5.

25

1.5.“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology”byRudolfCarnap

Theproblemmayjustbethatwecannotadequatelycapturewhatisgoingon

inanyrealismandanti-realismdebate(includingthemoralrealismandmoralanti-

realismdebate).Thisapparentstalematedoesnotmeanthatthedebatehastoend

here.Thereareotherwaysofapproachingthedebatethatmayhelpfurtherit.

WhileRudolfCarnapwasananti-realist,heprovidedatheoryoflinguist

frameworksthatcouldverywellhelp.

Carnap,inhispaper“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology”says,

[…][W]emustdistinguishtwokindsofquestionsofexistence:first,questionsoftheexistenceofcertainentities[…]withintheframework;wecalltheminternalquestions;andsecond,questionsconcerningtheexistenceorrealityofthesystemofentitiesasawhole,calledexternalquestions.51

ThefirstquestionCarnaparticulatesinthisquoteisconcerning“theexistenceof

certainentities”withinalinguisticframework:“internalquestions”.Internal

questionsarequestionsthatareepistemologicalinnature,orquestionsaboutwhat

wecanknowfromwithinagivenframework.ThesecondquestionCarnap

articulatesis“concerningtheexistenceortherealityofthesystemofentitiesasa

whole”:“externalquestions”.Externalquestionsarequestionsthatareontologicalin

nature,andarenotquestionsaboutwhatwecanknowfromwithinagiven

framework—theyarequestionsthatareaskedfromoutsideoftheframework.

Carnap’smainprojectinthispaperistoshowthatthroughusingalanguage

framework(bracketedfromanyontologicalstatementsaboutreality52)wecan

51RudolfCarnap,“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology,”inMeaningandNecessity:AStudyinSemanticsandModalLogic,SecondEdition(Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1956),206.52BracketedfromanystatementsabouttheRealworld.

26

avoidtheissuethatarisesforsomeanti-realists(orempiricistsinCarnap’s

language,sinceheassociatesempiricismwithanti-realism/nominalism)whenusing

“certainexpressionsinalanguage…[to]designate(ornameordenoteorsignifyor

referto)certainextra-linguisticentities.”53Theissuearisesforanti-realistswhen

these“extra-linguisticentities”areabstractentities,becausetheydenythatthese

expressionsinlanguage(suchastheadjective“red”orthenumber“five”)refertoa

realentityintheworld.54

Carnapbuildshisframeworkthroughusingexamplesofdifferentlanguages

ofabstractentities(suchasthelanguagesof“Theworldofthings”and“Thesystemof

numbers”).Heistryingtoshowthatwecanstillspeakmeaningfullyaboutabstract

entitieswhenweaskquestionsaboutthemofwhathecallsan“internal”nature—to

bedifferentiatedfromquestionsofanexternalnature.55Asareminder:internal

questionsare“questionsoftheexistenceofcertainentities[…]withinthe

framework,”whileexternalquestionsare“questionsconcerningtheexistenceor

realityofthesystemofentitiesasawhole.”56

IthinkCarnap’sinternalframeworktheoryin“Empiricism,Semantics,and

Ontology”showsthatwecanstillhaveinternalphilosophywithouthavingtostate

anythingaboutmetaphysics.WhileCarnap’spaperishelpfulfortheanti-realist,itis

alsohelpfulforthescepticconcerningtheontologicalstatusofabstractentities

(includingmoralfacts).Though,Carnap’sinternalframeworktheoryisnotactually

problematicfortherealist,becauseinternalframeworksdonotassertanything53Carnap,“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology,”216.54Ibid.55Ibid,206.56Ibid.

27

abouttheRealworld(or,inCarnap’slanguage,“theworldofthings”57).So,itseems

possibleforinternalquestionstobeaskedwithouthavingtoaskexternalquestions,

whichmeansthatwecanknowthingsonaninternallevelwithinagivenframe-

work—withoutrunningintotheproblemofnotbeingabletoproperlycapturewhat

isgoingoninanyrealismandanti-realismdebate(includingthemoralrealismand

moralanti-realismdebate)duetotheexternalnatureofthequestionswithinthe

realismandanti-realismdebate.

1.6.Pyrrhonian,Academic,orMethodologicalScepticism?

IntheOutlinesofPyrrhonismbySextusEmpiricus,hestatesthatthereare

three“natural[results]ofanyinvestigation”andthoseresultsarethefollowing

threepositions:“Dogmatic,”“Academic,”and“Sceptic.”58The“Dogmatists,”

accordingtoSextusEmpiricus,“speciallysocalled—Aristotle,forexample,and

EpicurusandTheStoicsandcertainothers;”thinkthattheyhave“[discovered]the

objectof[their]search.”59The“Academics,”suchas“CleitomachusandCarneades,”

“denythat[theobjectoftheirinvestigation]isdiscoverableandconfessittobe

inapprehensible.”60And,“theScepticskeeponsearching”61—theScepticsalso

remainagnostic(epochē)intheirsearching.

NeilGascoigneexplainsinhisbookScepticism,

ForSextus,theDogmatistandtheAcademicpresentmirrorimagesofeachother:whereoneassertsthatknowledgeispossible(thatthingscanbeapprehended),theotherdeniesit.Toputthismoreprecisely,theDogmatist

57Ibid.58SextusEmpiricus,OutlinesofPyrrhonism,trans.R.G.Bury(Cambridge,Massachusetts:LoebClassicalLibrary,1933),1.1-1.4.59Ibid.60Ibid.61Ibid.

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assumesthatwecanhavethephilosophicalknowledgethatshowsthatknowledgeispossible.Equally,theAcademicassumesthatwecanhavethephilosophicalknowledgethatshowsthatknowledgeisnotpossible.62

TheideaisthatforSextusEmpiricus,boththeDogmatistandtheAcademicare

dogmatic,becausetheydonoremainagnosticandbothasserttheirpositionstobe

true.TheScepticcannotassertthattheirpositionistrue,butcansaythattheydo

notknowwhethertheDogmaticpositionortheAcademicpositionistrueorfalse.

AsGascoignegoesontosay,

HowevertheScepticcomestotheviewthathemustgoalongwithappearancesinordertoachievehappiness,itcannotbeonthebasisofaclaimto[…]knowwhatthingsarereallylike(intheiressentialnature).63

Thatis,thatthoughtheScepticgoesalongwithappearances,64theirgoingalong

withappearancescannotbefoundedonanyclaimstoknowwhattheRealworldis

reallylike.

GascoignefurtherdistinguishesbetweenPyrrhonianScepticismand

AcademicScepticism.AccordingtoGascoigne,ArcesilausfoundedAcademic

Scepticism,around270BCE,whenhewasHeadoftheAcademy—around75years

afterPlato’sdeath.65ArcesilausthoughtthatbothStoicismandEpicureanism

(prominentschoolsofphilosophyinAncientGreece)were“Dogmaticperversionsof

theSocraticlegacy;”66andsoforwarded1)“thatheknewnothing”,and2)his

method“[suggested]alinkbetweenthe‘way’inwhichSocratesarrivedathis

‘admissionofignorance’andArcesilaus’sexplicitengagementwiththeopinionsof

62NeilGascoigne,Scepticism,inCentralProblemsofPhilosophy,ed.JohnShand(MontrealandKingston:McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress,2002),33.63Ibid,41.64Or,perceptions.65Gascoigne,Scepticism,41.66Ibid,42.

29

theDogmatistsofhisowntime.”67Arcesilaus’methodissimilartoSocrates’method

inPlato’sdialogues.68ThemethodPlatodetails:Socratesgoesaroundaskingpeople

whattheyknow,andthroughaseriesofquestionsshowsthepeopleheasksthat

theyactuallyknownothing.Thegoalbeingtoshowthattoonlyknowthatyou

knownothingisbetterthanthinkingyouknowsomethingwhenyoudonot.69

But,thisgetsbacktowhatSextusEmpiricussaidabouttheAcademicsinthe

OutlinesofPyrrhonism:they“denythat[theobjectoftheirinvestigation]is

discoverableandconfessittobeinapprehensible.”70AcademicScepticsdenythat

theyknowanything(concerningtheRealworld).Thisseemstobestilldogmatic,

evenifArcesilaustookissuewiththeDogmatists,andSextusEmpiricusisrightthat

AcademicScepticismistheflipsideor“mirror”(asGascoignesays)ofDogmatism.

Therefore,tousemorecontemporarylanguage,itseemsliketheDogmatistsare

realists,theAcademicsareanti-realists,andtheScepticsareactualagnosticsceptics.

UsingAcademicScepticismasatooliswhatturnsintothe‘MethodofDoubt’,

whichgetsassociatedwithRenéDescartes(specificallyhisFirstandSecond

MeditationsinhisMeditationsonFirstPhilosophy)intheEarlyModernperiod.

SimonBlackburnsays,oftheMethodofDoubt,intheOxfordDictionaryof

Philosophy,“Itattemptstoputknowledgeuponasecurefoundationbyfirstinviting

ustosuspendjudgementonanypropositionwhosetruthcanbedoubted,evenasa

67Ibid,43.68Ibid.69‘Toknow’meaningtoknowsomethingabouttheRealworld.70SextusEmpiricus,OutlinesofPyrrhonism,1.1.

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barepossibility.”71TheMethodofDoubtistoquestionanythingyouthinkyouknow

togetridofbeliefsfoundedonafalsefoundation.But,Descartesarguablydoesnot

actuallydoubtthattheextended,orReal,worldexists.HesaysintheSixth

Meditation,

[O]ntheonehandIhaveaclearanddistinctideaofmyself,insofarasIamsimplyathinking,non-extendedthing;andontheotherhandIhaveadistinctideaofbody,insofarasthisissimplyanextended,non-thinkingthing.[…]OfcourseIalsorecognizethatthereareotherfaculties(likethoseofchanging

position,oftakingonvariousshapes,andsoon)which,likesensoryperceptionandimagination,cannotbeunderstoodapartfromsomesubstanceforthemtoinherein,andhencecannotexistwithoutit.Butitisclearthattheseotherfaculties,iftheyexist,mustbeinacorporealorextendedsubstanceandnotanintellectualone;fortheclearanddistinctconceptionofthemincludesextension[…].72

ThisseemstoindicatethatDescarteswasnotanAcademicScepticoraPyrrhonian

Sceptic.HedidthinkhecouldknowsomethingabouttheReal(i.e.extended)world,

anddidnotremainagnosticeither.Forthisreason,theAcademicheritagethat

DescartesreliesonintheMethodofDoubtisonlyusedasatool,andnotused

seriously.Duetoitonlybeingusedinstrumentally,orasa“method”,IcallDescartes’

utilizationofscepticism‘MethodologicalScepticism’ratherthanAcademic,or

agnostic/PyrrhonianScepticism.

Therethenseemstobethreedifferenttypesofscepticismthatwecan

distinguishbetween:Pyrrhonian(oragnostic)Scepticism,AcademicScepticism,and

MethodologicalScepticism.IhavealreadyexplainedhowMethodologicalScepticism

differsfromPyrrhonianScepticismandAcademicScepticism,butitwouldbeagood

71SimonBlackburn,“methodofdoubt,”intheOxfordDictionaryofPhilosophy,ThirdEdition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),304.72RenéDescartes,MeditationsinFirstPhilosophy,inThePhilosophicalWritingsofDescartes,VolumeII,trans.JohnCottingham,RobertStoothoff,andDugaldMurdoch(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984),54-55.

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ideatomakethedistinctionbetweenPyrrhonianScepticismandAcademic

Scepticismalittlemoreclear.InBookI,ChapterXXXIII—“WhereinScepticism

differsfromtheAcademicPhilosophy”inOutlinesofPyrrhonism,SextusEmpiricus

explainshowPyrrhonianScepticismdiffersfromAcademicScepticism.At1.223,

SextusEmpiricussays,

AndifPlato[fromthefirstof,potentially,fiveschoolsofAcademicScepticism]doesreallyuttersomestatementsinascepticalwaywhenheis,astheysay,“exercising,”thatwillnotmakehimaSceptic;forthemanthatdogmatizesaboutasinglething,oreverprefersoneimpressiontoanotherinpointofcredibilityorincredibility,ormakesanyassertionaboutanynon-evidentobject,assumesthedogmaticcharacter[…].73

InBookI,ChapterXXXIII;SextusEmpiricusliststhreemainschoolsofAcademic

Scepticism,andliststwomoreschoolsthathealsothinksshouldbeincluded.74He

goesthroughexplaininghowthefivedifferentschoolsofAcademicScepticismare

notPyrrhonianScepticism,buttheabovequoteattackingPlato’s(orSocrates’)

‘scepticism’getstotheheartofthedistinctionbetweenAcademicScepticismand

PyrrhonianScepticism.

EvenAcademicScepticslikeArcesilaus,endupmakingaclaim:“allthingsare

non-apprehensible”75(i.e.thatallthingsarenotknowable).Theproblemwiththis,

SextusEmpiricussays,isthat“[Academics]affirm[thatallthingsarenon-

apprehensible]positively,whereastheScepticregardsitaspossiblethatsome

thingsmaybeapprehended.”76AssoonastheAcademicScepticaffirmsthatthey

knownothing,theyaremakinganassertionaboutsomething(inawaythatentails

73SextusEmpiricus,OutlinesofPyrrhonism,1.223.74Ibid,1.220-221.75Ibid,1.226.76Ibid.

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thattheydoknowsomething:thattheyknownothing),andthisisdogmaticandnot

actuallyScepticismaccordingtoSextusEmpiricus.

OnelastmajordifferencebetweenAcademicScepticismandPyrrhonian

ScepticismisthatforthePyrrhonians,agnosticism,orthesuspensionofjudgement

(epochē),iswhatleadstotranquillityofmind(ataraxia)andthegoodlife

(eudaimonia).RichardH.PopkinandJoséR.MaiaNetosayintheintroductionto

theiranthologySkepticism:AnAnthology,inregardstoPyrrhonianScepticism,

Theinvestigationdoesnotendwiththeinquirerfindingthetruth(whichiswhattheskepticstechnicallycall“dogmatism”),butinasituationofequipollencebetweenthedoctrinesorphenomenaexamined(thatis,onedoctrinedoesnotappearasmorecrediblethanaconflictingone)andso,unabletoassenttoeitherofthem,thePyrrhoniansuspendsjudgement(epoché).Contrarytotheinitialperspectiveofgettingridofthedisturbancebyfindingtruth,itiswhentheinquirersuspendsjudgementthatheorshefindsthetranquillitybeingsought.77

WhiletheAcademicScepticsaysthattheyabidebythesuspensionofjudgement

(epochē),theirprimarygoalistousethe‘Socraticmethod’togetridoffalsebeliefs.

ThePyrrhonianSceptic’sprimarygoalistranquillityofmind(ataraxia).

Toaddtothecomplexityofthedifferenttypesofscepticism,thereisalso

somethingcalledModeratePyrrhonism.Inhispaper“ModerateClassyPyrrhonian

MoralScepticism”andmoreelaboratelyinhisbookMoralSkepticisms,Walter

Sinnott-ArmstrongarticulatesakindofModeratePyrrhonism(inamoralscepticism

context).Sinnott-Armstrongsays,

Myscepticismisalsomoderate.Isuspendbeliefonlyaboutwhetheranyoneisjustifiedwithoutqualification.Thissuspensioniscompatiblewithrelativizedepistemicjudgements,suchasthatSueisjustifiedinbelievingthatherpetisadogasapposedtoacat,andthatsheisnotjustifiedinbelievingthatherpetisa

77RichardH.PopkinandJoséR.MaiaNeto,eds.,Skepticism:AnAnthology(Amherst,NewYork:PrometheusBooks,2007),22-23.

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dogasopposedtoadingoorhyena.78

Sinnott-Armstrong’sModeratePyrrhonismreinsintheuniversalaspectof

Pyrrhonism.Itstillremainsagnosticwhenitcomestojudgementsthatarenot

“justifiedwithoutqualification,”but“relativizedepistemicjudgements”canstillbe

madeonthisview.

Ithinkitisimportanttonowgiveageneral,contemporarydefinitionof

scepticism,andanalyseit.PartofBlackburn’sdefinitionofscepticismintheOxford

DictionaryofPhilosophystates,

AlthoughGreekscepticismcentredonthevalueofenquiryandquestioning,scepticismisnowthedenialthatknowledgeorevenrationalbeliefispossible,eitheraboutsomespecificsubjectmatter(e.g.ethics)orinanyareawhatsoever.79

ThispartofBlackburn’sdefinitionseemstobeheavilybiasedtowardsAcademic

Scepticism.IfyoucontinuereadingthedefinitionBlackburngives,itseemsattimes

thatheactuallyconflatesPyrrhonianScepticismwithAcademicScepticism.There

seemstobealotofconfusionoverthedifferenttypesofscepticismincontemporary

philosophy,andIthinkalotofthisisduetoconflatingthedifferenttypesof

scepticism.ItshouldbenotedthatPyrrhonian(oragnostic)Scepticismisnot

AcademicScepticism,andPyrrhonianScepticismandAcademicScepticismareboth

notMethodologicalScepticism.Theuseofscepticismasatoolinphilosophy(i.e.

MethodologicalScepticism)—sincetheEarlyModernperiodtopresentday—has

alsobeenconflatedwithbothPyrrhonianScepticism,orwhatIliketothinkofas

78WalterSinnott-Armstrong,“ModerateClassyPyrrhonianMoralScepticism,”ThePhilosophicalQuarterly58,no.232(July2008):454.79SimonBlackburn,“scepticism,”intheOxfordDictionaryofPhilosophy,ThirdEdition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),429.

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‘actual’agnosticscepticism,andAcademicScepticism.Ifindthisproblematic,

especiallywhentryingtounderstandspecificphilosophies(likeKant’s,orHume’s).

Ithinkitisimportanttokeepinmindtheproblematicconflationsofthedifferent

typesofscepticismwhilereadingallegedly‘sceptical’writings,andthecriticismsof

thosewritings,inordertodecipherthewritingsthatareactuallyscepticalandthe

criticismsthatshouldbetakenseriously.

1.7.Naturalism

Definingnaturalismisatrickyendeavour(notunlikedefiningrealismand

anti-realism).Theterm‘naturalism’hasbeenusedinphilosophybymanypeople

supportingmanydifferentvarietiesofideasandtheories.AsP.F.Strawsonstatesat

thebeginningofSkepticismandNaturalism:SomeVarieties,

Theterm“naturalism”iselasticinitsuse.ThefactthatithasbeenappliedtotheworkofphilosophershavingaslittleincommonasHumeandSpinozaisenoughtosuggestthatthereisadistinctiontobedrawnbetweenvarietiesofnaturalism.80

WhileStrawsongoesontodistinguishbetweenhardnaturalismandsoftnaturalism,

IwouldprefertodistinguishbetweenMethodologicalNaturalismandOntological

Naturalism(sometimesalsoconjoinedwithMetaphysicalNaturalismandreferredto

asPhilosophicalNaturalism).

Tostart,IwillfirstoutlineMethodologicalNaturalism.PaulKurtz,inhis

paper“Darwinre-crucified:whyaresomanyafraidofnaturalism,”defines

MethodologicalNaturalismasfollows,

First,naturalismiscommittedtoamethodologicalprinciplewithinthecontextofscientificenquiry;i.e.,allhypothesesandeventsaretobeexplainedand

80P.F.Strawson,SkepticismandNaturalism:SomeVarieties,TheWoodbridgeLectures1983(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1985),1.

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testedbyreferencetonaturalcausesandevents.Tointroduceasupernaturalortranscendentalcausewithinscienceistodepartfromnaturalisticexplanations.Onthisground,toinvokeanintelligentdesignerorcreatorisinadmissible.81

DavidPapineau,intheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle“Naturalism”,

moresimplysays,“Methodologicalnaturalistsseephilosophyandscienceas

engagedinessentiallythesameenterprise,pursuingsimilarendsandusingsimilar

methods.”82TheideabeingthatMethodologicalNaturalismfollowsthesame

methodasscience:usingnaturalexplanationwithoutappealtoanything

supernatural(suchGod,forexample).

Now,IwilloutlineOntologicalNaturalism.Papineaustates,withregardto

OntologicalNaturalism,

Acentralthoughtinontologicalnaturalismisthatallspatiotemporalentitiesmustbeidenticaltoormetaphysicallyconstitutedbyphysicalentities.Manyontologicalnaturaliststhusadoptaphysicalistattitudetomental,biologicalandothersuch“special”subjectmatters.Theyholdthatthereisnothingmoretothemental,biologicalandsocialrealmsthanarrangementsofphysicalentities.83

Addingtothis,Kurtzsaysmorebroadly,

Accordingtothenaturalists,natureisbestaccountedforbyreferencetomaterialprinciples,i.e.,bymassandenergyandphysicalchemicalpropertiesasencounteredindiversecontextsofinquiry.84

81PaulKurtz,“Darwinre-crucified:whyaresomanyafraidofnaturalism,”FreeInquiry,Spring1998,accessedApril22nd,2018,AcademicOneFile,http://link.galegroup.com.proxy.library.carleton.ca/apps/doc/A20633103/AONE?u=ocul_carleton&sid=AONE&xid=e7e2f9f7.82DavidPapineau,"Naturalism",TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,ed.EdwardN.Zalta(Winter2016Edition),accessedonApril22nd,2018,https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/naturalism/.83Ibid.84PaulKurtz,“Darwinre-crucified:whyaresomanyafraidofnaturalism.”

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And,so,MethodologicalNaturalismstatesthatitfollowsthesamemethodas

science,andOntologicalNaturalismstatesthateverythingintheuniversecanbe

explainedby“materialprinciples,”andisconstitutedof“physicalentities.”

Bothrealistsandanti-realistscanadoptMethodologicalNaturalismquite

easilyasitmakesnoontologicalclaimsabouttheRealworld—itmakesexplanatory

claims.Wherethingsgetmorechallengingfortheanti-realistiswhenitcomesto

OntologicalNaturalism.Though,ananti-realistmaynottakeissuewithOntological

Naturalismforeverydomain.Ananti-realistdoesnothavetobeananti-realist

whenitcomestoneuronsfiringexplainingbrainstates,buttheycanbeananti-

realistaboutabstractentitiessuchasmoralfacts(orclaims)—asHarmanis.85

But,IwouldliketogoastepfurtherandsaythatOntologicalNaturalismdoes

nothavetoentailanontologicalcommitmenttoattributingscientificexplanations,

likeneuronsfiringexplainingmentalstates,totheRealworld.Youcanverywell

explainmentalstatesbywayofneuronsfiring,evenifyouareanagnosticsceptic,

becausetheexplanationyougivecanbebasedonappearancesratherthanon

makingastatementabouttheRealworld.Thescepticcansay,“Itappearsthat

neuronsfiringexplainbrainstatesasfarasIcanknow.”Thisdoesnotassert

anythingabouttheRealworld,butrathermakesaclaimbasedonappearances

allowingthesceptictoremainagnosticabouttheRealworld.Thescepticcannotsay

thatthisishowtheworldis;theycanonlysaythatthisishowtheworldappears.As

quotedinsection1.6,inreferencetoPyrrhonianScepticism,“theScepticcomesto

85Referbacktosection1.3.

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theviewthathemustgoalongwithappearancesinordertoachievehappiness.”86

Thescepticstillneedstolivetheirlife,anditisunrealisticforthemtolivenot

acknowledginganything.So,ratherthanmakeclaimsrelatingtotheRealworld,

theymakeclaimsrelatingtoappearances.87

InSection2.2,thatfollows,natureismentioned,“Naturehasnotleftthisto

hischoice,andhasdoubtlessesteem’ditanaffairoftoogreatimportancetobe

trustedtoouruncertainreasoningsandspeculations.”88Humereferencesnature

countlesstimesthroughoutATreatiseofHumanNature,andAnEnquiryconcerning

HumanUnderstanding.Hume’snaturalismplaysaroleinhowtherestofhis

philosophyisinterpreted.OnewayofreadingHumeasarealistisbyusinghis

naturalismtodiscredit,orreducethepowerof,hisscepticism.Anotherwayof

readingHumeisthroughacceptingthatheendorsesbothscepticismandnaturalism,

butthathisphilosophyisnotcohesiveattimes.Ithinkitisimportanttounderstand

howHumeisusingnatureinordertounderstandwhatkindofnaturalismarisesin

hisphilosophyinanefforttobetterunderstandtherelationshipbetweenhis

scepticismandnaturalism.IfindthatHumeusesnatureintwoways:1)toreferto

humannature,and2)torefertoourunderstandingoftherulesofnaturethrough

ourperceptionsandexperiences.Thefirstuseofnatureisdependentonan

understandingoftheseconduseofnature.

86Gascoigne,Scepticism,41.87Appearancesarebasedonperceptions,andmay,ormaynot,beaccuraterepresentationsoftheRealworld—butthescepticcannotmakeaclaimaboutwhetherappearancesareaccuraterepresentationsoftheRealworldornot.88Treatise,1.4.2.1(p.125).

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IntheTreatise,Humesays,“Wemaydrawinferencesfromthecoherenceof

ourperceptions,whethertheybetrueorfalse;whethertheyrepresentnaturejustly,

orbemereillusionsofthesenses.”89Wemakeinferencesviatheknowledgewegain

throughoursenses,andtheimplicationhereisthatwecannotknowwhetherour

perceptionsgiveusaccurateknowledgeofnature(intheReal,externalworld)or

not.90ThisisinterestinggivenhowfrequentlyHumefallsbackonnatureinhis

explanationsthroughoutboththeTreatiseandtheFirstEnquiry.Iwillattemptto

reconstructHume’sunderstandingofnatureinordertounderstandhowitfitsinto

Hume’sphilosophyasawhole.

Tostartwith,Humedifferentiatesbetween“RelationsofIdeas”and“Matters

ofFact”.91RelationsofIdeas“arethesciencesofGeometry,Algebra,andArithmetic;

andinshort,everyaffirmation,whichiseitherintuitivelyordemonstratively

certain.”92Hegivesexamplesofwhathemeansbytherelationofideas,suchas,

“Thatthreetimesfiveisequaltothehalfofthirty,expressesarelationbetweenthese

numbers.”93Relationsofideasexpressarelationshipbetweentwoideasthatwecan

knowwithouthavingtorelyonexperience(perceivingsomethinghappenmultiple

times),andwhosenegationimpliesacontradiction.

89Ibid,1.3.5.2(p.59).90ItshouldbenotedthateventhoughwecannotknowwhetherornotourperceptionsgiveusaccurateknowledgeofaReal,externalworldornot;thecoherenceofourperceptionsstillallowsustomakeinferences,andassessthetruthorfalsityofperceptions.91WhyIambeginningwiththisdistinctionwillbecomemoreclearatthesectionprogresses.92FirstEnquiry,4.1(p.18).93Ibid.

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Mattersoffact,ontheotherhand,arenotdemonstrable94,andsosomething

anditsnegationcanbothbetrue.TheexampleHumegivesisthat“thesunmaynot

risetomorrow”,orthatthesunwillrisetomorrow.95Bothstatementscan

potentiallybetrue,andacontradictioncannotbederived.Theothermainfeatureof

mattersoffactisthat“[a]llreasoningsconcerningmatteroffactseemtobefounded

ontherelationofCauseandEffect.”96Humesaysthatitisbythis“relation[ofcause

andeffect]alonewecangobeyondtheevidenceofourmemoryandsenses.”97

Reasoningconcerningtherelationofcauseandeffect“arisesentirelyfrom

experience.”98Humegoesontomaketheevenstrongerclaim“thatcausesand

effectsarediscoverable,notbyreason,butbyexperience.”99Hume,then,goesonto

giveafewexamples.Oneoftheexampleshegivesisof“theexplosionof

gunpowder.”100Theideabeingthatyoucannotknowthatgunpowderexplodes

priortoexperiencewithit.101

Iamnotsomuchconcernedwithrelationsofideas,butwithmattersoffact.

Mattersoffactarehowwegainperceptualknowledgeofthenaturalworld(i.e.

94Alogicalproofcannotbegiven.95FirstEnquiry,4.1(p.18).96Ibid,4.4(p.19).97Ibid.98Ibid,4.6(p.19).99Ibid,4.7(p.20).100Ibid.101Imean,youcanreadaboutitinabook,butthepersonwhowrotethebookwouldneedtohavegainedknowledgeofgunpowdersomehowandthewaytodosowouldbetohaveexperiencewithgunpowder.Though,Idothink,forHume,thatreadingthatgunpowderexplodesinthebookisnotexactlyknowledgethatgunpowderexplodes.Youwouldneeddirectexperiencewithgunpowder,preferablymultipleexperienceswithit.

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externalworld).102So,itwouldappearthatthenaturalismfoundinHume’s

philosophyisonebasedonperceivedexperientialrelations(suchascauseand

effect)ratherthanconcreteknowledge,andthereforeallyoucanhavearenatural

relations(orrulesorfacts)thatcanonlyeverleadtoprobabilityandnotcertainty.

Thisisaverydifferentpicturethansomemodernreductionistformsofnaturalism

whereitisbelievedthatnature(andthewholeexternalworld)isreducibletothe

smallestdiscoverabledenominationinscience(forexample,quarks).ForHume,

onecanreducenaturetothesmallestdenominationdiscoverableinscience,butthis

wouldallbeconjecture—becauseitisbasedonexperience(i.e.senseimpressions/

perceptionscombinedwithourexperienceofthesesenseimpressions/perceptions)

andhasthepotentialtobetrueorfalse(wecannotknowforsurethetruthorfalsity

ofsomethingbyattemptingtoreferenceittotheexternalworld,wecanonlyassess

truthorfalsitywithinagivenframework).103

Itisworthadding,givenHume’sscepticalviewsconcerningmetaphysics,that

wecanneverhaveaccesstotheknowledgeofwhatanyultimatecausesorfirst

principle(s)are,makingnaturealwaysprobableandnot100%certain,

Hencewemaydiscoverthereason,whynophilosopher,whoisrationalandmodest,haseverpretendedtoassigntheultimatecauseofanynaturaloperation,orshowdistinctlytheactionofthatpower,whichproducesanysingleeffectintheuniverse.Itisconfessed,thattheutmosteffortofhumanreasonis,toreducetheprinciples,productiveofnaturalphaenomena,toagreatersimplicity,andtoresolvethemanyparticulareffectsintogeneralcauses,bymeansofreasoningsfromanalogy,experience,andobservation.But

102Thecontentofourknowledgeoftheexternalworldconsistsofperceptions.Thismeansthatwehavenodirectknowledgeoftheexternalworld,weonlyhaveknowledgeofourperceptions.DirectknowledgeoftheexternalworldisnotsomethingwehaveaccesstoforHume.103Itdoesnotgiveyouthecognitivistrequirementthatwecanknowthatatleastsomeclaimsaretrue.

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astothecausesofthesegeneralcauses,weshouldinvainattempttheirdiscovery;norshallweeverbeabletosatisfyourselves,byanyparticularexplanationofthem.Theseultimatespringsandprinciplesaretotallyshutupfromhumancuriosityandenquiry.104

So,thoughwecanreducenaturetogeneralrulesforgreatersimplicitythroughour

experiencesandobservations,theultimatecausesandfirstprinciple(s)ofnature

canneverbeknowntous(humans).ThisemphasizesthatReal,externalrules(or

laws)ofnaturearenotthingsthatcanbedirectlyknown.Therules,orlaws,of

naturethatwecanknowthroughperceptionandexperiencearebasedon

probability,notcertainty.ThisthenentailsthatHume’snaturalismisnotbasedon

assertinganythingintheexternalworldwithcertaintythatcanbeknowntobe

true—thatis,Hume’snaturalismisnotarealistorcognitiveassertion.Natural,or

physical,objectsthatwebecomeawareofviaperception,thethingsweperceivein

theworld,cannotnecessarilybeequatedwithReal,externalobjects—wecannot

knowtheconnectionbetweentheobjectofourstudy(thephysicalobjectofour

perception)andtheReal,externalobject.

1.8.Hume:Realist,Anti-Realist,orSceptic?

DifferentpeoplehaveinterpretedHumeasarealist,ananti-realist,ora

scepticintheireffortstounderstandhisphilosophy—thereisnoconsensusasto

whichHumeactuallywas.Becausethereisnoconsensusintheliterature,Iwill

havetogivemyowninterpretationofHumewithsupportinthefollowingchapter.

Inthissection,toshowthelackofconsensus,Iwillbrieflygiveanaccountofeachof

thedifferentinterpretationsofHume.Tostart,IwilllookatBarryStroud’srealist

interpretationofHume.Secondly,IwilllookatThomasReid’santi-realist104FirstEnquiry,4.12(p.22).

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interpretationofHume.And,thirdly,IwilllookatRobertJ.Fogelin’ssceptical

interpretationofHume.

WhileBarryStrouddoesacknowledgeHume’sscepticalpassages,hethinks

thatHumeisultimatelyarealist,

‘Obstinatenature’canobliterateourscepticaldoubtsinamoment,and‘carelessnessandin-attention’affordaneasyremedyforourdistress(p.218).Thisisnottosaythatnaturesomehowrefutesscepticismandshowsthatitisnottrue.Ournaturalinstinctsdonotsuccessfullymeetorresolvethescepticaldoubts;theysimplysubmergethem.Manissoconstitutedthathemustbelieve,forexample,intheexistenceofbodies,eventhoughhecannotdefendthatbeliefwithanygoodreasons.Norwillanyaccountofgoodreasoningfreehimfromthescepticaldoubtsarisinginevitablyoutofreflectiononthegroundsforthatbelief.But,wedogetfreefromsuchdoubts,nevertheless.105

StroudthenquotesHumeandcarriesonbysaying,

Wecannotavoidseeingtheresultsofourphilosophicalreflectionasartificialandcontrived,andwewillinevitablyyieldtonatureandaccept‘thegeneralmaximsoftheworld’(p.269)despiteaconvincingphilosophicaldemonstrationoftheunreasonableness,oreventhefalsity,ofthosebeliefs.106

AccordingtoStroud’sinterpretationofHume’sphilosophy,wecannothelpbutto

fallintodoubtwhenwereflectandphilosophize,but,intheend,werevertbackinto

arealistpositionaswe“yieldtonature”.ItisarealistinterpretationofHume,

because,accordingtoStroud,Humethinksthathumansnaturallythinkthatbodies

existintheexternalworld—notjusttheappearanceofbodiesintheexternalworld,

butReal,externalbodies.

ThomasReid,ontheotherhand,seemstohavehadananti-realist

interpretationofHume’sphilosophy.ReidwasacontemporaryofHume,andwas

highlycriticalofHume’sphilosophy.ReidinterpretedHumeasallowinghis,

meaningHume’s,philosophytoleadHume“todisbelievetheexistencebothof105BarryStroud,Hume(NewYork:Routledge&KeganPaulplc,1977),115.106Ibid,116.

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matterandofmind.”107AccordingtoReid,Humedeniedthatanythingexistedinthe

externalworld,whichaPyrrhonianScepticwouldcallnegativelydogmatic,

AcademicScepticism,oranti-realism.108Tofurtherelaborate,Reidsays,

MrHUMEadoptsLOCKE’Saccountoftheoriginofourideas,109andfromthatprincipleinfers,thatwehavenoideaofsubstance,corporealorspiritual,noideaofpower,nootherideaofcause,butthatitissomethingantecedent,andconstantlyconjoinedtothatwhichwecallitseffect;and,inaword,thatwecanhavenoideaofanythingbutoursensations,andtheoperationsofmindweareconsciousof.110

Again,ReidsaysthatHumenegativelyassertsthatwehavenoideaofsubstance

(thisalsomeansthatwehavenodirectideaoftheexternalworld).Reidalsosays

thatHumeassertsthatallwecanhaveideasof,knowledgeof,are“oursensations,

andtheoperationsofmindweareconsciousof”—thiswouldmeanthatourideas

aremind-dependent.Thecombinationofnothavinganyideaofexternalsubstance

andallourideasbeingmind-dependentmakesReid’sinterpretationofHume’s

philosophyananti-realistinterpretation.

RobertJ.FogelinarticulatesaninterpretationofHumeasatruescepticinhis

paper“TheSkepticsAreComing!TheSkepticsAreComing!”,

Hume,whomItaketobeanurbanePyrrhonian[ModeratePyrrhonianSceptic],explicitlymakesthismove[toshowthatthedogmatists’program,suchasAcademicScepticism,“actuallygeneratesaradicalskepticismratherthanavoidsit”]intheTreatisewhenhetellsus:“Itisimpossible,uponanysystem,todefendeitherourunderstandingorsenses;andwebutexposethemfurtherwhenweendeavourtojustifytheminthatmanner.Asthescepticaldoubtarisesnaturallyfromaprofoundandintensereflectiononthosesubjects,it

107ThomasReid,EssaysontheIntellectualPowersofMan(Edinburgh:PrintedforJohnBell,ParliamentSquare,andG.G.J.&J.Robinson,London,1785),187.108ReidisalsotakingissuewithHume’stheoryofmindinthepreviousquote,butIamfocusingonReid’sinterpretationofHume’stheoryofperceptionandmetaphysics.109ReidsaysinthepreviousparagraphthattheoriginofideasforLockeissensationandreflection.110Reid,EssaysontheIntellectualPowersofMan,189.

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alwaysincreasesthefurtherwecarryourreflections,whetherinoppositionorconformitytoit.”SinceHumeheldarustic111interpretationofancientPyrrhonism,hedistancedhimselffromitinthesewords:“ButaPyrrhoniancannotexpect,thathisphilosophywillhaveanyconstantinfluenceonthemind:orifithad,thatitsinfluencewouldbebeneficialtosociety.Onthecontrary,hemustacknowledge,ifhewillacknowledgeanything,thatallhumanlifemustperish,werehisprinciplesuniversallyandsteadilytoprevail.Alldiscourse,allactionwouldimmediatelycease;andmenremaininatotallethargy,tillthenecessitiesofnature,unsatisfied,putanendtotheirmiserableexistence.”Takingitasrustic,Humerecommendsaphilosophicaltoniccontaining“onlyasmalltinctureofPyrrhonism.”IfhehadinterpretedPyrrhonismasurbane,hecouldhavecounseledafullquaffoftherealstuff.112

Fogelin’sinterpretationofHume’sphilosophyintheabovequoteunderstandsHume

asmitigated,ormoderate,PyrrhonianSceptic—thekindthatassentsto

appearances,butremainsagnosticaboutthemetaphysicalstatusoffacts,objects,

etc.,intheexternal,Realworld.HumeisnotaradicalPyrrhonianSceptic,according

toFogelin,anditispreciselyradicalPyrrhonianScepticismthatHumespeaks

against.But,tobeaPyrrhonianSceptic,Humeneednotberadicalinhisviews.He

canacceptamitigatedPyrrhonianScepticism,orModeratePyrrhonianScepticism,

andstillbeatruesceptic(intheAncientGreekunderstandingofscepticismas

withholdingjudgement,epochē).

1.9.AnInterpretationofHume’sPhilosophy

IdothinkthatHume’sscepticismandnaturalismarecohesive,113andthathis

moralphilosophyisalsocohesive.Notonlythat,butthatHume’sphilosophyis

cohesiveacrosshisscepticism,naturalism,andmoralphilosophy.Inthissection,I111“Treatedasrustic,thePyrrhonistispicturedassettingasidesubtletyandflatfootedlyseekingsuspensionofbeliefonallmatterswhatsoever,includingthepracticalbeliefsconcerningeverydaylife.”RobertJ.Fogelin,“TheSkepticsAreComing!TheSkepticsAreComing!,”inPyrrhonianSkepticism,ed.WalterSinnott-Armstrong(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),163.112Ibid,164.113BycohesiveImeanconsistentandmutuallysupporting,andnotresultinginacontradictionorincompatibility.

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willbeprimarilyusingsecondarysupportfromDonGarretttohelpshowthatthese

componentsofHume’sphilosophyarecohesive.IwillfirstlookatapaperbyDon

Garrettcalled“‘ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism’:SkepticismandNaturalismin

Hume’sScienceofMan”(withsomereferencetoRobertJ.Fogelin’spaper“The

SkepticsAreComing!TheSkepticsAreComing!”)beforeturningtoChapter9:

“MoralEvaluation”inGarrett’sbookCognitionandCommitmentinHume’s

Philosophy.Afterconsidering“‘ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism’:Skepticismand

NaturalisminHume’sScienceofMan”and“MoralEvaluation”,Iwillshowthe

connectionsbetweenthemwiththegoalbeingtodemonstratethatHume’s

philosophyiscohesiveacrosshisscepticism,naturalism,andmoralphilosophy.

InthefirstpaperIreferredto,Garrettsays—attheveryendofhis

introduction—”Hume’snaturalismandhisskepticismaremutuallysupporting.”114

ItishisgoalinthispapertoshowthatHume’snaturalismandscepticismarenot

inconsistent.Garrett’salternativegoalistoshowthatyoudonothavetosupport

oneattheexpenseoftheother—forexample,youdonothavetoholdthatHumeis

actuallyanaturalistattheexpenseofhisscepticism;bothnaturalismandscepticism

canholdsimultaneously.115Afterhisintroduction,Garrettexplainsaclassification

systemofscepticism.UsingRobertJ.Fogelin’sclassificationofscepticismtostart

114DonGarrett,“‘ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism’:SkepticismandNaturalisminHume’sScienceofMan,”inPyrrhonianSkepticism,ed.WalterSinnott-Armstrong(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),69.115OnceitisestablishedthatHume’sscepticismandnaturalismarecohesive,Iwillthenshowthathisscepticismandnaturalismarealsoconsistentwithhismoralphilosophy.IstartwithsupportingHume’sscepticismandnaturalismfirst,becausetheyinformhismoralphilosophy.

46

with,Garrettdiscusses“sixdifferentdimensions”thatscepticismcanbebroken

downinto:domain,character,object,origin,degree,andpersistence.116

GarrettdefinesFogelin’s“sixdifferentdimensions”ofscepticismasfollows.

OfdomainGarrettsays,

[T]hesetsofpropositionstowardwhich[varietiesofskepticism]aredirected.Thedomainofagiveninstanceofskepticismmaybeeithergeneralorlimited.Generalskepticismconcernsallpropositionswhatsoever;limitedskepticismisdirectedonlytowardpropositionsofaparticularsubjectmatterorotherkind.117

Garretdefinescharacter,ashesaysFogelindefinesit,bysplittingitintothree

subcategories,

[Character]maybetheoretical,prescriptive,orpracticing.Theoreticalskeptic-ismisapositivestancetowardtheviewthatthatthereisalackof“rationalgrounds,warrant,orjustification”forassentingtothepropositionsofaspecifieddomain.Prescriptiveskepticismisapositivestancetowardstheviewthatoneoughtnottoassent—typicallyissuinginarecommendationtoresistorrefrainfromassent—tothepropositionsofaspecifieddomain.Practicingskepticismisastanceofactualdoubting,orrefrainingfromassentto,thepropositionsofaspecifieddomain.118

Hethensaysthatobjectcan“beeitherepistemologicalorconceptual,”

[E]pistemologicalskepticismdoesnotconcerntheintelligibilityofadomainofpropositionsbutonlythebasisforassentingtopropositionswithinit,whereasconceptualskepticismconcernstheveryintelligibilityofadomainofpropositions.119

Afterobject,Garrettsaysthatoriginis“eitherantecedentorconsequent,”

ThedistinctionbetweenantecedentandconsequentskepticismisoneoftwodistinctionsthatHumehimselfdrawsandemphasizesinsection12ofAnEnquiryConcerningHumanUnderstanding.AsHumeexplainsit,theformeris“aspeciesofscepticism,antecedenttoallstudyandphilosophy,which…recommendsanuniversaldoubt,notonlyofallourformeropinionsandprinciples,butalsoofourveryfaculties”(EHU12.3).Hecontraststhiswith

116Garrett,“‘ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism’:SkepticismandNaturalisminHume’sScienceofMan,”69.117Ibid,69-70.118Ibid,70.119Ibid,71.

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“anotherspeciesofskepticism,consequenttoscienceandenquiry,whenmenaresupposedtohavediscoveredeithertheabsolutefallaciousnessoftheirmentalfacultiesortheirunfitnesstoreachanyfixeddeterminationinallthosecurioussubjectsofspeculation,aboutwhichtheyarecommonlyemployed”(EHU12.5).120

Thesecondtolastdimension,ordifferentiation,isdegree.Degreecan“beeither

unmitigatedormitigated,”

Forexample,anunmitigatedtheoreticalskepticismaboutadomainembodiestheviewthatassenttoanypropositionwithinitisutterlywithoutrationalground,warrant,orjustification;amitigatedtheoreticalskepticismembodiesonlytheviewthattherationalground,warrant,orjustificationofassenttosuchpropositionsislimited,orminimal,orlessthangenerallysupposed,orlessthandesirable,orotherwisefallsbelowsomespecifiedorimpliedstandard.121

And,finally,GarrattsaysofFogelin’sdimensionofpersistence,

[T]hepersistenceofskepticismmaybeeitherconstantorvariable.Itisconstantiftheskepticmaintainsthesamedegreeofskepticismthroughtimeandreflection;itisvariableifthedegreeofskepticismincreasesordecreaseswithchangesintheskeptic’sperspectiveorfocusofattention.122

Garrettusesthese“sixdifferentdimensions”todissectHume’sscepticismin

ordertoclassifyit(viahowheunderstandsHume’sscepticism).Though,Garrettis

notcompletelysatisfiedwithFogelin’sinitialsixdifferentiations,andtothemhe

figuresintwomoreformsofscepticismthataremeanttoreplacewhatFogelincalls

“theoreticalskepticism”—whichfallsunderthecharacterdimensionofscepticism.

Thesetwonewdifferentiationsare“rationalsupportskepticism”and“epistemic

meritskepticism”.123Garrettdefines“rationalsupportskepticism”as“theviewthat

assenttopropositionsinagivendomainwilllackrationalsupport.”124,125And,

120Ibid.121Ibid,71-72.122Ibid,72-73.123Ibid,80.124Garrettsaysthat“[a]beliefhasrationalsupportifandonlyifithasepistemicmeritbecauseofthemannerinwhichitisproducedbyreason.”And,“[a]beliefis

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“epistemicmeritskepticism[…]istheviewthatassenttopropositionsinagiven

domainwilllackepistemicmerit.”126,127

Hereplacestheoreticalscepticismwithhisdistinctionbetweenthesetwo

newcategoriesinanefforttosupporthisconclusion.Garrettconcludesattheendof

“‘ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism’”,

Thus,naturalismleadsnaturallytoacrisisofunmitigatedpracticingscepticaldoubt,andthepsychologicaldefeatofthatunmitigatedpracticingdoubtincorporatestheadoptionoftheonlyprincipleofepistemicmeritthatcannowsustainareturntonaturalism.Thisreturntonaturalismcanoccur,however,onlyinconjunctionwithaprescriptiveandepistemicmeritskepticismthatisbothconstantandgeneral—butmitigated.128

Leadinguptotheabovequote,Garrettwrites,“Hume’sprocedureisnaturalistic

fromthestart[…][and]amitigatedandlimitedendorsementof[Hume’s]own

relianceonreasonandthesenses,anendorsementthatcanwithstandhis

awarenessofthemanylimitationsofhumancognitivenature[is]discovered.”129

Though,this“mitigatedandlimitedendorsement”isqualifiedbythelimitednature

ofhumancognition,whichnaturallyleadstodoubt(bywhichImeanscepticism).

Interestingly,Humedoesnotidentifyhimselfasamoderateormitigated

PyrrhonianScepticasGarrett’sdiagnosisofHume’sscepticismas“aprescriptive

andepistemicmeritscepticismthatisbothconstantandgeneral—butmitigated”

producedbyreasonifandonlyifitresultsfromanoperationoftheinferentialfaculty[theabilityforrationalinference].”Ibid.125Ibid.126Garrettsaysthat“[a]beliefhasepistemicmeritifandonlyifitdeservesorisworthyofbelieforassent.”Ibid.127Ibid.128Ibid,90.129Ibid.

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wouldimplythatHumewas.Though,GarrettandFogelinbothagreethatHume

maynothavehadextensiveknowledgeinancientformsofscepticism.Garretsays,

Humerecognizestwoancientscepticalschools:PyrrhonianskepticismandAcademicskepticism.AsJuliaAnnashasrecentlyargued,Humedoesnotexhibit,andevidentlydidnotpossess,deephistoricalknowledgeofthesetwoschools.130

So,whileHumeknewthatthereweretwoAncientGreekschoolsofscepticism,he

didnotknowthedifferentiatingfactorsbetweenthem.

AsFogelinemphasizesinhispaper“TheSkepticsAreComing!TheSkeptics

AreComing!”,

Hume,whomItaketobeanurbanePyrrhonian[ModeratePyrrhonianSceptic],explicitlymakesthismove[toshowthatthedogmatists’program,suchasAcademicScepticism,“actuallygeneratesaradicalskepticismratherthanavoidsit”]intheTreatisewhenhetellsus:“Itisimpossible,uponanysystem,todefendeitherourunderstandingorsenses;andwebutexposethemfurtherwhenweendeavourtojustifytheminthatmanner.Asthescepticaldoubtarisesnaturallyfromaprofoundandintensereflectiononthosesubjects,italwaysincreasesthefurtherwecarryourreflections,whetherinoppositionorconformitytoit.”SinceHumeheldarustic131interpretationofancientPyrrhonism,hedistancedhimselffromitinthesewords:“ButaPyrrhoniancannotexpect,thathisphilosophywillhaveanyconstantinfluenceonthemind:orifithad,thatitsinfluencewouldbebeneficialtosociety.Onthecontrary,hemustacknowledge,ifhewillacknowledgeanything,thatallhumanlifemustparish,werehisprinciplesuniversallyandsteadilytoprevail.Alldiscourse,allactionwouldimmediatelycease;andmenremaininatotallethargy,tillthenecessitiesofnature,unsatisfied,putanendtotheirmiserableexistence.”Takingitasrustic,Humerecommendsaphilosophicaltoniccontaining“onlyasmalltinctureofPyrrhonism.”IfhehadinterpretedPyrrhonismasurbane,hecouldhavecounseledafullquaffoftherealstuff.132

130Ibid,77.131“Treatedasrustic,thePyrrhonistispicturedassettingasidesubtletyandflatfootedlyseekingsuspensionofbeliefonallmatterswhatsoever,includingthepracticalbeliefsconcerningeverydaylife.”RobertJ.Fogelin,“TheSkepticsAreComing!TheSkepticsAreComing!,”inPyrrhonianSkepticism,ed.WalterSinnott-Armstrong(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004),163.132Ibid,164.

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Hume’sapprehensionofPyrrhonismcomesdowntohimnothavingathorough

understandingofAncientScepticism,and,though,hedeniesbeingaPyrrhonian,he

isaModeratePyrrhonianSceptic.And,ModeratePyrrhonianScepticismis

compatiblewithHume’s“scienceofman”(naturalism).133Iinviteyoutothinkback

toGarrett’sargumentthatHume’sscepticismandnaturalismarecompatibleatthis

point.

Garrettarticulates—inmorewordsthannecessary—thatHumeespousesa

kindofmitigated,ormoderate,formofPyrrhonianScepticism.And,thismitigated

Pyrrhonismiscompatiblewith“[t]henaturalisticcognitiveandconativepsychology

thatconstituteswhatHumecalls“thescienceofman”,because“thescienceofman”

isaninvestigationoftheoperationsofhumanfaculties,whichfacultiesinclude(amongothers)imagination,memory,thesenses,thepassions,themoralsense—andreason.ItisoftenclaimedthatHumeusestheterm“reason”inmanydifferentsenses.Infact,however,heconsistentlyusesitinasinglesense—asatermincognitivepsychologydesignatingthefacultyofmakinginferencesandengaginginargument.134

Hume’sscepticismandnaturalismareinterconnected,andreliantoneachother.

ThisgivesHumetheaddedbonusthathisscepticismdoesnoteliminatereason(or

rationalinference)duetohisnaturalism(whichentailsthecognitivepsychologyof

humans).135

133Hume’s“scienceofman”(naturalism)canbedefinedjustas“theprogramofprovidingcausalexplanationsformentalandotherphenomena.”Garrett,“ASmallTinctureofPyrrhonism,”68.134Ibid,79.135Thecognitivepsychologyofhumansisthementalabilityofhumanstohaveaccesstocertainknowledge.ThisharkensbacktotheCarnapianunderstandingofinternalinthatwecanonlyaskcertainkindsofquestionsbecauseweonlyhaveaccesstocertainkindsofanswers—inthecaseofhumans,wecanonlyhaveaccesstointernalquestionsandcanonlygiveinternalanswers.

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Hume’sscepticismandnaturalismareinterconnected,butwhatabouthis

moralphilosophy?Atthisstageinthesection,Ithinkitwouldbeagoodideato

switchovertoChapter9:“MoralEvaluations”inDonGarrett’sbookCognitionand

CommitmentinHume’sPhilosophy.Garrettstartsthechapterbydistinguishingbe-

tweentwocompetinginterpretationsofHume’smoralphilosophy(focusingon

moralevaluations).Oneinterpretation,Garrettcalls“nonpropositionaltheories”,

andtheotherinterpretationhecalls“propositionaltheories”.136,137Ofthe

nonpropositionalandpropositionaldistinction,Garrettwrites,

[The]questioniswhethermoralevaluationsdoordonotaffirmgenuinepropositions—thatis,dotheymakeassertionsthataresusceptibleoftruthorfalse-hoodandthatcouldthereforeprovidetheobjectsofgenuinebeliefs?138

Nonpropositionaltheoriesassert,insomeway,thatmoralevaluationsdonotaffirm

thetruthorfalsityofmoralpropositions,whilepropositionaltheoriesassertthat

moralevaluationsdoaffirmthetruthorfalsityofmoralpropositions.

Hume’sposition,withinhismoralphilosophy,hasbeeninterpretedaseither

nonpropositionalorpropositional,orseenasinconsistent(inthathe,onthesurface,

seemstocontradicthimself).ThecontradictionthatHumegetsaccusedofisthat

“thefirstsectionofBookIIIoftheTreatise[isdevoted]toestablishingthat‘moral

distinctions(are)notderiv’dfromreason,’”139while“inTreatiseIII.iii.1(“Ofthe

originofthenaturalvirtuesandvices”),Humedescribesvariouswaysinwhichwe

136DonGarrett,CognitionandCommitmentinHume’sPhilosophy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1997),188.137Garrett’s“nonpropositional”vs.“propositional”distinctionsoundsquitesimilartothenoncognitivevs.cognitivedistinctionmorebroadlyintherealismvs.anti-realismdebate.138Garrett,CognitionandCommitmentinHume’sPhilosophy,188.139Ibid,187.

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‘correct’ourmoralsentimentsbyreflection”140(whichseemstoimplythatmoral

distinctionscouldbederivedfromreason).TherolethisplaysinGarrett’schapteris

thatHumesometimesappearstobetakinganonpropositionalpositiontowards

moraldistinctions,andsometimesHumeappearstobetakingapropositionalposit-

iontowardsmoraldistinctions(inthecontextofmoralevaluation).Garrett

concludesthatHume’stheoryisbothnonpropositionalandpropositional,andthatit

isnotcontradictoryforHumetoholdboththeseseeminglycontradictorypositions.

GarrettclarifieswhatHumemeans“[…]whenHumedeniesthatmoral

distinctionsarederivedfromreason,”infirstsayingthatHume“doesnotusethe

term‘reason’inavagueormerelyhonorificsense”:

Rather,[Hume]usesitasatechnicalterminhiscognitivepsychology.Itis,hereaselsewherethroughouthiswritings,thetermthatspecificallydesignatesthefacultyofmakinginferences.Heisnot,therefore,askingwhethermoraldistinctionsarewarrantedorjustifiable;instead,heisaskingwhethertheiroccurrencecanbeexplainedasaproductofinferenceoperatingonrepresentationsoftheobjectsofevaluation,orwhetherwemustinsteadrecognizetheoccurrenceofsomespecificallymoralnoninferentialelement.141

Therefore,accordingtoGarrett,Hume’sunderstandingofreason“designatesthe

facultyofmakinginferences.”ForHume,reasonisnotjustavaguerationalfaculty.

Thisisimportant,becauseinferencetiesbacktoHume’smetaphysics(especiallyhis

scepticismandnaturalism).Followingthisfirstclarification,Garrettmakesasecond

clarification,

Hume’sargumentsaredirectedtowardansweringthegeneralquestionofwhethertheoriginofthecapacitytomakemoraldistinctionsdependsonlyonreasonoronsomethingelse(suchasdistinctivelymoralimpressions).Heisnotaddressingthemoreparticularquestionofwhetherornotsomeonewho

140Ibid,190.141Ibid,193.

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alreadyhasthiscapacity,basedpartlyonhisorhernoninferentialendowments,couldinferthecorrectnessofamoralevaluation.142

ThesecondclarificationisaimedatshowingthatHumeisaddressingwhetherthe

source,ororigin,“ofthecapacitytomakemoraldistinctions”reliessolelyonthis

inferentialreasoning,orifthesourcecouldpossiblyrelyonsomethingelse(i.e.what

Garrettcallsmoralimpressions;Humealsousestheterm‘sentiment’).

And,asGarrettalsoremarksintheabovequote,Humeisnotaddressing

whethersomeonewhohasinferentialrationalendowments(partlybasedonmoral

impressions/sentiments)couldmakeamoralevaluationabouttherightnessor

wrongnessofamoralproposition,etc..Humeisconcernedwiththeoriginofthe

moralevaluation,notwhetherrationalanimalscanassesstherightnessor

wrongness(i.e.correctness)ofamoralproposition(moralfact,act,etc.).What

spursthemoralevaluationtobe‘moral’?AfterHumearticulateswhathethinksis

theoriginofmoralevaluation,hecanthengoontoarticulateafurther,more

developedunderstandingofmoralevaluation(whichincludesreflectionand

inferentialreasoning).

ForHume,theoriginofmoraldistinctionismoralimpression/sentiment.As

Garrettsays,“Humeinsiststhattofeelamoralsentimentisitselfamoralevaluation

andthemakingofamoraldistinction(e.g.,atTHN471).”143But,thekeyastowhy

Humeisnotcontradictinghimself,assomeinterpretersmistakenlythink,liesin

Hume’smovementfrommoralsentimenttoreason.Garrettexplainsthismoveas

follows,

142Ibid.143Ibid,196.

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Oncewehavefunctioningabstractideasofvice,virtue,andtheirvariousdegreesandspecies,wecanformulatepropositionaljudgmentsorbeliefstotheeffectthataparticularpersonisvirtuous,orthataparticularmentalcharacteristicisespeciallyvicious,orthatanactionoughttobedone.[…]Althoughsuchjudgmentsarepropositionalincharacter,theyareneverthelessdependentontheexistenceofmoralfeelings[i.e.sentiments]intwoways.First,themostcommonwayofmakingsuchajudgmentinvolves,asapreliminary,imaginativelytakingupasteadyandgeneralpointofview,soastohavemoralfeelingsasaresultofthesympatheticreactionsthatareelicited.Second,andevenmorefundamentally,nopersoncouldhavethenecessaryabstractmoralideasinthefirstplaceunlessthatpersonhadpreviouslyhadmoralsentimentsfromwhichsuchabstractideascouldhavedeveloped.Moreover,itismoralfeelings,notthemoraljudgmentsthatresultfromthem,thataredirectlyandindependentlymotivating.144

Wefirsthavemoralsentimentbeforewecanhavemoraljudgmentsthatare

propositionalinnature(andthereforebasedoninference—andrational).Thisis

whyHumesays,asGarrettquoteshim,“moraldistinctions(are)notderiv’dfrom

reason.”145Moraldistinctionsarenotderivedfromreason;theyarederivedfrom

moralsentiment.But,thisdoesnotmeanthatmoraldistinctionscannotbecome

propositional,basedoninferentialreasoningforHume,oncetheinitialmoral

sentimentsarefelt.InordertoknowsomethingforHume,wemustexperienceit

first,andpreferablymultipletimesbeforewecanformamoreabstractideaofit.

Oncewehaveamoreabstract,orgeneral,ideaofwhatwehaveexperienceof,we

canthenreflectonitmakingitpropositionalandrational.146ForGarrett,thismeans

144Ibid,197-198.145Hume,Treatise,III.i.1.146Apotentialproblemcouldarisehere,butIcannotgointogreatdetailinexplainingoransweringtheproblemduetotimeandspaceconstraints.Theproblemisthis:itcouldbesaidthatapropositionthatonlyreportsone’sownsentiment(basedonone’sownexperiences)isnotamoralproposition,becauseitdoesnotreportwhatisrightorwronginanuniversallyapplicableway.Aquickanswer:theissuewiththisproblemisthatitignorespartofwhatHumewastryingtosay.Ourexperienceofsentimentisonlypartofthemoralpropositionstory.Itbeginswithsentiment,butafterthesentimentwecanthenreflectonthatsentimentinordertoweighwhetheritisrightorwrong.

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that“Humerecognizesbothnonpropositionalmoralevaluations(moralfeelings)

andpropositionalmoralevaluations(moraljudgmentsasdistinctpsychological

events.”147Nonpropositionalmoralfeelings(i.e.sentiments)donotconflictwith

propositionalmoraljudgements,forHume,becausewemustfirsthavethemoral

feelingbeforewecanhavethemoraljudgement(theyareinterconnectedrather

thancontradictory).

AfterechoingGarrett’swordsthatHume’sscepticismandnaturalism

“aremutuallysupporting”;IwouldaddthatHume’sscepticism,naturalism,and

moralphilosophyareallmutuallysupportingandcohesive.Hume’smoral

philosophyisbasedincognitivepsychology,asGarrettsays,whichrelatesbackto

Hume’s“scienceofman”(i.e.naturalism)andHume’sdesiretounderstandwhat

makeshumans‘human’.Hume’snaturalisticapproachisthatof,whatwewouldcall

inmorecontemporarytimes,anaturalscientistandpsychologist.Hisgoalwasto

lookforthesourceofknowledge,andthesourceofmorality.But,interestingly,

Hume’ssinceritytowardsnaturalism(or,perhaps,moreaccurately,akindof

scientificmethod)makeshimacknowledgethelimitsofhumanknowledge,and

doubtoccursintherealmsthatsurpasswhatisimmediatelyknowablethrough

experience.Thismakesdoubtnatural.But,thisdoesnotmeanthatthekindof

doubtthatDescarteswasfamousfor,suchastheMethodofDoubt(Academic

Scepticism),isnatural.Naturaldoubt,forHume,isthesuspensionofbeliefdueto

thelimitsofhumancognitiveabilities(or,asGarrettreferstoit,cognitive

psychology).

147Garrett,CognitionandCommitmentinHume’sPhilosophy,199.

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Naturaldoubt,orthesuspensionofbelief,orPyrrhonianScepticismdoesnot

meanthatwecannotliveourlives—thiswouldentailamuchmoreradicalformof

scepticism.Itmeansthatwemustacceptappearancesduetothelimitednatureof

humancognition.We(humans)shouldsuspendbeliefwhenitcomestomattersthat

gobeyondourlimitedcognitiveabilities;butthisdoesnotmeanthatwecannot

makejudgements,haveknowledge,ormakemoralevaluationsbasedon

appearances.Itonlymeansthatinoursearchforthesourcesofsuchthingsas

knowledgeandmorality,forexample,wemustkeepinmindthatwearelimitedto

humanabilities(andcannotknowanythingbeyondhumanabilities).Hume’s

philosophyboilsdownto:naturalismasthemethod,knowledgeandmoralityasthe

result,andscepticismasasideeffectduetothelimitsofhumancognitiveability.

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2.Chapter2.1.Introduction TherearemanydifferentinterpretationsofHume’sphilosophy.Hehasbeen

interpretedasarealist,ananti-realist,andascepticineffortstoexplainhis

metaphysics,andreconcileitwithhisnaturalismandmoralphilosophy.148Different

approacheshavealsobeenused:fromacceptingthatthereare‘twoHumes’to

effortstoreconcilehisphilosophyascohesivetoacceptingthathisphilosophyisnot

cohesive.149ManyaspectsofHume’sphilosophyarehotlydebatedstill,242years

afterhisdeath.Itwillbemyeffortinthispapertojointhedebatesurrounding

Hume’sphilosophyinanefforttobetterunderstandHume’sphilosophyasa

cohesivewhole.InordertobetterunderstandHume’sphilosophyasacohesive

whole,Iwillneedtoaddresshismetaphysics,naturalism,andhismoralphilosophy.

IwillbeginbysupportinganunderstandingofHumeasascepticthrough

usinghiswritingsinATreatiseofHumanNature(2.2.)andAnEnquiryconcerning

HumanUnderstanding(2.3.)assupport.Afterwhich,IwilltouchonHume’sposition

concerningmoralfacts(2.4.).IwillthenmakesomequalificationsonHume’smoral

philosophy(2.5.),whichwillhelpsupportHumeanScepticismasanalternativein

themoralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate(2.6.).Finally,Iwillventuresome

thoughtsonotherpotentialimplicationsHumeanScepticism,giventhatitisan

148Humehasbeeninterpretedasarealist,ananti-realist,andascepticwithregardtohisviewsoncausation,theexternalworld,theself,andmoralfacts.149JaniHakkarainendiscussesthisbrieflyinhispaper“Hume’sScepticismandRealism”.JaniHakkarainen,“Hume’sScepticismandRealism,”BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy20,no.2(2012):283–309.

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alternativeinthemoralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate,mayhavefor

metaethicsingeneral(2.7.).

2.2.HumeanScepticisminATreatiseofHumanNature

IwillstartoffbyconsideringHume’spositiononscepticismwithregardto

theexternalworld.Therearemanywaysinwhichsomeonecanbeasceptic;they

donothavetobeaglobal,orradical,sceptic.But,Ithinkthatthefoundationformy

interpretationofHume’sscepticismstartswithhisscepticismoftheexternalworld,

andmovesforwardfromthere.Scepticismwithregardtotheexternalworldisthe

foundationformyinterpretationofHume’sscepticismforonemainreason:it

providesahelpfulframeworkforthinkingaboutscepticismasanalternativeinthe

realismandanti-realismdebate.

InHume’sinfamousBookI“OftheUnderstanding”inATreatiseofHuman

Nature,hesaysinPart4“Ofthescepticalandothersystemsofphilosophy”,Section

2“Ofscepticismwithregardtothesenses”;

[T]hescepticstillcontinuestoreasonandbelieve,eventho’heasserts,thathecannotdefendhisreasonbyreason;andbythesamerulehemustassenttotheprincipleconcerningtheexistenceofbody,tho’hecannotpretendbyanyargumentsofphilosophytomaintainitsveracity.Naturehasnotleftthistohischoice,andhasdoubtlessesteem’ditanaffairoftoogreatimportancetobetrustedtoouruncertainreasoningsandspeculations.150

Humeisaddressingscepticismwithregardtotheexternalworldinthisquote.In

myreadingoftheabovequote,Iunderstandwhatisbeingarticulatedtobeaformof

ModeratePyrrhonianScepticism.151WhileHumedoessaythatthesceptic“must

150DavidHume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,eds.DavidFateNortonandMaryJ.Norton(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),1.4.2.1(p.125).151Isay“ModeratePyrrhonianScepticism”here,thoughthiswouldjustfallunderwhatSextusEmpiricuscalls“PyrrhonianScepticism”.Iusetheword“Moderate”

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assenttotheprincipleconcerningtheexistenceofbody,”hequalifiesthisstatement

whenhesays,“tho’[thesceptic]cannotpretendbyanyargumentsofphilosophyto

maintainitsveracity.”Thescepticcannothelpbutgiveintotheappearanceofbody,

“Naturehasnotleftthisto[thesceptic’s]choice,”butthatdoesnotmeanthatthe

scepticcangiveanargumentfortheexistenceofbody(ortheReal152world).153A

ModeratePyrrhonianScepticcangiveintoappearances,solongasthey

acknowledgethattheyarejustappearancesandremainagnosticwithregardtoany

argumentfororagainsttheseappearances—since,accordingtoHume,our

“reasoningsandspeculations”concerningthissubjectareuncertain.

deliberatelyinordertodistinguishthescepticismIamreferringtofromthemoreradicalPyrrhonianScepticismofPyrrhohimself.Pyrrho,accordingtoanecdote,didnotgiveintoappearances,whichresultedinhisfollowershavingtolookafterhimsothathedidn’tdie.ThisisnotthePyrrhonianScepticismIamreferringto.Iamreferringtotheagnostic,suspensionofjudgement(epochē)kindofscepticismstartedbyPyrrho,butamoremoderateformthatacknowledgesthatonemustgiveintoappearancestolivetheirlife.152WhenIusethewordRealwithacapital“R”,Imeanmind-independentlyrealintheontologicalsense(i.e.thatsomethingexistsintheexternalworld,andisnotconstructedbymentalstatesorisnotmind-dependent).153AccordingtoHume,thescepticcannotgiveaphilosophicalargumentfortheir“assenttotheprincipleconcerningtheexistenceofbody,”thoughthisdoesnotexplicitlymeanthatthescepticmustgiveintotheappearanceoftheexternalworld.Itmeansthatwhatwenaturallygiveintoistheidea,orprinciple,oftheexternalworld(i.e.“theexistenceofbody”),thisidea,orprinciple,issomethingthatwecannothelpbutbelieving—eventhoughwecannotprovideanyphilosophical,orrational,argumentforourbelievingintheexternalworld.Itendsupbeingthecasethatthescepticgivesintoappearances,becausewhentheyreflect,orphilosophize,theybecomeawarethattheycannotgiveanargumentforwhytheythinkthattheexternalworldexists.Oncetheyhavethisrealization,theyacknowledgethatwhattheycanknowisonlythattheyhaveideas,orperceptions,oftheexternalworld,andwhattheycando,whiletheycannotgiveanargumentasforwhy,isassent(orgiveinto)theseideasorperceptions(otherwisecanbecalledappearances).

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InsupportofmyunderstandingofwhatHumesaysinthepreviousquote,we

cangobacktoBookI,Part2,Section6ofATreatiseofHumanNature(theTreatise

fromhereon),

Alikereasoningwillaccountfortheideaofexternalexistence.Wemayobserve,that’tisuniversallyallow’dbyphilosophers,andisbesidesprettyobviousofitself,thatnothingiseverreallypresentwiththemindbutitsperceptionsorimpressionsandideas,andthatexternalobjectsbecomeknowntousonlybythoseperceptionstheyoccasion.Tohate,tolove,tothink,tofeel,tosee;allisnothingbuttoperceive.Nowsincenothingiseverpresenttothemindbutperceptions,andsinceall

ideasarederiv’dfromsomethingantecedentlypresenttothemind;itfollows,that’tisimpossibleforussomuchastoconceiveorformanideaofanythingspecificallydifferentfromideasandimpressions.Letusfixourattentionoutofourselvesasmuchaspossible:Letuschaceourimaginationtotheheavens,ortotheutmostlimitsoftheuniverse;weneverreallyadvanceastepbeyondourselves,norcanconceiveanykindofexistence,butthoseperceptions,whichhaveappear’dinthatnarrowcompass.154

“Perception”canbereplaced,insomeinstances,bywhatIhavebeencalling

“appearance”tobetterunderstandtheconnectionbetweentheabovequoteandmy

descriptionofthepreviousquote.155Humestatesthatallwehaveaccessto

(“presentwiththemind”)areourperceptions,impressions,and/orideas—Iwillput

theseallundertheumbrellaoftheword“appearances”,anduse“appearances”and

“perceptions”interchangeably.156,157Therefore,ifallwehaveaccesstoareour

perceptions(appearances),theneverythingweexperienceisnothingbutperception154DavidHume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,eds.DavidFateNortonandMaryJ.Norton(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),1.2.6.7-8(p.49).155Theterm“perception”isanumbrellatermforHumethatincludesawiderangeofmentalphenomena.Theterm“appearance”isoftenmorestrictlyusedtojustrepresentphysicalobjects(forexample,torepresentinformationgainedviathesenses,sensoryimpressions).156MentalideasandimpressionsareperceptionsforHume;justasanythingperceivedviathesensesareperceptions.157“Appearances”areoftenassociatedwithsenseimpressions(perceptionsgainedviathesenses),though“appearances”canbeusedmorebroadlytohavethesamemeaningasHume’sunderstandingof“perceptions”(andareusedmorebroadlyinthecontextofAncientorPyrrhonianScepticism).

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(whetherourperceptionsbeoftheReal/externalworldorofourownemotions/

affects/thoughts/ideas).

Interestingly,partoftheabovequote,

Nowsincenothingiseverpresenttothemindbutperceptions,andsinceallideasarederiv’dfromsomethingantecedentlypresenttothemind;itfollows,that’tisimpossibleforussomuchastoconceiveorformanideaofanythingspecificallydifferentfromideasandimpressions,158

expressesadirectattackonrealism.Hume’sconclusionfromonlyperceptions

being“presenttothemind”,andsomethingcomesfromsomethingbeforeit,is

thatwecannoteventhinkofanythingexternal,ordifferent,fromthemind

(perceptions,orappearances).Wecanonlythinkofperceptions,becausewe

onlyhaveaccesstoperceptions.Thisisanattackonrealism,becausethereis

nowayforustohaveaccesstoanythingmind-independent.Forexample,the

chairthatIperceivemyselftobesittinginis,andcanonlybe,knowntome

throughmyperceptionsofit.Thereisnowayformetohaveknowledgeofthe

chairoutsideofmyownperceptions.Realismrequiressomestatementabout

mind-independenceorobjectivity,but,accordingtoHume,thereisnowayfor

ustoknowanythingbeyondthemindandthatisalwaysbiasedsincethemind

consistsofourownperceptions.

Humemakestheclaimthatperceptionsarecausedbyotherperceptions(ina

kindofantecedent-consequentrelationship),and,therefore,wecannoteventhinkof

anythingotherthanperceptions(“ideasandimpressions”).Hetriestoemphasize

hispointbyimploringustothinkabouttheheavensorthefarthestreachesofthe

universe—ourthoughtsofthesethingsarejustthat,thoughts(orperceptions).This158Hume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,1.2.6.8(p.49).

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isbecause“weneverreallyadvanceastepbeyondourselves,norcanconceiveany

kindofexistence,butthoseperceptions,whichhaveappear’dinthatnarrow

compass.”159Wearestuckwithintherealmofourperceptions(ortherealmof

appearances).Duetothis,wecannothelpbutgiveintotheseperceptions/

appearancesinordertoliveourlives.But,thatdoesnotmean,asHumesaysat

1.4.2.1.,thatwecangiveanyreasoningforthoseperceptions(concerningthe

existenceoftheexternalworld)—atleastnot“byanyargumentsofphilosophy”,by

whichItakeHumetomeanexternalarguments(ormetaphysical/ontological

arguments).160Wecannotgivethesekindsofargumentsforourperceptions,be-

causewedonothaveaccesstothem(sincetheproof/justificationforthemseemsto

bebeyondourperceptions).

At1.4.2.4.,Humesays,

Thatoursensesoffernottheirimpressionsastheimagesofsomethingdistinct,orindependent,andexternal,isevident;becausetheyconveytousnothingbutasingleperception,andnevergiveustheleastintimationofanythingbeyond.Asingleperceptioncanneverproducetheideaofadoubleexistence,butbysomeinferenceeitherofreasonorimagination.Whenthemindlooksfurtherthanwhatimmediatelyappearstoit,itsconclusionscanneverbeputtotheaccountofthesenses;anditcertainlylooksfurther,whenfromasingleperceptionitinfersadoubleexistence[…].161

By“doubleexistence”,Humeisaddressingthedistinctionbetweentheperception

itselfandtheexternalobjectthattheperceptionwas,apparently,perceivedfrom.

159DavidHume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,eds.DavidFateNortonandMaryJ.Norton(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),1.2.6.8(p.49).160SeeRudolfCarnap’spaper/chapter“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology”foradetaileddistinctionbetweeninternalandexternalquestions.RudolfCarnap,“Empiricism,Semantics,andOntology,”inMeaningandNecessity:AStudyinSemanticsandModalLogic,SecondEdition(Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1956).161Hume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,1.4.2.4(p.126).

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Theproblembeingthatoursenseimpressions(perceptionsgainedviathesenses)

donotgiveustheexistenceofboththesenseimpressionandtheexternalobject—

senseimpressionsonlygiveussenseimpressions,wedonothaveaccesstothe

externalobjectthatwehavecometobelieveindueto“reasonorimagination”.I

interpretHumetobereferringtospecifically—whenheexpressesthatno

philosophicalargumentsfortheexternalworldcanbegiven—metaphysical

argumentsthattrytoargueforsomethingbeyondourperceptions.And,thisseems

tobeafurtherattackonrealism,aswellasanattackonanti-realism.Itattacksboth,

becausebotharedogmaticinassertingsomethingabouttheexternalworldthat

Humedoesnotthinkwehaveaccessto(becausetheirassertionsarebeyondour

perceptions).Therealistassertsthatthereissomethingbeyondourperceptions

andwecanknowit,andtheanti-realistassertsthatthereisnothingbeyondour

perceptionsandwecanknowthatthereisnothingbeyondourperceptions.

ItisalsoimportanttonotethatHumeaddressestheimpressions(i.e.

perceptions)wegainfromoursensesspecifically,

Astothoseimpressions,whicharisefromthesenses,theirultimatecauseis,inmyopinion,perfectlyinexplicablebyhumanreason,and’twillalwaysbeimpossibletodecidewithcertainty,whethertheyariseimmediatelyfromtheobject,orareproduc’dbythecreativepowerofthemind,orarederiv’dfromtheauthorofourbeing.Norissuchaquestionanywaymaterialtoourpresentpurpose.Wemaydrawinferencesfromthecoherenceofourperceptions,whethertheybetrueorfalse;whethertheyrepresentnaturejustly,orbemereillusionsofthesenses.162

ItisclearthatHumeistakinganagnostic(sceptical)stancewhenitcomestowhatis

the“ultimatecause”oftheimpressions(i.e.perceptions)wegainfromthesensesin

sayingthatthe“ultimatecause”is“inexplicablebyhumanreason”—thereisno

162Ibid,1.3.5.2(p.59).

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philosophical(metaphysical)reasonwecangivetojustifytheultimatecauseofour

perceptions(thatwegainviathesenses)beingdirectlyfromtheexternalobject

itself,createdbyourmind,orcreatedby“theauthorofourbeing”(forexample,

God).Humethentakeshispositionastepfurtherbysayingthattheultimatecause

ofourperceptionsisnotimportanttoourpresentpurposes,becausewecan“draw

inferencesfromthecoherenceofourperceptions.”And,thatitdoesnotactually

matterwhetherourperceptionsaretrueorfalse,163representtheRealworld

correctly,oraremerefigmentsofourimagination(mentalthoughts/ideas).The

import-antpointisthatwecanassenttotheseperceptions(orappearances)viathe

inferenceswemake“fromthecoherenceofourperceptions”.

Humeseemstobeingsayingthatwecanmakeinferencesviathe“coherence

ofourperceptions”,andnotbotherourselveswiththeultimatecauseofour

perceptions.ForHume,itdoesnotmatterwhattheultimatecauseofour

perceptionsis,becausewehavenowayofknowingwhattheultimatecauseis.But,

thisdoesnotmeanthatwecannotmakeinferencesviathecoherence,orregularity,

ofourperceptions—thoughtheseinferenceswillnevergiveyou100%certainty.

IntheTreatise,Humemakesadistinctionbetweenphilosophyandthevulgar

(orthephilosopherandthevulgar/commonperson).Humemakesthisdistinction

163TrueorfalseinthesenseofcorrespondingtotheReal,externalworld;aswellasverifiablytrueorfalsewithrespecttothiscorrespondencetotheReal,externalworld(andwecanknow/haveaccesstowhetherourperceptionsaretrueorfalsewithrespecttothiscorrespondence).Thisdoesnotmeanthatthroughsomeothermeans,suchasthecoherence(orconstantconjunction)ofourperceptions,wecannotprovideanalternativegroundsforourperceptionsinwhichwecanassesswhethertheyaretrueorfalse.Humecanbeinterpretedassayingexactlythat:wecanassessourperceptionstobetrueorfalse(orsomeperceptionstobemoretruethanothers)withreferencetothecoherenceofsomeperceptions,forexample.

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toshowthatthephilosopherandthenon-philosopherarebothinakindoftrouble.

Thephilosophertriestogiveargumentsforbeliefs(suchasthebeliefoftheReal

existenceoftheexternalworld)thattheycannotgiveargumentsfor,whilethe

vulgar,orcommonperson,cannotgiveanyargumentsatallfortheirbeliefs.Ofthe

twopositions,Humesays,

[W]hateverconvincingargumentsphilosophersmayfancytheycanproducetoestablishbeliefofobjectsindependentofthemind,’tisobvioustheseargumentsareknownbuttoveryfew,andthat’tisnotbythem,thatchildren,peasants,andthegreatestpartofmankindareinduc’dtoattributeobjectstosomeimpressions,anddenythemtoothers.[…]Forphilosophyinformsus,thateverything,whichappearstothemind,isnothingbutaperception,andisinterrupted,anddependentonthemind;whereasthevulgarconfoundperceptionsandobjects,andattributeadistinctcontinu’dexistencetotheverythingstheyfeelorsee.[…][A]slongaswetakeourperceptionsandobjectstobethesame,wecanneverinfertheexistenceoftheonefromtheother,norformanyargumentfromtherelationofcauseandeffect;whichistheonlyonethatcanassureusofmatteroffact.Evenafterwedistinguishourperceptionsfromourobjects,’twillappearpresently,thatwearestillincapableofreasoningfromtheexistenceofonetothatoftheother:Sothatuponthewholeourreasonneitherdoes,norisitpossibleitevershou’d,uponanysupposition,giveusanassuranceofthecontinu’danddistinctexistenceofbody.ThatopinionmustbeentirelyowingtotheIMAGINATION[…].164

Alongwiththedistinctionbetweenphilosophyandthevulgar,hemakessome

interestingclaimsintheabovequote(allfromthesameparagraph).Ataninitial

glance,thetwopositions,thephilosophicalandthevulgar,arenotcompatible—

philosophyproducesarguments,whilethevulgarnaturallyconfoundperceptions

andobjectstoproducethebeliefof“adistinctcontinu’dexistence”(ofexternal

objects/theexternalworld)withoutmuchthoughttothematter.

Thevulgarposition,theconflationofperceptionsandobjects,165doesnot

allowus,accordingtoHume,todifferentiatebetweenperceptionsandobjects,or

164Ibid,1.4.2.14(p.129).165Real,externalobjects.

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giveusanargumentforcauseandeffect.Itdoesnotallowustoinfercauseand

effect,becausethevulgarviewdoesnotallowustoinfertheantecedentandthe

consequent(whichiswhatgivesuscauseandeffect,accordingtoHume).166Evenif

wecoulddistinguishbetweenperceptionsandobjects,ourreasoningislimited,and

cannotactuallygiveusanadequateargumentfor“thecontinu’danddistinct

existenceofbody”(ortheReal,externalworld).167Thephilosophicalposition,for

Hume,isnotonstronggroundseither.AsHumesays,

[W]hateverconvincingargumentsphilosophersmayfancytheycanproducetoestablishbeliefofobjectsindependentofthemind,’tisobvioustheseargumentsareknownbuttoveryfew,andthat’tisnotbythem,thatchildren,peasants,andthegreatestpartofmankindareinduc’dtoattributeobjectstosomeimpressions,anddenythemtoothers.168

Whateverargumentsphilosopherscanproduceinordertoproveexternalobjects

areknowntoveryfew;thevastmajorityofpeopletakethevulgarposition.Though,

again,thevulgarcannotprovideanyargumentsfororagainsttheirposition(ofthe

conflationofperceptionsandobjects).Boththephilosopherandthevulgarperson

areinbadpositions—botharenotjustifiedingivingarguments(evenifthe

philosopherthinkstheyare),butatleastthevulgardoesnotattempttogivean

argumentfortheirposition.

Humegoesontosay,

Nowwehavealreadyobserv’d,thathoweverphilosophersmaydistinguishbetwixttheobjectsandperceptionsofthesenses;whichtheysupposeco-existentandresembling;yetthisisadistinction,whichisnotcomprehendedbythegeneralityofmankind,whoastheyperceiveonlyonebeing,cannever

166Thinkbackto1.2.6.8(p.49).167Duedohumanreasonbeinglimited,whetheryouareeducatedasaphilosopherornot,thephilosophicalpositionandthevulgarpositionbothcannotgiveadequateargumentsfor“thecontinu’danddistinctexistenceofbody”.168Treatise,1.4.2.14(p.129).

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assenttotheopinionofadoubleexistenceandrepresentation.Thoseverysensations,whichenterbytheeyeorear,arewiththemthetrueobjects,norcantheyreadilyconceivethatthispenorpaper,whichisimmediatelyperceiv’d,representsanother,whichisdifferentfrom,butresemblingit.Inorder,therefore,toaccommodatemyselftotheirnotions,Ishallfirstsuppose,thatthereisonlyonesingleexistence,whichIshallcallindifferentlyobjectorperception,accordingasitshallseembesttosuitmypurpose,understandingbybothofthemwhatanycommonmanmeansbyahat,orshoe,orstone,oranyotherimpression,convey’dtohimbythesenses.169

Thevulgar(or“generalityofmankind”or“commonman”),canonlyconsenttotheir

impressions(orperceptions)ofexternalobjects.Thevulgarcannotdistinguishbe-

tweenanexternalobjectandtheirperceptionofthatobject,andcannotgivean

explanationastotheconnectionbetweensaidexternalobjectandtheirperception

ofit.Thismeansthatthevulgarpersongivesintoappearance.But,givinginto

appearancesdoesnotmeanthatonecangiveanexplanationandsodoesnotassert

knowledgeofthecauseoftheperception.ThisisstillaformofModerate

PyrrhonianScepticismthatHumeisarticulatinghereforthevulgarposition—itis

justthatthevulgarpersondoesnotrealisethattheyaregivingintoappearancesto

livetheirlives.170

Returningbacktothephilosophicalposition,Humewrites,

Therearenoprincipleseitheroftheunderstandingorfancy,whichleadusdirectlytoembracethisopinionofthedoubleexistenceofperceptionsandobjects,norcanwearriveatitbutbypassingthro’thecommonhypothesisoftheidentityandcontinuanceofourinterruptedperceptions.Werewenotfirstpersuaded,thatourperceptionsareouronlyobjects,andcontinuetoexistevenwhentheynolongermaketheirappearancetothesenses,weshou’dneverbe

169Ibid,1.4.2.31(p.134).170Thevulgarpersongivesintoappearancewithoutargumentationorexplanation,whichiswhattheModeratePyrrhonianScepticdoes.TheonlydifferencebetweenthevulgarpersonandtheModeratePyrrhonianScepticisthattheModeratePyrrhonianScepticrealizesthattheygiveintoappearance,becausetheyhavereflectedandacknowledgethattheycannotgiveanargumentfortheirbeliefintheappearanceoftheexternalworld.Itisanappearanceofanexternalworld,becausetheyonlycanknowtheirperceptions(andperceptionsareappearances).

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ledtothink,thatourperceptionsandobjectsaredifferent,andthatourobjectsalonepreserveacontinu’dexistence.171

Thephilosophicalpositionisactuallyinaworsesituationthanthevulgarposition,

becauseitstartsfromthevulgarpositionandthentriestogiveanargumentforthe

separateexistenceofperceptionsandobjects.Thephilosophicalpositionstartsoff

fromthevulgarposition,becauseeveryonestartsfromthesameposition:unableto

distinguishbetweenexternalobjectsandtheirperceptionsofthem.But,thevulgar

positionstopsthere,itdoesnottrytogiveanargumentfortheexistenceofexternal

objects.Wherethephilosophicalpositiongoeswrongisintryingtogivearguments

fortheexistenceofexternalobjects—andHumedoesnotthinkthatsucharguments

canrationallybegiven.Thevulgarmaynotbeabletogiveanargumentfortheir

position,butthisisactuallybetter,atleasttoHume,becauseinnotgivingprinciples

(orproof)theyalsodonotmakeupsomethingthatisnotfoundedonproperreason

(asHumeaccusesphilosophersofdoing).

ItactuallyappearsasthoughHumeisarguingagainstrealisminhisargument

againstthephilosophicalposition.Directlyaftertheabovequote,Humecontinues

hisargumentagainstthephilosophicalposition,

Astothefirstpartoftheproposition,thatthisphilosophicalhypothesishasnoprimaryrecommendation,eithertoreasonortotheimagination,wemaysoonsatisfyourselveswithregardtoreasonbythefollowingreflections.Theonlyexistences,ofwhichwearecertain,areperceptions,whichbeingimmediatelypresenttousbyconsciousness,commandourstrongestassent,andarethefirstfoundationofallourconclusions.Theonlyconclusionwecandrawfromtheexistenceofonethingtothatofanother,isbymeansoftherelationofcauseandeffect,whichshows,thatthereisaconnexionbetwixtthem,andthattheexistenceofoneisdependentonthatoftheother.Theideaofthisrelationisderiv’dfrompastexperience,bywhichwefind,thattwobeingsareconstantlyconjoin’dtogether,andarealwayspresentatoncetothemind.Butasnobeingsareeverpresenttothemindbutperceptions;itfollowsthatwemayobservea

171Ibid,1.4.2.46(p.140).

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conjunctionorarelationofcauseandeffectbetwixtdifferentperceptions,butcanneverobserveitbetwixtperceptionsandobjects.172

Atthispoint,Humemovesawayfromexplicitlytalkingaboutthescepticismwith

regardtotheexternalworld,andmovesmoretowardsscepticismwithregardto

causation.Itisimplicitlyaboutscepticismwithregardtotheexternalworld,

becauseitisnotthatHumedoubtsthatthereiscausation;hedoubtsthatwecan

knowcausationotherthanfromthe‘constantconjunction’ofcauseandeffect.

Humere-emphasizesthatwecanonlybecertainoftheexistenceofperceptions.

Thisisknowledgeonaninternallevel,andstatesnothingontologicalaboutthe

externalworld.Wecaninferfromcauseandeffecttheexistenceofonethingto

another,butsincethisisbasedonpastexperience(ofconstantconjunction),andall

pastexperienceisbasedonperception,allthisgivesusistheexistenceofone

perceptiontotheexistenceofanotherperception—nottheexistenceofaperception

totheexistenceofanexternalobject.ForHume,youcannotjumpfromexperiencing

theperceptionsofseeingapenfalloffadeskontothegroundtostatingthatthepen

Reallyexistsjustbecauseyouexperiencedperceptionsofit.Throughseeingthepen

falloffthedeskmultipletimes(theeffect),perhapsyoucaninferthatthereisaforce

actinguponthepen(thecause)—butyoucannotgiveanargumentoranaccountas

towhatisbeyondyourperceptionsintheexternalworld(theultimate,Realorigin

ofthecause).So,whileyoucaninfer,basedonyourperceptions,acauseandan

effect,thatcauseandthateffectarestillonlywithinyourperceptions.

Thisseemstobeanargumentagainsttherealistposition,becauseitargues

thatwearenotfounded,byreason,toasserttheexistenceofexternalobjects—and172Ibid,1.4.2.47(pp.140-141).

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mostrealistsrequirecognitivism(thataclaimcanbetrueorfalse,andsomeclaims

canbeverifiedastrue),whichgenerallyrequiresbeingabletoverifythetruthor

falsityofsomethingagainsttheRealworld.IfweneverhaveaccesstotheReal,

externalworldandallwehaveaccesstoareourperceptions,thisseemstostate

that,intheveryleast,realismisnotbasedonreasonforHume.Ifrealismisnot

basedonreason,thenitisanirrationalpositiontohold.Intheveryleast,the

burdenofproofisontherealisttoproveaReal,externalworld,andhowwe

(humans)haveaccesstoit(i.e.canacquireknowledgebeyondourperceptions).

Itwouldseemthatsinceallwehaveareourperceptions,wemustrelyon

inference(notcertainty),andthatwecannothelpbutliveourlivesbywayof

appearancesthatHume’spositionisanagnosticpositionwhenitcomestotheReal

world.173ItisagnosticinthesenseofModeratePyrrhonianScepticism,andisa

formofscepticisminrelationtometaphysics—morespecificallyontology.Hume

doesnotthinkthatwecanassertanythingabouttheRealworld(i.e.external

objects).ThislackofabilitytorationallyconstructanargumentfortheRealworld

under-minesanydogmaticposition174towardstheRealworld.Itdoesso,because

therealistcannotrationallyargueforexternalobjectsoutofonlyperceptionsand

theanti-realistcannotassertanythingalongthelinesthatourperceptionsdonot

matchtheRealworld(becausetheycannotknowthateitherfromonlyperceptions).173Hume’spositionisagnostic,orsceptical,becauseassertingthatwecanhaveknowledgebeyondourperceptionsisnotrationalforHume.Wehavelimitedknowledgebasedonexperiencegainedthroughperceptions(whichdonotgiveusdirectaccesstotheexternalworldbeyondourperceptions).Theagnostic,orsceptical,positiondoesnotproveordisproverealismoranti-realism.But,itdoestrytoshowthatassertinganythingdogmatic(viarealismoranti-realism)isnotbasedonanythingwehaveaccessto,andisnotrational.174Dogmaticpositionsreferringtoarealistoranti-realistposition.

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Theonlyrationalpositionisthescepticalposition,becauseitdoesnottryto

overstepitsbounds.

HefurthersupportsthathisunderstandingoftheReal,externalworldis

understoodthroughascepticallenstowardstheendofBookI,Part4,Section2;

Ibegunthissubjectwithpremising,thatweoughttohaveanimplicitfaithinoursenses,andthatthiswou’dbetheconclusion,Ishou’ddrawfromthewholeofmyreasoning.Buttobeingenuous,Ifeelmyselfatpresentofaquitecontrarysentiment,andammoreinclin’dtoreposenofaithatallinmysenses,orratherimagination,thantoplaceinitsuchanimplicitconfidence.Icannotconceivehowsuchtrivialqualitiesofthefancy,conductedbysuchfalsesuppositions,caneverleadtoanysolidandrationalsystem.Theyarethecoherenceandconstancyofourperceptions,whichproducetheopinionoftheircontinu’dexistence;tho’thesequalitiesofperceptionshavenoperceivableconnexionwithsuchanexistence.175

Humestatesthathehasnofaithinhissenses,andItakethistomeanthathehasno

faiththathissensesgivehimknowledgeoftheexternalworld.Hissensesgivehim

perceptions,andperceptionsmaybeaccurateornot—wecannotknow,atleastnot

ontologically(withreferencetotheexternalworld).Anyphilosophicaltheoryor

systembasedonfalseattributionstotheexternalworldisnotmetaphysically

foundedandnotrational.Itistheregularityofourperceptionsthatgiveusour

understandingofthecontinuedexistenceofexternalobjects,thoughwehaveno

wayviaourperceptionstoprovethecontinuedexistenceofexternalobjects.

Though,Humedoesindicatethatpeoplewilloscillatebetweendifferentpositionson

theReal,externalworld,butsays,“Carelessnessandin-attentionalonecanaffordus

anyremedy.”176Itakethistomeanthatthevulgar,orcommon,positionistheonly

easyanswertoontologicalproblems.Thevulgarpositionallowsustoassentto

175Ibid,1.4.2.56(pp.143-144).176Ibid,1.4.2.57(p.144).

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appearanceswithoutargument,andliveourlives.Eventhough,thevulgarposition

isnotanymorerationalthanthephilosophicalposition,exceptthatthevulgar

positiondoesnotattempttogivephilosophical,ormetaphysical,argumentsforthe

externalworld(whichredeemsthevulgarpositioninthatthevulgarpositiondoes

nottrytoargueforthingsbeyondanyhuman’scognitiveabilityoranyhuman’s

accesstoknowledgeviaperceptions).

2.3.HumeanScepticisminAnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding

AtthebeginningofSectionXII“OftheAcademicorScepticalPhilosophy”,

HumeaddressesAcademicScepticism,andDescartes’MethodofDoubt.Humedoes

notthinkthatAcademicScepticism,orradicaldoubt,isfeasible,becausehedoesnot

thinkthatitispossibleviaachainofreasoningtodeduceanyfirstorfoundational

principlethatisnot“fallaciousordeceitful”(sincealltheotherprinciplesappearto

be“fallaciousordeceitful”).177Ifyouaregoingtodoubtalmostallyourprinciples,

whywouldyounotalsodoubtyourfoundationalprinciple(s)?Ifyoucandoubtmost

things,wheredoesthedoubtstop?AsHumesays,

TheCartesiandoubt,therefore,wereiteverpossibletobeattainedbyanyhumancreature(asitplainlyisnot)wouldbeentirelyincurable;andnoreasoningcouldeverbringustoastateofassuranceandconvictionuponanysubject.178

Thiskindofradicaldoubtis“incurable”,andtherewouldbenowaytoknowany-

thing—noteveninternally.179But,weneedtobecarefulwhenconsideringthis

criticismofAcademicScepticism,orradicaldoubt,becausethiscriticismdoesnot

177DavidHume,AnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding,ed.PeterMillican(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),12.3(p.109).178Ibid.179“Internally”hereismeanttobeunderstoodintheCarnapiansenseof“internal”.

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meanthatHumeiscriticizingallformsofscepticism.Humecanstillbeopentothe

ideaofPyrrhonianScepticism,though,aswe’llsee,heendorsesModerate

PyrrhonianScepticism.Humeshowsapprehensiontowardsanykindofradical

philosophythroughoutthewholeofAnEnquiryconcerningHumanUnderstanding

(referredtoastheFirstEnquiryfromhereon).

Humewritesthat,accordingtothecommonorvulgarposition,peopleare

boundtoassumethattheexternalworld“wouldexist,thoughweandeverysensible

creaturewereabsentorannihilated;”180and

philosophy,[…]teachesus,thatnothingcaneverbepresenttothemindbutanimageorperception,andthatthesensesareonlytheinlets,throughwhichtheseimagesareconveyed,withoutbeingabletoproduceanyimmediateintercoursebetweenthemindandtheobject.181

PhilosophyappearsatconflictwiththecommonopinionatthispointintheFirst

Enquiry,becauseitgoesbeyondbeingboundtothinksomethingandattemptsto

giveanexplanationforsomethingthatitcannotactuallyexplain.But,then,Hume

goesontosay,

But[…]philosophyfindsherselfextremelyembarrassed,whenshewouldjustifythisnewsystem,andobviatethecavilsandobjectionsofthesceptics.Shecannolongerpleadinfallibleandirresistibleinstinctofnature:Forthatledustoaquitedifferentsystem,whichisacknowledgedfallibleandevenerroneous.Andtojustifythispretendedphilosophicalsystem,bychainofclearconvincingargument,orevenanyappearanceofargument,exceedsthepowerofallhumancapacity.182

Theproblemforphilosophyariseswhenittriestojustifyitselfby“chainofclear

convincingargument”,becausethisisbeyondthehumancapacityforreason(we

cannotgetoutsideofourselves,ortracebacktoanyfoundationalprinciple,toseeif

180Ibid,12.7(p.110).181Ibid,12.9(p.111).182Ibid,12.10(p.111).

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ourchainofreasoningiscorrect).183Thisiswhythephilosophermustendorsethe

scepticalposition,orfallbackintothecommon,orvulgar,position.Thephilosopher

mustendorsescepticismorfallbackintothevulgarpositionduetoalackof

grounding184foranydogmaticposition.Thescepticalposition,meaningthe

agnosticposit-ionrecognizesthatwecannotgiveametaphysicalargumentforthe

externalworld/basisofourperceptions,whilethevulgarpositiondoesnoteventry

togiveametaphysicalargument.

Thephilosophicalposition,whenascepticalphilosophicalposition,isnotin

conflictwiththecommon/vulgaropinion,becauseneitherattempttogivea

metaphysicalargumentfortheexistenceoftheexternalworld.Hume’ssceptical

approachisarticulatedinSectionXII,PartI,Paragraph12ofhisFirstEnquiry,

Itisaquestionoffact,whethertheperceptionsofthesensesbeproducedbyexternalobjects,resembling:Howshallthisquestionbedetermined?Byexperiencesurely;asallotherquestionsofalikenature.Buthereexperienceis,andmustbeentirelysilent.Themindhasneveranythingpresenttoitbuttheperceptions,andcannotpossiblyreachanyexperienceoftheirconnexionwithobjects.Thesuppositionofsuchaconnexionis,therefore,withoutfoundationinreasoning.185

Whileweperceivethe‘external’worldviaoursenses,weneverperceivethe

connectionbetweenourperceptionsandtheexternalworld.And,so,noaccount,

noteventhroughexperience,cangiveusanargumentorfoundation,becauseallwe

183ThisbothsupportsthecriticismfoundintheTreatisethatwecannotgetbeyondourperceptions,butitalsoisacriticismagainstAcademicScepticismintheformofCartesianScepticism/Doubt.ItendsupbeingacriticismofCartesianScepticism/Doubt,becauseCartesianScepticism/Doubtendsupbeingdogmaticinthatittriestoassertafoundationalprinciplethatwesomehowknowwithcertainty.Humedoesnotlikeanydogmaticphilosophythatoverstepsitsbounds,andtriestoassertthingsthatarebeyondwhathumanbeingscanknowviasolelyperceptions.184Bygrounding,Imeanphilosophical,ormetaphysical,argument.185Ibid,12.12(p.112).

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perceiveareourperceptions—andnottheconnectionbetweenourperceptionsand

theexternalworld.Nomatterhowmanytimesweperceiveabookthatweownor

thepenthatweliketouse,weneverperceivetheconnectionbetweenour

perceptionofthatbookorpen,andtheRealbookorpen.Allwehaveaccesstois

ourperception(s)ofthatbookorpen.Experiencecanhelpusmakeinferences,like

thatofcauseandeffect,butitcannotgiveusanexplanationforanyconnection

betweenperceptionandtheRealworld.Thisassertionthatwecannotgivean

explanationorargumentorproofofanysortdoesnotmeanthattheconnectionmay

notbethere.Itmeansthatwemustnotmakeanargumentforsomethingthatis

outsideofour[human]reasoning.Therefore,Paragraph12assertsanagnostic,or

Pyrrhonian,formofscepticism.186

Hume,interestingly,giveswhatlookslikeaseriouschallenge,onthefaceof

it,toPyrrhonianScepticisminSectionXIIoftheFirstEnquiry—whichcouldbeone

ofthereasonswhysomepeopledonotinterpretHumeasasceptic.Hesays,

ThegreatsubverterofPyrrhonismortheexcessiveprinciplesofscepticism,isaction,andemployment,andtheoccupationsofcommonlife.[Sceptic]principlesmayflourishandtriumphintheschools;whereitis,indeed,difficult,ifnotimpossible,torefutethem.Butassoonastheyleavetheshade,andbythepresenceoftherealobjects,whichactuateourpassionsandsentiments,areputinoppositiontothemorepowerfulprinciplesofournature,theyvanishlikesmoke,andleavethemostdeterminedscepticinthesameconditionasothermortals.187

186Paragraph12doesnotassertananti-realistposition,becausetheanti-realistpositionstilltriestoassertsomethingtoomuchabouttheexternalworld—forexample,thatweknowthatourperceptionsarenotproducedbytheexternalworld.ForHume,reasondoesnotsupportanyclaim,positiveornegative,abouttheRealexistenceoftheexternalworld.,and,therefore,wecannotsayanythingaboutitorgiveanymetaphysicalargumentforsuchdogmaticclaims.187Ibid,12.21(pp.115-116).

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IthinkitisimportanttoclarifythatHumeisreferringtoexcessive,orradical,

Pyrrhonism,morealongthelinesofwhatPyrrhohimselfwasreportedtopractice.

CommonlifetakesoverevenforthosewhoendorseradicalPyrrhonianScepticism,

whethertheylikeitornot.Theyhavetoassenttosomeperceptions,forexample,or

theydie.188And,so,Hume’schallengetoradicalPyrrhonismmakesagoodpoint

thatisdifficulttorefute.

Though,thisdoesnotmeanthatHumeisnotstillasceptic.AsIsaidbefore,

Humedoesnotseemtohavelikedanykindofradicalopinion;thisincludesradical

scepticalopinion.HumehighlightsthatradicalPyrrhonismisnotviable,whilealso

highlightingthatcommonpeoplestillcannotjustifytheirbeliefs:

When[theradicalPyrrhonianSceptic]awakesfromhisdream,hewillbethefirsttojoininthelaughagainsthimself,andtoconfess,thatallhisobjectionsaremereamusement,andcanhavenoothertendencythantoshowthewhimsicalconditionofmankind,whomustactandreasonandbelieve;thoughtheyarenotable,bytheirmostdiligentenquiry,tosatisfythemselvesconcerningthefoundationoftheseoperations,ortoremovetheobjections,whichmayberaisedagainstthem.189

Mankind,orbothcommonpeopleandphilosophers,cannotjustify“thefoundation

of[their]operations,”andsoendupinamoderatescepticalposition:theycannot

justifytheRealworld,theymustjustassenttoappearances(i.e.perceptions)and

livetheirlives.

This“mitigatedscepticism,”accordingtoHume,can“bebothdurableand

useful.”190Itisusefulbecauseitshowsthat

188Likeeatinganddrinkingduetohungerandthirst,orthecommonbeliefthatyouarealivesinceyouareperceivingandexperiencing(suchasyouarehungryorthirstyandneedthesethingstocontinuebeingalive).189Ibid,12.23(p.117).190Ibid,12.24(p.117).

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[t]heilliteratemayreflectonthedispositionofthelearned,who,amidstalltheadvantagesofstudyandreflection,arecommonlystilldifferentintheirdeterminations:Andifanyofthelearnedbeinclined,fromtheirnaturaltemper,tohaughtinessandobstinacy,asmalltinctureofPYRRHONISMmightabatetheirpride,byshewingthem,thatthefewadvantages,whichtheymayhaveattainedovertheirfellows,arebutinconsiderable,ifcomparedwiththeuniversalperplexityandconfusion,whichisinherentinhumannature.Ingeneral,thereisadegreeofdoubt,andcaution,andmodesty,which,inallkindsofscrutinyanddecision,oughtforevertoaccompanyajustreasoner.191

Thisharkensbacktothephilosopherandthecommonpeople.Though,the

philosopheriseducated,thisdoesnotmeanthattheyareinapositionthatisany

betterthanthecommonperson.“[A]smalltinctureofPYRRHONISM”canshowthe

educatedthattheyarenotanybetteroffthantheuneducated.Noneofuscan

explainorgiveanargumentfortheconnectionbetweenourperceptionsandthe

externalworld—wecannotstepoutsideofourperceptionstoreceivesomespecial

knowledge.Weareallonthesameplayingfield.Whilethecommonperson

automaticallydoesnotattempttogiveanexplanationofhowourperceptions

correlatetotheexternalworld(ornot),theeducatedperson(thephilosopher)

requiresModeratePyrrhonianScepticisminordertounderstandthattheycannot

giveanexplanationofhowourperceptionscorrelatetotheexternalworld(ornot).

TowardstheendofSectionXII,Humewrites,

Theexistence,therefore,ofanybeingcanonlybeprovedbyargumentsfromitscauseoritseffect;andtheseargumentsarefoundedentirelyonexperience.Ifwereasonàpriori,anythingmayappearabletoproduceanything.Thefallingofapebblemay,foroughtweknow,extinguishthesun;orthewishofamancontroultheplanetsintheirorbits.Itisonlyexperience,whichteachesusthenatureandboundsofcauseandeffect,andenablesustoinfertheexistenceofoneobjectfromthatofanother.192

191Ibid,12.24(pp.117-118).192Ibid,12.29(pp.119-120).

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Thisisagainaboutcauseandeffect,andagainhasitsrootsinHume’sscepticism

abouttheexternalworld.Howwegainknowledgeofcauseandeffectispurely

throughexperience,andnotthroughhavingdirectaccesstotheexternalworld.

Experienceisgainedthroughperception,andthereforeanyexistenceweperceiveis

basedonperception.Wecannotreasonaprioriabouttheexistenceofexternal

objects,likeDescarteswouldhaveusattempt,becausethatwillleadusdowna

worseroad.Wecannotrelyonanyultimatecauseorfirstprinciple(s),becausewe

havenowayofaccessing/knowingthem.

2.4.Hume’sMoralPhilosophy

Thepurposeofmorality,forHume,issocialinconstitution.Moralfacts(or

claimsorpropositions)areasetofrules(orlaws)tolivebywithinagivensociety.

Theontologicalstatusofmoralfacts(orclaimsorpropositions)issimilartothe

statusofnaturalfactswithinHume’sphilosophy.Arguably,Humeespousesatypeof

consequentialism,morespecificallyatypeofindirectconsequentialism,inhisAn

EnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals(IwillalsorefertoitastheSecond

Enquiry).193And,so,tobeginwith,Iwillgivebriefdefinitionsofconsequentialism

andindirectconsequentialismbeforeoutliningmyinterpretationofHume’smoral

philosophy.

WalterSinnott-ArmstrongintheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophyarticle

titled“Consequentialism”,definesconsequentialismasfollows,

193Istartmysentenceoffwith“arguably”,becausethereisnoconsensusonwhetherHumewasanykindofconsequentialist.IamreadingHumeasaconsequentialist,becauseithelpsfurthermypurposeofusingmyspecificinterpretationofHumetogiveanalternativeoptioninthemoralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate.

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Consequentialism,asitsnamesuggests,istheviewthatnormativepropertiesdependonlyonconsequences.Thisgeneralapproachcanbeappliedatdifferentlevelstodifferentnormativepropertiesofdifferentkindsofthings,butthemostprominentexampleisconsequentialismaboutthemoralrightnessofacts,whichholdsthatwhetheranactismorallyrightdependsonlyontheconsequencesofthatactorofsomethingrelatedtothatact,suchasthemotivebehindtheactorageneralrulerequiringactsofthesamekind.194

Theemphasisinconsequentialismisontheconsequencesofanaction,andlikein

mostformsofconsequentialism,theactitselfhasonlyinstrumentalvalue,whereas

desirableconsequenceshaveintrinsicvalue(thevaluethatultimatelyjustifiesthe

actwithsuchconsequences).Thisputsanemphasisonutility(insofarasactsare

concerned),becauseifanactisnotusefulinbringingaboutacertainend—thenit

hasnovaluewithinaconsequentialistframework.Underthebroaderheadingof

consequentialism,thereareanumberofdifferentforms.Oneoftheseformsof

consequentialismissomethingcalledindirectconsequentialism,andSinnott-

Armstrongsaysthat

anindirectconsequentialistholdsthatthemoralqualitiesofsomethingdependontheconsequencesofsomethingelse.[…]Themostcommonindirectconsequentialismisruleconsequentialism,whichmakesthemoralrightnessofanactdependontheconsequencesofarule.195

Therefore,underindirectconsequentialism,theconsequencesarenotjust

dependentontheact,butonsomethingelseoutsideoftheact(thatinfluencesthe

consequencesoftheact).Astheabovequotesays,ruleconsequentialismisthemost

commonformofindirectconsequentialism.Ruleconsequentialismtriestoassess

thedifferentconsequencesofdifferentsetsofrules(intermsoftheimpact(s)of

194WalterSinnott-Armstrong,"Consequentialism",TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,ed.EdwardN.Zalta(Winter2015Edition),accessedonMay29th,2018,https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/consequentialism/.195Ibid.

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possiblesystemsofrules),andtheconsequencesofanactare,therefore,dependent

onasetofrules(orlaws).Thissetofrulesischosenbythesocietyitgoverns,andis

whatmakestheact(andtheconsequencesthatfollow)morallyrightorwrong.The

goalofconsequentialism,ingeneral,istoproduceoptimalconsequences.Oftenthis

getstranslated,asitdoesinutilitarianism,asanact(whethergovernedbyrulesor

not)needstoproducethemosthappinessorpleasureforthesociety.Themost

happiness,orpleasure,isthemostdesirableconsequence.196

IdothinkthatHumeexpressesakindofindirectconsequentialisminthe

SecondEnquiry.197Preparingus,thereaders,attheendoftheFirstEnquiryforthe

SecondEnquiry,Humesays,

Itisonlyexperience,whichteachesusthenatureandboundsofcauseandeffect,andenablesustoinfertheexistenceofoneobjectfromthatofanother.Suchisthefoundationofmoralreasoning,whichformsthegreaterpartofhumanknowledge,andisthesourceofallhumanactionandbehaviour.198

IthinkitisimportanttonoteherethatIthinkthatHume’sconsequentialismis

dependentonhisunderstandingofmetaphysics(whichhisunderstandingof

perceptionsandtheirroleinourunderstandinginhowweknowtheexternalworld

196Forexample,itcouldbearguedthat,forHume,theoverallhappiness,orpleasure,ofagivensocietyisthemostdesirableconsequence.Inaddition,itcouldfurtherbearguedthatHumeeithermeansthistobeappliedtoaparticularsociety(eachsocietycouldhavethesamegoalofhappiness,buttheformulationcouldbeslightlydifferentineachseparatesociety)ortothewholeofthehumanspecies(orfuturehumanity).197Though,consequentialismisa,potentially,problematictermtorefertoHume’snormativemoralphilosophyas,becauseitisatermthatcameafterHumewasalive.198FirstEnquiry,12.29(p.120).

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isalsobasedon).Experienceisthefoundationofmoralreasoning,andtherefore

moralreasoningisintherealmofmattersoffact(notrelationsofideas).199

Incontemporarymoralphilosophy,wetendtoseparatenormativemoral

theoriesfrommetaphysics(ormetaethics),butIdonotthinkthatissoeasilydone

inHume’sphilosophy.200Hume’sprojectintheTreatise,aswellasintheFirst

EnquiryandSecondEnquiry,istogiveacomprehensiveunderstandingofphilosophy

(especiallythephilosophicalissuesthatwereprominentduringhistime).Todo

this,hebeginswithmetaphysics(i.e.theexternalworld,andhowwecometo

associateourperceptionswithexternalobjects),andusesthisasabasistobuild

bothhisnaturalismandmoralphilosophyon.

ItwillbemygoalinthissectiontogiveanarticulationofHume’smoral

philosophy.MyultimategoalinthispaperistoshowthatHumeisconsistent

throughhisunderstandingofmetaphysics(i.e.thatheisaModeratePyrrhonian

Scepticwhenitcomestometaphysics),andhisunderstandingofmoralphilosophy

inordertogiveanalternativepositioninthemoralrealismandmoralanti-realism

debate.Hismoralphilosophycannotbeunderstoodwithoutunderstandinghis

metaphysicalpositionthatunderpinsthemboth.Therefore,Hume’smoral

philosophycannotonlybeunderstoodthroughanormativelens,butmustalsobe

understoodthroughametaethical201lensaswell(sinceitsunderpinningsaremore

199Isaynotintherealmofrelationsofideas,becauserelationsofideasareaprioriforHume.Mattersoffactarebasedinexperience,andexperience“isthefoundationofmoralreasoning.”200Or,inanyone’sphilosophywhoistryingtogiveacomprehensiveandwholeanalysisofmostofthemajorareaswithinphilosophy.201Definitionofmetaethics:“Thesecond-orderactivityofinvestigatingtheconceptsofmethodsofethics,ratherthandirectlyengagingwithpractical(‘first-order’)

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abstract).Morality,forHume,isdefinitelywithinthepracticaldomain,butits

foundationinmetaphysicsistheoretical.

InSection1“OftheGeneralPrinciplesofMorals”oftheSecondEnquiry,Hume

laysoutthemetaethicaldebatethatheissituatinghimselfwithinasfollows,

Therehasbeenacontroversystartedoflate,muchbetterworthexamination,concerningthegeneralfoundationofMORALS;whethertheybederivedfromREASON,orfromSENTIMENT;whetherweattaintheknowledgeofthembyachainofargumentandinduction,orbyanimmediatefeelingandfinerinternalsense;whether,likeallsoundjudgmentoftruthandfalsehood,theyshouldbethesametoeveryrationalintelligentbeing;orwhether,liketheperceptionofbeautyanddeformity,theybefoundedentirelyontheparticularfabricandconstitutionofthehumanspecies.202

ThedebatethatHumeislayingoutisametaethicaldebate:howmoralsareformed,

orwhatthesourceofmoralityis.Hepositionshimselfwithinthemetaethical

debatebeforegoingontoarticulatehisnormativemoraltheorybasedonhis

positionwithinthemetaethicaldebate.

Moralphilosophyhasoneaim,andtwomainaspectsforHume.Itsaim“isto

teachusourduty;and,byproperrepresentationsofthedeformityofviceand

beautyofvirtue,begetcorrespondinghabits,andengageustoavoidtheoneand

embracetheother.”203Thisaimisachievedbytheunderstanding,andbythe

affections(oremotions/passions).InsupportofthisHumesays,

[Inferencesandconclusionsoftheunderstanding]discovertruths:Butwherethetruthswhichtheydiscoverareindifferent,andbegetnodesireoraversion.

issuesofwhattodoandhowtobehave.Thedistinctionisapttoblur,inthatdifferentviewsaboutthestructureofethicsusuallyhaveimplicationsforthefirst-orderdecisionmaking.”SimonBlackburn,“metaethics,”intheOxfordDictionaryofPhilosophy,ThirdEdition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),302.202DavidHume,AnEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals,ed.TomL.Beauchamp(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),1.3(pp.73-74).203Ibid,1.7(p.75).

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Theycanhavenoinfluenceonconductandbehaviour.Whatishonourable,whatisfair,whatisbecoming,whatisnoble,whatisgenerous,takespossessionoftheheart,andanimatesustoembraceandmaintainit.Whatisintelligent,whatisevident,whatisprobable,whatistrue,procuresonlycoolassentoftheunderstanding;andgratifyingaspeculativecuriosity,putsanendtoourresearches.204

Aftersayingthis,Humegoessofarastosay,intheSecondEnquiryat1.8,thattoget

ridoftheaffections,astheypertaintomorality,wouldmakemorality“nolongera

practicalstudy,nor[have]anytendencytoregulateourlivesandactions.”205Then,

at1.9oftheSecondEnquiry,Humemakesthestrongclaimthat“reasonand

sentimentconcurinalmostallmoraldeterminationsandconclusions.”206Hegoeson

toexplainin1.9howreason(theunderstanding)andsentiment(affections)both

playaroleinmorality,andinvestigatingthisistheoverarchingfocusoftheSecond

Enquiry.

Inhissearchfortherolesthatreasonandsentimentplayinmorality,Hume

saysthatthereisoneprinciple,aconsequentialistprinciple,thatmoralityisguided

by,andthatprincipleisutility.207Inregardtothisprincipleofutility,Humewrites,

Inalldeterminationsofmorality,thiscircumstanceofpublicutilityiseverprincipallyinview;andwhereverdisputesarise,thequestioncannot,byanymeans,bedecidedwithgreatercertainty,thanbyascertaining,onanyside,thetrueinterestsofmankind.Ifanyfalseopinion,embracedfromappearances,hasbeenfoundtoprevail;assoonasfartherexperienceandsounderreasoninghavegivenusjusternotionsofhumanaffairs;weretractourfirstsentiment,andadjustanewtheboundariesofmoralgoodandevil.208

204Ibid.205Ibid,1.8(p.75).206Ibid,1.9(p.75).207Notallofmoralityisguidedbythisprinciple,forexample,religiousformsofmoralityarenot,butHumethinksthatarationalsystemofmoralityshouldbeguidedbyit.208Hume,SecondEnquiry,2.17(p.81).

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MoralityforHumeisnotunchanging,andisbasedonexperience.Weneedto

experiencemultiplecasesofmoralitytobeabletomakeinferencespertainingtothe

goodorevilofaparticularmoralactorfact(i.e.claim),andthemoreexperienceswe

havethebetter(astheyinformourinferences).Givennewexperiences,wecan

changeourinferencesconcerningwhetheraparticularactorfactisgoodorevil.

And,theprinciplethatguidesourinferences(thatwemakeviaexperiences)is

verifyingbasedonwhetheranactorfactisgoodorevilthroughitspublicutility.

ToreiteratewhatIsaidtowardsthebeginningofthissection:

consequentialismemphasizestheconsequencesofanact,theactitselfisnotso

muchimportantastheconsequencesorendsthatitbringsabout.Thisputsan

emphasisonutility,becauseifanactisnotusefulinbringingaboutacertainends—

thenithasnoutilitywithinaconsequentialistframework.Theconsequencesofany

moralaction,forHume,areweighedinlightoftheirpublicutilitywithinasociety.If

experienceshowsus[withinthesociety]thataparticularactionisnolongergoodin

accordancewithpublicutility,thenwecanchangeourguidelineswithrespectto

suchactions.

Humebasesthevalueofhistwomainvirtuesforthebettermentofsociety,

benevolenceandjustice,onpublicutility.But,Humedoesnotmeanvirtueinthe

moretraditionalvirtueethics,orAristotelian,understandingofvirtue.Avirtuefor

Humeisavirtueonlybecauseitisusefulinhelpingtocreateoverallhappiness

withinasociety.Humesaysat2.22oftheSecondEnquiry,

[It]seemsundeniable,thatnothingcanbestowmoremeritonanyhumancreaturethanthesentimentofbenevolenceinaneminentdegree;andthata

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part,atleast,ofitsmeritarisesfromitstendencytopromotetheinterestsofourspecies,andbestowhappinessonhumansociety.209

Benevolenceisavirtue,becauseofitsutility;itisusefulinpromotingtheinterests

andhappinessof“humansociety”.Humegoesontosayofjusticeat3.1,

Thatjusticeisusefultosociety,andconsequentlythatpartofitsmerit,atleast,mustarisefromthatconsideration,itwouldbeasuperfluousundertakingtoprove.Thatpublicutilityisthesoleoriginofjustice,andthatreflectionsonthebeneficialconsequencesofthisvirtuearethesolefoundationofitsmerit[…].210

Humeagainstressespublicutility.Justiceisonlyavirtue(orvaluable),becauseof

its“beneficialconsequences”forsociety—ithasnoothervaluethanitspractical

applicationandthebeneficialconsequencesthatarisefromit.

Thesetwovirtues,benevolenceandjustice,helpsocietyfunctioninsucha

wayastocreatethemosthappinessforthepeoplewithinsociety.Againreferring

backtowhatIsaidatthebeginningofthissection:forindirectconsequentialism,the

consequencesaredependentontheact,butinsuchawayastoaccountforoutside

influencesontheact.Therefore,underHume’smoralphilosophy,itisnotjust

performingabenevolentactthathasdesirableconsequences(forexample,

happiness),but,wheneveryonewithinasocietyseesbenevolenceasavirtue,it

becomesaguideforaction(andthegoodconsequencesstemnotonlyfromthe

benevolentactsbutfromthevirtueofbenevolenceaswell).Inthisway,Humeis

expressingakindofindirectconsequentialism,becausetheconsequencesstemnot

justfromactsbutalsofromsomethingexternaltotheactsguidingthemaswell.

209Ibid,2.22(p.82).210Ibid,3.1(p.83).

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ForHume,morality211hasitsoriginsinsentiment.Sentimentiswhat

motivatesustobemoral(i.e.“Whatishonourable,whatisfair,whatisbecoming,

whatisnoble,whatisgenerous,takespossessionoftheheart,andanimatesusto

embraceandmaintainit”212).Reason,though,isstillneeded,becauseitisonly

throughmanyexperienceswithacts,etc.,withinsocietythatwecanthencometo

inferwhatismoralthroughtheunderstanding.Whatitcomesdowntoisthatwe

needreasontomakeinferencesfromexperiences,butwhatmotivatesustobe

moralissentiment.

2.5.Hume’sMethodinAnEnquiryconcerningthePrinciplesofMorals

DespitethewayIdescribedHume’spositionintheprevioussection(2.4.

Hume’sMoralPhilosophy),thereisnoconsensusonwhetherHumewasanykindof

consequentialistornot.ItisdifficulttopigeonholeHumewithregardtohis

normativemoraltheory.Inthissection,IwillqualifyHume’smoralphilosophyby

givinganaccountofhowonecanunderstandHume’smethodinAnEnquiry

concerningthePrinciplesofMorals.Thisqualificationisimportantfor

understandingscepticism’sreachinHume’sphilosophy,andtyingtogetherHume’s

understandingofmetaphysicstohisunderstandingofmoralphilosophy.

Hume’smethodthroughouttheSecondEnquiryisareflectivecomparisonof

casesthatdoesnotseemtohaveanyintenttoassumethatitwilladduptoanything

intheend.FromHume’smethodofcomparisonofcases(orinstancesofwhatmight

bemoral),hedrawsakindofgeneralaccountofwhatmoralitymightconstitute—

211IamreferencingthemoralitythatHumeprescribesto—notallofmorality(generallyspeaking).212Hume,SecondEnquiry,1.7(p.75).

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andlookstoseehowreasonandsentimentmightfactorintomorality.Thiskindof

methoddoesnotassumethatitwillfindtheultimatefoundationofmorality,butis

moreofacontemplativeguessataframeworkthatmoralitycouldpossiblyoperate

within.Sinceitdoesnotseektofindtheultimatefoundationofmorality,itdoesnot

makeanydefiniteassertions.Inthisway,Hume’smethodkeepshismoral

philosophyinlinewithaModerate,ormitigated,PyrrhonianScepticism

understandingofhismetaphysics,whichunderpinsHume’sphilosophymore

generally.

In1.10oftheSecondEnquiry,Humelaysouthismethod,

Theonlyobjectofreasoningistodiscoverthecircumstancesonbothsides,whicharecommontothesequalities;toobservethatparticularinwhichtheestimablequalitiesagreeontheonehand,andtheblameableontheother;andthencetoreachthefoundationofethics,andfindthoseuniversalprinciples,fromwhichallcensureorapprobationisultimatelyderived.Asthisisaquestionoffact,notofabstractscience,wecanonlyexpectsuccess,byfollowingtheexperimentalmethod,anddeducinggeneralmaximsfromacomparisonofparticularinstances.213

Humehimselfsaysthatmorality“isaquestionoffact”,meaningthatmorality

pertainstoexperience,andisnotsomethingthatwecandeduceapriori(priorto

experience).TheexperimentalmethodbasedonexperiencethatHumespeaks

aboutintheabovequoteisnotperfectandinfallible.Wecannotgettoanapriori

foundationofmoralitythroughreasoning.Thereneedstobe“acomparisonof

particularinstances”(or“cases”asIsayinthepreviousparagraph)—whichcan

onlybeaccomplishedthroughexperience—andthiscomparisonwillonlyeverallow

ustoinfer“generalmaxims”ofmorality.214

213Ibid,1.10(pp.76-77).214Ofmorality,butmoralityasHumeunderstandsit—notmoralityatlarge.

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Thisisamethodologythataimstogeneralize.215Youhavethismethod,its

objectistofindgeneralizations,butdoesitfindgeneralizations?Ifitdoes,dothose

generalizationsamounttoanykindofcertaintyorultimatefoundation?Hume

seemstoinfersomegeneralizations(suchabenevolenceandjustice),butthereisno

certaintythatthesearetherightgeneralizations—whichmeansthatthereisno

certaintywhenitcomesmoralgeneralizations.Thesegeneralizationsareinferences

tothebestexplanationthatHumecanfindthroughhiscomparisonofcases.There

isnothingthatwouldpreventfurthercomparisons,andfurthergeneralizations.

EvenHume’suseofutilitycannotbeusedasafoundation,becauseallitisisa

potentialcandidateforafoundationthatseeminglyhasthepotentialtoproduce

desirableconsequences(whenacomparisonofcaseshasbeendone,itseemsthat

utilitycanhelpexplaincertaingeneralmaximsthatpeopleseemtotakeasvirtues,

likebenevolence).But,whileutilitymighthelptoexplainmoralitywhencomparing

certaincases,Hume’sattitudeintheSecondEnquiry,isstilloneofuncertainty—an

attitudethatisunderpinnedbyscepticism.AsHumesays,attheveryendofSection

1oftheSecondEnquiry,

The[…]scientificmethod,whereageneralabstractprincipleisfirstestablished,andisafterwardsbranchedoutintoavarietyofinferencesandconclusions,maybemoreperfectitself,butsuitslesstheimperfectionofhumannature[…].Menarenowcuredoftheirpassionforhypothesesandsystemsinnaturalphilosophy,andwillhearkentonoargumentsbutthosewhicharederivedfromexperience.Itisfulltimetheyshouldattemptalikereformationinallmoraldisquisitions;andrejecteverysystemofethics,howeversubtileoringenious,whichisnotfoundedonfactandobservation.216

And,then,finishesSection1oftheSecondEnquirywith

215Like,consequentialism,orutilitarianism.216Hume,SecondEnquiry,1.10(p.77).

89

Weshallbeginourenquiryonthisheadbyconsiderationofthesocialvirtues,benevolenceandjustice.Theexplicationofthemwillprobablygiveusanopeningbywhichothersmaybeaccountedfor.217

ThisisthetonethatHumesetsfortherestoftheSecondEnquiry.Hecontraststhe

experimentalmethodthatheseeshimselfasusingwiththescientificmethodmore

associatedwiththerationalistswhotrytofoundtheir“generalabstractprinciples”

orfoundationalprinciplesonsomethingthatisnotbasedinexperience.

Hisemphasisonexperience—thathedoesmakesoundlikethebetter

option—isnotsomethingthatwillgetyoucertaintyinthewaythatarationalist

wouldwant.ThebestHume’smethodisgoingtogiveusis“probably”and“may”.

Thissupportforamethodthatcanonlygiveusuncertaintyatbestisunderpinned

byanunwillingnesstoacceptaprioriprinciplesthatwehavenojustificationfor

(basedonwhatwecanknow).Hume’smethodleadstoakindoftentative

hypothesis,notasurething.Humeistellingus(thereaders)inadvancethat

whateverhecomesupwithforafoundationistentative.Thisisakindoffallibilism:

providingtentativeanswersthatmayormaynotberight(withtheawarenessthat

theanswersmayormaynotberight,andtheacceptancethatwemaynotever

knowtherightanswer).Whilefallibilismdoesnotnecessarilyentailscepticism,it

doesopenupthepathtoscepticism(orcantendtowardascepticalposition);

especiallyforsomeonelikeHume,who,throughouthisphilosophy,isfavourably

disposedtowardsscepticism.

217Ibid,1.11(p.77).Myitalics.

90

2.6.TheMoralRealismandMoralAnti-RealismDebate:HumeanScepticismasanAlternative

Therealismandanti-realismdebateinmetaphysicsisnotanewtopicof

discussion.IntheWesternPhilosophicalTradition,ithasrootsbacktoPlato’s

dialogues.Thedebateisentrenchedinmostotherfieldsofphilosophy.Takethe

philosophyofperception,forexample.Assoonasweaskwhetherourperceptions

arerepresentationsoftheexternalworldornot(orifourperceptionsareaccurate

representationsoftheexternalworldornot),webecomeembroiledintherealism

andanti-realismdebate.Realismstates,generally,thatfacts(orentities)exist,and

thatthesefacts(orentities)areobjectiveandmind-independentinsomeway.218

Anti-realismdeniesatleastoneaspectofrealism;itcandenythatfacts(orentities)

exist,itcandenythatfacts(orentities)areobjectiveormind-independent,oritcan

rejectbothoftheaforementionedrealistclaims.

Thedebateisfurthermadecomplexbythecognitivismandnon-cognitivism

differentiation.Cognitivismistraditionallyassociatedwithrealism,andnon-

cognitivismistraditionallyassociatedwithanti-realism.Cognitivismistheview

thatafact(orclaim,orproposition),likeamoralfact(orclaim,orproposition),can

betrueorfalse.Non-cognitivism,broadlydefined,istheviewthatafact(orclaim,

orproposition),likeamoralfact(orclaim,orproposition),isnottruth-apt(cannot

betrueorfalse).Theimportanceofthisdistinctionismostnoticeableinlogic-based

arguments,becauselogic-basedargumentstreattruth-aptnessandtruepremises

(andsoundarguments)ashighlyimportant.Therefore,forcognitivismtobe

218Iacknowledgethatthisdefinitionisnotwithoutcontroversy,butitsufficestooutlinethedichotomybetweenrealismandanti-realism.

91

associatedwithrealismandnon-cognitivismtobeassociatedwithanti-realismhas

itsconsequences.Realiststhinkthattheyhavetheupperhand,becausetheycan

giveargumentswithtruth-aptmoralfactsmakingtheirlogic-basedarguments

stronger.Theproblemisthattherearesomeanti-realistswhoarecognitivists,

thoughsometimesinqualifiedways(forexample,ErrorTheorists).Overall,the

associationbetweencognitivismandrealism,andnon-cognitivismandanti-realism

ismisleading—andcognitivismandnon-cognitivismshouldnotbeassociatedwith

realismoranti-realisminparticular.

Ithinkthatthisalsoholdstruewhenitcomestoscepticism,specifically

ModeratePyrrhonianScepticism.Scepticsintherealismandanti-realismliterature

oftengetlumpedinwiththeanti-realists,andsoareassociatedwithnon-

cognitivism.But,associatingModeratePyrrhonianScepticismwithnon-cognitivism

isnotanexplicitassociation,andneedsfurtherexplanation(whichisnotusually

given).APyrrhonianScepticremainsagnostic(withholdsjudgement,epochē)when

itcomestofacts(orclaims,orpropositions)concerningmetaphysics.Thisdoesnot

meanthattheyoutrightdenycognitivismortruth-aptnesswhenitcomesto

metaphysicalfacts(orclaimsorpropositions).Italsomeansthattheydonotassert

cognitivismortruth-aptnesswhenitcomestometaphysicalfacts(orclaimsor

propositions).ItistheiragnosticismthatputsPyrrhonianScepticsinaposition

wheretheycannotaffirmordenyanythingabouttheReal,externalworld.Now,this

doesnotmeanthattheycannotassertmoralclaims.Itjustmeansthattheycannot

argueoverthemetaphysicalstatusofmoralclaims.

92

AModeratePyrrhonianScepticwhilemaintainingagnosticismaboutthe

externalworlddoesconsenttoappearancesinordertolivetheirlife.Inconsenting

toappearances,theycanconsenttotheappearanceofclaims.Theissuetheyhaveis

withassertingametaphysicaloriginofthoseclaims.Inthecaseofmoralclaims,the

sameistrue.AModeratePyrrhonianScepticcanassertthemoralclaimthat

“Murderiswrong,”butwhatneedstobeunderstoodisthattheyarenotasserting

anythingmetaphysicalabouttheputativemoralclaim.Whattheyaredoingis

sayingthatbasedonappearances,murderappearstobewrong—thisisaninternal

endeavour,notanexternalendeavour(touseCarnapianlanguage).

ThistypeofModeratePyrrhonianScepticismcanbeattributedtoHume.

HumesaysinBookI,Part4,Section2oftheTreatise,

[T]hescepticstillcontinuestoreasonandbelieve,eventho’heasserts,thathecannotdefendhisreasonbyreason;andbythesamerulehemustassenttotheprincipleconcerningtheexistenceofbody,tho’hecannotpretendbyanyargumentsofphilosophytomaintainitsveracity.Naturehasnotleftthistohischoice,andhasdoubtlessesteem’ditanaffairoftoogreatimportancetobetrustedtoouruncertainreasoningsandspeculations.219

Eventhoughthescepticcontinuesto“reasonandbelieve”andcannothelpbutgive

into“theexistenceofbody”(i.e.theexternalworld),theydosowithoutthesupport

ofmetaphysicalarguments.Duetothefalliblenessofthehumanmind—something

thatcannotbehelped(asisthewaythathumansare)—theexternalworldis

deemedbythesceptictobesomethingthatcannot“betrustedtoouruncertain

reasoningsandspeculations.”Thescepticisleftwithassentingtotheworldof

appearances,thoughtheycannotgiveanargumentforthemetaphysicaloriginof

thoseappearances.ThescepticismthatHumearticulatesisaformofModerate

219Hume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,1.4.2.1(p.125).

93

PyrrhonianScepticism,but—sinceHumehimselfshiedawayfromattributing

PyrrhonianScepticismtohisownphilosophy(duetoalackofknowledgeof

PyrrhonianScepticism)—IwillcallHume’sModeratePyrrhonianScepticismjust

HumeanScepticism.220

Onthefaceofit,itwouldseemlikeHumeanScepticism,aswithModerate

PyrrhonianScepticism,wouldhavetotakeanon-cognitivestanceonthetruth-

aptnessoffacts(orclaimsorpropositions)—giventhataHumeanScepticwouldnot

beabletojustify,basedonanymetaphysicalargument,thetruthorfalsityofthe

facts.But,aHumeanScepticcoulduseCarnap’smove(whenitcomestoabstract

entities)tobeabletoapplyakindofqualifiedtruth-aptnesstofactswithinan

internalframework.Carnap’sinitialmoveistodifferentiatebetweeninternaland

externalquestions.Internalquestionsarequestionsthatcanbeaskedwithina

specifiedframework(i.e.epistemologicalquestions),whileexternalquestionshave

todowithaskingabouttherealityorexistenceoftheframeworkasawhole(i.e.

metaphysicalquestions).AHumeanScepticcannotaskexternalquestions,butthey

canaskinternalquestions.

Tobringthisbackintoamoralcontext,takethemoralclaim,“Murderis

wrong,”again.Perhapsthesocietyyouareapartofpracticesaformof

consequentialism.Murderiswrongwithinyoursociety’sconsequentialistmoral

framework,becausealawwascreatedstatingthatmurderiswrong.Thislawwas

createdinordertobringaboutthemostpleasureorhappinessforthesocietyasa

220IalsocallitHumeanScepticism,becauseitisbasedonmyinterpretationofHume’sphilosophytofurtheranargumentinmetaethicsratherthananinterpretationofthehistoricHumeasapieceofHumescholarship.

94

whole,becauseotherwisepeoplemightliveinfearthattheymaybemurdered

(whichisanunpleasantandunhappywaytolive).So,fortheoverallbenefitofyour

society,murderwasdeemedtobewrong.Withinaspecifiedframework,inthiscase

yoursociety’sconsequentialistmoralframework,afact(orclaimorproposition)can

berightorwrong,ortrueorfalse.Itcanbetrueorfalse,becauseforsomeone

withinyoursocietytostatethat“Murderisnotwrong,”forexample,wouldbefalse

giventheagreeduponlawwithinyoursociety’sconsequentialistmoralframework.

Thiskindofqualifiedtruth-aptnesswillnotgiveyouthetruthorfalsityofafact,etc.,

with100%certainty—itcanonlygiveyouaprobabletruthorfalsitybasedonthe

conditionswithintheframeworkatagiventime,andcannotstatewhetherafactis

trueorfalseintheexternalworld(inametaphysicalsense).

ToconnectbacktoHume,letusthinkbacktosections2.2,2.3,and2.4ofthis

paper.ForHume,moralityisasocialconstruct,andhowwelearnitisbasedon

inference(aftertheexperienceofsomethingisexperienced,preferably,multiple

times).Thisinferenceviaexperienceisbasedonourexperiencesoftheappearance

oftheexternalworld(i.e.ourperceptionsoftheexternalworld)—sinceourhuman

facultiescanonlygiveus“uncertainreasoningsandspeculations”221andcannotgive

uscertainmetaphysicalarguments.ForHume,wecannotknowwithanycertainty

thatourperceptionsoftheexternalworldaretrueorfalse.But,wecanassess

whetherafact(orclaimorproposition)istrueorfalsebasedonourinferencesand

theframeworkweareoperatingin(sinceframeworks,inthisunderstanding,area

221Hume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,1.4.2.1(p.125).

95

social,internalconstructionanddonotstateanythingabouttheReal,external

world).

UnderHumeanScepticismandHume’smoralphilosophy,themoralclaim,

“Murderiswrong,”istrue.Itistruebasedonappearances,andwithinagiven

internalframework.Itcannotbeknownwhetheritistrueorfalsefromanexternal,

metaphysicalstance—theshortcomingsofhumanreasoning(cognitiveability)do

notallowustoknowthis.Inaninternalsense,moralfactsarecognitive(though,

withanon-cognitiveorigin).Inanexternalsense,wecannotknowtheultimate

metaphysicaloriginofmoralfacts.But,whatisimportantisthatmoralfactsare

truth-aptforHume(justinaqualifiedwaybaseduponaconsequentialistmoral

frameworkthatissociallyconstructed).Ifthisistrue,andHume’sphilosophyis

cohesive,itlookslikeHumeanScepticism(combinedwithHume’smoral

philosophy)providesuswithanalternativetothetraditionalmoralrealismand

moralanti-realismdichotomymakingthetraditionaldichotomyanactualdebate.

2.7.PotentialImplications

ThepurposeofthissectionistoconsiderpotentialimplicationsofHumean

Scepticism,Hume’sphilosophybeingcohesive,andHume’slackofcleardistinction

betweenhisabstract,metaethicalmoralphilosophyandpractical(normativeand

applied)philosophy.IfHume’sphilosophyisanactualalternativetothetraditional

moralrealismandmoralanti-realismdebate,andhisphilosophyiscohesive;thenit

isimportantthatwetakeseriouslyhowweseparatefieldsinmoralphilosophy.

HumeconflateshismetaethicsandpracticalphilosophythroughouttheSecond

Enquire,but,asshowninsection2.6ofthispaper,thisdoesnotimpedethe

96

cohesivenessofhisphilosophy,nordoesitproduceanycontradictioninhismoral

philosophy.

Thepotentialimplicationbecomesaquestionforethics:istheseparationof

metaethicsandpracticalethicsanarbitraryseparation?Ifitisanarbitrary

separation,thelinebetweenmetaethicsandpracticalethicsisblurryatbest,and

theyinterconnectinwaysthatmakethemnotsoeasilyseparable.Thisisatopicfor

futurethought,butaquestiontoaskiswhatarethemetaethicalconsequencesfor

practicalphilosophy,ifthereareany?And,whatisthesignificanceofthose

consequencesforethicsingeneral?Mysecrethopebehindthispaperwastobring

attentiontohowwetraditionallyviewandunderstandtopics(orfields)in

philosophy,andquestionthosetraditionalviews.Goingforward,Iwouldlike

readerstoconsideralternativewaysofapproachingatopic(orfield)—notonlyin

philosophy,butalsoinallareasofstudyandknowledge.

97

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