Husserl English Final

8/6/2019 Husserl English Final

1/24

Philosophy 324

Introduction to the Phenomenology

of

Edmund Husserl

Written by HW Rossouw and AA van Niekerk

(Translated by HL Fouch and AA van Niekerk)

January 2006


2/24

2


3/24

The Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl

1. PHENOMENOLOGY AS PHILOSOPHY

The concept phenomenology refers to a way of doing philosophy. To be more

specific: phenomenology is a method of philosophical analysis that cannot easily be

typified under a common denominator. It doesnt really represent a unifying

standpoint of a consolidated research program. The phenomenological philosophy is a

way of thinking that is characterised by individual and historical variety. There are,

for instance, enormous differences that differentiate the pure phenomenology of

Husserl from the hermeneutical phenomenology of Heidegger and from the

phenomenology of the perceptive body-subject of Merleau-Ponty.

The main question in Husserls phenomenology was how the Greek inspired ideal ofabsolute certain knowledge can be realised in the daily work of the European (i.e.

Western) scientist. To realise this ideal, Husserl criticised the way the empirical

sciences of facts monopolised the practice and evaluation of the human attainment of

knowledge in modern Western culture. He especially criticised the way positivist

philosophy justified this monopolisation since the nineteenth century. According to

Husserl, the problem emerges from a curtailed concept of experience that constituted

the monopolising trend. He offered an impressive argument for a broadened concept

of experience that encompasses the (positivistic accent of the) idea of immediate

perceptive impressions and also the idea of eidetic intuitions. From this standpoint he

claimed for phenomenology the status of a philosophical science of essences that

served as the grounding of the knowledge that is attained in the empirical sciences.

Martin Heidegger was Husserls best-known student and the most original

philosopher of all of them. According to him the phenomenological way of thinking

served quite a different purpose. He used the phenomenological method to rehabilitate

philosophical ontology as discipline from its negative evaluation since the 19th

century. Heideggers critique was therefore not aimed at the pratice of regarding

positivist sciences as the only legitimate instances of knowledge (as was Husserls

critique). He rather criticised the metaphysical thinking of the Western intellectual

history and strategy of culture that was grounded in this mentality of thinking.

Heideggers phenomenology was a strategy for the renewal of ontology a strategy

that could free ontology from the grip of metaphysics. While Husserls starting point

was the human mind (consciousness) as the primal characteristic of the transcendental

ego, Heideggers starting point was the concrete life problem of seeking a meaningful

existence in this world. In his quest to answer the ontological question (the question

of reality), Heidegger sought the essence of reality not in a timeless order behind

phenomena, but rather in the occurrence of temporary appearances (phenomena). For

phenomenological ontology the temporary appearances was at the same time the birth

of meaning for existing humans. Heideggers thinking could therefore be typified as

the first existential phenomenology.

For Maurice Merleau-Ponty phenomenology was the type of reflection through whichwe gain access to the original dimension of human experience, i.e. the original

3


4/24

occurrence or appearance when reality becomes meaningful and accessible. The task

of the phenomenologist is the effort to be present at the original confluence of the

experiencing subject and experienced world. This confluence was for Merleau-Ponty

the event where reality at first obtains face or meaning for us. In scientific reflection

this meaningful confluence or meeting is the focus of critical examination, but at the

same time it is the presupposition for the possibility of any scientific approach.Merleau-Ponty called this original meeting the unreflective living experience and the

world that is experienced, the life-world[Lebenswelt]. We are initiated in reality as

it originally appears to us through unreflective experience on a first, primordial or pre-

conscious level.

The question is how does this happen? How does this primordial encounter where we

get to know the original meaning of reality, occur? The answer to this question

provided to Merleau-Ponty the object of his phenomenological analysis. His answer

was quite different from those of Husserl and Heidegger. According to Merleau-Ponty

we know reality in its most original appearance not as the sediment of a conscious act

of knowing of the thinking subject (cogito) as Husserl claimed. The primary meaningof reality is also not the sediment of mans practical dealings with phenomena that

announce themselves as ready to hand for the realisation of practical tasks and

projects, as Heidegger asserted. Merleau-Ponty rather saw perception as our

primordial initiation into all meaning. By perception he meant perception that is

conditioned by the body. Perception is the basic function of the body-subject by

which we get to know the world in which we live in its most original dimension or at

its most original level. For this reason Merleau-Pontys analysis focused on

perception. He was critical of the empiricists and idealists whose views on the

essence, structure and prerequisites of perception were inadequate. He was also

critical of his predecessors like Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre: because of their

depreciation of the relevance of the human body (and thus perception) in the knowing

process, they didnt do justice to the preconscious dimension of our human orientation

in the world.

The concept of phenomenology thus has clearly different meanings for different

philosophers. It would lead to a wrong conception of phenomenological philosophy

when those differences are not taken seriously. On the other hand the differences do

not cancel the common inspiration that is active in the phenomenological movement,

keeps it within strict contours and provides a foundational unity. The following

exposition will concentrate on this common inspiration as far as possible.

2. REACTIVATING FORGOTTEN KNOWLEDGE

Phenomenology, as a form of reflection, could best be characterised as

remembering or recollection. Phenomenology is reactivating forgotten

knowledge through which the philosopher mediates the recovery of real or

authentic humanity.

Therefore the point of departure for phenomenology is that there is a dimension of our

human experience that is always already passed over [or skipped] or forgotten in our

daily thinking and search for knowledge. In the phenomenological thinking this

forgetfulness is not at all an innocent matter. The forgetfulness is, rather, forHusserl, directly related to the European crisis of culture that endangers the humanity

4


5/24

of the human species in our time. The philosophical act of remembering is therefore

more than a mere critical refreshment of memory. Phenomenology is, in line with its

fundamental intention, the recapturing and sensitising of an awareness of a dimension

of existence where humans can acknowledge or re-acknowledge their freedom.

The forgotten sphere of human experience which is the focus of phenomenology canbe called the sphere of lived, pre-predicative meanings. These are the meanings of

experience when we initially become aware of anything, i.e. before this original

experience is purposefully objectified and conceptually described. The sphere of lived

meaning is for phenomenology the original dimension of experience i.e. our original

encounter with and initiation into reality. The word origin is here not used in a

chronological sense, but as a structural designation. In the structural dimension of our

experience the sphere of lived meaning logically precedes all other forms or levels or

dimensions of experience. Lived meaning can also be seen as the transcendentalsphere of our experience. The sphere of lived meaning is the prerequisite for the

possibility of all human experience. This prerequisite is not transcendent in the sense

that it is outside our experience, and therefore only reachable by a speculativetranscending of our experience into a metaphysical sphere. It rather is immanent to

our experience as the fundamental form of experience that is presupposed by all other

forms of experience. The task of phenomenology in Husserls words is to

excavate this fundamental form of experience archaeologically.

How does it happen that we always skip or forget the original dimension of our

experience in the every day knowledge process? Phenomenology attributes this to

what Husserl called the natural cognitive or thinking attitude. This is the thinking

attitude that constitutes [or reigns in] our every day quest for knowledge. In this

attitude our thinking is captivated and orientated to phenomena as if they are realities

entirely outside our sphere of consciousness. This attitude supposes that the

objective existence of phenomena, as well as their objective meaning, is already given

and thus independent of the human spirit. For phenomenology it is important to

realise that the natural thinking attitude presupposes the meaningfulness of the

phenomena of experience as self-evident and already given entities. This is an

uncritical supposition that closes all access to our fundamental experience or to the

transcendental original dimension of our experience where we encounter meanings as

they originally present themselves.

Phenomenology attributes the fact that the transcendental sphere of our lived meaning

disappeared in the historical development of Western thought and endeavour forknowledge, to the cognitive authority and monopoly of the empirical [or positive]

sciences which were gradually attained in the European culture. The current-day

natural sciences became the model of positive science. The natural sciences cultivated

the natural thinking attitude and disciplined it methodically to make it more effective.

The spectacular successes of the natural sciences lead a general orientation to reality

which in fact tends to absolutize the natural thinking attitude as the only true way.

Phenomenologists normally call this thinking attitude objectivism orscientism.

With the terms objectivism and scientism is meant an unreflective and uncritical

standpoint according to which the world-view that is constituted by scientific

conceptualisation on the basis of the empirical knowledge of facts, is a truerepresentation or reflection of the real world as it exists in itself. This scientifically

5


6/24

mediated world is already outside and independent of our knowing consciousness.

And this world is actually seen as the exclusive expression of legitimate knowledge

and insight. From this view the immediate, lived and pre-scientific experience is

degraded as a subjective contamination of the real world, and therefore rejected as an

unreliable basis for knowledge and understanding.

According to phenomenologists this objectivism or scientism created such a drastic

curtailment of human thinking and experience, that it inevitably confused the life

orientation of the European people and plunged them into a crisis. Husserl identified

this crisis as one of irrationalism where the ideal of a complete rational explication

and illumination of our experience becomes disillusioned. Heidegger described it as

the crisis ofnihilism where Western thought lost its metaphysical grip on a timeless,meaning-creating ground. No matter how this crisis is typified in different terms,

phenomenology continually reduces it to the forgetfulness that is endemic to the

natural knowing process that developed in Western thought. It is a forgetfulness that

caused the human thinking and quest for knowledge to be captivated in its entirety by

the mundane sphere of objective facts and that left the sphere of transcendentalknowledge unexplored.

To rectify this forgetfulness, phenomenology suggests an act of remembering that is a

counter-natural reflection and that necessarily requires a special effort. Husserl called

this philosophical reflection reduction. A significant part of his own philosophicalreflection was devoted to specify more exactly what the different steps of reduction as

method [or way of thinking] entails. Other phenomenologists did not necessarily

follow him in this enterprise. What Husserl generally had in mind with the different

reductions, is, however, an essential element of phenomenology, namely the

mediation of transcendental consciousness.

There can be no phenomenological knowledge if it is not based on the deliberate and

conscious reversal of the focus of our attention. This reversal is the reduction or

reorientation of our focus, away from the fixation on and preoccupation with the

objective world of facts, to our immediate experience of subjective lived meaning. No

matter what different terms phenomenologists use to describe this reversal of focus,

the presupposition remains that we must and can suspend or neutralise the influence

of well articulated terms, concepts and explanatory theories about experiential facts.

The aim of this is to bring our thinking, as unprejudiced as possible, into the sphere

where we originally become conscious of reality, where we experience reality

immediately on a pre-predicative level. In this sense the prophetic slogan ofphenomenology is: Back to the things themselves!

With the things themselves is not meant an object in itself or behind the

phenomenon as we become conscious of it. The thing itself is rather the

phenomenon in its phenomenality i.e. the thing as it de facto appears to the

experiencing subject, i.e. in its appearance as some or other meaning. [Note that

there can only be the possibility of meaning when the presence (activity?) of some

subjectfor whom the meaning exists or is constituted, is presupposed.] For this reason

the thing itself i.e. the object of phenomenological analysis and description is

not looked at in contrast to or without any reference to human subjectivity. The access

that reduction as an act of remembering provides is the access to the transcendentalsphere or subjective experience of meaning. For all phenomenologists the reflection

6


7/24

of reduction boils down to the recovering or restoration of human subjectivity in its

undisputed priority in the human knowledge process.

Phenomenological reduction makes phenomenological knowledge possible. Such

phenomenological knowledge is transcendental knowledge which is attained by

conceptual clarification of phenomena. With phenomena are meant the meaningfulentities of our original and lived experience in their immediate evidence for the

experiencing consciousness. In Phenomenology the phenomena are not subjective

contaminations of the objective reality which lies behind the (e.g. for Plato) unreal

appearances. In the phenomena of our original and lived experience we encounter the

fundamental and irreducible access to reality. The validity of all knowledge and

conceptions is grounded in the evidences of our subjective lived experience. The

phenomenological endeavour for knowledge is to bring to the fore these evidences by

analysis and description. In this way phenomenology intends to give our knowledge

of objective facts their final and definitive grounding behind which nothing more can

be established.

3. THE PRINCIPLE OF EVIDENCE

What is meant by evidence? It could be explained best by paying attention to

Husserls exposition of the concept. Husserl found the leading principle for the

development of a unique scientific methodology for philosophy in the principle of

evidence he called it the principle of principles. Evidence or compelling

obviousness is the mode of experience in which and by which all assertions

[propositions] about something is validated or legitimated as expressions of

knowledge. When we experience an utterance as not evident, we do not recognise it as

valid or legitimated knowledge. [Note that the term evidence is here employed in

the sense in which it is used in the sentence: It is evident that Einstein was an

intelligent man, and notin the sense of What evidence is there for the idea that thereis life in other parts of the universe?] Evidence is according to Husserl the

legitimating source of knowledge on all levels; it is the test of whether an utterance is

valid knowledge. Whenever we make an assertion with the claim that it conveys

knowledge, we appeal implicitly to the experience of evidence as the basis of its

validity.

What does the principle of evidence as legitimating source of knowledge entail?

Evidence is, according to Husserl, the immediate seeing or intuition

[contemplation] of a given thing in its given-ness or living presence for the knowingconsciousness. It is the coming to awareness [consciousness] of the knowledgeable as

it is there, as it is present, unmediated by any form of symbolic representation. For the

immediate seeing that is a characteristic of such a coming to consciousness, Husserl

uses the term intuition. And for the entity in its immediate and revealed self-

presentation [Selbstgebung] for the intuition, he uses the term phenomenon.

Evidence is the intuition of a phenomenon. An assertion finds the fulfilment of itsintention, and thereby the legitimation of its cognitive validity, the moment when the

intended content [i.e. the subject matter to which the content of the assertion refers] is

immediately seen [intuited] as a phenomenon.

If the legitimating source of knowledge is evidence, it then means that validknowledge can only be attained from that which is given in experience in the same

7


8/24

way; or from that which can be brought to such self given-ness, that it can be seen

immediately. This principle also accounts for the legitimation of philosophical

knowledge if such a thing is possible. But that means that philosophical knowledge

cannot exist in the form of a metaphysical science, when the latter is seen as

knowledge of entities [a reality] that are outside the borders of the experienceable and

are thus not accessible to immediate intuition. Metaphysical assertions that areattained speculatively are instances of bloss Vermeintes, of hollow, unfulfilled and

unfulfillable intentions.

In his rejection of the possibility of philosophy as a metaphysical science, Husserl

linked up with the empiricist tradition in philosophy. At the same time he offered

sharp criticism of the traditional empiricism which he called fake empiricism.

Against the fake empiricism, Husserl pleaded for a radical empiricism.

Husserls criticism of the traditional empiricism concerns the negative prejudice that

this philosophy presupposes. The negative prejudice comes to the fore in empiricisms

view of experience as exclusively sense experience. Traditional empiricism alsoespouses the principle of immediate experience as the final legitimation of

knowledge. But here givenness to experience is limited to being present for or

registering in/on the senses. What is given to the senses, are particular and

contingent [temporal and spatially determined] facts or states of affairs. Empiricism is

looking for immediate, foundational evidences of any valid knowing process in the

perceptive intuitions of particular and factual entities. Only those intuitions can be the

basic assertions for a valid system of knowledge. They attain this in the form of

factual assertions of particular states of affairs. All assertions of knowledge that entail

generalisations [e.g. metals expand when heated rather than iron expands when

heated] receive their validity from mediately attained evidences. [It is on the basis of

our knowledge of the behaviour of iron, gold, etc. when heated, that we can make the

generalisation: metals expand when heated.]

Evidences that legitimate contingent, factual utterances are not apodictic evidences,

but assertorical evidences. Assertorical evidences can be doubted, while apodicticevidences exclude the possibility of any doubt. If the original, fundamental evidences

of all valid knowledge are assertorical, the mediated evidences of that knowing

process would also be assertorical. The implication of this is that indubitable, absolute

certain knowledge utterances would be impossible. Traditional empiricism therefore

leads to scepticism about the possibility of absolute and certain knowledge of what is

given in experience.

As already said, Husserl couldnt accept this consequence because it would mean

resignation of the original idea and ideal of science. However he stuck to the principle

of evidence of immediate experience as the legitimating source of knowledge. He had

the conviction that we can still strive for the Greek rationalist ideal of rational

completely accountable and therefore absolutely certain knowledge of our experience

without getting trapped in metaphysical speculation that is extraneous to experience.

This ideal is, according to Husserl, reconcilable with the empiricist principle,

provided that this principle works in a radical way by eliminating the negative

prejudice that conditions the fake empiricism that modernity produced.

8


9/24

The untenability of these prejudices is obvious when we analyse a meaningful sense

perception and the knowledge-claims that are justified by it. In other words: Husserl

acknowledged that all reliable scientific knowledge is (and must be) based on

experience. He objected however to empiricisms curtailed concept of experience and

endeavoured to broaden the notion of evident experience.

Suppose I make the statement: The table is brown. It is a meaningful

conceptualisation of a direct sensory perception which is legitimated by the

perception as a statement of knowledge. It is however clear that the intentional

content of the statement is not completely fulfilled by that which is actually here and

now [and thus factually] given to my sensual apparatus on its own. What I see in one

sense-perceptive action [i.e. the actual content of my sensory intuition], is only a

certain side or profile [Abschattung] of the object that is intended by the word

table. By changing my spatial position, I can in effect see different sides or profiles

of the object, but I can never, in one act of sense-perception, see all the sides of the

object simultaneously in order to synthesise the different sides as part of the same

identical object. Nevertheless, my statement did not only articulate or cover only thecontents of the profile of the table that I sensed; it was, in fact a statement about the

table as whole, even if that whole can, in principle, never be registered on my senses

in toto. When I say the table is brown, I articulate the totality of something that I

can, in principle, never fully observe in totality. Thus concerning the actual content of

my sensual intuition, my statement the table is brown in fact conveys a surplus of

intention, i.e. I intended more with the statement than that which I actually observed

There are more intentional elements in my statement that are not fulfilled by the

actual content of the sense perception. The sense contents on the basis of which the

statement was made is, on its own, therefore always inadequate to legitimise the

cognitive validity of a knowledge claim as a whole. The surplus of intention refers to

the general concept of table. This general concept of table is in fact an entity which

consists of a synthesis of the actual sensual intuition with other potential sensual

intuitions in order to identify the actual perceived profile as the object table. The

general concept of table represents an ideal meaning in which the essential

characteristics [thus the essence or what-ness] of a specific kind of object are

collected. The surplus of intention concerning the content of the sensual intuition is

only fulfilled, and my statement consequently only fully legitimised in its cognitive

validity, if this ideal meaning itself is evident for my experience, i.e. immediately

given in my experience in such a way that it can be seen in an intuition.

According to Husserl one can go even further and say that the immediate given-nessof the being or essence of an object in its particular, temporal-spatial appearance to

sense perception is the pre-requisite for the possibility of sensual perception as

meaningful sensual perception. Without this pre-requisite the sensual perception

would not be identifiable and also not expressed understandably. The implication of

this is that the immediate given-ness of the being of an object is logically more

original than its particular appearance to the senses, because the former conditioned

the latter and not the other way round.

In this way, Husserl gave, inter alia, the concept of intuition [i.e. immediate perceptive given-ness] a broader application as was the case in the traditional

empiricism. He accepted [what he called] the eidetic intuition [from eidos essence] and by that the immediate perceptive given-ness of being-ness or essences.

9


10/24

The intuition of essences is for Husserl the original, fundamental evidence of all valid

knowledge. Not the particular, spacio-temporal determined facts as traditional

empiricism thought, but the general, ideal essences are the original phenomena of our

experience. It is the intuition of this original phenomena that is presupposed by all the

empirical, factual sciences, but is not [and could not be] thematised because of the

disposition of these sciences. The investigation of essences as the original phenomenaof our experience is the task of philosophy as distinctive, universal and foundational

science. Husserl thought that only a philosophy that is looking for the roots

[radices] of our experience in order to account rationally for our experiential

knowledge from that point could be typified as radical empiricism. Husserl called the

expressive, methodical, rigorous, accountable exploring of the original phenomena of

our experience that is not thematised in the factual sciences, phenomenology.

Philosophy is phenomenological science.

According to Husserl, only phenomenological knowledge, i.e. knowledge of essences,

is able to produce absolute certainty and thus to achieve the ideal of science. Absolute

certain, indubitable knowledge assertions are accounted and legitimised by apodicticalevidences. Essences provide apodictical intuitions. An essence is an ideal entity that is

independent from temporal and spatial and thus contingent determinations. An

essence is necessarily what it is, and cannot be different from what it is. The intuition

of an essence excludes the possibility that what is seen, could ever or anywhere be

different from what it is. Knowledge that is legitimised by such an intuition is

indubitable knowledge.

If philosophy wants to fulfil its task as universal foundational science, it should find

the essences or beings in their apodictically self-given-ness and express the

corresponding intuitions in knowledge assertions. To do this, philosophy has to

develop a method by which one can attain access to the original dimension of our

experience, i.e. the dimension of first intuitions and original phenomena. This

dimension is presupposed as the transcendental prerequisite by the factual sciences,

but is at the same time skipped or passed over. Husserl called this method or way of

thinking the method of reduction.

4. THE METHOD OF REDUCTION

Husserl used the term reduction in the original sense of leading back or reducing

[reducere]. With reduction as a manner of reflection he means the reducing of our

experience to its original dimension or to the roots of experience. This is the area ordimension of the original and fundamental evidences from where the legitimation of

all experiential knowledge can rationally be accounted for. One can also say that it is

the reduction of our experience to its transcendental basis in which the necessary pre-

requisites are given for the possibility of all valid and meaningful experiential

knowledge. The method of reduction is a search for transcendental knowledge in

order to fulfil the task of philosophy as universal foundational science.

The transcendental knowledge which the method of reduction pursues, is supposed to

be knowledge of the original phenomena of our experience. The original phenomena

of our experience are essences. Essences are the ideal meanings that are determined

by the logical structure [i.e. the understandability or intelligibility] of our experience.In so far as the method of reduction is the manner of reflection that leads to the

10


11/24


12/24

4.1 The Generalthesis of the natural experience attitude

In the natural attitude we experience a continuously expanding totality of evidences

with which a growing totality of knowledge assertions, which are grounded by these

evidences, correspond. According to Husserl there is however in all natural

experience only one universal basic evidence latently present. Husserl called theknowledge statement that is legitimated by this, the Generalthesis [General Thesis]of the natural experiential attitude. This general thesis is not necessarily consciously

and explicitly formulated. But when one tries to formulate it, it entails the following:

I am continually conscious of a real world of temporal-spatial qualifiedbeings that exist outside my being conscious of them, a world to which I as

real existing entity belong together with others and of which the temporal andspatial boundaries cannot be determined. I am immediately conscious of the

fact that the totality of real existing beings is not only those that are here and

now immediately present to my conscious experience. I am able to shift my

temporal as well as my spatial position to experience (up to now) unfamiliarentities. The possibilities to expand my experience by shifting my point oforientation is in principle unlimited and endless.

The Generalthesis of the natural experiential attitude does not exclude the possibility

that I may doubt the contentual components of the natural world - for instance,

whether the entities that I observe, in fact exist or are only illusions, hallucinations or

fictions of the imagination. It is precisely the task of the positive factual sciences to

endeavour such complete, reliable and exact possible knowledge of what belongs to

the world of the natural experiential attitude. The general presupposition of the natural

experiential attitude, namely that there is such a world of real existing entities

transcendent to human consciousness, is not changed by any partial doubt or critical

research of a sector of the real existing world. Even the most critical control of our

experience with the assistance of scientific methods and techniques presupposes the

unproblematic, allegedly self-evident insight that our experience always refers to a

spacio-temporally qualified world of real existing beings.

4.2 The phenomenological epoche

Once we have determined the general thesis or presupposition of the natural

experiential attitude, we can ask the question whether this general thesis can be

legitimated by an apodictical evidence and thus qualified as a philosophical assertionof knowledge.

Does the world which transcends our consciousness and that is presupposed in the

general thesis of the natural attitude really given to us in a manner that is absolutely

indubitable? The answer, for Husserl (and in this he follows Descartes) is an emphatic

no. Even though I may be convinced of the given-ness of the world, it is still possible

to think the opposite. The evidence of the real existing world of beings outside

consciousness does not convey the intuition that it is impossible for this world to be

different. If this is the case, we are not dealing with an apodictical evidence. This

means that the Generalthesis of the natural experiential attitude is philosophically

useless because it does not provide us with a final and indisputable grip in ourendeavour to attain absolute knowledge.

12


13/24

To complete the phenomenological reduction and with it the change of focus or

orientation point, Husserl suggets that we de-activate the Generalthesis with its

claim on validity. This de-activation is to be achieved in a reflection that he calls

epoche. Epoche means the suspension or withholding of the process of making

assertions or propositions. In the epoche I restrain myself from making or acceptingthe proposition that is formulated by the Generalthesis; I bracket it[Einklammerung] in the sense that I leave it for what it may be worth, but do not

accept the validity thereof in my philosophical thinking about experience. The epochemeans that I assume an attitude that implies that I no longer believe in a real existing

world which is the basis of the natural experiential attitude.

The epoche does not mean that I deny the contents of the Generalthesis, i.e. that I

deny that a real existing world is given. Such a denial would be just as dubious as the

confirmation of it. It also doesnt mean that I doubt the real existence of the natural

world in a sceptical way. Such a position would still mean that I have a specific view

about the content of the Generalthesis. That would carry the risk that I am stillcaptured within the natural attitude. The epoche only entails that I take leave of the

Generalthesis, i.e. that I remain completely non-committal as to is validity; I do notacknowledge or deny the validity of the general thesis and refrain from positively

asserting any proposition about the existence of the world, whether it is real or not.

The world still appears to me as always; I only disregard the claim of this world to

real existence, outside of or transcendent to consciousness, because it is not

apodictically evident and thus indubitable.

In spite of a certain kinship with Descartes methodical doubting, Husserls epoche is

quite different. The aim of Descartes doubting of the real existence of the outside

world is to prove with certainty what he previously doubted in order to put an end to

all doubting. Descartes bracketing of the outside world at first, and the analysis

which follows that bracketing, have the explicit purpose of, eventually, removing the

brackets. According to Husserl, Descartes doesnt succeed in overcoming the natural

experiential attitude. The project of Husserls epoche is different: he wants toeliminate doubt by refraining from any proposition about the elements of experience

that can possibly be doubted. The epoche is the pre-requisite for thephenomenological thinking attitude and can only be sustained if the epoche is upheld.

Once the epoche is implemented, it cannot be revoked the brackets cannot be

removed.

With the suspension of the Generalthesis I also cancel according to Husserl allpropositions [statements] of knowledge of the natural experience attitude which are

dependent on this foundational statement for their own validity. It includes all every

day statements about real existing entities, as well as all propositions that are made in

the positive factual sciences. The epoche means the purging of all possible referents to

real existence outside of our consciousness.

The epoche is the negative aspect of the reductive reflection. It creates the pre-

requisite for the disclosure of the access to the transcendental dimension of our

experience that Husserl seeks, where the possibility of doubt is excluded and where

the terrain for actual philosophical research is provided.

13


14/24

4.3 The ego cogito mea cogitata

The positive aspect of reductive reflection is the coming to consciousness of the

residue or the remaining sediment of the epoche. In other words, the positive aspect ofreductive reflection is the analysis of what remains in our consciousness once the

epoche has been executed and completed. When every reference to the real existenceof the world is eliminated from our consciousness, the experiencing consciousness

becomes conscious of itself in its absolute and undeniable given-ness to itself. The

residue of the epoche is a sphere of being that Husserl called the pure andtranscendental consciousness. This pure consciousness is the prerequisite for the

possibility of all natural perceptions. Husserl called this pure consciousness with its

immanent apparatus of conscious, meaningful experiences the ego cogito mea

cogitata (literally: I think my thoughts).

When I have eliminated every reference to real existence from my experience of the

natural world, because these references can be doubted, there is still something left.

What is left, is a stream of conscious and meaningful experiences [ cogitationes].Within this stream of conscious experiences I am conscious of a world of perceived

beings however, no longer as an existing world outside my being conscious of

them, but as a totality of meanings immanent or inherent to consciousness. Every

cogitatio is a cogito cogitatum an I think a thought or I am conscious of

meaning. The cogitationes or conscious experiencing of meaning are given or areknown in an absolutely indubitable way to consciousness. I can think that a certain

perceived being does not really exist.I can, however, not think that I dont think the

meaning of the being for me [i.e. the meaning as I understand it]. Whenever I try to

think that I dont think the meaning of the being, I am thinking itand by doing that I

am confirming what I want to deny. A cogitatio [- ego cogito meum cogitatum Iam conscious of a meaning that something has for me] is thus in principle indubitable.

A cogitatio is for the knowing consciousness apodictically and absolutely given,independent of whether that which is thought, really exists outside consciousness or

not.

In order to get a better picture of Husserls intentions, it is helpful to compare his

view on the residue of the epoche with the similar ideas of Descartes. Descartesmethodological doubting made it possible for him to discover an apodictical and

indubitable intuition which he made the starting point of his philosophy. He

formulated this intuition in his famous statement: ego cogito ergo sum. However,

Husserl raises a fundamental criticism of Descartes conception of the apodicticalevidence of the ego cogito, as well as of the way he developed this evidencephilosophically.

According to Descartes the ego cogito [i.e. the doubting consciousness whichbecomes reflexively conscious of itself as an undoubting given entity] is a matter of

pure self attentionality i.e. in the process of reflexively becoming aware of itself ,

the doubting consciousness is only concentrating on itself, or has only eyes for itself.

The certainty which Descartes discovered in the ego cogito is a certainty which is

only referred to as the consciousness as self-consciousness. It is precisely for this

reason that Descartes thought of the doubting and thinking consciousness as some

kind of substance, a res cogitans i.e. an entirely non-corporeal, non-materialisticspirit or soul with the attribute of thinking.

14


15/24

As opposed to this, Husserl claims that the certainty of the ego cogito is not onlybased on a punctual thinking act as such without any content, but also on the content

of or object on which the thinking act is focussed, i.e. the cogitatum. The apodicticalevidence which is made possible by Husserls epoche, is the evidence of a stream of

cogitationes [conscious experiences of meaning]. To state it differently: theconsciousness that became reflexively aware of itself in its apodictically given-ness,

is always a consciousness of meaning that refers to something which is not

consciousness itself. An absolutely pure consciousness, in the sense of a

consciousness that is only conscious of itself, is an illusion according to Husserl. The

consciousness which becomes reflexively aware of itself in its own indubitableness is

always referential. Consciousness is always referentially aimed [focussed] at or

related to something else which is not consciousness, but which is represented within

consciousness. The certainty which Descartes discovered in the ego cogito, hadactually [according to Husserl] referred to the act of consciousness [the direction] as

well as to the content of consciousness [the meaning that correlated with the

direction]. The apodictical intuition which is made possible by the epoche, shouldtherefore be formulated as the intuition of the ego cogito mea cogitata.

Husserl secondly states that what Descartes at first gained with his discovery of the

ego cogito as sphere of apodictical certainty, he in turn lost by his notion of the ego[i.e. the subject of thinking actions] as a real existing being [ergo sum]. To put it inHusserls terminology: Descartes didnt execute the counter-natural reflection of the

epoche or critical purification consistently. According to Husserl, Descartes confusedthe apodictical evidence of the ego cogito with the assertive evidence of a real

existing and therefore contingent thinking I. The moment Descartes introduced the

ergo sum, he fell back into the natural thinking attitude. Descartes fault was that hedidnt bracket the real existing world entirely. He still wanted to save something of

the real existing world and he did it in his axioma of the ergo sum. On the basis ofthe grip he meant to thus attain, he regains, by rational argumentation, certainty of the

real existence of the entities whose real status he earlier doubted. The real existence

of the thinking I is however just as contingent, and thus dubitable, as any other form

of real existence.

Husserl, on the other hand, also applies the epoche to the presupposition of the real

existence of the ego of the ego cogito itself. He refrains from the proposition

articulates the belief in the alleged real existence of the thinking subject in a time-and-

space conditioned world. The absolute certainty that he found reflexively on the basisof the epoche, also refers to a consciousness which is totally purged from anyreference to a real and thus contingent existence, even concerning its subject of

unifying ego.

The residue of Husserls epoche is thus a pure consciousness as a stream of pure

experiences of meaning that is unified [bound together into a unity or monad] by a

pure ego. Husserl uses the term pure as synonym for transcendental. The pure

consciousness is the transcendental consciousness, because it is the necessary [that

which is not possible to eliminate] pre-requisite for the possibility of all forms of

consciousness and experience. The ego or subject of this consciousness is also called

the transcendental ego or subject, which is differentiated from the natural andpsychological experiential I.

15


16/24

In conclusion, it should be said that Husserls ego cogito mea cogitata is not likeDescartes ego cogito ergo sum the expression of an axiomatic starting point from

which several evident statements can be deducted. It is rather the designation of an

apodictically given sphere of being to which we acquire access through the epoche.

This sphere of being is the starting point that provides a field of research whereabsolute certain philosophical knowledge can be obtained. However, to exploit this

field of research that the phenomenological reduction - epoche and becoming aware

of the residue of the epoche opened, a further reduction is necessary.

4.4 Eidetic reduction

The transcendental-phenomenological reduction has given us access to a sphere of

absolute self-given-ness, i.e. the area of the pure and transcendental consciousness as

stream of pure experiences of meaning. Absolute self-given-ness is however not yet

absolute knowledge; becoming aware of absolute entities is not yet science thereof

whatsoever. We come to scientific knowledge of the individual and singularexperiences of meaning [cogitationes] only by deducing from these experiences their

general and necessarily essence or eidos. This activity of deducing is called byHusserl eidetic reduction.

Eidetic reduction entails the elimination of all contingent, not necessary aspects of aspecific experience of meaning in order to see the general and always operative or

necessary essence or eidos of it. This essence or eidos is according to Husserl always given directly in the experience of meaning and can therefore immediately be

seen. Contingent experiences of meaning are variable and can always be different

from what they are at the moment. This variability or possibility to be different has

boundaries, namely the boundaries that are set by the necessary essence of such an

experience. The essence [or eidos] is that which makes a specific experience of

meaning what it is, and without which it cannot be this specific experience of

meaning. The aim of the eidetic reduction is to trace this essence [oreidos] and to

make it accessible for access to somethings essence. [Wesenschau]

5. INTENTIONALITY

Concerning Husserls view of the residue of the phenomenological epoche, we have

seen that he criticised Descartes view on the structure of the ego cogito as sphere of

apodictical evidences. The certainty we have found with the reflexive coming-aware-of-the-residue of the epoche, concerns - according to Husserl - not only the punctualand contentless thinking act as such, but also the content on which the act is focussed.

The ego cogito is always an ego cogito meum cogitatum. In other words:

consciousness that is given to itself in an absolute and indubitable way is always

consciousness of that which is not consciousness. Husserl uses the term intentionality

to designate this essential structure of pure consciousness.

The thesis of intentionality is a central part of the phenomenological vision of the

original dimension of our experience and therefore of the fundamental basis of all

knowledge. For this reason it is also an essential pre-requisite of the

phenomenological way of thinking itself. In the later existential phenomenology the

16


17/24

concept of existence developed and deepened to an independent anthropological

perspective.

That the knowing consciousness of humans has the basic form of intentionality,

implies a rejection of idealistic as well as realistic theories of knowledge. In the

epistemological debate both these poles rest on the Cartesian inspired concept of theknowing consciousness as an in-itself resting and by-itself existing substantial sphere

of pure inwardness. In the idealistic theory of knowledge consciousness is seen as a

reservoir ofapriori meanings which are projected onto the screen of experience in theknowing act in order to create the actual contents of our knowledge. The realistic

(empirical) theory of knowledge, on the other hand, sees consciousness as a camera or

tabula rasa that registers in a passive way all perceptively mediated stimuli which arecoming from outside as impressions. These impressions provide conceptual meaning

thanks to the association processes by which meaning is attached to experiences.

In contradistinction to this substantialist view of consciousness, the thesis of

intentionality promotes the idea that the knowing consciousness can only beunderstood as the coming to awareness of that which is not consciousness. The

knowing consciousness is structurally always something that approaches something

else, of referring to something or of being intentionally focussed on something

that is not itself consciousness. The original coming to awareness of an entity as either

this or that entity [i.e. in a definite meaning] entails a unity of mutual implication

between the act of referring or intention [noesis] and the reference or intended entity

[noema] that correlates with it. Without acts of intention there are no phenomena ormeaningful experiential data. Without evidence or self-given-ness with which

intended entities present themselves, intentional acts would find no actual fulfilling.

In such a case there would also be no phenomena. To understand the last statement

properly, a close-up exploration of Husserls concept of intentionality is necessary.

When we have eliminated the world that is transcendent to our consciousness and also

its claim to legitimate being [i.e. when we have eliminated the reference to real

existence that is prevalent in our natural experience], the consciousness which we

become aware of by reflection, is not pure consciousness. It remains a

consciousness ofthe world of beings. The being of these beings is however no longerthe being of real existing entities, but the being of meanings that belong immanently

to consciousness itself i.e. meanings which as meanings [Bedeutung = be-teken-

is] refer to entities that are not consciousness itself. Pure consciousness is in its

apodictic given-ness to itself always a consciousness of meaning [references]. Pureconsciousness is thus always a referring consciousness, an intentional focus on that

which is not consciousness. It means that pure consciousness is not only present by

itself or only attentive to itself in a substantial self-enclosedness. The structure of pure

consciousness is not self-attentionality, but rather intentionality i.e. an intentionalfocus on what is not consciousness. There is therefore no consciousness without an

intended entity on which consciousness is focussed. In every conscious experience of

meaning we are always confronted by an intentional focus [Einstellung] on the one

hand and an intended entity as the theme of the intentional act on the other hand.

Intentional act and intended entity form a unity of mutual implication. It follows that

we cannot isolate these two poles in the establishment of meaning in order to

investigate them separately on their own.

17


18/24

The subjective side of an experiencing of meaning, i.e. the intentional focus as act of

becoming aware, is called noesis by Husserl. The objective side of a consciousexperience of meaning i.e. the intended entity as the theme of the intentional act, is

called noema. Noesis and noema are in an inseperable (cor-)relation with each other.The one presupposes and implicates the other. In this dual unity ofnoesis and noema

meaning is constituted. Meaning is the way in which an entity is given to the knowingconsciousness or appears to consciousness as something, thanks to the fact that

consciousness lets it appear as such because of a specific intentional act. In its

intentional structure the transcendental consciousness is meaning constituting action.

The creation or constitution of meaning is an achievement of pure consciousness as

functioning intentionality.

When it is mentioned that meaning is constituted, it doesnt mean that an an sich

meaningless entity [being] is spirited with meaning by the intentional functioning

consciousness in order to make a meaningful experience possible. Meaning doesnt

belong to a self-enclosed substantial consciousness which projects its internal

images on the screen of experience. It is precisely this traditional idealistic viewwhich Husserl is trying to reject with his description of the structure of consciousness

as intentional. As functional intentionality, consciousness is not an in itself resting

reservoir of apriori meanings and therefore also focussed on entities transcendent [or

outside] consciousness that could be understood in terms of these apriori meanings.

Essentially consciousness is as consciousness focussed on what is not consciousness.

Consciousness is intentional being with orpresence at. Only in this intentional being

with are entities disclosed and thus understandable as meaningful entities. It means

however, on the other hand, that meaning does not belong merely to a brute reality

an sich, i.e. to a reality where consciousness is not intentionally present. The

disclosedness or intelligibility of an entity as a meaningful entity, is always

relationally involved in the intentional functioning consciousness. Only in this

unbreakable correlation between noesis [intentional act, meaning giving focus] and

noema [intended entity, designated object] does meaning originate.

REMARK

In the dual unity of noesis and noema we have, in a certain sense, the opposite ofKants distinction between the formal and material aspects of our knowledge. In

Kants view the subjective side or noetical aspect of our knowledge has rigid,

constant and apriori forms [perceptive forms and mental categories] which function

as static and universal operative structures of theoretical reason in all rational

knowledge. The variable aspect of our knowledge is according to this view onlygiven in that which is perceivable, i.e. in data of our perceptions that have their origin

in the unknowable Ding an sich [Thing in itself].

With Husserl however the noetical aspect of our experience and knowledge has a

dynamic and always changing structure. The noetical is not situated in categories or

perceptive forms that remain stable and constant, but in the continuously changing

intentional acts or attitudes of consciousness which on their part collaborate with the

correlative noemata. Transcendental consciousness is not a static composition of a

formal moulding frame, but it is the dynamic activity of an always changing focus

or attitude. The noetical aspect of our knowledge cannot be explained in an apriori

manner by pointing at fixed forms; it should rather continuously and creatively be

brought to language in relation to each phenomenon in its correlation with the noemainvolved.

18


19/24

Kants fixation of the noetical aspect of our experience in several fixed categories and

perceptive forms is in fact an unjustified restriction of our objective experience to the

experience of the natural sciences. The meaning of entities in the natural sciences are

hereby proclaimed as the only objective meaning which an entity can have, i.e. as the

only meaning which is free from subjective arbitrariness, and which thus has

objective status. The way of experiencing in the natural sciences is however only one

modification of our intentional life; it is only one possible Einstellung [attitude] in

the midst of a multitude of possible attitudes of the intentional functioning

consciousness. The meaning of an entity from the viewpoint of natural sciences is

consequently only one of many possible meanings or nuances of meaning which an

object may have for a knowing consciousness. The chemical meaning of water as it is

expressed in the formula H2O, is e.g. only one possible nuance of meaning that water

as experienced entity may have for us. It is a meaning that corresponds with a specific

intentional focus, namely a chemical questioning. There are other meanings of water

which correspond with other intentional foci, e.g. that of a thirsty traveller in the

desert, an angler, a drowning person, a fire fighter, an artist or a minister at the

baptismal font. In every perspective the entity water is meant in a different way andtherefore attains another nuance of meaning. In terms of Husserls view, it is

impermissible to proclaim one meaning or nuance of meaning as the only objective

and legitimate meaning. Such a proclamation is on the one hand an under-evaluation

of the abundance of our intentional life, on the other hand a disregard of the fact that

all meaning of experiences is constituted by the intentional functioning

consciousness.

The idea could emerge that the phenomenologist, after the reduction to the stream of

pure meaning-experiencing, could experience a series of phenomena and see the

essence of every one separately as an isolated entity an sich and make a

phenomenological description of each. It is not so simple. The phenomenological

analysis and description is very complicated. Apart from the fact that the cogitationesshould be analysed in terms of their noetical and noematical aspects, Husserl also

identified another structure of the functioning intentionality. This is the horizon

structure of our conscious experience.

The thesis of intentionality boils down to the fact that every phenomenon originally

appears to us as a specific meaning, and is therefore understandable, because we let it

appear like that to us by our active and selective attitude of our subjective

consciousness. The intentional thesis is therefore closely connected to the idea of the

constitution of meaning and the idea of the perspectivist determination of this

constitution of meaning. The knowing consciousness does not create meaningfulentities. Meaningful entities are however built by a complex of intentional acts. Such

intentional acts are selective. They always happen from a definite attitude or

orientation point which creates a definite perspective. It implies that the intentional

building of meaning happens within a confined surrounding which phenomenology

defines with the term horizon. In the following paragraph, we explore this central

concept of phenomenology, with special reference to Husserl who introduced the

concept.

19


20/24

6. THE HORIZON STRUCTURE OF EXPERIENCE

When the field of the pure experience of meaning is reduced, it is clear according to

Husserl that an entity never appears on its own, it never appears as an isolated

individuum on its own. Every given noema which is intended in a conscious

experience and is experienced as meaningful, always presents itself as a figure withina horizon. The term horizon [from the Greek horidzomai = to surround, to enclose,

to limit] as the designation of an essential structure of our original experience, simply

postulates that all our conscious experiences always happen within a confined field of

experience. This confined field forms the background that influences every conscious

theme of our experiences.

The horizon structure designates, firstly - considered from the noematical side- that

intended entities are originally never experienced in isolation. Intended entities are

always embedded in a complex, though coherent field of more entities which are

implicitly co-intended in a specific intentional act. The intended entity in a specific

experience of meaning always refers to other entities and forms a coherent andreferential order. This network of mutual references is an essential pre-requisite for

the fulfilment of the specific meaning of the intended entity. In other words, it is only

in its reference to other implicitly intended entities that a specific intended entity

receives its peculiar and articulated meaning in our experience. Thus, the reference to

other entities intrinsically belongs to the meaning structure of a meaningful entity and

is not constituted secondarily or afterwards through a process of argumentation and/or

association.

Noetically seen, it means that an intentional focus or attitude also reveals a complex

structure in the sense that it surpasses the specific entity ornoema on which it focuses.The intentional focus always implicitly intends entities other than the specific noema

at hand. Every intentional act therefore immediately implies other possibilities or

potential intentional acts by which the implicitly intended entities could have been

explicitly intended. By the immediate implication of reference to other possible

intended acts, every intentional focus organises a coherent referential order around

itself, a horizon within which the explicit intended entities of our experience appear.

Secondly, the term horizon designates that our experience is never all-embracing or

all-inclusive. Our experience always happens within the limited framework of a

specific and enclosed field of experience. Our experience always is perspectively

determined; it always occurs within a limited framework that corresponds with aspecific focus from a definite point of view. The limited framing which structurally

belongs to all experience, is not static and unchanging. Precisely this is the

enclosedness of a horizon. A horizon is the peculiar boundary which is always

expanding without disappearing. We can reach out to the boundary, but we can never

arrive at it or transcend it, simply because it is a consistently retreating border or limit.

The boundaries of our field of experience are shifting all the time in proportion to the

expansion of our current, always changing perspective. We can never abolish our

confinement within boundaries as such. We experience entities as meaningful only

within the confinement and limiting frame of a horizon.

According to Husserl we should differentiate the horizon structure of our experiencefurther into an external and internal horizon. What has been said up till now about the

20


21/24

structure of the horizon is mainly applicable to the external horizon of an intended

entity. Every meaningful entity in our experience appears within an external horizon

of also implicitly intended entities. We call it an external horizon because the

intentional act which explicitly intended a particular entity, implies several other

potential intentional acts which are not identical to it, but external to it.

The internal horizon, on the other hand, is connected to the fact that every intentional

act on its own is a synthesis of [or it is built up by] several internal partial-acts which

implicate one another and constitute in this way an internal horizon. Every partial-act

corresponds with or intends a specific aspect or Abschattung [profile, perspective]

of the noematical entity that is meant by the total intentional act as a unity. Every

aspect that is intended by a particular partial-act is always already embedded within a

coherent order or horizon of also implicitly intended aspects which in turn implicitly

refer to other potential intentional acts. All aspects of a meaningful experienced entity

are never simultaneously given in our experience. I always experience an entity in

consecutive profiles or aspects. All partial acts of a particular intentional act are never

actually fulfilled in one instant experience. However, every partial act refersimplicitly to all other possible or potential partial acts with which they are identical

within the same intentional focus. In the same way every aspect of an intended entity,

as it correlates with a particular partial act of an intended focus, refers to all other also

intended aspects. It is precisely for this reason that I experience in each aspect that is

explicitly intended in one actualised partial act, the total entity in its meaningfulness

for me. As I experience more and more new aspects consciously by the explicit

fulfillment of partial acts, the intended entity attains a deeper and richer meaning for

me.

The horizon structure of experience therefore means that the noematical correlate of

an intentional act is the nodal point of a network of internal and external references.

The meaning of an entity is always constituted within an external and internal

horizon. To clarify meaning phenomenologically and to see its essence, thus requires

clarification of the external and internal horizons within which such meaning is

constituted. All potential external intentional acts as well as all potential internal

partial acts which are implicated by the meaning constituting intentional act should

consciously and explicitly be actualised. The conscious actualisation of all potential

implicated acts and partial acts search for the complete fulfilment of everything that

was implicitly intended in the consciously and horizon-like experience of meaning.

The actualisation of potential acts and partial acts is called intentional analysis by

Husserl. Intentional analysis is in fact the reflection whereby the transcendentalconsciousness brings its own achievement to light in a clear description. This

achievement is the building or the constitution of meaning which is presupposed by

natural experience, but at the same time concealed by it. Intentional analysis is the

explicit and conscious analysis of the constitution of meaning. Husserl realised that

this is an endless and tiresome task, but he thought it is nevertheless feasible in

principle. Because of this he saw pure consciousness or the ego cogito as the originaldimension of all meaningful experiences.

The horizon of our experience is not a particular content or entity of our experiences

alongside other contents or entities which as such corresponds with specific

intentional acts. It rather is the transcendental pre-requisite for the meaningful

21


22/24

experience of entities berhaupt [at all]. Thus, horizon is a structural moment in our

experience which makes meaningful experience of entities possible.

The horizon structure demonstrates on the one hand the finiteness of our human

experience. Our experience is always already confined to boundaries. This limitedness

is in principle insurmountable. On the other hand it is precisely this confining, butalways expanding and evading horizon which gives mobility and expansive power to

our experience. The confining horizon is simultaneously an inviting horizon; it

demonstrates the possibilities for moving further, for transcending that which is

already experienced to that which is not yet experienced and lies behind the

boundaries of the present horizon.

7. THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO AS WORLD EXPERIENCING LIFE

We have already seen that every experience of meaning is horizon-like, i.e. the

intention of the intentional focus in a consciously experiencing of meaning is only

fulfilled within a network of external and internal references. Every referenceimmediately implicates other potential intended acts which possibly could be realised

within new horizons of experience. The question is whether there is an ultimate limit

to the referential coherence of possible intentional acts and the possible horizons of

experiences which correspond with it. To ask it differently: Is there an all-embracing

horizon or totality for our experience within which all possible horizons of experience

hang together and which corresponds with the transcendental ego as referential point

of all possible intentional acts?

The answer to this question is the phenomenon of world. We have seen that the

fundamental proposition of natural experience is the expression of faith in a real

existing world as the temporal and spatial whole of real existing entities. The

phenomenological reduction eliminated this fundamental proposition/assumption.

The residue that remained was the ego cogito mea cogitata i.e. the stream of

conscious experiencing of meaning of which I am absolute certain to be my

experiences. When we investigate [explore] these experiences of meaning, it is quite

obvious that the reference to a real existing world is eliminated. However, that world

didnt disappear all together. The world re-appears in a new way in the sphere of

transcendental experience, namely as the pre-requisite for the fulfilment of every

possible intentional act in the experience of meaning. The character of worldliness or

mundaneness always and already belongs to every meaning that we could possibly

bring to consciousness in transcendental experience. All meaning is mundane orworldly meaning. The world doesnt appear in transcendental experience as aparticular entity, but as an essential characteristic of all meaningful entities. All

entities of our transcendental experience always implicate the world. The world is a

constitutive element in the occurrences of intentionality. Fundamentally it has to

connect in one way or another with the total intentional activity which is the

transcendental ego.

If the world does not appear horizon-like as a particular entity to the transcendental

ego, this fundamental connection or coherent relation could not be part of thecorrelation ofnoesis-noema. The only other possibility is that the connection could be

interpreted as the correlation of perspective-horizon. The world appears in thetranscendental experience as horizon. While all pure entities of transcendental

22


23/24

experience always implicate worldliness, we have to conclude that in the occurrence

of intentionality the world connects with the transcendental ego as the all-embracingand final horizon.

World is the expression for the whole network of references which are implicated in

every possible intentional act. The world, phenomenologically seen, is not the totalexternal sum of all meaningful entities, but the final and all-embracing boundary

within which all the intentional foci of the transcendental ego occur. World is the last

or final boundary between that which is meaningful or meaningless to me.

As all-embracing horizon of our experience, the world phenomenologically seen - is

not a neutral and stagnant system of relations or coherent referential order. World

rather always implicates a perspectivical centre around which experience evolves.

This perspectivical centre is the transcendental ego as functioning intentionality.

World is always my world. World and transcendental ego implicate each other in a

unity of mutual or reciprocal implication and belonging. This unity of reciprocal

implication is the fundamental structure of the original experience behind which ourquestioning cant reach. If the world always already is my world, then we should also

say that the transcendental ego is always world experience. The world announcesitself in every possible experience of meaning where an intentional act is fulfilled.

It belongs to the essential structure of the transcendental ego that it always already isworld-experience. World designates according to Husserl an I can, an ability

of the experiencing ego. By that he doesnt mean that the egos experience of theworld is a characteristic of an in itself resting and by itself abiding I, in the same

sense as e.g. the ability to touch is a particular characteristic of humans. The ability to

world experiencing is not a mere potentiality which could sporadically and

incidentally be actualised. The ability to world experiencing rather is in a certain

sense the transcendental ego itself. The transcendental ego always is worldexperiencing and all possible intentional foci always happen on the basis or within the

framework of this fundamental world experiencing. When the concept world is

qualified as the expression of an I can, Husserl only wanted to say the world is not

an isolated and on its own standing reality an sich that is separated by a gap from

the experiencing I, a gulf which should be overcome by experience. World is rather

the unabolishable horizon that is glued to the intentional functioning consciousness in

al its modifications. All concrete experiences occur on the basis of a fundamental

familiarity of the I within its world.

For this reason Husserl called the transcendental ego world experiencing life. In itsdeepest foundation human subjectivity as intentionality is world experiencing life.

With the concept life Husserl demonstrated that the world experiencing of the

transcendental ego is not a resting state of a static and bi-polar relation, but rather adynamic and developing state; a state that is always evolving in an ongoing, lively

mobility. His world as final horizon is always glued to the transcendental ego, but thehorizon is not a static and unmovable boundary. By consciously actualising the

always increasing potential intentional acts, which are implicated by the world as final

network of references, the experience of the world of the transcendental ego unfoldsin a dynamic and ongoing mobility.

23


24/24

Husserl interpreted the world thus in its original given-ness as the all-embracing

horizon of which the transcendental ego is the perspectival centre around which allintentional occurrences of the transcendental ego find their fulfilment. Originally the

world is always my world, i.e. the world of the transcendental ego as worldexperiencing life. The phenomenological reduction brings our original experience to

consciousness as occurrence of the meaning-constitution which occurs within theintimate mutual involvement with each other of the transcendental ego and its world.

Date post:	08-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	meme999
View:	231 times
Download:	0 times

Husserl English Final

Documents