221Human Studies 27: 221–239, 2004.C© 2004 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Husserl and the Penetrability of the Transcendental andMundane Spheres

ROBERT ARPDepartment of Philosophy, Saint Louis University, 3800 Lindell Blvd., St.Louis,MO 63156-0907, U.S.A. (E-mail: arpr@slu.ed)

Essentially phenomenology is a product of the transcendentalsubject, whereas science in the ordinary sense is a product ofthe mundane subject. – Eugen Fink

Abstract. There is a two-fold problem the phenomenologist must face: the first has to do withthinking like a phenomenologist given that one is always already steeped in the mundane sphere;the second has to do with the phenomenologist entering into dialogue with those scientists,psychologists, sociologists and other laypersons who still remain in the mundane sphere. Iaddress the first problem by giving an Husserlian-inspired account of the movement from themundane to the transcendental, and show that there are decent prospects for getting life-worldfolks to start thinking like phenomenologists. I address the second problem by showing thatHusserl has himself caught in a dilemma: either the reduction takes place and no communicationis possible between phenomenologist and non-phenomenologist, or the reduction does nottake place and the phenomenological method remains a psychological makeshift, supposedlyaccessible to Husserl and his esoteric followers.

Introduction

There is a two-fold problem the phenomenologist must face. The first hasto do with the possibility of thinking like a phenomenologist given that oneis always already steeped in the mundaneness of the natural attitude. This isto pose a question that is Platonic in tone: How does one break free fromthe epistemic fetters that keep us thinking like life-world folks and penetratethe transcendental sphere? To put the question in another way, how does one“reverse the natural tendency of thinking?”1 Essentially, this is a problem thatany person who goes about “philosophizing” must face, as Husserl makesclear in The Crisis (1970, pp. 131–132, 175), Maurice Natanson suggestsin his Phenomenology and the Social Sciences (1973a, p. 42), and RichardZaner indicates in “On the Sense of Method in Phenomenology” (1975, pp.125–127, 139). I will call this the Way-Out Problem (WOP).

The second problem has to do with the possibility of a phenomenologist,having achieved epistemic transcendence, entering into dialogue with thosescientists, psychologists, sociologists and other laypersons who still remain

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in the mundane sphere. Eugen Fink calls this the “problem of communicatingand announcing transcendental knowledge in the world, in the natural attitude”(1995, p. 101). Natanson puts it another way: “Part of the philosopher’s prob-lem is to communicate with those who are not philosophers, but an equallynotable task is for the philosopher to live in the world he has conceptuallyupended” (1973b, p. 199). Again, Plato comes to mind. The phenomenolo-gist, having performed the transcendental epoche , is in a position not unlikethat of the freed person in the allegory of the cave who has bathed in thesunlight, and now must communicate this enlightenment to the enslaved in-dividuals deep down in the recesses of the cavern. The question remains: Isit possible for the enlightened phenomenologist to communicate with the un-enlightened scientist, psychologist, sociologist or other layperson? How doesthe phenomenologist re-penetrate the mundane sphere? This problem I willcall the Way-In Problem (WIP).

This paper is divided into two main sections. In the first section I addressthe WOP by giving an Husserlian-inspired account of the movement from themundane to the transcendental that begins in a cognitive interruption, contin-ues through scientific reflection, transcendent self-reflection, phenomenolog-ical self-reflection, and ends in the universal performance of intersubjectivephenomenological self-reflection. The end result of this section of the paperis positive, as I show that there are decent prospects for getting life-worldfolks to break free from naıve natural attitude bonds and start thinking likephenomenologists. The second section is not so positive, as I address theWIP and try to show that Husserl has himself caught in a dilemma: either thereduction takes place and no communication is possible between phenome-nologist and non-phenomenologist, or the reduction does not take place andthe phenomenological method remains a psychological makeshift, supposedlyaccessible to Husserl and his esoteric followers.

The WOP and Demergentism

We all begin like cattle, as Nietzsche intimates (1980, p. 8), or at least weare close to cattle in terms of our reflection concerning our daily life-worldroutines; such is the reality of the natural attitude (Husserl, 1970, pp. 121, 144).Richard Zaner rightly notes that the natural attitude is “mainly characterizedby being attentive to, or being concerned and busied with, the things in theenvirons” associated with that attitude (1970a, p. 49). It is “prison” (Fink,1970, p. 107), a “life full of unquestioned ‘validities’ and naıve ontologicalpresuppositions” (Buckley, 1992, p. 199). So, how does one get from thisnaivety to a transcendental phenomenology that seeks to clarify and disclosethe conditions of the possibility of our knowledge of ourselves and of realityitself? Zaner also notes that phenomenological philosophy is the “scienceof pre-suppositions: of beginnings, of origins, of foundations – including its

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own” (1970b, p. 34). How do we begin the process of turning our heads fromthe wall of shadows, breaking our chains, and journeying out of the cave toget a glimpse of these beginnings/origins/foundations? How does one startto philosophize when it never seems to occur to one that one can or shouldphilosophize in the first place?

At the outset it is important to emphasize that it is not inappropriate to bethinking of the phenomenological relationship between the transcendental andmundane spheres as analogous to the Platonic relationship between the out-of-cave and in-the-cave spheres. Thinkers like Zaner (1970a, p. 206), Heidegger(1971), Natanson (1973a, p. 40), McGaughey (1976) and Hopkins (1991)approach Husserl in this way, and Fink’s comments on Husserl’s methodologyhave this Platonic air (1970, p. 107; 1972, pp. 6–10). Insofar as Husserlthought phenomenology to be the true methodology of the philosopher (cf.Husserl, 1970, pp. 172, 175; Husserl, 1995, pp. 108–109; Fink, 1995, pp.114–115), and insofar as Western philosophy owes its genesis in many waysto Plato and the methodology expressed in the Republic’s cave allegory, thereis a philosophical continuum that links Husserl to Plato. Thus, in their workconcerning phenomenology Stewart and Mickunas (1974) can maintain that“as long as the sense of wonder of which Plato spoke does not arise, that is,as long as men refrain from questioning the basis of this world of experience,there is no philosophy” (p. 25).

Let me start with an illustration of what I think comprises the psycho-epistemological process spanning from naivety to the transcendental we-community, or Wir-Gemeinschaft as Husserl calls it (cf. King, 1982). Vi-sualize the entire process as layers (or levels) of something like an onion (orthe earth), whereby each layer that is peeled back reveals another layer underit until a core is reached. Below is a listing of what would be revealed at eachlayer/level, as well as at the core:

Outer Layer 1: The unreflective, naıve, natural attitude, mundane, everydaylife-world perceptions of the typical person

Layer 2: The third-person, reflective, naıve, theoretical attitude, mundaneexperience of the scientist

Layer 3: The first-person, reflective, world-bracketed, transcendent experienceof the philosopher

Layer 4: The third-person, reflective, ego-and-world-bracketed, transcendentalconsciousness of the phenomenologist

Inner Core 5: The third-person plural, reflective, ego(s)-and-world(s)-bracketed, intersubjective, universal, transcendental consciousness of thephenomenological we-community

This illustration suggests a few things about the life-world in relation to thephenomenological experience.

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First, even though the life-world is transcended in the epoche, it is notdiscarded altogether. As Husserl tells us, for the phenomenologist the “worldis valid and remains in its actual validity for us, no matter what interests wemay pursue; like all interests, those involving eidetic cognition are also relatedto it” (1970, p. 47). Fink comments further:

The transcending of the world which takes place in performing the phe-nomenological reduction does not lead outside of or away from the worldto an origin which is separate from the world . . . as if leading to some otherworld; the phenomenological transcending of the world, as the disclosureof transcendental subjectivity, is at the same time the retention of the worldwithin the universe of absolute “being” that has been exposed (1970, p.99).

Farber (1962, p. 531), Zaner (1975, p. 126), Stroker (1987, p. 75), Buckley(1992, pp. 199–200) and Carr (1999, p. 97) make similar claims about thebracketing of the life-world. Referring again to the illustration, one may thinkof peeling off a layer of the onion and disposing of it; however, this is thewrong way to think of the process. Better yet, think of the onion as beingsplit open and its insides exposed. This way, one can see outer layer(s) inrelation to inner layer(s). In the same way that the outer layer in relation toinner layer is “retained” in one’s visual field, so too, one retains knowledgeof the life-world as one comes to know scientifically. Likewise, one retainsscientific knowledge as one comes to self-knowledge; and life-world, scienceand self-knowledge are retained in the phenomenological reduction. After all,knowledge gained from the life-world, the sciences, and philosophical dis-ciplines supplements our phenomenological knowledge (cf. Farber, 1962, p.535).

Second, this illustration suggests that at the core of the entire experienceis phenomenological we-consciousness. Such an idea is not foreign to phe-nomenology, as the pre-conditions for our experience of the life-world areimbedded in our experience of that world. One and the same experience con-tains a concrete life-world “appearance” that conceals an “inner transcenden-tal essence” (Fink, 1995, p. 114; Husserl, 1970, p. 133; cf. Mouillie, 1997).The life-world is the “matrix from which all abstractive activity is generated”(Natanson, 1973a, p. 40). We recall that, for Husserl, it is transcendentalwe-consciousness that makes transcendent consciousness possible. In turn,transcendent consciousness makes experience possible. Finally, this experi-ence is the pre-condition for life-world perceptions. So, one need only beginthe process of exposing the core of that experience to see that there is acontinuum leading from life-world to we-consciousness. Helmut Wagner andGeorge Psathas hint at this seamlessness in one’s cognitive life. Although thevarious reflections “originate in different states of our consciousness, in dif-ferent attentional attitudes toward life,” it is the “one and same consciousness

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which shows different tensions and it is the one and same life, the mundane lifeunbroken from birth to death, which is attended to in different modifications”(1962, p. 191).

Finally, I have chosen to refer to the process of moving from life-world towe-consciousness as demergentism. This is a play on the word emergentismas understood by philosophers of mind and biology. For example, the mind issaid to emerge as a result of the complex processes of the brain (cf. Hagan andHirafuji, 2001; Silberstein, 2001), or biological processes in general are saidto emerge from physical and chemical processes (cf. Mayr, 1996). Whereasemergentism refers to the metaphysical notion of more complex entities arisingfrom less complex entities, I am stipulating the term demergentism to referto the epistemological process of uncovering the imbedded we-consciousnessthat ultimately underlies all of our knowledge concerning ourselves and reality(cf. Wagner and Psathas, p. 191). As Zaner notes, in doing phenomenology weare “not engaged in a kind of metaphysical easter-egg hunt” (1970a, p. 50).In the Husserlian phenomenological methodology, the ego demerges fromepistemological level to level until finally achieving universal consciousness.

Having given a general overview of this illustration, we can now speakabout the specific steps in this demergent process, and how it is possiblefor someone in the life-world to demerge from that cave-like perspective touniversal consciousness.

Early on in our lives we are taught what to believe, how to act, how to dress,what goals we should have for ourselves; for all intents and purposes, we areprogrammed by parents and role-models. This is not meant to be a critique,and it is probably good to guide children (and other unreflective folk) in thismanner. However, the end result of such programming is a kind of routine-ness; life becomes customary, procedural, humdrum, and truly mundane inthe Husserlian sense. Such routine perpetuates what I will refer to as cogni-tive flow. Cognitive flow is the uninterrupted psycho-epistemological state ofone’s mind as one goes about one’s business in the natural attitude, whateverthat business may be. Think of those appetite-driven folk in Plato’s Republicwho farm, mine, stitch, live, laugh, lie, and love as would be commonplacegiven their particular lifestyle. Alternatively, think of a machine or a computersimply going through the unimpeded algorithmic motions of some procedure.

At some point, there is bound to be a break in this cognitive flow. I willrefer to this break as cognitive interruption. Cognitive interruption can resultfrom any number of different possible events affecting a rational being, fromfairly minor events such as moments of doubt and uncertainty (cf. Zaner1970a, p. 48), being thrust into a new environment, or having one’s plansfoiled, to major events such as being present at a birth, going through intensesuffering or witnessing a death. One possible result of a cognitive interruptionis reflection. I am suggesting that the demergent process of reflection beginswith cognitive interruption, and a pass is made from Outer Layer 1 to Layer 2.

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For example, it was commonplace for folks living in Miletus circa 700 BCEto appeal to the shaman class of Greek mythologists when concerned about theweather and its relation to a crop yield for a particular season. Farmers wouldconsult shamans, who would consult their oracles, and then the shamans wouldmake weather predictions. Imagine what happened to this commonplace rou-tine when, time and time again, the predictions went unfulfilled. The farmers’livelihood, as well as the livelihood of the community (because they reliedon that farming for food), would be put into disorder. This disorder, in turn,would cause a cognitive interruption, which would cause reflection to occur.Something like this must have been a source of the move from mythologyto the crude science of the early Milesian philosophers/phusiscists as Barnes(1987, pp. 16–17) and Irwin (1989, pp. 20–21) suggest. Thales did not just ac-cept the standard party-line explanation for natural events that was routine andcommonplace for his Greek mythological world; he reflected, observed, hy-pothesized, reflected again, and thus, demerged from Outer Layer 1 to Layer 2.

Consider another type of example. Colleagues of mine have used Tolstoy’sThe Death of Ivan Illich or Frankl’s Man’s Search For Meaning as the firstwork students read in their Introduction to Philosophy courses in order tojump-start philosophical discussion. Also, I have told the story of my friendwho denounced god’s existence in the hospital emergency room to wife, in-laws and parish priest while holding the body of his infant son who had diedsuddenly of SIDS as a way to get my students to start thinking of the Problemof Evil. Being privy to death and suffering create cognitive interruption, whichin turn causes reflection to occur as well. Tools are put down, televisions aremuted, daydreams cease, and questions begin to arise: What am I really? Isthis all there is to life? Do I have an origin? Do we have an origin? Does realityhave an origin? Is there a master plan? Again, the move is made from OuterLayer 1 to Layer 2.

There is more to this onion schema. I want to suggest that this kind offlow/interruption activity occurs at every layer in the demergent process. Ateach cognitive level a kind of routineness is achieved, some dissonance occurs,and reflection takes place. Zaner hints at something like this occurring when hetalks about “shifts of focal attention” and “consequent reflective orientations”associated with the phenomenological reduction (1975, pp. 125, 139–140). Iwant to extend and expand this idea as the fundamental epistemic mechanismat work in our cognitive lives in general.

For example, in the theoretical attitude of science cognitive regularity isachieved, and a cognitive interruption occurs in order to begin the processof reflecting on the value of science in relation to the ego doing that sci-entific work. There must be something that science leaves unanswered, orthere must be some paradoxical implication that results from holding to a par-ticular scientific view. In Kant’s time, empiricism and rationalism each hadtheir seemingly sound arguments that generated antinomies (cf. Kant, 1929,

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A409-B436–A567-595). These antinomies caused a cognitive rift, Kant wasawakened from his dogmatic slumber, and science was reflected upon as wellas re-worked as an activity of a transcendent ego (cf. Carr, 1977; Robinson,2000). Thus, Kant demerged from Layer 2 to Layer 3.

Likewise, a cognitive stasis had been achieved with Kantian-inducedGerman idealism. Of course Hegel and others like Schopenhauer had spokenthe truth about reality; the world is as I or we envision it. It is constructivized,relativized, psychologized, and as Frege tells us, the end result of such idealismis that “everything is shunted off into the subjective” (1905, pp. 324–325; alsoFrege, 1960, p. 4). This kind of idealism became the philosophical party-linefor a time-period (cf. Solomon and Higgins, 1993). Once again, however, acognitive interruption occurred. Is the solus ipse or solus communis all thereis? Is there a world outside of me or we? If so, how do I/we know it or have ac-cess to it? And again, a further reflection takes place. I know my own thoughtsmost intimately, so let me reflect on myself as well as the world I have mademy own. Now, rather than simply living naively in the life-world as I did be-fore, I reflect on it, as well as the transcendent consciousness that makes it up,and on the meaning of the objects in the life-world. Consciousness becomesconsciousness of myself and the world, not mere pictures, perceptions, andimages of them (cf. Kockelmans, 1994, pp. 174–205; Welton, 1999, pp. 3–21).Thus, Husserl demerged from Layer 3 to Layer 4. In the words of Stroker:

Insofar as I, as an onlooker, speak of the “validity” of an existential belief,or, more precisely, insofar as I establish myself as a phenomenological on-looker in the thematization of this validity, a kind of reflection is put intoeffect which brings to light the phenomenological contents of the naıveperformance of acts which were completely hidden in natural reflection(1987, p. 72).

Finally, there was a phenomenological self-reflection that arose from thejolting possibility that I am alone with this world, and there are no other I’s butme. There may be myself (viz., the solus I) and the world, but are there otherI’s? If so, how do I come to know them intimately as other Is, if all I apperceiveis jaws moving up and down, sounds coming from their mouths, bodily length,width, depth, motion, etc.? And if these apperceptions are other I’s, how do Icommunicate with them? I must assume an inter-subjective connection withthese I’s. They must see, hear, feel, think and reason as I do: “My own world,and the very conditions of my meaningful experience, presuppose other selvesand an objective world” (Farber, 1962, p. 531). I must attribute to them thesame kind of achievements that make up my own genuine being, and I mustthink that together we can get at some kind of essential knowledge and absolutejustification regarding the world. It is the recognition of the transcendental we-community that comprises phenomenological activity in the complete sense(cf. Fink, 1995, 103–104). Thus, folks like Husserl, Fink, Scheler, Schutz

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and Heidegger demerged from Layer 4 to Layer 5. As Stroker observes: “Ifthe epoche is to be a philosophical method, Husserl demands that it must beradically conceived and universally performed” (1987, p. 73, her emphasis).

I have painted a somewhat crude and broad-sweeping historical picture ofthis cognitive flow/interruption schema that moves from pre-pre-Socratic topost-Husserlian philosophy; however, such a continuum is not inappropriategiven Husserl’s influences and proteges (cf. Mohanty, 1996; Rollinger, 1999;Crowell, 2001). At the same time, the question arises as to whether this ac-tivity can take place in the here-and-now of one’s epistemology. In principle,it would seem that someone could be brought from naivety to universal con-sciousness by an expert trained in phenomenology, and that it is not just thegreat geniuses of the philosophical world who are privy to such enlighten-ment. Something like this occurs (we philosophers hope!) within the contextof philosophy classrooms all over the world at any given time, as the examplesof my colleagues’ use of the Tolstoy and Frankl texts suggest. If this is true,then the WOP seems not to be an insurmountable problem.

I have suggested that philosophizing begins with some kind of cognitiveinterruption of cognitive flow in the mundane life-world, and that one contin-ues to philosophize by a flow/interruption-flow/interruption-flow/interruptionactivity demerging from level to level in an epistemological schema not un-like that of exposing the layers and core of an onion. The Platonic problemof breaking free from one’s epistemic fetters is not really a problem if somefolks already have broken free and are coaxing those who stare at the wall toturn around and begin the journey out of the cavern. It could be said, then, thatthere really is no WOP because there always exist thinkers who already arefree from their fetters. However, my account of cognitive interruption workseven if all of us are always already staring at the wall. If someone asked howwe begin the process of turning away from the wall in the first place, myaccount helps explain this. The answer has to do with an interruption in thecognitive flow associated with one’s humdrum life that causes one to reflect onthat humdrum life. Also, my account explains how folks can demerge furtherfrom science to philosophy to phenomenological philosophy until reachingthe core of our epistemic life, universal phenomenological self-consciousness.This occurs because there is some kind of flow/interruption-flow/interruptionat each layer of the cognitive schema. The next section of this paper exploresthe possibility of the enlightened phenomenologist, having performed such areduction, communicating with the unenlightened scientist or layperson.

The WIP and Husserl’s Response

While responding to the criticisms of phenomenology made by Rickert and hisschool (cf. Zocher, 1932 and Kreis, 1930) Eugen Fink points out that, becauseof its transcendental nature, phenomenology is its own source of paradoxes

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with respect to communication, the possibility of language, and logic. Finkentertains the possibility that these “unavoidable difficulties” lead to a kind ofphilosophical aporia, ultimately neutralizing the phenomenological positionas “inadequate” because all modes of communication and logic must takeplace within the context of the natural attitude (1970, pp. 142, 144, 145n1).Given that the phenomenologist purports to transcend, or even “escape” thenatural attitude, all relatedness to the scientist who is steeped in the naturalattitude is understood by critics of phenomenology to be doomed. Therefore,the end result would seem to be that the spheres of the transcendental andthe mundane remain impenetrable, thereby making communication betweenthe phenomenologist and the scientist, psychologist, sociologist, or any otherlife-world thinker, impossible (pp. 142–145).

Another way of posing the paradox runs something like this: Either (a)the transcendental is communicable or (b) the transcendental is not commu-nicable. If (a), then the problem is that the transcendental is communicable toother monadic phenomenologists only and, in the words of Alfred Schutz, the“transcendental ego is mute” (1962a, p. 190) with respect to the mundane ego.However, if (b), then the problem is that science does not have anything to ben-efit from phenomenological philosophy, and Die Krisis der Wissenschaftenin general wins the day. Natanson asks a specifically practical question thatencapsulates this dilemma: “Is there a philosophical problem of intersubjec-tivity for the sociologist who submits his paper to a professional journal?”(1973a, p. 39). And this philosophical problem is really a phenomenologicalphilosophical problem. How is the chemist metaphysically, epistemically, orotherwise benefited by the “horizon”? the biologist by “a presentation”? thephysician by the “eidetic”? Jon Doe on the street by the “reduction”? Whatphenomenology needs to do is show that communication of the transcendentalis possible to the scientist or other non-phenomenologist steeped in mundane-ity and that, therefore, science as well as other disciplines can be in a positionto understand itself as grounded in phenomenology.

Husserl was well aware of the various criticisms leveled against phe-nomenology, as can be evidenced by his close working relationship with Finkand endorsement of Fink’s interpretations of the phenomenological method(Fink, 1970, pp. 72–73; Fink, 1995, p. 201; Cairns, 1976, pp. 93–95). Husserlthinks that, given the paradoxes and apparent aporia that are generated bythe transcendental method, it is still possible for the phenomenologist to com-municate effectively with the scientist steeped in the natural attitude. He seesthe purpose of the phenomenological endeavor as one that takes scientistswho exist in the naıvely “already-given world” (1970, p. 132; 1995, p. 152;Cairns, 1976, p. 93) and helps move them into a state whereby they can reflectupon such a world and, to use the words of Fink, see the world as “transparentwith respect to its transcendental meaning” (1970, p. 143). This can only bepossible if lines of communication, language and logic are set up between the

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phenomenologist and the scientist. If science needs the comprehensive “em-brace” (Husserl, 1995, p. 7) of phenomenology, then science must understandwhat is entailed in this embrace.

Husserl felt that the formulation of his phenomenology could indeed beactualized by a “building up through theoretical steps from a naıve origin”(1970, pp. 132–133; 1995, p. 153). This naıve origin is the sphere of the mun-dane. Although the performance and the fruits of the transcendental reductionare “tasks” that exist as “extremely complicated and always lead to extensivedisciplines when we penetrate more deeply” (Husserl, 1995, p. 55), Husserlstill envisioned such tasks as possible to be undertaken. He clearly statesthat his transcendental phenomenology exists as a “beginning philosophy thatgrows and branches out” into the sciences of the naıve mundane world (1995,p. 152), and so he envisions a vital and life-giving connection between thetranscendental and the mundane.

The attacks on Husserl take the form of the paradox of communication, theparadox of language, and the paradox of logic. In opposition to the phenome-nologist of the transcendental world, Fink uses the term “dogmatist” to refer tothe scientist of the mundane world; but dogmatist can refer to any other non-phenomenologist in the world. The common element that runs through eachspecific paradox is the idea that the dogmatist, in relating to the phenomenol-ogist, is “left in the dark” because the dogmatist either has no understandingof the phenomenologist’s perspective, or can find no common footing fromwhich to respond to the phenomenologist’s epistemic claims. With respect tothe paradox of communication, the question is posed as to whether any relat-edness is possible between the dogmatist and the phenomenologist becausethe phenomenologist has broken out of the natural attitude, thereby strippingthe interaction of any common basis. Fink continues:

While all men, no matter how different their manner of thinking, sharethe common basis of the natural attitude, the phenomenologist has brokenout of this basis in performing the reduction . . . His communication withthe dogmatist is now burdened by the difficulty that, for the speaker, theposition from which statements concerning phenomenological knowledgeare made is transparent with respect to its transcendental meaning, whereasit is not so for the listener. Is it therefore possible for them to speak aboutthe same things? (1970, p. 143)

I think that Husserl’s answer to Fink’s final question here is Yes. Here arethe reasons why: Fink states in this quotation that the phenomenologist is “bur-dened” by the difficulty that what is communicated will not be understood bythe listener. This is only the case if the phenomenologist remains in the tran-scendental sphere. Husserl makes it very clear in the Cartesian Meditationsthat daily “practical living is naıve. It is immersion in the already-given world,whether it be experiencing, or thinking, or valuing, or acting” (1995, p. 152).

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Further, he states that the positive sciences are “naıvetes of a higher level”(1995, p. 153). Husserl’s intention is to offer a grounding for the positiveempirical sciences in “genuine concepts that are fundamental to all sciences”(1995, p. 154). But how is Husserl going to be able to accomplish this withoutapproaching the sciences from a standpoint to and from which they can relate?The phenomenologist must be immersed in the mundane world in order tocommunicate such a methodology; however, this is not to say that the phe-nomenologist cannot at the same time remain true to the phenomenologicalattitude. Plato comes to mind once again. The analogy can be drawn to thefreed and enlightened individual who goes down into the cave to communicatewith those in darkness. The enlightened one stays enlightened, but must workwithin the context of the darkened cave employing whatever means necessaryto help free those who are enslaved.

What further counts against the communication aporia is the fact thatHusserl was able to introduce the concept of “phenomenology” to a wholegeneration of thinkers, and some of those thinkers were able to communi-cate with him about his terms and methodology. In short, they were able tobreak free from their epistemic fetters. For example, Alfred Schutz (a dog-matist steeped in the natural attitude according to Fink’s interpretation) wasable to communicate with Husserlian phenomenology and developed his ownadvance upon Husserl’s epoche with the introduction of the “Epoche of theNatural Attitude,” which consists in the bracketing of daily “acts of working”life experiences so as to solve the problem of inter-monadic communication(Schutz, 1962b, pp. 191–192, 233). How was he able to do this if it werenot for Husserl, as it were, “coming to meet him at his level”? Also, severalother thinkers like Heidegger (1962; 1966), Scheler (1960; 1970) and Cairns(1976) were able to communicate with Husserl and his phenomenology toeither accept, reject or improve upon this manner of approach; Fink himself isincluded on the list. They all had to be introduced to this new kind of thinkingin some way. How was this able to happen?

Finally, we note that in the Meditations Husserl communicates his phe-nomenological methodology to a group of scientists by first appealing to themethodology of Descartes, a methodology to which these scientists can relate(cf. MacDonald, 2000, pp. 151–186). Husserl employs terms such as genuineand science that are familiar to the scientist as a way that ultimately will aid inclarifying something quite unfamiliar to the scientist, viz., the transcendentalmethod of discerning the “Objective world” (1995, p. 9). In his revised versionof the reduction in The Crisis, Husserl shows that he is mindful of the difficul-ties entailed in returning to the life-world. However, he still views the naıvelife-world as a “point of departure,” and maintains that the scientist can relateto concepts such as “component” and “stratum” which have been necessarily“transformed” in the reduction (Husserl, 1970, pp. 173–174). So, the claimthat the critic of phenomenology makes concerning non-communicability

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appears suspect. It seems that one can have one’s phenomenological cake andeat it with the non-phenomenologist, too.

The second paradox Fink speaks of deals with the way in which languagewill be presented and utilized by the phenomenologist within the context ofthe mundane sphere.

The criticism is that the phenomenologist uses an “invented technical lan-guage” which is “devoid of meaning” for the non-phenomenologist (1970, pp.143–144). However, Husserl would think that this criticism is misguided inassessing that an invented technical phenomenological language would be de-void of meaning. It seems that the language associated with a new conceptionor idea must necessarily change, and the language itself points to somethingmeaningful, viz., the conception or idea itself. True, just simply to use phe-nomenological language without any reference to the language of the naturalattitude would be devoid of meaning from the standpoint of the natural atti-tude. But when any new concept which does not fit the language of the naturalattitude is at first introduced, no one really fully understands what the conceptmeans. Do we think that the Platonic eidos was meaningful or even discernibleat first by the Pre-socratic, the Cartesian ego cogito by the Scholastic, or theTranscendental Unity of Apperception by the rationalist? No. The idea hereis that the epistemological or metaphysical entrepreneur of every age mustdraw the listener from a state of darkness into a state of light by utilizing con-cepts familiar to the listener’s dark environment. Yes, the phenomenologicalspeaker uses language that is not at first discernible by the listener, and this isunderstandable given the transcendental arena from which the phenomenolo-gist is working. But the phenomenologist must couch terminology within theframework and context of the natural scheme with the goal of bringing theother to the transcendendal. This is what Husserl means when he maintainsin the Meditations that the formulation of his phenomenology could indeedbe “built up through theoretical steps from a naıve origin” (1995, p. 153).

Also, Husserl would argue that the vocabulary of phenomenology uses themundane as a sign-post pointing to something wholly other than the mun-dane, viz., the phenomenological. With the help of mundane terminology,the language of phenomenology can be delineated. In other words, termsthat are unlike those in the phenomenological realm can serve to specify thephenomenological realm.

An analogy may serve to illuminate the point: In trying to communicateto freshmen in my introductory-level Philosophy course the nature of thePlatonic Form of the intelligible world and its relation to its counterpartsin the visible world I say, “The Form is like a perfect 81/2 by 11 original,and from this original many blemished and imperfect copies are made.” Imay even utilize the image of a Xerox machine printing out the imperfectcopies and speak about how these copies participate in the original. I use the

HUSSERL AND THE PENETRABILITY OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL 233

language of simile, analogy, allegory and metaphor, and by speaking about the“familiar” concepts (original, copies, Xerox machine, etc.) I am able to helpthe students see the “transcendent” concepts (Form, participation, intelligibleand visible worlds, etc.). My students, who previously had no knowledgeof such transcendent concepts, begin to grasp what is beyond their familiarconceptions; they become enlightened.

So too, Husserl’s phenomenological language utilizes familiar mundaneconcepts (e.g., as he lists them in the Meditations: world, nature, space, time,psychological being, man, psyche, animate organism, social community, cul-ture) and purports to move beyond these to a “genuine universal ontology”(1995, pp. 154–155). Further than this, the phenomenological terms them-selves can be related in some way to the mundane. Terms like “transcendent,”“bracket,” “horizon,” or even “apperception” strike the listener of the mun-dane world with some general meaning; albeit, from the standpoint of thephenomenologist these terms take on wholly new meanings.

Fink’s concern points to the fact that the transcendental epoche, as it isperformed by the scientist in the mundane world, is no easy task. Husserlis mindful that his entire endeavor is an “endless program” consisting of“enormous tasks” which have goals that are “difficult to arrive at” (1995,pp. 54, 152). Natanson, in titling his book, Edmund Husserl: Philosopher ofInfinite Tasks, obviously questions whether Husserl can achieve such goals(1973, pp. 199–203). However, (despite such an idealistic tenor) Husserl stillthought it feasible to bridge the worlds of the transcendental and the mundane(Husserl, 1970, pp. 173–174; Husserl, 1995, pp. 152–157).

Fink’s third paradox concerns the inadequacy of mundane logic as it at-tempts to grapple with the phenomenological experience, and he refers to it asthe “logical paradox of transcendental determinations” (1970, p. 144). Fromthe mundane perspective there are certain aporias the dogmatist experiencesthat make it such that few or no answers are made evident to the dogmatist inthe quest to understand matters pertaining to the transcendental sphere. Oneexample that Fink utilizes of this “philosophical block” is the relationship thatexists between the empirical and transcendental Ego (1970, p. 144). The phe-nomenologist utilizes a transcendental set of logical relations to explain therelationship that exists between the empirical and phenomenological Ego. Butaccording to Fink, the dogmatist has no cognition of such a relationship giventhe fact that merely mundane logical constructions are made available. Finktells us that this third paradox is “closely connected with the first two,” andhe is correct. Therefore, Husserl most likely would argue that the argumentsused to effectively dispatch Fink’s first two criticisms can be utilized here aswell.

In the same sense that language can be utilized in the mundane sphere asa way to point to the transcendental sphere, so too, the logical constructions

234 ROBERT ARP

of the mundane sphere can perform the same task. Taking Fink’s exampleof the aporia that exists for the dogmatist in attempting to understand therelationship between the empirical and transcendental Ego, we see Husserlin the Meditations and The Crisis speaking to a mundane audience tryingto explain and establish the parameters of the discussion surrounding psy-chology and the reduction. Husserl establishes that consciousness is alwaysconsciousness of something (1995, p. 33). This “something” is the object orwhat Husserl refers to as the cogitatum. Now, one can perceive the cogitatumand this perceiving process is known as the cogito. The perceiving process isa relationship between cogito and cogitatum manifesting what Husserl termsa noetic/noematic movement. I, as the ego who perceives, have a part in thisprocess. Husserl terms the ego who merely perceives an empirical ego (1970,§72, pp. 257–265; 1995, pp. 33–34). But I also have the capacity to reflectupon my own perceiving process. I am the only type of thing in the naturalworld that can, as it were, look upon, reflect upon, or be aware of my owncognitive processes. This kind of activity is different form merely participat-ing in the event of cognition. This reflective capacity is still a part of me, butbecause I can “stand above” or “look upon” my own cognition, there is a sensein which this activity is transcendental. Thus, Husserl splits the ego and termsthis reflective part of the ego “transcendental” (1970, p. 258; 1995, pp. 26, 52,65). I am now envisioned as an Ego (as reflecting or transcendental) engagedin a cogito (perceiving or cognitive processes) of some cogitatum (an objectlike my own bodily self, other bodily selves, or the world).

In a very mundane and “down to earth” fashion Husserl attempts to explainto the reader the conception Ego cogito cogitatum by using the example ofperceiving a house. There is the house (cogitatum), there is my empirical ego’sperception of the house (cogito) as an experiencing of the house, and there isan “experiencing experiencing of the house-perception with all its momentsof the perceiving itself, as the flowing subjective process, and the moments ofthe perceived “house,” purely as perceived” (1995, p. 34; cf. Husserl, 1970, pp.261–262). In the process of explaining these phenomenological logical con-structions, Husserl, a phenomenologist himself, utilizes a logical frameworkthat purports to be understandable by those in the mundane attitude. Husserlwould not see the “insurmountable aporia” that Fink would categorize as “therelationship between the empirical and transcendental ego.”

The WIP and Solipsism

The Natanson quotation near the beginning of this paper emphasizes that thereexist problems when philosophers try to communicate with non-philosophers.There is no denying that this is the case with all types of philosophizing,phenomenology notwithstanding. In fact, Husserl understood full well whatthose problems entailed. Fink’s point (in relaying the criticisms of Rickert

HUSSERL AND THE PENETRABILITY OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL 235

and his school) is that there are seemingly insurmountable aporias generatedby phenomenology that set up the transcendental as a sphere impenetrablefrom within or without. I have tried to construct what I think to be a possibleHusserlian response to these criticisms. Unfortunately, such a response stillremains problematic.

From the outset we can note that there is an ambiguity associated withthe term mundane. On one hand, mundane can mean a particular stance,take, or interpretive perspective taken that is naıve either because it is noteven recognized as a particular stance, or it can and should yield criticallyto more perceptive insight – in this case, by phenomenology. On the otherhand, and this is Fink’s point in his article (as well as in the Sixth Medita-tion), mundane can mean the station of human being in reality that is in-trinsic and constitutive (i.e., it is in principle irremovable because it makeshuman being what it is), and this “station” is existence-in-the-world. Mun-daneity, in other words, is the natural ontological constitution of human being,and there is no way to get out of it without ceasing to be human. So, whenphenomenology proposes a radical reduction the question is, What is beingattempted for phenomenology itself? What phenomenology seems to say isbeing done may in fact be impossible. And here is the ultimate rub: recon-ciling the Ego who is “disinterested spectator” (Husserl, 1970, pp. 157, 256)with the same ego who is also “existence-in-the-world” (Existenz) (Husserl,1995, pp. 152–153; Fink, 1995, pp. 101, 107, 113; Cairns, 1976, p. 93).For the human being “un-humanizes himself” in the reduction (Fink, 1995,p. 120).

Husserl has set up the spheres of the transcendental and the mundane,and may have doomed any communication between the realms because ofwhat is entailed theoretically in the transcendental epoche (cf. Keller, 1999,pp. 39–58; Overgaard, 2002). Such a methodology seems to be involved in asolipsism because all that exists for the Ego is the subjective given appearanceof the external world, including other Egos, as is understood solely fromthe standpoint of that Ego. Fink tries to point out that if you begin withsuch a starting point, then both access to what is external from the Ego’sperspective and access to what is entailed in the transcendental epoche fromthe world’s perspective is not possible. This is not, however, the solipsism ofsubjective idealism. To be sure, this brand of idealism Husserl never ceasedrejecting (e.g., Husserl, 1970, p. 135; Husserl, 1995, pp. 148, 150). In thissense, the problem of communicability is not that of overcoming incarcerationwithin one’s own self, but within the idiosyncratic language of the reductionitself. Thereby, the very nature and possibility of the project of transcendentalphenomenology in the first place becomes suspect.

Yet, Husserl’s endeavor is to show that the phenomenologist and the sci-entist actually communicate with one another. The mere fact of communica-tion does not prove that the transcendental epoche works as Husserl would

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have us believe when he tries to establish the links between science andphenomenology. Now, if Fink is wrong and the two spheres can commu-nicate, then there must be the possibility of getting out of the solipsism thatHusserl has set up in the transcendental epoche. But then if this is true, then thefullness of the epoche never really takes place, and Husserl’s theory becomesshoddy. It seems to me that we do communicate with one another in the naturalrealm, and this then points to the fact that the kind of activity involved in thetranscendental epoche does not and cannot take place. Fink has hit upon anaporia in Husserl that seems unable to be overcome. Either the transcendentalepoche takes place and no communication is possible, or the epoche doesn’ttake place and Husserl’s phenomenology is just a fiction or, at most, an idealthat never can be realized.

The solipsistic part of Husserl’s phenomenology was soon abandoned bythe likes of Heidegger, Schutz and Scheler in favor of a description of thegivenness of the world, not in the solitary experience of the Ego, but in Dasein,social interaction and the “religious act” (Heidegger, 1962; cf. Moran, 2000,192–221; Schutz, 1962b; Scheler, 1960).

In contradistinction to Husserl, who tried to “bracket” everything of theworld in the pursuit of the reduction (as is apparently evinced in this lastquotation), later phenomenologists tried to describe the natural attitude orthe givenness of mundane world taken in itself. I think that this advancebeyond Husserl necessarily had to take place because it became apparent thatthe demand of the transcendental epoche was too ambitious and really aninadequate way of viewing the Ego in relation to the world. A small casein point is that we do assume more than merely the appearance of otherEgos in the very act of communication. The Other exists precisely as Other,not as simply apperceived lip-moving, hand-waving and/or brow-furrowingphenomena (cf. Natanson, 1973a, p. 43).

It is clear that in an ideal world, Husserl would want scientists first to bephenomenologists who have a keen sense of a “genuine universal ontologygrounded on an absolute foundation” (Husserl, 1995, p. 155). But alas, notevery scientist exists as a phenomenologist (in the same way that, for instance,not every citizen in Plato’s Republic exists as a lover of wisdom). So, accordingto Husserl, there must be some sort of established communication between thephenomenologist and the scientist – specifically, for the benefit of the scientistand the rest of us who naıvely go about our business in the natural attitude ofthe mundane world. Such established communication keeps the scientist onsolid phenomenological ground, and ultimately benefits humankind in ethicaland religious realms as well (Husserl, 1995, p. 156). However, the questionwill remain as to whether that the transcendental realm exists as a sphere,impenetrable from within or without, and whether such aspirations for science(or any other kind of theoretical discipline) to base itself on phenomenologicalgrounds will remain frustrated.

HUSSERL AND THE PENETRABILITY OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL 237

Acknowledgements

In a special way, I thank Professor Richard Zaner for his comments andwords of support. Also, I thank Fr. Mike Barber, Brian Cameron, RandyColton and Eleonore Stump for their comments on earlier versions of thispaper.

Note

1. This way of putting the question comes from Henri Bergson, and I thank Professor RichardZaner for bringing this to my attention.

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