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Hypersonic Delivery Vehicles – a crossroads for the UK deterrent Martin Everett
Hypersonic Delivery Vehicles – a crossroads for the UK deterrent
Martin Everett
Background
• 2017-2019 – Science and Security MA, KCL War Studies
• Research focus: arms control, non-proliferation
• Current research assistant at KCL CSSS
• Previously, research physicist (St Andrews, Imperial)
Disclaimer
• All opinions are presented in a personal capacity, and do not represent the views of any of my past or current employers
• When discussing arms control, non-proliferation etc., this is not intended as a criticism of any technical work being carried out by any individual or company
Take-home message
• The decision to take the UK hypersonic is occurring at a very delicate time nationally and internationally, in particular given the precarious state of arms control, the US-UK and US-NATO relationships, and an upcoming election in the shadow of Brexit.
• Hypersonic missiles could, in theory, serve as platforms for the UK's strategic deterrent.
• Policy decisions for the UK deterrent will have to navigate all these tightropes; hypersonics may not be the best option for the UK deterrent and we should consider technological alternatives.
UK domestic political situation
• General election next month – outcome uncertain, anti-nuclear or nuclear-sceptical parties (SNP, Labour) likely to gain an increased share of Parliamentary seats
• Emerging talking point in the election is the nature of the UK’s relationship to the US, in particular with the Trump administration
International political situation – arms race
PRC DF-17 missiles tipped with DF-ZF HGV (al-Jazeera) Russian SS-19 system with Avangard HGV (Jane’s 360)
International political situation – arms race
PRC DF-100 hypersonic cruise missile (Sputnik) Russian Zircon hypersonic cruise missile (AIN Online)
International political situation – arms race
US Army THAAD interceptor test (US Army)Russian S-500 Prometey (National Interest)
International political situation – arms control
• Arms control regimes under immense pressure
• Trump Administration has pulled US out of INF Treaty, JCPOA, Arms Trade Treaty
• Critical of New START and Open Skies Treaty
Image source: US Department of Defence
What does this all mean for the UK?
• UK is committed to a minimum credible nuclear deterrent, and has the smallest deployed arsenal of the NPT P5 states
• Pressures increasing for it to remain credible in the face of proliferation of missile defence systems globally
• Increasing domestic pressure to cut costs or disarm
• Strategically unviable to disarm - but some forms of nuclear modernisation will not send the right message to NPT partner states without nuclear weapons
What does this all mean for UK hypersonics?
• Personal concern is the possibility of dual-capability of any hypersonic weapons platforms UK seeks to develop or acquire, in addition to numbers of such weapons and their mission
• Other aspects of hypersonic nuclear weapons are potentially destabilising
Hypersonics - a challenge for arms control
Source: Speier, Richard H.; Nacouzi, George; Lee, Carrie; & Moore, Richard M. ‘Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons’. RAND Corporation (2017): p.4, p.11.
Impact of hypersonics on crisis stability
Crisis stability – will the nuclear force deployments of one state lead to the other feeling pushed towards launching a nuclear strike on warning, or even a first strike?
Shortened reaction time / timeline compression of nuclear hypersonic weapons coming in fast ‘over the horizon’ and target ambiguity increase fears of disarming first strike or a decapitation strike -> risk of a ‘use it or lose it’ mindset
See: Acton, James M. ‘Reclaiming strategic stability’. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. February 5, 2013. Accessed November 20, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/05/reclaiming-strategic-stability-pub-51032
Impact of hypersonics on arms race stability
Arms race stability – will the nuclear force deployments of one state cause the other state to seek to develop and deploy more weapons to mitigate their fears of suffering a first strike?
Look at how this generation of weapons is emerging – US missile defences increase, so their strategic competitors build more defences and defence-breaking hypersonics, so the US is building its own hypersonics and hypersonic defences, and…..
See: Acton, James M. ‘Reclaiming strategic stability’. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. February 5, 2013. Accessed November 20, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/02/05/reclaiming-strategic-stability-pub-51032
Impact of emerging tech on strategic stability
Emerging technologies like hypersonics may threaten survivability of strategic arsenals – increased chance of a conventional decapitation strike or a disarming first strike on a nuclear-armed opponent
E.g. improvements in state cyberattack capability, precision strike capability, anti-submarine warfare, antisatellite systems, AI-enhanced weapons, autonomous weapons, missile defences
See: Futter, Andrew; & Zala, Benjaim. ‘Emerging Non-Nuclear Technology and the Future of Global Nuclear Order’. In: Nuclear Disarmament A Critical Assessment, edited by Steen, BårdNikolas Vik; & Njølstad, Olav. Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge, 2019.
Scenario 1: Brexit with high economic cost, Scottish independence
• Similar scenario discussed in greater detail by Gusterson (2016) *
• Ability to support continuous at sea deterrent via ballistic missile submarines hindered due to post-Brexit economic disruption and Scottish independence
• 2012 Parliamentary report ** considered relocation of UK nuclear missile submarines to England to be problematic
• Crossroads: might this scenario tempt the UK to tip its hypersonic missiles with nuclear weapons?
*Gusterson, Hugh. 'Nuclear Brexit'. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. June 30, 2016. Accessed November 17, 2019. https://thebulletin.org/2016/06/nuclear-brexit/**'The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Terminating Trident – Days or Decades?' UK Parliament. October 23, 2012. Accessed November 17, 2019.https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmscotaf/676/67607.htm
Scenario 2: No Brexit / Brexit that avoids economic cost and Scottish independence
• UK deterrent more likely to stay on course
• At a future point, SLBMs may be tipped with HGVs – US is considering this as part of Conventional Prompt Global Strike*
• Crossroads: Would HGVs end up on Trident D5s? Would the HGVs be dual-capable? Might the UK seek to develop / acquire them to improve the credibility of its own deterrent?
*’ Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues’. Congressional Research Service. August 14, 2019. Accessed November 18, 2019.
US-UK and US-NATO relationships• The 2020 US election will also be a
significant factor in terms of what happens next
• Re-election of President Trump means tensions will continue regarding role of US allies - including NATO
• Similar pressure may result on UK to ‘contribute more’
• Weakening of NATO would make credibility of UK deterrent all the more crucial
Alternatives to hypersonics: MaRVs
• Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicles only manoeuvre towards the end of their trajectory
• Limits target ambiguity and increases detectability of launch, while still enhancing ability to evade adversary defences
Source: Speier, Richard H.; Nacouzi, George; Lee, Carrie; & Moore, Richard M. ‘Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation: Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons’. RAND Corporation (2017): p. 9.
Alternatives to hypersonics: countermeasures
• The UK has been in a similar situation before
• Result was the Chevaline programme, where a Polaris missile warhead would deploy a variety of new countermeasures
• Not a perfect comparison with present day –while Moscow at the time did have ABM systems, they were limited by the ABMT in numbers and location
Image source: Federation of American Scientists
Alternatives to hypersonics: sensing
Image source: Northrup Grumman
• Often developed as part of a missile defence mission
• From a strategic stability point of view, enhancing the early warning detection of hypersonic missiles mitigates some of the destabilising aspects of these weapons (e.g. timeline compression)
• UK already takes part in early warning of nuclear attack via RAF Fylingdales
Importance of seeking alternatives
• The role of the UK deterrent and its impact on arms control was discussed at the House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations earlier this year
• Modernisation of P5 nuclear arsenals causes concern among non-nuclear weapon states, and the Committee cautioned that nuclear weapon states may ‘go well beyond what can properly be described as modernisation’
Source: ‘Rising nuclear risk, disarmament and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’. House of Lords Select Committee on International Relations’. April 24, 2019: §172-177; §196-197
Recommendations
1. US and Russia renew New START, incorporating nuclear-capable hypersonic delivery vehicles, launchers, etc. *
2. A return to some limitations on numbers of deployed missile defence systems and on development of counter-hypersonics
3. Continuing UK support of NATO is a priority
4. Review of alternative systems or enhancements to existing UK deterrent capabilities to both maintain UK security and strategic stability, and to avoid undermining arms control process
*Vaddi, Pranay. ‘Bringing Russia’s New Nuclear Weapons Into New START’. Lawfare. August 13, 2019. Accessed November 19, 2019. https://www.lawfareblog.com/bringing-russias-new-nuclear-weapons-new-start
