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Fire Refuge RevieiwExaminíng the role of Fire Refuges inhelping people mínímise the rísks of
Bushfire in Victoria.
SHIREo/vqRRABåNcrs
MORNINGTONPEN¡N5ULA..rl--"'
Shirc Cotncìl
Nat¡ral Resor¡rccs and Environmcnt
Developed bY theFire Refuge Revíew Working PartY
(a Local Governmetú multi-agency Committee)
April2001
@o/ WhittleseaCity
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CONTENTSPase
1
.,
INTRODUCTION
PURPOSE OF REPORT
EXECUTTVE SUMMARY
BUSHFIRE IN VICTORIA3.1 How a Bushfire Works3.2 Bushfire Fuel
BUSHFIRE FATALITIES4.1 Losses due to Bushfire4.2 How Deaths Occur4.3 Damage to Property4.4 Hierarchy of Risk to People4.5 Risk to Property
PERSONAL SURVTVAL TECHNIQUES IN A BUSHFIRE5.1 Leave the Area Early5.2 Stay and Defend5.3 Alternative Shelter before the Fire Front Arrives5.4 Seeking Shelter in a Formal Designated Fire Refuge
CURRENT ISSUES }VTTH FIRE REFUGES6.1 1997 Dandenong Ranges Fires Coronial Inquiry6.2 Purpose of a Refuge6.3 PerformanceCriteria6.4 Fire Refuges - A Greate¡ þanger or a Greater Benefit?
ISSUES CONCER¡IING THE ROLE OF AGENCIES7.l Dependency on Authorities during Bushfires7.2 The Management and Resourcing of Designated Fire Refuges7.3 Authority to determine a Designated Fire Refuge7.4 Proposed Role of Agencies
CONCLUSIONS
PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS
THE NEXT STEPS
REF'ERENCES
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INTRODUCTION
This report has been prepared by a working Party auspiced by the VíctorianEmergency Management council and comprises representatives from:
Name Organisation
Paul Gabriel Department of Justice
Bernard Barbetti Department of Natural Resources and Environment
David Craven Victorian State Emergency Service
John Hendrikson Victoria Police (Lilydale)
Murray Adams VictoriaPolice (Melbourne)
Jon Boura CountryFire Authority (Yarra Area - Region 13)
Peter Murphy City of Whittlesea
Nick Haslinghouse Macedon Ranges Shire Council
GrahamRobertson MomingtonPeninsulaShireCouncil
Sam De Gabrielle Mitchell Shire Council
Norman Golgerth Nillumbik Shire Council
Cr David Hodgett Shire of Yarra Ranges
Bob lforner Victorian Rural Fire Brigade Association
Brian Hine Dept. of Infrastructure - Local Govt. Division
Lex Ritchie Shire of Yarra Ranges
Noreen Krussel CountryFire Authority Headquarters
Duncan Maughan CountryFire Authority, Headquarters
Terry Wilkinson Shire ofYarra Ranges
Norm Free Shire ofYarra Ranges
John O'Donoghue Municipal Association of Victoria
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I.. PURPOSE OF REPORT
Communities across Victoria have to deal with bushfre.
Bushfires can cause significant loss of life as well as personal injury, damage to property andemotional distress for people faced with being caught in the path of a fierce and threateningbushflre, or losing family or friends as a result of such a disaster.
The last major bushfues in the Dandenong Ranges occurred rnlanuary 1997.
After the event, under the auspices of the Victorian EmergencyManagement Council(VEMC), the Shire ofYarra Ranges, in May 1998, called together the agencies and councilswho have a responsibility to plan for emergencies caused by bushf,re.
The meeting was attended by numerous agencies and local governments, including theCountry Fire Authority (CFA), Victoria Police, the Victorian State Emergency Service(VICSES), the Shires of Macedon Ranges, MorningtonPeninsula, Mitchell, Nillumbik,Whittlesea and Yarra Ranges and State Government representatives from the Office of LocalGovernment and the Department ofJustice. The task of the meeting was to commence theprocess of reviewing the role of fire refuges as a safety strategy in a bushfire.
Specifrcally, the Shire wished to examine the value of Designated Fire Refuges as a suitablestrategy in helping people minimise their risk of exposure to bushfire.
As a result of this meeting a .Working
Party was formed to prepare a background paper and aset of proposals on fire refuges which would improve community safety. The Working Partywas also required to develop a set ofrecommendations on the procedures required to achieveeffective implementation of the proposals.
The essential question for the Working Party was:
"What gives our community the best chance of survival in a high intensíty bushfire?n'
'HistoricalÍy, the Australían Cammunity l¡as afways faced 'wildfire' in the büst¡vironment. This wîlI not çhange. Wíth the increasrng desire af Í*dividuals ta li
in ptaces of rural and bash beauty {sucÍr as fñe Ðandenang Ranges} ffreerrt rísr< sf fire nrüsf be managed. Fire management will învaríably need to
balanced wíth the compúing requirement of erntironmental cantrols.Eecause of thesfieer magnitude and potentiat widespread destruction af'wíÍdfire' the managernent of its risks lras to öe both a cammunìty and
tlsemi gtluernfirettt age*q¡ responsibility.'Caroner, 1$97 Ðandenong Ranges Fires, Coronial. lnquest,2S:June 1999, Pa
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2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In May 1998, in the wake of the Dandenong Ranges bushfires, over 30 Victorian agencies,authorities and councils met to consìder the role of fìre refuges in helpíne oeople minimise therisk of bushfires. The task of the working Party was to answer the question:
"What gives our community the best chance of survival in a high intensity bushfîre?"
After three years of investigation the Working Party was able to reach a number ofconclusions regarding bushfires. These are:
The majority of fires are oro'low ìntensífit' (refer Table 1. Page 1l) and can besuppressed without loss to life and property.
The majority of property damage and death in a bushfire occurs with,,very Hìgh toExtreme fntensíþ' bushfires (refer Table 1. Page 11). Such fires are difficult to predictand there is usually little opportunity to provide adequate early warning to thecommunity in the vicinity of where the fire starts.
While property damage and death is caused by a number of components of a very highto extreme intensity bushfÌre most fatalities result from radiant heat, which is emittedfrom flames. It is therefore important that people place a barrier or space betweenthemselves and the radiant heat as the fire front passes over or around them.
Fire suppression is usually effective on low intensity bushlires. It becomes less effectiveas the intensity of fire increases. Other options are needed to protect the community andtravelling public from very high to extreme intensity bushfires. Designated fire refugesis one such option that has been promoted.
Studies indicate that in Victoria since 1962, the single greatest cause of death in abushfire is likely to be from radiant heat when people are caught in the open or in theircar fleeing from the fire.
A study of the loss of houses from bushfires indicates that embers are the greatest causeand that if people are informed and well prepared to stay and defend their propertythere is every chance their property will be saved.
The Working Party developed a hierarchy of rísk to people and property on dhe basis of allthe evidence before it (Refer section 4.4 page l4).
In summary those who are physically able and well prepared can probably survive a very highto extreme intensity bushfire and save their property if they stay and defend it. Those who areunable to do this should leave their arcaby early morning on a high-risk day that a bushfire islikely to occur (eg Total Fire Ban Day).
A desígnatedfre refuge ís usually ø buílding thaÍ ís sígned or otherwße þrmøtly identijìed ìnadvønce as a refugefor use by the publìc.
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Buildings can be used as refuges as they provide a barrier between people and radiant heat.However they need to be in close proximity so that people can get to them quickly on footwhen a bushfire occurs. Conversely, buildings can pose a risk to life through asphyxiationfrom smoke as well as from the flames so they need to be properþ prepared, ventilated, wellclear of any vegetatior¡ unlocked and accessible. People can shelter in them as a fire frontpasses and then move outside to defend the property from ember attack.
Local open spaces that are ideally free of firel and put sufficient space between people andradiant heat can also act as refuges and reduce the risk. These informal places of shelter maybe sports ovals, neighbour's tennis courts, a beach or the main street of a shopping centrewhere the distance ûom the flames and smoke is suffrcient to protect those assembled fromradiant heat and asphyxiation.
At greatest risk from a bushfire are those who plan to stay, then later decide to flee, either outof the bushfire area or to a o'safer" location that they need to drive to. This means that thedistance to a designated fire ref,rge, further than a short trip by foot, creates ahazardto thosefleeing the bushf,ne. People run the risk that they may be caught in the open or in their car ontheir journey to the refuge.
In respect of fi¡e refuges the Working Party concluded that:
The current formal designation of public refuges in some parts of the state is untenableand dangerous in the context of very high to extreme bushfires because:
Refuges have neither been selected nor maintained in accordance with anyperformance criteria or standards;
Many refuges are located so far from their population catchment that peoplewould need to drive to them - an extremely dangerous practice;
Most refuges could not cope with their current population catchment;
Adjacent vegetation or the refuge being locked when needed could compromisetheir safety.
Municipal councils are exposed to the risk of liability by designating public refuges. Ifcouncils were indemnified in respect of such liability, they could not guarantee safeshelter during very high to extreme bushfires in designated lire refuges.
Even with discontinuance of the use of fire refuges, the inappropriate legal exposure ofeouncils needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency.
VÍsÍtors and other non-residents need special consideration in bushfire safety. It isassumed that they do not know the location of designated fire refuges nor access routes.
Local, well chosen, informal places of shelter (particularly as part of a personal survivalstrategy) offer people of Victoria a better chance of surviving a hÍgh intensity bushfirethan designated /formal fire refuges.
The best chance to survive a bushfire Ís through community education to understand theneed for, and the development of, a personal survival plan. Through their planning,people will decide to "støy ønd defenû' or o'leuve eørly". If they decide to stay, their plan
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will help them to prepare their property to minimise the risk and assist them to locate anopen space or building where they can shelter by or with their neighbours as the firefront passes through.
In the light of these findings the Working Party makes these recommendations:
Recommendation 1. That the State Government release frrnding immediately for acommunity education program to be conducted by the CFA, with the support of local councilsand other agencies. The program should work in local communities to ensure that allresidents have a personal survival plan and that they have familiarised themselves with theirlocal area to identify an informal place of shelter where they will meet to support each otheras the fire front passes through.
Recommendation 2.That firnding be made available for information materials and programsto educate workers in and visitors to bushfi¡e prone areas, on how to behave on days ofriskfrom high intensity bushfires. The State agencies and the CFA with the support of the localcouncils and local employers should undertake this work.
Recommendation 3. That the Victoria Emergency Management Council undertakes thepreparation of Guidelines for Local lnformal Places of Shelter.
These guidelines should be framed to assist people who are planning to stay and defend theirproperty to identifu a place in their immediate neighbourhoods to shelter with neighbourswhile the fire front passes through.
Recommendation 4.That due to the risks associated with designated fire refuges, theVictoria Emergency Management Council:
remove all reference to designated formal fire refuges in the Emergency ManagementManual Victoria;
acknowledge that designated refuges have never been a valid means of providing thebest chance ofsurvival in a bushfire;
advise councÍls that the references to designated refuges (togo) have been removed fromthe Emergency Management Manual VÍctoria and other official publications.
Recommendation 5. That the State Government amend the Emergency Management Act1986 to provide an appropriate indemnity to Councils, to complement the provisions insection 94 of the country Fire Authority Act. 1958 along the following lines:
A Municipal Council, Councillor or member of staff of a Municipal Council or a Committeeof Management is not subject to any action, liability, claim or demand for any matter or thingdone or omitted to be done or contract entered for or in connection with:
an emergency management plan;
the suitability or availability of any venues mentioned or referred to in any emergency;
management plan;
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injuries or damage sustaÍned in attemFting to reach or in.taking refuge within any venuementioned or referred to in any management plan;
any communication or community educatíon;
if the action taken or omitted to be taken by the Council, CouncÍllor or the member ofcouncil staff or the Committee of Management was taken in good faith for the purposeof carryÍng out a power or duty of a Council under this .A,ct or Regulations or any otherAct or Regulations.
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3.BUSHFIRE IN VICTORIA
If we are to give people their best chance of survival, we need to understand the nature ofbushfi¡es and how they impact on communities. In this anaþis the word 'bushfi¡e' refers tofires in all vegetation types eg. forests, grasslands, heathlands.
Bushfnes are rated in terms of their intensity. This is a measurement of the amount of energyreleased per metre of fire front and is a major determinant of the damage likely to be causedby the bushf,re.
The bushfire history in Victoria is characterised by many low intensity, small consequencebushfires and a few large, high consequence (high intensity) bushfires. Although high intensitybushfres represent a small percentage of all bushfires that occur in Victoria, they result in themajority of damage and deaths.'
3.1 HOW A BUSIIFIRE WORKS
High intensity bushfires occur with extreme weather conditions such as high temperatures,low relative humidity and high wind speeds. They are more likely to occur during droughtconditions. They are also more likely to occur on, but not limited to, days of Total Fire Ban.High intensity bushfires require an ignition source, which can vary from lightning to arson.This makes them very hard to predict, and there is usually little opportunity to provide aneffective early warning to the community in the vicinity of the fire start.
People and property are at risk from various components of a bushfire. The three mainelements that make up a bushfire are:
3.1.1 Flames and Radiant Heät
Flames from a bushfi¡e form what is known as the jire front. The flames emit heat whichis known as radiant heøL
Radiant heat is responsible for the majority of fatalities caused by bushfre. It is theenergy emitted from flames and burning vegetation. Most people know radiant heat as theheat they experience as they stand in front ofa radiator.
Radiant heat has the following characteristics:t It decreases with distance from the source. For example, by doubling the distance
from the source, the amount of radiant heat is approximately decreased to onequarter.
c The effects of radíant heat are significantly decreased with the placement of abarrier and/or distance between people and the heat energy source. These solidobiects absorb heat energlt, which significantly increases the chance of survival.
Radiant heat can cause heat stroke, heat stress, dehydration and ultimately deathbecause the human body needs to retain a fanly constant internal temperature. Pushing
' Loane and Gould 1986
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the human body beyond normal limits of adjustment with too much heat input resultsin death.
3.1.2 Ember Attacks
Ember attacks are characterised by embers or burning material being thrown up tohundreds of metres or several kilometres from the fire front causing spotting, or theignition of new fires.
Ember attacks can occur before, during and after the fire front passes. The mostcornmon cause of house loss during a bushfire is when burning embers land on or neara building, and no one is present to extinguish fires caused by those burning embers.In some cases the fire front may not even pass the property that is lost or damaged.
Residents, and those assisting them, play a major role in controlling ember attacks thatoccur before the fire front arrives or after it passes.
3.1.3 Smoke
Production of large quantities of smoke is an inevitable consequence of bushfire. Thissmoke is detrimentai to human safety in two main ways:
o DisorientationThe most common impact of smoke in a bushfire is to discomfort and disorientatepeople. This can reduce their ability to protect themselves and defend their homes.Smoke across roads can lead to car accidents, leaving the occupants exposed to theradiant heat of the fire front.
o AsphyxiatíonFor asphyxiation to occur smoke needs to replace oxygen for a period of severalminutes. In the open air this is most unlikely to happen as the hot smoky air isrising away from the ground and being replaced with clean air. Where bushfresmoke fills a confined space asphyxiation can occur.
3.2 BUSHFIRE FUEL
In addition to extreme weather conditions a high intensity bushfire occurs where there isample fuel, particularly fine firel such as fallen leaves, bark, small twigs and generalundergrowth and also where there is an ignition source.
When the quantity of fine fuel in a given area is increased, the speed with which a bushfiretravels through the area and the height of the flames also increases.
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3.2.1 Fuel Management
There are three types of f,rel management applied to reduce bushfire loss. They are:
o Large scalefuel reductionAn example is the forest fuel reduction program. This is aimed at reducing thespread of a fire. This approach is beneficial when combined with suppressionoperations. Large-scale fuel reduction is often adopted at locations adjacent tospecific land uses (eg. housing areas). However, in the urban bushland interface itcan be difficult to apply. This is due to the steeper topography, amenity, the physicallocation of people and their houses and other environmental considerations.
t Middle scalefuel reductionExamples are roadside slashing, creating fire-breaks and bufÏer zones. Thesetechniques attempt to reduce fire intensity and aid in suppression operations. Thisapproach is usually unsuccessful at stopping the spread of high intensity bushfne butcan aid in asset survival.
o Small scalefuel reductionThis applies to individual residential blocks and involves landowners managing furefuel (grasses, bracken and twigs) near houses to reduce the likelihood of direct flamecontact, or radiant heat igniting the house. This approach can be a valuable treatmentwhen applied in conjunction with other approaches such as community education.
3.2.2 Suppression
Bushfires can be characterised by their intensity, that is the amount of energy beingreleased per metre of fire perimeter (kw/m). See Table 1. Fire intensity is related to theability of fire services to control a bushfne.
The vast majority of bushfires are of relatively low intensity and are suppressed with littleimpact upon the community. As intensity increases the ability to suppress becomes moredifficult. The table on the next page demonstrates this.
Suppression is not a viable option for community safety in those relatively rare,extremely high intensity fires that claim lives and significant amounts of property. Inthese conditions alternative strategies are required.
Designated fire refuges are one altemative strategy that has been used. If fire refuges areto be effective they need to enhance community safety under conditions of extreme firebehaviour where fire suppression will be ineffective.
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I'able 1: ot ¡-¡re {t ¡-orest ßlre B€havioürGUIDE TOWILDF'IRESEVERITY
TYPICAL FORESTFIRE BEIIAVIO{IR
IMPLICATIONS EXAMPLES
"Loil'Intensity <500 kW/m
Flames < 2 mRate ofspread < 0.1kmlhr
First suppression attack alwayssuccessfulMinimal property damage only, e.g.scorchins
Controlledfuel reductionburn
"Moderate"Intensity 500-2,500kWm
Flames < 6 mRate ofspread < 0.3km/hr
First suppression attack usuallysuccessfulMinor property damage only, e.g. fence
"High"Intensity 2,500-l 0,000kWm
Flames < 20 mRateofspread< l km/hr
Fire managed over timeIsolated house loss possible but notprobable
'VeryHigh"Intensity I 0,000-30,000kWm
Flames>30mcrownfireRate of spread < 2krn/hrLikelihood of signifi cantspotting
Fire attack ineffective until intensitydropsHouse loss probable but mainly remotehomes or boundary areasIsolated fatalities possible but notnrobable
DandenongRanges 1997
Arthurs Seat1997
"Extreme'oIntensity > 30,000kWm(maximum - 110,000kWm)
Crown fireFire storm at upperintensitiesMassive spotting likelyRate of spread > Zlçnlhr
Fire attack irrelevant and dangerous,forces overwhelmedWidespread house loss probablethroughout interface or rural villagesMultiple fatalities possible, probable atupper intensities
Sydney 1994(-40,000kWm)AshWednesday1983 (>100,000kWm)
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4. BUSHFIRE FATALITIESCurrent understanding of high intensity bushfire fatalities is based on research into theVictorian Ash Wedne^sday fires of 1983 and has been reinforced by formal reviews ofsubsequent bushfi¡es.2 The findings of this research assist in understanding the main reasonswhy fatalities occur during bushfires and offer guidance on the strategies and actions whichcan be taken to improve public safety and survival during such events.
4.I LOSSES DUE TO BUSHF'IRE
For high intensity bushfires the traditional methods of managing a fire are ineffective or oflimited benefit. Often the head fire spread cannot be stopped by suppression methods(whether from the ground or in the air), f,re breaks and other small fuel managed areas.
Management of such bushfires can be very complex and dangerous with significant loss ofhuman life and damage to property resulting. Potential life and property loss, as a result of ahigh intensity bushfire, is greatest in locations where human populations will be directlyimpacted. From past bushfire events, the greatest losses occur in locations that are referred toas urban-bttsh interface areas. Interface areas refer to the integration of areas of substantialpopulation with areas of grass and forest. Throughout these areas the potential for loss due tobushfire is high because of the combination of abundant fuel quantities and populationdensities. Several interface areas are well known from previous high intensity bushfire events,particularly Ash Wednesday.
Table 2: Bushfïres in Victoria since 1962 which have resulted in serious losses
YEAR F'IRE LTVES HOUSES LOST
t962 Dandenons Ranses T4 454
t965 Lonswood t2 53
t969 Lara 22 230
1977 Western Districts 5 t23
1983 Ash Wednesday 47 2090
1985 Central Victoria 6 r02
1990 Strathbosies 1 l7r995 Berrinsa-Enfield 9
1997 Dandenons Ranses J 4t
1998 Sprins Hill 11
1998 Linton 5 2
TOTAL 1ls 3132
' Boura, 1995, Boura ef a/., 1995; CFA and NRE, 1997; Boura ef a/., 19g8.
t2
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4.2 HOW DEATHS OCCUR
If we trace back to where deaths occurred, there a¡e a number of factors that influencebushfire fatalities. Table 3 examines the location of bushfire fatalities.
The evidence from this table shows that:
Just over half of deaths occurred when people were caught eíther in the open, or in theirvehicles, by the fire front. Many of these people made late attempts to evacuate from thefire. These deaths were probably caused by radiant heat;
Just under one quarter of deaths are firefighters who have died either while in thefirefighting vehicle or on foot in the open. These people are susceptible to radiant heat,work related accidents, and heart attacks;
Around I in7 deaths occurred to people inside their homes. The elderþ or disabled areparticularly vulnerable in these locations, as they are often unable to either prevent orextinguish structural ignitíons, or to leave the burning structure.'
4.3 DAMAGE TO PROPERTY
The most coÍlmon cause of house loss is fires started by burning embers landing on or nearthe buildingo. CSIRO studies and CFA field surveys have found that:
Houses not experiencing direct flame contact or high levels of radiant heat, and whichare located in areas where fine fuel reduction practices have occurred on a regular basishave a high probability of surviving the passage of the fire front.
Houses experiencing ember attacks, which occur before, during and after the fire frontpasses, are defendable by having able bodied, and well-prepared residents defend them.Research indicates that many houses, which survive the passage of the fire front, burndown in the hours afterwards if there is no-one present to extinguish the burningembers5.
3 Krusel, N. and Petris, S. (1992). Staying Alive: Lessons learnt from a study of civilian deaths in the1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires. Fire Management Quarterly,2, 1-20.* Lazarus and Elley, 1984; Wilson, 1984;Wilson and Ferguson, 1984; Ramsay et a1.,1987'Boura, 1995; Boura ef a/., 1995; CFA and NRE, 1997; Boura ef a/., 1998
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Table 3: Location of victims in recent and fatal bushfires in Victoria, 1962-1998
Table compiled tom CFA records.
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4.4 HIERARCITY OF RISK TO PEOPLE
The pattem of fatalities due to bushfires in Victoria indicates that the greatest dangers tohuman safety, in order from greatest to least risk are:
4.4.I Exposure to Radiant HeatBeing susceptible to radiant heat and the trauma of a bushfire, with no option ofshelter or evacuation.
4.4.2 Caught in a vehicle or on foot fleeing the lire frontFleeing the bushfire and being caught in a vehicle as the fire front passes. People wholeave it too late to evacuate from their homes or elsewhere can place themselves atrisk, as they will often be leaving in a vehicle or perhaps on foot.
4.4.3 Sheltering in indefensible buildingsSheltering in a structure such as a home, club-house or hall which is not properþprepared for a bushfire. These are known as indefensible buildings. They are identifiedby lack of vegetation clearance around the property, inappropriate design, combustiblematerial stored close to the house, combined with high-risk positioning on the site.
4.4.4 Staying home but not defending your shelterSheltering in a defensible building and not defending or not being able to defend it -especially from ember attacks.
4.4.5 Sheltering in a defensible buildingSheltering in a defensible building and defending it against bushfire provides the leastrisk ofproperty damage. It is also a much safer option for people than those listedabove. If you prepare in advance to stay and defend your home, you may have shelterfrom radiant heat as the fne front passes through. You will probably not be at riskfrom getting caught in the open or in a vehicle and be able to defend ember attacks onyour home before and after the fire front passes.
4.4.6 Sheltering in an open spaceSheltering in an open space whichprotects you from the fire Aont by virlue of thedistance, and the absence of combustible materials, is a safer option for people whodon't wish to stay and defend their homes.
RISK TO PROPERTY
Whilst leaving early on high-risk days prior to a fire starting provides the least risk to life,it presents a high risk of damage to property. The most coÍrmon cause of house lossduring a bushfire is from ember attacks that cause spot fires. Residents play a major rolein controlling ember attacks that may occur before and after the fire front passes.
4.5
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5. PERSONAL SURVIVAL TECHNIQTJES IN A BUSHFIRE
A CFA surveypublished in 20006 of residents living in a high fire risk area asked them whichstrategy they would adopt for a bushfire event. The responses were as follows:
41.60/0 - do as much as possible to protect the house but leave if threatened by the fire32yo - stay and defend their homes from the fire4.4oÁ - wait and see what happens but leave if threatened by the fire15.60/0 - leave as soon as they are âware of the fire4.5o/o - would leave the area on days of high fìre riskl.$Yo - other
Whilst one third of the respondents to the survey chose the 'stay and defend' option, unless theyare well prepared with a plan to put into action if a bushfi¡e is approaching, then they too are at
risk. These figures show that 61.6% ofpeople will wait and see how "bad" the fire is before theywill decide whether they will stay or go.
From the hierarchy of risk we can determine that there are only four safe personal survivaltechniques in a bushfire. Each of these techniques assumes that a person has prepared theirpersonal fire protection plan prior to a fire outbreak. The techniques are:
5.1 LEAVE THE ÄREA EARLY
Leaving early means that people should get out of a high-risk area prior to the commencement
ofa fire.
Because of the unpredictable elements and speed of a high intensity fire this usually means
that people who choose this option should leave by mid moming on a day when such a firemay occur.
Experience has shown that many people do not know what the early warning signs of abushfire are. Even if they are aware, they do not take note, or respond to the early warningsigns, such as extreme fire weather conditions or fife brigade activity. There is also often alack of preparedness to deal with possible events. This includes the many people who do notprepare a personal fire protection plan. This is a critical issue for cornmunity education.
Often people have little knowledge about the location of the fue, limited understanding oflikely fire behaviour and rely upon personal judgements and local knowledge to cope with theevent. This generally results in late, and often disorganised, evacuation during which people
are potentially exposed to dangerous levels of radiant heat and arc at ahigh risk in terms oftheir personal safety and well-being.
u CFA, Education of Bushfire Blitz, 2000
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RECOMMENDATION:
If people are not weII prepured, or conJident enough to stay ønd defend theirproperty or they think they might get nervous as the ftre øpproaches, evucaate løteand be øt greøter risk, then the only safe optionfor thetn ís to leave the øreø early.
5.2 STAY AND DEFEND
The legislation governing bushfire management in country areas of Victoria, ie. the CountryFire Authority Act. (1958) and the Emergency Management Act. (1986), clearly prohibitsemergency service personnel from directing any person with a pecuniary interest in a propertyto leave that property. This right of residents, to decide for themselves whether they willevacuate or stay with their homes, is firther reinforced in CFA policy (CFA 1995) and theEmergency Management Manual Victoria (Department of Justice, 1997).
Failure to prepare a house from bushfire, means that the house could potentially be affectedby direct flame contact and high levels of radiant heat, which potentially leads to fatalities.The risk can be reduced by, regular fuel reduction practices and various landscapingtechnþes.
It is essential that people en$re there is a physical barrier such as the wall of a houseseparating them from the radiant heat or that there is enough distance between them and theradiant heat. This is most commonly achieved by vegetation clearance around the house.
When people realise that they are in danger and decide to make a late evacuation, or whenthey are ill-prepared and yet still stay and defend their homes, they are most vulnerable tobushfire.
RECOMMENDATION:
OnIy ahle-bodíed people who øre well prepøred, weør øpproprìate clothing ønd tøkeshelter ín their homes fron rødíant heøt øs the jïre front passes, should stay ønddefend their property. Not only do they have ø good chønce of surviving a bushftre,but they øre líkely to be able to extínguísh øny small Jíres that begín from emberøttøcks, hefore and øfter theJire front pøsses, therehy savíng their homes.
5.3 ALTERNATIVE SHELTER BEFORE THE FIRE FRONT ARRTYES
Those people who have not left their homes prior to the fire starting and who are unable tostay and defend their homes are at significant risk. This risk will be reduced if they haveearlier identified a local place to shelter. This must be within walking distance to minimise theamount of time they are out in the open.
This local place of shelter may be a large, open non-flammable area or a solid structure suchas a neighbour's house. It could be on the beach. Most importantly, atthe chosen place ofshelter the risk of exposure from the fire front and the radiant heat will be reduced.
Seeking refuge in a safer, nearby location during the fire front means that people will be ableto defend their property from ember attacks both before and after the fire front passes.
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It needs to be understood that a local shelter cannot be a guaraalggd safe place given theunpredictable nature of high intensity bushfires and other considerations.
RECOMMENDATION:
últhen prepøring ø personal ftre preventíon pløn people must ídentífy an alternativesite of locøl refuge ín case they have not left theír home prior to a bashJîrecommencíng, or they decide they øre unable to støy ønd defend their propefi,
The designated place of shelter mast gíve protection from exposare to radíant heøtand should minímíse the tíme spent în the open. If you need to drìve avehìcle to thepløce of shelter it ís not local enough.
5.4 SEEKING SHELTER IN A FORMAL DESIGNATED FIRE REFUGE
When people decide to evacuate from an area due to bushfire they usually require safety andsecurity ûom the fire front, information about which direction to go to seek refuge, and somefamiliarity with the area so as to f,rnd a safe place.The community currently has the option of going to an officialdesignatedfire refuge rnthearea. A typical sign used by many municipalities is shown to the right.
5.4.1 Definition of a Fire Refuge
The Emergency Management Manual Victoria defines a community fire refuge as:
'a buildingwhere people may seek shelterfrom the danger of a bushJìre. A buildingconstntcted or designated as q Fire Refuge should have consideration given to itswlnerability to wildfire, parkingfor users, availability of water, telephone andelectric power, location and accessibility in relation to its service qree.'
5.4.2 Baekground to Formal Designated Fire Reftrges
During the Ash Wednesday fires several instances were identified where groups of peoplesuccessfully sheltered in well-constructed buildings, most notably the kindergarten atCockatoo and the hotel at Mt. Macedon. This prompted the inquiry chaired by Miller,S.L, (1984), entitled Report of the Bushfire Review Comrnittee on Bushfire DisasterPreparedness and Responses in Yictoria, to propose the adoption of designated firerefuges as part of the emergency management approach for Victoria.
The Miller Report stated that:
'under local disaster plans, consideration should be given to designating buildings whichcould serve qs emergency communal shelters. Such buildings would need to be assessedby a competent authority for their fire-resistønt capøbility and for availability of fire-fighting equipment and water ntpply.'
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This recommendation has only been partly implemented:o The competent authority has not been identifiedc Some of the designatedfire refuges do not comply as they are not buildingso No resources have been provided by the State Governmentfor these designøted
bldldings
5.4.3 Definition of an Emergency Relief Centre
It is important to understand the difference between a designated fire refuge and anEmergency Relief Centre as there is some confusion about the roles of these two differentfacilities. A Relief Centre is always set up outside the high-risk area while the location ofa Fire Refuge may be inside the high-risk area.
The Emergency Management Manual Victoria defines anEmergency Relief Centre as:
'A building or place established to provide emergency relief for persons affected by, orresponding to, an emergency. "
Emergency Relief Centres are required to have support services whereas designated firerefuges are not required to provide these types of services. The Victorian StateEmergency Service is responsible for coordinating emergency relief with this roledelegated to local councils at the municipal level.
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6. CURRENT ISSUES WITH FIRE REFUGES
The bushfires in the Dandenong Ranges in January 1997 tnggercd a review of the viabilityand effectiveness of designated fire refuges. An evaluation of the Coronial Inquest resultingfrom the fatalities caused by these bushfires and discussions with involved parties has led tothe identification of several key issues about the concept of designatedfire refuges.
6.1 1997 DANDENONG RANGES FrRES CORONTAL TNQUTRY
During the Dandenong Ranges fi¡es in 1997 the following incidents occurred:
At Ferny Creeþ several hundred people chose to evacuate to the Ferny CreekIlorticultural Centre which was a desígnøtedftre refuge. The evacuees were at thatlocation for a number of hours before those coordinating the emergency services becameaware of their presence. A number of people also chose to evacuate to the Ferny CreekPrimary School which was not a designated fire refuge.
fn the Kalorama area, people chose to evacuate to the Kalorama Recreation Reserve andthe Mt Dandenong Hotel. These locations were not desìgnøtedfre refuges but peoplewere able to access them to survive the fire.
The Coronial Inqury after this fire raised several concerns relating to fire refuges includingthe following:
oMany residents were unsure of the location of the emergency shelters and relief centres.There is a lot of confusion in relation to what a fire refrrge is and what an emergencyshelter is. Many residents self evacuated to locations that were not designated evacuationcentres which placed them at risk as no police or other support services knew that theywere there and therefore could not assist or register same.' [Page 281
oOne of the most important issues for the effective management of large numbers ofpeople during a major 'wildfire' emergency is the provision of safe community firerefuges and emergency shelters. Currently there is a multi-agency committee reviewingthe provision of refuges for the community during a fire or major emergency.' [Page 441
oln addition, it is important to ensure that any designated 'fire refuge' or 'emergencyshelter' is in fact sa;þ for the community in the event of bushfire.' [Page 45]
There are many interpretations of what these terrns, emergency shelters, assembly areas and f,nerefrrges mean. The confrrsion exists even within the various authorities responsible for assistingthe public during a bushf,ire.
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6.2 PURPOSE OF'A REFUGE
The primary purpose of a refuge is to provide short-term shelter from the fire front. It is almostalways within the fire front area.
However, the community has an expectation that at designated fire refuges they will be providedwith food and drinks, counselling, information regarding the bushfire, co-ordination andregistration, communications (telephone and radio), fire suppression equipment, staff etc. Manydesignated fire refuges are not resourced with the types of services which people may expect orneed at the time of bushfires.
These services can only be provided at Emergency Relief Centres which must be located outsidethe fire area. These centres are properþ equipped to meet a variety of needs that people expect tofind, but are unavailable at a designøtedfire refuge.
Designated fire refuges are not always an adequate size to provide for the population catchment,whicþ on the day, could include workers, visitors and tourists to the area. The facilities are oftenbasic and may not be open, particularly if the bushfire occurs on a day which is not a Total FireBan Day or is a holiday.
There is also some confusion amongst members of the local community and, in general, visitorsto the area as to where designated fire refuges are located. This places them at risk if they are outin the open searching for an official refuge when the bushfire is in the vicinity.
After two years of thorough investigation the Working Party has determined that a designatedfire refuge is not necessarily a safe place. It may only reduce risks in the short term for those whoarrive there safely. In addition, there are still no guidelines for refuges which are areas other thanbuildings.
6.3 PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
There are places identified as designated fire refuges that do not fulfill the definition in theEmergency Management Manual Victoria.
Due to the lack ofperforrnance criteria for selecting official designatedfire refuges, it is possiblethat some existing designated fire refuges would not survive the passage of bushfîre, or shelteroccupants from dangerous levels of radiant heat. Due to this, some authorities are reluctant toapprove the designation of fire refuges at all.
Other factors will influence the location, suitability and use of fre refuges in a municipality.These include:
local area characteristics in terms oftopography and standard ofroad access;
changes in the total population levels of an area including permanent and non permanentresidents as well as tourists;public visibility and easy identification of fire refuges within aflareageneral community awareness as to locations of fire refuges;public education programs informing people about the most sensible and safest actionsto take during a bushfre;
the direction of the bushfire.
o
O
o
o
a
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6.4 FIRE REFTIGES . A GREATER DAII{GER OR A GREATER BENEFIT?
Some members of the community believe tl:øit designated fire refuges provide a 'last minute'haven for residents who choose to evacuate at the last minute. However, research indicates thatlate evacuation Aom a wildfire is a very high-risk strategy for the community in terrns of theirsafety and well being. People are at greater risk because they are out in the open, some travellingconsiderable distances. Once they get there, they may not be able to get access.
tr'or these reasons the Working Party is of the view that fire refuges have a high level of riskfor residents.
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7. ISSUES CONCERNING THE ROLE OF' AGENCIESThe role that relevant agencies and authorities play in the management, resourcing, funding anddesignation of fire refuges has caused much confusion since they were introduced.
The agencies have formed a working party to resolve these issues.
The Fire Refuge Working Parfy determined that a multi-agency approach was required to reviewfire refuges in Victoria. This approach received support from the former Minister for police andEmergency Services, the Honorable 8il1 McGrath, the Chair of the Victorian EmergencyManagement Council and the State Coroner.
Issues relating to the role that agencies play tn designatedfire refuges include:
7.I DEPENDENCY ON AUTIIORITIES DURING BUSHFIRES
Over reliance or dependency on authorities by the local community can detract from selÊrelianceand self-help strategies within the community during bushfîre. It can also mean that members ofthe community do not devise a well-prepared survival strategy. Instead they rely on theauthorities to deal with all of the issues related to bushfire. Communities need to understand thatbushfire outbreaks are a coÍtmunity-wide problem that warrants community support and co-operation.
7.2 THE MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCING OF DESIGNATED FIRE REFUGES
Concerns also arise as to who is responsible for opening and staffing fire refuges duringbushfire events. Designatedfire refuges cannot guarantee 100% safety frombushfire. Asmany of these refuges are vested in local government, the issue of potential liability for thecouncil, councillors or council staffin relation to council performance of duties andresponsibilities related to flre refuges has been raised as an important issue. Furtherinvestigation has shown that there is no legislative protection for councils, councillors or staffin the area of designating, operating or managing fire refuges.
John O'Donoghue, legal consultant at the Municipal Association ofVictoria has advised that:"It would seem that the retention of fire refuges expose councils to unrealistic potential liabilitiesin that:
¡ their mere designation engenders in the community some sense that they will be available asa safe refuge;
¡ the council (at least to some extent on the basis of "expert" advice provided ) encourages afîre announcement response which might be inconsistent with the CFA/SES preferredoption;
o late evacuees expose themselves to risk in attempting to reach the fre refuges (andperhaps do so at a time later than they would do if the refuges were not designated);
r the perception of safety at the fire refuges might well be misplaced;¡ the users or potential users of fire refuges do so or attempt to do so in the belief that the
f,rre refuges provide a safe and proximate avenue for protection.,'
There appears to be an expectation among the agencies and authorities involved that the openingof designated buildings during ñre danger periods is a local government t"rpo*ìbility.However, many of these buildings designated as fire refuges are run by committees ofmanagement or schools and not by the local council itself.
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7.2.1 This issue can be illustrated with the case of the Shire of Yarra Ranges advising thegoverning bodies of their obligations in relation to designated Jìre refuges. The Councilhad requested that these bodies ensure buildings are opened on days of Total Fire Ban.However, this request resulted in numerous concerns including:. during school hours there is a conflict inuse, as only children and teachers are catered
for and the buildings are designated to cater for their needs and not additionalnumbers ofpeople;
. concern by committees of management about security and availability of someone tounlock buüdings and watch over possessions;
. concern that people on these committees of management were otherwise committedduring the bushfire event and could not guarantee their availability to unlockbuildings and stay on the premises on days of Total Fire Ban.
The costs associated with upgrading and maintaining designated fire refuges is a concern to the
relevant authorities. Many reñrges are primarily designed to and actually serve another purpose
in the community. They are likely to be in general use and controlled by another organizatione.g. football club. The lack of State Government funding combined with budgetary constraints
within local councils may restrict fire refuges from meeting performance standards, as there issimply inadequate funds available for councils to bear sole responsibility for upgrading these
premises which have largely been chosen almost entirely on the basis ofproximity.
AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE A DESIGNATED FIRE REFUGE
There is no clear definition of who is responsible for determining those places that are most
suitable as designated fire refuges.
Many local councils, some with the aid of expert advice from police, fre and emergencyservices, have identified available sites within their municipalities as designated fire refuges.
In some instances this may be appropriate. These designatedfire refuges have been selected
largely on the basis of reasonable proximity to the population to be served rather than by a set
of agreed performance criteria, which applies across Victoria.
If designated fi.re refuges are to be retained, there needs to be performance criteria standards set
for the responsible agency to follow when assessing a location for suitability as a designated firerefuge. The responsible agency would need to be identified in legislation and provided withappropriate legal protection.
The standards need to ensure the necessary safety requirements are met in terms of safety, the
location and nature of the refuge facility, and that the equipment, infrastructure and finances are
available to meet that criteria.
7.3
The possibility of setting these standards is complicated by the fact that
exposes itself to a duty of care and all the legal implications that follow.Bushfires can be unpredictable and whlle designated fire refuges can providethey cannot be guaranteed as a safe place to shelter.
local government
a degree of safetS
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7.4 PROPOSED ROLE OT'AGENCIES
Should the current function of Fire Refuges continue, there are a number of separate roles thatwould need to be shared across the agencies. The following allocation of roles is suggested.
7.4.1 Councils
That councils will be responsible for assisting other agencies in providing:
o local fire refuge plansr community education programs¡ signage for travellers/visitors who may not know thet way to fre refuge locationso education and assistance for owners preparing their properties to minimise the risks
from bushfirer post-fire management, including relief recovery assistance for the community.
7.4.2 Countrv Fire Authoritv
That the CFA should share responsibility for:
o local fire refuge planso communityeducationprogramso assistance to travellers and visitors who may be in the bushfire areao private preparationo advising Police of information on fre fronto post fire management including relief recovery operations.
7.4.3 Victoria Police
That Victoria Police should have responsibility for providing:
. emergency response coordination
. public warnings to travellers and visitors to the bushfire area
. registration of evacuees
r provide public way
7.4.4 Department of Justice:
That DOJ should be responsible for:
o endorsing the policy frameworko providing funding for community education programso detennining the performance criteria for refugeso setting standards for facilities etc. ando providing post fire management and private preparation assistance.
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7.4.5 VictorianEmersencvManagement Council:
That VEMC should be responsible for:
o endorsing the policy frameworko determining perforrnance criteria for refirges / standards for facilities
7.4.6 Denartment of Natural Resources & Environment:
That DNRE should be responsible for:
. properþ managing risk on the land for which it is responsible ando negotiating with landowners whose property borders its lando the safety of visitors to their Parks
7.4.7 Department of Treasurv & Finance
That Treasury is responsible for funding:
. pre fire management publicity and protection activities including fire refrrgese post fire management operations including recovery and reliefo infrastructure according to the set standards
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CONCLUSIONS
At the original Fire Refuge Workshop in May 1998 a strong view was expressed by more thanthirty agencies and councils in attendance that the provision of designated fire refitges withinan area makes communities:
Iess self reliant;more likely to evacuate an area late, in the knowledge that there is a designøted firerefuge within driving distance;more prone to seek help from and even blame the relevant emergency authorities ifsomething goes wrong.
It has been shown in the report of the Coroner's Enqury into the Dandenong Ranges Fires1997 , that the existenc e of designated fire refuges in an area ,actively encourages people toleave their homes as late as possible, thinking that they will be able to easily access a nearbyrefuge and be safe from a bushfire.
This attitude, held by many members of the public, is highly dangerous. However, takingaway these refirges does not guarantee there will be fewer fatalities resulting from bushfire.People still refuse to listen to the advice of the CFA and other authorities when dealing withbushíres and place themselves at risk when they do leave their homes seeking a place ofrefuge.
The provision of either:
informal local fire refuges, selected by a neighbourhood community as a place of mutualsupport, or
desígnøtedftre refuges, selected as a safe haven by the authorities,
may not in fact be safe.
The key to improving public safety and minimising loss to life and property, is having a moreinformed public, achieved as a result of inter agency co-operation and community education.Ifpeople have a better understanding of the preparation required to survive a bushfire anddefend their homes, and they are physically and mentally ready when a fire occurs they willhave the best chance of survival regardless of whether they use informal or designated firerefuges. Therefore community education programs are fundamental to the issue of publicsafety during bushfire events.
To date councils have acted on the expert advice provided to them in not just the selection of"ftre refuges" on the basis of availability and proximity, but in educating their communitiesabout the location and role of fre refuges. Although councils have acted in good faith andconsistent with expert guidance, it is now suggested that continuance of the existing policy isneither safe nor in the best interests of the community.
There will be a lead time before any decision regarding the future of designated fire refuges andsubsequent revised policies can be made.
Throughout this time councils will remain exposedwillingness and the legal obligation placed on them totechniques under the guidance of the'oexperts".
26
to legal liability, arising from theirparticipate in emergency management
8.
WIT.4000.001.0081
April 2001
Given the variety of environments that are at risk of bushfire throughout Victoria, a flexibleapproach is required within a consistent statewide polioy framework. Eaeh environment needs
to be assessed on risk and the suitability of tlre various teatments. Each council needs to beprovided with appropriate finance and expert advice to fornrulate its strategy and deternrinethe nrost appropriate treatments given its local envi¡onment.
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9, PROPOSEDRECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations result from the anaþis presented in this Background paper.
Recommendation 1. That the State Government release firnding immediately for acommunity education program to be conducted by the CFA, with the support of local councilsand other agencies. The program should work in local communities to ensure that allresidents have a personal survival plan and that they have worked in their local area to definean informal place of shelter where they will meet to support each other as the fire front passesthrough.
Recommendation 2.That funding be made available for information, materials and programsto educate workers in and visitors to bushfire prone ¿ueas, on how to behave on days of riskfrom high intensity bushfires. The State agencies and the CFA with the support of the localcouncils and local employers should undertake this work.
Recommendation 3. That the Victoria Emergency Management Council, undertakes thepreparation of Guidelines for Local Informal Places of Shelter.
These guidelines should be framed to assist people who are planning to stay and defend theirproperty to identifu a place in their immediate neighbourhoods to shelter with neighbourswhile the fire front passes through.
Recommendation 4.That due to the risks associated with designated fire refuges, theVictoria Emergency Management Council:
remove all reference to designated formal fire refuges in the Emergency ManagementManual Victoria.acknowledge that designated refuges have never been a valid means of providing thebest chance of survival Ín a bushfïreadvise councÍls that the references to designated refuges (logo) have been removed fromthe Emergency Management Manual VictorÍa and other official publications.
Reeommendation 5.
That the State Government amend the Emergency Management Act 1986 to provide anappropriate indemnity to Councils, to complement the provisions in Section 94 of the CounqvFire Authorit]¡ Act. 1958 along the following lines:
A Municipal Council, Councillor or member of staffof a Municipal Council or a Committeeof Management is not subject to any action, liability, claim or demand for any matter or thingdone or omitted to be done or contract entered for or in connection with:
an emergency management plar¡the suitability or availability or any venues mentioned or referred to in any emergencymanagement plarqinjuries or damage sustained in attempting to reach or in taking refuge within any venuementioned or referred to in any management plan,any communication or community education,
a
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If the action taken or omitted to be taken, by the Council, Councillor or the member of councilstaff or the Committee of Management, was taken in good faith for the purpose of carryingout a power or duty of a Council, under this Act or Regulations or any other Act orRegulations.
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10, THE NEXT STEPS
The procedures for dealing with this report and recommendations are as follows:
STEP I:That consultation occurs with parties represented on the Working Party and this report isdiscussed by the emergency agencies, the State Government and local councils to inform andprovide feedback on this Background Paper and its recommend.ations.
STEP 2:That after this process the document is submitted to the Victorian Emergency ManagementCouncil for their action.
STEP 3:That a separate Implementation Committee is formed to implement the proposals, assumingthat it is supported by the VEMC.
STEP 4:That the Inrplementation Committee consider the following in terms of implementing theproposals:
any amendments required to legislation;
any amendments required to the Emergency Management Manual;
the timeframe for councils to complete the assessment of their local environment.
design of community education material to support the implementation;
any further research that may be needed to support implementation of therecommended procedures (for example: research into social behaviour during highintensity bushfire).
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11. REFERENCES
Boura, J. (1995). Analysis of fire protection strategies in the Moggs Creek wildfire 19.11.1994.Fire Management Department Internal Report,Coan!ry Fire Authority, Melbourne.
Boura, J., Wassing, M., Silberbauer, G. and Jerome, H. (1995). Analysis of CFA Fire ManagementStrategies in the Beninga-Enfield wildfire 25-26.02.199J. Risk Managanent and HeadquartersOperations, Country Fire Authority, Melbourne.
Boura, J., Reinholdt, S., Boxelaar, L., Jenkins, A. and Rhodes A. (1998). Analysis of FirePrevention and Community Safety at the Spring Hill Fire of 22March 1998. Internsl Report.Risk Management Department, CFA Melbourne.
CFA andNRE (1997). Review of the Significant Fires of January 20 and 21, 1997. CountryFkeAuthority and Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Melbourne.
Country Fire Authority Act, 1958. No. 6228/1958, Støte of Victoria.Emergency Management Act, 1986. No. 30/1986, State of Victoria.Emergency Management Maruml Victoria, 1999.Johnstone, G. (1999). Inquests into the deaths of Jenniftr Louise Lindroth, Grsham Kingsley
Lindroth and Genevieve Erin during afire at Ferny Creek andþur otherfires in the
Dandenong Ranges on 21 January 1997. Coroners Report, Colonial Services, Melbourne
Lazarus, G. and Elley, J. (1984). A study of the effect of household occupancy during the AshWednesday bushfire in Upper Beaconsflreld, Victoria, February 1983. NCRFR TechnicalPaper No.3, National Centre for Rural Fire Research.
Loane, I.T. and Gould, J.S. (1986). Aerial Suppression of Bushfires: Cost-Benefit Study forVictoria. National Bushflre Research Unit, CSIRO, Canberra.
Miller, S.I., Carter, W. and Stephens, R.G. (1984). Report of the Bushfire Review Committeeon Bushfire Preparedness in Victoria, Australia, following the Ash Wednesday Firesl6 February 1983. Government Printer, Melbourne.
O'Donoghue, J. (1998). Letter, fire refuges and Legal Liability. Municipal Association ofVictoria, Local Government Centre, Melbourne.Ramsay, C., McArthur, N.A. and Dowling, V.P. (1995). Planning in fire-prone areas:
Buildingsurvival. In Browr¡ C. And Tohver, L, (eds) Bushfire ! Looking to the Fuhre. NatureConservation Council of NSW Sydney.
Reinholdt, S. , Rhodes, A. and Scillio, M. (1999). Stay or Go: Understanding CommunityResponses to the Threat of Hazards. CFA-EMA Draft Reporl, Emergency Management
Australia, Canberra.
Shire of Yarra Ranges (May 1998) Fire Refuge Workshop, Notes of worlæhop held on 13 may1998 at Lilydale, MelbourneWilson, A.A.G. (1984). Assessing the bushfire hazard ofhouses: A quantitative approach.
NCRFR Technical Paper No. 6, National Centre for Rural Fire Research.
Wilson, A.A.G. and Ferguson, I.S. (1984). Fight or flee? A case study of the Mount Macedonbushfire. Australian Forestry, 47, 230-236.
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