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    Towards Cyber-Security Protection of

    Critical Infrastructures by GeneratingSecurity Policy for SCADA Systems

    Djamel Khadraoui, Christophe Feltus

    Public Research Centre Henri Tudor, Luxembourg-Kirchberg, Luxembourg

    March, 2014

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    Table of contents

    Introduction and ArchiMate theory

    State of the art

    Policy Concept and Metamodel Core

    Agent System Metamodel

    Organizational Layer

    Application Layer Technical Layer

    Inter-Layer Link

    Policy modelling

    Organizational Policy

    Application policy Case study in Financial CI

    Conclusions

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    Introduction

    - Critical infrastructure monitored and protected by SCADA

    system

    - SCADA operate at different abstraction levels of the CI

    - SCADA based on 3 functions:

    data acquisition

    alert correlation

    policy instanciation and deployment

    - SCADA based on agents and agent systems (MAS)

    NO INTEGRATED MODELING APPROACH TO INTEGRATE ALL

    DIMENSIONS.

    3

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    ArchiMate theory

    - http://pubs.opengroup.org/architecture/archimate2-doc/

    - 3 abstraction layers (business, application and technical)

    - ArchiMate core concepts:

    - ArchiMate objective is to model enterprise architecture

    4

    http://pubs.opengroup.org/architecture/archimate2-doc/http://pubs.opengroup.org/architecture/archimate2-doc/http://pubs.opengroup.org/architecture/archimate2-doc/http://pubs.opengroup.org/architecture/archimate2-doc/http://pubs.opengroup.org/architecture/archimate2-doc/
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    State of the art

    Gaia: is a framework for the development of agent architectures basedon a lifecycle approach

    AUML andMAS-ML: are extensions of the UML language for the

    modelling of MAS

    Prometheus: defines a metamodel of the application layer and allowsto generate organizational diagrams, roles diagrams, classes

    diagrams, sequences diagrams and so forth

    CARBA: provides a dynamic architecture for MAS similar to the

    middleware CORBA

    Observation: No solution for modelling, in a common model, the

    different abstractions layer of an SCADA system

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    Policy Concept and Metamodel Core

    .the policy semantic :

    Our goal is to introduce the Agents po l icy as a Core metamodel

    concept as a intermediairy to handle passive and active structures

    for realization of a behaviour

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    Event Context Responsibilities

    Event: something done by a Structure

    Element that generates an execution of

    a Policy.

    Context: configuration of Passive

    Structure that allows the Policy to beexecuted

    Responsibility: a state assigned to an

    Agent (human or software) to signify him

    its obligations and rights in a specific

    context..

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    Agent System Metamodel

    Organizational layer

    7

    Organizational Policies are

    behavioural components ofthe organization whose

    goals are to achieve an

    Organizational Service to a

    role depending on Events

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    Agent System Metamodel Application

    layer

    8

    The Application layer is

    used to represent theApplication Components

    and their interactions with

    the Application Service

    derived from the

    Organizational Policy of theOrganizational layer

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    Agent System Metamodel Technical

    layer

    9

    Technical layer is used to

    represent the structuralaspect of the system and

    highlights the links

    between the Technical

    layer and the Application

    layer and how physicalpieces of information called

    Artifacts are produced or

    used.

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    Agent System Metamodel Interlayer

    links

    10

    Artefact of the TechnicalLayer realizes Data Object

    of the Application Layer

    which realizes

    Organizational Object of

    the Organizational layer

    Application Service uses

    the Organizational Policy to

    determine the services it

    proposes

    Technical layer bases his

    Infrastructure Service on

    theApplication Policy of

    the Application layer

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    ArchiMate

    metamodel

    for MAS

    Allows defining:

    1. Organizational policy

    2. Application policy

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    1

    2

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    Organizational policy

    Organizational Policycan be represented as an UML Use Case

    - Roles represent theActors which haverespon sibi l i t iesin theUse

    Case

    - Collaborat ion concepts show the connections between them.

    - Products, Valueand Organizat ional Serviceprovide the Goalof the

    Use Case.

    - Preand Post cond i t ionsmodel the context of the Use Caseand are

    symbol izedin the Metamodel as the Eventconcept (Precondition) and

    the Organizat ional Object (Pre/Post condition).

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    The set of rules that defines the organizational Responsibilities andgoverns the execution, by the Organization domain, of behaviours that

    serve the Product domain in response to a Process domain occurred in a

    specific context, symbolized by a configuration of the Information

    domain.

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    Application policy

    UML provides support for modelling the behaviour performed by

    the App l icat ion domainas Sequence Diagram.

    Configuration of the Data domaincan be expressed asPrecondi t ionsof the Sequence Diagramand symbolized by the

    execution of a test-method on the lifeline of the diagram.

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    The set of rules that defines the application Responsibilities and governs

    the execution, by the Application domain, of behaviours that serve the

    Data domain to achieve the application strategy

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    Petroleum distribution case study

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    ACE, PIE et RDP

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    Architecturescomponents

    TheACE Agents collects, aggregates and analyses networkinformation and confirms alerts are sent to the PIE

    The PIE Agentsreceives a confirmed alert from the ACE, set

    the severity level and the extent of the network response

    (depending on the alert layer). The high level alert messagesare transferred to the RDP.

    The RDP Agentsis composed of two modules

    The Cryptography Analysis (CA) is in charge of analysing

    the keys previously instantiated by the PIE.

    The Component Configuration Mapper, selects the

    appropriate communication channel.

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    Focus on the alerte

    correlation

    Instantiation of the metamodel

    to engineer the 3 layers policies

    At the application layer :

    Sequences diagrams:

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    Example of

    ArchiMate

    Instanciation of the ACE agent

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    Example of

    ArchiMate

    Instantiation of all agents

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    Policies

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    Conclusions (2/2)

    - ArchiMateadaptation allowed:

    Structuringof the policy concept,

    Synchronizingthe behaviour between many types of

    agents, spread over different types of critical architecture

    management components such as the alert correlationengine, the intrusion detection tools, and so forth.

    - Acquiring Issuing financial validation by case study

    Clarificationof the connection between the

    synchronization of the event that is generated at the levelof one component policy and the one that triggers

    policies to another component.

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    Acknowledgment

    The research described in this paper is funded by the

    CockpitCI research project within the 7th frameworkProgramme (FP7) of the European Union (EU) (topic SEC-

    2011.2.5-1 Cyber-attacks against critical infrastructures

    Capability Project).

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    Thank you for your attention !

    Any questions ?

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