SYRIA AND US FOREIGN

POLICYIdean Salehyan

Associate Professor of Political ScienceUniversity of North Texas

OUTLINE Background Understanding the Syrian war US responses and policy options

SYRIA BACKGROUND Demography:

22.5 Million peopleEthnicity: 90% Arab, 9% KurdishReligion: 74% Sunni Islam; 16% Alawi &

Shia; 10% Christian History:

Ottoman EmpireWWI, French Mandate Independence in 1946

SYRIA BACKGROUND 1963 Ba’athist coup Hafez al-Assad rise to power,

1971 Involvement in Lebanon

Relationship with Hezbollah Muslim Brotherhood Challenge

1982 Hama Massacre

Hafez al-Assad

BASHAR AL-ASSAD Born September 11,

1965 Studied medicine in the

UK Groomed to be president

after death of brother Assumes office, 2000

after father’s death Remains close to Iran,

Hezbollah Shia ‘revival’

ARAB SPRING Peaceful “revolutions”

Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen (partial) Successful repression

Bahrain Violent revolution

Libya Civil war

Syria Sectarian nature of the conflict

BEGINNINGS OF SYRIAN UNREST 15 March, 2011. Protests in Damascus, Aleppo, and

Daraa. Repression/imprisonment Promises of some reform

Failure of Arab League and UN peace plans 25 April, 2011, Siege of Daraa. Hundreds killed Military desertions. Armed clashes begin in June.

OPPOSITION FORCES Free Syrian Army. Military defectors, led

by Colonel Riad al-AsaadEstimates between 10,000-25,000 troopsNot a unified movement

Local defense groups Al-Nusra Front

Foreign Jihadists Kurdish Militias Syrian National CouncilSyrian National

Coalition

SECTARIAN CONFLICT Conflict has taken increasingly sectarian

tone Assad loyalists include Alawites and

ChristiansFighting for survival

Opposition forces largely Sunni ArabSecular/moderate forcesRadical Jihadists

Kurdish militias

INTERNATIONAL SPILLOVER 1.3 Million refugees Jordan: 420,000 Lebanon: 200,000 Turkey: 300,000 Iraq: 100,000

US RESPONSE “For the sake of the Syrian people, the

time has come for President Assad to step aside.”President Obama, August 18, 2011.

“Military intervention at this point could hinder humanitarian operations… embroil the United States in a significant, lengthy and uncertain military commitment… bringing the United States into a broader regional conflict or proxy war.” -Chuck Hegel, US Sec of Defense. April 13,

2013

US RESPONSE Policy debate over arming the rebels Strategic ambivalence: “Assad must go,

but…” Humanitarian and non-lethal aid only Working through US allies in region No military action

Difficulties of identificationUncertain outcome

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS Scenario 1 (best case) Assad steps aside, opposition forces

agree on a democratic constitution.

UNLIKELY

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS Scenario 2 Assad’s forces gain the upper hand,

crush the insurgency.

UNLIKELY

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS Scenario 3 (worst case) Assad removed from power by force Fighting between opposition militias,

widespread retaliation/cleansing against Alawites

Regional forces drawn in

POSSIBLE

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS Scenario 4 Conflict hits a “stalemate” Negotiated settlement including a UN

force, security guarantees, eventual elections

NOT ON THE AGENDA BUT SHOULD BE

US RESPONSE Time to start thinking about peace plan. Negotiations including Assad, opposition

forces, regional actors, Russia, US. Potential terms of a deal

Assad steps asidePower-sharing constitution between Sunnis,

Alawites, and KurdsUN force provides security guarantees, esp

for AlawitesMilitary reintegration

QUESTIONS?