Identification and Definition in the Lysis

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ZUR DISKUSSION

Identification and Definition in the Lysis

by Gale Justin (Sacramento)

Abstract: In this paper, I make a case for interpreting the Lysis as a dialogue of defi-nition, designed to answer the question of “What is a friend?” The main innovationof my interpretation is the contention – and this is argued for in the paper – that So-crates hints towards a definition of being a friend that applies equally to mutualfriendship and one-way attraction – the two kinds of friend relation very clearly iden-tified by Socrates in the dialogue. The key to understanding how the two differentkinds of friendship can have a common definition is to appreciate that the propertyof being a friend has a relational character.

What is the main question asked by Socrates in the Lysis? Some scholars have urgedthat what Socrates means to ask is what feature intrinsic to persons who desire andwhat features possessed by the objects of their desire explain the attraction betweenthe entities. Other scholars say that the question under consideration is, “What isfriendship?” – understood only as a reciprocal relationship between human beings.Still others suggest that Socrates is primarily interested in the question of “What is afriend?” – both in the case in which friendship is construed as a necessarily mutual re-lationship and in the case in which it is not.1 I subscribe to the third view, but I partcompany with its proponents on a central point. They believe that Socrates does notoffer any explanation of what is common to the two relations that he speaks of asfriends; whereas, I believe that he alludes in the Lysis to a single account of being afriend that applies equally to mutual friendship and to the one-way attraction rela-tion.2 It is, therefore, my concern to argue that (1) the question Socrates raises is the

1 The attraction theory is defended by Glidden 1981, 46; Mackenzie 1988, 26; Ir-win 1995, 54f.; Reshotko 1997, 4; Versenyi 1975, 187. The friendship view ismaintained by Annas 1977, 532; Adams 1992, 4; Bolotin 1979, 66; Gonzalez1995, 69f.; Guthrie 1977, 144f.; Pangle 2001, 305; Roth 1995, 2f.; Tessitore 1990,117; Vlastos 1969, 6f. The question of “What is a friend?” is taken to be the mainquestion by Levin 1972, 239f.; Robinson 1986, 65f.; Santas 1977, 81f.

2 Consider Robinson 1986, 79: “Plato has not, in his [favorite] suggestion that τ��γα��ν ‘the good’ is φλον ‘friend’ to the intermediate made any provision whichwould allow this one-way attraction to become an element in a mutual friend-

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definitional question of what is a friend; (2) he identifies, in the course of pursuing ananswer to that question, two kinds of friend relation; and (3) he provides the basis fora definition which can explain both kinds of relation.3

1. Main Question of the Lysis

I begin with remarks on how the dramatic dimension of the dialogue lays the ground-work for raising the definitional question. The general context is Socrates’ displayundertaken to advise the love-struck Hippothales on how a lover ought to go aboutendearing himself to his beloved. Socrates starts off his interrogation of Hippothalesby asking the youth to describe his tactics of amorous pursuit. After hearing thatHippothales composes encomiums in honor of Lysis, Socrates points out that the be-stowal of praise is likely to make the favorite harder to catch. Hippothales concedesthis and asks Socrates to advise him on what sort of seduction strategy he should useto win Lysis’ affection. Hence, the entire subsequent discussion is oriented towardsanswering the question that Hippothales’ request for assistance brings into the dia-logue, namely, “How does a person become friendly to, προσφιλ�«, (206c2) anotherperson?”

This exact question emerges explicitly when Socrates begins his first exchange withMenexenus. Socrates asks Menexenus, who is already Lysis’ friend, how a person be-comes the friend of another (212a6–8). Moreover, it is evident from the text at216c1–217a2 where Socrates uses interchangeably the phrases “to become a friend”,γγνεσ�αι φλον, and “to be a friend”, ε�ναι φλον, that the lead question, “How doesone become a friend?” is a variant of the definitional question, “What is a friend?”Socrates switches from one formulation to the other because both can be answered interms of exactly the same condition: whatever accounts for what it is to be a friendalso settles how one becomes a friend.4 Thus, the dramatic and the philosophic di-mensions of the dialogue make reasonably clear that the main question of the dialo-gue is (some version of) the definitional question, “What is a friend?”

My understanding of the main question may be contrasted with the approach ac-cording to which the question under investigation is, “What is friendship?” The term“friendship”, φιλα, appears only ten times in the dialogue; and, it never occurs in thecontext of a question. Moreover, on the friendship approach Socrates’ examples ofone-sided attraction are hard to accommodate, since friendship is normally under-stood to involve mutuality. But the examples of one-sided attraction qualify as friendrelations on the hypothesis (the neither good nor bad is friend to the good) that is So-

ship”. Robinson reaffirms this view in his overall interpretation of the Lysis forProject Archelogos: http://www.archelogos.phil.ed.ac.uk.

3 Nothing that I say hinges on a judgment about either for whom the Socrates-cha-racter speaks or what place the Lysis occupies in the chronological order of Pla-to’s dialogues.

4 Santas 1979, 155, notes the close connection between these questions.



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crates’ first candidate definition of the relation to be defined. So the specification ofthat relation should not be an obstacle to including one-sided attraction within itsscope.5 These considerations count against taking the question, “What is friend-ship?” to be at the heart of the Lysis.

The converse interpretative procedure which weights the examples of one-sided at-traction more heavily than those of mutual friendship recommends treating the Lysisas developing a theory of desire, pursuit, or ultimate value. There is, I think, one ma-jor drawback to this procedure. Socrates typically seeks to clarify a value conceptwith interlocutors who might be thought to know or have beliefs about the concept inquestion. For example, he discusses courage with the distinguished general Laches,piety with Euthyphro who is about to charge his own father with impiety, and the finewith the considerably accomplished Hippias. But nothing about Lysis or Menexenusuniquely qualifies them to discuss desire, pursuit, or ultimate value. So if the topic ofcentral concern in the Lysis is to have special relevance to the traits (especially the be-liefs) of the interlocutors, as it typically does, it is not likely to be the nature of desire,pursuit, or ultimate value. The drawbacks to the just now mentioned interpretativeprocedures give us, therefore, good reason to try for an interpretation of the Lysis interms of the question, “What is a friend?”

2. Identification of Two Kinds of Friends

As the opening step of such an interpretation, I want to consider how Socrates’ ap-proach to the poets’ views on friends reveals that the friend relation has two sub-kinds. Having suitably chastened Lysis and Menexenus, Socrates turns their atten-tion to traditional poetic teachings on the subject of friends (214a3–4).6 He takes upHomer’s view that god draws like to like and Hesiod’s contrary opinion that most op-posite things are friends.

In following out the implications of Homer’s verse, Socrates claims to find in it the“hidden meaning” that the good are friends. He then exclaims: “We are now able to saywho are friends.”7 The fact that Socrates “discovers” in Homer’s teaching (214d5–6)

5 Roth 1995, 11f., dismisses Socrates’ examples of an attraction of a person to hisopposite precisely because the relation cannot, he says, be mutual. But this is aproblem only if we assume at the outset, as Roth does, that the relation to be de-fined is reciprocal friendship.

6 I discuss below the interrogations of Lysis and Menexenus.7 Lysis, 214e1. I use throughout (sometimes slightly modified) the translation of

W. R. M. Lamb, Plato (Cambridge, Mass. 1925), vol. 3, 7f. Sedley 1989 proposesthat Socrates’ exclamation contains the main question of the dialogue. It is, hesays, the identification question of who or what is a friend to whom or what? So-crates’ exclamation may, however, contain the particular question as to whoexemplifies the friend relation rather than the general question concerning thenature of the relation itself. To support his view of the exclamation as containingthe general, i.e., the main question of the dialogue, Sedley argues that the identi-



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the case of friendship between good people, when this certainly is not explicitly there,suggests that he himself believes it to be, in a qualified form at least, a genuine exampleof the relation to be defined. Furthermore, it is made plain that this kind of friendshipis a mutual relation, for the consideration that counts against it is the fact that thefriends who are similar (or self-sufficient) cannot benefit each other. Setting aside thefact that this friendship cannot supply a definition of being a friend, I would point outthat Socrates needs at the beginning some agreed-on examples of the relation which theinterlocutors are attempting to define.8 I submit that the case of friendship betweengood people serves this purpose. In a qualified form, it is a bona fide example of onekind of friend relation. I discuss below additional evidence that Socrates accepts as onekind of friend relation the mutual friendship of people who possess good qualities, af-ter I consider an example of a second kind of friend relation that Socrates accepts. Thisis an example that Socrates extracts from Hesiod’s teaching.

In the course of investigating Hesiod’s proposal that a person is attracted to his/heropposite, Socrates mentions the attraction of an uninstructed person to a personwith a special expertise (215d7–8). He shows approval of this particular associationwhen he maintains that only a person who recognizes his own ignorance can loveknowledge (218a7–b3). The knowledge he has in mind is clearly not limited to theknowledge that is attainable by individual inquiry, but encompasses knowledge thatcan be acquired by associating with an expert. This supposition is supported by theprominent use Socrates makes of the example of the sick person who is friendly to thedoctor. The sick person is attracted to medical knowledge in the doctor.9

Furthermore, it is important to note that two moves by logic choppers (216a9)pave the way for Socrates’ dismissal of the relationship of attraction between oppo-sites. The logic choppers (a) treat the relation as if it were necessarily reciprocal, and

fication question also occurs at 218b7–8. But taking 218b7–8 to contain the iden-tification question requires an emendation in that line of text. 218b7–8 should be,Sedley says, emended from �� στι τ� φλον κα� οϊ to �� στι τ� φλον κα� ο�. This isbecause he translates 218b7–8 as “what the friendly and the unfriendly are”, and,as he points out, µ� not οϊ would be the proper negation for the substantive “thefriendly”, τ� φλον. So Sedley emends the omicron-upsilon from a negation to arelative pronoun. As I understand the disputed line of text, the expression beingnegated is not the substantive “the friendly”, τ� φλον, but the verb of the indirectquestion “what is a friend?”, �� στι τ� φλον. Thus, I think the line reads: “what isa friend and what is not [a friend]”. This is a suitable translation in the context;and, it is acceptable Greek, since οϊ is the proper negation for most finite verbs(Smyth 1920, 601 and 604f.). Yet without his (elegant) emendation, there is noclear-cut occurrence of the identification question as the main question of thedialogue. I am grateful to Ruby Blundell for discussing with me the grammaticalpoints of Sedley’s proposal.

8 I am indebted on this point to Burnyeat 1977.9 Roth 1995, 11, thinks that Socrates’ use of the patient-doctor relation is insincere,

for there is, Roth maintains, no way in which the doctor can be construed as op-posite to the sick. But the doctor has health in the sense of having medical skill.In this sense, what the doctor has is the opposite of the sick.



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(b) substitute moral terms for non-moral terms. They can, thereby, offer as an in-stance of the relation the case of a good person who is attracted to a bad person. Butthis association violates the interlocutors’ agreement that a bad person cannot be afriend (214c8–d4). So Socrates concludes that mutual attraction of opposites cannotprovide an adequate analysis of being a friend. Nothing that the logic choppers havesaid, however, impugns as an example of being a friend the one-way attraction of anuninstructed person to an expert. And the fact that Socrates builds a substantialamount of theory on the patient to doctor relation is a good reason to believe that heaccepts one-way attraction to an expert as a genuine example of the relation underdiscussion (218e3–220b5).

3. In Support of Two Sub-Kinds

I want now to offer additional considerations in support of my contention that So-crates accepts that being a friend has two sub-kinds, each of which has one of the afo-rementioned examples as a particular instance. The first consideration is linguistic.There is in Socrates’ discussion of the poets’ verses a division of labor imposed ontwo Greek constructions. Socrates uses “to be friends”, ε�ναι φλοι, and its variants todesignate the mutual relationship between good persons. For example, on the basisof the alike proposal, he claims: “We now can tell who are friends. For the argumentdiscloses that they are the good”, 5 Εξοµεν �ρα �δη τνε« ε�σ�ν ο! φλοι" # γ$ρ λ�γο«%µ&ν σηµανει 'τι ο( )ν *σιν �γατο (214e1–2). By contrast, he uses “is friendly to/friend of”, �στι φλο« τ+/το,, to designate the attraction relation between a personand his/her opposite. For example, he says: “The sick person is the friend of the doc-tor”, # κ-µν.ν […] το, �ατρο, φλο« (218e3–4). It could be mere coincidence that So-crates regularly employs the ε�ναι φλοι construction to refer to the mutual relation-ship between good people and to the mutual friendship of Lysis and Menexenus(207c7); whereas, he uses φλο« with dative or genitive for designating one-way attrac-tion to an expert. But the fact that these phrases serve consistently to denote instan-ces of two distinct kinds of relationship strongly suggests that Socrates intends tomark off by their means two varieties of the friend relation: a mutual friendship be-tween people who are good in some sense, and a one-way attraction relation betweena person who lacks some good and a person who possesses that good.

A second consideration supporting the same idea is based on features displayed bythe initial cross-examinations of Lysis and Menexenus. Each exchange gives promi-nence to a different one of these two varieties of the friend relation. Consider first So-crates’ examination of Lysis. The episode portrays Socrates engaged in behaviorwhich can achieve, according to the earlier agreement with Hippothales, a return ofaffection. Since Socrates actually does get from Lysis an affectionate response(211a3–5), the exchange is likely to provide some insight into the nature of a mutualfriendship.

To begin, Socrates asks Lysis whether he believes that his parents want him to behappy. When Lysis answers that he does, Socrates inquires whether Lysis believes aperson is happy if he is a slave and does nothing that he wants. Lysis says, “No”. At



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this point, Socrates ventures the conclusion that Lysis’ parents do not restrict himfrom doing what he wants. But Lysis affirms that they restrict him a great deal. NowSocrates probes Lysis on his attitude towards the restrictions in order to determinewhether it is incompatible with his combined beliefs that freedom is necessary forhappiness, and that his parents want his happiness. Socrates pursues the topic of in-compatibility by introducing examples of things that Lysis wants, but is not allowed,to do. In this way, Socrates hopes (a) to present the restrictions in unfavorable terms,and (b) to lay the groundwork for the judgment that Lysis’ parents do not desire hishappiness. From the negatively colored examples, Socrates infers the conclusion thatLysis seems to achieve no benefit from his considerable assets (208e8–209a1). And ifwe assume the additional premiss that happiness requires the beneficial use of what-ever assets one happens to have, then he insinuates the judgment that Lysis’ parentsprevent Lysis from being happy.

Lysis does not, however, concede Socrates’ claim that he gets no benefit from hispossessions. This suggests that he does not have a wholly negative view of the con-straints. He tells Socrates that they are in place because he is not yet of age (209a5–6).His response connects the restrictions to the goal of insuring his future happiness.This is how Lysis’ parents would explain the constraints. And given Lysis’ untrou-bled attitude towards the restrictions, he apparently shares his parents’ point of view.Thus, his reply makes clear that the freedom he requires for happiness is compatiblewith the imposition of some reasonable constraints.10

In the next phase of the cross-examination, Socrates leads Lysis to the realizationthat the restrictions are not due to his age, but to his level of skill. Socrates does thisby pointing out that his parents entrust to him things that he knows how to use. For itis these things that he will use well. So Lysis now explains the difference between theassets that he can control and those that he cannot in terms of his having and his nothaving knowledge. Thus, Lysis becomes at least dimly aware that the restrictions cor-respond to limits he himself would impose if he had knowledge. In this way, the free-dom that Lysis associates with happiness is nearly identified by him with self-rule.

With this much accomplished, Socrates goes on to insure that Lysis will giveknowledge pride of place among his values. To this end, he employs a story about theKing of Persia. The Great King, says Socrates, would allow Lysis to season soup withfistfuls of salt or use ashes to medicate the royal heir’s eyes if he considered Lysis tobe skilled at cookery or medicine. Since these imagined measures go well beyondstandard cooking and medical procedures, and since it is unlikely that the PersianKing makes competency the sole determining factor in his choices, Socrates’ claims

10 Bolotin 1979, 86, thinks that throughout the exchange Lysis understands free-dom to be doing whatever one wants. So, according to Bolotin, Socrates uses theexamples of parental restrictions to “challenge Lysis’ contentment with his pa-rents” (88). Gonzalez 1995, 73, also thinks that Socrates intends the examples tomake Lysis feel that his parents hinder his freedom. As I understand the negativelight in which Socrates casts the restriction, it is not intended to drive a wedgebetween Lysis and his parents but is a ploy used by Socrates for the purpose of as-certaining Lysis’ candid opinion of the restrictions.



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regarding Lysis’ prospects are surely exaggerated. Nevertheless, Socrates seems to bewilling to embellish a hypothetical case as a means of enticing Lysis to pursueknowledge. Thus, generalizing from the fanciful examples, Socrates concludes:

With regard to matters in which we become intelligent, every one will entrust uswith them […] and in such matters we shall do as we wish […]. Nay, not only shallwe ourselves be free and rule over others in these things, but these things will beours. For we shall derive benefit from them. (210a9–b7)

Socrates is telling Lysis what it means for a person to acquire expertise in something.A person who acquires expertise in a thing (eyes, mules, government) can extract be-nefit or advantage from the thing. Since he would be able to make possessions useful,other people entrust to him their possessions; and, he would, in turn, be free to dowith the things entrusted to him whatever he wants (cf. 208a2–b1). The legal ownerof the thing would be “ruled by” the expert’s opinion. It is, however, the legal ownerwho receives the benefit that the expert produces by his skilled use of the things en-trusted to him.11

Lysis may not grasp this last feature of the expert, which is to produce benefit forothers. But clearly the prospect of being in a leadership position, especially in the po-litical realm, may have sufficient appeal to motivate Lysis to put knowledge at thehead of his list of values. In any event, Socrates has surely enhanced Lysis’ desire forknowledge; and, he has simultaneously educated him on the essential ingredient of ahappy life (assuming that freedom in the sense of rational rule is necessary for hap-piness, as Lysis is likely to assume).

It now needs to be recalled that this exchange was intended to show Hippothaleshow to win the return of affection from a beloved. Lysis does, as I mentioned, re-spond to Socrates’ educative talk with affection and admiration. So it is fair to saythat were Hippothales capable of emulating Socrates’ philosophic discourse with Ly-sis, Lysis would be disposed to feel affection towards him. Moreover, Lysis is clearlyintellectually curious and reasonably self-restrained. Since these qualities in Lysis areapparently attractive to Hippothales, a friendship formed between them would bebased on the good qualities that each of them has.

What scholars may find troublesome in this view of Hippothales as attracted toLysis in virtue of Lysis’ good qualities is Ctesippus’ complaint that Hippothales’ po-ems and love songs dwell on Lysis’ noble birth and his family’s wealth.12 But Socratesignores Ctesippus’ complaint about the compositions when he chastises Hippotha-les. He says that the greater the praise that Hippothales lavishes on Lysis, the greaterwill be the blessings that he will seem to have lost, if he fails to win the youth’s affec-tion (205e5–8). Socrates’ reproach implies that Hippothales is attracted to Lysis’many good qualities, not the least of which is his bodily beauty. So there is reason to

11 In this paragraph I am indebted to remarks made in conversation with RoslynWeiss.

12 See, for example, Glidden 1981, 49, Tessitore 1990, 116, and Gonzalez 1995, 85.Contrast Bolotin 1979, 78: “Hippothales’ most pressing wish is to capture forhimself the ‘beautiful and good’ Lysis”.



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think that were Hippothales able to engage in co-inquiry, he and Lysis could form amutual friendship based on the good qualities of body and soul that are possessed byeach of the youths. The Lysis exchange, then, gives us a glimpse of what a mutualfriendship between Hippothales and Lysis might be like.13

I turn next to Socrates’ more adversarial approach to Menexenus. Dramatic detailsof the exchange suggest that Socrates is operating in this elenchus as an expert friend.The cross-examination is carried on in the presence of Ctesippus in his role of Men-exenus’ teacher, not cousin (211c3–d1). And Socrates’ line of questioning is reminis-cent of Euthydemus’ clever talk to Cleinias (Eud. 275d3–277b1). Thus, Socrates,functioning as instructor of moral inquiry, mimics the rhetorical style of sophisticeducators. Attention to Socrates’ instruction shows, however, (1) that Menexenus,not Socrates, confounds two kinds of friends,14 and (2) that Socrates works hard tohighlight, not obscure, the difference between one-sided attraction and mutualfriendship. In order to obtain confirmation of these two claims, it is necessary to con-sider how Socrates commences the cross-examination. He does so by offering Men-exenus three options for identifying who becomes friend to whom, if one person likesanother. These options are (a) the person who likes, (b) the person who is liked, and(c) “There is no difference”, (212a9–b2). Option (c) can be taken in more than oneway. One way is to interpret (c) as follows: (c’) The person who likes and the personwho is liked in return do not differ in respect of being a friend. This way of complet-ing (c) admits the possibility that the person who likes is not a friend of the same kindas the person who is liked. It is (c’) along with the possibility of friends of differentkinds that seems to be, as we shall see, the option that Socrates would choose.

Option (c) is actually chosen by Menexenus. Menexenus seems to understand (c)however, as an elliptical way of asserting something of this sort: (c’’): “It makes nodifference, if one says ‘A is a friend of B’ or ‘B is a friend of A’, each is a friend pe-riod.” As Menexenus sees it, friend A and friend B are “on a par”, since he seems notto realize that liking and being liked are different conditions. Menexenus subscribesto this unsophisticated view of a friend probably because he has acquired the affec-tion of his friend Lysis by doing no more than liking Lysis (212a1–5).15

13 The Lysis elenchus can also be seen as simulating the type of exchange engaged inby a philosophic lover and his beloved, each of whom possess an affinity of cha-racter but play asymmetric roles in the relationship. See Phaedrus 253a1–6 and253c2–6.

14 Annas 1977, 532f., Levin 1972, 242f., Robinson 1986, 65f., and Santas 1977, 83,contend that Socrates equivocates in this exchange on “friend”, φλο«. Glidden1980, 276f., argues against this contention.

15 Glidden 1980, 282, suggests that syntactic considerations underlie Menexenus’choice of (c). “As a student of Greek language, Menexenus might well assumethat the use of that verb [“to like” / “to be liked,” φιλε&ν / φιλε&σ�αι] explains theuse of the corresponding adjective”. But the Menexenus elenchus – unlike Socra-tes’ argument using “because” in the Euthyphro (9d2–11a8) to which Gliddencompares the elenchus – makes no mention of grammatical orderings. So theredoes not seem to be a textual basis for ascribing to Menexenus such an educatedchoice.



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In an effort to clarify what Menexenus is thinking when he selects option (c), So-crates inquires:

What are you saying? Do both become friends to each other (�λλ�λ.ν φλοιγγνονται), if only one likes the other? (212b3–5)

The most natural way of reading Socrates’ second question is to take him as askingwhether two people become mutual friends, if only one likes the other. This readingof the question is in harmony with Socrates’ use of the phrase “to be friends”, ε�ναιφλοι, to denote mutual friends, given that he has a tendency in this dialogue, as wehave seen, to switch back and forth between “to be” and “to become” (213c6–10,216c1–217a2). If this is a correct construal of Socrates’ second question, then it is fairto say that Socrates would not answer that question in the affirmative. Socrates’ open-ing question, “What are you saying?” shows, I think, that he is surprised by the viewthat he conjectures is implicit in Menexenus’ commitment to (3), namely, the viewthat a person becomes a mutual friend by doing nothing more than liking anotherperson. The surprised reaction shows that Socrates does not think one-way attrac-tion and mutual friendship are indistinguishable relationships. And although he doesnot here call “friend” either party to the one-way attraction relation, he later uses afriend expression to characterize both parties to the relation (212d5–213a6). Presum-ably, then, it is option (c), understood in terms of (c’) with the possibility of sub-kinds of friends, that Socrates would choose.

Menexenus readily assents, however, to Socrates’ second question because he hasnot given much thought to what is involved in being a friend. It is not until Socratesgoes on to point out (and Menexenus agrees) that a person who likes may not be likedin return that Menexenus realizes that liking and being liked are different conditions.Since he now also realizes that friendship for him involves two–way liking, Menexe-nus concludes that neither is a friend, if only one person likes the other (212c8–d1).He thereby contradicts his assent to the second question posed earlier by Socrates.Socrates next takes up separately the parties to the one way attraction relation. Butthe interlocutors agree that neither party individually can become a friend, since oneparty may hate the other; and, hatred makes enemies, not friends, of people. Thecross-examination concludes once Menexenus openly admits that he is at a loss to saywho becomes a friend to whom, if only one person likes the other. The negative out-come of the elenchus is, then, traceable not only to Menexenus’ reasonable belief thata person cannot be a friend to an enemy, but also to his inability to conceive of theone-way attraction relation. When faced with the possibility that the friendly personmight not be liked in return, he surrenders his belief that the two are friends becauseit does not occur to him that a person whose affection is not returned is a differentkind of friend.

It seems clear, however, that Socrates wants to highlight, not unacceptably oblite-rate, the distinction between one-sided attraction and mutual friendship. For hekeeps consistently to the case of one-sided attraction; and, he shows that there is abasis for distinguishing it from mutual friendship, namely, the fact that one-sided lik-ing can arise in contexts that preclude its being characterized as reciprocated affec-tion. Thus, Socrates does not, as a sophist might do, move on a purely verbal basis



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from consideration of a pair of persons who reciprocate affection to consideration ofa pair of persons, only one of whom likes. Rather, he works to reveal exactly what it isabout one-sided attraction that makes it a distinct kind of friend relation. The Men-exenus exchange emphasizes, then, the one-sided attraction relation; whereas, the Ly-sis exchange reveals some salient features of a mutual friendship. The fact that thetwo exchanges give prominence to a different kind of friend relation is further evi-dence for my claim that Socrates accepts that the friend relation has two sub-kinds.

One final consideration in support of this contention is the fact that Lysis is de-picted as being capable of having relations of both kinds. He and Menexenus claim tobe mutual friends (207c7–8). He is also the object of Hippothales’ one-way attrac-tion. And Socrates intimates that Lysis could be involved in a one-way attractionrelation with his fellow Athenians. Socrates’ remarks to Lysis concerning managingthe Athenians’ affairs suggest that Lysis could acquire an administrative expertise invirtue of which his fellow Athenians would be friendly to him (209c5–d4). Further-more, there is no indication that Lysis would be attracted in turn to something inthose whom his expertise serves. Thus, even if Socrates thinks it only a possibilitythat Lysis’ fellow Athenians could be friendly to an administrative skill in Lysis, themere mention of it shows that Socrates regards the one-way attraction relation asbeing a bona fide kind of friend relation.16

The details in this section strongly suggest that Socrates accepts mutual friendshipand one-way attraction as genuine sub-kinds of the friend relation. Socrates’ termi-nology, the philosophic content of the exchanges, and significant features of the dra-matic framework make reasonably clear that he divides friend relations into thesetwo kinds. I now want to show that Socrates hints towards a definition of being afriend that can explain both of the sub-kinds.

16 On the basis of Socrates’ subsequent positing of desire as a cause of being afriend, Gonzalez 1995, 78 n. 21 and 83 n. 30, maintains that only a good lackedby human beings can be the good in virtue of which people are friends. If Gon-zalez is correct, then Socrates could not hold that a person is a party to a friendrelation in virtue of possessing administrative expertise. But Gonzalez’s require-ment that all parties to a friend relation lack the good in virtue of which they arefriends results from his assumption that “friend” applies to entities one at a time.As a consequence of this assumption, he thinks “friend” shifts its meaning from“what is possessed” – the meaning he attributes to it in the first exchange withLysis – to “lacking what belongs” the meaning he thinks it takes on once Socratesidentifies desire of good with the motivating cause of being a friend (82f.). Thefact is, however, that being a friend is a relational property. A person is a friend toor of someone. Therefore, attribution of the property involves more than one per-son. I explain how this works on Socrates’ view in section 9. My point here is thatSocrates can without any shift in meaning maintain that the friend relation ob-tains between a person who possesses a good and a person who lacks/desires thatgood, since the property of being a friend applies to someone in relation to some-one else. So Lysis can be a party to a friendly relation in virtue of having an ex-pertise that his fellow-citizens lack.



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4. Socrates’ Analysis of Being a Friend

A number of commentators see 216c1–222d9 as offering Socrates’ own view of whatit is to be a friend.17 And most commentators would agree, I think, that Socrates’ ex-position divides, roughly, into four stages. Stage I (216c1–218c3) introduces Socrates’“favored” hypothesis that the neither good nor bad is friend to the good because ofthe presence of bad. Stage II (218c4–220b5) makes plain that the first friend of theneither good nor bad is some good.18 Stage III (220b6–222b3) removes “presence ofbad” and posits “desire of the akin” as what in our psychic make-up motivates us toacquire friends. And Stage IV (222b4–222d9) takes up the question of whether theakin relation could be the basis for the friend relation. I agree with this collectiveview of Socrates’ overall strategy. My question is whether Socrates works his waythrough these various stages to an account of being a friend that can simultaneously

17 Versenyi 1975, 188f., Glidden 1981, 50f., Mackenzie 1988, 27f., Santas 1977,81f., Gonzalez 1995, 78f., and Kahn 1996, 285f. For a different view see Vlastos1969, 6f., Annas 1977, 537f., and Roth 1995, 1f.

18 Bolotin 1979, 169, Mackenzie 1988, 29f., Santas 1977, 86, Gonzalez 1995, 83 n.30, Kahn 1996, 285f. Glidden’s view is different. He takes Socrates’ concern to bewhy does an individual (Hippothales, Menexenus) love or become a friend tosomeone in particular (Glidden 1981, 50). Thus, he construes the first friend,πρ/τον φλον, not as a kind of entity, but as a functional (formal) principle. Itexemplifies, he thinks, whatever it is that “is served by the agent’s loving what hedoes” (56). Glidden is, I think, mistaken in his belief that Socrates wants to ex-plain why particular individuals become friends and, as a consequence, value thethings they do. Glidden draws one line of support for this interpretation fromreading Socrates’ question “How does one become a friend?” as requesting anaccount of “how it is that Lysis and Menexenus became friends” (50). But Socra-tes’ question does not ask for a biographical account of the role that friends playin a person’s life. It is, as I have argued, a variant of the definitional question;and, it asks for the explanatory factors of being a friend.Furthermore, Glidden contends that Socrates’ investigation focuses on uncon-scious motivational factors that result from an agent’s condition (48f.). To sup-port this view, Glidden discusses the fanciful examples that Socrates uses to en-courage Lysis to become wise. Glidden points out that these examples provide awholly unrealistic picture of conscious motivation (48). So Socrates, Gliddenconcludes, cannot be striving to explain conscious motivations and attitudes.Rather, he wants to find “psychological elements in the personality which mightremain unknown to the agent himself” that explain the “function love playsin our lives” (49 and 56). Glidden is, I think, misled by his belief that Socratesis always intending to convey a truth, even when what he says is patently false, iftaken literary. The unrealistic character of Socrates’ examples relative to thechoices that people actually make seems wholly explicable in terms of Socrates’aim of converting a thirteen-year-old to intellectual pursuits. In my view, then,the conversation with Lysis is intended, not to reveal unconscious affective atti-tudes, but to encourage Lysis to form new ones.



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explain mutual friendship and one-way attraction. I hope to show that the answer tothis question is yes.

To better understand the drawback of attributing to Socrates an analysis of being afriend that cannot account for both kinds of relation consider a version of this view.Gonzalez says that Socrates’ “results can be summarized as follows: we who are nei-ther bad nor good desire that ultimately loved good of which we are in want”19. If theelements that explain the friend relation are, as Gonzalez proposes, a neither goodnor bad subject who desires an abstract good and the abstract good that is desired,then there can be no uniform account of reciprocal and non-reciprocal relations be-tween friends. For the primary analysis is in terms of a subject and an abstract object.Gonzalez attempts to extend his proposal as follows:

Socrates and the boys can establish a reciprocal friendship by seeking togetherthat good that belongs to all of them but of which all are deprived.20

But this extension introduces an explanation of being mutual friends that differsfrom the primary analysis of the friend relation. So Socrates would have to admit,contrary to the implication of his definitional question, that there is no uniform ac-count of the property of being a friend. The text gives us, however, no reason to thinkthat Socrates doubts that being a friend has a common nature. So I want to suggestthat Socrates’ four-stage analysis leads to an account of being a friend according towhich desire for good and a certain particular good possessed by another person arethe explanatory elements in virtue of which the property is applied. I will come backto the question of how this account can explain both reciprocal and non-reciprocalfriendships after I have discussed the stages of Socrates’ exposition.

5. Stage I

In Stage I, as others have noted, Socrates identifies the good as one component of thefriend relation.21 What has not, perhaps, been noticed is that at this stage of his ana-lysis, Socrates anticipates his shift in Stage III to desire as the motivating cause ofbeing a friend and, thereby, lays the groundwork for an analysis of being friend interms of desire for good.

Socrates anticipates his shift to desire as the motivating cause of being a friendwhen he compares the effects of being bad and having bad present on the relationbetween desire for good and being a friend. Since being bad and having bad presenthave opposite effects on the joint occurrence of desire for good and being a friend –having bad present engenders it, being bad precludes it – the comparison implies thatthe connection between desire for good and being a friend is causal. Moreover, the

19 Gonzalez 1995, 82.20 Gonzalez 1995, 86.21 This is noted by Mackenzie 1988, 29, Santas 1977, 84f., Gonzalez 1995, 78, Kahn

1996, 28, and Rowe 2000, 209.



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relative order in which the properties are introduced points to desire for good as thecausal antecedent (motivating cause) of being a friend (217e5–218a2).

Socrates lays the groundwork for analyzing being a friend in terms of desire forgood by emphasizing the link between desire for good and being a friend. For thisemphasis makes most sense if one of these notions can be used to explain the other.And this can be done because desire for good can account for the aspect of being afriend that Socrates clearly appreciates, namely, its relational aspect (218d6–7).

In order to strengthen my claim that desire for good can explain the relationalaspect of being a friend, I wish to compare desire for good with the relational inter-pretation of being hungry. If being hungry is interpreted as yearning for food ratherthan as rumbles in the stomach, then being hungry applies to a person in virtue of theperson’s yearning/desire and in relation to the abstract entity food. If we assume,however, that the person is hungry for the steak on the barbecue, then being hungryapplies to the person in virtue of the person’s yearning/desire and in relation to thatparticular instance of food. Analogous points hold for the property of desire forgood. Attribution of the property may be in reference to a relation between the psy-chological state and an abstract entity or in reference to a relation between the stateand a natural entity, depending on the specification of the object of desire that isgiven. The fact that desire for good itself has a relational nature makes it suitable toexplain the relational aspect of being a friend, and in consequence, qualifies it toserve as one of the explanatory elements of the friend relation. Hence, it is plausibleto regard Socrates’ attention here to desire for good as paving the way for his treat-ment of it as an explanatory factor of being a friend.22

6. Stage II

Socrates begins by asking:

Whoever is a friend, is he a friend to someone or not?[…] for the sake of something and because of something? (218d6–10)

The first question gives prominence to the relational nature of being a friend. Thesecond question pursues investigation of being a friend by asking about the causes ofthe relation. Scholars agree that Socrates takes up in this section the question con-

22 Glidden 1980 thinks that Socrates treats being a friend as a non-relational pro-perty. He contends this approach reflects “Plato’s bizarre theory of relations”(282). In Glidden’s view, then, a person can be a friend without being a friend toor of anyone (287). Mackenzie 1988, 26, also regards being a friend as a non-re-lational property. This prevents her, I think, from seeing that Socrates’ analysismakes genuine progress. For she assumes that being a friend must be explained interms of either the desired element or the desiring element; and, since neither oneby itself can provide an adequate account of the value property, the dialogue endsin an impasse (30f.). In my view, the attribution of being a friend depends on thepresence of both elements.



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cerning the aim of a friend relation, and that he investigates in the next section the to-pic of motivation.

Socrates’ discussion of the aim of a friend relation is connected to his claim inStage I that the good is a component of the friend relation. In both cases, Socrates’concern is with the range of entities that can be chosen as friends. When Socratesidentifies the good as one component of the relation, he is characterizing thebefriended party in a formal way. Whoever is chosen as a friend, that person is cho-sen as the source of some good. When Socrates takes up the question of aim, he istalking about the material side of the same choice, the specific good – for example,medical knowledge – in virtue of which the possessor of the good is befriended. Mo-reover, by drawing Menexenus’ attention to the aim of a friend relation, Socrates canpresent for Menexenus’ consideration the general idea that some attachments are di-rected towards procuring and sustaining others. To elucidate this point, Socratesasks Menexenus whether a person cherishes health, a good (218e6–7), for the sake ofacquiring a further friend. When Menexenus responds affirmatively, Socrates sug-gests that the series of means-end attachments must eventually reach the first friend,τ� πρ/τον φλον (219c7–d1). It is, Socrates says, this entity that is the genuine friend,whereas the friends that are used as means to the association with the first friend are“friends in name only” (220a6–b3).

Several scholars see in Socrates’ use of the phrase “first friend” an implicit ref-erence to the ultimate human good. On one version of this sort of interpretation, thefirst friend is happiness. According to a second version, it is the Good itself.23 Sup-port for this general approach may be found in the neuter phrase, “τ� πρ/τονφλον”, that Socrates uses to designate the terminus of the series of means-end at-tachments. The expression shows that for Socrates an inanimate entity, not a personas such, is the overall goal of the friendly person’s choice of friends. But a narrowreading of the neuter phrase is not the only option. The phrase can be understood todenote a property that is involved in the terminal friendship, not on its own, but invirtue of its being possessed by the befriended party to the final friendship. NoticeSocrates’ willingness to apply the neuter adjective (or possibly noun) “φλον”,“friend”, to the feminine “% ’ψγεια”, “health” (219a5–6) and the feminine “% �α-τρικ�”, “medicine” (219c1–2). Clearly, the application of the neuter term to entitieswhose names belong to the feminine gender is intended to indicate that the entitiesare included within the class of friends. But since here the application of “φλον” canbe understood to be in reference to the bodily health and the medical knowledge pos-sessed respectively by the healthy person and the doctor, it is arguable that the refer-rent of “τ� πρ/τον φλον” should be understood in a parallel way. On this alterna-tive, broad reading of “τ� πρ/τον φλον”, the phrase denotes a good possessed bythe befriended party to the terminal friendship.

The broad reading of the phrase coheres well with the general idea that Socrateswants to promote by bringing in the reference to the first friend. A person does take

23 Proponents of the happiness version of the interpretation include Vlastos 1969,7, Versenyi 1975, 195f., Irwin 1995, 54, and Adams 1992, 276. Kahn 1996, 288,and Bolotin 1979, 206f., endorse the Good itself version.



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an interest in a doctor, for instance, because a doctor possesses a good – medicalknowledge – that is, in normal circumstances, valued by the person merely as a meansto procuring and protecting other, more intimate attachments. So the broad readingof “first friend” can secure Socrates’ point about the means-end structure of personalattachments. Furthermore, the broad reading allows for relationships between per-sons – the agreed upon topic throughout the dialogue – to be genuine friend rela-tions. For on the broad reading, a person’s attachment to another person is a condi-tion of his/her acquisition of the first friend. On the narrow reading, by contrast,personal relationships are demoted to the status of “friends in name only”, since theperson’s ultimate attachment is to the first friend on its own.24 Thus, the broad rea-ding is, I think, the more plausible reading of “τ� πρ/τον φλον”. It can secure So-crates’ point about the means-end structure of personal relationships; and, it serveswell the associations that are the central topic of the conversation. On the interpre-tation that I recommend the first friend is, then, whatever good is involved in the ter-minal friendship.25 I offer support for the claim that the first friend is a good, not aspecific kind of good, after I ask what entitles Socrates to terminate the progressionand posit a first friend.

Irwin contends that a commitment to a psychological thesis about human motiva-tion lies behind Socrates’ insistence that there is a first friend. According to Irwin,“Socrates does not say it would be foolish to pursue one thing for the sake of anotherwithout limit; he implies (in ‘we must refuse’) that it is impossible.”26 Irwin’s inter-pretation is difficult for two reasons. First, it is implausible to suppose that it is onthe basis of a motivational theory implied by Socrates’ remark “we must refuse”,�ν-γκη �πειπε&ν (219c7), that Menexenus endorses Socrates’ supposition of a firstfriend. In the earlier exchanges, Socrates uses common sense views, not philosophicaldoctrines, to gain the boys’ acquiescence in his proofs and disproofs. So Irwin’s in-terpretation either leaves obscure on what grounds Socrates gains the concession

24 Kahn 1996, 290, indirectly defends the thesis that the first friend is the Good it-self by maintaining that the reciprocity of friendship ceases to be a central topicof the discussion towards the end of the dialogue. Socrates’ last words (223b3–9)suggest, however, that the topic of mutual friendship is central from the begin-ning of the discussion to its end. Scholars who affirm the thesis that the firstfriend is happiness, the ultimate goal of any rational action, cannot accommo-date Socrates’ requirement that a friend benefit whoever has one (207c9,222b10–c1). For it is difficult to understand how a goal, insofar as it is a goal andonly a goal, can be a thing that benefits a person. So proponents of the happinessas a goal approach must either ignore the benefit requirement or insist that So-crates does not seriously endorse it.

25 More exactly, the first friend is a good that is possessed by the befriended party tothe terminal friendship. Since the more exact characterization will receive addi-tional textual support in section 7 (see n. 34), it is enough for now to limit myselfto the more neutral claim that the first friend is “involved” in the terminal rela-tionship.

26 Irwin 1995, 54.



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from Menexenus, or it proposes grounds that are not in the least like those Socrateshas used to achieve earlier agreements.

Second, Socrates gives the reader no hint when he claims at 219c7–8 “we must re-fuse and arrive at some beginning” that our psychological make-up explains our re-sistance. The fact that the series of means-end attachments has an end could be ex-plained along psychological lines; but nothing else that Socrates says here supportsIrwin’s psychological explanation. So I would like to propose an interpretation thatfits better, I think, with the text than Irwin’s interpretation does.

On the interpretation that I favor, Socrates and Menexenus have different reasonsfor supposing that the series must end at a first friend. Menexenus endorses the ideaof a first friend because his friendship with Lysis supports it. He believes that he isLysis’ first friend (206d5–6). Socrates himself concludes that there is a first friendonly after he gives the father-son and coinage examples (219d5–220a6). Both of theseexamples are intended to show that people give priority to one among the variousgoods that they include in their lives. Having given these two examples, Socratesclaims that the very same principle embodied in the examples governs the case offriends (220a6–7). Just as people give priority to one among the various goods thatthey include in their lives, so too people regard one friendship among the associa-tions that they have as being more important than any of the others. If this is correct,then Socrates’ “we must refuse” is a matter of hypothetical necessity. When Socratesinitially raises the question of whether the series of attachments must terminate in theacquisition of a final friend, he assumes that there must be a first friend, if the case ofbeing friends is like other cases of valuing. His question to the boys takes into ac-count by anticipation the fact that they will agree that the case of being friends re-sembles cases of ordinary valuing. Thus, from Socrates’ perspective Menexenus’ con-cession jumps the gun. For Menexenus affirms a proposition whose truth is forSocrates conditional upon the truth of the soon to be established proposition that re-lations between friends resemble cases of ordinary valuing.

I now turn to the dispute regarding the nature of the first friend. In connectionwith this controversy, I shall address the two following questions. (1) Does Socratesthink that he has successfully argued for a unique first friend? And, if not, (2) whatview of the first friend can be ascribed to Socrates? I shall simply state and, then,briefly defend my answers to these questions. I do not think that Socrates believeshimself to have proven that there is only one first friend.27 As I understand Socrates’analogical argument, he cites two relevantly different cases as examples of peoplewho prioritize their values. Whereas it is natural to read Socrates’ father-son case asan example of a person for whom one good in his life occupies a unique position(219d6–7), the coinage example cannot plausibly be read in this way. People’s eco-nomic priorities vary depending upon their financial circumstances. Furthermore,Socrates seems to appreciate the difference between the two cases when he amplifiesthe phrase, used in stating the coinage case, “what is valued above everything else”,

27 Versenyi 1975, 192f., Mackenzie 1988, 34f., and Irwin 1995, 54, maintain thatSocrates’ series of attachments allows for multiple final friends relative to the dif-ferent ways people prioritize their values. Glidden 1981, 56 n. 145, disagrees.



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with the remark “whatever it happens to be” (220a4). If Socrates’ amplification is in-tended by him to indicate that one and the same good does not invariably predomi-nate in everyone’s life, then he has not proven, and does not think that he has proven,that the series of attachments terminates in a relationship that involves a unique firstfriend. The idea of a first friend in this sense is not contained in both of the examplesthat serve as a foundation for the analogy.

If Socrates has not proven and does not think that he has proven that there is a uni-que first friend, what view of the first friend can be ascribed to him? Socrates appearscommitted to the following theses concerning the first friend. The first friend is agood that partly explains why a person enters into friendships that are useful relativeto his achievement of a terminal friendship that involves that good. Genuine goodsare first friends.

The first thesis is a consequence of the argument for a first friend. According tothat argument, a first friend is analogous to the good that is the object of a completeseries of desires. Just as people desire some goods for the sake of a terminal good, soalso people form subordinate friendships for the sake of some terminal friend rela-tion. The good that grounds the terminal friendship is the good for the sake of whichthe person forms the subordinate friendships. It is the first friend. However, as I ex-plained earlier, the analogues used by Socrates to establish this point do not settle thequestion of whether there can be more than one first friend.

The second thesis that genuine goods are first friends allows for a plurality of firstfriends. The second thesis, in turn, has in its favor the fact that Socrates’ commitmentto it helps to explain his puzzling use of 2νεκα, “for the sake of”, at 220e5. The puzzlinguse of 2νεκα occurs in a premiss of an argument for the claim that (1) the first friend ap-pears to be completely opposite in nature to subordinate friends (220e3–4). In particu-lar, the premiss is (2) the first/terminal friend is a friend for the sake of an enemy, 3ξ�-ρο, 2νεκα (220e5). (2) is co-ordinate with (3) subordinate friends are friends for the sakeof a friend (220e3). (1) follows from (2) and (3). (3) is established by the argument for afirst friend. But it is less clear what supports (2) and what (2) asserts. The agreement at218d8–9, namely, (2a) that a friend is for the sake of something, and the conclusionreached at 220b4–5, namely, (2b) that the first friend is not for the sake of some furtherfriend provide a slight inductive basis for (2). But neither (2a) nor (2b) help to clarifythe meaning of (2). Moreover, if (2a) and (2b) are the only claims within its interpreta-tive context that bear on (2), then there intervenes between the evidence for (2) and theargument of which (2) is a part a stretch of text – 220c1–d9 – concerning the use-valueof the good that has no real connection to the argument. Thus, I want to suggest thatthe intervening chunk of text fits into the larger discussion concerning the necessity ofa first friend and the difference between it and subordinate friends. This proposal hasin its favor the fact that it can help to explicate (2). Accordingly, in my view Socratescarries on the discussion, switching between the language of the first friend and thelanguage of good things. If this is correct, then any good thing is a candidate for thestatus of first friend. To defend this suggestion, let me show how the intervening chunkof text fits into the main discussion concerning the first friend.

Our stretch of text – 220c1–d9 – deals with the use-value of the good in the absenceof the bad. The expression τ� �γα��ν, “the good”, employed here must designate



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good things in general rather than a certain kind of good. For it is clear that Socrateshypothesizes the absence of bad things in general (220c3–6). And there is no reasonto suppose that the hypothetical situation would have an effect on only one kind ofgood thing. Hence, Socrates is here talking about any kind of good thing. Further-more, this bit of text and the discussion of the first friend connect in the followingways. First, the stretch of text allows us to add to (2a) and (2b) Menexenus’ affirma-tion (2c) that good things are not intrinsically useful (220d7–8). With the addition of(2c), (2) becomes a more plausible candidate for the use-value of the first friend, sinceall the other obvious alternatives have now been ruled out. Second, our text providesa clue to the meaning of (2). For interpreting (2) in light of this stretch of text allowsus to read (2) as asserting the Hippias Minor point that good things/first friends areuseful for doing bad deeds/are for the sake of an enemy. This is a sensible claim. Italso upholds the distinction that Socrates draws between “for the sake of”, 2νεκα, and“because of”, δι-α (218d8–9).28 Third, our text’s introductory question about the use-value of the good in the absence of the bad can now be seen to have its final answer inthe last step of the argument concerning the difference between subordinate and firstfriends. The last step maintains that the absence of bad things/enemies leaves us withno friends presumably because there would be no use for friends under the imaginedcircumstances. The implication of the last step for good things is that they would beuseless, if bad things did not exist.

Thus, we can make sense of (2), find further support for (2), and answer the questionabout the use-value of the good in the absence of bad, if we read our stretch of text ascarrying on in the language of good things the larger discussion concerning the firstfriend. But this reading presupposes that Socrates equates good things and firstfriends and, thereby, acknowledges a possible plurality of first friends. This characte-rization of the discussion also raises the question of what Socrates gains by switchingterminology. The first shift at 220c1 enables Socrates to return to the remedial view ofthe good and, thereby, to temporarily settle the question of whether the good has, in

28 Shorey 1930, 380f., maintains that “for the sake of” replaces the more appro-priate “because of” to emphasize the difference between subordinate and termi-nal friends. If Shorey is correct, then it is hard to see how (2) can provide a reasonfor (1), the claim that subordinate and terminal friends are opposite. Yet (2) is a“because”, γ-ρ, clause, so it ought to give a reason for (1). Bolotin 1979, 174f.,suggests that “for the sake of an enemy” identifies a person’s defective self as theultimate aim of her friendships. But a person’s defective self is, on Bolotin’s view,what motivates a person to acquire the first friend. Thus, there is, on Bolotin’sview, no real distinction between the “because” factor and the “for the sake of”factor, despite the fact that Socrates distinguishes them (218d8–9). Mackenzie1988, 30, claims that the terminology “for the sake of the bad” is intended “to ex-plain the nature (ο?τ. πωφψκε, 220d5) of the final good” (emphasis in original).But her support for this construal of the phrase is misleading to the extent thatshe quotes only the portion of the line which fits her overall view of the dialogueas dealing with the metaphysical question of what explains intrinsic value. Theremaining bit – 220d7–8 – tends rather to suggest that Socrates is concerned withthe plain-man’s question of what makes the good useful to us.



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addition to its instrumental value, an intrinsic value. Because Menexenus well under-stands the instrumental value of the good he is inclined to agree, without thorough dis-cussion of intrinsic value, that instrumental value is the only use-value of the good.Thus, bringing back the familiar medical metaphor for the purpose of setting aside fornow the option of intrinsic value necessitates a shift to the language of the good. Thesecond shift at 220d9 signals Socrates’ return to the topic of friends. If this is correct,then Socrates’ attention to the means-end structure of our engagement in friendshipshas enabled him to identify one explanatory component of the friend relation. Thiscomponent is whatever good is involved in the relation that terminates a complete se-ries of attachments. The discussion of first friend closes, however, without providing asatisfactory account of the use-value of this friend. Socrates implies a plausible use-value for the first friend when he identifies what is, I think, the second explanatorycomponent of the relation. He takes up the latter task in Stage III, to which I now turn.

7. Stage III

In Stage III Socrates investigates the “because of” (motivating) factor. There is littledoubt that Socrates identifies desire as the motivating factor (221d3–4).29 What isless clear is why Socrates next proceeds to argue that any attitude that involves desirefor/pull towards an entity is by its very nature “of the akin”, το, ο�κεοψ (221e4).Most scholars suppose that Socrates is primarily interested in establishing somethingnew about the entity that a person desires. But taking this perspective on the roleplayed by the akin in Socrates’ analysis compels commentators either to put aside en-tirely the earlier specification of the good as one component of the friend relation orto show that “the akin” designates the good. Mackenzie thinks that the akin sup-plants the good as a specification of that on the basis of which a person is befriended.But why should we interpret one stage in the development of Socrates’ hypothesis soas to assume that he drops a key conclusion that he reaches in a previous stage? Gon-zalez maintains that “akin” and “good” are interchangeable designations of the be-friended entity. But there are, as he realizes, occurrences of “akin” for which “good”cannot be substituted. For example, “akin” has to have a sense other than “good”when it denotes the property in virtue of which the interlocutors are, on Gonzalez’sview, friends because the interlocutors are not fully good. Gonzalez gives it the senseof “lacking what belongs”. But were “akin” in the sense of “lacking what belongs” todenote the property in virtue of which the interlocutors are friends, then they wouldbe friends in virtue of a similarity. And, as Gonzalez recognizes, Socrates maintainsthat being akin can explain being a friend only if being akin is not applied in refer-ence to the relation of similarity (222b5–10).30

29 Bolotin 1979, 182f., Glidden 1981, 54, Mackenzie 1988, 30, Santas 1977, 84f.,Gonzalez 1995, 81, Kahn 1996, 289, and Rowe 2000, 209, agree.

30 Mackenzie 1988, 29f., treats akin as supplanting good. Gonzalez 1995, 86f., ap-pears to give “akin” a secondary sense that would imply that the akin are similar.



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In my view, Socrates has already specified the good as one element that explainsthe friend relation. In Stage III, he wants primarily, but not exclusively, to establishsomething about the subject who befriends a person who possesses a good of somesort. Taking this perspective on Stage III puts us in a position to see that the akin ar-gument (221d8–e5) reaches the conclusion that desiring attitudes themselves can becharacterized as being of the akin, since they arise out of a loss experienced by thesubject. The conclusion of the argument does, however, pertain to the desired entity,since these attitudes settle on whatever it is that the subject has lost. By using thephrase “of the akin”, το, ο�κεοψ, at 221e4 in the conclusion of his argument, Socra-tes can simultaneously characterize the desiring attitude and the desired entity, sincethe genitive construction is here legitimately ambiguous between subjective and ob-jective genitive.31

Because this approach to Socrates’ treatment of the akin is not the standard one, Iwish to mention two other features of the Stage III discussion that support my viewof it as pertaining particularly, but not exclusively, to the desiring subject. First, So-crates begins the discussion by talking about appetites. By beginning in this way, So-crates encourages the reader to understand desiring attitudes in general on analogywith appetites. Appetites are urges that normally arise, not as a result of encounter-ing an entity that in the subject’s estimation will satisfy the desire, but from physio-logical conditions in the subject. So by starting off in this way, Socrates sets the stagefor an account of desire on which at least ultimate desires turn out to have theirsource in the nature of the subject. The second feature of the discussion that suggestsSocrates wants to emphasize the idea that a person’s most basic desires are out-growths of his/her natural constitution is the connotation of the word “akin”. Its pri-mary meaning is “of the same household or family”32. Given that the word conveysthe idea of belonging based on birth or origin, it makes sense to suppose that Socra-tes uses it to bring out the fact that some desires originate in the physiological andpsychic make-up of the subject. Thus, there are good reasons to read Socrates’ argu-ment concerning the akin as making foremost a point about desiring attitudes and,derivatively, a point about the entities that attract.33

31 See Smyth 1920, 318f. Also see Rep. 437d2–8 for the use of a similar con-struction.

32 See Kerferd 1972/73, 177f., and Pembroke 1971, 114f.33 The lacks/losses that prompt desire of the akin are thought by some commenta-

tors to have in Socrates’ eyes a negative value (Vlastos 1969, 8 n. 20; Versenyi1975, 196; Bolotin 1979, 172f.). These commentators contend that for Socratesmotivating impulses always serve to eliminate some bad, although they admitthat Socrates expressly says that there will be some desires even if bad ceases toexist (221b5–7). Versenyi and Bolotin defend their contention by claiming thatSocrates’ central teaching on desire is contained in his medical equation of goodwith a drug for the bad (220d3–4). However, this analogy occurs in a question toMenexenus. So its centrality to Socrates’ own position needs support. Versenyiand Bolotin appear to offer in support only their own belief that it is psycho-logically impossible to need or want something unless there is some negative sti-mulus towards the thing. Thus, Bolotin: “No one would need it [the good] were it



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Upon completion of the akin argument, Socrates returns to the topic of being afriend. He says:

(1) It has been shown to be necessary for us to befriend the akin by nature […].(2) Then the true lover, and not the feigning one, προσποι�τ8, must be befriendedby the favorite. (222a6–b1)

(1) is partly a consequence of the akin argument for the case of friends. From the factthat all desires are of the akin, that is all desires are directed towards complementaryproperties possessed by other entities (221d8–e2), and given that the friendly attitudeis a kind of desire (221d3–5), a person naturally befriends/desires someone who pos-sesses a property that is akin to/complements her make-up in some respect. Further,(1) represents the akin relation as obtaining between the friendly pair rather than asholding between a desire and the desired object. So (1) departs in a relevant respectfrom Socrates’ initial characterization of the components of the akin relation. But itis also clear from what I will call the responsibility assigning passage (221e8–222a5)that it is because the attracted person desires something possessed by the attractiveperson that the pair themselves are akin. So Socrates is willing to attribute the akinrelation both to the friends and to features of the friends that explain the standing ofthe friends in the akin relation. And, as we shall see, Socrates allows one other cha-racterization of the parties to the akin relation.

Two additional points are worth noting about (1) in light of the responsibility as-signing passage. First, the causal structure of the friend relation is now clear. Desireis the motivating cause, since it pulls one party towards a property possessed by theother member of the pair. And the property possessed by the other party is the aim ofthe relation in the sense that it is what the attracted person lacks and, therefore, seeksto acquire.34 Finally, (1) contains the qualifier “by nature” added to the expression

not for the presence, or threatened presence of evils” (172f.). Socrates simply dis-agrees. He apparently thinks that the well-functioning human body can experi-ence motivating impulses for food and drink in the absence of anything negativeor bad (217a2–5). Hence, some of a person’s “lacks” are neutral in the sense thatthey are part of the structure of a normal member of the species. This point bearson the alleged selfishness of Socrates’ conception of the friend relation. If lacksare not confined to defects, then their elimination need not consist simply inbringing a person back to normal. A lack may motivate a person to extend therange of his capabilities by pursuing, for instance, a relationship with some-one who arouses his concern. For an interesting discussion of this possibility seePangle 2001, 315f.

34 We have here, as promised, additional support for the point that the ultimate aimof the series of means-end attachments is a good possessed by the befriendedparty to the terminal friendship. For the responsibility assigning passage indica-tes that a property possessed by the befriended person serves as the aim of thefriendship of the akin. If, as I go on to argue, the property is in the case of theakin by nature a genuine good, then a friendship of the akin by nature could ter-minate a series of means-end attachments, since it has the appropriate metaphy-sical structure to be the final friendship. Its defining purpose is a genuine good.



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“akin”. By adding the qualifier, Socrates may want to indicate that desire of the akinby nature is desire of a good that is akin to a person’s nature. I return to this pointafter I address (2).

(2) states that the attractive party cannot help but reciprocate the affectionate at-titude of the genuine lover/friend. It is, I think, significant that Socrates uses the ex-pression “genuine”, γν�σιο« (222a8–9) – a word etymologically related to “family,descendent”, γωνο« – to refer to the lover who inspires the return of affection. The ex-pression implies that there is in the lover something that complements the beloved’snature and, thereby, inevitably leads to the beloved’s affectionate response. That So-crates characterizes the lover in such a way as to account for the return of affectionsuggests that the akin relation is not symmetrical.35 Were standing in the akin rela-tionship sufficient for mutual affection, Socrates could have expressed (2) in such away as to imply that it is the akin nature of the pair that insures the mutuality. Sincehe chooses instead to further specify the nature of the lover, it would seem that morethan being akin is required for mutual affection. Consideration of one-way attrac-tion provides additional evidence for this claim. The parties to the one-way attrac-tion relation could not be akin, if it were part of the essential nature of the akin re-lation that its members reciprocate affection. Yet one-way attraction is grounded ondesire; and, desire is of the akin. So one way attraction has to be a kind of akin rela-tion. Moreover, even if we suppose that the akin by nature relation differs from theplain akin relation, we cannot look to the qualified relation to provide an example ofa symmetrical relation. For the responsibility assigning passage specifies desire andthe object desired as wholly explanatory of that relation. It is difficult to maintainthat mutual affection is an effect of that explanatory structure. Hence, it is safer, Ithink, to conclude that the reciprocity expressed in (2) derives from the genuine na-ture of the lover. His nature guarantees a return of affection from the beloved. If thisis correct, then (2) reports not one but two instances of the akin relation.

I now return to the point mentioned in the discussion of (1), namely, the fact thatthe qualification added to “akin” provides some grounds for supposing that desire ofthe akin by nature is fundamentally desire for a genuine good. What I wish to suggestis that desire of the akin has sub-kinds. Hence, to say that a person desires the akin isto identify the general character of the desire, not necessarily its specific kind. A spe-cific kind of desire of the akin is, I suggest, introduced by means of the qualifier “bynature”. And that specific kind of desire of the akin is desire for good. The main ad-vantage of this proposal is that it allows us to read the four stages of Socrates’ inves-tigation as promoting a single conception of being a friend as opposed to settingforth a series of unrelated and deficient conceptions of the relational property. Hereare some of the ways the proposal contributes to a unified reading of these stages.First, construing desire of the akin by nature as desire for a good akin to the desirerwould fit with the implication in Stage I that desire for good is a cause of being afriend (217e5–218a1). As I mentioned, Socrates’ focus on how the presence of bad af-

35 Bolotin 1979, 186, claims that “one cannot be akin to another without the otherbeing akin to oneself”.



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fects desire for good would make most sense, if desire for good were the relationalproperty upon which being a friend depended. Consequently, if we understand desireof the akin by nature as desire for good, then the motivating factor hinted at earlier isaffirmed in different phraseology in the responsibility assigning passage that belongsto the Stage III discussion of the akin conception. Second, on the supposition thatSocrates equates desire of the akin by nature with desire for good there is an obviousconnection between Stage II and Stage III of the investigation. For Stage II intro-duces genuine goods as the aim of the friend relation. If my proposal is adopted, thenStage III introduces a motivating cause of the friend relation, namely, desire of theakin by nature, that can be interpreted in such a way that it is the correlate of the aimof the relation. Third, the proposal allows us to resolve an apparent incompatibilitybetween the unrefuted option, option (a), offered in Stage IV and Socrates’ claim inStage III that people can desire neutral things (221b5–7). Option (a) emerges in StageIV’s examination of the hypothesis that the akin relation explains the friend relation.Option (a) asserts that the good is the akin for everyone (222c4–5). Consequently, ifoption (a) were selected to elucidate the akin relation that underlies the friend rela-tion, the good would be one component of the friend relation and desire for goodwould be the other component. For the explanatorily more fundamental characteri-zation of the akin relation is in terms of desire and the object desired (221e4–5). Andon option (a), the akin/the object of desire is the good. Selecting (a) would mean,however, that only good things are desired. And, as I said, this conflicts with Socra-tes’ Stage III claim that there can be neutral desires.

It is worth considering whether option (a) can be made consistent with the broaderview of desire because (a) carries over into Stage IV what seems to be the prime can-didates for explaining the friend relation: desire for good and the good desired. Thus,if the option can be made consistent with the Stage III claim, then its unrefuted sta-tus enhances the thesis that the four stages of Socrates’ investigation are promotingessentially the same conception of being a friend. Option (a) can be made consistentwith the broader view of desire, if “akin” in option (a) has the sense “akin by nature”.The option would, then, express the point that the good is the akin for everyonewhose desire of the akin is of the specific kind, desire of the akin by nature. This con-strual of (a) would render it consistent with the claim at 221b5–7, since (a) would beasserting that goods are desired by everyone without implying that they are the onlyobjects of desire because desire directed towards good things is only one of the sub-kinds of desire of the akin. So the proposal that desire of the akin has sub-kinds, oneof which is desire of the akin by nature directed towards good things, allows us to in-terpret the unrefuted option of Stage IV in such a way that it does not conflict withthe broader view of desire taken by Socrates in Stage III. The proposal, thereby, freesus to retain desire for good and the good desired as the prime candidates for what ex-plains the friend relation because these are the explanatory components of the rela-tion presented by the unrefuted option in Stage IV. There are, then, several ways inwhich the proposal that desire of the akin has sub-kinds enables us to give a unifiedreading of the stages of Socrates’ investigation, and thereby, reinforces the view thatSocrates develops in these stages a single conception of being a friend. These consi-derations are not entirely decisive but they make it reasonable to claim that desire for



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good – introduced under a different name in the responsibility assigning passage – isthe second explanatory component of the friend relation. I now turn to Stage IVwhere Socrates has the resources to argue that people who desire good are friendsonly to the good. Thus, Stage IV can be read as promoting the explanatory compo-nents of the friend relation already introduced in the earlier stages of the investiga-tion, namely, desire for good and the good desired.

8. Stage IV

Socrates begins Stage IV by insisting that a successful account of the friend relationcan be given only if it is possible to distinguish the akin from the similar (222b4–10).The salient difference is this. The akin relation holds in consequence of the fact thatone person lacks and, therefore, desires a property possessed by the other party tothe relation. The similarity relation obtains between entities in virtue of what eachentity has on its own. Thus, were the akin relation conflated with the similarity rela-tion, it would be difficult to explain the attraction to the friend and also difficult tomeet the requirement that a friend benefit whoever has one.

The aporetic conclusion of the Lysis is partly due, I think, to the fact that boysequate the akin relation with the similarity relation. This mistake is revealed to thereader when Socrates begins the Stage IV argument. He does so by posing a di-lemma. He asks whether (a) good is the akin for everyone or (b) it is the case that badpeople are akin to bad, good people are akin to good, and neither good nor badpeople akin to neither good nor bad (222c4–8). The boys affirm (b). But this optionequates the akin relation with the similarity relation, since the pairs on this optionexemplify the akin relation presumably because the paired entities belong to the sameontological kind. So the basis of the akin relation on this option is a similarity be-tween the akin entities. Even when Socrates points out that (b), in conjuntion withthe hypothesis that the akin is friend to the akin, implies that bad people can befriends, a proposition that was rejected earlier, the boys bypass (a) and endorse in-stead a more restricted version of (b). But their second choice – good is akin to good –leads to a problem already mentioned by Socrates, namely, that the good are self-suf-ficient and, therefore, seem to have no need or desire for friends (215a7–b2). Unsur-prisingly, then, Socrates evinces puzzlement over the closing conclusion that thegood are friends to the good only. We thought, 6�µε�α (222d8), he says, that we hadexcluded this hypothesis. The fact that Socrates hedges when he casts suspicion onthis conclusion suggests that the conclusion might be satisfactory were there a diffe-rent line of argument from which it could be drawn.36 To argue satisfactorily for the

36 Further support for my suggestion that Socrates here invites presumably the rea-der to find some solution to the final aporia is given at 222e1–4 where Socratescalls for a re-examination of the entire discussion. Socrates’ request would makemost sense, if he thought that a review of the arguments would reveal that some-thing went wrong, thus making possible a way out of the impasse. See also the



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closing conclusion requires, I think, that we preserve the distinction between the akinand the similar. This means that the akin relation is fundamentally a relation betweena desire and the entity that is desired. Socrates’ formulation of options (a) and (b) in-dicate, however, that he introduces, as I said he would, a third characterization of therelata of the akin relation. For the options represent the relation as obtaining bet-ween a person and an entity. Consequently, if we wish to incorporate into the refor-mulation of the closing argument one of the aforementioned options, we need toadopt the third characterization of the relation. But we are justified in slightly modi-fying the characterization in order to accommodate the explanatorily more funda-mental characterization of the relation as obtaining between a desire and an object ofdesire. Hence, we ought to represent the relation as follows:

P1 People who desire the akin are akin to the akin object(s) of desire.

Furthermore, preserving the distinction between the akin and the similar means thatthe elements that comprise the akin relation can belong to different ontologicalkinds. This consideration would, in light of the earlier stages of the investigation,counsel adopting option (a) as a premiss in the argument.

P2 The good is the akin object of desire for everyone.

To P1 and P2 we should add the hypothesis under examination:

P3 The akin is friend to the akin.

Given these premisses, we can infer:

P4 People who desire the akin are friends to the akin object(s) of desire. (P1, P3)

and,

P5 People who desire the good are friends to the good. (P2, P4)

Concern about P5 as involving a substitution in an intentional context should be al-layed by the observation that the argument proceeds from an outsider’s point of view.So “the akin” occurs purely referentially in P4 rather than within the attudinist’s on-tology and is, therefore, subject to substitutivity of identify.37 Now on the basis of So-crates’ conjecture at 222d5–6, namely, “if we say that the good and the akin are thesame”, we can add:

P6 The good and people who desire the akin are qualitatively the same.

“so far,” οϊπ., at 223b7. Thus, three of Socrates’ comments suggest that furtherreflection on all of the earlier exchanges can produce a positive result. Yet in asense the dialogue does end inconclusively. Although Socrates seems to be com-mitted to the view that philosophic activity, health, and different kinds ofknowledge are genuine goods, he does not make clear what else constitutes a ge-nuine good in a friend. In this sense, then, the Lysis is aporetic like the otherelenctic dialogues.

37 For a defense of the substitution see Bonomi 1995, 164f., and Quine 1995, 356f.



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and infer:

P7 The good and people who desire the good are qualitatively the same. (P2, P6)

The next move is perhaps the most contentious.38

P9 The good are people who desire the good. (P7)

We can now infer the conclusion:

C10 The good is friend only to the good.39 (P5, P9)

The conclusion of this argument evades the difficulty encountered by the conclusionof the closing argument. For “good person” is construed here as “person who desiresthe good”, i.e., good things. Thus, a good person would likely care for and wantfriends who possess goods that complement the good person’s desire for good. Thisfact is also relevant to answering the question of what makes the good intrinsicallyuseful to a person, i.e., useful in the absence of bad. The answer seems to be that thegood benefits, at least partly, by satisfying a person’s desire for good.

There still remains a problem. My reconstruction of the closing argument relies onthe assumption that a good person is a person who desires good things. Thus, somecomment is due on this move. A starting point is the textual evidence for the strongerconception according to which a good person is a person who is self-sufficient in thesense of “having no needs or wants” – the sense that would block my move. Thetextual evidence does not plainly support ascribing to Socrates the stronger con-ception of a good person. Consider 215a7–c2 where Socrates takes up the issue ofwhether good people can be friends. Socrates first inquires whether a good person isself-sufficient, i.e., has no needs in the specific ways in which he is good. Lysis as-sents. Socrates’ next question concerns the person who needs nothing. He asks Lysiswhether this person will cherish anything (215b1–2). Lysis responds, “Presumablynot.” From this agreement, Socrates argues that the person who needs nothing can-not be a friend. But it is important to notice that Socrates never presents for Lysis’consideration the question of whether a good person has no needs. Consequently,when Socrates finally raises the question of how a good person can care for and be-friend another person (215b4–9), he would be asking an improper question, if he isinterpreted as asking whether a good person’s lack of needs precludes him from ha-ving friends. For by assenting to the qualified self-sufficiency of a good person, Lysisdoes not imply that a good person has no needs. Even if Lysis is unaware that his as-sent does not have this implication, it is difficult to believe that Socrates does not re-cognize what follows from Lysis’ admissions. So rather than attribute to Socrates animproper question, it is more charitable to interpret him as asking how a friend rela-tion between good people can be explained other than by means of a similarity – qua-lified self-sufficiency – that makes the relation implausible in light of the previous

38 See below for a defense of this move.39 To justify “only” in C10 we would need to add to the argument the assumption

that there are three kinds of things, good, bad and neither good nor bad(216d6–8), and steps that bear on the exclusion of option (b).



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conclusion that having friends depends upon having needs. But reading Socrates’question in this way suggests that he does not regard good people as having no needsor desires, since this reading takes him to be asking how the friendship of goodpeople can be made compatible with the dependency of having friends on needs con-clusion. So Socrates’ reservation concerning the friendship of good people does notconclusively establish his commitment to the stronger conception of a good person.

Furthermore, two other passages of the Lysis text strongly suggest that for Socra-tes a good person has needs and desires. One passage is Lysis 221a9–b7 where Socra-tes speaks of people (not just those without merit) as having desires. Since nothing inwhat Socrates says here indicates that he has in mind only people whose behavior dis-plays none of the virtues, the passage suggests Socrates’ acceptance of the view thatpeople who are moderate and “orderly”, i.e., have some measure of virtue, have needsand desires, including desires for genuine goods.40

A second passage that supports the same idea contains Socrates’ declaration thathe would wish, βοψλοµην, to have a good friend more than the wealth of Darius(211d8–e6). Now Socrates clearly regards himself as a good person. For he says in theApology that death cannot bring harm to a good person (41d1–3) and that what hashappened to him (i.e., his impending death) is a good thing (40b8–9). Since it is dif-ficult to believe that Socrates would not realize what is implied by his declarationcombined with his belief that he is a good man, the inference must be that he thinks agood person can want good things. The textual evidence, then, tends not to favor as-cribing to Socrates the stronger conception of a good person, but rather tends to sug-gest that he holds the weaker conception. Hence, my revised version of the argumentrelies on a conception of a good person that appears to be acceptable to Socrates. Thereformulation also retains the view of being a friend that is promoted in the previous

40 As the reader probably realizes, by arguing that for Socrates good people desiregenuine goods, I implicitly attribute to Socrates the recognition of non-rationaldesires. For a corollary of my argument that Socrates holds that a good person –a person who is moderate and “orderly” (see 214c6–d4, 216b4–6) – desires this orthat good thing, is that in Socrates’ view not every desire that a person experi-ences is an instance of desire for good. Socrates holds, I believe, a broader view ofdesire, according to which a person can in some cases desire things that the per-son herself judges not to conduce to her overall good. By favoring this understand-ing of Socrates on desire, I am following scholars who have argued that the So-cratic position in many elenctic dialogues allows for non-rational desires. See onthis Devereux 1995, 381f., and Brickhouse / Smith 2000, 180f. Furthermore,there is evidence in the Lysis that favors attribution to Socrates of this broaderview of desire. At 207e7–209a6, Lysis expresses desires to drive his father’s cha-riot and to play with his mother’s wool-spinner, despite his belief that these acti-vities are unsuitable sources of enjoyment for him, given his age. Socrates wouldseem, then, to be aware that there are other objects besides genuine goods forwhich the restrained and the unrestrained person can have a desire. Hence, thiscorollary of understanding Socrates’ view of a good person in the terms I havesuggested fits with the Lysis text and with recent work on Socrates’ moral psy-chology.



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stages of Socrates’ investigation. So Stage IV, like the earlier stages, hints towards theconclusion that desire for good and the good desired are the explanatory compo-nents of the friend relation.

9. Strategy of Accommodation

I now wish to give the promised explanation of how this understanding of the friendrelation can accommodate both mutual friendship and the relation of one-way at-traction. The strategy for accommodation conforms to the idea that an individualpossesses a relational property in a qualified way.41 The strategy also assumes thatthe friend relation holds between two persons in virtue of one person’s desire for a ge-nuine good and the other person’s possession of that good. Furthermore, it takes theuse by Socrates of different phrases for designating the two kinds of friend relation toreflect a difference in the way the property of being a friend applies to each memberof the pair. When two people are mutual friends, each member of the pair has theproperty in relation to the other person. When one person is attracted to another per-son, only one party to the relation has the property of being a friend in relation to theother party.

Consider first mutual friends. Recall that Socrates describes these friends by aphrase of the form “a and b are friends”. Using Lysis and Hippothales as the pair,their (future) friendship can be analyzed thus:

(1) Lysis has the property of being a friend in virtue of his desire for good and inreference to Hippothales in virtue of his (Hippothales’) capacity to engagein philosophic inquiry.

and

41 My strategy of accommodation is indebted to Matthen 1982. According to Mat-then, Plato explains a person’s possession of a relational property by introducingin the Phaedo 102b–102c the notion of qualified participation/predication. A re-lational property such as being tall, to use Matthen’s example, applies to a personin virtue of some characteristic of that person (i.e., his specific size) and in rela-tion to some other person in virtue of a characteristic of that other person (i.e.,her specific size). Matthen’s analysis has been challenged by McPherran 1983.McPherran objects that Plato is not analyzing in these Phaedo passages relation-al predications but relations that involve the joint instantiation of Forms. This isa complicated issue that I cannot pursue here. But it may be useful to say in Mat-then’s defense that Plato does explicitly draw from the discussion a conclusionabout the predications of “tall” and “short” to Simmias (Phaedo 102c8–d3). Itmay also be, as McPherran argues, that for Plato the predication of a relationalproperty implies or can be expanded into a statement about the entity to whichthe subject of the predication is related by means of the relation that correspondsto the relational property. For an excellent discussion of how this might work seeMignucci 1986.



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(2) Hippothales has the property of being a friend in virtue of his desire forgood and in reference to Lysis in virtue of his (Lysis’) beauty and self-re-straint.

So the youths are on this analysis mutual friends. Both have the property of being afriend in reference to the other and in virtue of some good possessed by the other.

Turning now to one-way attraction, the strategy works like this. Given that Socra-tes uses language of the form “a is friendly to (friend of) b” to denote one-way attrac-tion, the sick person’s relation to the doctor can be analyzed as follows:

(3) The sick person has the property of being a friend in virtue of his desire forhealth and in reference to the doctor in virtue of the doctor’s medicalknowledge.

In (3) being a friend applies in virtue of one’s person desire for a good and in refer-ence to a good in another person. But the relation is not necessarily mutual.

This is, then, how Socrates’ analysis of being a friend can explain the two kinds ofrelation that are, I have argued, regarded by him as genuine examples of the friend re-lation. Those commentators who charge Socrates with trading on ambiguity, as wellas those who find in the Lysis no positive teaching, fail to see that Socrates has ascheme that provides for mutual and one-sided friend relations. Sometimes being afriend applies in a qualified way to a pair (or more); and, sometimes it characterizesonly one person in reference to another person. But the fundamental basis of the as-cription of the property is the same in both cases: desire for good and the desiredgood possessed by the other person. So I would conclude that a fruitful interpreta-tion of the Lysis is possible on the assumption that its main question is, “What is afriend?”42

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42 Mohan Matthen and Roslyn Weiss provided careful and helpful criticisms of ear-lier versions of this paper. I am grateful to both of them. I benefited also from thesuggestions made to me by the editor of this journal, Don Garrett, and by twoanonymous reviewers. I thank all three of these readers for helping me to betterexplain my views.



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Identification and Definition in the Lysis

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