978-1-4673-1900-3/12/$31.00 ©2012 IEEE A1-1

INTEGRATED SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY GAP ANALYSIS

H. Leslie Crane, Duncan Thomson, and Katie Bolczak

The MITRE Corporation, McLean, Virginia

Abstract Integrated surveillance is defined as the

integration of information from cooperative and non-cooperative Air Domain surveillance sources to create a common understanding (picture) of the real-time situation for providing safety, security, and efficiency in the Aviation Transportation System [1]. Integrated surveillance includes the production, dissemination, and archiving of air vehicle position and movement information (longitude, latitude, altitude, ground speed, and ground track), as well as associating this air vehicle position and movement information with relevant flight information (flight plan, aircraft and aircrew information, etc.). Integrated surveillance also includes the sharing and collaborative use of this information by government command and control centers to conduct operations.

The best way to provide the capabilities needed to conduct integrated surveillance is to efficiently use all government agency surveillance resources. This will require cooperative interagency planning, development, deployment, operation, cost sharing, and data sharing. The goal is a national surveillance infrastructure that supports the missions of government agencies and satisfies their individual and collective surveillance requirements.

In FY11, the Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) Strategic Interagency Initiatives (SII) Division formed an Integrated Surveillance Analysis Team (ISAT), chartered to lead and collaborate with partner agencies on key activities related to integrated surveillance. The ISAT developed a revised, multi-agency Integrated Air Surveillance Concept of Operations (IS ConOps) [2], The IS ConOps identifies seven desired operational capabilities, including capabilities related to improving air vehicle detection, confirming and sharing track data, sharing pre- and in-flight data, and operating an agile information sharing infrastructure.

Under sponsorship of the JPDO SII Division, The MITRE Corporation’s Center for Advanced Aviation System Development (CAASD) applied systems engineering methods to describe the future

system-of-systems to provide the desired operational capabilities. The approach involved the following steps: (1) defining a baseline system-of-systems, which consists of the current applicable systems of the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as well as enhancements and new systems that are currently funded and being implemented; (2) translating the desired operational capabilities in the IS ConOps into functions, (3) defining a high level and abstract future system-of-systems architecture that could implement those functions; and (4) comparing the baseline with the future system-of-systems to identify major gaps that will need to be filled in order to transform the baseline into the future.

A MITRE technical report [3] documents a future architecture developed from the IS ConOps desired operational capabilities and a preliminary analysis of gaps found in a comparison with today’s systems. This paper is based on that report and presents an overview of the desired operational capabilities, their analysis, and the resulting architecture. A discussion of the architecture focuses on an information sharing and collaboration gap that was identified and aspects of a technique to improve information coordination capabilities across government Air Domain surveillance systems. Working with the JPDO, MITRE continues to extend the analysis, as one part of an inter-agency effort to improve Air Domain awareness from integrated surveillance.

Scope and Definitions The IS ConOps narrowly defines integrated

surveillance as integration of information from cooperative and non-cooperative surveillance systems. However, the scope of the IS ConOps describes “a broader goal of increased Air Domain awareness and collaborative interagency decision-making.” [2]

A MITRE IS ConOps capability functional analysis report [3] addressed the broader IS ConOps

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goal, treating integrated surveillance as a composite of the functionality listed below:

Manage and share flight information associated with air vehicles, e.g., air traffic control (ATC) clearance and flight plan.

Manage and share security information associated with air vehicles, e.g., intelligence alerts applicable to real-time Air Domain security monitoring. However, intelligence gathering and analysis is out of scope—only the management and use of actionable information applicable for immediate Air Domain monitoring is in scope.

Facilitate inter-agency collaboration and coordination supporting activities and responses to events that occur in the Air Domain.

The integrated surveillance community includes the DoD, DHS, FAA, U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC), the intelligence community (IC), and others. The MITRE analysis, however, was limited to the integrated surveillance capabilities and associated information technology infrastructure from the perspective of the DoD, DHS, and FAA, since these are the primary organizations with operational missions requiring integrated surveillance. The analysis focused on production, sharing, and use of surveillance information by ground-based operators; surveillance information provided for pilot use was beyond the scope of the analysis. Weather and intelligence information was also beyond the scope of this initial effort, but are recommended for inclusion in follow-on efforts. Consideration of new or emerging types of surveillance sensors and technologies was also beyond the scope of this report.

The MITRE IS ConOps capability analysis goals were [3]:

Conduct a preliminary analysis of the functionality required to field the integrated air surveillance operational capability needs as defined in the IS ConOps.

Identify current and planned systems used to fulfill IS ConOps capability needs.

Initiate a gap analysis to determine what is needed to evolve from the current

capabilities to the desired integrated air surveillance capabilities.

In the MITRE analysis, a “gap” was defined as a change necessary to existing systems, beyond changes already funded and underway, to achieve desired integrated air surveillance capabilities described in the IS ConOps. Gap analysis results were intended to inform the strategic integrated surveillance planning activities of the JPDO and its partner agencies. Specifically, the results can be used by the JPDO’s Integrated Surveillance Support Office (ISSO) to establish the direction and define milestones for realizing integrated surveillance.

Gap Analysis Methodology IS ConOps desired operational capabilities were

analyzed to define functions as a basis to describe an architectural framework for a future system-of-systems. Analysts’ knowledge, existing systems documentation, and consultations with subject matter experts enabled description of a baseline system-of-systems representing current government Air Domain surveillance systems including applicable systems of DoD, DHS, and FAA, as well as enhancements and new systems that are currently funded and being implemented.

JPDO ISAT and MITRE obtained information from DoD, DHS, and FAA subject matter experts. In addition to government subject matter experts, the analysis leveraged domain and technical subject matter experts from across MITRE’s Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs). MITRE expertise was provided from its Command Control Communications and Intelligence (C3I) FFRDC, sponsored by DoD, CAASD FFRDC, sponsored by FAA, and Systems Engineering and Development Institute (SEDI) FFRDC, sponsored by DHS.

A systems engineering methodology was applied to translate IS ConOps desired capabilities to functions that will be needed in a future system-of-systems. Figure 1 illustrates the analysis approach as adapted from a widely accepted methodology that is consistent with FAA, DoD, and DHS practices [4]. Figure 2 illustrates application of the methodology to facilitate a gap analysis where the baseline system-of-systems is compared with the future system-of-systems. The gap analysis, and associated findings

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and recommendations, are documented in a MITRE report [3].

Figure 1 shows that the IS Conops contributes at the needs level identifying the desired operational capabilities and, to a lesser extent, desired system capabilities that form the basis for the next lower

level functional analysis. The functional analysis level produces a future system-of-systems description. The goal of the gap analysis was to identify new systems, or system enhancements, needed to support the stated operational objectives.

Figure 1. Systems Engineering Methodology

Figure 2. Gap Analysis Overview

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Baseline System-of-Systems Figure 3 illustrates today’s Air Domain

operations centers, surveillance source sharing, and surveillance tracking systems, showing how sensors and surveillance data processing systems are organized and share surveillance information.

Surveillance sources depicted at the bottom of Figure 3 include radar and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B). Surveillance position reports obtained from primary surveillance radars (PSR) and secondary surveillance radars (SSR)—respectively non-cooperative and cooperative surveillance technology—are integrated

at the radar site in today’s architecture. Typically, collocated SSR and PSR data are merged into a single data stream from each radar site, with the PSR position measurements discarded whenever there is a SSR measurement produced. Improved cooperative surveillance technology, ADS-B, is a recent addition with presently expanding surveillance coverage and capability for NAS systems. ADS-B, in comparison with radar, produces enhanced surveillance reports including identity, position, ground speed, ground track, and more. Rather than owning and operating ADS-B ground stations, the government is contracting for a service to deliver ADS-B data to specified service delivery points (SDPs).

Figure 3. Baseline Surveillance Information Flow

The surveillance sources discussed above provide aircraft position report inputs to DoD and DHS command and control (C2) systems and National Airspace System (NAS) ATC and security systems. These systems, shown in the middle layer of the figure, provide correlation and tracking functions that integrate across subsets of available surveillance sources; as well as performing other non-surveillance functions such as flight data processing and functions that support traffic flow

management (TFM). These systems independently produce Air Domain situation awareness pictures, which are displayed to operators at various command, control, and operations facilities, shown at the top of the figure.

There is no operational picture that is common to all operations centers since each center produces its own display using surveillance obtained from a unique subset of all potential sources. Some track and flight data originating at NAS ATC systems is

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shared digitally among these systems, however the primary means of facilitating shared situation awareness among centers is via voice coordination using the Domestic Events Network (DEN) teleconference capability. Additional teleconferences using voice networks such as the secure Defense Red Switch Network (DRSN) are added depending on the situation. Collocated display equipment and operators at the National Capital Region Coordination Center (NCRCC) provide an improved capability for shared situation awareness for airspace around Washington DC.

Functional Analysis of Desired Operational Capabilities

The IS ConOps identifies these desired operational capabilities:

“Confirmation of the same track”

“Information known pre-flight will be shared before aircraft take-off”

“Increased track-monitoring confidence and user-defined operating picture”

“Selected dissemination of updated in-flight information”

“Air vehicle detection”

“Flexible sensor infrastructures”

“Agile information sharing capability”

MITRE analyzed desired operational capabilities, deriving and defining functions and sub-functions expressed in “verb-noun” form, all traceable to the desired capabilities expressed in the IS ConOps. In some cases, desired operational capabilities required interpretation. Ambiguities or issues found were documented. Figure 4 depicts desired operations capabilities described in the IS ConOps in functional terms and also shows the first level decomposition into sub-functions.

Figure 4. Desired Capabilities Functional Analysis

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Future Integrated Air Surveillance System-of-Systems

System engineering is best performed as an iterative process. Having identified the set of functions needed, the next step is to provide a high-level description of the future system, or system-of-systems that will perform these functions. The major components of the future system-of-systems, and the information flows among these components, should be initially defined in abstract terms, to avoid prematurely specifying a particular technology or design. Further iterations of functional and system decomposition can then be performed, until reaching a sufficiently detailed understanding of requirements and allocation of these requirements to major system components.

Figure 5 shows a future system-of-systems that can provide the functions needed for integrated surveillance, derived in accordance with the system engineering process described above. The components in Figure 5 are intended to remain somewhat abstract, but represent generalized

processing and communications elements that can interact to carry out the necessary functions. These elements were selected based on knowledge of existing systems and well as understanding of evolving technologies that have been demonstrated to have potential application in this domain.

Two of the major components shown in Figure 5 are the Sensor Data Bus and Information Coordination Bus. The term “bus” should not be construed to imply a specific technology; the term applies to any technology that enables data sharing and routing. While it was reasonable to have identified a single “bus” to be used for all inter-system information sharing, it was viewed as valuable to distinguish the high bandwidth, low latency flow of data from sensors to processing systems from the lower bandwidth exchange of processed surveillance tracks and related surveillance information that is needed between command and control systems. Therefore the Sensor Data Bus was identified to support the former, and the Information Coordination Bus was identified to support the latter.

Figure 5. Future Surveillance Information Exchange

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In the future system-of-systems shown in Figure 5, Radars and ADS ground infrastructure components provide Air Vehicle surveillance data via a Sensor Data Bus connected to DoD, DHS, and FAA Control Systems. Control Systems perform real-time or near-real-time control functions (e.g., ATC, intercept, and weapons control). Control Systems are broken down into Correlation and Tracking components that process surveillance data to produce tracks and Automation and Decision Support components that provide functions to support operators performing ATC, security, and defense control functions.

Control Systems share information over an Information Coordination Bus with higher level Command and Management systems, and may also share information with the Air Vehicle. Track sources, such as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), also use the Information Coordination bus.

Command and Management systems for FAA support operators performing functions such as TFM and overall command of the operations of the NAS. For DoD and DHS, the Command and Management systems support commanders and decision-makers with command authority for Air Domain defense and security operations. Collaboration among operators at different locations and using different systems is facilitated both by data exchanges on the Information Coordination Bus, as well as by the Teleconference Support component.

Gap Analysis for the Information Coordination Bus

The MITRE analysis [3] addresses all future system-of-systems components shown in Figure 5 by comparing with the baseline system-of-systems in the context of the functional analysis of desired operational capabilities. This paper discusses the Information Coordination Bus.

Differences between the baseline system-of-systems (current and planned systems) and the future system-of-systems are the “gaps” that were identified from IS ConOps desired operational capabilities analysis. Each of the in-scope abstract components of the future system-of-systems was examined in turn. The current system and network components that apply were assessed to determine how well they support the functions needed in the future system-of-systems. For the Information Coordination Bus, the current information exchange environment was described and contrasted with the environment enabled by an Information Coordination Bus.

The Information Coordination Bus is a key component supporting many IS ConOps desired capabilities. It disseminates many different categories of information pertinent to the integrated air surveillance mission. Table 1 lists functions and sub-functions needed to produce IS ConOps desired capabilities and identifies Information Coordination Bus support for the function.

Table 1. Information Coordination Bus Functions

Functions and Sub-Functions Support from Information Coordination Bus

Confirm same track Develop tracks

Share tracks Track info is made available via the bus

Relate tracks Shared track info and collaboration tool support via the bus

enables operators to identify tracks to each other

Share pre-flight

information

Share flight information (before departure) Flight information is made available via the bus

Share risk assessments

Provide User Defined

Operational Picture

(UDOP) Service

Build UDOP

Share UDOP UDOP definitions can be located and shared via the bus

Visualize UDOP Provide transport service to deliver track state data or other

dynamic information associated with a UDOP

Monitor Tracks Detect anomalies

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Functions and Sub-Functions Support from Information Coordination Bus

Report anomalies Anomaly reports are shared via the bus

Share selected in-flight

information

Share flight information (for active flights) Flight information is made available via the bus

Detect Air Vehicles

Detect air vehicles of all sizes, altitudes,

speeds

Access all sensor data

Provide Flexible

Sensor Infrastructures

Reconfigure sensors

Use mobile sensors

Provide Agile

Information Sharing

Connect network-security domains Bus is subdivided and segregated as needed to support

different security domains

Enable cross-domain access to information Guard gateways are provided to allow structured information

to be filtered as needed to support cross-domain access

Provide fault tolerance Bus provides access to redundant sources of information and

allows rapid connection of redundant command and control

systems

Current and planned systems use a variety of networks and point-to-point interfaces to exchange information for Air Domain security coordination, illustrated at a high level in Figure 3. The Information Coordination Bus replaces point-to-point interfaces in the future system-of-systems, supporting existing data flows and facilitating flexible and evolving data flows. Table 1 identifies the Information Coordination Bus as a key component enabling the desired function to Provide Agile Information Sharing.

Several examples of baseline data flow are discussed below in the context of Figure 5 italicized information flow items.

In the baseline system-of-systems, Flight1 and Flow2 information are exchanged between the FAA Traffic Flow Management System (TFMS) and airline operation centers. Flight and Flow information moves via the NAS Enterprise Security Gateway (NESG) and a collection of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) and private network facilities known collectively as the Collaborative Decision

1 Flight information refers to information related to an air vehicle that is receiving or shortly will be receiving ATC services. 2 Flow information includes information on Traffic Management Initiatives (e.g., ground delay programs, miles-in-trail restrictions, Flow Constrained Areas).

Making Network (CDMNET). This information exchange is primarily conducted well before flights depart.

Once a flight becomes active, an FAA Automation and Decision Support system becomes the authoritative system for most information related to the flight, in particular clearance information. Flight information is provided by airlines to these systems, as well as general aviation flight plan filing services.

Track3 and Flight information is provided from the TFMS via the NESG to DoD and DHS systems in the Traffic Flow Management Data to Government (TFMDG) feed. A filtered and delayed version of the TFMDG, referred to as the Aircraft Situation Display to Industry (ASDI), is provided to airlines, and also industry partners that repackage and provide the data to other subscribers, including information available to the general public over the Internet. Airlines and industry partners also receive Flow information in the Traffic Flow Management Data to Industry (TFMDI) feed.

Exchange of information such as Track, Flight, and Flow information among DoD and DHS systems

3 Track information describes the current state of an air vehicle that is present in the airspace.

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is currently similarly complex. In some cases, information is exchanged among different command centers by providing remote displays of control systems such as BCS-F.

The Information Coordination Bus provides a mechanism to exchange data in a coordinated,

standardized fashion to reduce point-to-point, duplicative paths that may lead to data inconsistences and operational inefficiencies. Figure 6 shows a preliminary and notional architecture for the Information Coordination Bus in the future system.

Figure 6. Information Coordination Bus Expanded

As illustrated in Figure 6, the Information Coordination Bus is further subdivided to be able to support both classified and unclassified information exchanges.

The Information Coordination Bus does not exist, and no funded programs are in place to create it. In addition to the lack of this infrastructure to enable more agile information sharing, there are no or very few standards for broadly sharing data among government partners, including track, pre- and in-flight, collaboration, and visualization data. There is no common solution to connect network security domains, and there are very limited solutions for

connecting networks that operate at different levels of classification. There are also gaps in the ability of Automation and Decision Support components and Command and Management Systems to interface to an Air Surveillance Sensor Data Bus, which are discussed in the MITRE report in the gap analysis sections for these components.

Considerable work has been done that could be leveraged to form the basis of a future Information Coordination Bus, including FAA System Wide Information Management (SWIM) services, the Command & Control (C2) Gap Filler (C2GF) Joint Capabilities. Technology Demonstration (JCTD), and

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earlier efforts such as the Net-Enabled Operations (NEO) demonstrations.

Further analysis is needed to compare the current systems and networks to the future architecture, to determine the gaps, and a plan to fill those gaps.

Recommendations and Current Activity

Based on the preliminary gap analysis of all components of the future system-of-systems, the MITRE report identified numerous findings and associated recommendations in the following areas:

Iterate Needs Analysis: It was recommended that IS roles and responsibilities be evolved to support integrated IS operations; that the concepts and terminology identified in the IS ConOps be more completely and precisely defined; and that the desired operational capabilities be prioritized.

Iterate Functional Analysis: It was recommended that high-level requirements be defined, and that the complete scope of mission functions, beyond the desired capabilities described in the ConOps, be analyzed to ensure all requirements are identified.

MITRE completed this preliminary functional and gap analysis at the end of Fiscal Year 2011. Subsequently, MITRE has refined and extended the preliminary gap analysis, by developing a list of discrete gap statements, providing additional supporting information, and making recommendations as appropriate. Three major recommendations emerged from this follow-on gap analysis:

Provide Collaboration and Coordination Capabilities—Provide operators with additional tools beyond the voice teleconferences and phone calls that are the primary means of collaboration and coordination today.

Standardize air picture data sharing—Provide operators with operational data to achieve a more complete Air Domain picture by establishing data exchange

standards and a common means of sharing the data over the network.

Improve sensor data distribution—Provide agile sensor data sharing and net-centric access to all sensors by establishing sensor data formats; providing a common means of sharing sensor data over a network or networks; and making associated updates to control systems.

This refined gap analysis was coordinated with and reviewed by the JPDO SII Division and its ISSO. The ISSO is associated with an integrated, whole-of-government effort to achieve Air Domain Awareness as outlined in the National Strategy for Aviation Security (NSAS) [5] and its supporting plans. In this capacity, ISSO identifies opportunities to improve air surveillance capabilities and facilitates interagency coordination. The identified gaps will inform potential recommendations and actions to be advocated by the ISSO.

References [1] Joint Planning and Development Office - Integrated Surveillance Study Team, October 31, 2008, Integrated Surveillance for the Next Generation Air Transportation System: Final Report of the Integrated Surveillance Study Team. http://www.jpdo.gov/library/ISST_Final_Report_Board.pdf

[2] Joint Planning and Development Office, November 2011, Integrated Air Surveillance Concept of Operations. http://www.jpdo.gov/library/20120215_Integrated_Air_Surveillance_ConOps_Endorsed.pdf

[3] H. Leslie Crane, Lowell Shayn Hawthorne, Dr. W. Jody Mandeville, Avinash Pinto, Duncan Thomson, September 2011, Integrated Air Surveillance Capabilities – Preliminary Functional Analysis, MTR110427, McLean, VA, The MITRE Corporation.

[4] Alexander Kossiakoff, William N. Sweet, Samuel J. Seymour, and Steven M. Biemer; published by Wiley & Sons; 2011, Systems Engineering Principles and Practice; Second Edition.

[5] Department of Homeland Security, March 2007, Aviation Security Policy: National Security Presidential Directive 47 / Homeland Security

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Presidential Directive 16, National Strategy for Aviation Security and Supporting Plans,

http://www.dhs.gov/files/laws/gc_1173113497603.shtm

Acknowledgements The authors would like to acknowledge the

contributions of Lowell Shayn Hawthorne, Dr. W. Jody Mandeville, and Avinash Pinto to the MITRE IS ConOps capability functional analysis and report.

Disclaimer The contents of this material reflect the views of

the author and/or the Director of the Center for Advanced Aviation System Development. Neither the Federal Aviation Administration nor the Department of Transportation makes any warranty or guarantee, or promise, expressed or implied, concerning the content or accuracy of the views expressed herein.

2012 Integrated Communications Navigation and Surveillance (ICNS) Conference

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