IFPRI Gender Methods Seminar, May 28, 2015: Women's Empowerment, Participation in Information...

INTRODUCTION DATA AND CONTEXT METHODOLOGY RESULTS DISCUSSION

.

WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT,PARTICIPATION IN INFORMATION

NETWORKS, AND CHILD HEALTH

KNOWLEDGE IN HIGHLAND GUATEMALA

Brooke L. Krause

Ph.D. Candidate, Applied EconomicsUniversity of Minnesota

May 28, 2015


MOTIVATION

In Guatemala,I 31% of adult women are illiterate.

I 48% of children are chronically malnourished.I 69% of children from uneducated mothers are

malnourished.


MOTIVATION

In Guatemala,I 31% of adult women are illiterate.I 48% of children are chronically malnourished.

I 69% of children from uneducated mothers aremalnourished.


MOTIVATION

In Guatemala,I 31% of adult women are illiterate.I 48% of children are chronically malnourished.I 69% of children from uneducated mothers are

malnourished.


RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What is the impact of increased women’s intra-householdbargaining power on their participation in both formal andinformal health information networks?

2. What is the relationship between formal and informalnetworks and a woman’s actual child health knowledge?


RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What is the impact of increased women’s intra-householdbargaining power on their participation in both formal andinformal health information networks?

2. What is the relationship between formal and informalnetworks and a woman’s actual child health knowledge?


BACKGROUND

I Women play a critical role in meeting the nutritional statusof their families (Quisumbing et al., 1995; Thomas, 1997).

I Maternal knowledge the crucial skill for improvingchildren’ nutritional status (Glewwe, 1999).


BACKGROUND

I Women play a critical role in meeting the nutritional statusof their families (Quisumbing et al., 1995; Thomas, 1997).

I Maternal knowledge the crucial skill for improvingchildren’ nutritional status (Glewwe, 1999).


OVERVIEW OF SAMPLE

I 248 womenI 18 randomly chosen villagesI Department of Sololá in Guatemala


MAP OF SAMPLE IN SOLOLÁ, GUATEMALA

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HOUSEHOLDS

Mean s.d.

Household Size 6.94 2.87Number of Rooms 2.88 1.44Electricity 0.94 0.23Metal Roof 0.84 0.37Earth Floor 0.35 0.48Cement Floor 0.55 0.50Piped Water into House 0.37 0.48Piped Water into Yard 0.51 0.50Flush Toilet 0.07 0.25Pit Latrine 0.71 0.45Firewood as Cooking Fuel 0.97 0.17Gas as Cooking Fuel 0.03 0.17


HOUSEHOLDS

Mean s.d.



HOUSEHOLDS

Mean s.d.



HOUSEHOLDS

Mean s.d.



INDIVIDUALS

Mean s.d.

Age 35.04 11.37Literate 0.55 0.50Completed Primary School 0.46 0.50Completed Secondary School 0.09 0.29Number of Children 3.40 2.62


INDIVIDUALS

Mean s.d.

Age 35.04 11.37Literate 0.55 0.50Completed Primary School 0.46 0.50Completed Secondary School 0.09 0.29Number of Children 3.40 2.62



BARGAINING POWER

I Women’s involvement in agriculture in Guatemala hasincreased since the armed conflict.

I Applies the WEAI to measure bargaining power:I Household Expenditures and AssetsI Agricultural ProductionI Income Generated from Agricultural ProductionI Productive Capital and AssetsI Credit


BARGAINING POWER


I Applies the WEAI to measure bargaining power:

I Household Expenditures and AssetsI Agricultural ProductionI Income Generated from Agricultural ProductionI Productive Capital and AssetsI Credit


BARGAINING POWER


I Applies the WEAI to measure bargaining power:I Household Expenditures and AssetsI Agricultural ProductionI Income Generated from Agricultural ProductionI Productive Capital and AssetsI Credit


WEAI

B.1 Household Decision-Making n Mean

MakeDecisions

(1) Agricultural Production 219 0.52(2) Inputs for Agricultural Production 220 0.52(3) Crop Type 219 0.53(4) Serious Health Problem 246 0.63(5) Wage or Salary Employment 246 0.54(6) Household Expenditures 246 0.65

B.2 Production and Income Generation n Mean Mean

Make Decide onDecisions Income Generated

(1) Food Crop Farming 190 0.68 0.69(2) Cash Crop Farming 110 0.70 0.71(3) Livestock Raising 47 0.64 0.65(4) Non-Farm Economic Activities 101 0.76 0.77(5) Wage and Salary Employment 149 0.71 0.71


WEAI

B.1 Household Decision-Making n Mean

MakeDecisions

(1) Agricultural Production 219 0.52(2) Inputs for Agricultural Production 220 0.52(3) Crop Type 219 0.53(4) Serious Health Problem 246 0.63(5) Wage or Salary Employment 246 0.54(6) Household Expenditures 246 0.65

B.2 Production and Income Generation n Mean Mean

Make Decide onDecisions Income Generated

(1) Food Crop Farming 190 0.68 0.69(2) Cash Crop Farming 110 0.70 0.71(3) Livestock Raising 47 0.64 0.65(4) Non-Farm Economic Activities 101 0.76 0.77(5) Wage and Salary Employment 149 0.71 0.71


WEAI

B3. Access to Productive Capital n Mean Mean

Decide to Decide onSell or Rent New Purchases

(1) Agricultural Land 201 0.50 0.52(2) Large Livestock (oxen, cattle) 41 0.63 0.54(3) Small Livestock (goats, pigs, sheep) 52 0.69 0.67(4) Chickens, Ducks, Turkeys, Pigeons 192 0.87 0.88(5) Fish Pond or Fishing Equipment 8 0.88 0.88(6) Farm Equipment (non-mechanized) 196 0.33 0.37(7) Farm Equipment (mechanized) 2 1.00 1.00(8) Non-farm Business Equipment 5 0.60 0.60(9) House (and other structures) 245 0.57 0.57(10) Large Consumer Durables (fridge, TV) 131 0.62 0.61(11) Small Consumer Durables (radio) 157 0.63 0.64(12) Cell Phone 194 0.64 0.63(13) Non-Agricultural Land 33 0.64 0.52(14) Means of Transportation 55 0.38 0.38


WEAI





WEAI





WEAI





WEAI

B.4 Access to Credit n Mean Mean

Decide to Decide onBorrow Loan Use

(1) Non-Governmental Organization 7 0.71 1.00(2) Informal lender 5 0.20 0.40(3) Formal lender 51 0.45 0.63(4) Friends or relatives 9 0.56 0.78(5) Group based micro-finance or lending 14 0.64 0.93


WEAI





WEAI





DISTRIBUTION OF WOMEN’S BARGAINING POWER

0.0

5.1

.15

.2.2

5F

ract

ion

0 1 2 3 4bp

Distribution of Women's Bargaining Power


HEALTH INFORMATION NETWORKS

Mean s.d. Min. Max.

Books or brochures 1.71 4.20 0 18Newspaper or Magazine 1.33 3.72 0 18Internet 0.18 0.93 0 7TV or radio 3.64 6.07 0 18Family 7.52 7.55 0 18Friends 2.78 4.85 0 18Neighbors 4.54 6.19 0 18Pharmacy 2.74 4.83 0 18Community Health Worker 11.51 7.37 0 18Doctor 5.33 6.79 0 18Nurse 12.09 7.28 0 18

Average for All Sources 5.32 2.72 0.30 15.25Average for Formal Sources 5.93 3.08 0 16.17Average for Informal Sources 4.40 3.78 0 18



Mean s.d. Min. Max.





Mean s.d. Min. Max.





Mean s.d. Min. Max.





Mean s.d. Min. Max.




CHILD HEALTH KNOWLEDGE

Mean s.d.

(1) Diarrhea treatment 0.82 0.38(2) Signs child is malnourished 0.95 0.22(3) Avoiding infection in a wound 0.65 0.48(4) Polio vaccination 0.98 0.13(5) Safe drinking water 0.56 0.50(6) Introducing solid foods 0.80 0.40(7) Signs of respiratory infection 0.94 0.25(8) Baby sleeping position 0.82 0.38(9) Danger of smoke in house 0.95 0.22(10) Complimentary foods for babies 0.83 0.38

Total Answered Correctly 8.31 1.35



Mean s.d.





Mean s.d.





Mean s.d.




EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK

What is the impact of increased women’s bargaining power ontheir ability to participate in information networks?

Wi = βW0 + βW1Xi + βW2Xh + βW3Zi + fc + εWi

Ii = β0 + β1Xi + β2Xh + β3Wi + fc + εi

Wi= bargaining powerIi= participation in health information networksZi= age gap (F=7.88)fc = community fixed effects


EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK






EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK






EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK






EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK






EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK

Age gap is used as an instrument for bargaining power.

First condition: Age gap needs to have explanatory power ofbargaining power.

Second condition: Age gap does not directly affect a woman’sability to participate in health information networks.


EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK





EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK





EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK

What is the relationship between the frequency with whichwomen participate in information networks and theirknowledge of child health?

Ki = βK0 + βK1Xi + βK2Xh + βK3Ii + fc + εKi

Ki = dichotomous variable indicating a perfect score on thechild health knowledge questionnaireIi= participation in health information networksfc = community fixed effects


EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK





EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK





EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK





COMPARISON OF RESULTS

All Sources

Informal Sources Formal Sources

CFE IVCFE

CFE IVCFE CFE IVCFE

Bargaining 14.929*** 33.32

21.522*** 26.060 10.534** 38.16

Power (2.800) (20.32)

(4.614) (27.800) (4.147) (23.62)

n 223 176

223 176 223 176

Other Covariates: Age, Children, Primary Education, Secondary Education, Household Size, WealthHuber-White robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗(p < 0.10), ∗ ∗ (p < 0.05), ∗ ∗ ∗(p < 0.01).



All Sources Informal Sources

Formal Sources

CFE IVCFE CFE IVCFE

CFE IVCFE

Bargaining 14.929*** 33.32 21.522*** 26.060

10.534** 38.16

Power (2.800) (20.32) (4.614) (27.800)

(4.147) (23.62)

n 223 176 223 176

223 176




All Sources Informal Sources Formal SourcesCFE IVCFE CFE IVCFE CFE IVCFE

Bargaining 14.929*** 33.32 21.522*** 26.060 10.534** 38.16Power (2.800) (20.32) (4.614) (27.800) (4.147) (23.62)

n 223 176 223 176 223 176




Model I

Model II Model III

Secondary Education 0.262**

0.244* 0.245*

(0.118)

(0.116) (0.117)

Average Informal -0.001

-0.004

Information Sources (0.006)

(0.006)

Average Formal

0.012* 0.014*

Information Sources

(0.006) (0.006)

Community Fixed Effects yes

yes yes

Number of Obs. 248

248 248

R2 0.05

0.06 0.06

F-stat 5.34

8.69 8.47

Dependent Variable: Child Health Knowledge (1=Perfect Score; 0=Otherwise)Other Covariates: Age, Children, Primary Education, Household Size, WealthHuber-White robust standard errors in parentheses: ∗(p < 0.10), ∗ ∗ (p < 0.05), ∗ ∗ ∗(p < 0.01).



Model I Model II

Model III

Secondary Education 0.262** 0.244*

0.245*

(0.118) (0.116)

(0.117)

Average Informal -0.001

-0.004


(0.006)

Average Formal 0.012*

0.014*


(0.006)

Community Fixed Effects yes yes

yes

Number of Obs. 248 248

248

R2 0.05 0.06

0.06

F-stat 5.34 8.69

8.47




Model I Model II Model III

Secondary Education 0.262** 0.244* 0.245*(0.118) (0.116) (0.117)

Average Informal -0.001 -0.004Information Sources (0.006) (0.006)

Average Formal 0.012* 0.014*Information Sources (0.006) (0.006)

Community Fixed Effects yes yes yesNumber of Obs. 248 248 248R2 0.05 0.06 0.06F-stat 5.34 8.69 8.47



DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

I Improved women’s bargaining power within thehousehold increases their ability to participate in healthinformation networks.

I Informal information networks improve her ability to giveand receive support.

I Positive conditional correlation between formal healthinformation networks and actual child health knowledge.












CONFIDENCE IN KNOWLEDGE

I Receives 15 quetzales if she guesses correctlyI Receives 5 quetzales if she guesses within one question

Mean s.d.

Actually answered correctly 8.31 1.35Guessed she answered correctly 7.51 1.91Thought fellow villagers answered correctly 6.12 2.50Thought local expert answered correctly 9.08 1.58


CONFIDENCE IN KNOWLEDGE

I Receives 15 quetzales if she guesses correctlyI Receives 5 quetzales if she guesses within one question

Mean s.d.

Actually answered correctly 8.31 1.35Guessed she answered correctly 7.51 1.91Thought fellow villagers answered correctly 6.12 2.50Thought local expert answered correctly 9.08 1.58


RISK ATTITUDES

Gamble COLOR Payoff Chances Expected Return Risk

1RED 10 quetzales 50%

BLUE 10 quetzales 50% 10 quetzales 0









6RED 0 quetzal 50%



RISK ATTITUDES


BUILDING ON THIS RESEARCH

Risk AttitudesI 12.5% of women choose the no risk option while 27.4%

choose the highest risk option.

I Preliminary findings suggest a positive relationshipbetween choosing the no risk option and seekinginformation from a doctor or nurse.

Confidence in KnowledgeI On average, women are under-confident in their

knowledge of child health.I Initial results show that increased bargaining power is

positively related to an accurate self-assessment of childhealth knowledge.




choose the highest risk option.I Preliminary findings suggest a positive relationship

between choosing the no risk option and seekinginformation from a doctor or nurse.










knowledge of child health.

I Initial results show that increased bargaining power ispositively related to an accurate self-assessment of childhealth knowledge.










Brooke Krause [email protected]

Date post:	25-Jul-2015
Category:	Government & Nonprofit
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IFPRI Gender Methods Seminar, May 28, 2015: Women's Empowerment, Participation in Information...

Government & Nonprofit