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THE DEEDS OF VALIANT MEN:A STUDY IN LEADERSHIP

THE MARAUDERS IN NORTH BURMA, 1944

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HENRY L. KINNISON IVUnited States Army

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(Icla scua casil~aiooThe Deeds of Valiant Men"- A Study in Leadership -Themarauders in North Burma, 1944

HnyL. Kinnison IV, LTC, USA

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This paper is intended to examine key aspects of seniorleadership in the execution of the North Burma Campaign of 1944 bythe 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). The paper addresses theformation and training of the unit, also known as Merrill'sMarauders. It also addresses the three major missions performedby the Marauders to include the seizing of the Myitkyina airstrip.In particular, the paper considers the leadership of GeneralsStilwell and Merrill during the campaign and examines new evidenceconcerning their performance.

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THE DEEDS OF VALIANT MENA STUDY IN LEADERSHIP

THE MARAUDERS IN NORTH BURMA, 1944

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Henry L. Kinnison IVUnited States Army

Dr. James W. WilliamsProject Advisor

The views expressed in this paper are those of theauthor and do not necessarily reflect the views ofthe Department of Defense or any of its agencies.This doc,'-ment may not be released for open publicationuntil it has been cleared by the appropriate mil.itarvservice or government agency.

U.S. Army War CollegeCarlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Henry L. Kinnison IV, LTC, USA

TITLE: The Deeds of Valiant MenA Study in LeadershipThe Marauders in North Burma, 1944

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 15 April 1993 PAGES: 137 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper is intended to examine key aspects of seniorleadership in the execution of the North Burma Campaign of 1944 bythe 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). The paper addresses theformation and training of the unit, also known as Merrill'sMarauders. It also addresses the three major missions oerformed bythe Marauders to include the seizing of the Myitkyina airstrip. Inparticular, the paper considers the leadership of Generals Stilwelland Merrill during the campaign and examines new evidenceconcerning their performance.

THE DEEDS OF VALIANT MENA STUDY IN LEADERSHIP

THE MARAUDERS IN NORTH BURMA, 1944

Numerous secondary accounts of the 1944 allied campaign

in north Burma hare examined an organization known popularly

as Merrill's Marauders and officially by the abstruse title

of the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). Many of the

accounts, in detail, alleged broken promises, ineptness, and

failed leadership. Most often, those blamed are General

Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of the American China-Burma-

India Theater, and Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill,

commander of the Marauders. The allegations, in fact,

derived principally from two first-hand accounts that

provided unofficial and somewhat flawed histories of the

Marauders. A third first-hand account, recently published.

sheds a different light on General Stilwell's and General

Merrill's association with the 5307th. The account,

offered as a history of the Marauders' 2d Battalion, also

provides a wealth of information about both generals. Using

the newly published information, this paper will examine

the Marauders and their senior leaders. It will also

highlight some basic themes and issues of significance to

current and future military leaders.

The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) of the Army of

the United States entered the annals of American military

history for its actions in Japanese-held northern Burma

during the spring of 1944. Organized and trained for long-

range penetration, it bore the code name GALAHAD and popular

name "Merrill's Marauders," an appellation provided by the

press. Commanded by Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill, the

Marauders consisted of 2,997 officers and men organized into

a headquarters and three battalions. The Marauders fougnt

and died from the village of Ledo in northeast India to the

Burmese town of Myitkyina, situated alorg the Irrawaddy

River.

Operating in conjunction with the Chinese 22d and 33th

Divisions the American Tenth Air Force, and Detachment 101

of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the

Marauders penetrated behind Japanese lines in some of the

most difficult, disease ridden terrain in the world. In a

little over three months, they marched by foot over 700

miles; in five major and 30 minor fights, they met and

defeated the Japanese 18th Division (the Chrysanthemum

Division), veterans of the capture of Singapore and Burma.

Their operations culminated in the seizure of the

strategically important, all-weather airstrip at Myitkyina.

Though bought with the blood and bravery of fevered,

exhausted, emaciated men--this extraordinary achievement

could be realized only by the courage of equally fevered,

exhausted, and emaciated leaders, who refused to quit.

Two unofficial accounts of the Marauders have proven the

most popular works on the operations of the 5307th.

Virtually every secondary work examining some aspect of the

North Burma Campaign uses one or both of the works as a

principal if not the sole source of information. The first,

2

The Marauders, was written by Charleton Ogburn,

communications officer for the 1st Battalion. The second,

Galahad, was written by Charles N. Hunter, General Merrill's

deputy commander.

The official history of the unit is captured in American

Forces in Action account, Merrill's Marauders. This

manuscript rests primarily on the war diary of the

Marauders' command historian and on the interviews he

conducted. The command historian, Major John M. Jones,

received relatively little other material to use in the

preparation of the history. Three reasons explain this.

First, because they were traveling behind Japanese lines,

the Marauders minimized their record keeping to stay as

light as possible. Second, a Japanese artillery round

scored a direct hit on the mule carrying the unit records

during the Marauders' second mission. Third, monsoon rains

during the third and final mission made record keeping

almost impossible. Moreover, all the papers of the

Marauders' intelligence officer were lost when he was killed

during the assault on Myitkyina's airstrip, and the papers

washed away before his body could be recovered.

Two other official histories provide a thorough

consideration of the Marauders and their operations.

Stilwell's Command Problems, by Charles F. Romanus and Riley

Sunderland presents the official story of a commander, his

staff, and his soldiers in a theater of war. Published in

19S6, the work looks at the drama of high command and

3

leadership in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater. Because

the Marauders were an important element of the drama, they

receive a correspondingly large representation in the

volume. The other official history is Crisis Fleeting,

which contains original reports on military medicine in

India and Burma in the World War II. Published in 1969, the

history includes the reports of two of the Marauders'

surgeons annotated by the editor, James H. Stone. The

reports, still bearing the emotion of recently completed

battle, detail the experiences and observations of two

doctors who marchea with the Marauders. Mr. Stone's

annotations add perspective and balance. Taken as a whole,

the annotated reports provide a vivid account of combat

medicine in the jungle.

A third first-hand account, The History of the 2nd

Battalion, Merrill's Marauders, appeared recently. This

work provides a view sharply in contrast to Ogburn's and

Hunter's, as well as certain aspects of the medical reports

in Crisis Fleeti.ng. George A. McGee, commander of the

Marauders' 2d Battalion, details the actions of the 2d

Battalion from its beginnings in Trinidad until Colonel

McGee's departure from his unit in July of 1944. This

account rests on his personal experience and on his

battalion's combat journal and operations maps. Clearly,

McGee saw or remembers events differently from Ogburn and

Hunter. McGee purports not to challenge their accounts on

matters addressing the first and third battalions but does

4

so by implication. McGee's account clearly questions

Hunter's actions as deputy commander and disputes Hunter's

account of his importance as the "field commander" of the

Marauders.

Some indication of McGee's views on the campaign in

northern Burma appeared in 1987 when McGee wrote a letter to

Parameters' editor in response to an article published by

the journal. "Common Man, Uncommon Leadership, Charles N.

Hunter with Galahad in Burma," written by Scott McMichael,

had extolled Colonel Hunter's leadership of the Marauders.

Following the line taken by Colonel Hunter in his book,

McMichael depicted Colonel Hunter as the real leader of the

Marauders and indicted Generals Stilwell and Merrill as

uncaring and inept. Colonel McGee sharply disagreed with

McMichael as did the theater historian, Riley Sunderland,

who separately chastised McMichael for an unbalanced

criticism of Stilwell.

What is the truth? Did failings of leadership occur on a

monumental scale? Were the Marauders, as McMichael asked

and asserted, "unloved, misunderstood, and mercilessly

abused, perhaps the most badly handled American force in the

war?" These questions have defied historians for a variety

of reasons but principally two. (1)

First, neither of the two earlier unofficial histories

incorporated the views of all of the Marauders' senior

commanders. Specifically, Ogburn and Hunter did not

incorporate McGee's views when writing their works. Likely

5

this exclusion occurred because McGee was stationed outside

of the United States during much of the time that Ogburn arid

Hunter were writing their books. Other principals were

unavailable to support or refute the two unofficial

accounts: Stilwell died in 1946; Merrill died in 1955,

and Lieutenant Colonel Beach, commander of the 3d Battalion,

committed suicide a few years after the war. Colonel Henry

L. Kinnison, Jr., formerly Stilwell's G3 for the Northern

Area Combat Command (NCAC) and commander of K Force during

the Marauders' final mission, died of mite typhus contracted

during the march to Myitkyina.

Second, the difficulties of combat in the hostile

environment of Burma made it extraordinar'ly difficult for

the Maruaders' command historian to collect after action

interviews with key figures. In certain instances, the

separation of the Marauders' forces made it impossible for

Major Jones to interview battalion commanders about the

actions of their battalions ,n important operations and

battles. Of particular importance, Major Jones did not

intervie.. Colonel McGee concerning the 2d Battalion's action

at Inkangahtwang and at Nhpum Ga. This and the previously

noted defect in the historical process warrant

consideration.

This paper will offer one more limited view on the

performance of senior leaders of the Marauders in the

execution of the North Burma Campaign. Even so, this view

is a needed corrective: McMichael's biting indictment of

6

senior leadership certainly falls short in getting; at the

truth. It relies too much on the account provided by

Colonel Hunter and on the accounts that have repeated

Colonel Hunter's allegatiom;s until they have become the

unquestioned truth. In relooking the North Burma Campaign

of 1944, it is important to lay out Colonel McGee's evidence

particularly as it contradicts significant portions of the

accepted secondary source version. To do this, the text

will often include man' and detailed quotations to give the

flavor of the people and the sources they created at the

time. This is not to say that Colonel Hunter does not stand

to receive great praise as a courageous leader, particularly

for his heroic leadership during the three months following

the seizure of the Myitkyina airstrip; but Hunter was not

the only uncommon leader on the field in northern Burma.

Then-Lieutenant Colonel William L. Osborne, commander of the

1st Battalion, McGee, Beach, Kinnison, Hunter, Merrill. and

Stilwell all displayed uncommon leadership in the executior

of the campaign. They all made mistakes. They all

exhibited failings, sometimes of the body but ncer of the

mind, while under the extrenfse pressures of command. They

were good enough to lead the brave men of the Marauders

through a string of extraordinary victories. Thus, this

study is an account of senior leadership within the

Marauders and of the Marauders themselves that deserves

review by combat '-eaders today.

7

BACKGROUND

The Japanese conquered Burma two years before the

Marauders begai, their operations. By the end of 1942, the

enemy held the Philippines, much of Oceania, all of the

Dutch East Indies, the Malay Peninsula, and most o, Burma.

The enemy's position within Eurma threatened India itself

and cut the ground lines of communications between India and

China. The occupation of Burma provided protection against

an allied counterattack. Its difficult terrain consisted of

nearly impenetrable jungle and steep mountains, and would

prove well suited to defense by a determined enemy.

The Japanese conquest of Burma in 1942 moved quickly and

decisively. The enemy launched two divisions from Thailand

and in succession took Moulmein and then Rangoon, seizing

Burma's capital and main port on 8 March. The divisions

then split into two forces and attacked north. One attacked

up the Sittang River toward the Burma Road. The second

pursued an Indian and Burmese force up the Irrawaddy River

Valley. Then Major General Stilwell led a Chinese force in

an attempt to defend the Burma Road.

A third enemy force of two divisions landed at Raiigoon in

April. The force attacked east into the upper Salween Rivei

Valley and then turned north to seize Lashio, the junctur',

of rail and highway portions of the Burma Road. This force

continued its attack north into the Chinese province of

Yunan. From this force, the enemy sent smaller elements

along the Irrawaddy River almost to Fort Hertz, located in

8

northernmost Burma. Because the Japanese force had flanked

the Chinese forces defending at Mandalay, the Chinese had to

withdraw. As a result, the Japanese entered Mandalay

unopposed on 1 May. The remnants of the British, India,),

and Burmese forces withdrew by foot up the Chindwin River

Valley and across the Chin Hills into India. The fragments

of the Chinese forces under General Stilwell withdrew from

northern Burma into India through Shingbwiyang.

The withdrawals from Burma were not orderly affairs. At

one point during the Chinese efforts to resist the Japanese.

General Stilwe..l, under intense enemy fire, had to direct

personally an infantry counterattack against the advancing

Japanese. For this action he received the Distinguished

Service Cross. Than as a part of the withdrawal, General

Stilwell found himself and a part of his headquarters

trapped behind the Japanese advance. Stilwell's diary

contained the simple comment, "HELL." As a result of his

entrapment, he led a small element by foot out of Burma and

to Imphal, India. An Associated Press account captured

General Stilwell's reaction to allied actions in Burma:

... He said he regarded Burma as a vitallyimportant area for re-entry into China, nowblocked from the Burma Road supply route .... Here,in his own salty words, is what happened to theAllies in Burma: I claim we got a hell of abeating. tJe got run out of Burma and it ishumiliating as hell. I think we ought to find outwhat caused it, go back, and retake it. (2)

When the monsoons ended, the Japanese continued their

attacks. By the end of 1942 they had reached the Bengal

9

frontier and were closing on Sumprabum in northern Burma.

Allied attempts to stop the Japanese advance had proven

fruitless. In the face of considerable failure, the Allies

found some small satisfaction in an offensive operation

conducted by then Brigadier Orde C. Wingate. The operation,

a long range penetration into Japanese held Burma, was

conducted by eight specially trained columns of the 77th

Indian Infantry Brigade, numbering 3,200 men. This force,

popularly called the "Chindits," a derivation of the

mythical Burmese creature, the Chinthe, held the code name

LONGCLOTH.

LONGCLOTH marched over 1,000 miles during a four-month

period receiving direction by radio and supplies by plane.

While the unit was able to inflict moderate damage on the

Mandalay-Myitkyina railway, its losses proved significant.

Of the 3,000 officers and men who had begun the penetration

operation in February, nearly 1,000 men were captured or

killed. (A little over 100 men of a Burma Rifle unit had

been permitted to destroy their uniforms and remain in

Burma.) The Chindits lost nearly all their mules and most

equipment except personal arms. Strategically, the

operation had no effect. However, since the Chindits were

the only victorious allied unit in south Asia, they rec',ived

acclaim far beyond their apparent success.

At this stage of World War II, the United Kingdom needed

heroes. Called the "Clive of Burma" by Churchill, Wingate

gave the allies, particularly the British public, a glimmer

10

of hope where none had been seen. A controversial figure in

the British army, Wingate used his new-found popularity to

advance his concept for a division sized special force that

would penetrate deep behind Japanese lines during 1944. As

a result of a decision made during the Quebec Conference in

August 1943, an American force of 3,OOu men was to be raised

and trained by Wingate as one of seven brigades in his long

range penetration campaign. Wingate's force, the 3rd Indian

Division, received the code name GIDEON; the American force,

GALAHAD. Additionally, Wingate received commitment of an

American air contingent, called No. 1 Air Commando, to

support his force during penetration operations.

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FORMATION AND TRAINING

The War Department at General George C. Marshall's

direction requested volunteers for GALAHAD from the South

Pacific, Southwest Pacific, Caribbean Defense Command and

the Army Ground Forces in the United States. In response to

the request, 950 soldiers volunteered from the continental

United States; 950, from Trinidad and Puerto Rico--with the

great majority coming from the 33d Infantry; and 950,

veterans of Guadalcanal and New Guinea.

These volunteers would subsequently form the three

battalions of the Marauders. The first two battalions

departed together from San Francisco with the third

battalion joining the force on the way to India. The

Transport Command termed the entire group Shipment 1688,

with the battalions listed above referred to respectively as

casual detachments: 1688 A, 1688 8, and 1688 C. As a

result, the men of the battalions would often continue to

refer to themselves as Battalions A, B, and C.

Then-Lieutenant Colonel Charles N. Hunter was the senior

officer among the casual detachments and as such performed

the duties of commander of Shipment 1688. This arrangement

was typical for travel. He was to become General Merrill's

second in command. Lieutenant Colonel William L. Osborne,

was senior among the officers of Detachment 1688 A; he would

command the Marauders' 1st Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel

George A. McGee, Jr., senior officer among Detachment 1688

B. would command the 2d Battalion. Based on a conversation

13

with his former regimental commander, McGee understood that

the volunteers he was to lead would become an infantry

battalion committed to a dangerous mission yet to be

specified. Because this detachment consisted almost

exclusively of volunteers from one infantry regiment, McGee

effectively asserted himself as a battalion commander from

the beginning of the detachment's formation. Lieutenant

Colonel Charles E. Beach was senior officer of Detachment

1688 C. He would command the 3d Battalion.

During the voyage to India, the detachments began such

individual training as was possible. Among the written

materials studied by Marauders enroute was a pamphlet

prepared by Wingate. The pamphlet described the mission of

a long range penetration unit.

The long range penetration group consists of anumber of separate self-contained columns, eachwith a specific route of advance and mission.Supplied by air from a base in the rear-area, anddirected from a centrally located GroupHeadquarters by ground and air radio and by air-ground visual signals, these columns operate bydeception, evasion and infiltration for aconsiderable period (up to three months) in theheart of enemy occupied territory. (3)

A three month (or 90 day) limitation on long range

penetration operations was to become the subject of much

controversy at the end of the Marauders' second mission.

Based on the experience of 77th Brigade's four-month

operation during the spring of 1943, Wingate came to believe

that a deep penetration unit could reasonably expect to

remain effective for 90 days. Ogburn and Hunter would

14

assert their belief that the Marauders as whole considered

90 days as a hard limit on combat operations. In contrast,

McGee states he always considered the 90 day figure a

planniTng factor with the actual time to be spent in

operations to be determined by many factors but "with

military necessity being the paramount one-" (4)

After Detachment 1688 disembarked at Bombay on the west

coast of India, the three groups traveled a short distance

to a British transit camp at Deolali where they remained for

three weeks. McGee recalls the situation as one of

inconvenience with its primary effect as the loss of

effective training time. Since the original tables of

organization had not provided for cooks, the messing

situation in particular proved unsatisfactory for the

enlisted men. As a result, native cooks and the detachment

volunteers had to fulfill duty as mess personnel, In

contrast, the officers were separated from their men in

accommodations and fed at the transit camp officers mess.

In a formal letter to General Stilwell listing several

complaints against his command, Hunter later would charge

bad treatment of the Marauders when they arrived in India.

However, McGee's description of the Deolali transit camp

seems to depict a rather typical British camp organized

within traditional British conceptions of the appropriate

stations in life of officers and enlisted men. In McGee's

assessment, Deolali was simply "a rude but necessary

awakening to The fact that we must get back to the job of

15

taking care of ourselves and depending on no one else to do

SO." (5)

The three battalions departed separately by train from

Deolali on 17, 19, and 20 November--each at 2110 hours.

Concern for operational security reflected in the listing by

train authorities of each battalion as a shipment of medical

fillers. Upon arrival at Jakhlaun station, located in

central India, the battalions collected their men and

followed a compass heading to the training camp near

Deogarh. The British had set up the camp along the Betwa

river. The layout of the camp provided for battalion areas

for each of the battalions and plenty of open ground for

training to include firing of weapons and practice with

explosives. The Marauders again ate British rations--

exactly that provided their British soldiers; the rations

were clearly limited in quality and quantity. No PX

existed, and there was no recreational facility. McGee

noted in his account that the British standard of living "at

this stage in the war was by necessity much more austere

than ours" and that the Marauders were "accorded the same

treatment as their troops." Austere conditions in the

United Kingdom and the relative well-being of U.S. troops

were reflected in the British lament about the Americans

being "over-sexed, over-fed, and over here." India proved

no exception to the strained friendship between the

Americans and English.

16

From the Marauders' arrival in India, Colonel Francis G.

Brink, a general staff officer from China-Burma-India (CBI)

Theater Headquarters, overwatched the unit's preparation for

combat. General Stilwell had charged Brink with

responsibility for all facets of the Marauders' activities.

Hunter would recall Brink as an intelligent, aggressive

officer, though technically not qualified to command because

of his general staff assignment. Although Hunter saw

himself as the commander of the Marauders for matters of

administration and discipline, both Hunter and McGee then

clearly saw Brink as the officer in charge. McGee recalled

Brink as the de facto commander; Hunter was the camp

commandant with responsibility for administration and with

duty as the camp meeter and greeter. McGee noted that

Hunter did not involve himself in the day to day activities

and training of the battalions.

Brink would direct a reorganization of each of the

battalions into two jungle columns or combat teams

permitting some latitude to each of the battalion

commanders. A typical column or team as exemplified by B

Battalion consisted of a beefed up rifle company, a heavy

weapons platoon, an intelligence and reconnaissance (I & R)

platoon, a pioneer and demolitions (P & D) detachment, a

communications element and a complement of animals. A

medical officer and several aidmen would accompany each

column. The battalion executive officer and the battalion

17

operations officer each assumed command of a column. Each

rifle company had its own commander-.

By McGee's account, training was decentralized in

execution with Brink ever present to provide guidance and

suggestions. Training guidance came from three sources:

Brink's notes, U.S. Army training documents, and

comprehensive training notes from Wingate's headquarters.

McGee recalled Colonel Brink and his contribution to the

training of the Marauders:

Colonel Brink delegated the responsibility fortraining to the battalion commanders, permittingthem wide latitude in carrying out this task.There was no question but that training was thefirst priority mission, and that the battalioncommanders were not interfered with in getting thejob done. Colonel Brink rarely if ever convenedthe battalion commanders, instead he visited themindividually and observed training frequently, andin a soft-spoken but firm manner made suggestionsand otherwise provided guidance.

He had observed warfare against the Japs sincethe beginnings of the war, and he had maintainedin small leather notebooks his comments thereon,together with precise sketches of Jap tacticaldispositions andmovements under various conditions andcircumstances, and these he made available to thebattalions. (6)

In addition to the contribution by Brink, Wingate's

training notes outlined tactics and techniques and

prescribed standing operating procedures based on the

experiences of the Chindit long range penetration during the

spring of 1943. McGee observed there was no counterpart in

U.S. training literature. Battalion training programs

focused on platoon patrolling, establishment of outposts and

18

trail blocks, ambush techniques, and security actions.

Exercise involved columns in the attack and defense, and the

battalion on the march and in perimeter defense. Subjects

new to the soldiers of the battalions were animal management

and packing, airdrop and air support procedures, and river

crossings.

McGee, in particular, notes that the troops were neither

green troops nor misfits. Instead they were representative

of experienced soldiers then assigned throughout the army.

Ogburn and others' recall of the unsavory appearance of the

Marauders and depiction of them as misfits seems more a

function of the observer's inexperience than the condition

and quality of the soldiers. This difference of observation

between McGee and others would be one of many addressing

either the leaders or the led.

The battalions participated as independent opposing

forces in a week long exercise before Christmas against all

the brigades under Wingate's control. At the time, no

regimental headquarters existed so Brink provided mission

orders for each of the battalion to begin the exercise.

McGee notes the training value of serving as an opposing

force was marginal in preparing to become a long range

penetrating force. Still, each of the Marauder battalions

performed credibly.

By the time the Marauders departed for combat at the end

of January 1944, they were well trained for the missions

they were to undertake, with one exception. The battalions

19

would not receive their several hundred pack animals until

just before departing to Burma. As a result, the battalion

lacked desirable experience in nandling and loading animals.

Two companies of quarterm ster specialists somewhat relieved

the deficit in knowledge until experience on the road from

Ledo into Burma acquainted soldiers with their animals. Of

more serious concern was the lack of time to train and

condition the animals. Consequently, the mules and horse,:-

suffered excessive sores at the beginning of the campaign.

Another matter of concern about the animals was they had

not been devocalized as had all of the Chindit animals.

This would be omission of great concern during the

Marauders' first mission. Hunter in his work says that he

personally had prevented devocalization. Information

provided by McGee suggests no such decision was made. In

his view, the failure to devocalize the animals resulted

from a combination of a shortage of available time on the

receiving end and an unintended omission by the stateside

senders. If, in fact, Hunter made the decision, it would

prove to be a bad decision as subsequent events would show.

It would be a mistake to think that disagreement was

common at the time of the actual events. Merrill, Hunter,

and McGee collectively viewed the foot march from Ledo into

Burma as necessary training and a good shake out march,

particularly for the animals. In this matter, they ignored

the advice of Colonel William R. Peers, commander of OSS

Detachment 101, to fly or truck the Marauders from Ledo to

20

Shingbwiyang in Burma to conserve their strength. Peers's

advice derived from Detachment 101's experience in the

jungle, which caused him to share Wingate's concern about

the practical limits of human endurance in the jungle.

Peers's view was that the Marauders' three-month clock

started unnecessarily early by the long march from Ledo.

Hunter asserted he caused the march znd Merrill would have

done whatever Hunter thought right. However, Merrill was a

cavalryman with a broader experience than Hunter in matters

of horses and mules. More likely the Marauders' commanders

collectively thought it the right thing to do.

To some extent, disagreement expressed later in personal

accounts probably represented the unilateral perceptions at

the time that became exagerated over the years. McGee

stated that until he received Colonel Hunter's letter at

Myitkyina, he was unaware of any strain or disagreement

between General Merrill and Hunter. McGee seemed to see the

strain as a matter of Colonei Hunter's perception, not

General Merrill's. It seems possible these perceptions

partly derived from an implicit rivalry. Both Merrill and

Hunter were classmates from the Class of 1929 at the United

States Military Academy. Clearly Merrill's star had risen

faster than Hunter's.

21

omp7-

A-1<- 4z"

MOVING FORWARD

In early January 1944, the Marauders received

notification they were to move at the end of the month from

Deogarh to Ledo and then into Burma. While the unit had

experienced some personnel losses resulting from sickness

incurred in training, the Marauders received no

replacements. The War Department plans for the 5307th

envisioned the Marauders would be employed for approximately

90 days, then dissolved. To this end, planners required no

replacements to join the unit.

Toward the end of January, the battalions departed

Jakhlaun station in central India and journeyed by train to

Ledo. The trip lasted ten days with various stops,

transfers, and river crossings. The battalions ate C

rations and some 10-in-1 rations. General Merrill and the

unit staff made the trip by piane and had been in the Ledo

area for about ten days when the battalions began to arrive.

The battalions arrived at Margherita on 5 through 7 February

and began preparations for movement into Burma. The animals

were unloaded from the trains, and combat teams began

building their loads. Still traveling with ali of their

personal effects, the battalions stacked all their

belongings in several locations at the bivouac site. Orders

required the Marauders to travel into Burma with their

combat loads. Assurances were offered as to the safety of

the unguarded baggage. Personal items left by the units

included barracks bags, duffel bags, suit cases with khakis

23

and other clothing, shoes, wallets, pictures, and items

purchased as gifts. McGee recalled being brought his

battalion's national and battalion colors tc be stored irk

his personal gear. He hoped it might not be lost: "When

we departed that night our baggage remained there in the

jUngle, uncovered in a light rain. It wrould be thorougnly

looted by rear area troops." (7)

Despite Colonel Peers' cautioning, General Merrill chose

to make che long adminstrative foot march into Burma for

what he believed good reasons. Several tasks confronted

leaders and men. The animals required conditioning and

their handlers required experience. The march provided the

chance to break in new saddles. It also let the men adjust

their marching loads. McGee recalled General W~ingate's

training note on "Christmas treeing"--the tendency of

soldiers to carry too large a load encumbered by

nonessential items. The long daily marches still without

the weight of three to five days of combat rations corrected

this inclination. Units shed nonessential gear at

Shingbwiyang and later at Ningbyen. The battalions

typically marched 10 to 12 miles per day along an improved

dirt road. Marches varied between as many as 17 or 18 miles

and as few as three miles, depending on march objectives.

Unit kitchen detachments traveled by truck ahead of the

battalions so units could eat hot rations at their bivouac

sites. Despite an accident with 2d Battalion's ration truck

that kiiled ten men, the march entailed no particular

24

difficulty. Various accounts later called into question a

general absence of coordination between OSS Detachment 101

and the Marauders. However during the march, Colonel Peers

drove from Shingbwiyang to visit with his old friend McGee,

and there were many close contacts between Detachment 101

and the 5307th.

Entering its assembly area at Ningbyen during the latter

part of February, the 5307th came together for i.,be first

time as a tactical unit. This was the first experience for

the Marauders' u;,it headquarters. The battalions used their

time in their assembly areas to rest and conduct final

preparations for combat. McGee assessed the the impact of

his battalion's movement from Deogarh as a positive

experience, reflective of good leadership:

During the long journey covering 25 days we hadbeen most fortunate in avoiding any significanthealth problems. Constantly on the move, across adisease-ridden country, we had eaten a variety ofrations prepared under varying conditions anddrunk from water from many sources, though treatedwith chlorine, Halazone and/or boiled. We hadlived and slept in dirty train cars, stayed atfilthy and overcrowded transient camps and hadbeen for two days on a river boat with normalaccomodations for 160 persons. The conditionsdown the Ledo Road were also conducive to troublesince we were staying at and moving through oldcampsites and bivouac areas which had beenrecently occupied. The battalion had run thisgauntlet without damage. This result was muchless a matter of luck than it was of the awarenessand understanding by the troops as to thepotential health hazards and of vigilence on thepart of the company officers and noncommissionedofficers. (8)

As a result of their experience on the Ledo Road, units

reduced their marching loads to the essentials. Typically

25

soldiers would carry toilet articles, a change in socks and

underwear, a blanket, a shelter half, and mess gear.

Soldiers carried all of their personal gear with the

battalions' animals being committed to carrying unit

equipment. Loads typically consisted of five rategories of

equipment: ammunition, communications equipment, medical

supplies, and engineering equipment and supplies. The

battalions also took their first parachute drops of supplies

into paddy drop zones located near their encampments. This

was to be the first of many such resupply drops that the

Marauders would take. As operations unfolded, the units

would gain great proficiency at taking resupply drops. They

would also gain expertise in running medical evacuations by

light planes flying in and out airstrips often hacked out of

the jungle. To facilitate air-ground operations, each of

the battalions received army air corps liaison officers.

The officers would handle radio contact with airdrop

aircraft. They --ould also provide forward control for

fighter aircraft supporting the battlions.

It was in their assembly areas that the Marauders met

General Stilwell. McGee recalled the visit by Generals

Stilwell and Merrill to his area and reflected on its

importance. McGee was clearly impressed by Stilwell's

demeanor. An extended excerpt from McGee's account reveals

his feelings and the values in leadership McGee saw

expressed in Stilwell, Merrill, and the relationships

involved:

26

The remainder of that morning was spent in dryingout clothing and equipment and caring for weapons.While this work was going on, General Stilwellaccompanied General Merrill moved through thebattalion area observing with evident interest thetroop activity, making a quiet comment here anathere but causing no flurry on the part of the mennor making any demands on their time. However,the interest was mutual, and they saw a wiryindividual, a Lieutenant General, dressed for thefield in baggy khakis and leggins, an open-collared shirt, a well worn field jacket andwearing a peaked Chinese troop cap, and whosereputation as a tough and dogged soldier was wellknown to them.

As General Merrill and I followed him through thebattalion area, General Merrill told me withamusement that he had mentioned to GeneralStilwell that one soldier on seeing him seated ina jeep along the trail and wearing his peaked cap,not recognizing him, had said, " Well I'll bedamned, imagine seeing a duck hunter way outhere." He said that General Stilwell's reply was,"I don't care what they call me as long as theywill fight."

The visit was carried out in an appropriate andeffective manner; and it accomplished all thatneeded to be done, that is, he saw the troops andsized them up and they saw him and appreciated hisinterest, and both were well satisfied. Althoughclearly not General Stilwell's style, this was notime for oratory and there was no need forexhortations and flattery. These were well-motivated soldiers, and any questions which mayhave been in their minds at this time, on the eveof being committed to combat, were not ones thatGeneral Stilwell could answer.

This would be the only time that the 2nd Battalionwould see General Stilwell during the campaign,although I would meet him again at Maingkwan andMyitkyina. As a matter of fact, there would be noreason for us to be concerned with GeneralStilwell and his staff: General Merrill was ourcommander and the person responsible for ouremployment and welfare, and I never looked beyondhim.

Of particular interest was the easy andcomfortable relationship that clearly existedbeLween General Stilwell and General Merrill. It

27

was one that could only exist between twoindividuals who knew and understood one another,shared a mutual respect and confidence and were inagreement as to the course of action to beundertaken. Having been General Stilwell's G-3during the planning for the Northern BurmaCampaign, General Merrill, would require only abrief statement of mission for our commitment.Throughout the campaign, General Merrill was tooperate with the lightest touch of reins. (9)

THE STRATEGIC SITUATION

In late February 1944, six Japanese ground divisions and

an air division occupied Burma; two more were arriving. The

33d and 55th Divisions had led the initial Japanese attack

from Siam into Burma in 1942. The 18th and 56th Divisions

had come from Malaya to Rangoon in March 1942 after the fall

of the port city. The 31st and the 54th Divisions arrived

during the summer of 1942. The 2d and 15th Divisions were

closing into Burma at the beginning of tie Maruaders' first

mission.

During this time, two Japanese armies controlled combat

operations in Burma. The Japanese Fifteenth Army, which had

conducted the attack into Burma, controlled all of the

divisions listed above except the 55th Division and the 5th

Air Division. The Burma Area Army controlled the Fifteenth

Army, the latter two divisions, and other smaller units to

include marines. At the time of the Marauders' initial

mission, the Burma Area Army had tasked the Japanese

Fifteenth Army to begin planning and preparing for an

offensive into India in 1944. Under the command of the

Japanese Expeditionary Forces in the Southern Regions, the

28

Burma Area Army held complete authority for planning and

executing local strategy. Neither the Expeditionary Forces

nor the Area Army had any control over naval forces.

Instead, Japanese army and army air forces worked in

cooperation with Japanese naval forces.

Opposing Japanese forces along the Indo-Burmese border

were elements of the Allied South-East Asia Command (SEAC).

British forces consisted of six divisions under the control

of the IV and XV Corps. Chinese forces consisted of two

American trained divisions, the 22d and 38th Divisions

organized as the Chinese Army of India. Chinese forces

along the Salween River consisted of many divisions but

largely untrained and poorly organized. The British had

conducted two offensive operations during 1943. An attack

into the Arakan peninsula failed and British forces had to

withdraw to the Indo-Burmese border. The second operation

had been that of Wingate's long range penetration element,

the 77th Brigade (the Chindits). This operation directed at

the Japanese line of communication achieved limited success,

and some argued that it had resulted in little benefit.

Still it caused the Japanese concern for the security of

their activities in northern and central Burma. Certainly

the operation provided a needed lift in morale for allied

forces in theater at a time when little else good had

happened. In October 1943, Japanese forces conducted their

only offensive operation of 1943 by launching a spoiling

attack against Chinese forces along the Salween River. The

29

Chinese 30th Division took a thorough beating by the

Japanese 56th Division and an element of the 18th Division.

SEAC plans for 1944 called for the main effort to go into

central Burma and the Arakan Peninsula with the British IV

and XV Corps attacking to destroy Japanese forces.

Supporting attacks would come from a long range penetration

by Wingate's 3d Indian Division (the Chindits) to cut north-

south lines of communication in the area encompassed by

Katha, Indaw, and Mawlu; from the Chinese Yoke Force

attacking from the east to divert Japanese attention from

the Allied main effort; and from Chinese 22d and 38th

Divisions in conjunction with the 5307th and a brigade of

the 3d Indian Division attacking south toward Myitkyina to

open a ground line of communication between India and China.

THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL SITUATION

Japanese forces in northern Burma consisted of the 18th

Division. Arrayed in strong defensive positions near and

north of Maingkwan, the 18th Division conducted operations

to control the Hukawng Valley and protect the Kamaing Road,

the main line of communication for the division. Peers

describes the Japanese defense:

The 18th was solidly dug in. They had shownuncommon aptitude in utilizing the natural terrainas their front of resistance--and what it was likecan best be desribed as a wall of steel, though infact, it was bamboo. Since to most of us bamboosuggests something light and fragile, dedicated tothe easy way of fishing, it should be explainedthat this was a variety of bamboo known asbullaca; it is from four to eight inches in

30

diameter, and is capable of withstanding lightartilleyy fire. The Japanese had perfected thisbamboo into a concrete-strong barricade. Clumpsof the bamboo grew ten to fifteen feet indiameter; the enemy had burrowed underground, asif building a tunnel, until they reached thecenter of the clump. Then, coming up to thecenter, they had chopped away enough so that theywere absolutely surrounded by the naturalobstacle, protected against light and heavy riflefire. (10)

Against this bamboo reinforced defense, which protected

the Kamaing Road, the Chinese 22d and 38th Divisions had

struggled. Nearly five months of slow advance against a

most determined enemy brought the Chinese 60 miles into the

Hukawng Valley. Each of the principal Japanese positions

held 40 to 100 Japanese and required the bravest of efforts

to dislodge the defenders. By 24 February 1944, the Chinese

38th Division and the 1st Provisional Tank Group, NCAC's

main effort, were attacking south along the Kamaing Road

toward Maingkwan. They had cleared the area north of the

Tawang and Tanai Hka Rivers. (The tank group was a Chinese-

American unit that consisted of 90 light and medium tanks.

An American, Colonel Rothwell Brown, commanded it. An

American tank platoon served as its spearhead.) The 22d

Division operated in a supporting effort, 20 miles to the

west across a range of 4,000 foot hills. The 22d Division

covered the 38th Division's left flank by continuing to move

to the southeast.

Operating in support of NCAC, OSS Detachment 101 had

already proven itself enormously effective in disrupting the

operations of the Japanese Army in northern Burma. It had

31

extended its operations as far south as Mandalay and proven

itself in direct action and strategic reconnaissance. The

detachment, in spite of various setbacks, had developed an

effective resistance movement among the Kachins, a tribe of

northern Burma. Thirty-five agents--American, English,

Anglo-Burmese, and others--were operating in north Burma by

the end of October 1943 and controlling less than a thousand

guerrillas. In less than a year and one-half, the number of

agents would nearly quadruple and would ccntrol over 10,000

guerrillas. OSS Detachment 101 accounted for up to 85 per

cent of targets attacked by the Tenth Air Force, which

killed approximately 11,000 Japanese by the end of the

campaign. The G2 of NCAC later estimated that between 85

and 95 percent of all usable intelligence derived from the

detachment. While the Tenth Air Force would continue to

improve its aerial photographic capabilities, the skill of

the Japanese was such that on-the-ground reconnaissance

continued to provide the most effective way of finding the

enemy. (11)

At the beginning of the Marauders' first mission,

Detachment 101 was under General Stilwell's orders to expand

its guerrilla force to 3,000, center its operations around

Myitkyina, and provide intelligence and espionage throughout

north Burma. As a result, the detachment organized itself

to operate in direct support of the advancing forces as well

as to go deep into Japanese held north Burma. In addition

to the OSS Detachment 101, NCAC also controlled Kachin

32

Levies under the command of a British brigadier. The Kachin

Levies originated from Fort Hertz and were conducting

operations on the east flank of the NOAC's main effort.

WALAW.BUM

The Plan

On 22 February, General Stilwell gave oral orders to

General Merrill for the 5307th "to cut the Japanese supply

line, the Kamaing Road, south of Walawbum, and to seek out

and attack the 18th Division's command post, which was

thought to be near Walawbum." General Merrill met with his

battalion commanders later on the same day and outlined his

plan for the upcoming operation. McGee recalls this first

orders meeting as typical of those conducted by General

Merrill:

This meeting with the battalion commanders wastypical of those which General Merrill wouldconduct as necessary. He always dealt directlywith the battalion commanders, as a group orsingly, and rarely through a member of his staff.It will be realized that his unit consisted ofonly three infantry battalions which had beentrained to operate independently. There was noother units, organic, attached or supporting.There was no administrative encumbrance orworkload. -... The 5307th was as lean and combat-tailored as a unit could be. Directing thebattalions was a one-man task, and General Merrillwould do the job exclusively. (12)

With Chinese forces driving for Maingkwan, the Marauders

would attack in an encircling movement to' the east then

south to establish road blocks behind the Japanese front

lines. The Marauders' Intelligence and Reconnaissance ( I&R)

33

platoons, one from each of the batttalions, would move in

advance of the main body. The platoons would reconnoiter

three trails leading to the Tawang Hka River. On the basis

of the reconnaissance, General Merrill would chose a route

for the main body to move along. General Merrill did not

specify an objective for his commanders. The I&R platoons

were to depart on 23 February, a day in advance of the main

body. The platoons maintained radio contact with their

battalions. The main body would move out on 24 February

with the order of march as Ist Battalion, Regimental

Headquarters, 2d Battalion, and 3d Battalion. The

regimental net would be in operation on 24 February.

Contact with the Japanese was expected. Exact locations

would be developed on contact.

Terrain and Movement

The envelopment march crossed generally flat terrain

heavily jungled with undergrowth. Stream beds were dry;

rivers were shallow but broad. Clearly the onset of

monsoons would bring significant problems. The broad rivers

provided defenders great fields of fire. Trails seldom

directly crossed riverbeds. Instead, they tended to follow

the river with the trails crossing and recrossing several

times. Because of the heavy undergrowth, movement through

the area was restricted to the trails. As a result, point

elements throughout the campaign experienced extraordinary

danger because Japanese defenders could concentrate their

34

defenses along the few usable trails. Movement of the main

body presented challenges to marchers. The 5307th moved in

a column of battalions; each battalion moved in a column of

combat teams; combat teams moved in single file. With

nearly 3,000 men and 700 mules and horses following one

another, trail units often had to march in the dark to close

on bivouac sites. An occasion, units would bivouac on the

trail when movement at night became too difficult to be

useful.

fction Summary

On 23 February the I&R platoons departed as ordered; the

Marauder main body departed on the following day. On 25

February, the I&R platoon of 2d Battalion's Blue Combat Team

made contact with a Japanese squad-sized element. After a

firefight, the Japanese withdrew. During the fight, Private

Robert W. Landis became the first United States Infantryman

to be killed in Southeast Asia. McGee describes this first

Japanese position, a first indication of the skill the

Marauders repeatedly found in the Japanese 18th Division:

I found the Japs had been set up in a thoroughlyprofessional manner. A light machine gun had beenemplaced, well dug in and concealed, on a smallrise on, the edge of the jungle where the trailsouth to Nfhkang Kayang left the village. Fromthis position, with the entire village clearing asfield of fire, the machine gun covered the othertwo trails entering the village, from Nding Ga tothe north and from Tanja Ga to the east. In adraw to the rear of this position a bamboo lean-tohad been constructed for unit sleeping quarters,and in front of it was a single communalfiTeplace. It appeared that the unit had been of

35

squad-size, eight men. From the lean-to paths ledup to the machine gun position and to the riflemenfoxholes on both sides of it. These paths hadbeen cleared of jungle growth, and bamboo had beenstrung railing-like about three Feet above theground along them. It was evident that day andnight these soldiers could get to their positions.(13)

Also on 25 February, the I&R platoon of 3d Battalion's

Orange Combat Team made contact with a Japanese patrol near

Nzang Ga. The platoon killed one Japanese soldier; one

Marauder was wounded. The Marauders arrived near Tanja Ga

and Lanem Ga on 28 February where they took an airdrop of

two days food and grain and received orders from General

Stilwell. On 2 'arch after three days of movement but still

15 miles from Walawbum, General Merrill issued combat orders

to his battalion commanders:

.... the 3d Battalion was to pass through Sabaw Gaand Lagang Ga and secure hold of the Kamaing Roadat Walawbum by seizing the high ground along theNumpyek River east of the road. The 2d Battalionwas to proceed via Wesu Ga, cut a trail throughthe jungle westerly to strike the Kamaing Roadjust east of the Nambyu River at a point 2 1/2miles west of Walawbum, and there construct a roadblock. The ist Battalion was to block the trailsat Sana Ga and Nchet Ga, with a minimum of oneplatoon at each point. One combat team of thebattalion was to establish combat patrols alongthe Nambyu River between Shimak Ga and Uga Ga.The rest of the battalion was to constitute areserve at Wesu Ga. The Marauders were to holdtheir positions blocking the Kamaing Road untilthe Chinese, following up an enemy withdrawal,could occupy and relieve them. (14)

On 3 March the battalions started for their objectives.

The Marauders made numerous contacts wit' the small elements

of combat support and service support units one would expect

to find 20 miles behind division front lines. The 3d

36

Battalion bivouacked within a half mile of Walawbum. Orange

Combat Team led the battalion column followed by Khaki

Combat Team. Major Lew of Orange Combat Team relieved his

I&R platoon from its duties at the point of the column and

sent it across the Numpyek River to protect his right flank.

Khaki Combat Team began construction of a small airstrip to

permit the landing of L-4 and L-5 liaison airplanes. The

1st and 2d Battalions bivouacked within two miles of Wesu

Ga. All three battalions put out trail blocks and listening

posts, and made contact with many small Japanese elements

throughout the night.

On 4 March the Japanese began actions to find the

Marauders' positions. The 3d Battalion's Khaki Combat Team

was securing the airstrip they had built when at 0630 they

received an attack by a 30 man Japanese unit. Fog and heavy

undergrowth had permitted the Japanese to get close. Ten

Japanese were killed during the fight. Khaki Combat Team

suffered six wounded. The combat team evacuated four of the

w.o;unded by plane. Within an hour, the Orange I&R platoon

led by Lieutenant Logan Weston received the first of five

attacks by a 90 man force--each attack from a different

direction. Weston was able to shift his forces to meet each

new attack because of the efforts of his Niesi interpreter

who quickly translated shouted enemy orders. During the

third attack, the enemy attacked from three sides and used

mortar fire against the platoon. Khaki Combat Team

responded with its 81mm mortars and the I&R platoon broke

37

contact across the river supported by direct fire from the

combat team. The action by the I&R platoon permitted the

combat team to move into position on the high ground

overlooking Walawbum. In this position, the combat team

could provide effective direct and indirect fires onto the

Kamaing Road.

The 2d Battalion continued its movement toward the

Kamaing Road by cutting itz way through the jungle. The

battalion neared the road after dark and went into a bivouac

without exterior patrols and listening posts. A Nisei

interpreter with the battalion tapped a Japanese telephone

line and learned of the enemy's confusion and --,e location

of an ammunition dump. Although 2d Battalion had sent back

nonessential animals, a number still accompanied the unit.

During the night, some of the mules began braying. The

failure to provide the Marauders with devocalized animals

seemed a large failing to the men of 2d Battalion hoping to

escape notice in their clandestine position. Somehow, the

Japanese did not hear the mules.

Throughout 4 March, the 1st Battalion continued to guard

the Marauders' rear and serve as the regimental reserve. It

made many small contacts with its several patrols and caused

heavy Japanese casualties among rear echelon elements.

Early on 5 March, 2d Battalion moved to the Kamaing Road

and dug in a perimeter roadblock with a combat team facing

each way along the road. Each combat team dispatched its

I&R platoon down the road on its side to establish an ambush

38

to provide early warning. General Merrill and Colonel McGee

agreed the 2d Battalion would wait tor the 3d Battalion and

the 1st Provisional Tank Unit to link up at the roadblock.

As the 2d Battalion dug in, the battalion's communications

section tapped a Japanese telephone line and found it in use

by the Japanese. Technician 4th Grade Roy H. Maysumoto, who

had lived in Tokyo, translated the conversations and passed

the information to General Merrill. Later in the day,

information on the telephone line indicated the Japanese

were using a route other than the Kamaing Road to move

around the 2d Battalion's block. Still the Japanese made a

strong effort to clear 2d Battalion's block by shelling the

perimeter and launching six successive infantry attacks.

The battalion had one man killed and five wounded. As the

day progressed, water for the animals and ammunition became

a factor in the continued occupation of the perimeter.

The 3d Battalion, south of Walawbum, received heavy

mortar and light artillery fire. Strong Japanese patrols

attempted to find and attack Orange Combat Team's flanks,

but found no success in doing so. Ambushes set by Orange

Combat Team killed at least 75 Japanese. Orange suffered

one man killed and seven wounded. By evening Japanese

attacks had eased in intensity and frequency, but the enemy

was moving significant reinforcements up the Kamaing Road

from Kamaing. A 2d Battalion intercept on the Japanese

telephone line indicated the Japanese intention to attack

the 2d Battalion in strength while the remainder of the 18th

39

Division's elements would withdraw through the bypassing

route. Throughout the day, fighter aircraft attacked

Japanese forces as they moved up the road.

General Merrill and Colonel McGee reviewed the situation

in the late afternoon. The 1st Provisional Tank Unit was

delayed. The 3d Battalion's considerable contact with the

enemy prevented its moving to 2d Battalion's location. The

2d Battalion needed rations. Water for the animals had

become critical. While soldiers were able to survive with

water taken from bamboo, the animals in the perimeter had

not watered since 2 March. The surgeons had stabilized the

wounded and conducted immediate surgery, but evacuation of

the men was required. Finally ammunition, particularly

mortar ammunition, was low. As a result of their review,

General Merrill directed the McGee to withdraw 2d Battalion

to Wesu Ga, about two miles north of Walawbum. Colonel McGee

dispatched an element to reconnoiter a route back to Wesu Ga

that could support the battalion's movement at night. A

modified return route plus good light from the moon

permitted the battalion to move "steadily." While an easier

move than the one into the blocking position, the move back

required much hard work. No move in any jungle is ever

easy. McGee recalled the march as "a haro and jarring

ordeal for the litter patients and a tiring experience for

the relays of bearers." (15)

On 6 March 3d Battalion's Orange Combat Team remained in

position to command the Kamaing Road by direct and indirect

40

fire. Khaki Combat Team broke was relieved from its

security mission and proceeded to reinforce Khaki's

position. Against the Orange Combat Team, the Japanese

directed considerable mortar and artillery fire but without

effect. Orange had dug in with strong overhead cover.

Throughout the day, 3d Battalion employed its mortars

effectively to break up assaults before they could be

launched. At 171S, two Japanese companies with support by

heavy machine guns, mortars, and artillery fire attempted to

cross the river against Orange Combat Team. Orange held its

fire until the assaulting force reached within 25 yards of

the defenders. At that point, all within view to include

two heavy machine guns opened fire. Four hundred Japanese

died. The attack failed. This was the last attack of

significance by the Japanese against the Marauders in the

Walawbum area.

One final incident occurred as the Chinese 38th Division

closed on Walawbum after the Chinese Divisions and the 1st

Provisional Tank Unit had forced the Japanese to withdraw

from Maingkwan. Before the final fight by Orange Combat

Team, a Chinese battalion commander met with General Merrill

to arrange for the 113th Regiment's relief of the Marauders

at Walawbum. The Chinese regiment arrived on 7 March, but

its initial contact with the Red Combat Team resulted in a

firefight initiated by the Chinese, who did not recognize

the Americans. Red Team responded with direct and indirect

fires. The fight stopped when a Chinese interpreter

41

identified the Chinese force as friends. The Chinese lost

four badly wounded men, to include a major. Red team

surgeons treated the wounded, who were quickly air

evacuated.

That evening, General Merrill, meeting with his three

battalion commanders, offered his commendation and General

Stilwell's congratulations on a job well done. In five days

from the beginning of the Walawbum action on 3 March, the

Marauders had killed 800 Japanese. Moreover, they

cooperated with the Army Air Corps, the Chinese, and OSS

Detachment 101 to force a major withdrawal by the Japanese

18th Division. The Marauders had lost 8 men killed and 37

wounded. Seventy patients had been evacuated for malaria,

other fevers, psychoneurosis, and various injuries.

Reflections on Leadership

Having reviewed the basic facts and chronology of events

up to the capture of Walawbum in March 1944, it is worth

stepping back to analyze various facets as they pertain to

larger, more enduring issues. These issues are the presence

of the commander in battle, styles of senior leadership, use

of the deputy commander, and the provision by commanders of

the purpose, direction, and intent of their operations.

Commander's Presence

A central issue concerns the relationships between the

methods of senior leadership, the physical enviorment, and

42

the tactical and operational situation. Jungle warfare does

not lend itself to the traditional applications of face-to-

face leadership by senior leaders. The close terrain of the

jungle inhibits a general's use of his personal presence to

inspire his subordinate leaders and his men. Opportunities

for men to see their generals and for generals to see their

men rarely come. A senior leader cannot easily move to the

decisive point of battle to rally his men. Jungle movemeýnt,

often measured in hundreds of yards per hour, denies the

senior leader the ability to move easily and quickly

anywhere on the battlefield. As a consequence of these

limitations, senior leaders in jungle warfare must carefully

weigh the opportunities to see and be seen by their

soldiers. The realization of these opportunities should

always result from careful consideration rather than

impulse.

Understanding these difficulties, General Stilwell got it

right in joining the Marauders as they entered the assembly

area at Ningbyen near his headquarters at Shingbwiyang. On

the trail near the unit's assembly area, he watched the

Marauders mo'.,e. Then in the assembly area, he spent time

walking through battalion bivouacs talking with soldiers.

His time in observation on the trail seems appropriate for

two reasons. First, the unit was finishing a 140-mile

march; watching the unit at the finish would give him a good

idea of the soundness of its leadership. Second, the

upcoming campaign was going to require daily, long marches;

43

observing the Marauders at the end of a series of lengthy

marches would provide a good notion of their fitness to

complete their missions. Given his style of leadership, he

was seeking neither to inspire nor rally the 5307th. He

came to assess its qualities.

Colonel Hunter criticized Stilwell for not visiting the

Marauders in Deogarh (located in central India) and noted

visits by Admiral Mountbatten, supreme commander for

Southeast Asia, and General Wingate. In the case of the

latter, it must be remembered that General Wingate, in spite

of publicity, was only commander of a division not yet

committed to combat. He had the time to devote to such

visits. Since the Marauders were to have been one of his

brigades before it was decided otherwise, visits to the

5307th seem obligatory. As to Admiral Mountbatten, he like

Stilwell spent a proper moment as a senior commander in

seeing and being seen. Visiting the Marauders in Deogarh

made sense geographically. His presence unquestionably gave

the Marauders a sense of importance and purpose. As to

General Stilwell not coming to Deogarh, it did not make

sense geographically. General Stilwell was actively

prosecuting a campaign against the Japanese with the Chinese

Army of India. Deogarh stood a long ways from combat

operations, and men Stilwell trusted were overseeing the

training of the Maruaders. Occupant of multiple positions

of responsbility ranging from the strategic to the tactical,

Stilwell had no time to waste and little time to spend. In

44

using his presence at the beginning of the campaign as he

did, he got it right.

General Merrill got his part right, too. He spent a lot

of time with his men. He could do this because the 5307th

was a relatively uncomplicated organization at this time.

Other than Colonel Hunter's criticisms, the Marauders

appeared to have uniformly liked and respected Merrill. In

executing the Walawbum campaign, General Merrill's decision

to employ the Marauders as a single unit permitted him to

move his command post with the battalions. As a result,

Merrill was to share with his men the rigors and dangers of

the operation, and they knew it. The movement of the

Marauders as a regiment during the first mission also

permitted him almost daily contact with his battalion

commanders. His presence reassured them, and a mutual trust

developed between General Merrill and his battalion

commanders. Composed under fire, too, he cast a calming

presence that seemed to permeate the command environment of

the Marauders.

Styles of Senior Leadership

Some of the discussion on presence has already addressed

the styles used by General Stilwell and by General Merrill

in dealing with the Marauders. Capturing a thorough

understanding of General Stilwell's style of leadership as

he applied it to all of his responsiblities certainly

45

exceeds the scope of this paper. Reknowned or infamous for

bluntness and irrascibility, he showed none of this in

dealing with the Marauders. Throughout the campaign, he

only once visited the battalions of the Marauders. Given

the type of combat, which widely dispersed Marauder columns,

this was not remarkable. However, he was to visit with

Marauder commanders on several occasions until their

withdrawal from Myitkyina. In all cases, he is described as

calm, direct, and even polite. He did not seek to attract

attention to himself. Even Colonel Hunter's account does

not discount this description. Except for Colonel Hunter,

who barely knew General Stilwell, no one within the

Marauders who did know the General from firsthand experience

has written to criticize him. In fact, Colonel Peers,

commander of Detachment 101, who did know him well, wrote

with great admiration about "Uncle Joe." Years later as a

senior general officer, Peers was appointed to head an

inquiry because of his own reputation for honesty and

directness--Stilwell characteristics. (16)

General Merrill clearly enjoyed working around soldiers.

Calm, confident, and outgoing, his style won him wide

admiration. He did not waste words when time was short, but

he could also tell a story with ease. His confidence

derived in part from considerable personal intelligence and

from the experience gained from having worked in the theater

of operation for over two years. He had walked out of Burma

with Stilwell and survived a heart attack enroute. As

46

Stilwell's G3 earlier in the war, Merrill implicitly

understood the strategic, operational, and tactical

situation faced by the Marauders. His warm relationship

with General Stilwell bought him considerable freedom of

action in leading the Marauders. Merrill was no puppet. In

dealing with his commanders, he dealt with them directly and

in a low key manner. Quiet strength was his mark. Except

for Hunter's comments, one cannot find criticisms by his

subordinate commanders.

The Deputy Commander

Colonel Hunter's account of his actions as deputy

commander suggests an importance throughout the campaign

transcending the actions of General Merrill. This is

nonsense. He contributed to the actions of the Marauders

dutifully--at times outstandingly and at times poorly.

Neither he nor Merrill had served before as commanders at

the regimental level, and both made mistakes. Hunter had

not participated in battalion training in Deogarh, nor had

he played any part in the employment of the Marauders during

the exercise with the 3d Indian Division in December 1943.

Certainly through the beginning of the campaign, both Hunter

and Merrill were learning how to best employ a deputy

commander. Since Merrill and Hunter had been classmates at

West Point, one would expect Merrill to give Hunter as wide

authority as possible. However, because General Merrill

chos- Lo employ the Marauders as a single element in its

47

first mission, no command requirement existed for Colonel

Hunter beyond ensuring the provision of logistical support.

He seems to have done this adequately.

Hunter's commentary on tactical operations during

Walawbum certainly was not based on personal observation but

on speculation. His suggestion that General Merrill

withdrew the 2d Battalion's block prematurely does not match

up with the tactical facts. McGee's account of his

battalion's occupation and subsequent withdrawal from the

block at Walawbum confirms General Merrill did the sensible

thing in agreeing to the withdrawal. Hunter and others have

suggested Merrill as a tactical novice, but Hunter had never

seen combat before. Merrill had served as Stilwell's G3

during combat operations and had enjoyed considerable

experience as an operations officer. In combat he appeared

quick to comprehend developing tactical situations and

unafraid to take appropriate action, even if it did not

fully match his commander's desires.

Purpose, Direction and Intent

To Colonel Hunter's frustration, General Stilwell chose

to deal directly and almost exclusively with General Merrill

in the planning and directing of combat operations. Because

of General Merrill's previous experience as a member of

Stilwell's staff, he undoubtedly understood the purpose and

48

intent of the campaign in north Burma. Jungle operations

tend to be slow. What General Merrill could not know, nor

could General Stilwell, was the timing of operations.

General Merrill assuredly knew of or could reason Myitkyina

as the campaign's objective, but he probably did not think

of the Marauders as the instrument of final action against

Myitkyina. Neither he nor General Stilwell could foresee

how successfully the Marauders would conduct operations.

General Merrill chose to keep his thoughts to himself on

such matters when dealing with his commanders. In fact, he

tended to begin operations with a march order and a general

area of operation, and, as the situation developed, would

issue fragmentary orders adjusting the tasks given the

battalions. As McGee's account shows, General Merrill did

not provide his or General Stilwell's intent, and instead he

chose to provide tight instructions for each battalion as it

neared possible action. Several rrasons argue for this

approach. First, because of the very long enveloping

marches the Marauders would make, he could make no hard

assessments of enemy dispositions until the battalions had

reached their general objective areas. Second, in the

spirit of Stonewall Jackson, keeping intent and purpose

general until time of action may have helped preserve

operations security. Last, experience with the Chinese had

shown them slow and somewhat unpredictable in action.

Merrill may not have wanted to build an elaborate plan

contingent on Chinese action thinking it easier instead to

49

issue subsequent orders than to build an oveiall plan and

have to readjust it significantly by radio. Neither

Stilwell nor Merrill apparently ever revealed a broader

operational or strategic view until immediately necessary

when executing combat operations. In the short term, thiE

would have no impact. In the long terms, this approach

would yield grave consequences.

SHADUZUP AND INKANGAHTAWNG

The Operational and Tactical Situation

With the occupation of Walawbum, NCAC controlled the

Hukawng Valley. The Japanese had withdrawn 15 to 20 miles

south to defend the the northern end of the Mogaung Valley.

Japanese losses in defending Walawbum had proven high.

Accustomed to the slow forward movement of the Chinese,

General Tanaka felt he could concentrate at will to defeat

his attackers in detail. In attempting to concentrate

against the enveloping attack by the Marauders, he found his

forces outfought and forced into a withdrawal.

The Strategic Situation

During the Marauders' first mission and the two months

preceding it, serious differences had risen between the

British and Americans as to the strategic direction to be

taken in Southeast Asia. The British desired to fight a

holding action in Burma and pursue an offensive through

Malaya. They would then retake Singapore and possibly seize

5o

a Chinese poit to facilitate prosecution of operations in

the Pacific. Clearly the British wanted to reacquire their

colonial holdings. In contrast, the Americans wanted to

support the Chinese. To do this, they sought a decisive

action in Burma to reestablish a land bridge between India

and China. Across this land bridge, the Allies would move

supplies and equipment that would permit the Chinese Army to

attack east in support of operations in the Pacific. In the

disagreements, Admiral Mountbatten thought at one point that

General Stilwell, his deputy in SEAC, had acted disloyally.

Specifically, Mountbatten felt actions by Stilwell had

proven decisive in convincing President Roosevelt to block

British intentions. Both Mountbatten and Stilwell were to

learn subsequently that independent action by the American

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), not by Stilwell, had led to the

President's actions. In conversation with Prime Minister

Churchill, the President said he was expecting the seizure

of the Myitkyina by the end of the dry season (May-June) in

Burma. On 2 March, Mountbatten and Stilwell met at

Stilwell's invitation and rrestablished a cordial

relationship. Stilwell wrote General Marshall that he "ate

crow" for not keeping Mountbatten fully informed. The

meeting did not decide the stratregic questions of the

theater, but it did establish Mountbatten's willingness to

cooperate with the effort in north Burma.

On 8 March, the Japanese Fifteenth Army launched its

major offensive into India. In support of the operation,

51

General Tanaka withdrew his forward defense to the area

around Jambu Bum and limited his actions against NCAC to

counterattacks.

The Plan

The next operation by NCAC aimed the Mogaung Valley. A

set of low hills holding the village of Jambu Bum marked the

northern end of the valley and separated the Hukawng Valley

from the Mogaung. The Chinese 22d Division would advance

south along the Kamaing Road toward Jambu Bum. The Chinese

65th Regiment, located 25 miles to the west, would cover the

right flank of the advance. The Marauders would conduct

enveloping attacks on the left flank of the operation.

Detachment 101 would operate in direct support of the attack

as well as continuing actions near and beyond Myitkyina.

Colonel McGee recalled receiving his initial orders for

the Marauders' second mission. His recollection speaks to a

clear admiration for General Merrill's style of command and

leadership:

On 11 March General Merrill met with Beach and meand informed us that the 5307th less the 1stBattalion would move out the next morning. Withthe 2d Battalion leading, the route of march wouldbe Shikau Ga-Galun Ga-Kaidau Ga and thence alongand up the Tanai Hka. I understood that thisrather sudden departure was due in part to his

concern over the number of cases of diarrhea beingexperienced, particularly in the 1st Battalionwhich was bivouacked much closer to Chinese unitsthan the other two battalions.

At this meeting, as had been the case at Ningbyenprior to the Walawbum operation, General Merrill

confirmed himself to matters pertaining to the

52

march movement. While we knew that the generalplan envisioned an attack on the Road north ofKamaing, it would not be until we were well downtrail, at Janpan, that he would inform usconcerning the operational plan. His reticenceconcerning these operational details wasunderstandable; first, we had a long march aheadof us and the situation could change quickly anddrastically, and secondly, Beach and I had norequirement for such detail at this time.

He had given Osborne his instructions separately,and I knew generally that his mission involved ashallow envelopment of the Japanese positon in theJambu Bum, and that the 1st Battalion would befollowed at a day's march by a regiment of the38th Chinese Division with an attached artillerybattery.

At this time General Merrill had GeneralStilwell's approval of the operation and the onematter left unsettled was the degree ofparticipation by the 38th Chinese Division. Itwas General Merrill's plan, in which General Sunhad expressed agreement, that the other tworegiments would follow the 5307th(-) up the TanaiHka. It should be noted that in each instance theChinese units were not to be attached to the5307th but rather would remain under Chinesecontrol. This matter of the extent of Chineseparticipation was currently under consideration byNCAC staff, and General Merrill had sent Hunter toMiangkwan to get the decision. The outcome wouldbe that the NCAC staff would recommend against theparticipation of the two regiments in the TanaiHka operation, and General Stilwell would sodecide. This was to prove a crucial decision.

At the conclusion of this meeting, I told GeneralMerrill that Sergeant Freer was now ii. command ofthe Green C(ombat)T(eam) I&R Platoon, and I wouldlike to have him commissioned as soon as possibleand preferably before we moved out on this newmission. His unhesitating reply was that I shouldpin second lieutenant bars on him, and we wouldleave the adminstrative details to be sorted outlater. (17)

53

Action Summary

Movement to Shaduzup

On 12 March, the 1st Battalion started in an enveloping

march for Shaduzup. The Chinese 113th Regiment and 6th Pack

Artillery Battery trailed the battalion. Two days march

covered about 20 miles and brought the battalion into rugged

terrain with hills as high as 2,000 feet. On 14 March, the

point platoon of the battalion surprised elements of a

Japanese company killing five men. The Japanese withdrew

but now knew where the Ist Battalion was. The next day, the

battalion experienced eight separate fights along the trail.

Unknown to the battalion, an element of Detachment 101's

Kachin guerrillas led by Lieutenant James L. Tilly was

harrassing the Japanese in support of the ist Battalion's

movement south. To avoid the continued resistance by the

Japanese, Colonel Osborne left one combat team in contact

with the Japanese and moved the second team to cut a path

around the Japanese position. White Combat Team took two

days of exhausting effort to hack four miles through the

jungle to Kumshan Ga reaching it on 17 March. The Red Team

and the Chinese regiment followed. On 19 March, the

battalion received an airdrop of supplies and another one on

21 March.

From 19 March the battalion continued its movement

steadily opposed by Japanese ambushes. Each contact would

lead to a sharp fight followed by a Marauder element cutting

a path around the enemy's trail block. On 23 March Colonel

54

Osborne again decided to take 1st Battalion off the trail.

Two days of hacking through the jungle covered only five

miles but without opposition from the Japanese. Frequently

the battalion would encounter hills too steep for its

animals to climb loaded. Again and again, soldiets would

unload the animals, hand carry the heavy loads to the top of

the hill, and reload the animals. This would become a

familiar experience on the trail.

From Detachment 101, Colonel Osborne learned that an

estimated 300 Japanese held Shaduzup and another 500 to 600

were defending near Jambu Bum. Based on the information,

Colonel Osborne decided to feint to the north of Shaduzup

with a platoon and move the 1st Battalion into a road block

four miles south of the village. He selected a block

position close to the Mogaung River where the road ran

parallel to the river.

As the feinting rifle platoon made contact with the

Japanese, the 1st Battalion continued its move south of

Shaduzup. Arriving in the area of the intended block, White

Combat Team's I&R platoon reported it had seen an estimated

company sized force encamped near the river. The platoon

also reported that another larger element was just south of

the first element.

Colonel Osborne planned a night attack on the first

position with one combat team attacking, one in support, and

the Chinese 113th Regiment in reserve. White Combat Team

crossed the Mogaung River at 0300 on 28 March and caught the

55

Japanese by surprise. The attacking team killed many of the

enemy with bayonets, grenades, and tommy guns. White Team

quickly pushed to the road and began digging in its

perimeter. The Japanese responded almost immediately with

snipers, assaulting infantry, and artillery. By midday, Ist

Battalion was receiving 77mm and 150mm fire. Throughout the

afternoon, the Japanese repeatedly atticked in force from

different directions. All attacks were repelled. By

evening infantry assaults ceased, but Japanese artillery

attacks continued to hammer the battalion.

On 29 March, the 113th Regiment relieved the 1st

Battalion from the roadblock. The battalion withdrew to a

position near a Seagrave Hospital supporting the Chinese.

Caught between the Chinese moving south through Jambu Bum

and the roadblock, the Japanese withdrew south toward

Kamaing along the Kamaing Road. The 1st Battalion had

killed more than 300 Japanese soldiers but had lost eight

men killed and 35 wounded. By 1500 lead elements of the 22d

Chinese Division linked up with the 113th Regiment. The

Kamaing Road now stood open to Laban.

The 1st Battalion's original orders called for it to

rejoin the main body of the Marauders somewhere near

Hsamshingyang. A confirming order directed it to move to

Janpan, about 17 miles straight line distance. Movement

took the battalion across a part of the Kumon Range with a

rugged climb nearing 4,000 feet. A day's march at times

yielded little more than a mile of movement. The battalion

56

lost all radio contact when a sack of grain delievered from

a supply plane fell on the unit's long range radio. On 3

March, impatient with his inability to talk with General

Merrill, Colonel Osborne retraced the unit's movement from

Shaduzup to find a radio. When communications were

reestablished, the 1st Battalion received instructions to

move as fast as possible to join the rest of the 5307th at

Hsamshingyang. The 2d and 3d Battalions were engaged in a

major battle with the Japanese.

Movement to Inkangahtawng

While the 1st Battalion conducted its shorter enveloping

attack to Shaduzup, the rest of the Marauders moved on a

longer enveloping attack to block the Kamaing Road near

Inkangatawng, about 12 miles south of Shaduzup. The block

near Inkangatawng would sever the line of communications of

the 18th Division about halfway between the division's

foward line of troops and its supply base at Kamaing.

Conducted in concert with the block at Shaduzup, the

Inkangahtawng block would cause great problems for the

integrity of the Japanese division's defense.

From 12 through 16 March, the 5307th(-) covered nearly 40

miles. The Chinese regiment that was to accompany the

Marauders was not available at the time of the Marauders'

departure. Enroute to the Village of Naubum, the Marauders

picked up an element of Detachment 101, led by Captain

Vincent L. Curl, that consisted of 300 Kachin guerrillas.

57

Also joining the Marauders at Naubum was Father James

Stuart, a missionary Roman Catholic priest, who became the

Marauders' unofficial chaplain. On the 18 March, General

Merrill stopped the 2d and 3d Battalions in the Weilangyang-

Janpan area to receive supplies and wait for final orders

from NCAC.

Merrill's Marauders, of the Armed Forces in Action

Series, records that General Merrill received new orders

from General Stilwell on 20 March. The orders directed the

2d and 3d Battalions to complete their original missions of

blocking the Kamaing Road plus blocking Japanese movement

along the Tanai River. General Stilwell's order included an

estimate of Japanese stra.ngth south and west of Kamaing at

about 2,000 men. McGee recollects receiving his battalion's

order on 19 March. McGee received the order in an one-on-

one meeting with General Merrill. Again, McGee's account of

the meeting illustrates General Merrill's style of command

and leadership:

General Merrill said that the job was for us tomove to the Kamaing Road. A task force composedof the 2d Battalion and one combat team of the 3dBattalion would move down the ridgeline towardKamaing, cut down into the Hkuma Hka at Auche andthence proceed downsteam through the NampamaChaung to Manpin on the edge of the Mogaung plain,some seven miles north of Kamaing. From there wewould move through Sharaw, countermarching some 20odd miles to Warazup.

At Warazup our mission was to block the KamaingRoad and "to remain there for 24 hours or as longas consistent with not getting cut off."

He said that Hunter would command this task force,adding at once, "I know that you can do the job,

58

but one-half the outfit is involved, and after allthat is what Hunter is here for and he might aswell get started."

He stated further that the 3d Battalion less theKhaki Combat Team would remain under his control.He did not mention a specific mission or locationfor the 3d Battalion (-), but he did say that hiscommand post would remain at Janpan for the timebeing.

I mentioned the matter of being kept informed ofthe progress of the 1st Battalion, and we agreedthat it was desirable that the two forces hit theRoad at approximately the same time in order toget the maximum effect of surprise effect ofsurprise and shock. He said that he would keep usso informed.

There was no mention of any linking-up of the twobattalions nor of any other joint efforts.

He said that the Kachins had made the trail fromAuche down into the Hkuma Hka passable foranimals, but there was no other mention of Kachinparticipation in the operation. However, he didsay that an OSS operative, "Skittles," would be inthe vicinity of Manpin but he did not elaborate onthis statement.

A food drop would be required, and in any casedesirable, before leaving the ridgeline, andGeneral Merrill said that he would provideinformation as to the place and time of this dropwhich would probably be at Auche.

He said that he would provide me furtherinformation pertainig to the move down theridgeline to Auche. It was clear to me that hewished to personally control our movement as longas possible. Undoubtedly in view of the unsettledconditions in the Theater and in the Jambu Bum,and he was not yet ready to turn us loose.

As far as the Chinese forces were concerned, theywere all involved in one way or another with theattack at Jambu Bum. No Chinese troops hadfollowed us up the Tanai Hka Valley.

As to the Japanese forces south of toe Jambu Bumand in the Mogaung valley, there was noinformation at this time as to where or in whatstrength they might be. Kamaing, along withMyitkyina and Mogaung, was known to us as a

59

Japanese stronghold, and it might be expected thatthe Mogaung valley and the Japanese main supplyroute from Kamaing to the Jambu Bum would be anarea of increasing Japanese activity, bothlogistical and tactical. However, iwe did notdwell on this matter to the extent of the above,and the current information was that CaptainCurl's sources indicated that the trail fromJanpan to Auche was free of Japs at the time ofhis report. However, this could change quickly.

Some later accounts of the coming operations wouldindicate that our movement into and in the Mogaungvalley was secured or otherwise covered by Kachinguerrillas but this was not the case at all.

The foregoing account of my meeting with GeneralMerrill at Janpan incorporates the atmosphere, thesubstance and the manner in which the missionorder for the Inkangahtawng operation was given tome. I have seen accounts which would indicatedthat General Merrill issued a formal writtenorder, but I never saw nor heard of such an order.(18)

McGee's comments, shown below, on his command

relationship in the Inkangahtawng operation with the

Marauders' deputy commander, Colonel Hunter, are cool. In

Hunter's account of the Marauders and his role in the unit,

Hunter would describe himself and his actions as key and

essential to the command and leadership of the 5307th.

McGee would disagree strongly with Hunter's assertions,

arguing that he always considered General Merrill as the

commander of the Marauders in every way.

As to Hunter, I did not know where he was at thistime. I had last observed him on the drop fieldat Tategahtawng engaged in trying to incorporatethree elephants which Captain Curl had producedinto the bundle-retrieving operation, an exerciseof no current or future significance. In point offact, Hunter would not come into the picture untilafter the arrival at Auche, as General Merrillwould deal directly with me concerning themovement.

60

With reference to the command arrangements for theoperation, I was personally not happy at all withthe set-up. Hunter had never participated in anytraining with the battalion, and up to this pointin the campaign he had no command responsibilitiesnor even demanding duties. His prinripal functionhad been in regard to routine airdrcý,s, and inthat capacity I had little contact with him asthese matters and related duties were normally andcompetently handled within the battalion by MajorHestad, the battalion executive officer, andCaptain Scott, the battalion S-4. Thus, on thebasis of my observations and contacts at Deogarhand in the campaign to date, I did not haveconfidence in him, and I was most reluctant (to)see my battalion come under his control at thiscritical time. However, General Merrill had putthe situation in perspective, and in so doing hadshown regard for my feelings. My personal viewsnotwithstanding, it was indeed time for Hunter toget his feet wet operationally. I accepted thearrangement without comment. (19)

Merrill's Marauders, similar to Colonel McGee's

recollection, recorded General Merrill's order as follows:

The 2d Battalion and the Khaki Combat Team of the3d Battalion under command of Col. Charles N.Hunter will move south on the (trail to)Warong .... reconnoiter the trails south towardKamaing, and move rapidly to seize and hold.. .ablock on the main road between Warazup andMalakawng in the general vicinity ofInkangahtawng.

Orange Combat Team will remain in the vicinity ofJanpan, prepared to move on short notice. Tworeinforced platoons will be kept ready to polishoff any Japs filtering into this area. Extensivepatrolling of the trails to the north, south, andwest will be maintained.

Capt. Curl's guerrillas will also aid in thepatrolling of this area and will furrish guides togo with Col. Hunter's force.

Communications will be maintained by radio,runner, and liaison plane with command post whichwill be at Janpan temporarily. (20)

61

McGee's account of the Inkangahtawng operation and that

of Hunter's differ considerably particularly in the matter

of Hunter's involvement. Merrill's Marauders seems to

follow Hunter's line. However, McGee notes that Major

Jones, the 5307th's combat historian, was unable to secure a

post operational interview with Colonel McGee on both the

Inkangahtawng and Nhpum Ga operations and that Major Jones

was never able to the 2d Battalion's input. It does not

seem unreasonable that Jones would accept Colonel Hunter's

account. However, this manuscript will follow the account

provided by McGee.

McGee's account provides a wealth of detail. It recounts

orders sent and received by the 2d Battalion. It also

provides entries made in the battalion's combat log.

McGee's account clearly discounts Hunter's involvement in

all but the most peripheral aspects of the operation.

Perhaps this discounting arose from some criticisms made by

Hunter in his book about the 2d Battalion, as one subsequent

writer has argued. The argument cannot be immediately

dismissed.

The style of the two writers differs, too. A reading of

Hunter's account reveals a folksy, colorful, somewhat self--

glorifying story. On the other hand, McGee's rendition

reflects much detail, straight-forward language, with no

hint of self service. McGee does go to great length to

debunk some of Hunter's story; but, in spite of the

possibility of bias, the debunking should also not be

62

dismissed. Many subsequent accounts of the Marauders rely

heavily on Hunter's account of the second and third missions

of the Marauders without confirmation by other principals in

the North Burma Cam~paign. McGve's offering, 2erhaps

discomforting to old soldiers who hold favorable memories of

Hunter's compassion, deserves equal hearing in future

histories.

As a final note on this matter, all accounts would seem

to indicate that Hunter acted with courage throughout the

entire campaign, particularly so in the difficult summer

months during the seige of Myitkyina. Hunter appeared a

forthright individual, apparently fond of offering his

opinion, and not unskilled as a soldier. His concern for

the survivors of Myitkyina earned him much respect among the

Marauders, respect he rightly deserved. He was a tough,

capable soldier and lealer, but he stood in the company of

strong men who also knew their business. That Hunter and

McGee would see the same campaign so differently is not

surprising in personal accounts of war. Thei,- difference of

views, in fact, represents but one of a number of sharp

contrasts in opinion regarding operations in north Burma.

War in this theater was fought by diseased, exhausted, and

brave men who killed and died in great numbers under the

toughest of combat conditions. At times, they made mistakes

and misjudgments with heavy consequences. An absence of any

disagreement about the campaign would not have been

possible.

63

A summary of McGee's account follows. Blue Combat Team

led the Marauder force out of the Janpan area at 0700 on 20

March. The remainder of the task force followed. The 2d

Battalion arrived at Auche on 21 March where it received

orders from General Merrill to wait for a supply drop on 22

March. Late in the afternoon, Hunter joined the 2d

Battalion with striker and mule. It is at this point in

McGee's Eccount that he addresses some of the differences

between wriaL ;:nter wrote had happened and what McGee saw:

While I have no intention of taking on the endlesstask of putting straight thj many inaccuracies andmisstatements which would later appear in Hunter'saccount of the Inkangahtawng operation, I think itappropriate at this point, the beginning of themission, to quote his version of "our" arrival atAuche and the "airdrop" there. I think that thisportion of his tale, in the light of my account,is indicative of the factual quality and generaltenor of his total account. I have tranposed hisfirst two paragraphs for the purpose ofchronology, and I have omitted nonrelevantsuperfluities. His story begins, as far as I candetermine, at Janpan on the night of 20 March, atwhich time the 2nd Battalion was already at NhpumGa and Hsamshingyang. I quote:

'After organizing my task force that night andissuing a march order, I went to be too tired tothink further. My force was to proceed to eiuche,take an air drop..."

"Villages along the trail occupied the ?ew openareas we traversed. They were neat, well kept andcarpeted with a luxurious green grass thatappeared not to grow beyond three inches in heightand made sleeping on it a pleasure to our wearybones. Each village had its bed of poppies..."

"We reached Auche without incident. Finding thevillage occupying the only open area in thevicinity, I was faced with a problem in selectinga drop zone. After a conference with the headmanof the village, he agreed to let us drop on thevillage itself. In return, we were to leave all

64

parachutes in the drop in the villagers'possession. This was a bargain for sure. Weseldom recovered the chutes any way except to hidethem from air observation by hiding them in thebush."

"When the drop came, surprisingly little damagewas done to some of the bashas, and our relationswith the Kachins of Auche were fortunately notimpaired."

The facts are that there were no occupied villagesalong the route down to Auche, no villagers and nopoppy beds. He had not accompanied us. Auche wasunoccupied; there was no headman, and the onlybasha on the site was a bamboo leanto erected bythe Kachins as a rain shelter or whatever duringtheir improvement of the trail we would take downinto the Hkuma Hka. Finally, we were never totake an air drop at Auche. (21)

During the afternoon and evening of 21 March, two orders

came to Hunter through the 2d Battalion:

To Hunter: Push on like hell after our Auche dropand hold on to the road as long as possible. Boss(General Stilwell) says blow off at hand andeveryone must get along fast if they want to getin on the party. C.G. 5307 3/21/1347 (22)

To Hunter: Boss directs disregard security andmove with maximum speed to road. Inkangahtawng issatisfactory instead of Warazup. Orange Teamarrives south of Warong night of 24th and willblock all trails leading north from Kamaing.Chinese have broken through Jambu Bum and Nips arerunning, so move fast, get on the road. C.G. 53073/21/1402 (23)

Urgency clearly dictated canceling the supply drop and

pressing with all speed. Blue Combat Team's I&P platoon

departed at 0630 and the battalion main body depart at 0700

on 22 March bound for Manpin. During the inital part of the

battlion's movement, the battalion followed a riverbed

"rock-strewn" and requiring "many wadings from side to side

65

of the river." McGee's operations sergeant noted in the

unit journal, "Crossed river 51 times today." (24)

The battalion plus Khaki Combat Team received a much

needed supply drop in the late afternoon with each man

receiving three days of K rations and a doughnut. In spite

of losing march time to take the drop, the task force

continued moving at night until its lead elements reached

Sharaw, located on the edge of the Moguang Valley about six

miles from Inkangahtawng. The majority of the task force

bivoaucked along the trail.

The next morning, McGee moved the force in and around

Sharaw and planned for an officers' call to give orders. He

then sought Hunter, who indicated he was not going to

accompany the force but to remain instead at Sharaw. Hunter

requested the provision of an SCR 284 radio with operators

and a platoon. McGee's account of the meeting concluded

with the following recollection.

"Do you have anything to tell me before I leave?"and he replied, "No, you know as much about it asI do." I returned to the battalion. This meetingconcluded Hunter's active participation in theInkangahtawng operation. (25)

Based on his conversation, McGee issued his plan to his

officers. He also contacted Major Briggs of Khaki Combat

Team and advised him of the plan. Essentially the plan was

to move closer, assess the situation, and choose the road

block site. Hunter's decision to remain at Sharaw

effectively removed him from control of the task fo.e of

which he had been given temporay command. Out of position

66

to influence the key decisions of the operation because of a

subsequent lack communications, Hunter would not move

forward to regain contact with the task force. (Through

some malfunction, Colonel Hunter's radio apparently could

transmit but not receive messages.) Later, Hunter would

conjecture that McGee should have remained in the roadblock

or raided further south against Kamaing. The developing

enemy situation and actions by the Chinese moving south

along the Kamaing Road would show both courses of action as

unwise and tactically unsound.

On 23 March, the task force moved all the way to

Ngagahtawng without contact from the Japanese. Green I&R

platoon made first contact with the Mogaung River. At this

point, t*e river was 250 feet wide from bank to bank. Steep

banks of 8 to 10 feet bordered both sides of the riverbed.

The river itself was 150 feet wide and fordable.

Observation by a possible Japanese soldier or Burmese caused

McGee to push the 2d Battalion immediately across the river

with Khaki Combat Team overwatching the crossing and

remaining on the east side of the bank to secure the

crossing point. Based on the experience at Walawbum, 2d

Battalion left its animals in a village on the east side of

the river. The 2d Battalion also left its mortars with

those of Khaki Combat Team also located on the east side of

the River. As the men of the battalion dug in the perimeter

roadblock that night, they could hear the sounds of trucks

67

discharging passengers and the Japanese digging in their

positions.

At first light on 24 March, 2d Battalion expanded its

bridgehead, anchored its flanks on the river, and continued

to dig. The Japanese quickly began its assaults on the

roadblock. The Japanese "banzai" assaults would come again

and again, always from a different direction, and supported

by mortar fire. Several times during the morning, McGee

sent radio messages to Hunter reporting the force's

situation and making various requests, but without response.

Unable to communicate with Hunter, McGee turned by noon to

sending his radio traffic to General Merrill and the

regimental headquarters. Artillery fire continued through

the day but with minor physical effect. The Marauders were

dug in, but the psychological impact of getting shelled

remained considerable. Concerned about ammunition resupply

and in the absence of communication with Hunter, McGee had

sent Captain Hickman, his S4, back to Sharaw to seek supply

assistance. Upon Hickman's arrival at Sharaw, Hunter sent

two messages to McGee. The first provided a code word to 2d

Battalion for an ammo drop; however, McGee had already

gained a code word by his direct contact with regiment. The

second message gave a vague situation report on the 1st

Battalion. In conjunction with a situation report

intercepted from 1st Battalion to regiment, McGee knew that

1st Battalion was four miles from Shaduzup and making slow

68

progress from the east. This he passed to combat team

commanders.

While 1st Battalion was clearly winning its current

battle, McGee developed concerns about getting cut off in

his present position. The Chinese did not appear close to

linking up at the roadblock although precise information on

their situation was not forthcoming. Ammunitf-- and food

were becoming an issue. A supply drop under fighter cover

could effectively deliver what the battalion needed but on

the east not west side of the river. Lastly, General

Merrill's guidance requiring the battalion to remain in

position "at least 24 hours or as long as possible

consistent with not getting cut off" loomed large in McGee's

considerations.

Based on these considerations, McGee decided to withdraw

to the east side of the Mogaung and move to Ngagahtawng that

night. McGee issued his plan to the two 2d Battalion

combat teaa commanders. The 2d Battalion would withdraw as

soon as it gained fighter support to help in breaking

contact. To Major Briggs, commander of Khaki Combat Team

(KCT), McGee sent the following message:

To CO KCT: I plan to withdraw from this side toeast bank when I get fighter support. Be preparedto support me with all you have. Cover the riverbanks on my sides so they do not catch us from theflanks. Grissom with I&R platoon is going tovillage to cover trail junction. Osborne is 4miles NE Shaduzup with enemy opposition. C.O. 2ndBn 3/24/1303 (26)

69

P-51 fighters came at 1545 hours and began their attacks

under the control of Lieutenant Dallison, Army Air Force

Liaison Officer attached to the 2d Battalion. Upon their

departure and at 1700, Khaki Combat Team opened up with the

task force's mortars; Green Combat Team, followed by Blue

Team, recrossed the river. The Japanese did not interfere

with the crossing and did not follow. McGee reported:

To Regt: Have withdrawn to Ngagahtawng. Positionwest of Mogaung Hka under artillery fire for fivehours. Two killed 12 wounded 2nd Bn. One killedKCT. Plan to move to Tigrawmyang tomorrow. ManyNips piled up. C.O. 2nd Bn 3/24/1907 (27)

The force had performed extraordinarily well and was

ready for resupply. A second message from General Merrill

would foreshadow a developing situation that soon would

place 2nd Battalion in a tough fight:

To C.O. 2nd Bn: 300 Japs moving north on route asfollows SC3366 to stream junction at SC 3694.Other route Zigyun SC 3963 by trail to Paokum, SC4275. at least 7 LMG with this force. Infoconsidered reliable. Orange in position tointercept. Orange to withdraw via Taronyang-

Sharaw if unable to hold. First batch seen at1600 two miles north of road. C.G. 3/24 (28)

McGee understood the message in two parts. First, two

Japanese forces were just north of Kamaing probably heading

for either Manpin or Warong or both. Second, Orange Combat

Team under General Merrill's control was in position to

block the trails leading north from Kamaing.

Two other entries appearing in McGee's history warrant

noting. First, on 24 March, Genera 1 Wdingate was killed in a

plane crash. All aboard the B-25 bomber in which he was

70

traveling were killed. The loss of this visionary,

charismatic, and most controversial leader weighed heavily

on the officers and men of the 3d Indian Division.

Brigadier (General) Lentaigne, commander or the 3d

Division's 111th Brigade, assumed command of the 3d

Division, but could not replace Wingate. Second, the

Chinese forces moving down the Kamaing Road did not arrive

at Inkangahtawng until 4 May. McGee had made a sound

tactical decision in withdrawing from the roadblock.

Movement to Nhpum Ga

The flanking attacks of the Marauders had severely

threatened the Japanese 18th Division's line of

communications and required an immediate response. As the

supporting effort to the Japanese Fifteenth Army's main

effort to the south, the 18th Division had to maintain the

integrity of its defense. A failure by the division to

withhold the attack of Chinese-American force would threaten

the success of the ongoing Japanese offensive and as a

result the Japanese position within Burma.

The 18th Division had experienced difficulties brought on

by heavy losses and defeat at Shaduzup and heavy losses at

Inkangahtawng. As a result, General Tanaka withdrew his

battle lines to about three and one-half miles north of

Inkangahtawng. Against the Mara.uders, the 18th Division

would move several forces, first in an attempt to maintain,

then in an effort reestablish an effective defense. Before

71

the Marauders hit Shaduzup and Inkangahtawng, the division

sent the Ist Battalion 55th Regiment to be joined with two

companies of the 114th Regiment to block the enveloping

movements. After the Marauders had hit their targets, the

18th Division also sent two battalions of the 114th Regiment

less the two companies already committed. The mission of

the Japanese task force was to push the American force as

far north as possible to permit the capture and defense of

Nhpum Ga. Located on a defensible hill astride the north-

south ridgeline of the Kumon Range, Nhpum Ga constituted

decisive terrain. The 18th Division committed a 1600-man

force to take it. By 24 March, the Japanese were racing to

Nhpum Ga. Reading Tanaka's intent, the Marauders, too, soon

entered the race.

On 25 March during the march away from Inkangahtawng, the

2d Battalion received two messages from General Merrill that

began to clarify the situation:

To C.O. 2nd Battalion: Situation at Shaduzupuncertain. Beach holds all trails north ofKamaing against increasing Jap pressure. Best betis for you to pull back to Warong as I can see norpt no help in sight for several days. C.G. 3/25(29)

To C.O. 2nd Battalion: At least two battalionsmoving on your flanks and rear. Withdraw rptwithdraw along route of march towards Carolina andOregon who will withdraw toward CP rpt CP when yourendezvous. C.G. 3/25 (30)

At Sharaw, McGee released Khaki Combat Team to rejoin 3d

Battalion. He also regained the security platoon and radio

72

detachment he had left with Hunter. As to Hunter, McGee

recalled the following:

I found Hunter to be completely out of touch withGeneral Merrill and accordingly with thedeveloping situation; and he resisted beinginformed, saying General Merrill did not mean whathis messages stated. He said something to theeffect that we were going to Kamaing, a notion Iconsidered idiotic. .-.. I told him bluntly thatmy orders were coming from General Merrill andthat after my wounded were evacuated the nextmorning the 2nd Battalion was moving with delay,in accordance with my current orders, to Manpinand on to the Auche-Warong ridgeline. (31)

In his account of 2d Battalion's withdrawal to Auche,

Hunter disparaged McGee's decision to keep his animals to

the rear without rear guard. McGee's decision was derived

from the message traffic he received from regimental

headquarters and from reports made by his own unit. Clearly

the information indicated the threat would be in front not

behind 2d Battalion. McGee would explain in the 2d

Battalion's history that he wanted to keep his columns free

of animals so they could move or maneuver forward more

quickly. In a recent comment in a professional journal, a

writer would suggest that McGee resented Hunter's criticism

that McGee lost control of his battalion during movement,

that he had improperly placed his animals at the rear of his

column, etc. Perhaps McGee's resentment was justified. It

should be noted that Hunter would again apply the "animals

at the end of the column" criticism to another Marauder

battalion. This time it would be the 3d Battalion as a part

of K Force that would be its object.

73

At Manpin, Colonels McGee and Beach met. Beach confirmed

Orange Combat Team was blocking the trail from Kamaing and

that he had a small element on the ridgeline. Both agreed

General Merrill's command post, located Nhpum Ga was at risk

until the two battalions could move back onto the ridgeline.

McGee commended Khaki Combat Team's performance. Beach

advised of an incoming supply drop at Manpin for both

battalions. Finally, both commanders agreed Auche was a

critical point that had to be reached before the Japanese

reached it.

Again, two more incoming messages began to shape 2nd and

3d Battalions' situation:

To C.O.s 2nd and 3rd Bns: (Garble interpreted as"Move") Auche area as rapidly as possible. Fairlylarge force Japs moving up trail from Sugar Cast5680 toward Auche. On arrival 2nd Bn block alltrails both towns. 3rd Bn no rpt no change atpresent time and supplies will be dropped to youroutfit at Warong. C.G. 3/26 (32)

To C.O. 2nd Bn: Japs moving in strength on Auchefrom SE. (garble) to hold Auche during the nightwith special care and attention to trail (garble)N of Auche going SE. In the morning move onecombat team to Hnhum Ga rpt Nhum Ga and leave onecombat team to cover Beach withdrawal at Auche.C.G. 3/26/1730 (33)

The daily journal entry from 2nd Battalion captured the

flavor of the day:

3/26/44 At Sharaw--L-5s came over 0655. Four alltold. Evacuation of patients ended 0940.Evacuated 10 patients. Moved from Sharaw 1000,marched on Manpin. Made Manpin at 1200. Learnedhere two L-5 cracked up pilots with us. At 1245moved out and headed up the river. Marched towardAuche until 1500. Made 14 river crossings so far.Received two days of K and 1 pack of fags. Also 1box of matches. Moved out at 1700. Crossed river

74

14 more times, made total of 28 crossings.Bivouacked at 2000. Tonite makes total of 70miles we have covered in last four days. (34)

On 27 March, with 3d Battalion covering their movement

with Orange Combat Team, 2d Battalion moved onto Auche.

Based on his orders from General Merrill, McGee selected

Blue Combat Team, which had seen less action Inkangahtawng,

to remain in a blocking position at Auche. Green Combat

Team would move to Nhpum Ga the next day. At 1630, Orange

Combat Team passed through Auche marching as long as

daylight permitted toward Nhpum Ga. Lieutenant Weston's I&R

platoon, which had performed heroically in delaying Japanese

pursuit, rejoined Orange Team as it passed. The remainder

of 3d Battalion passed through at 1730. Shortly thereafter,

2d Battalion received from its patrols reports of Japanese

reconnaissance patrols south of Auche. In response to a

query by McGee, regimental headquarters respondeu with

instructions to move the entire battalion to Nhpum Ga the

next morning. From the 2d Battlion's journal, the day was

summarized:

3/27/44: Moved from bivouac 0530, crossed river22 more times (toLal 51). Left riverbed to climbAuche hill at 0730. Reached Auche at 1000. Dugin here. Waiting for 3rd Bn to pull thru, theyfinished passing at 1730. Booby trapped area.(35)

The 2nd Battalion's movement to Nhpum Ga on the morning

of 28 March brought an unpleasant surprise. As the

battalion stretched out in column, it received two incoming

artillery rounds with two more following in rapid

succession. The Japanese were close and in force.

75

Organized with a strong rear guard to cover the withdrawal,

the 2d Battalion could not avoid stretching itself out along

a narrow trail along a ridgeline. Thick growth and steep

terrain to either side of the trail gave 2d Battalion no

choice but to pick up the pace. More rounds came in. The

2d Battalion struggled along the muddy trail breaking into

the awkward run of tired, pack-carrying soldiers. Animals

fell often. Because of their heavy loads, the animal

required unloading to permit them to rise to their feet and

then reloading. Exhaustion was at hand when the battalion

arrived at Nhpum Ga an hour and a half after it started. An

excerpt from the 2d Battalion journal encapsulated the

ordeal:

3/28/44: Moved from Auche at 0600. Artilleryopned up at 0700. Men wounded, one bit the dust.First time I ever saw the boys shaken up likethis. Made Nhpum Ga after double-timing most ofthe way, 0830. (36)

Siege at Nhpum Ga

At Nhpum Ga McGee reported to General Merrill for orders.

3d Battalion had already cleared Nhpum Ga proceeding to the

Hsamshingyang area, about five miles north. McGee recalled

his conversation with General Merrill:

General Merrill said that he was glad to see me ashe had heard that I had been killed. He asked howthings were going, and I recounted what hadhappened. He asked if I had left a combat team atAuche, and I told him that I had not as my orderswere to move the battalion. I then informed himof the rear guard arrangements.

76

I do not know how General Merrill viewed thesituation at this time; but, for my part, I wasonly too aware that the Jaos were now on theridgeline in sufficient strength to warrantaccompanying infantry guns. This was clearly nopatrol or small unit that we were concerned with.

He then mentioned the possibility of "holding atAuche" with a combat team. This was the firstindication that I had that he was considering astatic defense on the ridgeline rather than adelaying action. I said a combat team could nothold Auche. He asked the reason, and I told himthat the requirements for aneffective defensethere exceeded the capability of a combat team.He acknowledged this.

He asked, "Can Nhpum Ga be held?" , and I replied,"Yes, we can hold Nhpum Ga. "His response was,"Good. Hold Nhpum Ga. I am going down the traiito Hsamshingyang and get out of your way. I willsend you further instructions from there."

Throughout the meeting he had been composed asalways, and as I turned to leave him, he said,"The Kachins made this basha for me. You may wantto move in." (37)

After General Merrill's departure, McGee emplaced Blue

Combat Team on the south side of a battalion perimeter and

Green Team on the north side. The 2d Battalion's P&D

section placed booby traps in the village of Kauri halfway

between Auche and Nhpum Ga. By noon the perimeter was set.

From the remainder of the daily entry for 2nd Battalion

journal:

3/28/44: .... Regt and C Bn pulled stakes,leaving us here to guard rear. Japs opened upwith knee mortar or artillery piece. One hit goteight mules. They hit flanks most of theafternoon in small groups. Planes over at 1200.Ordered to bomb and strafe Warong-Auche trail.This quieted down field piece, but all hell wasstill going on with small weapons. Planes cameback at 1600 and given same mission. Expectedaction after dark but all was quiet. (38)

77

Protection of the animals became a growing problem.

Artillery and mortar fire had killed at least ten the first

day. Should the 2d Battalion receive orders to move, the

immediate presence of the animals was imperative.

Additionally, evacuation of the sick and wounded as well as

resupply "Duld require the animals. Three days later,

however, the ,7rrounding of the 2d Battalior -,ould sentence

the animals to remain in the perimet.Pr generally

unprotected. By 30 March, 75 of the 200 mules and horses

belonging to the 2d Battalion would cie. Others were

wounded. The animals would suffer. The soldiers would

suffer watching.

The next day, 29 March, would prove relatively quiet.

The battalion evacuated its wounded to Hsamshingyang.

Improvement of the perimeter and patrolling occu:ied its

attention. The Japanese conducted probing attacks and

continued to shell the perimeter, and Hunter visited the

perimeter at General Merrill's request and toured the

perimeter. On this day, General Merrill suffered a heart

attack, his second since he had been in Southeast asia, and

was evacuated. His apparent loss shocked the Marauders and

in particular the 2d Battalion. The daily journda entry for

2d Battalion summarized the day:

3/28/44: Now 0720, nothing has happened as yet.Just finished eating breakfast. Good old Kration. Marine stove really came in handy.Heated my coffee on it. P-51s over 0935. BombingAuche. C-47s for our drop over 1040. Dropfinished 1400. were shelled while getting drop.Drop contained ammo, clothes, shoes, Ks, 10 in 1,

78

chicken, bread, turnovers, jam and milk. (StaffSergeant) Sobczak said, "Christmas in March."Japs started to hit 1730. Action slowed as nightcame. Started as though it would be hot allnight. (39)

On 30 March the Japanese attacked Nhpum Ga in force.

Assaults supported by mortars and artillery fire began at

first light and continued through the day and into the

night. The 200-by-400 meter perimeter held despite severe

attacks. The wounded had been evacuated during the morning

to Hsamshingyang. McGee began requests to regiment to keep

open the trail from Nhpum Ga to Hsamshingyang. The

battalion's journal entry was brief:

3/30/44: Firing started this morning andcontinuing--still holding the fort. Under heavymortar fire and artillery fire all afternoon.Threw everything at us. Night was sort ofpeaceful. We were set for anything to happen.(40)

The morning of 31 March repeated the activities of the

previous morning. A 2d Battalion patrol reported a Japanese

element digging in, and McGee repeated his call for strong

action by regiment to keep open the trail north out of Nhpum

Ga. His call was preceded and followed by numerous spot

reports. Early regimental responses sugggested a lack of

understanding of the size of force facing the 2d Battalion.

To a report of a 20-man enemy patrol digging into the north

of the perimeter with a request for assistai-ce to keep the

trail open, regiment responded:

To 2nd Bn: Beach cannotl furnish you men. 'C. rar,patrol nothing to worry about. Iuma l pat! o.ntbe sent in all directions. Regt ,/(i ( 41

Concerned that regiment did not understand the size of

the enemy force, McGee repeated messages explaining his

concern. Additionally, messages for ammunition provided an

indication of the volume of fire ongoing in the perimeter.

Of grave concern, 2d Battalion lost control of its waterhole

leaving only two sources of drinking water: a seepage hole

and muddy ground water. Finally a series of messages caused

regimental headquarters to understand the severity of the

situation. A seige had begun:

To Regt: We have been hit on three sides.Platoon from Orange was cut off and are makingtheir way back through the jungle. C.O. 2nd Bn3/31/1242 (42)

To Regt: My rear is blocked. I cannot withdrawnorth. Something has to come up to take thepressure off. C.O. 2nd Bn 3/31/1610 (43)

To Regt: Casulty report today three dead ninewounded. C.O. 2nd Bn 3/31/1610 (44)

To Regt: Will need sixty and eighty one ammo

tomorrow badly. C.O. 2nd Bn 3/31/1610 (45)

From the 2d Battalion's journal:

3/31/44: Hit at the break of day by patrol withknee mortars, time 0530. Tough sledding allmorning. Japs reported to be in our OP. Rumoredpart of Orange coming up. P-51s over at 1200.Stayed until 1245. Ran low on fuel and had toreturn. Animals are taking a beating. Shrapneland stray bullets are mowing them down. P-40sover at 1500, had mission of bombing and strafing.After 1730 firing heard outside the perimeter.Figure it was Orange not able to cut through.This night first night Japs started to yell.Yelled for a half hour, and then a shot and allwas still. (46)

The day of 1 April proved relativeli quiet with

continuing probing attacks b, the Japagnese Likei-/ th1 i• Ja)-

'~2

the remainder of the Japanese 114th Regiment joined the

Japanese force surrounding Nhpum Ga. Rain precluded air

resupply and airstrikes but offered some relief for the

extreme lack of water. Regiment reported the next day

availability of an ad hoc battery of two 75mm pack

howitzers, which General Merrill had planned for some

earlier. Messages received from regiment (presumably from

Colonel Hunter) on 31 March and 1 April suggested that

relief was in sight. The journal entry for day:

4/1/44: Quiet this morning, time 0700. Startedto rain about 1040. Rained all day. Hit inspurts off and on. Saddled up and prepared tomove on relief. No relief--unsaddled. Nightquiet. (47)

The day of 2 April repeated the activities of previous

mornings with heavy assaults supported by artillery and

mortar fire. The mini-battery began to support the 2d

Battlion. Lacking coinfidence in its accuracy, the battalion

used it to fire against Kauri, well away from the perimeter.

Still the pack howitzers were a morale booster regardless of

their effect. A somewhat confused message from Colonel

Hunter provided information about the howitzer battery then

directed 2d Battalion not to withdraw until further orders.

The battalion had lacked this option for two days. McGee

requested 500 gallons of water to relieve a critical

situation growing worse each day. To this point, the

Marauders had not planned or trained to drop water, but

McGee looked for any option he could develop. I he d

Batrelioa's efforts. to Perletrate the Jananee 71q aC T'cJ

ý3 1

Battalion's position were again unsuccessful. In the

journal:

2/4/44: Under heavy fire all morning. In contactwith Orange by radio. Plane dropped grenades, -45ammo, 1100. P-51s over 1115. Started to givedirection to artillery fire. Really burned upammo today. (48)

A message of 3 April captured the situation of the

morning:

To Regt: Situation getting critical. Took heavyartillery attack this morning. 3 killed, 12wounded. Japs working around to our west. Animallosses heavy. Detailed report later. Generalhealth of command only fair. Much diarrhea andstomach disorders. You must push on. C.O. 2nd Bn3/4/1000 (49)

The battalion's aid station was well dug in and

satisfactorily situated. The medical detachment performed

well under extreme circumstances and provided medical care

that later received praise from hospital units that

supported the evacuated wounded. Still, the animals

suffered. Surviving animals received what care could be

given: If the animal could stand and had a reasonable

chance for survival, it was permitted to live. In the other

case, muleskinners moved the mule or horse away from the

picket line, shot it, and covered it. Because of the health

problems associated with dead animals, no animal was killed

willingly.

From Colonel Hunter, a message came that caused much

surprise:

To 2nd Bn: Make plans to fight your way out tothe northwest tomorrow. Will give all possibleassistance. Suggest 0600 as best time. Allies

not in sight. Destroy all excess equipment andshoot animals if necessary. Adjust our artilleryon west flank. Hunter 3/4/44 (50)

McGee liked the notion of an all out effort, but informed

Hunter of the impossibility of fighting out. The battalion

had many sick and wounded. The men were close to

exhaustion. The Japanese were engaging the battalion on all

sides 24 hours a day, and they were particularly active to

the north.

Hunter relented based on McGee's advice and on the

arrival of Chinese troops in the general area. McGee then

received a message from the regiment indicating they would

start another push the next day.

The journal entry for the day read:

3/3/44: This morning they opened up with barrageof mortar fire or something. All it was was "whizbang." Buried six today. Air drop ammo, food 3days K. Also disposed of dead animals. Activitythroughout afternoon varied. P-51s straffed andbombed. Artillery opened up 1600. (51)

On this day, six men died and four wounded would die thu

next day. More than 35 men were wounded. More animals

died. Enemy assaults continued through the night.

On 4 April, the assaults of the night continued into the

day. The Japanese began employing mortars from the north

side of the perimeter and used them to attack heavily the CP

and aid station. Two of McGee's messages captured the

growing severity of the situation. McGee, concerned with

the "straight up the trail" attacks by 3d Battalion that

were not yielding fast progress toward a linkup, volunteeied

a different approach. Clearly he was under great stress.

His unit's situation was extremely serious.

To Regt: Estimate will have only 80 live animals.Only twenty carrying light loads. Need your helptoday. C.O. 2nd Bn 4/4/0835 (52)

To Regt: I can not rpt not attack but can supportany action of yours by fire. 2nd Bn will have tumove faster and envelop and infiltrate behind roadblock. Dive bombers could be used to flattenthem. They have spent three days now patrolling athousand yards from us and should know they cannotkeep butting down the trail. Please hurry. C.O.2nd Bn 4/4/0920 (53)

A fighter attack occurred during the day against the

trail running north out of the perimeter; additionally, the

pack howitzers opened up at 1430. During the day one man

was killed and eight were wounded. As fighting continued

into the night, assaults on the west, north and east side

of the perimeters were successfully resisted except for the

loss of a heavy machine gun position, which was overrun.

The attackers killed the crew. Still no water resupply had

come. The journal entry reflected the events of the day:

4/4/44: Scattered activity through the night.This morning same mortar barrage laid in--landedplenty close. Boy, was really sweating it out.One shell took Craig's poncho to the wind.Another took my camouflage from behind the hole.Bounced me about two feet. P-51s overhead, bombedand straffed our rear. Told that at 1430 theartillery would open up and C Battalion wouldattack. Planes laid eggs, we laid mortars as fastas we could throw them. Really had a battleRoyal. (54)

On 5 April, 2d Battalion received more of the same from

the Japanese although initially not as severe as the

previous day. No supply drop of water would occur- That

evening the Japanese launched a series of violent assaults

against a position defended by a reinforced platoon.

Sergeant Matsumoto who joined the platoon that day helped in

the defense of the position by translating Japanese o-ders.

As a result, forces were repositioned to meet the next

assault. The Japanese, as in previous assaults, suffered

large losses. Four men of the 2d Battalion died as a result

of this action, Two would die later of wounds sustained

during the night's fighting. The journal recorded the

following:

4/5/44: Scattered attacks through the day. Tooquiet for one thing. Planes over morning andafternoon. Chinese (Note: the reference here isto our own pack artillery) laid artillery to ourrear. We try to match bursts with 81s. Japsopened up with artillery 1830. This startedthings off. Fireworks through the night. (55)

On 6 April, the usual enemy barrage did not occur.

Japanese pressure on the perimeter continued apparently in

an effort to collect their dead. The 2d Battalion

identified one of the attacking Japanese units from the

previous night as the 3d Company, 1st Battalion, 114th

Regiment. Subsequent examination of enemy dead would show

that the 1st Battalion had been the attacking force against

the platoo.i position. Of great importance to morale, water

came. Although insufficient to meet the needs of the

battalion, its delivery proved important for the wounded.

The battalion's senior surgeon noted, "Question of drinking

or using water for casts." (56) Health continued to

decline within the perimeter, and the smell of rotting flesh

85

was ever present. A brief message from General Merrill

showed that he had returned to command. The 3d Battalion

continued in its efforts to break through to 2d Battalion.

The journal entry for the day:

6/4/44: Morning of scattered activity. Nipsdropped five shells on us this morning. P-51sbombed ridge. Black smoke seen, must have gotsomething. Now in contact with "C." They are notfar out. Time 1100. Drop continued in afternoon.One plane lost about eight chutes, all rations,guess he is feeding the Nips. C Battalionhammering out there now. Time 1640. Also planejust finished dropping water. Activity slight atnight. (57)

The daily entry for 7 April summarized the day. Many

messages were sent:

7/4/44: Activity last night quiet--rations splitthis morning--canned goods. We are now givinghand to C Bn. Laid in mortars. Time 1000. P-Slsover--bombed and strafed our rear. Artilleryopened up 1430, Japs just laid in a few. Wereally laid mucho mortars into them today. HeardC Bn but did not contact them. Time 1745 and allquiet. No food dropped today. Cigarettes alsogiven out today. Patrolled area 200 yards tofront. Boys captured some documents and turnedthem over to S-2. Today was Good Friday. Boy, wenever realized Easter is almost here. (58)

Both 8 and 9 April were relatively quiet with little

enemy activity. Khaki Combat Team had replaced Orange Team

in the effort to break through, and about 1200 on 9 April 3d

Battalion broke through. The seige was finished. Quickly

the battalion began the process of evacuating its wounded

and getting its animals to water and grazing. Following

Khaki Combat team were Colonels Beach, Hunter, and Still

(General Merrill's S-3) accompanied by Colonel Kinnison from

NCAC headquarters. Shortly thereafter, Colonel Osborne

8£

joined the position. The journal entry for 9 April was

upbeat:

4/9/44: Today is Easter. Activity very slight.In fact we tried to stir some up. Drop started0700. Drop continued -- 10 in is--medics the onlyones issued them. "C" Battalion broke through1200. Boy, good to see them. Sgt. Marsh woundedthis morning. Patients are being readied to beevacuated. Boy, it was really good to know theyare going to be taken care of. Artillery (Jap)opened up 1600. Now having artillery duel. (59)

The days of 10 and 11 April saw no enemy activity. Both

Beach and Osborne accompanied McGee on a tour of the

battalion's positions. Green Combat Team was relieved from

its postions on 10 April and Blue Combat Team on 11 April.

The battalion CP departed on 10 April with Green. McGee

accompanied Blue out on the next day. The battalion entered

bivouac at Hsamshingyang. No men of the 2d Battalion were

missing or unaccounted for. The battle of Nhpum Ga had

ended. General Merrill wrote later, "At Nhpum Ga the best

part of 3 Jap Bns were engaged. It was a Jap defeat as they

withdrew all the way to Myitkyina." (60)

Reflections on Leadership

Having reviewed the basic facts and chronology of events

between the capture of Walawbum and the defense of Nhpum Ga,

several larger issues deserve consideration. These include

the role of the deputy commande-, presence of the commander

on the battlefield, and soldier motivation and morale.

87

The Deputy Commander

General Merrill's use of Colonel Hunter as commander of

the Inkangahtawng task force was a proper use of a deputy

commander, but Hunter performed poorly in this capacity.

Several reasons contributed to this. First, one gets the

feeling in reading McGee's account of the operation that

Hunter would have had to assert himself strongly to have

gained proper control of the 2d Battalion. In hindsight,

Merrill would have done better to appoint McGee as task

force commander. Second, Hunter did not move rapidly to

gain control of his forces and failed to give an order of

any kind to McGee. Third, having caught the 2d Battalion

already on the move, Hunter chose not to accompany the task

force beyond Sharaw toward Inkangahtawng. Had he maintained

communication, he might have been able to exercise control

over the operation. However, once he lost the ability to

receive radio traffic, he effectively lost the ability to

control his task force. At this point he should have moved

forward but never did, leaving Merrill to control the

operation himself.

By not moving forward, Colonel Hunter forfeited an

important opportunity not only to control but to lead the

action, too. It is doubtful the men of 2d Battalion ever

knew about the forfeiture, but certainly McGee did.

Possibly his combat team commanders to include the Orange

Team Commander knew, too. Hunter advances in his account of

the action the notion that the task force should have

8 8

continued south to raid against Kamaing. While the notion

does not stand up to the perceived or actual enemy

situation, Hunter was in no position to advance his concept.

His failure cost him credibility with the commander of the

2d Battalion that he did not recover.

Presence of the Commander

General Merrill correctly chose to position his command

post on the ridgeline defined by Mupaw Ga and Nhpum Ga. His

positioning along the ridgeline facilitated communication

with the ist Battalion at Shaduzup, the Ikangahtawng task

force, and NCAC headquarters. He correctly chose to extend

his command influence by placing Hunter with the

Ikangahtawng task force even though that action did not work

as he might have wished. When he expeditiously withdrew

McGee's force to Nhpum Ga, Merrill was there in person to

give orders to McGee, which in Merrill's style were succinct

and calmly stated. Given the Japanese force that was in

pursuit of the battalion, General Merrill appeared at just

the right point to give his subordinate commander the

reassurance he needed.

When General Merrill suffered a heart attack during 2d

Battalion's defense of Nhpum Ga, his absence weighed heavily

on Colonel McGee. The orders from regiment--presumably from

Hunter--initially reflected understandable confusion, but

were followed by indecision, then inappropriate

decisiveness. It is interesting that throughout this

period, General Stilwell seems unaware of the hard fight

underway at Nhpum Ga. Did Hunter keep Stilwell properly

informed after Merrill's departure? Probably not. However,

this failing probably belonged to Stilwell and Merrill and

their personal style of command. Hunter did not enjcy

Merrill's rapport with Stilwell and could not easily command

his attention. Because of Stilwell's mutiplicity of

positions and problems, he used his staff to screen with

what and whom he should deal. For whatever reason, General

Stilwell did not know the seriousness of the fight. He did

not get the chance to chose between influencing the fight at

Nhpum Ga and prodding the Chinese. When General Merrill did

return to the Marauders toward the end of the seige of Nhpum

Ga, one can sense relief in McGee and an improved clarity of

action.

Soldier Motivation and Morale

Many accounts of the Marauders stated the morale of the

Marauders reached rock bottom during the time between the

end of the seige at Nhpum Ga and the start for Myitkyina.

Ogburn, as the 1st Battalion communications officer,

certainly held z position to make a personal observation of

morale within that battalion. He and others argued that

promises of no more than 90 days in combat operations

coupled with the current condition of the command made any

notion of a mission to Myitkyina "grotesque." The accounts

of bad morale also alleged mistreatment by General Stilwell.

90

In contrast, Colonel McGee disagreed sharply with the

viewpoint of low morale. He found this view to be the

belief of a "few disgruntled individuals" who wished to

grind an axe "to the detriment of General Stilwell and the

Marauders." He argued that 90 days was a planning figure,

never a promise. In arguing his point he provided credible

evidence from a news report filed on his unit at the time in

question. Subsequent investigations seemed to corroborate

Colonel McGee's view that promises had not been made, but

the investigations also indicated that a certain element of

junior officers and enlisted men believed--albeit

inappropriately--in the notion of a 90-day limit.

Another body of evidence concerning the state of morale

and motivation came from the medical reports about the

campaign. A junior surgeon from 2d Battalion's medical

staff and the 3d Battalion's surgeon wrote these. Simply

put, the reports stated the command had much illness and

morale was low. A careful and balanced reading of the

reports and accompanying comments causes this reader to

downplay the assessments. However, little question exists

that long-term exhaustion had set in and that disease,

differing in each battalion, was running its course. Given

its origins in the south and southwest Pacific, it appears

likely that most if not all the men of the 3d Battalion were

malarial. Likely most of the rest of the Marauders were not

far behind only in a matter of degree. Even if they did

want to continue, the Marauders were sick, they were tired,

91

and they did not receive enough time to recuperate from the

struggle to retain Nhpum Ga. The 2d Battalion still

retained a credible number of men, but many of these men

were by no means at 100 percent. The 1st Battalion and 3d

Battalions had spent heavily, too, in their efforts to link

up with the 2d Battalion. Credibly the surgeons argued the

disease that woulo ultimately cause evacuation of the

Marauders at Myitkyina took hold at or around Nhpum Ga.

This seems plausible.

Given General Stilwell's and General Merrill's penchant

for restricting advertisement of their intent for subsequent

operations and for the campaign---junior officers and

soldiers, all dog tired and many ill, were left to

conjecture on what was going to happen. Despite aggressive

leadership by the battalion commanders, rumors probably

spread in the 5307th. Certainly Colonel McGee handled it in

the proper way, but Stilwell's and Merrill's sicretive

approach to combat operations did not focus the 3307th and,

thus, discourage rumor. General Merrill's own illness made

it difficult for him to reduce the impact o' the rumors

through his personal presence. Moreover, his involvement in

planning the operation severely limited his available time.

Finally, leveraging the situation was the decision long

before in the War Department that the Marauders would

receive no replacements.

To some degree these problems reflected practices c. the

times that have chanad. Simple, lin front staterrient'- of

intent by both General Stilwell and General Merrill, as is

now practiced, would have dampened rumor and reduced

misguided bitterness toward General Stilwell. Stilwell

probably would argue that he could live with the bitterness

as long as the Marauders fought, and fight they did. Still,

the bitterness was counterproductive and partially

avoidable.

MYITKYINA

The Operational and Tactical Situation

The victory at Nhpum Ga had blocked the Japanese counter

envelopment and protected the left flank of the advancing

Chinese forces. The Japanese task force from the 18th

Division failed to push back the American force and seize

Nhpum Ga and left a sizable threat on the 18th Division's

right flank. As a result of the defeat, the 114th Regiment

(-) returned to Myitkyina intact but badly battered. A

small element of the 1st Battalion, 55th Regiment, remained

in a blocking position south of Nhpum Ga along the

ridgeline.

Late April of 1944 saw the North Burma Campaign pressure

the Japanese. The Chinese column in the Moguang Valley had

gained 35 miles, albeit prodded by continuing pressure from

Stilwell for the Chinese to advance more quickly. Fighting

just south of Inkangahtawng, the Chinese stood only 20 miles

from Kamaing. In the Irrawaddy Valley to the east, a Kachin

and Gurkha foice had captured an enemy -jrnnv base at

93

Sumorabum and pressing toward Myitkyina 45 miles to the

south. To the southeast of Myitkyina in the Yunnan Province

of China, the divisions of the Chinese Yoke Force were

massing for an offensive, although Stilwell continued to

worry about Chinese intransigence toward offensive

operations. To the south of lyitkyina and Kamaing, the 3d

Indian Division (the Chindits), had cut the Japanese rail

supply route leaving only the Irrawaddy River as a means of

bulk resupply. The division had inserted four of its

brigades by air and one by ground, and was operating in

twenty-six columns of 400 men each.

The Strategic Situation

Stilwell's Command Problems summarized the strategic

situation from the commander's view.

while the Chinese Army in India (the 22d and 38thChinese Divisions) had been edging up to Shaduzupthe thought crossed Stilwell's mind that Shaduzupmight be as far as his forces could get before therains began. Then the Japanese drive on Imphalbegan to acquire a disturbing aspect, and theconference between Mountbatten, Slim, and Stilwellwas called at Jorhat on 3 April 1944. At theconference, Slim expressed his confidence that hewould win at Imphal. Perhaps as a result of thatconfidence, Mountbatten confirmed the existingdirectives that called for Stilwell to take theMogaung-Myitkyina area. Meanwhile, in one radio(message) after another, SEAC's staff told theJoint and Combined Chiefs that Myitkyina probablycould not be taken without sending heavy addedreinforcements to SEAC, if taken probably couldnot be held, and even if held was not worthtaking.

The Japanese offensive on India, the slow progressof the North Burma Campaign, the Generalissimo'sreluctance to cross the Salween, and the steady

94

consumption of time, all registered on Stilwell'sestimate of what he could do in north Burma. Hisestimate of what he could do with the meansseveral superiors had allotted him began to shrinkdrastically. (61)

The Plan

Stilwell's Command Problems also laid out the plan, which

was:

To seize the Mogaung-Myitkyina area as directed byMountabatten at Jorhat, Stilwell determined todrive down the Mogaung valley on Kamaing with suchvigor as to persuade General Tanaka that this wasthe principal effort. (62)

The Marauders organized into a task force called END RUN

FORCE to strike directl/ at Myitkyina, the principal

objective of the North 2urma Campaign and the 18th

Division's center of gravity. Located 170 miles southeast

of Ledo, Myitkyina served as the principal base of

operations for the Japanese 18th Division. The town

terminated the northern most point on the Burmese railroad

and the head of navigation on the Irrawaddy River. It also

held the only all-weather airstrip in north Burma. From the

airstrip, fighters attacked allied aircraft flying supplies

across the Hump to China.

After Nhpum Ga, the Marauders were exhausted but still

capable as a combat force. They had marched 500 miles over

difficult terrain, fought four major actions and numerous

minor fights, and lived on mostly K rations for 80 days.

Disease had taken a major toll on the 5307th, and losses

from all sources amounted to about 700 men. Thus, the

95

Marauders required additional combat power to accomplish

their third and last mission, so General Stilwell added two

Chinese regiments and a force of Kachin Rangers that brought

total combat power to about 7,000 men.

The task organization for the new mission called for

three task forces. The 1st and 3d Battalions ,-etained their

internal task organization. Because of losses sustained at

Nhpum Ga, 2d Battalion reorganized from two combat teams

into two rifle companies and a weapons company. The 1st

Battalion and the Chinese 150th Regiment formed H Force,

commanded by Colonel Hunter. The 2d Battalion and about 300

Kachin Rangers formed M Force, commanded by Colonel McGee.

The 3d Battalion and the Chinese 88th Regiment formed K

Force, commanded by Colonel Kinnison. The H Force received

a battery of 75mm pack howitzers from the 22d Chinese

Division. The K Force received the battery from the 5307th.

General Merrill appointed Colonel McCammon as his executive

officer, but apparently did not notify his task force

commanders at the outset. The commanders first met this

officer on the airstrip at Myitkyina.

On 27 April, General Stilwell met with General Merrill at

Naubum to confirm final arrangements. The airstrip at

Myitkyina would be the first objective. The same day

General Merrill issued his movement order to Colonels Hunter

and Kinnison. Both H and K Forces were ordered to move

north from Naubum to Taikri, then east across the Kumon

Range through the northernmost pass of two availble mountain

96

oasses to Ritpong. From Ritpong the forces would move south

through Seilngheing to Myitkyina. On 30 April he issued the

order to Colonel McGee who came that day to Naubum. The M

Force was ordered to continue its current mission of

screening the movements of the 1st and 3d Battalions, now H

and K Forces, by patrolling in the north Tanai Hka valley.

Once the other two forces had cleared the mountain range, M

Force would preferably follow through the southern pass

across the Kumon. General Merrill left open use of the

northern pass because of reports that the southern pass was

impassable to animals.

Terrain and Movement

The monsoon season was beginning. Instead of raining

every two or three days, it now rained every day. With the

combination of heat and daily deluges, the climate became

oppressive. Climate was not the only challenge. In

crossing the Kumon Range the H and K Forces would climb to a

6,100 foot pass over a trail that had not been used in 10

years. A party of 30 Kachin Rangers and 30 Chinese coolies

moved in advance of K Force to make the route passable.

Frequently the men had to climb on all fours and cut

footholds for the animals. When the animals could not

ascend, the men would unload them and hand carry the loads.

Often the animals lost their footing and fell to their

deaths. Khaki Combat Team in the lead for 3d Battalion lost

15 animals; Orange lost 5. The 2d Battalion, in making it--

97

passage across a different perhaps more challenging route,

lost nearly one-third of its animal train despite the care

of a veterinarian and experienced handlers. Begun with

near-spent men. the passage through the Kumon Range depleted

the Marauders' limited reserves of strength. Many did not

finish the march to Myitkyina, but most found courage of the

deepest kind to persevere.

Action Summary

On 28 April, K Force departed to Taikri, turned east, and

crossed the Kumon Range. On 5 May, K Force stopped at a

trail junction one mile north of the village of Ritpong. In

approaching Ritpong, a Chinese patrol made a minor contact

with the Japanese. K Force believed the Japanese were

holding Ritpong in force. Colonel Kinnison chose to envelop

the Japanese force. Sending the 88th Regiment into attack

down the trail, Khaki, followed by Orange Combat Teams, cut

an eneveloping path to the east of the village. The 3d

Battalion emerged on the trail south of the village by the

end of daylight on 6 May.

Moving at 0530, 7 May, Khaki Combat Team turned up the

trail and established a block. Attempts to enter the

village were blocked by strong Japanese resistance. Early

on, a Japanese squad was killed at the trail block when it

attempted to move south. Based on successful progress of

the 88th Regiment in its attack, Kinnison left Khaki in its

block and sent the I&R platoon south to Sana to provide

98

security for K Force's rear. Enroute to Sana, the I&R

platoon made contact with a supply train moving to Ritpong.

A firefight scattered the Japanese, who left their supplies.

Twice during the night, the Japanese would attempt to fight

through Khaki's trail block. The Japanese suffered heavily.

On 8 May, attacks by the 88th Regiment continued with the

support of 3d Battalion mortars. On 9 May, K Force seized

the village. Leaving the Chinese to complete the action,

3d Battalion pressed south to Lazu where it blocked the

trail and bivouacked.

During the fight at Ritpong, H Force caught up with K

Force. On 10 May both forces were at Lazu. General Merrill

then directed K Force to move toward Nsopzup in a feint

designed to screen the Marauders' east flank. Concerned

about clearing the trail for H Force to continue its move

south toward Myitkyina, K Force was requested to make its

move immediately. Beginning on 11 May, K Force headed

toward Ngao Ga and faced exhausting climbs and extreme heat.

The men, weakened by disease and exhaustion, struggled to

keep up. After moving about 5 miles, K Force found itself

in another fight with a determined enemy. About 400 yards

from the village of Tingkrukawng, on 12 May, Orange Team

made contact with an estimated platoon and attacked

immediately. As the attack by 3d Battalion developed and

was joined by a company from the 88th Regiment, it became

apparent K Force had made contact with a battalion sized

force well sited in defense.

99

Deciding on an enveloping attack, Colonel Kinnison sent

Khaki Combat Team the next morning to cut a path north of

the village. Climbing much of the way, often on all fours,

Khaki emerged the other side but found the village protected

by a strong Japanese trail block. A series of fights

followed with both fcrces moving against the other, but

Khaki Combat Team lacked suffi ant combat strength to force

the block and faced exhausted supplies of ammo and food. In

support of the Khaki effo-t, a Chinese battalion had

attacked on the west side of the village, but it too was

repulsed. Unable to resupply the enveloping force, Kinnison

ordered a night withdrawal. Withdrawing with its wounded

over the route it had struggled to cut that morning, Khaki

suffered through an exhausting night. With Japanese

reinforcements beginning to arrive in the village, K Force

could not easily continue the attack. Believing K Force's

attack to that point had met the purpose of the screen,

Colonel Kinnison decided to break contact and withdrew K

Force under tires provide by the howitzer battery. The K

Force then headed southwest to Marawngkawng to rejoin the

trail used by H Force. Marauder casualties numbered 8 men

killed and 35 wounded. The Chinese suffered more heavily.

While K Force was engaged to the east, H Force continued

south. H Force took its final supply drop on 14 May at

Seinneing and reached the Namkwi River at 2030 on 15 May.

At this time the Kachin guide leading the force suffered a

snake bite and could not immediately continue. Specially

100

selected because of his detailed knowledge of local trails

near Myitkyina, the guide was essential to further night

mo-,ement. A Marauder surgeon slashed the fang marks, and

two Marauder officers spent two hours sucking out the

poison. By 0230 the guide's condition improved, and,

mounted on Colonel Hunter's horse, he continued leading H

Force. Reaching the village of Namkwi, about four miles

from Myitkyina, H Force rounded up its inhabitants to ensure

operational security until they attacked the airfield the

next day. A six man reconnaisance patrol was dispatched to

gather information about the airstrip.

Colonel Hunter planned for H Force to attack on 17 May at

1000 to seize the Myitkyina airstrip. The ist Battalion

would lead the 150th Regiment to the southwest corner of the

airstrip, where it would leave the Chinese Regiment to

secure the airstrip, and attack southwest to seize Pamati,

the nearest ferry site on the Irrawaddy River.

The attack to seize the airstrip unfolded as planned. At

1050, H Force sent the code words "at the ring" meaning "at

the field." By 1100 Ist Battalion had secured Pamati. By

1200 the 150th Regiment had secured the airstrip. After 3d

Battalion had secured Pamati, Colonel Osborne and White

Combat Team returned to the airstrip where Colonel Hunter

directed Colonel Osborne to seize the main ferry site at

Zigyun, located about two miles south Myitkyina. Departing

the airstrip, White Combat Team moved south to Rampur about

two miles distant where the combat team bivouacked in place

101

and prepared for the attack the next morning. At 1530, H

Force sent the code words "Merchant of Venice" meaning

"transports can land." Almost immediately two transports

landed, followed by a stream of tranports and gliders. One

battalion of 89th Chinese Regiment came into Myitkyina late

in the afternoon. The airstrip became alive with activity.

As the airstrip was being seized. K and M Forces were

between 20 to 30 miles north of Myitkyina continuing their

march south. Both K and M Forces had suffered greatly in

crossing the Kumon Range. K Force had followed its crossing

with two sharp fights with the Japanese. The marches

continued to drain the strength and capability of both

forces. The Marauders were wearing out, but rest was not

immediately at hand. That night, M Force received the

following message:

To C.O. 2nd Rn: Field taken. Expedite movement.CG, 17/5/1309 (63)

On 17 May, while his two forces were pressing to the

south, General Merrill landed at Myitkyina airstrip and

established his headquarters. Colonel McCammon, Merrill's

executive officer, ordered Colonel Hunter to attack the town

the next morning. The plan called for the newly aiivjed

battalion of the 89th Chinese Regiment to defend the

airstrip. Two battalions of the 150th Regiment would attack

the town with the remaining battalion of the 150th remaining

in reserve at the airstrip. Red Combat Team was to continue

102

holding the Pamati ferry site while White Team would

continue Co seize t•& Zigyun ferry site. (64)

General Stil•., l's diary captured the day:

MAY 17 Clear. By God a break. .... At 10:50message "in the ring" came in. That meant "at the'ield." Old flew over (Myitkyina) at 12:00 andsaw nothing. Hunter probably getting in place.We'll just have to sweat it out. Merrill in at2:50. Had been over field which was clear (cfJaps). He saw trench mortar fire to thenortheast. About 3:30 we go "Merchant of Venice--i.e., transports can land. WHOOPS! Enormousrelief to get Merrill's report. At once orderedmachinery and reinforcements started. About 4:00we saw transports and gliders going over.Thereafter, a stream of planes both ways. Toldthem to keep going all night. We may have 89th(Regiment) in by morning--WILL THIS BURN UP THELIMEYS. Monsoon coming in on south Burma now.Myitkyina due (for monsoon) June 1. (65)

On 18 May, White Combat Team captured several supply

warehouses in Rampur, then moved to Zigyun, where it seized

the ferry site at 1000. In spite of the overwhelming

exhaustion felt by the Marauders at Myitkyina, all seemed to

go well except when Colonel Hunter dispatched a Chinese

company to relieve White Team in position. The company did

not arrive for 48 hours. Enroute to the position, the

company dug in nine times in five miles. Meanwhile, a worse

incident occurred that would doom the attempt to quickly

seize the town of Myitkyina. The two battalions of 150th

Regiment launched their attack achieving success initially

by seizing the railroad station in Myitkyina. Success soon

turned to disaster as the two battalions became involved in

a massive case of fratricide with the two units engaged in a

heavy firefight between themselves. A great number of

103

Chinese soldiers were killed or wounded. The survivors of

the two battalions struggled out of Myitkyina about half a

mile west of the town where they dug in.

Both K and M Forces, moving toward Myitkyina and

desparately needing rations, had arranged for an airdrop on

18 May. Neither supply drop came because an unexpected

change in the supply system. Both forces, realizing a change

in plans had occurred, continued their march. They had not

received their rations, but they had lost time from the

march. McGee recalled the occasiorn:

The fact was that our drop at Seingneing andthose of K Force had been cancelled, and not byGeneral Merrill or Major Hancock (the regimentalS-4). I would later learn that with the taking ofthe airstrip the 5307th's hitherto independentsupply system, including transport aircraft andlight plane evacuation support, had (eased to be.We had been integrated into the overall supplyoperation supporting the Myitkyina Task Force, andwithin this new system our requirements for thisday, 18 May, had been deemed less critical thanthose -oncerned with the buildup at Myitkyina.(66)

General Stilwell began visits early on to assess the

situation. His diary recorded his first reaction:

MAY 18 Not much sleep. Ants and worry. 9:30Theissen took us into Myitkyina. About twelvecorrespondents. Heavy clouds. we let down andgot in O.K., about 10:00. 89th (Regiment) comingin, 150th had not started attack. First Battalion(of) Galahad (Marauders) had gone to the Zigonferry. No Jap reaction, Japs not yet located.Planes bombing the town. Shoved off at noon andcame back around the Mogaung corner. Got an L-1and flew back to Shaduzup. (67)

Greatly fatigued, K Force had closed from the north to

about eight miles from Myitkyina on the night of 18-19 May.

104

When the guide lust his way in the dark, the task force

bivouacked. Colonel Kinnison was suffering from mite typhus

and would die within two weeks of the disease. His men, for

the most part veterans of the south Pac~fic and long time

sufferers of a variety of tropical diseases, were nearly

dead on their feet. The next morning, 19 May, revealed that

K Force was located about 50 yards off the Mogaung-Myitkyina

Road. Learning K Force's location, General Merrill (or

Colonel McCammon) ordered K Force to secure Charpate, which

it did with little oppostion. Colonel Kinnison then

directed the 88th Regiment to move southwest and establish a

defensive line between Charpate and the railroad.

Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion dug in a block of the Mogaung

Road and sent out patrols to screen the position. While in

position at Charpate, the 3d Battalion received minor

attacks from small elements of Japanese who were passing

around Marauder blocks to reinforce the Japanese garrison in

Myitkyina.

Relieved by Chinese units from the positions at the two

ferry sites, ist Battalion began the process of moving its

combat teams into postion on the K Force's left flank. Red

Combat Team repositioned on 19 May and White Team on 20 May.

In this new position, ist Battalion defended to the

northwest as did 3d Battalion on its right flank.

M Force, its men weakened by illness, hunger, and its

long approach march, arrived at Myitkyina on 19 May. The 2d

Battalion's journal decribed the events of the day.

105

19 May Moved 0900, marching fast to make thestrip. Old man can't seem to get any infowhatsoever. We are totally in dark. Justmarching on strip, and hoping to hit nothing. Hitthe Mogaung-Myitkyina Road at 1200 on the head.Sent I&R on to strip. Battalion closed up and wemoved on toward RR (railroad). We were held upnorth of RR by mortar fire until contact was madewith Division. (note: 2d Battalion now perceives5307 as a division, which is appropriateconsidering its maneuver forces.) Mortar fire ofChinks. Trying to mortar the hell out of us.Moved then down RR to Chinese position, cut to theright, and marched to Namkwi. Nicest and cleanesttown since I've been in Burma. Moved thru Namkwiand tied with RCT about 3 miles from strip. Whilemarching we could see fight the Chinese werehaving at strip. Tracers going thru the air, andit looked like they were having a picnic. Bivouacat 1900. Red Combat team gave us emergencyrations for supper. First meal I had in threedays. (68)

On 19 May, the 150th Chinese Regiment, again committed to

an attack on Myitkyina, essentiaily went nowhere. On 19

May, too, General Merrill suffered his third heart attack

and was evaucated. General Stilwell's diary recorded:

MAY 19 Flock of visitors continues. Merrill in--he has had another (heart) attack. Peterson gavehim morphine and p-it him to bed. Progressterribly slow at Mitch. I am worried about theJap reaction. 150th (Regiment) moved this a.m.and overran two Jap positions. A Jap group up bynorth field has not moved. Counterattack lastnight at Zigon ferry. (69)

The days 20 and 21 May saw the Marauders in blocking

positions to the north and west. Chinese attacks against

Myitkyina continued unsuccessfully. The Chinese did not

appear capable of completing the attack necessary to seize

Myitkyina. General Stilwell's diary captured his

unhappiness:

106

MAY 21 Six p.m. Cannon in from Mitch. BAD NEWS.Panic in 150th (Regiment); they also ran away andhad to be taken out. What goes on at Mitch. Abad day mentally. Good deal of strain and worry--if the troops are undependable (meaning theChinese), where are we? I'm looking forward to afull stop to this business. Wish it would pourright now. (70)

Colonel McGee recalled the circumstances.

His questioning of the dependability of theChinese troops at Myitkyina would bring to mindthat the ground troops he could count on, theMarauders, were not in the best of shape and theirnumbers were dwindling daily. He needed to keepan American presence at Myitkyina. (71)

On 23 May, the Maruaders received the only written order

McGee had seen since he entered Burma. The field order,

containing General Merrill's authority line, directed a

battalion combat team of the 1st Battalion to conduct a

reconnaissance in force from its current position to

Charpate and back. The day also saw large numbers of

Japanese infiltrating into the Myitkyina area. General

Stilwell's diary entry for the day:

MAY 22 BLACK MONDAY. Bad news from Mitch. Nowthey saw 800 Japs go into Charpati (Charpate) lastnight. And 200 crossed the river from the east.McCammon says "situation is critical." Not athing I can do. It had rained heavily allmorning. We can't get troops in, also the fieldis in bad shape at Mitch. Radioed McCammon totake out Charpati if information was true. Latermessage said Japanese both in front and behind of3d Battalion of Galahad. General air ofdiscouragement down there, and of coursecorresponding worry here. We've got to sweat itout, but it's no fun. Q: Get Pick's engineers(as reinforcement)? Yes. At least alert them,and use as replacements for Galahad. Meanwhilepush 42nd (Regiment) in, and follow with 41st(Regiment) if necessary. (72)

107

On 23 May, Colonel (nominated to be brigadier general)

McCammon became commander of all units in the Myitkyina area

by order of the Chinese Army in India (Chih Hui Pu) although

the order was dated 22 May. The order appointed General Hu

Su to command of the 30th Chinese Division, and 88th and

89th Infantry Regiments, and General Pan Yu-kun to command

the the 50th Division, and the 150th Regiment and the 42d

Regiment. By the same order, Colonel Hunter was appointed

as commander of the 5307th Unit with all Chinese and Kachin

units released to their parent organizations.

Hunter would write of himself as commander of the

Marauders during this time; but, by McGee's account,

Hunter's service was in name only. Hunter remained at the

airstrip and never constituted a staff or communications

capability to support his responisbilities. While McGee

would walk on numerous occasion to the airstrip for

information form Myitkyina Task Force Headquarters and

Hunter, Hunter would never visit the 2d or 3d Battalions in

the field. McGee recalled Hunter never called for a meeting

of battalion commanders as a group or, in McGee's case,

individually.

From 2d Battalion's journal:

23 May--Still at Namkwi. We were attacked earlythis morning. They threw in quite a few mortarsbut they go a bigger dose back. The I&R captureda Nip knee mortar this morning. There was a Nippatrol sighted across the Namkwi (Hka or River) at1815. They (I&R) got one and wounded another.(73)

108

From General Stilwell's diary:

MAY 23 Cleared up at 11:00. Myitkyina fieldclosed to C-47 (troop carrier planes). Sent(Brigadier General Hayden) Boatner in (toMyitkyina) with Hu and P'an. Boatner back at7:00, matters fairly satisfactory. Attack on25th, tomorrow to get lined up. (74)

On 24 May, McGee learned of what he initially presumed

was a Myitkyina Task Force evacuation policy. The policy

called for a sick man to run a fever of 102 degrees or more

for three consecutive days, then receive an evaluation by a

panel of three doctors before evacuation could occur. McGee

noted General Boatner, not yet on the scene at Myitkyina,

received the blame from some for establishing the criteria.

He also noted Colonel Hunter later wrote that he initiated

the policy after discussion with available battalion

surgeons. In any of the cases, McGee believed the policy

unnecessary, ineffective, and shortsighted.

On 25 May, patrolling continued with adjustments to

patrol areas being coordinated by Myitkyina Task Force

Headquarters. On this day, McGee met with General Stilwell

who had flown into the airstrip. While visiting Task Force

headquarters and Hunter at the airstrip, McGee learned

General Stilwell wanted to see him. McGee recalled the

visit and his thoughts on the General Stilwell himself.

General Stilwell, in a raincoat and wearing hiscampaign hat, was sitting on an ammunition boxnear the edge of the runway. After I reported tohim, he asked me in a calm, informal manner aboutthe situation in the Namkwi area, that is, whathad we run into, what was my estimate of thenumber of Japs there and other questionspertaining to the tactical situation. I told him

109

substantially the same information that we hadbeen reporting to TF Headquarters, to include thatwe had not identified any Jap force of more thancompany size. Contrary to Hunter's experience, Ifound him interested and easy to talk with; hedisplayed no irritability, no impatience and nooutward indication of the serious problems withwhich he was most surely concerned at the time.The leadership situation resulting from theunexpected loss of General Merrill, the failure ofthe 150th Regiment to exploit the seizure of theairstrip, the abortive attack by the 88th and 89thRegiments the preceding day and a complaint byHunter which I did not know about at the timecould have been some of the worrisome thoughts inhis mind that day.

However there was nothing in the content and tenorof my remarks to add to such worries he may havehad.

In passing, I had a high regard for GerneralStilwell as a professional soldier and as aconsiderate individual. From my point of view, hehas been unjustly treated in many accounts as faras his relations with the Marauders wereconcerned. Unfortunately much of this ill willstems from the writings by a few members of the5307th, with the most damaging being those byOgburn and Hunter. (75)

As McGee departed, General Stilwell insured that McGee

received a quart bottle of bourbon, which he later shared at

his officers' call when he covered the day's activities.

On 26 May, the Japanese were active with what appeared to

be probing attacks. Based on postwar interviews of General

Tanaka and on his observations of the day, McGee later

concluded the Japanese were conducting limited attacks to

permit the passing of larger forces into the Myitkyina area.

On this day, Colonel Hunter provided McGee with a copy of a

letter he said he had presented to General Stilwell, McGee

noted he saw it was a complaint letter but did not read it

until the next day:

110

26 May 44. Still at Namkwi. Boy, they hit uswith everything this morning. Artillery andmortar fire was very heavy today. It started at0730 and lasted till 1715. We moved back to ourold area about two miles SW of Namkwi. Healypulled sweet withdrawal. Wounded all evacuatedO.K. (Upon setting up new perimeter, men foundunconscious from physical exhaustion.) (76)

On 27 May, with the addition of Company C, 209th

Engineers, 2d Battalion's reported strength was 455 enlisted

men, 24 officers, and 45 animals. The battalion had lost

200 men through evacuation since 27 April.

McGee recalled his reading and reaction on 27 May to

Colonel Hunter's letter of complaint. Generally he

categorized the contents as frivolous, incorrect, and

arrogant. Simply, McGee found no validity in the

allegations against General Stilwell, his staff, and by

implication General Merrill. McGee noted that, while Hunter

issued a number of complaints, he provided no

recommendations that would correct the problems if they had

been true. McGee did not share its contents with his

officers.

On 28 and 29 May Japanese units continued to infiltrate

into the area. Patrolling continued. The 2d Battalion

journal:

29 May 44. Still in the same place. Thingspretty quiet around here last night. Fighterplanes were over early this morning. Boy, theysure done a good job. There was quite a bit ofartillery fire last night from both sides. Thecompany commanders were told to keep their outfitson alert for night patrols because of themoonlight night. (77)

ill

From 30 May until 2 June, the Marauders continued the

final process of wearing out completely. On 30 May, General

Stilwell would place General Boatner in command of

Myitkyina. Stilwell noted that "Galahad was shot" but

incorrectly notes that 2d Battalion had only 12 men left.

The comment should have listed 3d Battalion, which had only

12 men left on this day. In his account of this period,

Hunter recalled an attack order given to the Marauder

commanders, to include Colonel Kinnison, by General Boatner.

McGee noted that he never attended such a meeting and

pointed out that Kinnison had already been evacuated.

(Kinnison's evacuation probably occurred on 26 May.)

Finally, McGee stated that any attack was beyond the

capability of the organization at the time. It was during

this period that Colonel McGee passed out three times from

exhaustion. (78)

On 2 June, Colonel McGee requested his battalion be

relieved and moved to the airstrip. Colonel Hunter agreed

and McGee undertook the handing over of responsiblities to

the commander of Company C, 209th Engineers. The 2d

Battalion, last of the standing Marauder Battalions, moved

to the airstrip and went into bivouac. Air evacuation began

on 3 June and finished the next day. McGee recalled one

final event:

During the morning I was in the aid station, lyingdown and watching Major Rogoff and Captain Kolodnyconduct the processing, when someone mentioned tome that General Boatner was approaching the aidstation. I went out and reported to him. As of

112

this time, I had never met General Boatner noreven seen him before. He was a brisk, militaryindividual, and he got right to the point, saying"McGee, I want to thank you and your battalion forthe fine work done throughout the campaign." Iexpressed appreciation for his comment, and hethen moved on. His remark was our valediction andit could not have come at a more appropriate time.(79)

Final entry in the 2d Battalion Journal for duty in

Burma:

4 June 44--Evacuation continued; whole Bn clearedby tonight. McGee, Rogoff and Healy last of ourunit to come out. (80)

CONCLUSION

Thus far, this paper had examined several themes focused

principally on the the style and methods of senior

co-manders. Leadership roles and styles within the

Marauders evolved until they reached maturity 3t Nhpum Ga.

The commonly accepted views of the North Burma Campaign,

founded in the works of some members of the 5307th, have

diminished the leadership of Generals Stilwell and Merrill.

As we have already seen, these views often reflected the re--

or uninterpreted views of subordinates that lacked an

operational and strategical baseline for judgment. Often

the reinterpretations have confused the causal with

incidental and asssigned blame where none belonged. In

addition to the themes already discussed, the final mission

to Myitkyina raises three additional facets deserving

examination. These facets are the limits of human

113

endurance, commanders and surgeons, and leadership and valor

under extreme stress.

The Limits of Human Endurance

In conducting its final mission, the Marauders marched

and fought literally to exhaustion. Ravaged by malaria,

typhus, and dysentary, emaciated and deprived of rest and

nutrition--soldiers and their leaders struggled to complete

the march to Myitkyina. The task demanded a kind of courage

that none of them foresaw. Colonel McGee, one of the three

two-time Silver Star winners during the campaign, passed out

three times from exhaustion while leading his battalion

during one of the last days at Myitkyina. Lieutenant Sam

Wilson, 1st Battalion's I&R platoon leader, another two-time

Silver Star winner, captured the essence of the challenge:

I could command one foot to move out in front ofthe other one. There's no great trick in that, isthere? A matter of elementary muscular control!You can tell your leg what to do, certainly.What's a step? A child can take one! You advanceone foot so.. .and the the other...and now thefirst again. And that is all you have to do,except wipe your hands from time to time so theywon't be too slippery to hold your gun. That'sall that is required of you. You just have totake the next step. (81)

Veterans of four major battles, numerous minor fights,

and over 500 miles of marching in less than three months--

the Marauders did not quit when confronted by the Myitkyina

mission. They extended their march total to over 700 miles

and fought two more significant minor fights and one more

battle. The accomplishment demonstrated the difficulties of

114

attempting to define and measure the morale of a unit on the

premise that a certain level of morale is essential to

proper combat performance. One can argue that Marauder

morale was low, but low morale did not stop the heroic

performance that yielded the Myitkyina airstrip.

War planners in marking the parameters of the Marauders'

employment had defined 85 percent casualties as what they

believed the limits of endurance to be, and they were not

far wrong. Final casualties for the 5307th reached 80

percent, although that figure reflected cunsiderably greater

losses for disease than planned: 66 percent actual versus

50 percent planned. The planners also had used 90 days of

operations to estimate combat utility. Again they were not

far wrong. Not counting the administrative march into

Burma, the Marauders reached their limits in about 90 days.

Yet one would suspect that none of the long range planners

truly foresaw what 85 percent, or for that matter, 80

percent casualties meant in terms of human experience.

The planning decision to commit the 5307th to an

exhaustion limit without replacements long before its

operations began sentenced its leaders and soldiers to the

fate they suffered. Ninety days was a dependent variable in

the planning, not an independent variable defining a

parameter of employment. From a planner's perspective, if

the Marauders achieved 120 days of combat within 85 percent

casualty limits, a good thing had occurred. Put another

115

way, war planners had planned for the Marauders to be

expended exactly as they were expended.

Essentially what the planners had allowed for had

occurred, but the American Army had little or no experience

in developing and supporting units developed to be expended

on a specific campaign without replacements. In the heat of

an exhausting, bloody campaign, leaders made tough decisions

with knowledge of the planner's parameters. The bottom line

was to spend the unit to accomplish the mission. Leading

men within such a campaign, as discussed throughout this

paper, placed great demands--perhaps too great--on those

leaders.

Commanders and Surgeons

History has marked the relationship

between combat commanders and their surgeons as complex and

typically filled with tension. The Marauders proved no

exception. While a number of physicians accompanied the

5307th and its medical evacuation support was effective, the

Marauders still suffered 80 percent casualties of which 65

percent resulted from illness. In spite of skill well

applied and a heroic effort to save lives, the doctors

failed. They coild not reverse much less stop the unending

loss of soldiers to a frightening collection of tropical

diseases. They made every effort to keep the men of their

units fit to fight. As the men neared and passed the

reasonable limits of human endurance, the officers and men

116

of the Marauders went on and on. Daily the surgeons faced

unthinkable circumstances. In the end, disease and

exhaustion did what the Japanese could not.

Human reaction to extreme exhaustion varies widely.

Compromised by wounds and chronic illness, the exhausted

Marauders reacted to their circumstances in many ways not

always positive. Perhaps most of participants understood

what they had done and did not blame others for their

circumstances. However, three written accounts in

particular demonstrated that there were Marauders who

developed bitterness about their situation and felt that

certain leaders had acted unethically or perhaps immorally

in continuing the mission in spite of the cost. (82)

Suffering extreme exhaustion, Marauder leaders, once

evacuated from Myitkyina, lost their ability effectively to

control their men.

Rumors flourished as they do in every unit, but without

leaders they grew unchecked. The two most common themes

among the rumors were these. First, we were promised that

our service was to last only 90 days. This derived from

Wingate's experiences with the 77th Indian Brigade the

previous year. Second, we were promised to receive good

care and treatment once evacuated from the battlefield.

This was a reasonable belief. However, when Stilwell,

confronting a tactical emergency at Myitkyina, gave

directions that returned exhausted, wounded, {il l, en

returned to Myitkyina, it appeared as a broken promise.

117

The apparent conflict between the profession of arms and

medicine as represented by written accounts of the campaign

illustrated the root cause of the controversy that rose

after the campaign alleging mistreatment of valiant men.

Both professions most certainly shared much common ground.

They both evidenced a sense of corporateness, a deep ethical

basis, high regard for education, and strong belief in

service. But, in the case of medicine, the doctor served

his patient--a duty to the individual. In contrast, the

professional officer served his nation as embodied in the

constitution--a duty to the collective that might require

sacrifice of the individual.

As the Marauder leaders--to include senior leaders

outside of the 5307th--pressed to accomplish missions, they

offered medical professionals no opportunity to succeed in

the campaign. To tiLz end, they knowingly, and perhaps at

times unknowingly, sacrificed their soldiers. As previously

discussed, the parameters of the war planners set conditions

that ordained the dissolution of the unit. DuLy to

individual and country clashed, and the individual lost.

Doctors and military officers then, as now, tended to carry

big egos. In combat, leaders did not doubt what they had to

do to accomplish the mission. Doctors, not used in their

profession to subordination to others, had to support the

mission. In that support, doctors ultimately failed--not

that the parameters of the planners ever allowed for

success.

118

When the Marauders entered hospitals and convalescent

care, some bone-tired men, including doctors, lacking

operational and strategic perspective, lashed out at

perceived failures in leadership. The lack of experience in

senior leadership in dealing with no-replacement units

showed nowhere more than in the final care the Marauders

got. Mistakes reoccurred. Men beyond exhaustion received

less than their due. The bitterness that flowed from some

Marauders skewed the telling of an extraordinary

demonstration of leadership, soldiership, and military

medicine. The Marauders had won. They were heroes, and

they deserved better than the history that some of their

company wrote for them. Despite mistakes, all, to include

General Stilwell, took enormous risks. They served their

country well in time of war. Many sacrificed their lives.

They were our soldiers.

Valor and Leadership under Extreme Stress

One can only find the the heights of valor among the

depths of combat--the higher the valor the deeper the

depths. Appropriately code named GALAHAD and END RUN FORCE,

the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) pLumbed the depths.

For heroism during the campaign, six Marauders earned the

Distinguished Service Cross and 41 men earned the Silver

Star.

Leading soldiers under extreme stress poses big costs to

those who would lead, as well as those who follow. The

119

valiant deserve to have their campaigns studied and their

sacrifices understood. But smugness in study and coolness

in understanding can distort the truth, which is never neat

or easy to comprehend. Sacrifice of life is a matter of the

heart and full of heat. Decisions made in death-threatening

situations often lack clarity when seen from the light of

desk and armchair. A fleeting moment of casual analysis can

demean the worth and contribution of the leader. Perhaps

some historians--particularly in secondary source histories-

-have accepted neater truths about the Marauders because

they did not choose to feel and understand the battlefield

of Burma. In contrast, others may have fallen prey to

Marauder authors who carried the heat of their experiences

from the battlefield and could not find the perspective to

interpret the meaning of their accomplishments. To some

extent, bitterness and misunderstanding spawned in the heat

of their memories, and distortions followed.

The Marauders deserve better. They met every challenge-

given them. They anchored the defeat of a veteran Japanese

division over some of the toughest terrain in the world.

They did not vote themselves across north Burma to achieve

their extraordinary accomplishments; they were led there.

Their leaders made mistakes but not many. Doomed to

destruction by exhaustion, unremitting stress, and

preordained expenditure of the force, the Marauders did not

get the treatment they should have when they finished their

final mission. Unfortunately their final treatment, brought

120

on by emergency circumstances and inexperience with no--

replacement units, has improperly diminished their feat of

arms. We should acknowledge and understand failings within

operations of the Northern Combat Area Command. We also

should aspire to match "the deeds of valiant men" achieved

on the fields of north Burma in 1944. (83)

121

NOTES

(1) Scott R. McMichael, "Common Man, UncommonLeadership: Colonel Charles N. Hunter with Galahad inBurma," Parameters XVI (Summer 1986): 45.

(2) Joseph W. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers (New York:Sloane, 1948), 106.

(a) George A McGee, Jr., The History of the 2ndBattalion, Merrill's Marauders (Privately Published, 1987),11. The term sic will not be used in any of the quotationsfrom this reference. Punctuation used in quotations will beas used by the author.

(4) Ibid.(5) Ibid., 15.(6) Ibid., 18.(7) Ibid., 33.(8) Ibid., 40.(9) Ibid., 39.

(10) William R. Peers, Behind the Burma Road (Boston:Little and Brown, 1963), 6.

(11) Ibid., 219.(12) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's

Marauders, 45.(13) Ibid., 49.(15) Ibid., 59.(16) Peers, Behind the Burma Road, 150-154.(17) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's

Marauders, 71.(18) Ibid., 81 and 83.(19) Ibid., 84.(20) U. S. War Department, Historical Section, Merrill's

Marauders (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,1945), 62.

(21) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill'sMarauders, 87.

(22) Ibid., 88.(23) Ibid.(24) Ibid., 89.(25) Ibid., 90.(26) Ibid., 95.(27) Ibid., 96.(28) Ibid.(29) Ibid., 97.(30) Ibid., 98.(31) Ibid., 98-99.(32) Ibid., 100.(33) Ibid.(34 ) Ibid.(35) Ibid., 102.(36) Ibid., ill.(37) Ibid., 108.(38) Ibid., 111.(39) Ibid., 113.(40) Ibid., 115.(41) Ibid.(42) Ibid, 116.

122

(43) Ibid.(44) Ibid.(45) Ibid.(46) Ibid., 117.(47) Ibid., 119.(48) Ibid., 121.(49) Ibid., 122.(50) Ibid., 122-123.(51) Ibid., 124.(52) Ibid.(53) Ibid., 125.(54) Ibid.(55) Ibid., 128.(56) Ibid., 129.(57) Ibid., 130.(58) Ibid., 131.(59) Ibid., 133.(60) Ibid., 135.(61) Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's

Command Problems (Washington, D.C.: Office for the Centerof Military History, 1953), 204.

(62) Ibid.(63) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's

Marauders, 191.(64) U.S. War Department, Merrill's Marauders, 108-109.(65) Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, 296. In presenting

entries from General Stilwell's diary, this paper followsColonel McGee's superb methodology of interspersingapplicable quotations by General Stilwell.

(66) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill'sMarauders, 193.

(67) Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, 296.(68) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's

Marauders, 194.(69) Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, 296-297.(70) Ibid., 298.(71) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's

Marauders, 119.(72) Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, 298-299.(73) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's

Marauders, 204.(74) Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, 300.(75) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's

Marauders, 206-207.(76) Ibid., 209.(77) Ibid., 214.(78) Ibid., 215-217.(79) Ibid., 223.(80) Ibid.(81) Charleton Ogburn, Jr., The Marauders (New York:

Harper, 1959), 286-287.(82) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's

Marauders, final flyleaf.

123

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