1. Historiography for Dissertation, Provisional Question: “ -Primary Consulted Cesare Paoli, Il libro di Montaperti M. Villani, Cronica, Coen, Firenze, 1846 or (Excellent version with annotation and indexes) Matteo Villani, Cronica : con la continuazione di Filippo Villani / Matteo Villani ; edizione critica a cura di Giuseppe Porta (Parma : Fondazione Pietro Bembo : U. Guanda, c1995.) -Secondary Consulted Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) Daniel Philip Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian City Republics, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pg 46-51 Storia d’Italia (Annali): I Document, vol. 5 (Torino: Einaudi, 1973), Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, pg. 646-669 Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic from the twelfth to the fourteenth century” Florentine Studies, N. Rubinestein, ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1968), 70-108. Bowsky, William M., “City and Contade. Military relationships and communal bods in 14th century Siena”, Reneissance Studies in honor of Hans Baron, A. Molho & J.A. Tedeschi, eds. (Deklab: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971) C.C. Bayley, War and society in Renaissance Florence : the De militia of Leonardo Bruni (Toronto: Toronto UP, 1961). -Potential Primary Giovanni Villani, Cronica, ed M.L Ridotta (Florence, 1823), on Crecy. See Abbreviations on Daniel Philip Waley, Trevor Dean pg. 198 (picture on phone) Ludovico Antonio Muratori, RIS (Rerum Italicarum Scriptores), Internet Archive o Vol 8 On Florence/Tuscany:
Transcript
1. Historiography for Dissertation, Provisional Question: “-Primary ConsultedCesare Paoli, Il libro di Montaperti
M. Villani, Cronica, Coen, Firenze, 1846 or (Excellent version with annotation and indexes) Matteo Villani, Cronica : con la continuazione di Filippo Villani / Matteo Villani ; edizione critica a cura di Giuseppe Porta (Parma : Fondazione Pietro Bembo : U. Guanda, c1995.)
-Secondary Consulted Philippe Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, trans. Michael Jones (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) Daniel Philip Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian City Republics, (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), pg 46-51 Storia d’Italia (Annali): I Document, vol. 5 (Torino: Einaudi, 1973), Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E
Condottieri’, pg. 646-669 Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic from the twelfth to the fourteenth century”
Florentine Studies, N. Rubinestein, ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1968), 70-108. Bowsky, William M., “City and Contade. Military relationships and communal bods in 14th
century Siena”, Reneissance Studies in honor of Hans Baron, A. Molho & J.A. Tedeschi, eds. (Deklab: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971)
C.C. Bayley, War and society in Renaissance Florence : the De militia of Leonardo Bruni (Toronto: Toronto UP, 1961).
-Potential Primary Giovanni Villani, Cronica, ed M.L Ridotta (Florence, 1823), on Crecy. See Abbreviations on Daniel Philip Waley, Trevor Dean pg. 198 (picture on phone) Ludovico Antonio Muratori, RIS (Rerum Italicarum Scriptores), Internet Archive
o Vol 8 On Florence/Tuscany:
Istoria Fiorentine di Ricordano Malespini, Gentiluomo Fiorentino, a history from the founding of the city up to the year 1281
o Vol 9 On Florence/Tuscany:
Cronaca di Dino Compagni (su Firenza) delle cose occorrenti nei suoi tempi. From 1280 to 1312. (translated also in english 26.05.2018)
o Vol 11 On Pistoia/Tuscany:
Istorie Pistolesi, five commentaries describing events from 1300 to 1348. o Vol 13
On Florence/Tuscany: A Universal History which then transmutes in a history of Florence by
Giovanni Villani, goes up to 1348. (very long, only from book 5 perhaps relevance).
o Vol 15
On Siena/On Arezzo/On Pisa/Tuscany: Sienese Chronicle by Andrea Dei and continued by Agnolo di Tura, from
1186 to 1352. Sienese Annals by Neri Di Donato Da Siena, from 1352 to 1381(4?) Cronaca di Pisa by anonymous author from 1089 to 1389 and continued
up to 1407o Vol 18
On Lucca/Tuscany Caso del Tumulto dei Ciompi di Gino Capponi, events of 1378 up to
1419. Later to it was added the commentaries by Nerii which continued the account up to 1456.
o Vol 19 On Siena/On Florence/Tuscany
Annali Sienensi by anonymous author, from 1385 to 1422 Istorie di Firenze by anonymous author, from 1406 to 1438.
(Both Primary and Secondary): Documenti per Servire alla Storia della Milizia Italiana dal XIII secolo al XVI Raccolti Negli Archivi della Toscana, Giuseppe Canestrini, edi. [Archivio Storico Italiano, 15]. (Firenze: G.P. Vieisseux, 1851).
(Both Primary and Secondary): E Ricotti, Storia delle compagnie di ventura in Italia. 4 vols. (Torino: Giuseppe Pomba, 1845-1847). – Ample, and when I say ample I mean ‘Ample’, amount of primary documents contained within it.
(Both Primary and Secondary) C.C. Bayley, War and society in Renaissance Florence : the De militia of Leonardo Bruni (Toronto: Toronto UP, 1961) (fatto)
Pompilio Totti (Giulio Roscio?), Ritratti et elogii di capitani illustri (Roma: Andrea Fei, MDCXXV) (BOTH PRIMARY AND SECONDARY-FUNDAMENTAL), William Caferro, “War and Economy,
1300-1600”, Oxford Bibliographies. (Includes many condottieri (and their primary documents) who fought for all sides including
florence) Ariodante Fabbretti, Note e documenti raccolti e pubblicati da Ariodante Fabretti che servono ad illustrare le biografie dei capitani venturieri dell'Umbria, (Montepulcino: Angiolo Fumi, 1851).
Lorenzo Aulo Cecina, Notizie istoriche della città di Volterra alle quali si aggiunge la serie de' podestà, e capitani del popolo di essa (Pisa: Almo Studio Pisano,1758).
SEE PRIMARY SOURCE FOLDER FOR DECEMBER 17 FOR SHORT EXCERPTS OF DESCRIPTIONS OF WAR/SKIRMISHES
(FUNDAMENTAL, COMPILATION OF CHRONICLES TRANSLATED RECENTLY IN ITALIAN), Ciucciovino, Carlo, La cronaca del Trecento italiano. Giorno per giorno (Roma: UniversItalia, 2007).
(IN LATIN ERGO DOUBTFUL), Novati, Francesco “Trattative di Gian Galeazzo Visconti con Condottieri di Ventura durante la Guerra contro Antonio della Scala (1387)”, Archivio Storico Lombardo 39 (1912), 572-77
Paolo Cesari, Le Cavallate Fiorentine nei Secoli XIII e XIV. Saggio Storico compilato sui documenti dell’archivio fiorentino, (Archivio Storico Italiano, 1865), 76-94
-Potential Secondary Maybe Pile
o Aroldi, Aldo M., Armi e armature Italiane fino al XVIII secolo (Milano: Bromante, 1961).
o Grillo, Paolo, Cavalieri e popoli in armi: Le istituzioni militari nell'Italia medievale (Roma: Laterza, 2015). (on kindle 11 euros)
o (Potential but cannot find), Marchionni, Roberto, Tuscan Armies (1): Sienese and Florentines at Montaperti (Siena: Roberto Marchionni Editore, 2001)
o G. Galasso, “Storia d’Italia: Comuni e Signorie, Istituzioni, Societa’, e Lotte Per L’egemonia”, vol. 4 (Torino: UTET, 1981), 451-562 (552-557 especially) (in library)
o Storti, Francesco, “La «novellaja» mercenaria. Vita militare, esercito e stato nella corrispondenza di commissari, principi e soldati del secolo XV”, Reti Medieval (Online)
o Vittozzi, Elvira, “Micheletto degli Attendoli e la sua condotta nel regno di Napoli (1435-1439)”, Reti Medievali. (online)
o A.K. Isaacs, “Condottieri, stati, e territori nell’ Italia centrale”. Federico di Montefeltro. Lo stato, le arti, la cultura. Giorgio C. Baiardi, et. Al., eds. [Biblioteca del Cinquecento, 30]. (Roma: Bulzoni, 1986), 23-60.
o Langton, Douglas, A history of Siena (London: John Murray, 1902), chapter x. (online)o ML Lenzi, La Pace strega. Guerra e societa’ In Italia dal XIII al XVI secolo. (Montepulciano:
Grifo, 1988). (maybe but cant find)o P Rasi, “Exercitus Italicus” e milizie cittadine nell’alto medievo. [Pubblicazioni
dell’Istituto di diritto Romano, 2] (Padova: Antoni Milani, 1937) (Cannot find)o Storia d’Italia (Annali): Dalla Caduta dell’Impero Romano al Secolo XVIII, vol. 2.1 (Torino:
Einaudi, 2002), pg. 323-328 (library)o Storia d’Italia (Annali): Guerra e Pace, vol. 18 (Torino: Einaudi, 2002), 49-73 and 306-319
(library)o
-Definitely:
Aspects of Warfare/Practices o Bargigia, Fabio, “Gli aspetti militari della “riconquista” del marchesato: Teodoro I di
Monferrato nel biennio 1306-1307”, Reti Medievali. (online 17 Dic)o Boccia, Lionello G., “L’armamento in Toscana dal millecento al trecento” Civilta’ delle
arti minori in Toscana. [Atti del I convegno, Arezzo, 11-15 maggio, 191]. (Firenze: Edam 1973), 193-212. (A milano)
o Contamine, War and Competition Between States (especially “Chapter 2 Political and Military Bonds in the Italian State System, Thirteenth to Sixteenth Centuries”), (Paris: La Sorbonne, 2000). (online Glasgow library)
o S. Gasparri, I milites cittadini. Studi sulla cavalleria in Italia [Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo]. Nuovi Studi Storici, 19 (1992). (online 5 Luglio)
o Naldini, Lamberto, “La “ TALLIA MILITUM SOCIETATIS TALLIE TUSCIE „ nella 2ª metà del secolo XIII”, JSTOR (online)
o Ragazzini, Massimo, “1358, LA BATTAGLIA DELLE SCALELLE: CORRADO DI LANDAU SCONFITTO DAL POPOLO IN ARMI”, STORIAINNETWORK (Online)
o Romanoni, Fabio, “Come i Visconti asediaro Pavia. Assedi e operazioni militari intorno a Pavia dal 1356 al 1359”, Reti Medievali. (Online)
o Settia, Aldo, De re militari: Pratica e teoria nella guerra medievale (Roma: Viella Editore, 2008). (Owned Book)
o Settia, Aldo, Rapine, assedi, battaglie. La guerra nel Medioevo (Bari: Laterza editori, 2009). (Owned Book)
o Settia, Aldo, “Zone strategiche e borghi nuovi. Aspetti della guerra nell’ eta’ comunale”. Studi Storici 31 (1990), 983-997. (Online)
o Storti, Francesco “Istituzioni militari in Italia tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna”, reti medievali. (Online)
Armament/Military Organizationo Settia, Aldo, “Come si usa in Monferrato”: l’organizzazione militare in età aleramica”,
Reti Medievali. (Online) Economic/Military Organization and Development:
o Caffero, William, “City and Countryside in Siena in the Second Half of the Fourteenth Century”, Journal of Economic History 54, no. 1, JSTOR (Online)
o Caffero, William, “Mercenaries and Military Expenditure: The Costs of Undeclared Warfare in XIVth Century Siena”, ProQuest (Online)
o Caferro, William, “Warfare and Economy in Renaissance Italy, 1350-1450”, JSTOR. (Online)
o Covini, Maria, “Guerra e relazioni diplomatiche in Italia (secoli XIV-XV): la diplomazia dei condottieri”, reti medievali. (online)
o Del Treppo, “Gli aspetti organizzativi, economici e sociali di una compagnia di ventura”, RSI, 85 (1973), 253-75 (online)
General/To Check:o Argiolas, Tommaso, Armi ed eserciti del rinascimento Italiano (Roma: Newton Compton,
1991 (at library)o M. Mallet, Mercenaries and their Masters. Warfare in Reneissance Italy. (London: Bodley
Head, 1974). (book)o R. Paddu, “Istituzioni militari, societa e stato tra medieovo e rinascimento”, Rivista
Storica Italiana 87 (1975), 749-769 (cannot find)o Settia, Comuni In Guerra Armi ed Eserciti nell’Italia della citta’ (book) o Storia d’Italia (Annali): I Documenti, vol. 5 (Torino: Einaudi, 1973), Clemente Ancona:
‘Milizie E Condottieri’, pg. 646-669 (fatto)o Trease, Geoffrey, The condottieri. Soldiers of Fortune. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1971).
(library)o Waley, Daniel, Condotte and Condottieri in the 13th century, Proceedings of the British
o Webb, Diana M., “Cities of God, the Italian communes at war.” Studies in Church History 20 (1983), 111-127 (online)
o P Pieri, La crisi militare italiana nel rinascimento nelle sue relazioni con la crisi politica ed economica. (Napoli: Ricciardi, 1934). (in library annexe – no found under “scritti vari” a Milan check 5 Lug)
On Florence/On Siena/Tuscany o Bowsky, William M., “City and Contade. Military relationships and communal bods in
14th century Siena”, Reneissance Studies in honor of Hans Baron, A. Molho & J.A. Tedeschi, eds. (Deklab: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971). (fatto)
o M. Del Treppo, Condottieri e uomini d'arme nell'Italia del Rinascimento (Napoli: Liguore Editori, 2002) (book)
o G. Galasso, “Storia d’Italia: Comuni e Signorie Nell’Italia Nordorientale e Centrale”, vol. 7(Torino: UTET, 1987), 563-778
o L. Green, “Changes in the nature of war in earl 14th century Tuscany”, War and Society 1 (1983), 1-24
o Guerra e Guerrieri nella Toscana Medievale and Guerra e Guerrieri nella Toscana del Rinascimento. Franco Cardini & Marco Tangheroni, eds (Firenze: Edifir, 1990).
o M. Mallett, Mercenary companies and the decline of Siena, (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP: 1998)
o Santini, Pietro, Costituzione del Comune di Firenze (Roma: Multigrafica editrice, 1972), CHAP I-IV
o Professione, Alonso. Siena e le compagnie di ventura nella seconda meta’ del secolo XIV (Civitanova Marche, 1898). FOUND IN MILAN
o Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic from the twelfth to the fourteenth century” Florentine Studies, N. Rubinestein, ed. (London: Faber & Faber, 1968), 70-108. (Fatto)
Further General Referenceo Guarda Contamine bibliography a pg. 334-5 (picture on phone)o William Caferro, War and Economy, 1300-1600
On Milan/Lombardyo Covini, Nadia, L’Esercito de Duca. Organizzazione militare e istituzioni al tempo degli
Sforza, 1450-1480. [Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo, nuovi studi storici, vol. 42] (Roma: Istituto Storico, 1998)
o Settia, Aldo, “I Milanesi in guerra. Organizzazione militare e tecniche di combattimento.” [Atti dell’ XI Congresso Internazionale di Studi Sull’Alto Medievo, Milano, 1987]. (Spoleto: CISAM, 1989), 265-289.
Profileso Ceccarelli Lemut, Maria, “I Montefeltro e il Comune di Pisa tra XIII e XIV”, Reti Medievali.
(online)o Baiardi, Giorgio C., et al., Federico di Montefeltro : lo stato, le arti, la cultura (Roma:
Bulzoni, 1986). o Browning, Oscar, The life of Bartolomeo Colleoni (London : Chiswick press, C.
Whittingham and co., 1891). o Caferro, John Hawkwood : an English mercenary in fourteenth-century Italy (Baltimore:
John Hopkins UP: 2006). o Caferro, William, “"The Fox and the Lion": The White Company and the Hundred Years
War in Italy”, in Hundred Years War : A Wider Focus (Brill, 2005)o Covini, Maria, “Condottieri «sanza stato» e condottieri prìncipi: un confronto tra
Pandolfo Malatesta e Facino Cane”, Reti Medievali. o Franceschini, Gino, “Boldrino da Panicale (1331?-1391). Contributo alla storia delle
milizie mercenarie italiane”, Bollettino della Deputazione di storia patria per l'Umbria (Library Research Annexe).
o Tabanelli, Mario, Sigismondo Pandolfo Malatesta : signore del Medioevo e del Rinascimento, (Faenza : Stab. grafico F.lli Lega, 1977.)
o Tommasoli, Walter, La vita di Federico da Montefeltro (1422-1482), (Urbino : Argalìa, 1978.)
Recruitment and Service
o Bianchi, Silvana, “Fanti, Cavalieri e Siptendiarii nelle Fonti Statuarie Veronesi”, Gli Scaligeri: 1277-1387, Gian Maria Varanini, ed (Verona: Arnoldo Mondardori, 1988), 167-180.
o Bueno de Mesquita, D.M., “ Some condottieri of the trecento and thier political authority.” Proceedings of the British Academy 32 (1946), 219-241.
o Covini, Nadia, L’Esercito de Duca. Organizzazione militare e istituzioni al tempo degli Sforza, 1450-1480. [Istituto storico italiano per il medio evo, nuovi studi storici, vol. 42] (Roma: Istituto Storico, 1998)
o Covini Nadia, “I castellani ducali all’epoca di Galeazzo Maria Sforza. Offici, carriere, state sociale.” Nuova rivista storica 71 (1987), 531-586.
o Covini, Nadia, “Condottieri ed eserciti permanenti negli stati italiani nel XV secolo in alcuni studi recenti.” Nuova rivista storica 69 (1985), 329-352.
o Del Treppo, Gli aspetti organizzativi, economici e sociali di una compagnia di ventura, RSI, 85 (1973), 253-75
o Franceschini, Gino, “Boldrino de Panicale. Contributo alla storia delle milizie mercenaries italiane”. Bollettino della deputazione di sotria patria dell’Umbria 46 (1949), 118-139.
o P Pieri, “Alcune questioni sopra la fanteria in Italia nel periodo comunale.” Rivista Storica Italiana 50 (1933), 561-614
o Paddu, Raffaele, “Lettere ed armi. Il ritratto del guerriero tra quattro e cinquecento” Federico di Montefeltro : lo stato, le arti, la cultura (Roma: Bulzoni, 1986).
o Settia, Aldo “ ‘Sont Inobdiens et refusent de servir’ Il principe e l’esercito nel Monferrato dell’eta’ Avignonese.” Piemonte Medievale. Forme del Potere e della Societa. Studi per Giovanni Tabacco. (Torino: G. Einaudi, 1985), 87-121.
o Waley, Daniel, “Le Origini della condotta nel duecento e le compagnia di ventura”, Rivista Storica Italiana 88 (1976), 531-538.
o Waley, Daniel P., “Papal Armies in the 13th century”. EHR 72 (1957), 1-30. o Zamberieri, Teresa, “La partecipazione Milanese nella guerra del bene pubblico.
Allestimento e realizzazione dell’impresa militare.” Nuova Rivista Storica 69 (1985), 1-30.
o P. Santini, Documenti dell’Antica Costituzione del comune di Firenze,(Florence, 1895), pg. 21, 56-57, 63-64, 71, 148-149, 211-214, 394 (vol II?), 473 (online)
o Bibliografia statuti toscana: https://www.storiadifirenze.org/pdf_ex_eprints/146-Bibliografia_statuti.pdf
o Enrico Fiumi, Statuti di Volterra, Firenze, 1951, pg. 47, 213 (library)o Le Consulte della Repubblica di Firenze, ed. A. Gerardi (Florence, 1896-8), vol I, pg
188, 196, 225, 229-30, 250-2 – cavallata in pecunia 408– regarding reluctance by citizen to serve: 48-9, 90, 228, 331, 334
o Le consulte-pratiche-repubblica-fiorentina-quattrocento: https://www.storiadifirenze.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/217-le-consulte-pratiche-repubblica-fiorentina-quattrocento.pdf
o Fondamentale per Primary: http://www.archivi.beniculturali.it/index.php/news-home/biblioteca-digitale
o For primary Sources on William the Catalan, well document merc in Tuscany, see pictures on phone of bibliography from Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 88-90
o I consigli della Repubblica Fiorentina, Barbadoro ( a Milano). o ASI VI, Pt.1, LA GUERRA DEI FIORENTINI CON PAPA GREGORIO XI, 1375, (online). o ACTA HENRICI, Bonaini (online but unsure). o Idelfonso di S. Luigi, Delizie degli Eruditi Toscani, (Florence 1770-89), vol XI, 208 or
vol XII, 262-8, 268-287. o Romolo Caggese, ed (nuova versione) Giuliano Pinto, Francesco Salvestrini, Andrea
Zorzi, Statuti della Repubblica fiorentina, (Firenze, 1999) o vecchia edizione (meglio) con pagine I, 295 ff, 330-2, 336-9 II, 378, 417-418 (a milano entrambi)
o Leonardi Aretini Historiarum Florentini populi libri XII = Istoria fiorentina di Leonardo Aretino tradotta in volgare da Donato Acciajuoli (online)x
o Giugurta Tommasi, Dell Historie di Siena, II, 130 (online)o Alessandro Lisini, l Costituto del comune di Siena volgarizzato nel 1309-1310 (a
milano), Dist I, r. XXXVIII-XLVII (38-47)o Inventario generale del r. Archivio di Stato in Siena : Parte II
(Consiglio generale), (a milano). o And in G. Capponi, Storia della Repubblic di Firenze, 2 vol. (Flor, 1930) I., pg 559 and
on. (online)o F. Bonaini, “Statuto della parte guelf di Firenze”, ASI, ser. 2, V (1857), pg 41 (online) o And C. Paoli “Della Signoria di Gualtieri Duca D’Atene Documenti”, ASI, XVI (1862),
pg 250 (ma anche prima). (online)o Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, Ris, XXX, rubric 577, 607, 612,
647, 661, 662 ff., 674 (online) General
o Marzorati, Nuove questioni di storia medioevale, Milano: 1964, pg 347 (library)o Pieri, Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana, Torino : G. Einaudi, 1952, pg 217
(trovato a Milano)o L. Naldini “La Tallia Militum Tallie Tuscie” ASI vol 78 (1920), pg 80-81, 101
o C. Paoli, “Le Cavallate Fiorentine”, ASI 1, no. 1 (1865), pg 53, 74 (Online)o C. Paoli ‘Rendiconto e approviazioni di spese occorse nell’esercito fiorentino contro
Pisotia nel maggio 1302’ ASI s III, vol 6, pt. 2 (1867), pp 3-16 and (9. ff)o Davidsohn, Storia di Firenza, (Firenze: 1960) (Library)o G. Capponi, Storia della Repubblica di Firenze (Florence, 1875), vol. 1m pg 552-62.
On Sienao Bowsky “The anatomy of rebellion in 14th century Siena; From commune to Signory”
(Los Angeles and Berkeley, 1970), nn. 15-17, 88 f. Mercenaries
o Previte-Orton, Cambridge Medieval History, vol Vi., pg. 182
2. Citations/Knowledge Basis by topic:-Movement to Communal armies
The transition to communal armies was partially a product of the economic crippling of the manorial owners of the countryside, with portions of their wealth and of their subject being continuously appropriated by the city and thus preventing them from supplying troops with necessary arms (that would have meant that then they would become the key military apparatus within Italy). Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, pg. 646
In particular, it was the new found wealth and development of Northern-Central Italian city - which developed at the expense of the intrinsically fragile Longobardian feudal state – which made it impose on these city states of feudal institution (both civic and military) and the development of new forms of governance (which would inevitably bring into conflict the Italicorum Communia e Theutonicorum Imperium). Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, pg. 647
-Early Feudal Armies General Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, pg. 647-649
o Two main portion: fighting troop and non-fighting personnel Non-fighting troops were the pedities, of servile extraction, charged with all
those necessary task which moving feudal armies required: guarding of the baggage train, carrying for the army’s cattle heads, construction of encampments, construction of fortifications and siege engines.
Fighting troops would consist instead in volounteers, conscripts or mercenariers (these latter acting prevalently as ranged troops or sappers).
o Recruitment The pedites were mainly recruited via a sort of crovee. Freemen and volounteers instead joined up out of a civic sense of duty.
Their participation entailed the privilege-right of carrying weapons however this sense of duty started being seen as an unbearable burden.
o Social stratification of armies (which also emphasized diverging statuses). The cavalry, typically of noble extraction, was not required to offer its
service based on a unilateral obligation (as the infantry did), rather they offered homage to their lord. This homage was a bilateral contract were the noblemen received a benefice in exchange for military service (a feudum, tenurial salary, a war pension, a stipendium for a military obligation).
Results in a contempt by knights for foot-soldiers and viceversa (as seen by the indifference infantry-men felt for outcomes battles and the
underestimation by Knight of said troops when fighting with/against them – as seen by Barbarossa’s relegation of allied communal militia to baggage protection or peripheral tasks during the war with the Lombard league).
Further translates in knightly contempt of ranged units, considered cowardly and their use is often discouraged on the basis of social premises.
o Military Role Noble cavalry: had the obligation acting as shock troop, engaged in charges
on horseback while fully armoured and carrying a lance in couched position. There is no legislation even bothering to establish standardized equipment
for pedites and for infantry freemen (according to Charlemagne’s legislation) only those individuals who possessed more than 12 manses/hides of land had a personal equipment requirement.
o Chain of command, Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, pg. 652 A feudal knight, because he is an affirmed warrior, conducted personally his
military action and that of his immediate subordinates (i.e. squires). As such there were no true intermediary officers who were acknowledged as being representatives of a universally recognized chain of command, rather a feudal army was a loose connection of vassal retinues whose components recognized in practice the authority of their retinue commander and only nominally that of the commanded in chief.
-Early Communal Armies General The differences between infantry and cavalry were less profound within communal armies,
where foot soldiers were given at least a value of 100 soldi vs. that of knight which was of 100 lire (according to Bolognese statutes where commune established to pay out these sums to their troops who captured these types of soldiers). Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, pg. 648
Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, pg. 649-651o The Organization (largely similar to feudal armies)
A cavalry, made of noblemen, who acted as shock troops. An infantry and non-combatant personnel of popular and sometimes servile
extraction. They made ample use of mercenaries and stipendiaries especially of
vastatores romagnoli and Ligurian/Corsican crossbowmen. o Recruitment
Juridically, the recruitment of knights and infantrymen occurred through similar method (through conscription not servile obligation).
Rather than being servants, the pedites artifices (craftsmen’s infantry) enjoyed a much more defined liberty because of its importance within the communal infantry. Their economic strength reflected in the quality of their armament and training and thus resulted in a greater effectiveness during combat.
Unlike conscripted feudal infantries, who let go state imposed equipment and training standards in accordance to one’s means – leaving it all to one’s discretion, the commune imposed specific material norms which were enforced.
As well the commune organized several and frequent competitions that required the use of weapons used during war which acted as indirect drills to train communal militias.
o Military Role The Pedites role centred around the defence of the carroccio who would
defeind it by closing themselves into squares which could resist and destroy wave after wave of cavalry charges. This infantry, especially that of citizens, was to acquire fundamental weight within communal armies (against feudal infantries which were composed primarily of mercenary pedones).
The communal cavalry, split among citizen of the commune and the rural vassal of said commune, had largely the same role of their feudal counterpart. However, the tendency of noblemen to avoid cavalry service (through replacement) combined with the access given to those “knights of opportunity” (non-nobles of slightly weaker economic condition which made them unprepared for shock combat) lowered the quality of communal cavalry but largely reduced the differences among various corps.
o Social organization The rural vassal element to the cavalry of the commune still were in a clear
condition of privilege (though more modest) offering their military service to the commune in exchange of same privileges (which their enjoyment was contingent to their participation).
The urban element to the cavalry of the commune derived its wealth, power and privilege from their profitable financial activities. Their wealth was their own and obligations as that of a feudal noblemen with a feudum did not exist. Their obligation to the state were indirect and limited.
Access to cavalry in commune as well was not precluded to non-nobles, a man sufficiently rich to buy a war horse, equipment and hire necessary subservient could aspire to become a cavalrymen.
o Chain of command, Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, pg. 652 Generally commanded by the middle/higher nobility but their authority over
a communal militia was not derivative of their social status and privilege (as if he were in charge of feudal levy raised within his domain). Their authority derived from the fact that they were employees of the commune (the power thus resided in the authority of the commune itself who were commissioned with leading the armies under the watchful communal deputies eyes). i.e. an ante-literam condottieri hired to lead armies nearly exclusively and not with bring their own band of soldier whose service would be put at the commune’s disposition.
This hiring of external personalities to lead armies was also a product on intra-factional rivalry within cities, where each faction would refuse to put in charge a local personality who associated with one of the two factions.
The hiring of a noble belonging to the traditional feudal structure ensured that the communal armies would be led by someone who possessed appropriate means for the job: from being trained and prepared for individual combat, to knowledge on the art of commands, and he could count as well on his own entourage of servants and advisors.
One cannot forget, especially for Tuscany, the importance mercenary contingents had as far back as late 12th century (see Money/Contract/Paid Soldiering) . Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic” pg. 77
-Enlistment/Recruitment All the communes compelled their nobles and prosperous citizen to maintain horses for
cavalry service. Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian, pg. 50o By 1162 300 Pisan mlites had to swear that they would provide war-horses. o Joint inheritance often implied an obligation on both co-heirs meaning that all must
provide a cavalry-men between them. Nearly two thirds of the Florentine horses recorded in the Libro di Montaperti were owned jointly by consortes.
Cavalry services fell on all who could afford to perform it, there was a large class of men who owed it although not nobles in the sense of having been dubbed knight (these the milites/knight pro commune). Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian, pg. 50-51
o The size of the militia/cavalry force faried greatly with its number approaching 1000 by the end of the 13th century (and sometimes surpassing it like in Bologna, 1600 in 1298).
o These were not called to serve all at the same time. Florence summoned from one to five of its 6 districts (sesti).
o The horses service was maintained through reception of a wage (40 florins a year) and the owned would be compensated in injured or killed while in service of commune.
The infantry obligation fell on the remaining adult population, those whose age ranged between 14 and 70 (but also more human limits of 18 to 60). A regional force, paid on a daily basis with its commander receiving a retainer throughout the years. Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian, pg. 51
A man who could not serve in person had to furnish a substitute. Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian, pg. 50
A widespread medieval Italian standard that of being called to serve in the city of militia, a common civic duty in the name of the survival of the repubic. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 70.
The Florentine promise to Siena (Andrew, mentioned below in your notes) and the precise numerical obligations of Lucca (150 cav and 500 foot) and bishop of Volterra (200 cav and 1000 foot) to Florence indicates the existence of arrangements for the calling of a quota of the total service due – Further emphasized by a remark in chronicle that the Florentine force engaging pisans in 1222 comprised the whole of cavalry and 1/3 of the infantry implies that two of the city’s Sesti were involved in conflict – Further coheres with 1250 reorganization which establishes a call to arms for two, three, four, or all six Sesti. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 70. And Villani, 40.
It appears to be a universal communal standard that the state paid their own troop, both infantry and cavalry, when on service (never was an obligation and hence unpaid service and hence fruit of civic spirit) Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 72.
(In relation to Florence) Largely the army can be seen as made of Florentine (paid) conscripts and these are distinguished from the Florentine serving his city voluntarily for pay, and these latter must be differentiated from the outsider (non-native) serving the state. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 72;
-Mobilization/Societal Apparatus backing War “A Pavian register from 1248 gives the responses of those who had failed to answer the
latest mobilisation. The excuses included old age, poverty, infirmity, unavailability of horses, exemption and entry into religious order”. Daniel Philip Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian, pg. 51
“ Paid service not only had the advantage of allowing mobilization in a few days, it also facilitated the pread of order for an assembly, either by means of individual letters addressed to the most important men or through public announcements asking for specialized personnel who could bet set to work and controlled by baillis, sheriffs, provosts, justicars, and other local administrators.” Contamine, War, pg 98.
“Revenue was required for two things: the payment of officials salaries and the cost of war.” … “Military expenditure was the crucial aspect of finance” resulting often in an expansion of commune’s budget. Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian, pg. 47-48
o Siena, for whom 13th century budgets are well documented, shows that warfare multiplied expenditure and hence revenue. While Siena was locked in a bitter struggle with Florence in 1230-31 the expenditure of the commune ran at a figure of 50,000 L/55,000 L per annum. In peace instead it fluctuated between 10,000 and 20000 L. As the century progressed the average expenditure for both peace and war went increasing.
o The Genovese revenue for the year 1162-63 is recorded by the town’s chronicler at 6850 L. Half a century later the annual farm of the toll on the port alone was worth the same sum. The main cause to this increase was the ability and willingness to conduce longer campaign, fight costlier forms of war, and make more used highly paid troops.
Funding: Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian, pg. 48-49o Mostly from taxation and loans (profits from communal lands, leases of market
booth and from justice (i.e. confiscation) could not cover costs).o Main forms of direct taxes:
was the imperial-like hearth tax, not inequitable in nature for amount varied from rich and poor.
The allibramentum, a tax based on the census/catasto of the property was another mechanism. It came into being in Pisa mid way through the 12 th century and replaces completely hearth tax in all Italian towns by next century. In milan it was undertaken by 12, later 18, groups of 4 members (2 surveyors and 2 notaries). These men were paid by the men being assessed, these latter made a declaration of value of their property and were liable to fines if under-valuing.
o Indirect taxation: tolls, custom duties, levies on sales and transations and profitable monopoly on distribution of salt (eventually some cities like Tuscany prefer them vs direct taxation, conscious of this one of the demands of the rebellious ciompi is a return to direct taxation).
o Loans, Genoa became indebted to its citizens by 15000 L as early as 1154. As well the forced loan, first noted in 1207 in Venice, became a standard practice of Italian states.
Economic mechanism of Florence Bayley, War and society, pg. 20 and M. Villani, ii, 171 (drag) and Consigli, I, 677
o The direct tax based on the estimate of the capital and income of citizen (estimo) had been main pillar of war finance, but had been abolished in 1315 because of political pressure.
o Cost of war was shifted on indirect taxation, which bore less heavily on the prosperous. In 1351 indirect taxes were increased to bring in a revenue of 360,000 florins vs. 300,000 florins of 1338.
o The old hearth tax, paid by head of families, borught in a further 50,000 florins yearly.
o An impost of underterminied amount was laid upon the clergy. o The contadini were freed from military service for a eyar in return for a collective
payment of 52,000 florins (the practice had been to create select militia – cerna- of the younger and better armed men from each rural community and plebatus. Those who didn’t serve were taxed to furnish the cerna of active servicemen
-Training “Unless one has trained beforehand through mock battles, the art of war will not be
possessed when it is necessary to be put in practice”. Roger of Hovedon, Chronica, ed. W.Stubbus, London, vol ii, 166 (1868-71),
o “It was the fiefs which allowed its holder and is sons the leisure and nnecessary income to live on a level with the world of warfare” through the practice of relevant military activities like mock battles fought between 1150-1350. )”, Contamine, War, pg 95
-Equipment/Its Cost/Military Standard Issues “At Genoa between 1200-1250 a headpiece (barberia) cost between 16s. and 32s., a haubert
between 120s. and 152s. and , if one adds the protection for the legs and other various accessories, the total amounts to about 200s. or £10 Genoese, the equivalent of 800 grammes of silver” … “In addition there was also the cost of offensive weapons, as well as that of more simple military equipment for an esquire, if not for a valet” placing total cost at about 1400 grammes of silver for a knight and his following at around 1250 – a month/a month and half’s wages (the Genoese shilling contained 3.947 grammes of silver at the beginning of the 13th century). Contamine, War, pg 95
“The mounts were even more expensive”… “In 1277 Florence took into service a number of Provencal horseman and in the clauses of their contract it was stated that each of them should have a horse wroth at least £30 (133 days of wages)”. Contamine, War, pg 96
o Italian republics appointed commissioners “ad equos imponendos” (to impose a cavalry obligation). “At Florence, for example, the number of horses raised in 1260 was 1400, in 1310 1,000 and in 1312, 1,300”. Contamine, War, pg 96
o “Officials were required not only to impose the cavalry obligation, but to inspect, review and value the horses and to investigate claims to compensation for death or injury”. Daniel Philip Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian, pg. 51
o “From this bundle of fragmentary and sometimes discordant facts, it is permissible to conclude that in the 13th century the capital represented by the defensive and offensive equipment and the mounts of a knight and his following represents on average between 6 and 8 months’ daily wages”. Contamine, War, pg 97
-On Florence’s Communal Army Early Communal
o The exact composition of host remains unknown absence of sources. What is known it was made by horsemen and foot soldiers (Fiesole is attacked ‘a cavallo e a pie’ in 1110 and 1125 according to Villani and Villari). Waley, Daniel “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 71,
o Accompanied by the waggon (carroccio), emblem of civic patriotism. Waley, Daniel “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 71
o A Florentine promise to assist Siena in 1201 promises a relief force of a hundred cavalry, 1000 foot (of which some would be archers). Waley, Daniel “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 71 and Santini, pg 63-4
o It is highly probable that this citizen army was, from the start, a paid force. The first undoubted evidence of pay for Florentine soldiers relation to horsemen ‘chosen to serve with the Emperor’. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 72
o Unlike Siena, the Florentines did not employ mercenaries on such a great scale since no trace has survived in chronicles or elsewhere (compare with section on MONEY/Contract/Paid Soldiering). Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 73
o The Florentine capacity to withstand the Sienese, a power who employed professional soldier on a much larger scale, and even force them to accept unfavourable peace terms suggests that the amateur city militia was not merely a spontaneous, disorganized, levee en masse. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 73
o Furthermore the fact that only one third of the city’s infantry was summoned to campaign in a year (ctrl f 1222) invalidates claims that ‘each campaign interrupted the entire activity of the city’. It was very common to summon to arms, according to specific pairings of sesti (‘un ordine molto antico’), 3/6 (Oltrarno/Borgo/S.Pancrazio or S. Pier Scheraggio/Porta Del Duomo/Porta S. Pietro) or 2/6 (Oltrarno/S. Pancrazio or Scheraggio/Borgo or Porta Duomo/Porta S. Pietro) of city’s sesti . Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 74 and Villiani, VI, 40
1240 as golden age of Florentine communal strength and authority in Tuscany, Villani in a sort of Stoic Latin way reminisces about this period suggesting it was one of great sobriety, were the moral fibre of society was strong and intact, ‘men kept good faith and loyalty with the city and with each other’ where ‘The Florentines were united by the good Popolo, they served in person in the host on horse or foot, openly and with a good heart’ and their prowess brought triumph and glory to Florence from all sides’. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 74 and Villian, VI, 52, 70, 76
Much of what is known about the Florentine army in the 2nd half of the 13th century is due to the survival of the libro di Montaperti, an archival source written before one of Florence’s heaviest defeats. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 74
Definite feature of armies of 1250 and 1260 which probably existed before and are confirmed by Montaperti. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 74-76 and Villani VI, 39-40 and Il libro di MOntaperti 103-77, 312-38
o The advent of the government of the Primo Popolo (that which kicked out the Ghibellines led by Fredrick II son, Fredrick of Antiochia) sees the politicization of the army, the 20 companies of pedites were to be employed for domestic strife and
suppression of a comeback of the nobility. These companies however do not appear as units within Montaperti.
o The infantry was grouped up by the usual regional division (popoli) and within these they were grouped in platoons of 25.
o Within the book, and probably originating within the prescriptions of the primo popolo, each sesto was allotted (for military organization) a portion of the Florentine contado.
o Command was excercised by the Podesta’ and a council of twelve captain (two from each Sesto. The liber de Regimini Civitatum, written around that time, also assumes that the Podesta’ shall command the host while on campaign, inspiring the men through his words and presence (i.e. tent at the middle of the camp), punishing those who are remissive but not fighting the battle personally. In 1260, the Podesta’ was a foreigner, Giacopo di Rangone of Modena. And Liber de Regimine Civitatis, ed. G. Salvemin in Biblioteca Iuridica Medii Aevi vol. III (Bologna, 1901) pg 268-75.
o The number of Sesti called onto arms varied, i.e. the war in the Casentino saw the the involvement, at various stages of the war, of 3, 4 or 5 sesti. and Villani VI, 47-48, and VII, 19.
o Each Sesto had its own cavalry the obligation to provide this falling on certain individuals and groups of relatives (consorts), these were selected by special official (ad equos iponendos) and had to maintain a horse or horses on behalf of the city. They didn’t serve have to serve in person, permitting them to provide a substitute (i.e. a younger relative or suitable rider). The consort system meant, as Montaperti shows, that horses of city were owned jointly thus the consorts were the joint heirs of a man on whom the obligation had previously fallen. The obligation thus rested on a combination of relatives such as brothers or fathers and sons. This system were one may owe service of serval horses to city, and several men might jointly owe one horse was to secure maximum mobilization of city’s cavalry potential and Montperti, 291-308, and Santini, vol ii, 394.
o Infantry not a homogenous forces but made of a number of specialized elements. Each sesto corps: Montaperti, 1-32, and Villani VI, 40
Separated archers from crossbowmen, each with their own brigated and stardard-bearers.
Infantrymen equipped only with hoes and stakes were also similarly separated.
The pavesarii (shield-men) were under three standard each heading the men coming of two Sesti. This grouping were employed occasionally as sappers (guastatori) and to defend the provision-train.
The pack train was orgainzed in two corps A special bodyguard under a single commander was appointed and charged
with the defence of the carroccio. The camp follower were placed under the command of another captain or
banner-bearer. The libro of Montaperti is the only instance of an exact record documenting the composition
and recording the prescriptions of an army which fought during a Florentine campaign of the 13th century. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 76
o Composition . war: An army of nearly exclusively paid Florentines.
All sesti appeared to be present in the host. Montaperti, 83 The Sesto of S. Pancrazio provided approximately 2/15 of city pavesarii
force. Montaperti, 17-27. Based on this we may say, quite forcefully however, that they provided a similar amount of cavalrymen. Since their sesto is recorded to have provided 185 cav then we may put the city’s cavallata to 1400 men. Part of this quota however must have been fulfilled by the quite numerous, but ultimately not calculable, “knight of the contado”. Montaperti, 97, 291-308
To the Cavallata we must add those Florentine who received a higher pay rate for they have volunteered when they had not been summoned, their number however is not known. Montaperti 42-43.
The guard of the carroccio was 48 florentine cav and 152 infantry. There were at least 200 more merc cav (from Emilia and Romagna) and
possible even more mercs. Montaperti, 38-40, 83, 96 and 45-47. Based on S. Pancrazio Pavesarii proportion and figures available, again, we
may estimate the number of unspecialized Florentine city foot. The incomplete list of foot for S. Pancrazio (seven popoli of the eight of the sesto) recorded 1058 names, on the eve of battle 531 name were reported to be absentee. Thus if S. Pan is 2/15 of the host’s infantry, the total host was about 8000 names (7935). If the absentee rate was consistent, then about ½ half of the force went missing so the remaning host on the eve of battle was about 4000 men (3968). Montaperti, 312-38.
From, June there was a force of 1000 crossbowmen, Montaperti, 97-98 The archers, of whom only ¼ of total force were called, may have been
equally numerous. Montaperti, 98. The libro records 302 pavesarii in service during February, potentially more
in summer. 3000 sappers, equipped with scythes and hoes, had been raised from the
contado. Montaperti, 98-99. As for the infantry for the contado, there is a list of 881 men from pivieri and
popoli attached to the Sesto of Porta S. Pietro. This sesto provided 1/6 of the pavesarii, and using this proportion, we may suppose that the general infantry of the contado is 5000 troops. Montaperti, 341-68.
A force of contandini was raised for local defence, but these were not part of the regular host.
The total army at the Battle of Montaperti would be of 16100 men of whom 1650 mounted. All but 200 were Florentines and all were paid.
This estimate is relatively close to Villani’s who states that the Florentine troops consisted in total of 1300 cavalry out of a potential of 3000 and though he gives a total figure of 30000 for the Florentine infantry, if we use the same proportion for it of the cavalry summoned, we can deduce that 13000 foot were called upon. A grand total of 14,300 men. Villani VI 79
o Pay rate: Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 78-79 City cav 6 l., 15 s. a month Merc cav, 8 florins a month. City crossbowmen, 3s. a day Archers, 2s. 8d. a day Pavesarii, 2s. 6d. a day
City infantry (including infantry of carroccio) 2s. a day Sappers/Pioneers 1s a day (likely paid by their own regions, as the contado
infantry was and hence excluded). Summed up this force likely came to cost about 35,000 l. per month (a large
but not enormous sum (especially compared to Siena see pay examples ON SIENA’S COMMUNAL ARMY)
The Financial burden was like likely alleviated by fines levied on absentees and defaulters (whom were many, see above estimates).
The normal fine for absence was 10l. for cav and 5l for infantry. Failure to show a costly item (lance, saddle, shield) of required equipment involved a penalty of 1l. and for cheaper items (hoes, saws) was 5 s. Failure to denounce absentees was also a fineable crime.
Enormous fine were further exacted for grave offences such as 100 l. on selling a horse imposed as an obligation by the city.
Crossbowmen could purchase exemption from service for 30s. (15s. for contandini) and 10s. for archers (but no numeric evidence is given to show how much was raised from such sources). Montaperti, 97-98, 370-376.
o Mercenaries, Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, 79 Recruited in march, by Flo emissaries, 200 cavalry (100 in Emilia – with
emphasis in Moden if not Reggio, Parma and Frignano – half in Romagna). 50 more cavalry were promised Pietro de Bazacape di Milano (i.e. letter to
Pietro of Milan promised 8 florins a month for his men who would bring one horse and hired for two months, loss of horse or arms was to be compensated by state – a condition which florentines wanted to omit from emilian-romagnan contract – and terms concerning prisoners same as below), these however are never mentioned again in the book (unlike Emilian-Romanian cav, present in May records). Montaperti, 38-40, 45-47
Further cavalry recruited from the contado of Siena. Montaperti 83, 86-87, 89-90, 92-93, 96).
The instructions of March embody terms of service: enlistment of 3 months, each group of 100 divided in two
companies of 50 officered by a GONF and 2 captain (these were required to have 3 horses each), their men one only.
Florence, through its emissaries, should try and make sure that the city pay no compensation of any kind to the troops. If unacceptable to mercs, the city might offer a mendum for horses killed or injured.
Any prisoner captured would be handed to Florentine authorities, these shall be paid 10 l. per captive, failure to make paymes would result in prisoner becoming possession of the captor. Property captured may be retained by captor.
If a merc capture he would be exchanged against a prisoner taken by his own force.
Financial details were to left to emissaries who would try and get best possible deal.
The Florentine Ghibelline decade (1260-70) results in a source-less period. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg. 80
Post 1270 and because of existence of surviving minutes of council meetings from 1280, we see that the period which leads to the semi-permanent garrisoning of Spanish merc in
Florence up to 1305 results in major military changes. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg. 80.
o Army becomes expression of Guelf military policyo Increased importance of mercenary bands which transforms Florentine army in a
complicated combination of civic militia with professional troops. Post battle of Benevento, 1266, we see the creation of a permanently standing Guelf army
by the Tuscan Guelf League. Each member of the paid a share (tallia) of this force (tallia militum societatits tallie Tuscia). Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg. 81
o From 1268 florence paid the largest share of the wages of a diverse force of Guelf Merc (as revealed by the pisan agreement to release those ‘lombards, germans, Spaniards, Catalans, and provencal mercs of the commune of Florence’) ASI vol 78 (1920), pg 80-81,
o In 1281 it was decided that the Tallia merc should be “French or foreign by language or race” and they should be “de parte guelfa”. ASI vol 78 (1920), pg 80-81,
o The men hired by each share of the army would be affair of that city and remain within the confines of that territory unless a general campaign was proclaimed.
o The army of the Tallia must have been quite small in the 1270s (with Siena, one of its wealthier components, only maintaining 29 horsemen in 1272 and in 1277-78 only 20) but grew largers by the 1280s (with Florence keeping in its pay 500 cav of a total force of 1500, which costed the city 5500 l. for just a period of two months). Le Consulte della Repubblica di Firenze, ed. A. Gerardi (Florence, 1896-8), vol I, pg 188, 196, 225, 229-30, 250-2.
o In 1288 the total cavalry force of the Tallia was 500 but Florence prodided and additional force of 300 merc. Villani, VII, 120
o Florentine opinion on size of Tallia changed continuously according to different and councils and facilitated by the fact that Tallia contracts/arrangements lasted only few months (while in 1291 it wanted to reduce its quote from 500 to 300 horsemen, the next year vs Pisans, the Florentines pushed for a general league force of 2500 cav and 20000 infantry of which Florence would offer 300 cav and 2000 inf beyond its rightful share).
Development by the side of mercenaries between 1270 and 1305. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 94.-96
o Citizen element and contribution to war host still requested of Florentines (develop in mixed forces).
o Continued to call on 2 or 3 sesti to serve as the infantry of the host for 10 days or two weeks (even ingenious alternatives like calling onto 2/3 of the sesto force or only ¼ while the remaining 3 paid the fighting men).
o As a result the city and contado could with ease must a force of 6000 or even 15000 men. And Villiani, VII, 148 and VIII, 52-3 and Consulte, vol 1. Pp 177-9, 218-30 vol II, 263.
o The cavallata (obligation to keep a horse for service) survived as an effective and important institution. During the war of 1288-92 it was normal for 500 or 600 citizens to be in receipt of the Cavallata payment (40 florins a year) and the number was even raised to 800 (and potentially 1000) by summer of 1282. The Cavallata troops received 10 or 15 s a day as well other than the 40 florins p.a. Attempt to make it a civic duty or to impose a progressive connotation to it (cavallata without salary for
rich men) always failed. And Villani, VII, 120 and Consulte, I, 329-30, 407-8, 423-4, 492 and II, 66, 234.
o A general reluctance by the Florentines to serve as mercenaries in foreign campaign (i.e. Romagna in 1281-82 and with Siena in 1285, it failed even when as few as 24 men were sought). And Consulte I, 46-49, 89-90, 332-3
o The citizens were paying to be reinforced not superseded. The composition of the army remain flexible and subject to discussion (as seen during deliberations in 1285 for campaign vs. Pisa that never materialized). And Consulte, I, 208-58
Force should be augmented by Mercs cav of several hundreds The contado would provide a large infantry body The Cavallata was the controversy (over issue of remuneration and financing
– i.e. heavier taxation for those only serving as a garrison, those not called should provide the money for those who did, the city cav should not compensated at all).
Disagreement over how man cavalry men should be provided by each sesto. When debating over aid to send Siena we get a glimpse of composition of
relief force: 400 foot and 50 merc cav sent promptly, argument rose over further reinforcement some wished to send more cav only, other wanted to send a force of 1000 inf split in equal shares from city and contado and further debate on size of city contribution and volunteer recruitment. And Consulte vol. I, 319-31.
o Army of Campaldino comp (better documented) in 1289: Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 97 and Davidsohn, Geschichtem vol II, 2, pg 339-53
City Cavalry supplemented by Campagnan merc and the 100 of Amauri of Narbonne.
1000 of 1600 cav total on battle day the 11th of June were in Florentine pay (400 merc and 600 Florentines).
If similar proportions prevailed, Florence then provided 6000 infantry to host.
Of these 400 florentine cav and 2000 foot were lent to lucca for 25 days in August and a similar force was used again Arezzo – in vain- in November.
o Similar debate between 8 speaksers on composition of force can be found on discussion in 16 April 1296 during ad hoc council to consider military aid for Bologna. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 97 and Consulte, II, 542-3.
100 merc cav + 400 Flo inf (200 pike and 200 crossb) was the acceptable baselnie
Debate again on size of cavalry element of the city (from 30 to 150). Ultimately 50 cav with a socius (squire) would be called.
o Not matter the debate, 1289 composition at Campaldino had become a sort of standard for the armies of the communal age. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 97
Against Pistoia in 1302 the Florentine host was 500 cav and 7000 inf (1000 of which were pioneers and sappers). Horse where all Florentines, 1000 of foot were merc, the remaining infantry was 4000 contandini and 750 specialists (crossb and shieldbearers). And C. Paoli, ASI, vol 6 pt. 2 (1867) 3-16
The pay of all inf amounted at one florin per month and that of cav 9 florins (meaning the wages of the small cavalry element counted to 40% total campaign expense).
o These mixed armies, with an important citizen element, or uncontestably proves by chroniclers, unreliable figures for the campaign of 1288-93 and indisputable financial account for 1302 army vs Pistoia. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg
The Cavallatao A burdensome prescription on city finances (just for service without action they owed
to a 500 man troop 20,000 florins) which had to be financed by special tax first record for Florence in 1266 ( or such as that of Siena which was first imposed in 1252 on city and contado). ): Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 95 and Libri dell’ entrata e dell’ UScit, vol. 8, pp 49-58 (1252)
o The necessity of a tax didn’ t mean it ineffective or anachronistic, while perhaps it may be suggested that Florentines were remissive to fight as seen in the difficulty in raising troops to fight as volunteers in Romagna or in the granting of exemption from service to 200 man on payment of 20 florins each, there were large number of Florentines on horseback fighting at Campaldino and at Altopascio. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 95 and Consulte, Vol I, 407-8.
o The tax imposition was rather using the military obligation as an excuse for taxation not for replacing cavalry service by commuting it into cash payment, ‘a cavallata fittizia’. The fiscal schemes of 1288, 1290,and 1304 were means of extracting 20 to 50 florins onf well to do citizens fo the class which was generally liable for the cavallata Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 95-96 and Compagni, Cronica, p. 170.
o Responsibility fell on citizens who possessed property of 500 florins or more, they had to assemble by sesti when summons went forth and had to muster -at their own expense- a war horse worth not less of 35 florins and not worth more than 70. Failure to answer the call to arms must even be compensated by providing a substitute or presenting a valid excuse (defensio, like age or sickness). Otherwise a fine of 50 florins was levied. Bayley, War and society, pg. 7-8
Changes in Warfareo The presence of paversarii and crossbowmen in Florentine army against Pistoia in
1302 seems to suggest that abandonment of the use of infantry en masse in favour of corps d’elite. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 97-99 and Pieri ‘Alcune questioni sopra la fanteria in Italia nel period comunale’ 597-609.
Seen also in Charles of Anjou demand of Tuscan archers, crossbowmen, pikemen and pavesarii against the Vespers and these units played an important part at Campaldino.
But does not appear truthful, merc companies of crossbowmen had been recruited by Siena ever since 1231, furthermore in 1292 large amounts of infantry were still being used/demanded (i.e. the Tallia is made to raise 20,000 foot consulte II, 265) and at Montaperti in 1260 the Florentines engaged 2000 specialized troops to fight the Sienese (a grand total of 14% of the Florentine army could be said to be specialized vs. 10% army fighting in 1302).
These specialized troops had already come to be valued in the 13th century and their loans were often sought (so much so that 400 specialized troops were loan by Florence to Bologna in 1296, see RIS 18 pt 1 pg 244). Their rise must have been a prior development.
o The development of mixed cav and inf merc bands was a later occurrence, at least in Tuscany. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 98
-The Florentine Contado As early as 1233 the commune maintained register of contado population in which all males
had to be recorded and their condition of dependence transcribed. (Davidshon, pg. 330-31) Existence of right of accattum held by dependant lords, an occasional subsidy (later yearly
regular tax) collected from his subject to fund various sudden expenses (including military campaigns). (pg. 331)
Obligation of Albergaria (housing and feeding of lord and his servants, also applies to troops of the commune).
All contado subjects owed some form of personal obbligation to their local lord: they had to present themselves at the summons of the lord (placiti), they owed him military service (on foot or on horse in accordance to the type of relationship with the lord), owed garrisoning duty of lord’s castle (guaita) , owed military squad/line service (superguaita) in the lord’s army during conflicts and owed castle construction corvees. (pg. 332)
With the registration of the population of the contado, we see that each Sesto of the city was assigned a portion of it (each was named in accordance to the sixth he belonged to). (Pg. 337)
A great decrease in the population of the contado born out of the destructive wars of the second half of the 13th century and the first 20 years of the 14th century and the general move to the city born out of better opportunities.
The term masniaderi originally meant non-noble knight (that is subject of a lord who worked/held some land on his behalf). With the dcadence of feudal lord and subjection to the city, they were to become subjects taxed by Florence. Such development resulted in the adoption of their name to indicate mercenary cavalryman (rather than to signify a horseman who depended on a feudatory). (pg. 342)
A collection of popoli made a parish (plebato o piviere). The popolo could be a very small grouping of people (one that could contain only 9 men) or another popolo very close to the city could not count in 1277 more than 36 men. The umber of popoli included in a parish varied (they could go from 2 or 13). Each was governed by an elected rector that rule for a year. While serving in the army, these men had the function of policing their fellow popolani. They were side by a series of nominated or elected officials (depending on the size of the popolo) known as the massai. (pg. 357)
The parishes were generally commanded by elected consuls or rettori who excercised office I the name of the commune. By 1250 this practice started dying out with the Florentines imposing on them a city Podesta or capitano. Were election remained the candidate had to be approved by the dominant commune. By 1276 all rural parish ahd to accept a Podesta nominated by the city of Flroence (considered a great honour). (358-59)
It was widespread and common to have commune defended by wall and gates or palisades or moats. Many walled villages also posses a communal bell to summon the men from the parish to war. (358-59)
Around 1250, Florence had 96 parishes – growth continued through the years and by 1322 we know the contado had been expanded to 112 parishes. (359)
Florence had within its domain 6 contado cities, there 2 further ones belonging to the bishop and Poggibonsi had a special status but after forceful conquest by Florence it swore loyalty to Florence. There existed also 3 further towns (Fucecchio, Santa roce di Valdarno, Castelfranco di Sotto) which though out of Florentine territory owed tribute as subjected to
them. San miniato, through autonomous, submitted itself to the protection of Florence. (360-61)
These cities (like Filgline) did tend, up to the mid of the 13 th century, retain a greater degree of autonomy - their Podestas allowed greater rights (like that of being able to construct defensive twoer and be in charge of their own policing and justice) but as they were all subject of the emperor, and Figline enjoyed imperial favors. This all finished when the people and the guelf ascended. By 1290 Figline’s Podesta was appointed every 6 months by Florence. (361-62)
o Similar story for Certaldo, go see if necessary.o Story for Signa: a powerful monastery city, it had a favourable position and thus
obtained right of market. Their ties to Florence start when Florences support the populations right to refuse the appointment of the rector by the local powerful prior. Slowly they are incorporated into Florence.
o Story for Empoli. Existed a series of fortified burghs like Capraia Montelupo Gangalands. (363). Clearly, Florence had a tendency to centralize the government of its contado and maintain
both cities and rural parishes subjected alike. Their subjection was further aided by the war of 1200 were the countryside came to suffer the brunt of the devastation of war. (363)
If you go and trace the genealogy of many of the great men of the time, one may notice that many come from families which immigrated from the contado to the city (Giotto, Botticelli, Andrea Dal Castagno). (364).
While Originally, by imperial decree, Florence had to have an influence diameter of 18 kilometers – by the 13th century it expansive aims blew it out of proportions going from the nearly the borders of the Bolognese up to the walls of Siena and latter would even reach the borders of Umbria (with the definite annexation of Arezzo). (364-65).
A complete list of Florentine usurpations compiled by Emperor Arrigo VII annoverated that by 1312 Florence possessed illegaly 158 castles and 60 rural districts. (364-5)
Leagues of the contado were associations of popoli which acted as organizations for military service. These were also to prevent the resurgence of the Grandi and could be mobilized for the defence of Florence or even for garrisoning duty. (365)
Their overall number changed often, in 1322 there 44. By 1355 there were 46.These leagues replaced the old rural militia companies and such transformation must have occurred in its full strength at the start of the 1300s (albeit their true function we can only extract from the captain of the people statute of 1322). They included various people around the contado – even those just outside the doors of the city and who were registed to the Florentine battistry.(365)
They were in charge of capturing rebels, defending rural areas from noble/Ghibelline violence, patrolling the road and preventing armed robbery or various other crimes, defense of the monasteries. (365).
Each league was headed by a captain or gonfaloniere, who served for a year and received a wage based on the importance of the league. There was a standard-bearer and a council of varying number. All these were elected by and from members of the league itself among those eligible to serve in the army. The council was made of a representatives of each single popolo, the greater the popolo the more representatives in the council. It also possessed an administrative apparatus which included 3 chamberlains, a notary, messangers, policeman.
The election was temporary and their appointment came to be determined by a prior through an estrazione a sorte. The more important leagues saw a direct appointment from the priori of the city (365-6).Importantly the league had not to be headed by a captain which
resided within the leagues domain itself. The captain doveva far part perte del sesto del contado interessato. All this suggested a more centralized imposition by the city on the governance of the countryside. 366
Convocation for military duty of the League was formally done in conjunction the podesta, capitano del popolo, and the priori. The priori alone however had the right to call onto the rural militias alone during time of crisis. 367
The ultimate end of the contado organization was to ensure the penetration of the city, its language and its dynamics within the contado – ultimately weakening any remenant of autonomy. (https://journals.openedition.org/mefrm/630#bodyftn7)
-On Siena’s Communal Army A similar system of consortes for cavalry obligation existed in Siena. Waley, Daniel, “the
Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 75 Widespread merc employment,
o the Sienese employing 400 Genovese crossbowmen by 1231 to who me may add 300 more from the region of Spoleto (according to entry and exit books for the Republic published in Siena in 1907 at page 148, 157-8, 176) . Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 73.
o The Sienese, against Florence, according to the Regestum Senense (pg 114) made use of cav from Latium by 1180 and mercenaries played an important role in their campaigns of 1229-1234 (the Sienese hire each year between 1229 and 31 hundreds of mercenaries from umbria, emilia, Lombardy, liguria and some France and Germany). Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 73o The earlier and initially more prevalent Presence of the expression
conestabilia/conestabileria (Andrew, if you don’t remember what it is ctrl f) within Sienese sources reflects likely the city state’s greater willingness to employ mercs. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg. 84
Siena military expenses were quite exhaustive, compared to Florence (if we consider that Siena was a smaller and considerably less wealthy city): Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 78
o Just in the 2nd half of 1261, Siena paid out more than 7000 l. (of Sienese currency) to Sienese soldiers in a time which was not of great military crisis).
o They paid well over 20,000 l to German troops during the second half of 1268. o The Cavallata had to be financed by special tax first record for Florence in 1266 ( or
such as that of Siena which was first imposed in 1252 on city and contado). ): Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 95 and Libri dell’ entrata e dell’ UScit, vol. 8, pp 49-58 (1252)
The contado: o The contadini and their communities played a fundamental role in the military
defence of the Italian city-state. Bowsky, “City and Contade”, pg 77o 3 separate vicariates mid 13th century, 1262 constitution say there was *San Quirico
in Osenna, Orgia, Montagutolo Ardenghesca. The military offices of each vicariate (commander/vicars) were paid in part by principal commune of area, rest by other communities in district. Bowsky, “City and Contade”, pg 80 and Giugurta Tommasi, Dell Historie di Siena, II, 130
o Not much is known of the vicariate, their use might even have been temporarily discontinued. In 1292 there are mentions of the contado being divide in vicariates
and serving militarily on command of the city but in 1303, after the end of the war with the counts of Maremma, their existence is debated. Bowsky, “City and Contade”, pg 81-84 and Consiglio Generale, 43 f. 34 r / 62, ff. 30 v – 32v
The issue raised by Podesta particularly concerned in particular with division of the Sienese contado in vicariates and in securing the highways/roads through such units.
This brought forth question on the relations between city and contado: in particular the right the city had to call upon all to is subjects for military assistance whereas their existed still in much of the contado private and feudal jurisdictions that claimed primacy over such issues.
These vicariates according to Messer Frederigo di messer Renaldo Tolomei would be placed under captains no less than 25 no more than 60. Ultimately also his further additions were added and passed with the council ordinances, preserving the rights of feudatories by establishing that their land (not previously in the vicariate) would not be added to the vicariate subdivision. Those already in the vicariate would remain.
o By 1303 we have three new vicariate subdivision which replace the old: Castelfranco di Paganica/Prata (both in Maremma), and Buonconvento (SE of Siena near major highway the via Francigena). Bowsky, “City and Contade”, pg 85
Each vicariate was to be captained by a knight of the family of the Podesta rather than being under jurisdiction of Captain of the people. These men were essentially police officials, their task being peace enforcement and suppression of crime. And Lisini, Costituto Dist I, r. XXXVIII-XLVII (38-48)
Gave, or confused, the vicariates a mixture of military and policing responsabilities. Mantained for at least 7 years for it was included in constitution of 1309-10.
o Guelf-Ghibelline crisis with ascension of Henry VII forces reconsideration Bowsky, “City and Contado”, pg 86-7.
Question of violence and crime and military strength/obligation of the contado had to be dealt in two separate jurisdictional categories. The administration was separated and crime remained in the hands of the Podesta, his knights, and the bands of infantry assigned to various contado districts.
The 3 vicariate districts were considered too large (and unruly especially in light of the noble discord that threatened order) to be administered effectively as such it was divided in 1310 into 9 vicaraites that contained 289 communities (see pic on phone for new subdivision pg 86). And Agnolo, 307
The new division was placed under supervision of the captain of the people, expanding his military authority within the commune. The command of vicariate was further restricted preventing it to from being assigned to foreign knights and given to Sienese urban popolani. And Bowsky, “Anatomy”, 15-17, 88f.
Further primary evidence suggest continuous experimentation with number of vicariates (in the Biccherna books only 7 vicars of the vicariates are shown to be paid 40 soldi per day in 1311– only 6 vicariates of 9 above appear in 1310 legilsation) and that the
vicariates were assigned not merely to poplani but to those loyal to the new order of nine. (see picture on phone for pg 87)
o By late 1330s further modifications (according to the major constitutional redactions), with redcation we see the listing of 9 vicariates with 299 communities. If compared with Podesta’s knights police districts of April 14 1332 there is overlap between their jurisdiction but by no means were these the same. Bowsky, “City and Contado”, pg 87, 90
The constitution specifically ordered that “all of the Sienese contado be divided and separated (into nine vicariates) and … perpetually kept so divided. And Statuti Siena, 26, Dist III, r.383, f. 189 v.
For each vicariate a captain “de populairbus civitatis senarum” was to be selected by the 9 and orders, together with a notary and messanger for each. Office of 6 month, serving on wish of 9 and orders. 6 days of each month had to spent in the lands of the vicariates (supervisors for military affairs in general rather than officials in stationary post).
Their duties were the same of those of company captains in the city, their standard bearers and of their councillors. And Statuti, Siena, Dist III, r, 380, f 189 r. and Bowsky, “Anatomy”, nn. 22, 24 ff.
Carried each their own banner assigned by the Captain of the People. Their office, that of their notaries, messengers and “familiars” (unspecified
amount) were to be subject, as for city official of the Masse and Cortine, to scrutiny/syndication by the Maggior Sindaco at the close of their office (Statuti, Siena, Dist III, r. 397, f. 193 v.
o Prescriptions and Enforcement for late 1330s, Bowsky, “City and Contado”, pg 90-96 All communities swore that they would be loyal to their vicars, failure to
comply 25 lire fines (within 10 days the captains had to assign the fines to the Captain of the People). And Statuti, Siena, Dist. III, r. 397, f. 193 v.
At times of alarms the vicariates, and the 5000 from the elite corps of the contado, could be called to defend/guard the city.
Those not called to arms were to remain in their districts, disobedience a fine of 100 lire and amputation if not paid within a month.
If anyone, during times of alarm, went to serve a private individual instead of the city he would be fined for 25 lire. And Statuti, Siens, Dist III, r. 396, f. 193 v.
What we may deduce from this is that not all of the contado were part of the military districts, likely there were the same requirements for military eligibility that had been placed in the city (i.e. must be of the ruling party, loyal to the new order).
Failure by the vicariate to send the designated armed men to Siena resulted in an enormous fine: a sum equal to that community’s entire annual contado gabelle taxation. Further disobedience to any orders of the Nine could be fined 100 lire and Statuti, Siena, Dist III, r. 395, f. 193 v.
Murky jurisdiction between Captain of the People and Podesta, with the vicariates being directed by the CoP when Siena was threatened directly but specific military expedition were organized and directed by the Podesta (despite the existence of the war captin designated as the Lead of Siena’s army).
Ad Tempus provision: the 9 selected official for Terzo to prepare a list of all between 20 and 60 in the contado and to arrange them groups of ten or fifty (or other suitable fashion) so that their names would be available when Siena called for contado troops. And Statuti, Siena, 15, ff. 242 r -243 v.
The city further manifested control on the contado through prescriptions which stated that the 9, the podes, the CoP, or any designated official could command the contado communities to dispatch footsoldiers to Siena or elsewhere. A community would be fined 60 soldi for each absent trooper from first day of summons (and for each further day 20 more soldi had to be paid), the soldier himself would be fined 20 soldi (and thereafter 10 soldi a day).
Contado communities were not allowed to substitute service with foreign mercenaries, they had to send men from their own communities from 20 to 60 years old. Failure to comply to such standard a fine of 40 soldi for each ineligible man.
Although the contado troops were paid by their own communities, the contado towns could deduct such expense from the annual gabelle taxation owed to Siena -on some occasions the Sienes commune directly reimbursed the contado in chas.
All the fines had to be imposed by the Podesta 15 days after stipulated military service was completed and collection must occurs in a month from imposition. Neglicence in imposition and collection of these fines would have cost the Podesta a 100 lire by the maggior sinadco. And Statuti, Siena, 26 Dist I, r. 341, f. 76 r.
Lords and lands subject to Sien, but not within contado, owed service (military as well) as defined by special pact/acts of capitulation known as ‘capituli’.
The commune of Montepulciano agreed in June 13 1294 that whenever a general army was field by Siena the commune would contribute 500 infantry of its subjects at her own expense and would maintain them in the field so long as the Sienese army was fielded. A partial army fielded by Siena (i.e. one of the terzi) was to be supplemented by the commune 200 inf of her own subjects. And Checchini, Il Caleffo Vecchio del Comune di Siena, 3 vols., (Fonti di Sotria Senese: Florence, 1932-34) No. 992, vol III, pp. 1387-1393 e pg 1389 – see picture on phone of pg 94).
Travale, in 1317, agreed to allign its diplomatic stance with that of Siena, it would accept Sienese troop in its castles for making war, and when a full army was fielded Travale would contribute 40 well armed men and fifteen when army was only partially raised. If a Sienese army was to be made of all stipendiaries, Siene can require from Travale 20 well-armed men these however being maintained at Sienese expense.
Perolla in 1331 promised to field and maintain 10 well armed infantrymen at its own expense and for as long as Siena field an army by terzi, it further promised to provide 25 soldier whenever Siena had an army in certain parts of Maremma.
Count Ranierus of Elci submitted to Siena for himself and his heir in perpetuity, he promises to align himself to Siena diplomatically and to field an army personally or through his vassals at the Podesta or commune of Siena’s and the Nine’s request (or at the request of any other authority existing in Siena) And Capitoli, 2, ff. 541 r- 542 v.
Even the once mighty Sienese foes the Aldobrandecschi counts of Santa Fiora promised in 1345 to align themselves diplomatically to Siena and to make war and peace at Siena’s will and to allow Sienese troops to pass through their domain unmolested and to refuse asylum to acknowledged rebels of Siena. If Siena was to field an army south of the river Orcia river then the Aldobrandeschi must, on request of any authority In Siena , send 6 well armed cav and 25 well armed inf at their own expense. These must be maintained until the army remains standing.
o By 1347 addition of 2 further vicariates, 11 in all (cthe 11 made from some districts assigned to knights of the Podesta for police purposes, some of the earlier vicariates, and the new vicariates of Asciano and Arcidosso). Bowsky, “City and Contado”, pg 88-89
A deliberation of the signory from Dec, 1347 reveals that the vicariates were commanded by captains (not anymore vice). Such captains and those of the 3 vicariates of the Mass were selected by the nine and other orders of the city for 6 months’ offices. All eight of the captains which can be identified by family were of the nine party – thus they still exerted oligarchical control over the military districts. ASS, Concistoro, 2, f. 62 r-v and Agnolo, pg 519
See picture on phone for pg 89, what is Massa?o That with the contado was an ad hoc military and administrative arrangement
initially, through the vicariates i.e. military districtst the arrangement was to become a nearly universal military obligation imposed upon the entirety of the contado through their formalization as institutions. Bowsky, “City and Contado”, pg 96-98
A uniform system of military service supervise and directed by the urban Sienese popolani and led by those men most loyal to the new oligarchic order, the Noveschi themselves.
Two separate jurisdiction for military matter and policing ones: the latter left in the hands of the Podesta, the former assigned large part to the Captain of the People (now a purely communal official rather than the leader of a semi-autonomous organization of the Popolo).
A partial triumph by the Commune in retaining within the vicariate division lands of natural lords who had been included prior to constitutional debates. This meant that the Siena managed to impose its sovereignty over some of the wealthiest, most powerful, influential and essential members of the Sienese citizenry. Many however despite capitulation to the commune where under special pacts and retained a series of rights which enabled thme to remain apart from the contado.
The Italian city state not a unired and homogenous political unit but composed of server entities of distinct status bound in differing degrees of closeness and obligation to central gov.
Sienese Army Equipment
o Each contado troops, and those provided by the towns of the Masse, had to be fully equipped with offensive and defensive weapons. Bowsky, “City and Contado”, pg 92
Each man had to have at least a headpiece, neck guard, a shield, knife, short spear (spontone), exe (manaria), long lance, and a light throwing lance (spedo) or a crossbow.
An incompletely equipped soldier would cost the community a 5 soldi fine. Siena’s Army recruitment:
o Political recruitment: The mercantile-banking oligarchy of the “nine”, that is the nine governors and defenders of the commune and people who rules the city through such bimensal magistracies, dictated severe requirements to enter office – though they could be of burgher or noble origin they could not include judges, notaries, physicians and members of the casati (proscribed magnates houses). Bowsky, “City and Contade”, pg 78
Siena army compositiono The city contributed considerable amount of citizens to war effort serving as
mounted cav or infantry/crossbowmen). Bowsky, “City and Contade”, pg 78 and Bowsky “The anatomy of rebellion in 14th century Siena; From commune to Signory” (Los Angeles and Berkeley, 1970)
o Aid provided by the official families of leading foreign magistrates (especially the podesta, the captain of the people, and from 1323 the war captain), each providing a masnade of 50 cav and 100 inf. Bowsky, “City and Contade”, pg 78-79 and Biccherna, 149, ff. 111r, 125 v, 165 v and Statuti, Siena, 26, Dist IV, r. 87, f. 213 r (see pic on phone)
o Considerable employment of merc constable and thir masnade of infantry or cav supplemented the force. Bowsky, “City and Contade”, pg 78
o The contado provided a large and essential element, in March 1292 providing the city with 3000 inf. And as many as 7000 inf from the contado must have percolated in 1318 against the commune of Massa Marittima (chroniclers however often fail to distinguish) . Bowsky, “City and Contade”, pg 78 and Consiglio Generale, Deliberazione, 43 ff. 40 v – 41 r. and Agnolo di Tura (AG) , Cronache Senesi (CS), + anon Cronichle Siena, Ris XV, VI, AG: pg 351, 371, 503/CS:145, 169, 371(?)
o In 1302 creation of a special force of contado inf known for their patriotic zeal from the 9 vicaraite (military districts) of the contado. These were to act as political police, crushing uprising in the contado and suppressing turmoil in the city. Their number was increased in 1310 to 5000 (pending conflict with Henry VII’s Ghibellines) their task being’ the defense of the office of the lords Nine and of the pacific state of the city of Siena”. It was these contandini which suppressed most serious threat to the Nine, the Crisis of 1318. Bowsky, “City and Contade”, pg 80 and Bowsky, “Anatomy”, n. 34, 61.
-Nature Of Communal Warfare Taken/learnt primarily from untrustworthy primary sources chroniclers. Waley, Daniel, “the
Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 71 A mixed cavalry and infantry fighting force who fought short campaigns against
neighbouring feudatories. Focused around the capturing of fortified towns or castles. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 71
The terms of military service owed to Florence by allies or dependant powers suggest campaigns, fought in summer or autumn, which lasted from two to three weeks (with a max
of one month) at least up to 13th century. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 71
The campaign of Flo vs. Siena in 1207-8 and 1229-34 remained a series of annual forays in Siena, ravaging the territory and only occasionally clashing with arms. “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 71
A growing ambition within, according to villari, Florentine campaigns – those of 1233-34 resulting in a 54 days siege of Siena in 1233 and a campaign of 53 days in 1234. “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 71
-Communal Armies Decadence As the imperial threat dissipated, the Communal Armies started seeing growing disunity. Each
army was made of autonomous companies (i.e. societates militum or companies of the people), each representing/support a faction, class, corporative, or district interest. Each as well existed as an autonomous body discipline itself and providing its own armaments. Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, 654, 656
Two internal conflict particularly tore the unity of communal armies: that between Guelf and that with the Ghibellines and that between populars and magnates. Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, 654
When political rivalry was exacerbated into conflict, the various companies (which generally were composed of a homogenous socio-economic group which lived in the same district) would be called into conflict to support their interest group. Each company would then pursue their war efforts in accordance to their interest resulting in various recorded episodes of forceful redirection of other companies war efforts, defection in favour of an external enemy, renunciations or refusing the call to arms against an external enemy. Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, 656-7
o However if one of two factions obtained absolute victory over the other, destroying communal military component, we would see the purging of the enemy’s influence (by eliminating its military organization) and absolute establishment of its military organization as the only one of the commune.
o This could only be achieved by augmenting a company’s number by hiring mercenaries or striking alliances with external power (both type of troops which had to be paid).
o As well, the elimination of rival companies put an end to armies exclusively made of communal militias, since some of their fundamental components had been eliminated.
“’The decline of the commune and of its militia’ is a conventional conjunction and the 14 th century is a time of ‘military crisis’ in which ‘the citizen militia cannot withstand the superior organization and technique of the mercenary companies’” – see Ricotti, Companie di Ventura, pg. 92 and ). Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 70
The great wealth, circulation of currency, the higher revenues of state ‘caused the citizens to lose the practice of arms and brought about the decline of the proud spirit which had animated the resistance of the town militias to Bararossa and Fredrick II’ … The Bourgeosie once the city’s infantry, had become ‘absorbed in industry and trade’. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic” (civic zeal supressed by apathy, economic specialization and ‘the cash nexus’), pg 70-71
Reasons according to Bayley: o Harsh lessons on battlefield
At Montaperti the Florentine militia and its much more numerous auxiliaries were slaughtered by German cavalry in the pay of Siena and the Ghibelline
nobles in their pay. And in G. Capponi, Storia della Repubblic di Firenze, 2 vol. (Flor, 1930) I., pg 559 and on.
Superiority of trained cavalry troops over numericall infantry amateurs. Lesson reinforced at Campaldino, the cavalry attack of nobles in Florence hire
won them the day against Arezzo. And Villani, Cronica (Drag), VII: 459-460 Further confirmation of obsoleteness of militia confirmed during Henry VII
expedition in Italy, 1310-3, were the large Florentine force headed by 1800 cavalry was defeated at Incisa leading to the Siege of Florence by an army greatly inferior in numbers.
Mixed militia and merc fores provide ineffective at Montecatino in 1315, Ugaccione della Faggiuola (lord of Pisa and Lucca) retained in his pay 800 German cavalry under command of Henry VII who slaughtered the cavalry element of the Tuscan army (led by Robert’s brothers Pietro and Filippo) forcing communal withdrawal. And Villani, ix 191-2
The enormous force mustered by Florentine to front Castruccio, after his seizure of Pistoia, surpassed all other efforts. Captained by Raymond of Cardona, it was ls made of 1880 horse (of which of 400 were Florentine knights) and 15000 foot from city and contado. It cost 3000 florins daily. At Altopascio, while the Florentine foot held its ground, the cavalry (infected by the examples of corrupted French captain) fled on charge. Their Florentine defeat and subsequent pillage of countryside forces the city to impose a new tax of 70,000 florins to hastily purchase the services of Charles of Calabria as military protector. And Villani, ix, 329, 347 (drag) and Statuti della Repubblica Fiorentina, Caggese, 2 vols. (Flor 1910, 21), I, 295 ff, II, 378 (vecchia edizione).
o Divided inner conflict of citizen body The ever reliance on the noble elements to survive military crisis led to rising
unruliness among them so much that there was the need, through the ordinance of justice of 1293, to form a political police made of 1000 militia men of the popular faction who could inflict heavy judicial penalties on nobles.
The nobles, fundamental to military apparatus of new regime, nourished a resentment which prevented loyalty to the Popolo grasso regime. A potential existential threatening vacuum and challenge. Despite noble service in exchange for annulment, the city inflicted statutory penalties of increasing severity through the re-enactment of the ordinances in 1306, 1309, 1321, and 1324. And Leonardo Bruni, Historiarum Florentinarum Libri XII. Pg 83.
When the numerically large, 20000 men, but untrained and undisciplined Florentine army was about to face Castruccio Lucchese army before Prato we see the toll the internal political conflict could place on army. The noble elements of Florence’s army resist popular demand for immediate attack on ground that they would fall easy to victim to Lucchese professional troops. Furthermore, they complained against the Ordinances of Justice ire-enacted in 1321 suggesting that they reduced their status in a community which they were expected to defend. This nurtures suspicions in popular faction, thinking that the nobles wanted to avoid engagement to prevent prestigious victory for popular regime. As a result political pressure are put on civil authorities (the priors) who dictate strategy forcing the army to join the battle forcing the host to drift aimlessly to Fucecchio. An alienated member of said nobles then attempts to seize Florence by a coup halted only by the return of the army.
o Growing wealth of the communityo Pursuit of a policy of territorial expansion which increased duration and burder of
warfare. Bayley, War and society, pg. 7-8 The death of Castruccio frees Florence from competitors, becoming itself the
aggressor. Chief target was Lucca, its military and financial capacity tooled extensively by
Castruccio’s campaigns. Led by Mastino della Scala, lord of Verona, the Lucchese put up a protracted fight which results in a 12 year conflict only resulting in Florence gain control on Luccan dependency of Pistoia (this makes the transition to merc armies very understandable since militiamen were business men and had a propensity to secure by all means possible a return to their activities even during tours as short as 20/30 days and which involved nearby locations see Villani IX, 329 (drag) people securing return home during service). And Villani, Xi, 370
In particular it the large forces required for more distant operation and more specifically the need to siege strong points (such as Montecatino) that added to the length and cost of campaigns that require a transition to newer forms of warfare. Montecatino lasted 11 months and required 2 successive levies raised from the entirety of the city before it was taken down in July 1330. And Villani, x, 145 (drag).
Extensive evidence in the Florentine Consulte by Gherardi which suggest an increasing remissiveness in serving in cavalry in person by wealthy Florentines. And Gherardi, Consulte, regarding reluctance by citizen to serve: 48-9, 90, 228, 331, 334
As well, penalty clauses for enforcing personal service in the cavallate started falling in disuse (cavallata in pecunia) and Consulte, vol I, I, 408
General mobilization also seriously affected industrial production by withdrawing masses of men from the loom and the workshop. And Villani, IX, 278 (drag) closing all places of business in 1323 when relieving prato.
Prospect of capture meant also to have to dip in one’s own resources to pay ransom.
Numbers of fully armed and equipped milititi di cavallate dwindled inexorably from 800 in 1260 to 600 in 1289, and to a mere 300 in 1325. Though 600 citizens were still subject to maintain a horse for service in 1339, there citizens did not normally serve in person but through substitute. A decline in marshal spirit, according to Villani where the number of elite cavalry (cavlieri di corredo) had sunk from 250 in 1293 to 75 in 1338 and fewer citizens by the second date were ready to assume the honour. And Villani, Xi, 324 (drag)
Attempts to incentivize citizen service, i.e. 1335 statute offered a subsidy of 50 florins to all recipients of dignity. Bonaini, Statuto Guelfo, pg 41
o Villani suggests that during Henry’s expedition the weakness and passivity of communal armies derived either from faintheartedness or lack of firm leadership. Bayley, War and society, pg 4-5 And Villani, IX 174 (drag)
Further symptomized by ready acceptance of professionals as lords/captains of the city (like King Robert of Naples or Diego del Ratta).
A newfound propensity to hire/purchase military aid among the European nobility or captains of bands (who prove unreliable often). Bayley, War and society, pg 5
o In 1316, Phillip of Valoi and John of Luxemburg, king of Bohemia, are approached with no avail. And Villani, Ix, 188 (drag), 194 (drag)
o The Republic ultimately resolved to hire a band of mercaneries, partly, German from the March of Friuli. Their Captain, Jacpopo de Fontanabouna, was bribed by Castruccio Castracane (duke of Lucca, ghibbeline, and most pressing threat to Florentine Guelf commonwealth) to join the enemies following. And Villani, IX, 273 (drag)
o The general paralysis of the militia and host encourages the priors to hire as stipendiaries a force of 600 French cav which arrive in 1324. Immediate attempt by Castruccio to bribe their captains, though frustrated some leeway by 1325 campaign. Bayley, War and society, pg 6 and Villani, ix, 292, 321 (drag)
o Charles of Calabria, pact concluded 1325, installed him in Florence for 10 years where he brings a following of 1000 knights. He was to receive 200,000 florins annualy with power to declare war and make peace. Results in general withdrawal of wealthier Florentine from cavalry service (so much so that at Battle of Santa Croce on 1327 only a couple hundred natives flanked Charles cavalry). The captain again proves dubious diverting great funds from city in only 2 years (500,000 florins – 1326-1327) and providing untrustworthy security (abandoning Florence in defence of his father’s kingdom from possible invasion when Ludwig of Bavaria marches to Rome to get crowned) And Villani, X, 28, 31 (drag).
Eventually the newfound propensity is formalized in a code, reformed by a commcials under Francesco Biliotti in September 1337, which regulated the Florentines Republic relations with stipendiaries. Bayley, War and society, pg 9-11
o This became a pressing necessity after the 100000 florins raised in 1336 for hired troops vs Lucca had been abused by the responsible functionaries for hiring and controlling stipendiaries, the ufficiali della condotta.
o The code was further amended in 1363 and 1369. o The revised version established that: and Canestrini, 500-3
Official could engage on their own authority no more than 800 horse and 1000 foot. The consent of priors, the gonfalonier of justice and that of their twelve colleagues of buoni homini (or the majority of them) was required before the officials could proceed with enrolment of troops exceeding the number.
The official cannot recruit any citizen, contadino or any Italian without the approval of above magistrates.
The Italian cav cannot exceed 15 men in each bandier of 20 to 50 horse. No Italian was to recive in wages more than ten pounds in small florins monthly. Each masnada of 50 foot must at least include 20 foreigners. Contracts were to be limited initially for 6 months, these could be renewed for a
further 6 by majority vote of officials. An initial condotta of over 6 month was possible if it was voted by secre scrutiny
and received a 2/3 majority among the officials (of the condotta office) and their superiors (those mentioned above).
o No rooted objection to enrolement of substantial amounts of Italians in the the armed forces of the republic.
o The power of veto enjoyed by the high officials prevented nepotism of officials when hiring and paying Italian condottieri and could prevent the indiscriminate engagement of Italian nationals of doubtful loyalty.
o Short contracts, yet flexible, worked on the basis that warfare was tendiatally brief, seasonal. It facilitated the dismissal of ineffective or unruly mercenary forces and it enabled the gov to reduce expenses quickly when conflict ceased.
o Further provisions: and Canestrini, 505-11 Officials had to compile full and up-to-date records of all mercenaries engaged. Officials were empowered encouraged to inspect troops as many times deemed
necessary (the merc captain had to produce an initial muster roll of his troops within two days of the payment of the first month’s wages). The roll (consignatio) was to be delivered to the officials which in turn sent their consegnatori armed with these rolls to assess all field and garrison troops, comparing their on paper strength with the one in actual display.
Discrepancies in equipment of personnel were noted by the accompanying ufficiali dei defecti who would have to reports all defects in 3 days. These official were to receive legitimate excuses of the merc captain for deficiencies within 15 days of the muster, failure to do so would result in a reduction of the company’s pay proportional to the magnitude of the defects reported.
If the officiali dei defecti were found to be corrupt, their illegal gains were congiscated by the gov and in addition they paid a fine of 200 florins and were ermantnetly excluded from office.
Despite muster, as argued by mercs, became harder during times of war (for the rapid movements of field forces made it hard to assemble all troops for review on demand) – it also served to check those mercs prevening them from indulging in predatory raids conducted on personal enterprsise.
The must provision was to be loosened as prestige and trustworthiness of captains would increase. By the second half of the 14th century only a full muster of the cavalry was demanded during the 6 months contract. If none were held, a further month of grace was allowed.
By the fifteenth century great condottieri’s like Francesco Sforza, were able to impose their condition, obtain complete exemption from muster duties. Canestrini, 150
A defective merc company -on first muster- resulted in a fine of its captains of 200 florins (probably from their wages). If defects persisted at 3rd muster, the captain was broken (cassato – cacciato?) and his wages stropped. And Canestrini, 512 From this we may infer that at least 3 musters were taken during the 6 month contract.
o The loosening of contractual conditions, like the muster, weakened efficacy of sanctions through which the Republic enforced the contract. Bayley, War and society, pg 11
Le polize de’ defecti which were presented to the city chamberlains after each muster, on which deduction from company wages were based, came to be subject to great fraud and deception.
Peasants were used to fill holes in ranks of foot, armed for the review and then immediately dismissed.
Weapons were borrowed by force or persuasion from civil population. Troops from one company were sent to another to swell the depleted
ranks of those under scrutiny. Captains of cavalry and their cavalieri, who had to have respectively
horses worth 50 and 30 florins, borrowed local horses for the muster. Often they did so from religious houses. Even more often missing horses
were reported as a casualty of war, their loss – as established by contract- had to be compensated by the republic. (this concession came to disappear from contracts) – the Emandada equorum is denied by Florence for the first time in 1363-64 and Canestrini, 55, 58
Furthermore Chamberlain were not allow to pay any company until list of defects had been deposited. After the 14th century however the chamberlains were empowered to disburse 4/5 of the wages due event if list had not been presented. Only the remaining fifth would be subjected to deduction for defect and would be disbursed after the list arrived. And Canestrini, 533-4
With ultimate immunity from muster, the stipend of troops was automatically regardless of shortcomings.
o Clauses to ensure faithful and continuous service, Bayley, War and society, pg 12-13 Inserted in 1363 as response to events of 1362. In 1362 the Pisan garrison of
Peccioli when besieged by Florentine italo-german mercs, the pisan garrison offered surrender for bribe. The besiegers demand double pay for current month from gov for their first pay had provided the necessary bribe from the public funds. The government refused says that double pays was received only for a decisive victory in the field vs opposing force with at least 200 horses, renumeration was prohibited if a strong point was won by pact or agreement. As a result, 3 of the Italian captains with 1000 horses withdrew from Florentine service to form the new company of the Cappelleto. The republic nonetheless stood strong and exacted fresh oath of fidelity from the remaining condottieri still excluding double pay. And M. Villani, Cronica, XI, 419-420 (Drag)
The question of double pay was brought forth again after Galeotto Malatesta was appointed captain-general of Florence on the 17th of July 1364, he forced the insertion of a double pay clause in his contract before accepting supreme command. Furthermore, his victory over Pisans at Cascina on the 29th of July reopened the dispute with all Malatesta soldiers threatening 18 th of August to strike and suspend military operations. Florence yielded. M. Villani, Cronica, XI, 492 (drag)
Ultimately double pay was allowed by Flo in a redrafted double pay clause – double pay was to be allowed if an enemy force of at least 500 horse had been drive the field of battle, only troops engaged in the battle would receive double pay and this would be withheld if the mercs to not surrender all prisoners and booty to the city. And Canestrini, 545
o Spoils of war matter of everlasting contention. Bayley, War and society, pg 13-14 In 1337 established practice prescribed that lands, castle and other immovable
should fall to the republic. Harness armour and mobilia in general were claimed by the solidery who were also at liberty to profit from the ransom of prisoners of war. Rebels and enemies of state however had to be surrendered to the city after receiving compensation in proportion to his rank. And Canestrini 546
Marginal cases which were not unregulated (source of discontent), i.e. movable in castles – claimed by condottieri as was standard but republic maintained property rights of them as part of captured castles (ultimately a compromise was reached – if castle taken by assault movables went to troops – if taken per trattato moveables went to Repubblic). and Canestrini, 129
The compensation for prisoners surrendered to the city was the fruit of the city’s inability to enforce their will over the condottieri. Despite attempts by
Florentines to pressue the mercs to yield prominent POW, Mercs stood their ground.
Nor could the Republic ensure that the capitano della Guerra, the republican official who nominally commanded all condottieri, receive 1/10 of all spoils taken during his office. By 15th century mercs gained express immunity from this ‘tax’ in their contracts. And Canestrini, 51
Types of Condotta and contracts, Bayley, War and society, pg 14-15o Contract ranged from 4 or six months with possibility of further renewal of equal period.
The shortness of such condotta allowed economic flexibility for employer and cohere to their expectations of war (operations halted in winter).
o In times of war, or impending war, the merc were paid a soldo intero (full pay). If not service a mezzo soldo, half pay.
o Could attempt to retain disengaged merc future service by obtaining a lien (in aspetto) in exchange of nominal payment.
o A fourth type, la condotta di garanzia, obliged the entire company to refrain from attack against Florence and its territories for an agreed period in return for a stipulated payment. And Canestrini, 72
o The shortness of contract resulted in mercs often leveraging their position by slacking off in final months before end of contract or approaching other (previously enemy) employers, often inducing renewal or resulting in tranferance of allegiance. To avoid the latter republic added clauses which forbade the companies to wage war against Florence after a set time from end of contract. And Canestrini, 129
o Mercs also were not allowed to depart (licenza) unless service found satisfactory by 2/3 majority of the ufficiali della condotta. This was a symptom of gorwing competition for the service of prominent leader, were request to depart might either consist in an attempt to pressure renewal or potentially jump ship. Financial pressure, i.e. suspending wages, might would often result in departure for another captain without licenza. And Canestrini, 529
Attempts to revive communal militia often ended in failure, especially in 1353 against Grand Company. , Bayley, War and society, pg 22-24
o Late in 1353 300 prominent citizens called for cavalry service, these reduced their obligations for a payment of 100 lire and thus these were assured that they would not be obliged to serve outside the city in the coming year except perhaps to garrison castles of the republic.
o Attempt to revive Guelfic League results in a triple alliance with Siena and Perugia and revival of the Taglia Guelf, a standing merc force for defence of alliance of 2000 merc cav and a retinue of foot infantry made from the communal militia of the cities. However each ccity was to concerned with its own security – the weak cohesion was exploited by the Grand Company/Monreale resulting in separate agreement with Perugia and Siena which isolated Florence.
o Florence attempted to raise additional recruits with a popular assembly vesting the signoria with the power to impose a prestanza (forced loan) of whatever amount. Monreale’s company however had been englobing all the available manpower and buying much of the supply of iron – leaving the defences of Florence well under-staffed and under-supplied.
o As a result the Grand Company start ravaging the Florentine contado (in particular they target the Vadelsa – at Staggia and at San Casciano) . And M. Villani, III: 301, 316-7 And Stefani, Cronaca, XXX, rubr. 661
o Public discontent in Florence against the Guelfic gov was fanned by older more conservative Guelfs who capitalized on the general discontent of wealthy landed citizens (who saw their contado lands ravaged by mercenaries) and that of the lesser citizenry/plebes (who had recently immigrated to the city and were still tied to contado by tradition and family). The discontent erupts in violent street demonstrations which harm and disrupt the operation of mercenaries hired in defense of Florence.
o As a result, 2 envoys (Ridolfi and Cavoni) are sent to reach an accord with Monreale at any cost. Together with an initial bribe of 3000 florins given to Monreale’s subordinates, an agreement was finally reached on the 7th of July were 25000 Florins were paid in exchange for the promise of immunity to Florentine territory for 2 years. And M. Villani, IV, 316, 318 (Drag)
With the imminent advent of Emperor Charles IV in Italy, the Ricci and Alibizzi families exploit the situation to renew hostilities between themselves – arming themselves and their supporter to the teeth while also attempting to exploit the renewed Ammonizioni law (that excluding all suspected Ghibelline from public office through a vote made by the 6 Guelf captains) to reduce the influence of their enemies with the city. Bayley, War and society, pg 24 and Stefani, Cronaca, rubr. 662 ff, 674
o The very partisan and tense environment within the city made it impossible to insist on the personal performance of military duties the influential citizens who from them inconvenient or distasteful.
o Furthermore it was heavily doubted that the partisan and factional spirit ravaging the Florentine society would be overcome by the citizen soldier on the field. And M. Villani, XI, 480 (Drag)
More successful renewal of communal militia by end of non-agression pact with Grand Company in 1356. Bayley, War and society, pg 24-25
o On February 1356, a league concluded with Pisa, Perguia, Volterra lead to creation of a joint army of 1800 horse and 900 crossbowmen.
o Florence also enacted a military ordianance where 800 corssbowmen were selected from the 16 gonfaloni of the city and organized in companies of 25 under a constable. An adiditional 4000 crossbowmen were levied in the contado. These were paid with a regular stipend comaing from the revenues of the gabelle ( during peace, a constable received 40 soldi a month - rank and file receiving 20 soldi a month, during war the wages were increased respectively by 6 florins and 3 florins). This force was subject to muster and review every 3 or at most 4 months. The levies were drilled regularly and a highly embellished bow was awared to the best marksman. And M. Villani, VI, 523-4 (Drag).
o The main concern was allowing the Grand Company (a predominantely mounted band) access to the Tuscan plains were they could systematically pilage the Florentine countryside while also retain the tactical advantage in fielded battles (the Republic cavalry being less trained and numerous). As a result the Florentines opt to block their invasion route by denying them entry on the Appenine passes. This explains the emphasis on missile infantry who was well adapted to to fight against cavalry on this unfavourable terrain.
o As a result when the Grand Company presented itself at the Appenine barrier in July 1356, led by Monreale’s successor Conrad of Landau, the pass garrisoned by 2500 Florentine arabalasters turned away the Company without a fight. And M. Villani, VI, 523 (Drag).
o Repeated attempts to extort the Republic asking for permission to pass through Tuscany during harvesting season where met first with attempts of bribery of company captains, when these failed, a full mobilization of the rural militia to garrison the Appenine passes was chosen but these meant that the stoutest workers would also be drawn away from field work. Nonetheless this latter solution forced the withdrawl of the company in 1357. And M. Villani, IX, 213
The Martial virtue of Florence was broken at Montaperti, the noblemen now preferring civil liberties and commercial prosperity rather than wanting to display their honour and strength. Il Libro Di Montaperti, C. Paoli, Preface, pg. x
-Florence’s Later (generally Mercenary) Armies From the Duke of Calabria (later King Robert) captaincy of the Guelf League (1304) up to the
Florentine defeat by the Ghibellines at Altopascio (1325). Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 99-100
o Duke Of Calabri new Capitano di Guerra. By 1305 he brought a large force of Catalonian mercs under marshal Diego de Rat.
o With Duke departure by end of 1305, the Catalan’s band from 1306 to 1313 are a permanent and important feature of Florence’s army (this long standing and unbroken link/arrangement with the city is a new innovation, the Rat even becomes a personality in the city even celebrated n Day VI of the Decameron).
His salary and that of the band was provided by all members of league, but Rat center of operation was Florence – becoming the city defence advisor and his company was so acclimatized that it was excused from formal parades (mostre). And Consigli vol I 383,404,415,442,449,45607,461,472,476,483,498,509,550,564,570.
o Mercenaries even became important element of Florentine politics (the Catalans kill Corso Donati in 1308). And Villani, VIII, 97 and Compagni, Cronica, 212-3
o In 1311 a mercenary captain becomes himself captain of the Guelf Tallia. And Consigli, I, 549 and Villani, IX, 5, 17
Rat’s Force was a significant development for it became an example of mixed inf and cav brigade. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 100 and Villani, VIII, 82, 118 and ASF SIGNORIA, Missive I, fol. 86 and v, 102 and v.
o 300 cav in 1305-07 later reduced to 200 in 1310-11.o Infantry element of 300 in 1305 later increased to 500 by 1307. The desire for
infantry did not go reducing itself with the Florentine in 1306 hiring 500 more infantryman from Romagna to fight Pisoia and the Ubaldini in 1306.
o Disparity in pay with cav paid 15 florins a months, the infantry 3 florins. o The mixed force dev further reinforced by fact that King Roberts send to Rat in 1311
in Romagna 200 Catalan cav and 500 almugavari under Gilbert of Centellas. And Villani IX, 18.
Dev of diplomatic component to mercenary bands. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 100
o Rat through his effectiveness and friendliness manged to extend his contract with the city, Florence writing to the Duke of Calabria praising Rat’s marshal skills and his
strenuous drive against the enemy of the Guelfs and wishing to retain his service for another year at least (until November 1308). And ASF, Signoria, Missive, I, fols. 20 v – 21, 53v – 54 v, 86 and v, 102 and v. and see pic of phone for Walye 100-101 for direct latin quote from text.
o Despite this the obtain reduction in their pay from 16 to 15 florins a months for cav and for infantry from 3 to 2.5.
Changes in the city forceo La Cavallata: Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 101
The obligation remained and the number of citizen affected raised from 1000 in 1310 to 1300 in 1312. And Consigli vol II, p 379 and Villiani, IX, 7, 44
Payment to duty-bound kept being emanated but modes of it changes: first via revenue yielded from confiscated property, payments made (in part) in grain and accompanied by preferential taxation. And Consigli, vol II, pg 463, 553.
A growing remission by Florentines to serve in cavallata as seen by fact that fines for non-performance were frequent and often ineffective so much so that in 1313 it was decided to levy only 5% of amount due from such fines. (a slow agonizing decline for this type of obligation).
o A growing acceptance to commute service in monetary tribute (a viable alternative), so much so that during siege of Pistoia in 1305, Florentines ‘had to go or to send a substitute, when it was their turn (come toccava per vicenda) or else pay a poll-tax called the sega’. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 100 and Villani VIII, 85 and Consigli Vol II, pg. 568, 629-30.
By 1310 service was expected from those who ‘had the cavallate and (whose names) were drawn froom the bags).
Army during war with Henry VII (1311-13, were Florence was drawn in a vast alliance and made up part of a host under Angevine leadership with Guelfs from Tuscany, Bologna, and Romagna). Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 101-104
o A triumph by Guelfs of mobilization and numbers. o Composition of Force
Total merc cav in 11-12 was raised to 800 (though not all under Florentine pay). 500 potentially from Catalan bands + elements from Peugia, Bologna, and nearby. And Consiglia, II, 550.
Catalan inf of at least 500. This was Part of grand Guelf army, in Rome by 1312, of 1500 infantry and some 400-600 cav from Florence (some where Rat’s men but majority were Flo citizens). And Villani IX, 17, 39 and Davidson Gersg, III, 457
By later summer the Guelf Tallia seem to then have been 2000 cav (700 or 800 merc) and 8000 infantry. And Villani, IX, 44
o The army, under Rats command in chief, suffered a minor defeat at Incisa. Though unsure of impact of such defeat, Rat’s position and relationship with Flo was bumped down. Relationship worsen from 1314, until merc depateture in 1313, over unpaid salary (with Florence continuous promises of payment) – when he leaves he is owed 18,500 florins paid only in part by mid-September with special tax Davidson, Gersch., vol. III, 584. And Consigli II, 629-30, 632.
Most worrisomely Rat refuses order by League to go to Pggibonsi announcing his march on the Val D’Arno because of a quarrel with people
of S.Giovanni who killed an capture some of his band (threatening a private war against Florentines during their times of crisis).
With the crisis with empire ending with Henry VII’s death, Florence refuses King Robert’s offer to renew Rat’s tenure as marshal (saying his services are no longer needed). After fighting on losing side at Montecatini, the popularity enjoyed in Florence by Rat, the Catalonians and Aragonese vanishes.
o City contribution to Force In 1312 the cavallata was levied on 1300 men and of these, simultaneously,
200 were serving in Rome and 500 in Tuscany. Considerable contribution of Guelf feudatories of Region like Count Guy
Battifolle and his son Charles, Count Guy Salvatico and Count Roger of Dovadola (who was to become Capitano di Guerra towards the end of the war).
An attempt to secure further professional commanders especially with the fall from grace Rat
By August 1313 Count Roger commanded a force composed of the cavalry of 3 Florentine Sesti and his own retinue. And Consigli, Vol II, 631-2, 634, 656.
The contado supplied enormous amounts of men at arms and these were to be the main force to oppose Henry VII in the contado when threatening the city. The Signoria by September had mobilized 12000 foot in Early September of 1312.
Numbers were further augmented by letters to the captains of the leagues who had to levy a certain number of men from their domain based on the tax assessment of each village (x quota for every 1000l due by the estimo).
During the harshest crisis general indiscriminate conscription was enacted and the contado had to send to the city all Guelf males between 15 and 70 years of age.
Within the City by summer 1312 there were 6450 cav and 9300 inf which forced the Emperor to turn away. And Villani IX, 48
A volunteer yet elite force of Florentine cavalry, made up of the young men of the city, even managed to gain a glorious victory agains the Germans in Val di Pesa. These men were “called the Cavalieri della banda … and they accomplishes much in the field (assai feciono d’arme).” Villani, IX, 48
Yet this very specific mention to this patriotic gests seems to suggest that it was not the norms but an exception, suggest that there was a declining military zeal among citizens.
Army of 1314-15 Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 104-105o A mixed force were Rat’s Catalan mercs are substituted by a mixed body of
mercenary horse from the Regno di Napoli (under King Robert’s bro, the count of Eboli) and recruited primarily in France. And Villani, IX, 61, 72, 82 and Consigli, vol II, 666 and Davidsohn, Gescgm Vol IV, I, pg 227, 230.
o Spaniards kept serving under the Florentines, as seen by fact that at Montecatini two merc constables of French preference highlighted by Florentine stratagem to force Pisan surrender, a fake letter was planted on them were Florence offered to Philip VI of France to recruit a 1000 French knight for 60000 Florins.
o Reorganization of contado infantry organization: a list was drawn up establishing quotas based on the estimo from each pivere and commune, regulations were laid down concerning weapon requirements and fixing proportion of crossb to infantry (10: 100). And Consigli, vol II, 677.
o Cavallata system continued, which was providing considerable men (at Montecatini it cannot be less of 300) since Villani puts causalities of this force at 114 killed or taken prisoners (and this is a propagandistic underestimate). And Villani IX 72 and Delizi, vol XI, 208 and Vol XII, 262-8
o A satirical sonnet by Pietro de Faitinelli, Lucchese, suggests that Florentines had lost their marshal virtue now only good for jousting, commerce and making money. AF Massera, Sonetti burleschi e realistici dei primi due secoli, Bari, 1940 pg 189 – see photo of pg 105-6
Army and War with Castruccio in the 1320 Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 106-108
o Mercs employment a matter of administrative routine: legislation ruled of issues like loans to the mercenaries. Regulated through the creation of an office staffed by six offitiales super conductis for terms of 6 months. and Romolo Caggese, Statuti della Repubblica fiorentina, (Firenze, 1999), vol I pg 330-2, 336-9 : vol II, pg 417-418 (Page numbers belong to the old edition of the book).
o New dev was recruitment of new nationalities of mercs (Germans and Friulans) who brought with them new fighting styles (mounted crossbowmen). However mantainence of old traditions (i.e. in 1324 500 french from Artois and Chmapgne were recuited under 12 constables each with an average size of about 50 men). And Villani, IX, 135, 147, 151, 208, 238, 276, 302
o Under this normalization and formalization of merc hiring we see creation of increasingly cohesive merc units. Not yet semi-independent political entities (like mid 14th century) but starting to understand strength. i.e. La compagna a 200 men band in 1322-23 deserts Florentine service in Winter and is joined up by many unattached soldiers, the band came to number the 5000 and plundered the Sienese contado until stopped by a large Florentine and Sienese army (after which they moved in the Marche). And Villani IX, 183.
o Yet continued large city element, when Castruccio threatened Prato the Florentine ‘shut up their shope, lef their work, and rode to Prato, both popolo and knights. Every gild sent infantry and cavalry, and many families, both of grandi and popolani, sent bands (masnade) of foot at their own expense’ and Villani IX, 214
This ad hoc response during crisis seems to again highlight that their was a weakened/defective functioning of the cavallata system and the normal infantry obligation.
o The army at the disaster of Altopascio in 1325 still shows a large city element which (excluding the Florence’s Guelf allies) included 1500 merc cav (700 french, 200, german, 100 catalans, 450 of a mixed body of French/Flemings/Italians), 500 flo cav (400 from cavallata, 100 squires), 15000 infantrymen.
The Cav of Florence, according to Villani, even suffered heavy casualties (killed and capture) that numbered ‘40 de’ migliori di Firenze grandi e popolani’ but a surviving, incomplete, list (including infantry) names 199 Florentine prisoners and 578 from the contado. And Villani IX 306 and Delizie, XII, 268-287
The 500 flo cav at Altopascio (of which 1/5 died or were captured) is comparable to priori contributions such as the 300 at Montecatini (1315) or 600 at Campaldino (1289). The only true change, if Waley’s estimates for Montaperti are true (thus there were 1400 flo cav), is that post 1260 the use of Cav Marc did induce an initial decline in Florentine employment but then there was no further decline for the next half of a century up until at least 1325.
After Altopascio the defence of Florence relied on Charles of Calabria and his hired force of 1000 cav men. As a result we have a progressive regulation and enshrinement of merc employment within Florentine practice and in 1337 we see the formal promulgation of a lengthy code regulating aspects of mercenary service. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 107-108.
By the Florentine Luccan campaign of 1341-2, the mercenary elements had eclipsed the city militia one. Bayley, War and society, pg 15
o Whereas the host contained a striking force in the campaign of 1341 of 2000 merc horse under Matteo de Pontecarli, the Florentine Cavalieiri were a much smaller component. Their defeat at Lucca and the fact that only 3 prominent citizens among the militia contingent were recorded to be taken captive (Giovanni della Tosa, Francesco Brunelleschi, Albertaccio de’ Ricasoli) and freed for a heavy ransom suggest that militia element was small. And Villani, xi, 369 (drag)
o For the Spring campaign of 1342, Florence fielded 2000 mounted condottieri and only forty citizen cav. And Villani, xi, 376
A partial revival in of the militia element is attempted in the middle years of the 14 th century after a series of negative experience with stipendiary forces. Bayley, War and society, pg 16
o In May 1342 the captain general, in Florence’s hire, Maltesta de Malatesta of Rimini withdrew a superior force from Lucca on plea of supply difficulty causing the city to fall to Pisans. And Villani, Xi, 380
o The loss of Lucca resulted in Florentine crisis. As a result Walter de Brienne, titular duke of Athens, was made Signore for life in September. This man, who enjoyed international renown for being one of those aristocratic condottiero, was brought to town to aid with military situation and conquer Lucca
o However he abuses his authority tyrannically: executes a Medici and Altoviti and strike a peace with the Pisans on October 14th thus essentially filling his pockets with Florentine public funds and refusing to accomplish his prescribed task (the conquest of Lucca). And C. Paoli “Della Signoria di Gualtieri Duca D’Atene Documenti”, ASI, XVI (1862), pg 250 (ma anche prima).
o Results in an insurrection led by city militia who muster 1000 horse and 10000 foot vs the 600 Burgundian cav of the duke. In particular the heavy crossbows obtained illegally by the citizens and the barricades forced the cavalry to dismount and abandon control of the streets in favour of regufe inside of the walls. And Villani XII, 32 (Drag) and Marchionne di Coppo Stegani, Cronaca Fiorentina, Ris, XXX, rubric 577, 607
o Losing even the support of the Florentine nobles (I Grandi) for even the Duke refused to annul the Ordinances of Justice (the popolani one’s which declassed aristocrats), the duke was made to capitulate and withdraw in August. The aristocrats were rewarded by the popolani with the rescinding of the harsh penal clause of the Ordinances and 1/3 of higher offices to their estate.
o Renewed aristocratic violence on members of popular faction plus intrinsic distrust by middle and lower guilds renews internal strife (eventually forcing the resignation of the 4 new aristocratic priori).
o When threatened by the aristocratic forces and their vassals’ armies (and by the gitation of the impoverished proto industrial labourers – sottoposti), the republic called on the militia of the San Giovanni quarted led by Medic and Rondinelli. And Villani, XII, 44ff (drag) With the aid of the wool carders of San Firano under Capponi, the popolo grasso, it allies and the militia tore to ashes the Grandi’s fortified residences and their defenders.
The reorganized militia, Bayley, War and society, pg 17-18o Reorganized after the expulsion of duke Walter d’Atene.o Previously, the 2 largest Sesti (Oltrarno and San Piero Sheraggio) contributed 4
companies each, and the other four sesti had raised 3 companies each.o Now, the new reforms of October 1343 divided the city in 4 quarter of roughly equal
population. Each would provide 4 contingents under 4 gonfalonieri. The size of the contingents depended on urgency of military situation.
The societates were made of cavalry, heavily armed foot and crossbowmen in proportion of 1:2:2.
The cavalry however suffered of endemic shortages for the grandi, who generally served in it, had fled the city in 1343. Attempts to amend by new gov by restoring to 500 grandi to citizenship and allowing them to serve as captains of suburban militia after probationary period of 5 years. Villani, XII, 50-1, 61 (Drag)
o Militia also proved a necessity after the financial condition of the republic had detreated, militia as partial substitute to costly stipendiaries.
Collapse of banking houses of Bardi and Peruzzi (heavy lenders for warlike purposes) and the city owed floating loans to citizens for 700,000 florins (raised previously to attempt to subdue Lucca).
Previously the g’vment had funded the debt at 540,000 florins an an annual nominal interest rate of 5 per cent. The rate compared unfavourably with the average return from business and land investmentsand hence the low-interest forced loans (prestanze) were imposed during times of war (accused of diverting capital from more profitable courses).
A reluctance to dispense entirely with the low-cost militia. M. Villani, Cornica, iii, 295 (Drag) and Stegani, Cronaca, XXX, rubr. 612 and Paoli, “Rendiconto”, 9ff. (see picture on phone for summary exact number in footnotes of baley pg 18)
The Militia against Milan, Bayley, War and society 18-21o Conflict, and sever test for Florentine militia, product of expansion of Archbp
Giovanni Visconte who had obtained Bologna by bribery and Prato and Pistoia. o While Prato was taken by a mixed force of Florentine militiamen and mercs, an
attempt to assault Pistoia with ladders during night failed because of defective leadership (i.e. militiamen led by a civilian notary of office de la condotta, Piero Mucini) – though he did manage to get himself and his men over the wall without alarming anyone, he then disappeared from the walls causing much confusion, the men were detected later at day and disarmed while their captain was at an inn consuming an eel pie and enjoying a hearty sleep. And M. Villani, I, 114-15 (Drag)
o When the attack failed the whole of the militia was fully mobilized to renew offence. Stefani, Cronaca, XXX, rubr. 647
Sweeping ordinance allowed the return of all exiles who were willing to serve faithfully the new expedition.
16 Gonfaloni of the city fielded 2000 militia cav (a figure seldom equalled previously), Pisotia was sieged through March and April until it was forced to accept a Florentine Garrison. And M. Villani, I, 115-17
o No effort by Florentines during conflict/threat of Milan to engage stipendiaries or hire captain-generals. Partially product of dissimulation of Milan (mislead into thinking Milan had peaceful intentions) and because the middle and lesser gilds (which provided 6 of 8 priors under constitution of 1343) were slow on matters of war (only making preparation when city itself was threatened (so much so the defence of peripheral locations like Mugello had to be organized by wealthier citizens). And M. Villani, II, 127-8, 131-2
o When Milan finally mobilized a host under vicar Giovanni da Oleggio, and made of German mercs – the Florentine mobilized the local militia (of the Mugello) to contest their entrance to the fertile Mugello region at the Valdimarina passes. The Milanese musted a fearsome force of 5000 heavy cav, 2000 light horse, and 6000 foot.
However its unidentified local commander abandoned his post, informing his command that he had urgent business elsewhere. The militiamen as a result abandoned all effort to resist and fled with family and stock.
Elsewhere, the farmers, sharecroppers and labourers of large estates offered little resistance to the moving army (especially since the estate owners refused to improve their contract and wages after the black death of 1348).
o The city militia eventually was mobilized under threat of heavy fines for absentees. Mobilization was impaired by fear of public order issues (fear of the underpaid proto industrial workers rising up as the enemy approached, thus militiamen rather preferred to protect their homes and workshops from such threat). This was fixed by issuing ordinance that punished violence with lass of a hand forcing their dispersion. And Stefani, Cronaca, RIS 30, rubr 647.
o Open field battle was impossible, the militia could only muster a max of 2000 cav. Furthermore no captain-general of repute was willing to enter service of Florence fearing the hostility of the powerful Visconti.
o Florence, who by desperation engaged a further 1500 horse and 3500 foot (unsure check picture on phone pg 20), managed to mount an effective efence of the Scarperia in Mugello – forcing the withdrawal of a qualitatively superior army from Tuscany in October. M. Villani, II, 133, 145 (Drag)
o By December renewed attack was met with better precautions: By December 1351, Florence had engaged 3000 cavalry. Furthermore the
defensive alliance signed with Perugia, Siena, and Arezzo ruled that the four signatories must keep on foot 3000 foot and 1000 infantry.
o Eventually the attempted though failed courting of Emperor Charles IV by Tuscans to hire 6000 german knights scares Giovanni Visconti into signing the peace of Sarzana with Tuscan cities in 1353.
-Money/Contract/Paid Soldiering, theory: “According to contemporaries themselves, this phenomenon (paid service) accelerated from the
mid 12th century”. Contamine, War, pg 90 “At every turn the sources mention hired men (solidarii), stipendiaries (stipendiarii), those
summoned to serve for pay (summonitiones ad denarius), wages (vadia) and money gifts (donative)”. Contamine, War, pg 90
The Commercial revolution: “The stock of precious metal possessed by the West was from this time on more abundant, coins circulated more quickly and monetary exchanges affected a greater number of social levels.” This must be combined with the fact that “kings and princes learnt at the same times to increase their own monetary resources, perhaps even at a superior rate” Contamine, War, pg 90-91
Revenues increased on the back of “(rapidly expanding) demesne, to public taxation which continually grew and diversified and, finally, to the commutation of military services for money”. Contamine, War, pg 91
An attempt to push to maintain and reinforces a system of obligation which porogressively made obsolete and subverted by a general shift towards payment of wages and various indemnities or other types of recompense. Contamine, War, pg 93
“It is true that frequently there was compensation, reimbursement, sometimes called in Italy mendum… for warhorses killed or injured during a campaign”. Contamine, War, pg 97
“If one could convoke those obliged to serve for a minimum period, in contrast an appeal to volunteers had a better chance of success it they could be guaranteed a longer term of employment”. These would be compensated by the frequently mentioned monthly rates. Contamine, War, pg 97
“The guarding of castles gave rise to contracts for even longer periods. In 1280, to defend the peninsular part of the kingdom of Sicily, Charles of Anjou, again, installed garrisons in 78 castles divided amongst five great territorial district … The command of each was entrusted to 18 knight and 60 esquires … these castellans commanded 1,037 Sergeants and 15 chaplains … they were paid every 4 months and received in 1280 8,852 ounces of gold (5 florins containing 1 ounce of gold) … In fact garrison service could be prolonged indefinitely”. Contamine, War, pg 98
“the level of pay appears to result from to result in the first instance from tintiative by the authorities and not as a result of bargaining between employer and employees following market forces.” Contamine, War, pg 98
Competition between those who were contracted and those who were summoned byt paid, constraining and moderating their demands. Contamine, War, pg 98
“The wages paid both those summoned and those who had sought employment were paid were not sufficient to turn them into true mercenarie.” Contamine, War, pg 99
“Those who rallied at various point on the premise of pay came “in family, feudal or regional groups and continued to fight in the service of their rightful sovereign but under the orders of their immediate natural lords… they left home together in their customary social formation”. Contamine, War, pg 99
“The disintegration of the feudal axilium… (does not imply) that the chivalric class in broader term suffered from military weaknesses… (it continued) to furnish the heavy cavalry evien if their forms of service and… basis of their obligations …were largely modified”. Contamine, War, pg 99
“Nor can one call every soldier a mercenary from the moment he received payment in one form or another”. Garland’s definition: “the mercenary is a professional soldier whose conduct is
dictated not by his membership of a political community but above all his desire for gain”… “3 qualities: being a specialist, stateless and paid”. Contamine, War, pg. 99
Why Mercenaries? Contamine, War, 100o “The worth and reputation of a group of fighters whose equivalent it was impossible to
find locally amongst vassals, subjects or fellow citizens” (i.e. The crossbowmen of Pisa, Tortosa, Ligura).
o The general dissatisfaction and resistance to the changing way of life brought on by the military-political situation and enlistment which affected the dependants of certain princes. “If Florence from the 1270s more willingly recruited horsemen from other parts of Italy, Provence, France and Germany it was in part because the urban patriciate refused to fulfil its military duties and preferred to employ paid troops at great cost.
o “There existed a potential market or supply. The presence of this market may be explained in turn by demographic factors, fluctuations in economics conditions or even by successoral practices.” … “The supply stimulated the demand at the same time as demand encouraged supply”.
The tallia system (used by alliances where proportion of price of mercenaries was paid by all constituents) employed to keep bodies of mercenaries permanently in employment, and as a result of continual service together these troops acquired increasing cohesion. Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian, pg. 95-96.
Rise of constabularies, an appointed middlemen (constable) who was able to provide a body of soldiers already accustomed to his leadership. First mentioned in Sienese records in 1267, later become normal communal practice. Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian, pg. 96
As the recruitment of bands came to be the norm, cities came began to legislate to regulate the employment of merc companies. A customary law came to be applied to the contracts of employment (condotte): “let us recruit mercenaries on the usual terms” (ad pacta solita) was a common decision. Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian, pg. 96
The Condotta contract, of which 100 of examples can be found in Italian archives, worked as public contract and was the most prevalent form of recruitment in the 14 th-15th century. Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, 645
The military condotta contract is equivalent to the typical condotta institution, it consisted in establishing the contracting party, the calculation and forms of remuneration received, the means/condition which determine the duration and terms of contract, the establishment of an inspection clause (mostra) that allows the contractor to inspect the quality and numbers of forces provided. Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, 645
The establishment of condottieri companies and later of the signoria was largely a product of intestinal conflicts among Italian communes who started offered great sums of moneys to hordes of available knights who were ready to live by the sword. Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, 654
Paid soldiering largely a product of Northern EU (Franco-German) and Southern Italian forms of inheritance, in places where inheritance occurred by majority we see the rise of mass of impoverished cadet kinsman who become either adventurers or mercenaries. Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, 654
Similarly the failure of military enterprise on Italian territory (such as that of Arrigo VII, Ludwig of Bavaria or John of Bohemia) lead to the disbandment of large group of troops who offer their services to local potentates. Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, 654 Mercenaries a product of the pursuit to establish the Signoria in Italy + the consequence of
the ‘love of money’, that is the greater wealth and circulation of currency within the Italic peninsula. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg. 70
Pay for period of service is assumed in the agreement of Florence with other communes regarding military assistance ever since the 12th century. The Lucchese cavalry was paid by Florence 3 soldi, and the foot soldier were paid one soldo. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 72 and Santini, 21
Citizen armies were paid, not serving under mere obligation, thus the term mercenary must be reserved “for the men who served a ‘foreign’ power”. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 72.
Late 12th century communal army were generally commanded by the middle/higher nobility but their authority over a communal militia was not derivative of their social status and privilege (as if he were in charge of feudal levy raised within his domain). Their authority derived from the fact that they were employees of the commune (the power thus resided in the authority of the commune itself who were commissioned with leading the armies under the watchful communal deputies eyes). i.e. an ante-literam condottieri hired to lead armies nearly exclusively and not with bring their own band of soldier whose service would be put at the commune’s disposition. Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, pg. 653
The dispatch of Sienese recruiting officials to Umbria, Lombardy and Genoa suggests that it was not yet possible to find already organized bands through contact with their commanders. This did not however hinder total numbers, the Sienese employing 400 Genovese crossbowmen by 1231 to who me may add 300 more from the region of Spoleto (according to entry and exit books for the Republic published in Siena in 1907 at page 148, 157-8, 176) . Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 73.
The Advent of the Tallia, Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg. 83o Montaperti ‘tuaght the Florentines a lesson’, that they learnt the inability of
burghers to withstand professional on the field hence mercs were better to ensure protection.
o The prolonged military crisi made as well necessary the presence of a ‘virtually standing army’. This was facilitated by the economic strength of Florence (deployment of mercs feasible)
o The existence of a merc supply, large numbers of cavalrymen from Southern France and surrounding areas were now on a market – these had a considerable need to paid (further facilitated by political pressure of angevin monarchy, a powerful ally of Tuscan guelf who urged their employment).
o A buyers market where the large supply of merc drove down prices even in critical campaigning periods like Tagliacozzo and Colli (German mercs in Siensa so a decline in wages from 12 to 9 pounds). And Archivio Storico Senense, Biccherna, n. 42, fol. 105.
-Money/Contract/Paid Soldiering, examples: Evidence of paid soldiering as far back as 12, early 13th century:
o Fiesole hired as far back as 1124 mercenaries to preserve its independence from Florence. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 73
o The statue of Volterra as well issue a legislation forbidding citizens to servy in armies of any other cities, suggesting mercenary work was an escalating phenomenon in Tuscany already by end of 12th century. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 73 and statuti di volterra, pg 47, 213
o Evidence of employment of mercenaries can be seen in Florence as far back as 1208 when the city paid of a group of Umbrian who fought with them vs. Siena. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 73 and Santini, 148-149
o The Sienese, against Florence, according to the Regestum Senense (pg 114) made use of cav from Latium by 1180 and mercenaries played an important role in their campaigns of 1229-1234 (the Sienese hire each year between 1229 and 31 hundreds of mercenaries from umbria, emilia, Lombardy, liguria and some France and Germany). Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 73
“In 1227 Fredrick II … ordered that in the kingdom of Sicily ‘every fief-holder should pay for each fief eight ounces of gold and every eight fiefs should provide a knight’” Contamine, War, pg 91
“Fredrick II ordered various judges in the kingdom of Sicily to choose from their districts milites strenui who were to assemble at a given place. … But for the selected knights (milites) a wage of 10 ounces of gold for two months was fixed.” Contamine, War, pg 91-92
“From 1255 certain communes in the papal states preffered to pay rather than serve”. Contamine, War, pg 91
The First instance within Florentine sources of the expression conestabilia or conestabileria was in the Florentine council minutes for the 18th of August 1285 which discussed “super facto militum stipendiariorum qui errant sub conestabilia Petri Rugerii”. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 84
o The Florentines as well had ‘a chapter in the constitutione of the commune concerning the employment of mercenaries’ and this employment in turn naturally involved the appointment of ad hoc officials, for instances those elected in 1285 ‘to inspect mercenaries and their arms and their horses’.
o Relations with mercs in Florence became so routine and expression that it became a common Florentine expression tosuggest a contract ‘on the usual terms’ (ad pacta solita – payment for a period of two months) and Consulte, vol I., 58, 80, 212, 345-6, 445-446, 458-9
“At Perugia, as at Florences, the communal militia were paid from the first day of the campaign – 5s. for a foot soldier, 10s. for a man with one horse, 15s. for a man with two horses, in the first instance; 3s, for crossbowmen, 2s. 8d. for archers, 2s 6d. for pavesiers, 2s. for ordinary foot soldier in the second.” Contamine, War, pg 91
Post battle of Benevento, 1266, we see the creation of a permanently standing Guelf army by the Tuscan Guelf League. Each member of the paid a share (tallia) of this force (tallia militum societatits tallie Tuscia). Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg. 81-82
o From 1268 florence paid the largest share of the wages of a diverse force of Guelf Merc (as revealed by the pisan agreement to release those ‘lombards, germans, Spaniards, Catalans, and provencal mercs of the commune of Florence’) ASI vol 78 (1920), pg 80-81,
o In 1281 it was decided that the Tallia merc should be “French or foreign by language or race” and they should be “de parte guelfa”. ASI vol 78 (1920), pg 80-81,
o The men hired by each share of the army would be affair of that city and remain within the confines of that territory unless a general campaign was proclaimed.
o The army of the Tallia must have been quite small in the 1270s (with Siena, one of its wealthier components, only maintaining 29 horsemen in 1272 and in 1277-78 only 20) but grew largers by the 1280s (with Florence keeping in its pay 500 cav of a total force of 1500, which costed the city 5500 l. for just a period of two months). Le Consulte della Repubblica di Firenze, ed. A. Gerardi (Florence, 1896-8), vol I, pg 188, 196, 225, 229-30, 250-2.
o In 1288 the total cavalry force of the Tallia was 500 but Florence prodided and additional force of 300 merc. Villani, VII, 120
o Florentine opinion on size of Tallia changed continuously according to different and councils and facilitated by the fact that Tallia contracts/arrangements lasted only few months (while in 1291 it wanted to reduce its quote from 500 to 300 horsemen, the next year vs Pisans, the Florentines pushed for a general league force of 2500 cav and 20000 infantry of which Florence would offer 300 cav and 2000 inf beyond its rightful share).
o Under Angevine vicar in Tuscany, whose treasurer received payment from Tuscan guelf. Possessed its own special captaincy, whose officer where elected every 6 months and through which it emancipated itself from Angevin control.
o Its captains were prevalently feudatories from Tuscany or the Tuscan-Romagnol frontier. There was some experimentation with Frenchmen with an Angevin connection but the offices os said mercenary army went back to solely Italian captains by 1292.
o “The wages offered around 1300 were of about the same level as the daily rates of a labourer (at
Florence)”, Contamine, War, pg 94 The compensation for dead warhorses “At Perugia … ranged from 15£ to 100£ from which 30s.
was regularly docked for the price of the skin” … “at Florence in the last decades of the 13 th century warhorses were often apprised by a commission headed by the town’s marshal and reimbursement was automatic if the loss was reported within 3 days”. Contamine, War, pg 97
“When Florence was preparing for the 1260 campaign, the Signory had recourse to a Milanese lords, Pietro of Bazacape, amongst others, inviting him to come with 50 men, promising his two months’ pay at the rate of 8£ of small florins a month for each horseman”… “The same town decided to recruit at Modena in Lombardy 100 berrierii, including two gonfaloniers and four captains, all six having three horses as opposed to the single for the ordinary berrierius, for a period of 3 months.” Contamine, War, pg 97-98
“The cavalry engaged by Florence in the years 1270-1280 were mercenaries: small constabularies of horsemen with the description tallia militum societatis tallie Tuscie (taglia being the promise of reward in monetary terms) who from 1270 prefigure the 14 th century condotte in Italy”. Contamine, War, 99.
o The 1277 agremment conluded between Florence and the Provencal Inghilse de Saint-Remy, who had been under contract with Siena, concerned 100 horsemen “each receiving 11 florins a month and commanded by two standard-bearers in addition to the captain”. Contamine, War, 100
o “Every eventuality was foreseen in the contract – the number and allowances for rounceys carrying the baggage, inspection of horses and weapons of the soldiers, the settlement of disputes, the fate of prisoners, reciprocal guarantees, indemnities in case the contract was broken and its stipulations”. Contamine, War, 100
“William the Catalan who had first seen service with Siena from 1277-85, then with Bologna from 1288-89, then with Florence from 1290-92.” Contamine, War, 100
From 1340-80 there was a period of companies in which non-Italian elements dominated (period of companies of adventure). Contamines, War, 158-60
o 1334, Knights of the Dove, Germans, terrorized central Italy.o 1339, Company of St George, under Lodrizio Visconti. o 1342, Great company, under german Werner von Urslingen. o 1350s, Great Company (of ex Provencal hospitaller Fra Moriale), which collected French,
Hungarians, germans and eventually came to be led by Conrad Von Landau (after leaders decapitation by Cola di Rienzo at Rome) and were defeated by Tuscans in 1358 at Biforco.
o 1380s, the Breton company under Sylvestre Budes who were defeated by Alberigo da Barbiano at the Battle of Marino, putting an end to the period foreign companies in Italy.
Armies of communes very often augmented their numbers by hiring strangers to serve for pay. Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian, pg. 94o Fiesole used them to free themselves in 1124 vs neighbouring Florence. o In 1216 Rimini hired 300 cavalry/infantry raised by count of Montefeltro to fight for the
commune. o In 1224-27 Geno collected considerable mercenary forces through the service of count
of Savoy, Marquise of Malaspina, the Counts of Lavagna and of Ventimiglia and a number of other feudatories. The condotta of count Thomas of Saovy committed him to send 200 cavalrymen for two months at the rate of 16 l. per man.
o In 1231 during the Sienese-Florentine conflict, the Sienese urgently sent for crossbowmen in 1231 in Umbria, Lombardy and Liguria, raising at Genoa and Spoleto alone no fewer than 700 men. This was a tremendous expense which prevented Siena from spending more on mercenaries for the next 25 years.
Mercenaries armies by the 13th centuries had grown because of communal demands, i.e. with the Milanese having on their books about 1000 cavalry mercenaries, such a costly money sink that the Milanese had to call onto a Bolognese to learn on new ways to extort money from commune. Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian, pg. 95
The tallia of cavalry of the Tuscan tallia alliance, a force of provencal and French cavalry (but also of other nationalities) that number 1500 cavalrymen in 1280s but rose also to 2500 cavalrymen and an infantry of 20000 men. Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian, pg. 96
Among some of the first Companies of Venture to establish themselves on Italian soil was that del Consiglio (born out of Ludwig of Bavaria’s failed enterprise). It was formed out of a mixture of Ludwig’s former cavalry (about 800 according to Villani) and his infantry (unknown number). Its establishment was both a product of Ludwig inability to ever pay his debt (unlike other kings like Fredrick II and Charles V who had finished funds during campaign but could count on producing new wealth through though their demesne) and by the ongoing calamities in the Italian region (i.e. the Company of St. George of Lordrisio Visconti was formed on the backdrop of an extremely harsh winter + the financial collapse of Florence + a harsh famine in Milan and the North, Ursinglen’s company was formed first in 1342 when a violent popular revolution was happening in Florence that lead to the ascension of Gulatiero di Brienne and later reformed in 1348 when the black death hit Naples and the armies of Luigi d’Ungheria were revolting) Clemente Ancona: ‘Milizie E Condottieri’, 655 + See Villani, Cronica 107, 120
-The development and transformation of free companies in Italy: By 1260/Montaperti, certain patterns have developed in Italy regarding mercenaries: Waley,
Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 79-80o Accepted size of unit was 50, companies were expected to have officers. 50 however
was not a standard as seen by the service in 1257 of a group of 10 Mantuan mercs and miscellaneous groups of cav from Siena for Florence. Santini 211-214
o The fact that further instructions were given to Florentine emissaries hiring merc to visit not only towns but contadi of Emilia suggests that companies would not be recruited and brought along en bloc by commander of merc outfit.
o Merc outfit were primarily composed of those who had fallen at odds, either politically or judicially, with the regime in their homeland:
For the latter crimes mercs were granted a safeconduct i.e. Milanese merc for Florence in 1260 in so much as their precedent crimes did not involve a native citizen.
The former was a product of the push and pull of Guelf and Ghibellines, when one triumphed the other was proscribed and sent into exile penniless. These men ended being driven into paid military service (i.e in 1264 the exiled Florentine Guelf travelled to Bologna, becoming a hotspot for paid Guelf Militia, this mercenary militia would by employed by Modenese Guelf to defeat their Ghibelline enemies. Their triumph supplied the Guelf mercenaries with looted wealth, weapons, and horses and eventually would transform them in a well organized 400 men company under pay of Charles of Anjou). G. Villani, VI, 87
The creation of constabularies facilitated hiring/recruitment which would be conduct through a single leader with which whole terms would be concluded and would be less exhaustive than sending emissaries who would have to individually contract various men. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 85
o Hence increase in expressions such as “that Dino di Catislgione be employed if he can be got” or “that Mainardo should come”. And Consulte, 445-6, 458-9
o Organization wise this was also superior, men serving under a common to whom they were known likely served better and these units could be moved around without large scale desertion.
o Eased also practice of lending companies to allies (sometimes though still difficult as Peter de Perra refuses Bolognese order to move to Florence without increase of 90 l. a month because of the high cost of living in Tuscany).
o The recruitment of feudatories as Captains of Tallia was encouraged by the same above considerations, for they were capable of bring to the table retinue of a hundred or of hundreds of men loyal and obedient (i.e. attempt at recruitment of Bladwin of Supino, Campagnan noblemen in 1289) and Dino Compagni, Cronica, RIS IX, p. 21
Reorganization also occurred because of political pressure of Communal governments who were reluctant to employ miscellaneous and officer-less mercenaries. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 85
o In 1285 a council decided that all merc in Florentine employment should be given a constable. Consulte, I, 278
o In 1293 further discussions moved to give “constables to those cavalrymen who have been, or are to be, taken on and have no constables”. Consulte II, 302
o This ultimately leads to the making, in 1301, of Schiatta dei Cancelleri (a Pistoian hence a foreigner) as the ‘Captain of the Florentine Militia’ and commander of 300 mercenary cavalry, with powers to recruit constables and mercenaries. And I consigli della Repubblica Fiorentina, ed B. Barbadoro (Bologna, 1920-1) vol 1, pg. 32
o The Constable is the embryo of the 14th century condottiere (the key difference being the small number of troops under him).
o They only come to play a major role after 1320-1330. Contamine, War, 157 Why dev? Contamine, War, 157
o “The ruling classes who should normally have provided the majority of men-at-arm allowed themselves to become more and more absorbed by their professional activities and preferred to use mercenaries, recuited either from other inhabitants of their own state, or from elsewhere in Italy or from foreigners.
o “Fourteenth century businessmen ceased to gird on their swords and form themselves into companies under the banners of citizen militias with their glorious past. They decided on wars, they financed them, but they no longer took part in them in person”. Y. Renouds, Les Hommes d’affaires italiens du Moyen Age, Paris 1968, pg 237
o A political development born out of establishment of signorie, where : “The signori, lordships and lords who, through fear of the popolo, preferred to use mercenaries”… however these generally commanded support of popular faction and thus could recruit their militia for this faction. Contamine, War, 158.
o The great cash on hand of cities vs. mercenaries being readily available on great war market, their worth and efficiency recognized. Contamine, War, 158.
The Condotta system : “was it not reasonable and economical to avoid mobilizing the most efficient citizens and to pay mercenaries who could fight whilst merchants, active in their counting houses, earned the money to pay them?” Y. Renouds, Les Hommes d’affaires italiens du Moyen Age, Paris 1968, pg 237
o “If during the 1325 campaign which terminated in the disaster of Altopascio, Florence lined up with 1500 mercenary cavalry, 500 Florentine horsemen (of whom 400 were provided by the citizens’ cavallata), this (last feature) was a sort of swan song for the old institution of warhorses maintained by the popoli grassi”. Contamine, War, 158.
o Traditionally all Florentine owed service from ages of 15 to 70, recalcitrant and defaulters in times of war risked capital punishment and confiscation of their goods. Contamine, War, 158.
“Largely had been temporary association whose primary aim was to exploit an indigenous population reduced to the state of victims, they later become permanent cohrerent military organizations entering into or seeking to enter systematically into the service and pay of one or other Italian states.” Contamine, War, 158.
o I.e. John Hawkwood, serves under the Great Company of the marquis of Montferrat for the Savoyards against the Visconti of Milan. Serves Pisa against Florence. Serves the Visconti heading the most renown mercenary company for the next 9 years (the White Company) fighting against Florence, the pope, and Charles IV. Betrays Milan and serves the papal states defeating his Ex employer at the battle of the River Chiese. After the end of papal-milanese wars he is left without employment until renewed hostilities between Florence and Papal state. Florence and other central Italian communes pay him an enormous indemnity 225,000 florins plus an annual salary of 1200 florins for life in exchange for non-belligerence in oncoming war. Despite further service with papal state for next 2 years, he ultimately join Florence and the League who pay him 250,000 florins a year. He marries Donnina, illegitimate daughter of Bernabo Visconti, and becomes the owner of a castle and land. He remained faithful to Florence until his death in 1394. Contamine, War, 158.
o He appears to have been truly appreciated by his men whom he paid regularly and who never mutinied. Contamine, War, 158.
After the popularity of foreign companies, “Italian states endeavoured to recruit chiefly Italian mercenaries and to tighten their links with the war-leaders who they employed” *period of condottieri*. Contamine, War, 160
The Italian condotta, Contamine, War, 160-161:o A great company, collection of a body of freebooters who accepted a supreme chief
by sort of election. He governed with the aid of a council of caporales et consiliarii and the condotta mentioned not only the name of the condottiere but also of his councillors separately.
o Pay was remitted to the captain and councillors who then distributed it among men.o Giovanni di Legnano, the 14th century Italian jurist, defined the condotta as a locatio
operarum et rei (a consensual contract which hired the execution of a service and things) where the employer hired the services service of an entrepreneur for an agreed salary for a set period and specific task.
o The number and type of troops and the duration, either for a set period or indefinitely, were specified (time varied ibn 14th century about 3/4 moth average, in 15th century 6 months plus possibility of 6 more). The rates of pay were also specified, part of which was paid in advance in the form of a loan. Conditions for divisions of ransoms and booty, methods of inspection, the extent of the authority which the condottiere could exercise over his men and his fiscal privileges, and for the provision of billets, wood, straw and food supplies at a fair price.
o Condottieri behaving in noteworthy fashion could receive further rewards from a silver helm, to a pension, a palace, or even a fief.
o A desire to integrate themselves into the recognized framework of Italian political society encouraged loyal behaviour and tendency to strike territorial roots.
I.e. out of the 40 foreigners admitted to the Venetian Great council between 1404 and 1454, 13 were condottieri. On their death they were guaranteed a public funeral and a statue/fresco depicting them in their full glory.
Braccio da Montone became Lord of his native Perugia in 1416. Of the sons of Muccio Attendolo Sforza, Alessandro became master of Pesaro, his brother Francesco (through marriage to Biance Visconti) became duke of Milan.
Very rarely were condottieri truly newcomers, the majority were member of the aristrocratic world, who shared their privileges and tastes. Contamine, War, 161
o The lords of towns like Urbino, Mantua, Rimina, and Ferrara became condottieri. o A prosopographic study of 170 aristocratic families them shows that 60% belonged
to only 13 military lineages. The Italian condotta not only meant a predominance of italians among the leaders but also
among the soldiers. Contamine, War, 161o Books of Micheletto degli Attendoli from 1425-49, of 450 soldiers whose geo origins
are known, 3.5% were French, Provencal, German, Hungarian, Brabancon, or Catalan, 2.2.% were Slav, Albanian or Greek, 26.8% came from the kingdom of Naples, 36% from the Papal states, and 31.5% from Tuscany and Northern Italy.
Military Obligations contributed little to military of towns in Italy, with exception of northern principalities like Savoy. Contamine, War, 161
o However in times of crisis raising men among citizens was not shun upon.o When threatened by a company of adventurers, Florence raised a company of 4000
crossbowmen 800 from the city itself, 3200 from the contado.
o The ciompi would do the same thing to defend their regime, arming 1000 citizens with crossbows.
o Milan at the end of 14th century, raised an elite body numbering 1200 soldier made from the ‘best and tallest men” who could either serve by foot or on horseback.
o The Venetian cernide. Especially because of volatile fidelity and availability of condottieri and because it was
necessary to provide for the security and guard of fortresses, Italian states (Venice, Milan, Naples) from mid-15th century regularly maintained forced placed directly under their command both in times of peace and war (Venetian Senate in 1421: “it is always our policy to have men of worth in our service both in peace and war”). Contamine, War, 172
o The civic militia infantry host lived on into the 14th century reinforced but no superseded. The approximate number of Florentine cavalrymen engaged in 4 great battles of from 1260-1325 (Montaperti, Campaldino, Montecatine, Altopasci) did initially suffer a sharp decline but later their reduced number did not suffer any continuous decline. Waley, Trevor Dean, The Italian, pg. 97
-Structure of Mercenaries Armies Organization
o Up to the second half of the 13th century, merc armies were defined by the their nature as small units or bands of soldiers (these were known as ‘masnada)’. This term was widespread and quite universal in Italian nomenclature. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg. 83-84 and Montaperti, 90-91
o The term was later superseded by the expression conestabilia or conestabileria. Thus the unit derived its nomenclature from its commander (the conestabilis=constable) and the constabulary is his body of men – not anymore merely a group (they are acquiring a structure under the leader). First rused in Tuscany by Sienese in regards to German troops. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg. 84 and Archivio Storico Sienense, Biccherna, n.40, fol. 55.
o At the time of Montaperti the normal Florentine infantry platoon was the Venticinquina and this was the extremely common of a size for bands of mercenaries. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg. 85 and Consulte vol. 1 pg 14, 82, 457, 485 and vol. ii, pp. 189, 504-5.
o Companies of 50 men were no less frequent, and very many bands of this size are found in the FLorentime employments in the 1280s and 1290s. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg. 85 and Consulte vol. 1 pg 8-9, 485 and vol. ii, pp. 168, 489-90, 514.
o The next largest recourse, when large number of mercs necessary, was bands of 100 – not unusal. This was the size of Provencal Inghilese of St Remy (1277), William the Catalan (1291-92) and of Count Menente of Sarteano (1293). Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 86.
o Yet the difficulties of recruitment led to inevitable fluctuation of size of bands (making uneven numbers common) and the 25,50,100 was not a detectable organizational trend. The constable in Florentine in 1300 commanded respectively bands of 5, 20 (x3), 25, 30, 40 (x2). Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 86 and ASF. Prot.Provv., II, fols. 7v-8, 16-17.
o The Tallia of Amauri (son of Aimeri V Vicomte of Narbonne and leader of Florentine troops at Campaldino in 1289): Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 87-88
After victory, Florentine appoint him as captain of the Tallia commanding 200 cav
In 1290 he is reconfirmed, commanding of 30 knights de conredo (experienced at war), 420 other knights (of whom 170 from beyond the alps), and 170 squires.
The knights each had a warhorse, palfrey and rouncy. They was one florin a day.
The squires received only half of this pay, and did not have to possess palfreys.
In 1290-91 he is in Florentine service with 200 cavalry most of whom were reinforcements recruited in Provence. Amauri remains on Florentine payroll up to the 31st October 1291 after which he goes back home. And Consulte vol I 407-8, 445-6, 468-9, 487, 522-6, vol II 5-7, 15-16, 20, 52, 54, 70-71.
o The company of William the Catalan. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 87-88
Initially part of a band of 19 in 1277, by 1279 he becomes the constable of his own band still sterving the Sienese.
Between 1280-82 he grows his band from a mere 22 men to 48 (when serving Romagna in 1281), such size only rarely declines below 40. By 1282 William fifty men. His last receipt for Siena is a company of 59 men and 59 rounceys for the period of October-December 1282. In Siena he returns in 1285, November, with a company of 114 cav. His force by next May mysteriously decline back to 50.
He reappears in November 1288 in service of Bologna with a company of 100 men. By September of 1289 it declines to 50 but remains in contract of Bologna until 1290.
On the 14th of September 1290 he leaves for Tuscany ‘to begin in the service of Florence’. By Autumn, the Florentine council discuss the use for the band and its size again had double to its size of 100 horsemen.
William and the fellow constable the Picard John “de Chesta” were paid 40 florins a months, the other men 10 florins.
In 1292, summer, they are put on garrison duty of S.Minitato al Tedesco, a key strategic point during the war with Pisa.
However In July, at the request of the municipality of S.Miniato, William is released his constabulary subbed with that of Count Manente of Sarteano.
After a potential short stint with Milan (either ended briefly or prematurely because of unsatisfactory terms), William tries to negotiate a new contract wilth Bologna by deputising two Florentine (Neri and Bindo del Bene) to accomplish the job.
o Consolidated bands essentially revolved around their commanders. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 90.
o Between 1270-1305 (in particular during the 1280s and 1290s) we see the formation of increasingly cohesive companies of cavalry mercenaries. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 98.
Organization/Unitso Majority of Florentine mercs were cav. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine
Republic”, pg 94
o Some exceptions such as body of 200 crossbowmen (reflecting preamble to the drive to specialization of those times, Waley, pg. 98) in employment of Florence in 1291 (but these were in the minority). Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 94 and Consulte vol I, pg 6-7, vol II, pg 129 and Consigli vol I, pg. 117.
Recruitmento Early on, from Charles of Anjou expedition in 1265, up to the 1290 Florentine
mercenaries essentially came from Provence (emphasized by the release of several Provencal men by Pisa in 1270 – see source of the ASI L. Naldini). In 1288 their extensive documentation showing the recruitment of French mercenaries from the Kingdom of Naples. The Florentine and Tuscan Guelf depended som much on them that at Campaldino the password was “Nerbona Cavaliere”. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 91 and 314-315., ASF: Provv. 1, fols. 67v-69.
o Bands however were not defined by homogenous provenance. Amauri had Spaniards and Frenchmen, not only Provencal (Navarrese, Champagne, Paris) Consulte vol I, ASF prov II, fol 107v. For William, of 53 men of known origin in 1292, only 28 were Provencal. The Remaining were from France, Flanders, Italy, Iberia and England (not a given since then later on wee see that companies under Italians are primarily made of italians). Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 91.
o After the French departure in 1292, they disappear from Florentine Scene. They never had a monopoly – the French constables recruited extensively Italians and most importantly many bands were commanded by Italian and made up exclusively of Italians – that is of the Italic peninsula, like Lombards. (a large number of Tuscan bands of cav could be in Florentine service in 1280-1305) Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 91-92. and consulte vol 2, pg. 12, 29, 61, 63, 275-6, 159, 166, 172, 181, 299, 239, 246, 343 and vol 1., 8=9, 345-6, 367-9, 380, 434, 437, 449, 452, 468—9, 485, 497, 526
Florence could count on bands of the Casentino (who supplied many merc because of less manpower demanding agri of the mountainous region).
Captains like Bonavia of Popppi with a band of 50 (1280) Stephen of Bibbiena, whose long serving company (1290-94) went from 25
to 50 men. 2 Aretine bands under Micheal (1291-92) and Puccio (1293-1300) of 50 men
each. Large bands of Tuscans in Florence pays (265 men in 6 companies in 1283
and 200 men in 8 companies in 1299-1300). Consulte vol II, 374. The next most common area was Umbria, council minutes reciting: “send
men to Perugia to raise 200 horse” in 1285. Consulte vol I, 236-7, 374, vol II, 44 69, 206.
The March of Ancona (who provided bands of men from Fermo and Recanati in 1290 and 1296), Lombardy (Brescia) and Emilia (Parma, Bologna) were all convenient regions from recruitment. Consulte, I, 524 and ASF, Not. C. 102, fols. 103v-104v. Bologna in particular was such a hotspot that the city legislated against recruitment in its territory except for crusading. Ghiradacci, Historia di Bologna (Bologna, 1605), p. 307 and Consigli, vol 1, p. 22, 214 and Consulte vol II 317, 319.
Campagna was also a popular region for both Guelf and Ghibelline (Florence having a cav force from there both in 1280 and 1288-92). And Consulte vol I, 6, 8-9, 14. In particular Florentine recruited the local noblemen, such as the Lord of Supino or Gentile Orsini, to serve for them with their large cavalry retinues (i.e. respectively 400 horses in 1289 and 200 horse in 1292) and Compagni, Cronica, pg. 21, Villani, VII 154, Conulte vol II, 206-7.
o Occasionally bodies of cavalry were recruited from the city of Florence itself but this was unusual and not always successful. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 92
o The ample existence with the region of feudatories who had essentially become professional soldiers by calling in Tuscany. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 93
Southern Tuscan’s like Nello della Pietra de Pannocchieschi or the Counts of Sarteano served the Sienese and Florentines.
Count Manente of Sarteano, despite his conviction on a murder by the city, served Florence between 1290 and 1293 with a band of 40, and the increasing to 100, men while his son Bolgaruccio served at the same time with 25 men.
The vassals of the men could served as a useful nexus for the constabulary but was not the only source of men for the band. Consulte vol 1, 345-6, 380, 407-9, 457, 485, 497-9, 526 vol II, 6, 10, 11, 17, 20, 29, 42, 54, 61, 71, 77, 82-83, 88, 166, 207, 212, 222, 275-6, 292.
The Tuscan-Romagnol-Marche border was strongly feudalized and montaninous and became a breeding ground for Tuscany’s mercenary bands and the first condottieri who would become tyrant and despots of Romagna (i.e. Uguccione della Faggioula). From here came the counts of Romena who served as generals of the Tallia in 1286 and 1288.
The army of the Tuscan Guelf against Arezzo included 250 horseman raised by Tuscan barons and baroncelli. Villiani, VII, 120
Terms of Serviceo Earliest condotta contract for Florence that with Inghilese of St Remy in 5 May 1277
signed with Florence at Church of S.Maria supra portam. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 86-87 and ASF DIP, Coperte di Libri, n.i.
Serve Florence for the Guelf faction with 100 cav (each with a good war horse worth at least 30l, full armour covering neck, thig, legs. A helmet, shield, sword, lance, knife).
Half of force had to be found mid-May, the rest before June 1. Rate of pay 11 flroins per month. The captain, who must have 2 further horses to his war horse, would receive
double pay together with the two gonfalonieri (banner bearers – one for each company of fifty).
Each company would have a trumpeter who received normal pay. The force must have 30 pack horses, for each of which 5l would be pand
monthly. The war horses would ve judged by a committee made of the Florentine
marshal, two other citizens and a rp of the band. A compensation in full would be paid to the soldier for the injury or death of
these horses at the hands of the enemy, so long as reported within 3 days.
This would be paid in 10 days and the man receiving it must shows the horse within 3 days of receipt.
Failure to ride by anyone in the company would result in a fine of 40s. for first day and 10s. for all subsequent days.
The merc had to parade on request (facere mostram de personis et armis) on request.
Provision of sub on parade or service was punishable by a fine. Prisoners capture would be handed over within 4 days to the city, the city
would 25l. for a horseman and 10l. for inf. If the city did not want him the captor is free to do with him as he pleases short of putting him to death.
Any merc who is captured would be exchanged for enemy prisoner if possible..
Each side was to give secuirities, that of Florence extending for four months and guaranteeing the pay of the first two:pay would normally be given monthly, 3 days before end of month.
Law-breaking of mercs would be put under jurisdiction of Florentine authorities.
Another clause promises Inghilese a loan of unreadable amount (likely 100l.).
If either side fails to observe these promises, made on oath, ut was to pay 1000 l., the terms remaining valid.
Role in Battleo An arduous task to evaluate their role in the 13th century since their were so few
battles. They were arduously engaged with the Aretines at Pieve del Toppo in 1288 and again during Campaldino in 1289 but primarily their focus was that of Garrisoning S.Miniato al Tedesco, Volterra and other fortress with some interspersed raiding. Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 94 and ASF pprovv, I fols. 90v-91v, II, fol. 46
-Example of Mercenary Companies (Fra Monreale D’Albano’s Grand Company)
Bayley, War and society, pg 21-22o Cause of success was ability to address quickly all issues born from internal disputes
which might impair cohesion.: Led by a lesser noble of Provence and a renegade of the Order of St. John.
Won him great prestige and obedience by rank and file Regular payment of wages Abundance of plunder in Italy.
o Had lent effective and professional service in Kingdom of Naples until in 1352 the troop was deprived of its booty and ejected by Queen Joanna’s forces under Malatesta of Rimini.
o To swell his ranks again he moves northwards laying to waste the territories of Rimini and promising regular pay and equitable division of pay. And M. Villani, III, 237, 298-9 (drag)
o Crashes the armies of the lordlings of Ancona and capture 48 of the castles of the region.
o The development of a complex diplomatic and economic apparatus to the company. (Bayley, War and society, pg 22):
All plunder was deposited in the castle of Montelupo received by chamberlains and recorded by company treasurers. A further notary attached to the camp kept a record of incoming booty and had the power to issue advances and loans to the soldiery (with consent of the leader).
The leader was aided in diplomatic and military issues by an advisory council made by the 4 captains of the horse and 4 Italian captains of the foot.
o By 1354 the company was made by 5000 horse, 2000 dismounted cavalry and 1500 heavy infantry. It also had its own great following of foragers, female camp followers and merchants. And M. Villani, III: 280, 298, 300-301, IV: 316-7, 324-5 (Drag)
o These companies were a new and unpleasant military problem for Tuscan city-states: they had grown too large and cohesive making it impossible to impose on them a supreme commander chosen by the employing city gov and their size made them so greatly expensive to keep in hire for the usual time spans (especially considering that the Grand Company insisted in being engaged en bloc to prvent being split into smaller units and diminish its bargaining power). (Bayley, War and society, pg 22) and M. Villani, XI, 439 (Drag)
Particularly problematic was their request to traverse Florentine territory at the harvest season – resulted either in requisition or they could buy immunity but capitulation would signal weakness forcing further abuses by company.
Attempts to split company by hiring constituent captains and their following was avoided by extracting from constituent captains a binding oath of fidelity to commander of company.
o
-Covini (TO CONTINUE FOR MERCS), Political and Military Bonds in the Italian State System, Thirteenth to Sixteenth Centuries
Absence of an all territorially encompassing monarchichal authority in Italy allowed for a peculiar development in Italy. This development was led by the commune and rural lords, the protagonists of the era, who sough to achieve a process of territorial reorganization/centralization through internal coercion and war.
Yet the monopoly of arms was not possessed by only the major players. Several bands and grouping existed in Italy who, in accordance to inclination and capacity, would influence the development of the peninsula by their ability of making war (autonomous military intiative).
“the city-states of northern and central Italy were strongly linked to the surrounding countryside and showed a general tendency which might be more or less successful, towards the subjugation of rural lords, land, and minor centres, and the assumption of political, jurisdictional, and fiscal control of the surrounding territories.” – Their triumphs where not all through direct military conquest but also informal pressure and agreement.
Their ascension as nation-wide important players was a product of the vacuum left by Fredrick’s II death and the conflict within the empire of the Angevins and Swabians.
“Popular domination of the city-states also corresponded to the period of stronger expansionist moves towards the subjugation of the communities and rural lords of the urban district, the contado (the old comitatus), which had been the cities' most immediate object of conquest.” – more forceful, not informal, expansion with tried and tested communal armies.
All the citizen body had to contribute to war effort, either informal (as a sort of depository for the commune of goods/equipments) or as soldiers.
Milites (nobleman with bellicose custom and military tradition that dominated urban government, cornerstone of armies acted as cavalry) vs. cives (non-noble infrantryman proud heir of those who triumphed vs. Barbarossa).
“The rural militias also contributed to the military campaigns of the city-states: each community of the contado provided an infantry of a size proportional to its estimo and led by a local captain. Moreover, the countryside bore the main burden of logistic support for the army: provision of pioneers, sappers, and auxiliary personnel variously responsible for supplies, transport, and the setting-up of camps, military quarters, and siege positions”
A series of systematic reform allowing non-noble/magnate participation in cavalry by lowering wealth/material requirement (i.e. Padua/Verona).
A larger domain meant longer campaigns, discouraging merchants/craftsman in partaking in military efforts. Similarly city and contado infantry was dissatisfied tendency to dodge service or commute obligation.
Conscripted forces are ever more outclassed by professional troops (their service to short of a time, equipment was power logistical support not sufficient).
Masnade’s: mercenary contingent always present sometimes they were given great freedom of action when requirement of warfare became to pressing.
A relentless demilitarization of city in context of intense internal conflict between different city factions which had formed armed societies. Althouth citizen recruitment kept existing, as service rolls being used to record names of citizen, these rolls also double as urban registers and did not thus imply service.
Mercenary Examples:o “As Daniel Waley has shown, from the beginning of the thirteenth century the Italian
city-states began to recruit mercenaries on formal contracts, initially engaging individuals or small groups and later small organized units.”
o “early as the mid-thirteenth century, and with a huge financial effort, Milan was paying over 1,000 mercenaries from different parts of Italy.”
o “the battle of Montaperti in 1260, in which Siena and the Florentine s faced Florence, urban and contado militia with some small mercenary support fought for Florence.”
o “A few decades later, in 1325, at the battle of Altopascio between Florence and the lord of Lucca, only 500 armed citizens, recruited through the cavallate system, did battle with 1,500 professional cavalry, almost all of whom were foreigners.”
Mercenaries in 13-14th century:o New astounding expenses incurred from merc recruitment resulte in introduction of
new economic institution to fund such contingents. o Heteorgenous group of different nationalities including Italians, French, provencales,
Catalans, Germans (of the imperial and AAngevin armies). The root of mercenary employment in Italy
o Urban milites as well start to transform war-making into employment so much so that as early as 1229 Milan sends a contingent of milites to its allies to Alba. These after exceeding period of obligatory service strike a contract and fight as paid professionals.
o Guelph-Ghibelline conflict generates frequent exile who come to swell the ranks of professional armies.
o Similarly the extrinseci, nobles or grandi expelled from their cities, dedicated from themselves to military service – seeking masters among their own political party and
attempted to direct the war effort to their home by forming League and joing a Guelph/Ghibelline confederation.
The Rural masnadeo Cities often entrusted recruitment ot a rural lord/signore who, coming from a
warring legacy, could recruit from his own system of military clients and vassals. As a result these signori could easily equip bands in the service of the commune.
o Their existence was dictated by their military skill. They managed to retain their own domain (despite existing within the communal sphere of influence) by placing their military capacity at the service of others.
o “While the minor signori could only count on a small, rural masnada which could only be employed in local wars, the more powerful signori were real military recruiters, able to raise armies even of some hundreds of men. In 1216, the count of Montefeltro recruited 300 cavalry for the city of Urbino, and between 1224 and 1227 a group of feudatories from Piedmont engaged hundreds of mercenaries for the city of Genoa”
o This system was spread all over Italy but had it roots in Appenines mountains region and Central Italy. These would become recruiting resoervoirs of Italian powers. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Umbria, the Marches, Lazio, and Romagna were the principal areas of recruitment for all the Italian powers.
o This bands grew to become very mobile, extremely professional bands of soldier virtually identical to foreign bands in the pay of the city. To further stress this point Formal contracts were drawn up between the city state and the dominus of the contado which stipulated the form of service, pay division of spoils and ransom, conditions of arms and horses, compensation for injury or loss of horses, and so on. A significant difference was that the city-state as well offered their protection of the domain of the the dominus/recruiter.
The dev of this bands led by rural noble seems paradoxical in light of the ambition of cities to subject the communities and domains surrounding them, but this very ambition required a military capacity and skill which only such a rural aristrocracy (with long lasting military tradition) could offer.
o Guido da Montefeltro, lord of a small dominion in the Marches was defeated in 1282–3 when he tried, at the head of a league of city-states and Ghibelline forces, to establish a vast dominion between the Marches and Romagna. Obliged to go into exile by a Guelph revolt, in 1289 he took command of the armies of Pisa, which belonged to the same faction, and began an important reorganization of communal forces.
o In the intense political game between the cities, the Empire and the Angevin initiative, some dynasties of signori, which had seen their sphere of influence reduced to very limited areas by the expansion of the surrounding city-states, found new opportunities for political promotion and deflected the threat of a definitive decline.
o Exploiting of conflict between cities, offering service to most powerful of two factions and carving an ever greater domain for themselves (regardless of formal ties). i.e. Prefetti of Vico though vassals of the pope offered their service to competing city states in the region and imperial power.
o Also competition/conflict on a local level involving endemic campaigns/skirmishes with other local lords which resulted in essentially brigandage.
o An unlikely coexistence of city-states and their institutions with minor and major rural lord with cultivated military traditions. These militaristic aristocratic dynasties (Montefeltro/Malatesta) were able to exploit endemic conflict and become a key ally to players.
North/North-East characterized by tranisition from urban communes to urban signoria. The one-lord dominion however did not entail military organization changes.
o Signore of Verona Delia Scala armies remained largely similar to those of communal times.
Majority Professional soldier (primarily foreign mercs, Germans). Contingents from the cities Verona and Vicenza, these provided (cavalry and
infantry both from within the region and outside it). In 1330 Treviso provided a large contingent of cavalry, crossbowmen, infantry, and pioneers.
The most significant change perhaps was a a bodyguard/elite rertinue led directly by the signore made of elite German Mercs and the city elite.
Free companies: large organized bands of mercs who replace the piecemeal and independent recruitment.
o A product of expanding scale of conflict in terms of time and distance. o Appear from 1320s-1340s and expand in scale from 1360 with 100 years war truce. o A very impactful presence in Italy, their large numbers, numerous camp followers,
efficient treasury, and internal judiciary system made them a nomadic state of great impact.
o Though fighting on contract with well established terms, they rarely respected commitment.
“The Lombard Pietro Azario, both a witness and victim of dramatic events of the times, records many episodes which highlight the greed and unscrupulousness of these paid soldiers who fought the length and breadth of Lombardy between 1340 and 1370. He also omits many other events too cruel and too painful for those who were directly affected to recall”
Lack of a coercive local power results in systematic devastation of Italy by the autonomous companies.
The systematic consumption of resource of communal states by these companies prevents their accumulation necessary.
Their ever greater autonomy plus their possibility of defecting to the enemy side made conflict during period an uncertain matter and their will could change the outcome of war.
Their release from a contract due to the end of conflict made them into a common threat to a region, inducing the peninsula to engage in a permanent state of war to avoid the devastation caused by them (antecedent to the war of the Otto Santi).
o Pre-condition: large amount of physical wealth in Italy. Though weakened by crisis of the first half of the century, commercial and financial activites of the commune were still reliable..
o Pre-condition: financial institutions existed that allowed their hiring (i.e. raising loans).
o Pre-condition: Free companies employment came to exceed traditional armies of cives and their rustici counterpart because their performance decline and their long-lasting military tradition between contado and city started fading.
o Pre-condition: A slippery slope born from inter-regional ambitious epxnasion of Italian powers. The ambitions and period of hostilities would induce either as a military or preventive measure to hire further mercenaries. These would in turn be hard to dismiss as such the very same recruiters would organize a League to fight the riotous companies hiring even more mercs.
o Pre-Condition: War was an enormous strain on a states resources (human, financial, material), an ability to administer rationally such resources was required. Among this rational concerns we see that the need to compete continuously with the enemy and the ability to equip large, stable, and efficient armies; and to move and quarter these forces for long periods of time even in territories far from home was required. Mercs could satisfy many of these requirements.
o Pre-Condition: A growing tendency, born out of continuous antagonism, to raise armies which needed to become permanent.
o Escalating factors: protracted nature of conflict results in defaults and overdue payment. The system of administration of mercenaries armies were not efficient enough.
Free companies contribute to the subjection of smaller centres to largers cities (i.e. Florence, the leader of the Guelph league) since they were unable to mount a political military challenge to free companies. – Luzzati, ‘Firenze e l'area toscana’, in G. Cracco et al, Comuni e signorie nell'Italia nordorientale e centrale”, pg. 660.
While the free company scene is characterized by foreigner captains, we start seeing a development of Italian captain (i.e. those under the signori of Verona under the Delia Scala). With the constant rise and fall of states we see that these captains start moving entering into the service of the most well-off states.
o These lords also start gaining prominence because of their status. They enjoy a good reputation one liked with the aristocratic feudal tradition of the militaries of the 13 th and 14th centuries. These were nobles or minor rural lords from military dynasties based in the contado and strong ties to cities and their ruling class.
o A re-establishment of the city as the center for state development while the rural signoria as the main military component/enforcer of city will.
Mercanaries companies become a stable and crystallized system in Italian affairs with the development of bureacratics structure (i.e. longer condotte contracts breeding loyalty, incentivizing rewards such as territorial concessions and rights for loyal service) which induce their integration in the armies of states.
“The urban and mercantile centres, guided by the diverse aims of an articulate and composite ruling class, were more interested in expansion along the lines of their commercial activity than in large-scale territorial conquest. However, Visconti aggression and the extension of the conflict obliged all major powers, and especially Venice and Florence, to lay aside their anti-military and anti-expansionist tendencies.” Ultimately the great competition between states meant that with each conquest of a rival, there a was a necessity to restablish the balance of power and this causes a progressive intensification in the confrontation of states.
o Secuirty was a valid concern, Florence premptively taking over Pisotia Arezzo Prato San Gimignano and Volterra for fear of Papal and Visconti expansion.
o Came with imposition of a new centralized administration and jurisdictional and fiscal reorganization on the conquered territories
o Institutional developments towards the end of the century at least up to the serious defeats in the war of Lucca, brought to power an oligarchy with a greater interest in expansion and conquest.
The link between war and state formation is, therefore, particularly evident in Italy where the process of territorial aggregation also took place at regional level. The political prerogatives of central state (such as centralization of governance, growth of a bureaucracy, and coercive powers) were tentatively applied to mercenaries.
-Settia, “Come si usa in Monferrato” Covini sui Monferrato: “In c.1250, the marquis was the head of an ailing
rural signoria besieged by the communes which surrounded it and financially drained by debts with the city bankers. The dynasty's policy was founded entirely on the attempt to save the territory of the dominion from the aggressive policy of the neighbouring city-states.29 In the course of just a few decades, the position of this lord changed radically Having successfully established himself in a complex web of alliances, he became the champion of the anti-Angevin league and gained the leadership of contingents of communal and feudal troops. He also became a podestà and captain of many city-states in Piedmont and southern Lombardy, and—at the height of his short-lived fortune—even managed to impose a kind of military dictatorship on the powerful city of Milan which had recruited him as a captain against its own exiles.”
This partciular marchesato had to supply Guglielmo VII with many troops in the second half of the 13th century when he was captain of war of many Italian northern cities.
This particular marchesato, though technically a rural principate, is strongly influenced by neighboring communes in its military practices.
Millitary Obbligations:o Albergaria, the duty to house and feed a number of transitioning fighters (in 1228
Motiglio has to house 50 cavalryman at its great expense – such onerous implies the hiring of milites de masnade, foreign warriors hired for war).
o Some communities had to offer military service but for limited periods. In 1158 localities like Gassino e Valenza have to raise a host thrice per year for 3 days at they expense (further days would be financed by the marquesse). New necessities in the coming century extend terms of service or give new prerogative (the marquess can summon at his pleasure a host or cavallate from subjected communities, i.e. the Lords of San Sebastian Po had to raise a cavallate every time it is request of them in 1232 or similar expectation for those of the Commune of Trino in 1275 or that for Burgh San Martino in 1278).
o Exemptions could be given but these shows how much such practice was common and expected.
o In the exemption documents, we see that generally a subjected commune (both urban and rural ones) was expected to provide cavalryman, infantryman, animals for transportation or vehicles for transportation.
Ivrean citizens are expected to raise a host and serve him between the localities of Chiavasso and Casalette to defend his lands.
Alessandria had to send 10 well armed knight to join the marquess at Verona.
Alba promises to raise a host in 1283 at its own expense for a month which will serve in a range of 40 miles for the Marquess (and can be kept more than that period but at the expense of the Marquess). A much larger onerous in terms of distance and time.
o The obligation owed to the marquess are similar, but ligther (for they change jurisdiction on premise of lighter service), to that owed to any commune.
When Vignale in 1290 passes from jurisdiction of the Marquess to that of the Commune of Asti they promise to raise a host that will stary with their army of 100 clientes (infantryman) for 15 days at their expense (and future days at the expense of the commune) but they shall not include contingents of cavalryman. Carusi
Casorzo agrees to send in the same year calvaryman and infantry everytime Asti wants but not any wagons.
Similar agrements also struck by Cunico (but enjoys 15 year exemption from all service) and Chivasso.
o As time passes single communities are mora capable of contracting their terms of military service, and are able to achieve unique solutions to avoid service, and manifest a difficulty in being capable of sending animals, wagons, and horseman to host.
Armies and their size can be constructed from fragmentary date. It would appear that in the marchesato between 1200 and 1278 about 500 horseman and 1500 infantryman could be recruited at one time.
o During his twice attempted invasion of Asti in 1290, he recruits 9000 milites and 15000 pedites and 1000 milites and 35000 pedites but the majority of these must be recruited from the communes he ruled or hired from foreign lands.
o A common practice of the time was to assign specific insignia each host raised by a community, these contingents were also mobilized from those areas in the marchesato which were closest to the areao of operation. This mobilization of community under their own single flag was a common practice in Italy, one shared with communes.
Similar practice as with other communes in regards to prisoners: “come è da tempo consueto nel territorio di Monferrato e del Vasto si proceda così: a chi cattura un cavaliere spettino 20 soldi, a chi cattura un fante 5 soldi. Le somme lucrate e la preda fatta verranno poi ripartite in base all’armamento e all’importanza operativa di ciascun combattente: se la preda è stata fatta da cavalieri sarà perciò divisa anche con gli arcieri.” – suggests the existence of a long lasting military practice in regards to this matter.
o As time goes by the practice changes and becomes more complex reducing the earned bounty according the presence of certain factors (i.e the capture was achieved with the aid of horsemand or infantryman of Alessandria).
o Very important is to acknowledge the hire bounties crossbowman received compared to other soldiers (that is mounted crossbowman more than mounted soldiers, crossbowman on foot more than footsoldiers). Highlight the importance that the crossbow had achieved.
Armaments:o The practice of Western EU apply also to Monferrato. o When infantryman operating at Paciliano wer einjured they lost all their equipment
consisting in: ““spatam, panzerias, capellos, clamides, cultellos, arcos et lanzas”.
These item are listing the items of two different but well equipped types of soldiers: pikemen archers.
Those who are protected by the panzeria and kettlehead, likely also breings a sword and primarily employs his pike in defence of cavalry charge. Those who wear the clamide (gambeson/veste imbottita and is armed with a knife is an archer).
Shield are not mentioned for they are likely not lost and the request for the indemnity then must have not been registered.
o An established practice of holding standing contingents of both knights and horseback archers as since in the alliance between the Marquess and the commune of Alba in 1204. Horseback archer were a common practice but are soon replaced in Italy with horseback crossbowmen.
o The employment of crossbow becomes widespread and very popular. This development also entail the strengthening of knight’s armour, the more widespread adoption by footmen of armour and the introduction of horse armoud.
Regarding the status of troops and their actions in war, the Piacentino Codagnello when narrating the defense of Chiavasso in 1231 against Codagnello’s own Milanese and Vercellesu says tha the defenders were: “uomini nobilissimi, magnanimi, bellicosi, di somma audacia e di grande valore”; essi - dice - “combattevano i loro nemici con forza sferrando durissimi colpi con mangani e petriere, lance, spade, pietre e altre macchine”. I balestrieri, in specie, si mostravano “agguerritissimi più di quanto di solito si usi e più di quanto si sia mai sentito né si possa ricordare” dal momento che colpivano i nemici in modo assai grave, li ferivano e ne uccidevano molti. Il presidio si difende così egregiamente che gli attaccanti “oltre modo spaventati, specialmente dai gravissimi lanci di grandi pietre e dai colpi dei ferocissimi balestrieri”, mostrano di temere “l’audacia e il valore dei difensori” tanto da non avere più il coraggio di continuare gli assalti né di tentare la fortuna contro di loro. Solo dopo aver resistito da maggio sino a settembre i bravi Chivassesi, non ricevendo soccorso dal marchese, privi ormai di viveri e minacciati di essere passati a fil di spada se il luogo venisse preso d’assalto, decidono infine di arrendersi”.
-Changes in the nature of war in Early 14th century Tuscany, Green
-Combination of military and economic factors in conduct of war between 1313-28 results in major changes. Pg. 69
-Involves employment of heavily armed mercenary cavalry as spearhead of civic armies.
-Factors:
Availability of hired troops allows statal expansion for they can act as permanent garrisons. High wealth of cities could only afford that heavy merc cav necessary to win cities.
-In the duecento mercs had been used in Italy but as small axuxiliary units, with little impact on outcome of war.
-Argues that Montaperti and Campaldino were won because of the psychological response of poorly disciplined soldiery not necessarily from professional skill.
Villani, at VI (79), suggests that the striking down of the guelph standard by Bocca degli Abbati, a traitor, caused mass route.
But also the 800 well trained knights, sent by the kingdom of Naples, charge against the Florentine cavalry contributed.
The Mercs on the Guelph side, under Kfroff von Fuglingen, played no part in the engagement – breaking as soon as the front ranks collapsed. Pg 70
The defeat at Campaldino of the Aretine was a product of Corso’s Donati sudden cavalry charge on behalf of Florentine (in defiance of orders) which unnerved the enemy armies. Though 400 mercs made up the Florentine cavalry (out of a total of 1600), it was not them who routed the enemy. Villani, VII, 131
-It was cavalry charge that had a tendency to break the enemy lines (even before the infantry caught up) i.e. Colle val d’Elsa, 1269 – Villani, VII, 31
-The transition to merc occurred when professional troops began to play a key role in war.
1305-6, Sieges of Pistoia by Flo and Pistoia still included civ infantry but were led by Duke of Calabria Robert and his band of 300 Catalan cavalry and Almoravidian infantry. Villani, VIII, 82
Further facilitater by the descent of Henry VII of Luxembourg in 1310, brought a substantial number of German knight in peninsula which would form a large supply base (once disbanded) of mercs (allowing their ever greater use).
The effectiveness of Merc is proved by Henry when after Incisa the well trained troops of Henry besiege the city of Florence which contained twice as many knight and four times as much infantry. Pg 71 and Villani, IX, 43-47
After the death of Henry in 1313, 10 companies (about 1000 men) of his cavalry hired by Pisa to defent the city from Guelph alliance. Placed under Ugaccione della Faggiuola (a condottiero, soldier of fortune), the Pisans managed to decisively defeat the Guelphs.
Ugaccione again attacking Lucca in late 1313 manages through his foreign knights (600 to 800 personnel) to rout immediately the Guelph forces. A Sienese chronichler and participant recalls how these were given Pisan unfirom and were only distinguished on the battledfield by their ruthlessness and professionalism (ravaging the territory, killing many, and refusing surrender – probably because they did not understand the language).
o Notes a remarkable discipline riding in tight formation, simultaneously, and communicating effectively through signs.
o Some suggest that discipline was achieved by Ugaccione’s drastic punishment for those who fell out of line (loss of foot) – such draconian punishment recalled bu authors suggests how unexpected it was to find well drilled troops.
-Never forget that cities were ostensabily taken by betrayal like Lucca from the Pisans, whose repress Ghibellines open the doors to Ugaccione dellla faggiuola. Pg 72 and Villani, IX, 60
-Despite enjoying the support of the Ghibelllines, Uga ruled essentially via the military power provided by his mercs. This conquest and capacity to retain a city was a key development/breakthrough in the geo-political situation of Italy making mercenaries a more attractive prospect. Citizen armies just could not stay and garrison a foreign city in the name of their own state, the common practice was to install a politically friendly regime in the city made of local political exiles.
-We see that in the Guelph reaction to Uga, certain military development are adopted by his enemies. The alliance led by Florence (the richest and most populous centre of the region) was to
raise a substantial army made of civic contginents from all the member-cities, their dependencies and through the recruitment of mercs of south Italy. This gave in total a force of 4000 cav and 40000 infantry(vs Uga and His Northern/Central allies of 2000 infantry and 2500-3000 cav). Pg 73-75. And Mussato, de Gestis Italicis.
Results in Montecatini, after failing to siege local fort because of arrival of Guelph army who cut off his supply, Uga retreats to nearby defensive position (in ordered fashion) in prep of attack
The tactical retreat was taken by inexperienced Florentine and Guelphs as a general rout resulting in a disorderly pursuit. The pursuit, undertaken by civic levies (and not by the attached professional cavalry who had been in charge of effective skirmishing) resulted in a general dispersion of Guelph army. and Villani, IX, 71
Uga’s troops in tight formation dispersed the enemy (even despite suffering an attack on its rear). Their tight ranks showed the strength of discipline during battle (a discipline potentially enforces through severe penalties).
When withdrawing over the Bone river, the Guelphs were attacked on a bridge by a large component of Uga’s cavalry. Their charge, which could have been a catastrophe, was stooped by the merc cavalry under Peter of Eboli. The charge was deflected, resulting in the death of its commander (Uga’s son and a Malaspina) and the loss of the imperial banner. Villani, IX, 71.
Yet this was not it, the expertise of Ugaccione and his troops showed. He quickly dispatched 8000 archers on his side, halting the Eboli’s pursuit of his cavalry. Uga was saved by the fact that his second division of Pisan force was made of professional troops who did not take flight and cause a geneal rout.
With eboli routed, the soft centre made of Florentine levies was exposed. These were cut down by the charge of Ghibelline professional calvary and their slaughter augmented by them being in marching order and because their escape routes were hindered by amount of bodies of water and marshes. The Florentine must have lost several thousands and perhaps saw 1300 of its soldiers captured. Villani, IX, 71.
Ultimately Montecatini shows strength of well drilled troops. The Florentine, after losing the protection of the Merc cavalry had to face a well-mounted and professional cav attack with civic militias, resulting in a typical mass route of the likes of the 13th century.
-Montecatini ushers period where city-state armies’ backbone was made of foreign professional knight and hired crossbowmen. It also whoed the importance of discipline and maintaining formation, so much so that a wells positioned smaller force could defeat a larger one. Pg. 75
-Sudden overthrow of Uga results in a 5 year peace between Guelph and Ghibelline, which ends with renewed formal conflict of 1320.
Among the participants we find Visconti’s (Giangaleazzo) Milans, who hired former imperial troops and between 1313 and 1315 expands in Piedmont and Lombardy.
The conflict re-kindles over Genoa, which had been taken over by Robert. The Neapolitan king encourages his Tuscan Guelf allies to attack Milan to release his forces from pressure, meanwhile the Northern Ghibellines (i.e. Milan and Verona) foment a Ghibelline uprising inducing them to enact a diversionary attack onf Val d’Arno. Pg 76.
Fundemental changes to support merc professional troops: pg. 76-78
The high cost of merc resulted in introduction of new communal finances. These in turn affect strategies of armies and policies of state.
Enormous strain on resources of cities, regardless wealth, for maintainance of viable body of professional troops. See note 31 for more on payments.
o Knights averaged around 12 florins per months in war (with their captains receiving a florin per man under his command).
o Crossbows and hire infantry got considerably less, costing generally one or two florins and their captains receiving double.
o It would appear that communal armies spent on infantry 3/7 of what they would spend on cavalry.
To maintain forces of the size listed by chroniclers would cause the collapse of smaller commune while heavily increasing the public debt of the larger ones.
o Lucca, a small commune, at war from 1313-7 and 1320-42o Its revenue in 1335-6 estimated at 85,000 Florins. Of these about 53000 would go in
supporting mercs and this would have sufficed in hiring 260 foreign knight for a whole year of 520 for six months.
o Florence in 1339 had a revenue of 343,300 florins (Delizie, XII, 349) – villani in 1325 placed the revenue of the Gabelle (indirect taxes) at 250,000 florins, an increase of 70,000 on the amounts previously raised (Villani, IX, 324)
This sum must be considered against various sums actually employed by the cities.
The Guelphs employed 1100 at Montecatini (de Gestis Italicis). At Altopascio, both side had more than 2000 cav (majority merc – Villani,
IX, 306). At the siege of Pistoia, Florence had 2500-2600 knignt (most foreign,
professional troops). – Villani, X, 84-85 Even if these are exceptional sums enlisted for expedition, chroniclers
suggests that there was a force of 600-1200 knight maintained at all times by both side after resumption of hostilies in 1320 (Villani, X, 115, 135, 209, 214).
o Considering that a 100 knights would cost 14500 florins a year (12 florins per month) plus infantry necessary for garrisoning castle and archers needed for army and that other commitments limited war budget to 2/3 of total revenue htne hiring an army of above dimension was exhaustive.
To meet financial demand a series of policy introducedo Increase taxes.o Imposition of forced loanso Expansion of revenue base of the stateo Maximize effectiveness of hired merc while under contract.
Florence did this by borrowing from its richer citizens, leading merchants of EU, and paying back debt’s interest by raising taxes.
Smaller communes like Lucca had to either depend on allies or extend its territories and therefore income. Until then had to wage a war proportional to is resource, from 1316 its captain and later lord Castracani had to wage defensive campaign which exploited the hilly, marshy, rivery terrain of Northern Tuscany and by engaging at key moments for short periods foreign troops (mutual assistance agreement with Ghibelllines).
o The combined resource of Lucca and Pisa (300,000 florins a year) allowed them to raise a merc force capable of matching that of Florence or even the entire Guelph League.
-Florence use of merc and necessity for standing army came from sustained expeditionary conflicts (either support Lombard Guelf cause or dealing with the Aretine Ghibelline in val D’Arno while facing the Lucchese and Pisan threat). Pg. 79-81 and Villani, IX, 129, 130, 151, 166, 187, 199, 211, 215, 226, 253
With Lucca’s acquisition of Pistoia, which gave Castracani a foothold within the plains Florence was located in, the necessity to crash this bustling enemy became a priority.
The Luccan threat also signalled a worrying prospect the minor communes could redress the balance of power through the acquisition of other cities and resources which enanbled them to to furnish a merc force which could match Florentine strength.
To do so an army of 15000 infantry and 2400 knight (of which 1500 were mercs, the rest were citizen) was raised and placed under Catalan Ramon de Cardona (villani, ix, 276, 300).
To thus conquer Pistoia appear to see the typical deployment of the communal tactic of systematic devastation of economic means of citys: Florentine forced defender behind the walls of the city and its border outpost by sheer quantitative superiority and meanwhile ravaging of the countryside, conquest of fortified outpost.
In reality however, and here is where the expertise of foreign military man comes in, a series of feint attacks and sieges were launched – this diversionary move allowed an elite group of soldiers and local to take key outposts on the road to Lucca (i.e. Ponte a Cappiano – frontier post guarding access to Lucca from Val D’Elsa – or foritifed village of Montefalcone). Villani, ix, 301, 302-3
o In moving the area of operations, and having all the army move towards it, the Florentine forced their enemies out of Pistoia and back to Lucca, forcing them to face the more powerful Florentine on the open field.
Despite being on the verge of triumph, weakness of citizens army start kicking in:o IN particular it was the permission of allowing citizen soldiers to return home in
exchange of the payment of a fee. Reduces number (but still enjoyed more knights than Pistoia, 3000 vs 1500).
o This incessant tendency for citizen soldiers to go back home was exacerbated by the length of the campaign (which progression was severely halted by an effective defence of Castracani that exploited the geography).
The refusal of Cardona to commit his troops in open engagement on unfavourable terrain was equal to an admission of failure since it meant an inability to achieve goals of the campaign (a break through the pass of Porcari to get to Lucca)
By then Villanis suggests that the Florentine cavalry had declined to 2000 knights. (Villani, IX, 306)
In these reduced conditions, open the florentine to attack. The quick and effective negotiations of Castracani secured the service of 800 mounted mercenaries from Ghibelline cities (under Azzo Visconti for 10,500 florins) which gave him a tactical edge. Villani, IX, 304
-Altopascio: pg. 82
Pinzered between the Lucchese army and the Visconti reinforcement, the Florentine had nowhere to retreat. Their escape route was further blocked with the rapid capture of Ponte a Cappiano by 200 knights dispatched by Castracani.
This resulted in the capture, death or drowning of 4000 to 5000 men. Villani, 304-306 The battle was won by the shock tactic of a heavy cavalry charge but the campaign
resolved itself as it did because of the strategy of the Lucchese commander. The cutting off of the retreat and complete/decisive destruction of a large part of the troops,
put an immediate end to the enemy campaign thus reducing costs but also refunded most of the investment (through the capture of prisoners whose ransome would pay for the campaign and the devastation and plundering of the contado). Villani, IX, 317-320, 322-323
-The defeat of Altpoascio led Florence to elect King of naples’ son, Charles of Calabria, as their lord. He was granted 200,000 Flroins a year on the promise that he maintain a standing army of 1000 merc cav in Tuscany for the Guelphs. Pg 83-84 and Villani, IX, 333
This gave the Guelph a temporary advantage, checking Castracani’s expansion, until the descent of emperor Ludwig of Bavaria on behest of Italian Ghibellines. Villani, X, 29-30.
Castracani’s gain crystalized by emperor through dukedom and vicariate. Pistoia is effectively taken away from him soon after receiving his new titles (when it taken by surprise by the Florentine while Cas is at Rome). Though he retakes it temporarily, his premature death leads to the unravelling of his domain. Villani, X, 59.
o Pistoia is temporarily loss because of the frictions the new expensive professional armies were causing, Pistoia is sieged after Cas learny of financial dispute between Florence and Charles over the provisioning of Pistoia resulting in the city being inadequetly supplied (only 3 months of food). Villani, X, 84
o His considerable body of infantry and 1600-1700 knight effectively siege the city by cutting its supplies through the construction of siege forts. Villani, X, 84
o The Florentine captain Charles had left to go back to defend his father’s throne, delegating the task to his vicar Filippo di Sangineto and leaving Florence with 800 merc cav (while 300 where stationed at Pistoia). This force was augmented with other 1760 merc knights from the pope, guelph allies, and norther of Italy. Villani, X, 85
o The preminence of cavalry is seen by Castracani’s defensive disposition on arrival of Florentine troops to Pistoia: he order ditches to be dug and the cutting down of trees to create obstacles.
o Castracani refuses engagement on the open field, despite the formal challenge by Guelph. Waiting for Visconti merc cav reinforcement from Cremona, he bides his time. Once news of this recruitment arrives to the Florentine, they choose to retreat and launch a diversionary siege on Pisa (to force Cas’s withdrawal). However the Pistoian garrison seing their would be delivers withdrawing, and food dwindling, negotiate a surrender.
-Castrcani’s example showed there existed the condition to create larger political units at the time. After his death Florence would hasten to secure Pistoia and conquer Arezzo. It was on the verge of capturing Lucca to in 1342 but where beat to it by the Pisans (who conquered it with the help of Milan). Tuscany came to be dominated by 3 main cities (Pisa, Flo, Siena and the last one was a sattleite of Flo) vs the 6 main city state and many smaller commune of before. Pg. 85 and Villani, X, 128, 184 and XI, 60, 130-140
-Florence through its great wealth recovered from its deafeat and expanded its domain too however the costs of warfare where no longer the same -> this resulted in spiralling public debt and was pulled down by the demands on its financial resources.
The default of Edward III of England on his debt affected all especially its Florentine lenders, thie resulted in a straining of the Florentine economy which led to the installment of the tyrannical Duke of Athens to power. Florence in Transition, I, 125-148
Independence regained in 1343 (but loss of Pistoia and Arezzo as well). Pistoia regained in 1351 and Arezzo in 1384.
Menaced by Milan by 1384, with Giangaleazzo Visconti on verge of annexing Tuscany in a large central-northern Italian tyranny (but his death in 1402 saves Florence).
Conquest of Pisa in 1406 makes Florence one of five main states in Italy of rougly equal strength,
-Change caused by the commune’s military and political institutions’ inadequacy for waging a war fought by paid professional troops. Pg. 85-87
The demands of regional and not local warfare axacerbated the old system and thus system and thus shifted political powers from hands of citizen to that of paymaster.
The oligarchy and tyranny would triumph ofver communal republic since they were capable of commanding merc troops or posses the capital to hire them.
As well a shift from a prevalently defensive policy to one of territorial expansion. Previously cities were rarely taken by assault but more by intrigue. As a result of this the focus was then to prevent/defeat attempts at retaking them (encouraging a policy of containment while also one which destroyed aggressive capacity of the enemy). In the fourteenth century this was replaced by policies that emphasized positional strategy and would resort to pitch battle when temporary superiority could be secured.
-Italy and the Companies of Adventure in the 14th Century
-Urban |V describes them as villaina at arms, united by greed systematically devastating the countryside and extrorting money from the good people of Italy (1364). Pg. 341
-Free companies, large autonomous unites tieeed together in loose confederation under an elected captain. Their numbers of professional soldiers inflated in Italy by continuous warfare and lack of economic opportunity in their own country.
A corporate hierarchy with a series of sub commanders and chancellors plus internal machinery to distribute loot and payment
Examples Great Company, The Company of the Star, Company of St. George.
-Sold services during war, became marauders during peacetime. Their path of destruction apexed in Italy (with its prosperour cities and contentious communities). Tuscany and Umbria were most frequent locations of their excesses. Pg. 342-3 and in M. Villani and in Coppo Stefani
Italian state solution, which fed in the problem, was bribing companies. Part of a formulaic contract where companies would promise in eachange of a lump sum not to tenter contractors territory for a specific time. Werner of Urslingen and his Great Company were paid off in 1342 in turn by Cesena, Perugia, Arezzo, Siena, and Lombard Commune.
Again the GC, under d’Albarno (i.e Far Moriale), would be paid off in 1354 by Pisa, Arezzo, Florence, Siena, and the Mataltesta of Rimini.
I.e. in 1381 Siena pay Acuto 4000 Flroins in return for promise not attack Siena for 18 months (Siena would have to buy its Freedom 37 times between 1342 and 1399).
-The problem of mercenary manifested itself, and was nourished by, the lack of contemporaries marshal virtue according to the writers of the time (Petrarch). The times were they faced the Mercenaries and triumphed, like te Florentiens did again the Great Company in 1358, were elevated by contemporaries and modern historians alike to suggest the continued viability of the communal system. (i.e Canestrini or Ricotti)
-Was combat preferable to bribery? Pg. 343-5
Combat involved enormous manpower commitment, at its peak these companies formidable and trained unites – Great Company 10,000 hardened veteran (by Contrast the French king’s army at Agincourt was 6,000 soldiers).
o The black death had ravages Italian manpower. Cutting edge tactics (like that of the White Company coming from one of the truce in 100
years war) -> introduced the lance formation in Italy and the long bow. Also soldier tactic of dismounting from horse and fighting on foot an effective dev introduced by them. And F.Villani, Cronica, 389 and search “inghlesi” for introduction of lance to Italy, Mallet credits it introduction In Italy at pg.37 by earlier mercs.
Companies had a Hannibal like military discipline that was not impeded by the elements nor fear. F.Villani, Cronica, 389
Translated in the Great confidence of these companies, a sense of invicibility, when the Breton Company is invited by pope to repress the anti-papal league led by Florence and asked if they could manage, their commader (Jean Malestroit) answer “does the sun enter there? If so, so can we).
The brutal violence and exaggeration they committed (sack of Cesena resulting in Cardinal order massacre of all the population, children, women, men – more than 5000 people died) also left a mark on contemporary citizen (who did not want to end on the wrong side of the sword).
An infra company coop to loot more effectively that made even more irresistible (i.e Hawkwood, stopped by Sienese in 1365, comes back joined with companies of Viscont and Hapsburg or Frederigo of Brescia and Luscius Landau uniting in 1370 to plunder Sienes contado). And Ricotti, Storia, Vol 2, 179
-Communal confrontation inevitable entailed hiring of merc to augment forces and these were notoriously unreliable. Had to be promptly paid, delays or premature end of payment would result in their immediate move to find more employments (Breton company during War of 8 saints, split in 3: some stayed with pope on promise of larg payment, other went and fought for Pisa, others stayed in the Sienes contado to loot it. Monetary payment itself was no guarantee of loyalty, a tendency to be bribed by higher bidder (in 1364 during war with Pisa, Florence won by bribing the mercenary contingents assembled before its gates – Acuto did the same thing despite his high reputation, 8 saints war he was employed by the pope but by the end led Florentines). With mercenary companies “there is neither love nor faith” (Francesco Sachetti) Pg. 345, 347
Victory was no guarantee and defeat would entail bearing the cost of own mercanery force and that of bribing the enemy. In 1384, Siena defeat to three free companies resulted in the desertion of two Sienese captains of war, the cost of hiring new merc reinforcement and bribe of 16000 Florine to the enemy.
Defeating them could also result in a sudden vengeful resurgence or arrival of a new company (i.e White company vs Perugia in 1364, defeated promised 1 year respite but attacks few months later).
Even Florence with decisive victories in 1358-59 was to faced renewed conflict against them in 1362 – “a hyrdra with a hundread heads”.
-The defeated companies or those whose employment was terminated remained in the lands of their enemy/employer and wreaked havock. (i.e. Company of the Hat and Siena in 1363, after being defeated by Siena and its captain captured stragglers remained to garrison Campagnatico and had to be dispersed by mobilizing the entirety of the Sienese army). Pg. 348
Even worst those still in employment were a problem for public order – rowdy behaviour criticised by Petrarch and regulated by legisliation in Siena and Pisa.
-The ranks of these companies further inflated by their permanence on land (especially during hostilities) to which brigands, exiles, and political dissidents tended to gravitate to (especially those from powerful noble families).
The White company attacking Arezzo in 1364-5 saw the rapid adhesion of Ghibeline exiles. Nobles also exploited either merc raids or campaign to turn a profit (by selling land on eve of
conflict to commune and then reqconquering it by joining Merc side, i.e.e in Siena) or to restablish political dominance on city (i.e. Perugia, Hawkwood and exile in 1379)
-The problem of free companie appear as aearly as 1342 with the Perugian passing law that punished material support of Great Company with decapitation. Similar laws in 1354 are passed by Pistoia, the banning the company under Fra Moriale. Pg. 349
These companies tended to exacerbate local political situation, i.e. in Florence citizens angry with gov for inability to defend contado property lead to weakening of Signoria and resurgence of the Ricce and Albizzi dispute. Bayler, pg. 23-24
-The merc companies curtailed productive capacity of the commune, with effects ranging from damage of countryside, to loss of shipment, to destruction of livestock (for Siena alone the damage of this was estimated at 40,000 Florins) or discouragement of contadini to resume normal activities.
-Material costs of bribing vs. attacking: pg. 350-3
1359 bribe to Great company: a bribe was paid to Landua after arrival on Siena of 6041 Florin. TO discourage fURTHER ACTION MERCENARIES WORTH 10266 florins were hired.
1363 military actions: during a pause in hostilities between flo and Pisa, the company of the capelleto moved on to Siena to plunder it. When negotiation for bribe failed, the Sienes hired 400 German horseman from Pisa and placed in the communal army. The communal army and merc troops advanced despite being ordered not to. Their engagement, in which both merc and civ troops fought well, resulted in a general route and capture of many company leaders and its captain (Niccolo di Montefeltro). Their victory avoided them the expense of a bribe.
o Nonetheless the Germans had tobe paid and the budget of the for the second semester of 1363 Biccherna records that 26,289 Florins were paid to the Condotta office.
o To this we add the substantial the substantial revenue of the tax on wine (7,771 Florine). This was then augmented by a series of military gabelles to sustain mercs
placed on communal soldiers and the priors year’s budget of the office. Total: 48,509 florins.
o As well costs of bounty given by commune for triumph to communal infantry and cavalry: 9262 Florins.
o The capture of Capelletto captain rewarded with payment of 457 Florins. o Orsini and his victorious corpals were celebrated with 800 florins worth of
festivities/reqrds.o A further expenditure of 32,4842 Florins on cavalry and a mere 2260 Florins on
Infantry (the victorious army was made primarily of a large force of cavalry, a composition which proved successful for ridding merc companies).
o A further expenditure to secure the town of Batignano through purchase (preventing its potential fall to mercs): paid 6,040 Florins to magnate owning 2/3 of city.
o Much more expensive than prior encounter. Alone expenditure directly connected to Capelletto were 54, 549 Florins (x3 more of 1359). Figure represent ¾ expenditure by the Biccherna that semester.
o One as well has to account for damages of period of hostilities and that prior of it of raiding (though not surviving in expense account) – their activities resulted in the destruction of 280 home and damage to fortifications (worth 2000 Florins).
-The costs of independent warfare proved burdensome and attempt to make this a matter of regional security through league of mutual defence known as the taglia guelfa (modelled by the 12 th-13th century institution of the same name) - (Siena joined 10 between 1347 and 1389). Their existence was meant to rid of Italy from something was perceived as non-indigenous (pg. 353-5).
Composition (1354, Siena, Flor, Perugia)o Hired 2000 merc horsemen (Florence, 1040, Perugia, 585, and Siena, 375). o Hired 1000 crossbowmen. o Swore not to treat with company separately.
Composition (1366, Urban V’s league to destroy companies – pope, naples, Florence, pisa, Perugia, siena, Arezzo, todi, cortna) and Canestrini, pg 90
o Army of 3000 horse and 3000 infantry under a warp captain elected by the members.
o Plenary indulgence for all those who aided the league vs companies.o Swore not to treat with company separately.
These shcemes inevitable failed, coordinated military actions required common political objective but no agreement among communes.
o 1354 issues over appointment of Malatesta Malatesta resulting in eventually separate agreements.
o 1366 no agreement on common agenda other than general guideline other than general ban on all future bands. The league was doomed when Pope tried to bring emperor Charles IV into League, Florence fearing imperial ambition withdrew.
Rivalries as that in 1357 between Perugia and Siena, despite Moriale’s threat, discouraged members like Siena to join Leauge despite being in their interest.
-No policy proved effective to eradicate free company problems, even a resurgence of marshal virtue in Italians was always met with some doubt by its proponents (i.e. Petrarch and Bruni). Ultimately that which suffered the most was the economy of Italian cities: their productive capacity, wealth
reserves and tax base were exhausted by bribes to mercs, costs of arising armies, the loss of life, famines, plagues, depopulation and destruction of the contado. Loans (especially from Jews) and taxes had to be eneacted to pay specific merc related expenses. Furthemore it would appear that the cities inflicte dhte companies on one another as means of economic warfare. Pg. 355-56
-FLORIN: GOLD COIN FOR MAJOR TRANSACTION.note 27, pg. 350
-LIRA: IMAGINARY UNIT OF ACCOUNT BOOKS> EXCHANGE BETWEEN FLORIN AND LIRA FLUCTUATED> IN 1359 A FLORI=3LIRA. note 27, pg. 350
-Pieri, Scritti Vari pg. 70-84
-Ch 11, pg 70-73:
A more evident general call to arms spirit than that of Lombardy when it came to communal armies. A spirit strongly influenced by the socio-political background of the commune in which the burgher class has an absolute sense of distrust vs the old landed and military nobility.
Despite this, the new order does not re-model its army around a warrior bourgeoisie, rather they enacted a very wide and general military obligations for its citizen. Such obligation were not confined to mere defensive/garrison duty, citizens had to go on actual offensive expeditions. The number of those conscripted was much larger than Milan.
General mobilization however was for special occasion, generally expedition worked on a volounteer or a rotation system.
A particular development occurs where the citizen military unit are ever more developed )in terms of weaponry and organization) and yet the citizen armies for offensive expedition are ever more mercenaries.
o Citizen armed societies, generally armed with a crossbow and dagger, become a policing mechanism and less used for external war
o Mercenaries are better armied and better trained and better trusted sine they have no connection with the factional warfare in the city.
Mercenaries on horse are preferred, a well armed mercenary infantry is only effective if numerous (and thus expensive), if not its useless. And cavalry/cavalry charges remain key weapon regardless i1f formed by old nobility, new elites or foreigners.
A new development in infantry is the greater adoption of crossbowmen paired with the recruitment of shield-bearers (with a large shield of shoulder-length height which could be planted on the ground) for the protection of the crossbows or of pikeman from enemy shooters.
This development of infantry, rather than being a shock force, made it more of a defensive force. Yet a similar character is seen among the horseman. While it used to be a light armoured and rapid and mobile shock troop capable of charging into corssbowmen after their first shot, they now slow themselves down with heavy armour and mix their units missile troops either on foot or on horse.
A fundamental precondition to professionalization is this very increase in material standard of knight, and the ever larger following he requires.
Montaperti remains a battle of old communal stamp (one between that of Lombard stamp or Tuscan stamp).
1
o The FLoreinte infantry was amassed next to the carrocio. In front of it the cavalry was deployed, behind it the cavalry and infantry of Florence’s allies. Similar disposition for the enemy with the infantry well behind the cav.
o The fight starts with a cavalry fight in which a portion of the Floretine cavalryman betrays the Florentine and passes to the enemy.
o This causes a great hole in the formation, causing panic and route of the Florentine horseman (exposing their backs) and abbandonind their infantry and carroccio.
o The infantry starts disbanding with some brave resistance but ultimately resulting in a general route in which many are killed.
o The last phase consist in the staunch defense of the Lucchese and Orvietan knights who ultimately have to give up for lack of reinforcement.
At Montaperti a compact infantry could resist the initial cavalry onslaught but must be reinforced if not it shall be doomed.
Ch 12, 74-81
By 1281, Florence in charge of a Guelf consideration with its own permanent merc army “tallia militum societati talliae Tuscia”.
o Composed primarily of knights, Italian and non, who fought for a profession (not improvised citizen cavalry or noblemen).
o Initially 500 employed later 800.o We see that the communal army of this period shall centre themselves around this
mounted core, integrating under them the communal infantryman. At campaldino we have an exact composition of troops (LOOK FOR IT ON VILLANI)
o 1300 Knight and 10000 guelph infantryman on ons die vs 800 ghibelline knights and 8000 infantryman.
o The mass of inatryman has gown in proportion compared to the cavalryman (especially compared to the the Lombard wars of the past).
o The guelph force is made of a well trained expeditionary force and not merely a levee en masse. These fight very far away from Florence and any other allied city.
o The Florentine deploy a vanguard of 150 cavalryman (feditory) and behind it the bulk of the cavalry. The infantry instead of being bejind is placed on the sides of the infantry, slighty in front of it, and its ranks are made of shieldbearers followed by either corssbowmen or pikeman. The first portion of crossbowmen enjoy the protection of the shieldbearer, the latter instead are able to open up and get some side shot on engaging enemies.
o Behind the army, the carts of the baggage train were deployed in such a way to make a load-bearing barrier preventing the sudden route of troops (thus keeping them in formation after the initial charge) and could also act as a trench (obstacling the cavalru pursuit) behind which the infantry could rally – an apparently unique Italian development
o Further behind and on the sides there exist a 150 horseman reserve + allied infantry ready to interevene either as a reserve or flakning force. The Aretine seem to have adopted a similar disposition of reserves (of 150 knights) with the difference being that the mass of their fighters was pikeman with little missile units.
o A disposition which stress defence and counter-offensives. The defensive elements seems to rely on the crossed fire of crossbows while the counteroffensive aspects
are based on the movements and actions of the reserve cavalry sided by pikeman contingents.
o This principle is expressed by Simone de Mangiadori in Compagni’s chronicle: “Signori, le guerre di Toscana si sogliano vincere per bene assalire… ora e’mutato modo, e vinconsi per stare bene fermi”. The fundemental necessity of counter-attacking the warfare of the age is stressed by Villani’s lament on the Altopascio defeat. Villani, IX, chapter cccvi.
o A fundamental change in the role of the feditori (vanguard) who once used to be a large prepondering force who tried to break the enemy on charge, now it acted as a small probing force attempting to get the enemy to engage in conditions unfavourable to it.
o The battle is an excellent example of combined arms operation (of infantry and cavalry and cavalry and missile infantry) with the effective and rapid deployment of reserves win the day.
The larger Aretine vanguard (300 knights) charges and disbands the smaller Floretine one.
The aretine vanguard, together with the remaining cavalry, charge the bulk of the Florentine army.
The Florentine bulk is slightly pushed back but the situation is stabilized by the Florentine pikeman.
To support the aretine cavalry, the knights attendants and infantry joins the melee.
The Florentine crossbow crossfire however hits the enemy with great efficieny without any interference.
To seal the enemy’s fate, the Florentine reserve attacks the enemy on its back and sides. The enemy reserves rather than interevening, flees.
The day is again won thanks to a last decisive cavalry attack and the lack of a potential infantry counter-attack.
As the 14 century gives way, the importance and number of shieldbearers and crossbowmen increases while that of pikeman decrease. In 1302 the Taglia decides to hire with the 800 knight, a body of 20000 infantryman (1/3 which is armed crossbows, 1/3 carries pavesi shield, 1/3 is armed with either spears or pikes). This composition heavily reduced pikeman, previously they nearly made up the totality of an infantry body. This mixed infantry body is made up completely of specialized professionals (substituting completely the pike squares of the old communarl armies).
o The last two battles that included considerable communal militia elements were montecatini (1315) and Altopascio (1352). Yet already in these we see that the bulk of the communal army is made of contado infantry augmented by a number of professional soldiers.
Montecatini:o Pisans siege Montecatinio To relieve the siege, the Florentines send a relief force while also trying to envelop
from the side the Pisan and Lucchese territories, cutting out their potential retreat.o Uga lifts the siege and challenges the Guelph forces, and manages to deply his
troops without disruption.
o He has a large hill to his right and deploys a small vanguard, followed by the bulk of Ghibelline knights, followed by 800 german knights who are soded on both flanks by a mixed contingent of pikeman and shield.
o The Florentine deploy a larger vanguard made of allied knight and followed by the bulk of Florentine knight sided by their own infantry. Behind all there is a large reserve of merc cavalryman (1200) led by the prince of Taranto.
o There is a noticeable absence of line of carts in both side and Uga lacks the pavesi shield and deploys the infantry with the third line instead of the second. Flo has a larger vanguard and reserve than usual (since the small vanguard was destroyed previously while the reserve played a decisive role in the course of the battle). This was achievable because of their larger numbers. The second line infantry is lacking as well the pavesi and the crossbowmen are not armed with their crossbow (which are with the baggage train) since the Guelph commander decided to leave supplies behind in an attempt to outmanoeuvre the enemy.
o Battle: Most of the combat take place on the hill on the right of Uga, Uga’s vanguard assaults and repels the Florentine one. The repelled flo vanguard is supported by the bulk of the army (2nd line), Uga
mobilizes his own 2nd line and in an attempt force the hill pass the 2nd line is halted by Florentine pikes.
Uga deploys his crossbowmen to shake the flo pikeman defending the pass. Deployed in 3 lines, the first line shoots while the other two reload (allows for un-interrupted firing). Without the pavesi, cavalry intervention or return fire, the flo infantry are sitting ducks. They break.
Uga with the 3rd line of German cavalry rides up the hill and launches an irresistible charge on the flor. The Florentine reserve intervenes to late, unable to prevent the general route. The day is again won by the cavalry.
-Ch 13, pg 81-84
Altopascio battle (a battle with scarce primary record, Villani, IX, chapter 321)o Composition
Flo infantry a mass levee of different city and contado elements. A prevalence of pikemen and no special mention in regards to missile units.
Both armies shared a large vanguard and a bulk of horseman (potentially supported by a large infantry mass).
The infantry mass of Cas however did not participate, only the attendants/squire of knight participated on foot, killing horse and horseman once they saw enemy knights dehorsed.
o Battle: Vanguard skirmish, the Florentine one is defeat and retreats disorederly. The bulk of the Florentine infantry rathern than intervening tempestively, is
kept to wait. Seeing the disorderly retreat of the vanguard they break as well.
Seeing the break of the bulk, the infantryman behind them partially routes. The remaing ones, keeping a tight and square formation, resist the initial cavalry onslaught of the vanguard (who were giving a disorder chase of the
routing troops). However Cas’s vanguard is quickly reinforced by the bulk of cavalryman, forcing another route.
The communal infantry of Florence never reached the quality of the Milanese. Though greater in quantity (through ample conscription of contado soldiers), they did not serve to increase the quality. In particular the contadini were coalesced in units which served under a city officer whose appointment lasted only 6 month, preventing the development of experienced officers or esprit de corps (since these also were barred for 1 year from serving again in the same league, and for at least 6 moths from serving in another league). This was done because of the constant fear the ruling order had of an internal armed insurrection against them or the state.
The cavalry also was a very eterogenous bodies coming from different classes and whose material standard, discipline and loyalty varied considerably (making it a defective body).
The rest of Italy, exhausted by endemic war, is forced to raise its infantry from the contado, creating massive but qualitatively poor bodies of infantry. Ricotti, II, pg. 16
The Florentines create, to counter the free companies, a 5000 man body in 1354 of crossbowmen. These will be proper stipendiaries and adopted only for defensive purposes (i.e. defence of mountain passes or fortified lands).
Some remnants of Italian communal infantry can be found in the service of French as an auxiliary body to their cavalry during the battles of Courtrai (1302) and Crecy (1346).
The rest of the 14th century does present the use in war of city and cotado crossbowmen, infantry, and dismounted cavalrymen but these do not exist in ther communal form, and Villani, Cronica, XII, chapter 67
-Tallia Militum Societatis Tallie Tuscie
-A federation, with its on monopoly of force, born out of the necessity to check Pisan expansion driven by economic needs of the bustling marittime republic. The efforts are driven by the industrial and productive classes of Florence who want to free themselves from the monopoly on commerce the Pisans have. Pg. 76-77
-The triumph of Florence, whose military necessity end influencing the commercial and socio-political order in Tuscany, leads to the formation of an inter-comunal army (la Tallia) for the defence of the region. Pg. 77
-This Tallia is a precursor to the Free companies and liquidates the necessity to rely militarily on the minor nobility.
-This army was a nearly permanent force of the Tuscan league. Pg. 78
-Already precedence in having a foreigner leading Florence military, the Captain of the People had to be a Guelf and Foreigner. Through him and the popular military ordering, Florence and the Primo Popolo subject the neighbouring hostile communes securing an eventual hegemony on the region (despite the Ghibbelline temporary resurgence between the Battle of Montaperti and Benevento, the Ghibelline patron the king of Sicily Manfred defeat leads to Guelf resurgence) . Pg. 78-79
-The renewed curtailment of the Grandi results in a decadence of the strength of Florentine arms. To renew their strength they come to rely on a new military patron, Charles of Anjou. Pg. 80
-To secure the new regional order, Florence coalesces in a League creating the taglia guelfa and olacing it under a vicar (maliscalco) of Charles. This army is military society (societas militum) made
of paid mercenary (paid by the communes) and by the soldier of Charles (this is very similar to the Ghibelline own leagues, made of an imperial vicar, Ghibelline local nobles, their vassals, and German mercs).
-With Pisa subjected by Charles, peace is achieved also between Florence and Pisa along certain military convention: each has to return the rightful territories of communities conquered by force and the Pisan have to release Florentine prisoners and mercenaries paid by Florences (lombardos, teutonicos, spanos, catalanos et proviciales stipendiaries communis florenti). Pg. 81
-The taglia guelfa either corresponds to Charles’ army augmented by sympathetic locals who enter in alliance with it for a determined political ends or is a precursor to the Tallia militum, a formal and shared military institution of the region> In its first appearance the taglia appears to be a military alliance for a determined military operation struck by the communes of the region and their patron Charles, the military institution supporting it is not formally recognized but by all standards it acts in the same way the future tallia does. Pg. 81-83
All communes had their own mercenaries that served in said war: The Florentines soldiers (search in Villani) were masnade “tedesche ch’ erano in Siena ed in Pisa”, “cento cavallieri di Orvieto”.
o Further evidence of Merc in 1281 league agreements promising not to enlist merc already in the service of an ally without their express consent.
o Receipt of payment found in Florentine archive to Rainiero Gatti and his associate fo serving in the Florentine army against Pisa.
The collection of these masnades made up the tallia. The leader of this league is Charles who is represented by a vicar but in reality the direction
of the league is determine by the Florentine burghers (only formally promising obedience to Charles and the Pope).
-The development of this standing army based on Charles and Papal support had to be checked, excessive reliance on either two could menace the autonomy of Florence. In particular Charles was to become an ever more influential presence in the League because of the resurgence of Vevian threat, the hostilities of Genova, the return of Milan to the imperial cause, the desecent of imperial troops in Tuscany. Pg. 84
To avoid resurgence of any subversive faction Florence imposes precautionary measures: they introduce dispositions that heavily punish subversive nobles, impose a series of measure to ensure public order, create (out of its military potential) a series of policing forces by sesto.
All these curtail Florence’s capacity to wage external campaigns.
-To thus curtail this, Florence’s leaders seeks to introduce a regional army able to campaign against enemies by binding the city to its communal neighbours through a military pact that preserved the status quo: these will produce the Tallia militum. Pg. 84-87
In 1281 the representative of Tuscan commune, after paying respect to the papacy (not Charles), strike an alliance that shall last 10 years against all enemies of the Church in Tuscany.
A merely formal formula to say that the communal alliance is only interested in maintaining their predominance in Tuscany (thus not committing it to external endeavours).
This was a defensive alliance, ultimately in the interest of Flor, since most likely to be attacked. The alliance was unlikely to launch offensive enterprises since it required 2/3
consent of its members to launch them. No one was allow to sign separate peaces unless they had full consent of the league (or at least 2/3 of its members).
The alliance was controlled by a general congress held every 3 months, created a spirit of comradery which prevented desertion.
This agreement also entailed a commercial agreement which essentially created a shared and free market for all members (to the benefit of Florence).
The only real threat was Pisa, the constitution of the League checked the resurgence of any revanchist spirt (especially if and when Charles of Anjou was to fall).
To support this alliance a military convention is enacted (which unlike the alliance) lasts only a year. This, as well as the alliance, keeps and in renewed each year: pg. 87-890
This more temporary nature was to allow some flexibility in the disbandment of troops (and hence costs) during the downtimes of the sporadic warfare.
The army was composed by stipendiary milities (an elite troop of horseman) who were the core of the army and augmented by the civic infantryman. All participants shall as well maintain in common 2000 communal horseman at the ready to be mobilized when necessary to support the mercenaries.
This was done in a way to free themselves from the dependence on Charles’s military capacity and to compensate for the deficiencies of the popular militia system (a good infantry but lacked an effective cavalry force and competent commanders epxert in the art of war).
Each ally would take on a quota of the fiscal onerous of hiring mercenaries (which could be negotiated but ultimately proportional to one’s means).
-Prior precedent to form regional league or federations (in 1197, S. Genesio league – a loose and vaguely regulated/established institution – lacks any commercial agreement and well defined military agreement or institution). Pg. 90
-The alliance and tallia keep the peace for 8 years effectively, only employed in offensive conflict when the Pisans are weakened (after their defeat vs. Genova, between 1282-84) in an attempt to completely subject them and remove any uncertain players in the territory. Pg. 91
-The Pisan war (fought by a triple alliance Florence, Lucca (who obtain the consent of other Guelfs to wage it with common army) and Genoa vs Pisa) was one dictated by economic needs (the freedom from the Pisan monopoly on commerce) as well as precautionary one (to pre-emptively strike a potential source of regional instability). One may come to question the commitment of the civic militia to such needs (they were a zeleous and useful force when in defence of the autonomy of the city). Pg 92-93
There would have been a single and energetically conducted war The conduct of the war shall be regulated by the frequent councils held by representatives
of the allied communes. The alliance and war was sought as a more permanent solution to the military threat posed
by Pisa needed (so much so that the triple alliance is made to last for 25 years). This objective was achieved through the creation of a more permanent military institution.
Yet the permanence of the solution was tempered again by Florentine political ambition, for it was just necessary to have Pisa dominated by a pro-guelf regime rather than have it completely destroyed (or annexed) -> creating a buffer from Genoese commercial rivalry.
-This political function of the Tallia militum is again seen when its deployed to aid the Guelf Aretine to reconquer the city from the Ghibellines: pg. 94
The expeditionary force was made of 300 stipendiary cavalryman (paid by all members) and 1500 horsmen levied among the civic forces of the commune. These would be also supported by further communal footmen mobilized and at the ready.
-As the regional ties and cooperation by communes became stronger with time, Florence attempt to enlargen the Tallia and bring it under its control. Pg. 94-5
In 1287 it proposes to raise the number of stipendiary milites to 600 and suggest to always keep at the ready a force of 1500 communal horseman to be mobilized.
To further secure political control, Florence proposes that no official or Podesta can be appointed in the allied commune if he stakes a claim on the entirety of Tuscany or is of the imperial party.
As well the captain of the league held the right of intervening in the negotiations of any agreement made by a communal ally with the emperor, Sicilian king, their represenatives or any other feudatory (i.e. the politics of communal Tuscany is supported by a monopoly of force).
-When the Ghibellines take control of Pisa they call Guido da Montefeltro as their Podesta. He hires to defend Pisa both mercenaries and knights from the countryside. Pg. 96
-Even the peace of Fucecchio in 1293, after the decsive defeat of the Aretina and Pisans Ghibelline, result in the imposition of a temporary regime sympathetic to the Tuscan guelf cause (by imposing on Pisa, for several years, the election of a Podesta and Capitano del Popolo who came from one of the conquering communes). Pg. 97
-In 1295 the military organization of the new expanded Tallia (such as number of stipendiaries, their compensation, residence and disciplining) are completely determined by the Priori and Gonfaloniere of Flornce and the mayors and delegates of Lucca, Siena, and Pistoia during a supreme council summoned in Florence. These shall also determine the number of communal horsemen to be levied from each commune. The general council kept being summoned with all participants of the commune but this only held an advisory role. Pg. 98-100
This centralization of power escalates between 1290-2, and Florence goes as far as allowing its magistrates to take various decisions for the league and its war without even having to call on the general council for consent (as they did from 1284-1290)
They even state that it is they alone that control the policy and direction of the alliance. Eventually the election of Captain shall be determined by Firenze, Siena and Lucca. The
captain must be a man who was presented himself to one of the three commune and the election takes place in Florence,
-The military organization of the Tallia: pg. 101-113
Regulated by represantives of the commune who not only determined pact of alliance but also the common military commitment and norms.
The stipendiaries horseman could not be Italian but Frankish or from beyond the alps. They all had to be of reputable character, their capacity proved, well supplied and faithful to
the Catholic Church and the Guelf faction. They had to be accompanied by the largest possible number of milites de corredo (that is
well armed and ordained/dubbed knights, knights which fulfilled the principles of chivalry
and descended from noble or heraldic families, people trained in the art of war not mere commoners with a horse).
The number of horseman is always 500 or more (like in 1287, in 1302 there were 800 horsmen).
In 1302, the commune agrees to as well hire 20000 pedites (of the guelf faction and faithful to the Catholic Church) to thus free a greater number of communal citizens (from city and contado) from military obbligations (sometimes paid, sometimes not). 1/3 of these had to be armed with pike and lances (check pieri for he says javelins, but if I recall correctly this was mistranslation), 1/3 with crossbows and 1/3 with pavesi or tage shield and other useful arms.
The infantryman act as an auxiliary force to the horseman. The horseman had to be well armed, equipped with a war horse and a rouncey of certain
age (both worth a determined value). Their value shall be inspected and determined by communal authorities, especially as the soldier were entitled a communal indemnity if the horse was harmed during military service.
o He shall as well personally possess armour for the horse and himself.o He shall as well have rest attire (which he was banned from using during during
battle) that was to be used during rest time and in exercise of their non-war related function.
The material standard was enforced by severe punishment on the horsemen. Furthermore such a high standard suggest a certain high amount of wealth required(meaning that only certain prosperous individuals, i.e. noblemen, could be a horseman in the Tallia).
o While the moral and political requirements could not be tested reliably, the material ones could.
o Retaining a certain exclusivity within the profession of arms. The milites were recruited and collected in one of the cities of the League chosen by
congress. Once hire they were to be in the service of the League as a whole and where distributed between the various allied communes. Each commune was then in charge on conducting and delivering their knight contingent.
Each contingent (of 100 or 200 knights) had to permanently reside in the commune assigned and had to rally with the rest of the contingents only when a general host was raised (that is when moving against an enemy with an army made of both tallia and citizen troops).
When following the host, the knights had to follow and reside in whatever commune the Captain of the Taglia went to.
The division of troops among various commune was to allow for the ready defense of the members of alliance through tempestive action of the local contingent. Furthermore, if grouped in one commune, there was the fear that the authorities of such commune (or perhaps the captain himself) might defect with the entirety of the mercenary army for their own benefit. As such, the merc army was made to move around from one commune to another, it high command was to be followed only by a certain number of contingents.
The high command of the armyo A captain which had to be a great and powerful Virum (i.e. nobleman) and qualified
for the job. He had to be of the guelf faction and loyal to the Church. Ul In 1287 captain is Rinuccius de Rinucci Peponis de Farnes In 1296 it’s Inghirranum comitem de Biserno In 1302 it’s Malatestino Maltesta of Rimini In 1304 it’s the Marquis Francesco Malaspina In 1306 it’s the Marquis Moroello dei Malaspina.
o Clear contrast in origins of the appointed captain and communal authorities of the League who negotiated peace or were sent on embassy. These rarely possessed noble title (they were rarely a dominus or filius domini and more of often mere ser or discreti viri)
o Elected in theory by all the confederate communes, in practice he is actually chosen by the principal communes and the Florentine magistrates.
o He is made to swear to abide to all the rules of the confederation (and sometimes he is made to offer guarantees like Bertoldo Malpighiere did in 1296). He has to reside in one the member communes for the duration of his office (6 months).
o The captain shall be aided by various councillors each sent by one of the allied communities (they shall oversee the captain and ultimately determine the direction of the mercenary host). The 500 knights are ultimately controlled by them. Each councillor also controls one another.
Paymento The onerus is divided between members of alliance and proportional to their
economic capacity (meaning some communes pay for a greater number of knights than others).
Florence paid for 166 Lucca for 114 Siena for 103 Pistoia and the rest paid lower numbers.
o The wage of the captain was divided between the communes. Each commune paid a quota proportional to the number of knights being paid by it. The captain had to go and claim from each individual commune what he is owed (no collective responsibility).
He was paid 100 florins a month in 1296, in 1302 he is paid 10 Florins a day. o The payment of the troops was bimestral. On those occasion also indeminities for
injured horses (emendation) were disbursed and also eventual bounties for captured prisoners – following their relative consignment to communal authorities -were paid (25 lire for cavalrymen, 10 lire for infantryman).
o Each commune was responsible for its own payments and could not appeal to the League for help.
The captain was responsible with policing and discipling the mercenary troops according to the deliberation of the league’s parliament and proceeding to apply the ordinances and penalites agreed upon enlistment (the sums levied by the captain were then to go to the damaged commune). If the captain failed to enforce the rule of order, the communes could recoup their losses by taking an indemnity from their quota of the captain’s wage.
The captain had to posses a war horse and a second horse, horse armour, weapons. He had to be accompanied by a large retinue (10 horsmen and 7 officer/standard bearers/heralds). This was enabled by his large salary.
The captain was subject to the entire League, he could not deal with an individual community (under threat of a large fine for it and the community).
To ensure the material condition and quality of the mercenary troop, every 2 months in one of the League’s cities a reassignation was held (rivista): captain and horsemen had to present themselves (under fine of 2 gold florins for each absence) and had to present their horse and its armour, their own armour and their proper defensive and offensive weapons (“lameriis sive corazzis, gozzerina, elmo seu capello de ferro, gamberuolis, guantis ferries, spata,
cultello, targia, lancea”) and from 1302 the “spronibus”. The horse must be worth at least 40 florins. Each missing item was fined:
o War Horse 2 florin.o Roucney 1 florin.o Horse armour 2 florino Horse cover/harness 1 florino Each offensive or defensive weapon from 20 to 10 soldi.
Since a missing war horse was punished with a fine worth 1/20th of its value then (if the proportion holds), the horse/rouncey/armour/weapons must be worth in total 120 gold florins, 400 denari and about 2000 soldi (a great expense and punishment considering the wage of the captain, who maintained a 17 man retinue).
This mercenary army and its components differed from those hired previously (and after) by the communes:
o Previously, the mercs were enlisted individually or in small groups on behalf of a single commune. The mercs fought only on behalf of a single commune and serve only to augment the ranks of the citizen (thus are placed under the authority of the officials of the commune). Sometimes among these we find a nobleman offering their service to the commune.
o During the Tallia, mercs do appear to be recruited and serve under the same mechanism as previously. But, in reality, these mercenaries are all hired simultaneously. These are equally paid and had to present themselves together. They had to obey common norms and are made to participate to inspection. They have to fight all together and are collected in a single organism under its own unique leader (who is a functionary of the league and capable of treating/negotiating with communal authorities and other diplomatic/political units).
o These mercenaries do not depend anymore on a single commune, but on the federation of cities whose authority is expressed in the election of a captain they have to serve. A nearly autonomous inter-communal army.
o The difference with future mercenaries and free companies lay in the fact that the milites of the tallia (despite being under a single authority under a single code of discipline) have no attachment to their captain or to the band as a whole. They do not reside as a single large unit but are divided minor groups each residing and being paid by a commune. It is not fighting its own war under a single condottiero they choose to follow and are not regulated by some self-regulating internal apparatus. They are a loose group of soldier serving various confederated communes and who are punished according to the leagues rules and ordinances. All prisoners and plunder are not captured on behalf of the mercenary company/unit buton behalf of the commune who proceeds to compensate them. The mercenaries cannot even carry their or their city’s arms, removing any form of group association.
o They as well are not mere paid soldiery but rather political agents of the guelf and church factions (who happened to be paid) and of eleveated social standing.
o Most importantly the Tallia is not a large mercenary army who does all the fighting on behalf of the communes, rather they act as either a standing garrison for castles/strategic position or serve to augment the civic armies (fighting side by side with the mass of merchant and labourers conscripted from the communes). The war is not won because of the skill of a single captain but by all the commune and its people (thus the Captain of Taglia could not claim the same triumphs which later
condottier would use to increase their gravitas and on which they would base their claims of signoria).
The move to condottieri and the companies is both born by the general reticence of citizens to take up arms and by the creation of more compact, well structure mercenary units who are used to fight together and who chose their own-officers and regulate and rule/order themselves.
o The tallia captains shared command and authority with communal officers, saw his army divided in smaller units and scattered around Tuscany, had a very brief tenure and did not pay directly the soldiers under his commands (preventing him from collecting loyal followers around his person)
-Mallet Merc and Mast (pg. 6-25), (25-50)
-The Leagues of Italy (Lombard and Guelf) were little more than defensive alliance (which enabled resistance from imperial domination). Not federations. Pg. 9
-Variety of political organisation and political tradition plus precious urban growth eroded the traditional strength of feudal institutions which had been trasnpanted to Italy from the North (Charlemagne in North and Normans in souths attempted to impose system of feudal tenure/military obligation) Pg. 9-10
-Despite some feudatories in central and north Italy, only in Naples and sicilicy patterns of military service are influenced by feudal obligations.
-Nobility in north and central Italy either was subjected and owed service to city, or integrated itself in city becoming urban elite.
-Italian armies in 13th century: pg. 10-11
Mass of levies and merc soldier made bulk of army, the Lombards (longobardi) had relied on universal obligations to fill their army (tradition which survived in Northern and central Italy, their territories).
Levies: citizen from city and, as expansion to contado, conscripts from countryside. While technically all men who could bear arms were eligible and obliged to undertake
military service, the enlistment was strongly influenced by the politics of the city (those citizens who served belonged to the party that ran the city).
o Citizenship: permanent stake in the community via long residence, ownership of property. Entiltled them to a say in politics but also to pay taxes and render military service.
Military service was paid from the 12th century with development of money economy. District system where call to arms was based on rotation of these (only part of the districts
were called). Entailed arms and horse at the ready, but duty onften confined to defence of wall of the city
and occasional brief excursiong in rural areas. Service as such lasted little or subject to a frequent rotation (not disruptive to the economy).
-Service was not onerous (not a rapid attempt to convert service in a monetary due), strong patriotic pride in city making it a honour for citizens to serve in defense of their homeland and lasts well into the 14th century (after greater affluence and merc availability). Pg. 11-12
-Militias: pg. 12-13
Large infantry but not completely made out of it, required less practice and material commitment.
Wealthy citizens served on horse and coming from the old feudal nobility, somewhat accustomed to such service.
The bulk of both armies at montaperti and legnano was made of infantry, and was a surprising feature compered to prior and subsequent periods.
The rols of such infantry was primarily defensive, their strength from number and patriotic zeal and not training or experience.
The crossbow gives infantry some offensive capacity but most a defensive screen to allow regroup of the cavalry.
Carroccio heart of communal defence, a wooden carts with city insignas which acted as rally point for citizen soldiers (like the king’s person but for the communes/republics).
-Sprinkiling of mercenaries within citizen armies (a well established phenomenon like in the North prior to 14th century). Pg. 13-15
The greater availability of manpower in northern and central Italy might be said to have slowed down adoption of merc that in Norther Eu, but in the South imperial papal and Angevin armies mercs were principal component.
Mercenary means foreign combat (not at a national level but at a city/regional one, non-florentines where foreigns) who were paid. One can distinguish between the man who fought purely for money and that that was compensated but was fighting out of a sense of obligation and patriotism.
o Provenance give us a clear distinction between communal and merc troops (although occassionaly a Florentine could be found among mercs)
Merc were recruited and served as individuals not as a company. They were employed by Fiesole against Florence in 12th century and large numbers are found
in service of Genoa and Siena in 1220s. The significant factor that enables this was that Genoa and Siena were more economically advance Florence (explaining their earlier use).
o By Montaperty, Florence angages 200 merc cavalry to serve. o 3 months contracts and largely recruited in Emilia and Romgna. Organised into
companies of 50, they were not hired in companies. By 1277 growing number of Germans and French, and in 1277 there were 100 English mercs
in Flo service. Merc hiring was crystalized by the formation of League of Tuscan cities which required
members to furnish a contingent to a joint army. Maintain force of merc continuously became common.
The mutual protection of a wider regional area sort of removed the motivation and zeal of communal militia that where defending what they perceived as their homeland, encouraging merc hiring.
Merc serving for longer periods together start forming themselves into companies under accepted leader. By 1300, though unlikely to hire a band that was greater than 25 men, the commander of of the Florentine mercenary army was expected to have a large following.
o Amauri of Narbonne, wh commanded the Florentine at Campaldino over Arezzo in 1289, had a company of 100-200 Angevin knights during his service.
Foreign mercenary start appearing in greater number thanks to the foreign expedition of the emperor and Angevin, however Italy as well grows a reputation as a good market for merc work (attracting English and Catalans).
-By the end of the century, communal army still primarily made of militiamen. Both the militia tradition and importance of infantry died hard (making the merc companies mainly made of cavalry only valuable as their auxiliary force). Pg. 15
-At Benevento, both Manfred and Charles relied on great amount of mercs (more than their feudal contingents): 2/3 of Manfred cavalry were german and Italian mercs, infantry made nearly of all Saracen archers, Charles cavalry was made primarily of French paid adventurers, both employed Genoese and Pisan crossbows.
-By turn of the century, merc employment gradually change. not anymore as individuals but as a group and these start superceding the local milita element. Causes: Pg. 16-20
Economic, Italy at hear of commercial revolution and expanding money economy. With greater wealth citizens and widening business interest citizens look for a more efficient and less distracting military system (the costs of which they were able to pay). Economic expansion also contributed to growing aggressiveness of cities, and expanding and industriall successful city requires more secure hinterlands to sustain its population, secure sources of raw material and secure share/dominate the markets.
Poltically, with Germans emperor withdrawing, cities lost that common threat which tied them together. Rivalries were rekindled and exacerbated and the numerous player in the political scene (which could strike a sort of balance of power through collection) are incorporated in large states. War became a continuous possibility. Internal factionalism as well was exacerbated without a cmmon enemy. Factions became ever more militant with the prospect of controlling the growing power of communal authorities and since unity declined. These rifts made it hard to levy an effective communal militia particularly when the aims the war were no longer purely in the defence of the city’s survival. These rifts caused serious distrust among citizens of the same city, preferring confer authority to a foreign official perceived as netural than to a political rival (justice and public order delegated to these forestieri). Such officials (like the Podesta) could easily abuse their supreme authority and becoming the lords of the city. These officials as well expaned size of company of mercenaries in the city domain along the same line, rather than to entrust arms to a potential political rival they were given to paid soldiers. Some companies were formed out of their joint and continuous service as city’s police force or as a guard to civic officials. Politics and factionalism as well formed exils who, in their struggle to regain entrance and aposition in their old city through armed insurrection, became experienced in the art of war. Exiles as well have a tendency to enlist as mercenaries in the same city which is a declared rival of the one they have been exiled from.
Nature of war, not anymore the defence of the city’s wall but offensive and aggressive expedition for a prolonged time against neighbours. Furthemore even in defensive scenario, with the incorporation of the contado in the state, communal authorities did not have to defend anymore the city walls but its greater frontiers. Permanent specialised infantry was needed for frontier garrison and effective siege warfare. A professional cavalry as well was was required for rabid and mobile summer campaigns that sought to devastate through territorial destruction the enemy’s economy.
Arguments which argue that spirit paranoia of ruling elite/signore was what contributed to the rise of mercenary, who feared that political rivals might exploit communal milita apparatus to overturn them, carry little weight.
o Mercenaries appeared prior to this period, meaning that they were not innovations to the militaries of cities.
o Many signori ruled by consent and not force, the signori also were the leaders of factions and it was factionalism that caused the decline of communal militia not one man rule.
Economic possibilities, political situation and the presence of a supply of mercenary soldiers (via political exiles and under-employed foreign troops which came with foreign expedition) allowed for the transition.
Outlets for further more permanent war/service were declining by the end of the 13 th century (the last crusader foothold was gone in 1291 and similarly in 1360 the 100 years war truces released many soldiers from service). Many expeditionary soldier from foreign kingdom chose to remain in service as mercenaries for Italian states (i.e. Angevins and Hungarians). By mid 14th century economic depression in peninsula plus rural under-employment crease many potential recruits for companies.
Military development, one of the the most significant changes in war was the large scale introduction of the crossbow and long bow (a development born out of the experience from the campaigns in the East and the begrudging respect given to Saracen archers). Italians were among the first EU to import them from the East (thanks to the maritime republic involved in the transportation and provisioning of crusading armies). Initially under papal ban for wars between Christians, slowing down its adoption and production in EU, by mid 13th century both crossbow and long bow had been greatly adopted. This led to important changes:
o These weapons required lots of practice for efficient use, leading to specialization and professionalism.
o The new firepower in turn severely changed nature of infantry in peninsula. Before the infantry had a short lance, sword and shield. Now he infantry was either divided into lance or pikeman and shieldbearers. The function of the former was to carry a large shield to rest on the ground for defence of pike or crossbow men.
o The stopping power of crossbows furthermore led to changes in cavalry armour – from leath and mail armour to plate armous. As well introduction of protection/armour for horses.
o The deadliness of the new weapons or the greater encumberance of new armours as well required each horseman to carry spare horses ready at hand in battle. Furthermore he need the support of a small entourage of attendants and archer to lead horse and provide covering fire for his retreat. These needs would result in the eventual development of the cavalry “lance”, a military formation which indicated a unit made of a small group of men attached to an armoured man-at-arms.
These development widened the gap between part-time and professional soldier encouraging the recruitment of professional and specialist troops. Plate armous was more costly and more physically demanding to wear – it was the armous of a professional not a part-time knight.
-Once large number of merc became accepted part of system, their formation into organised companies was inevitable: it facilitated employment (by allowing states to recruit whole companies immediately) and it improved their efficieny (through a long experience of fighting together) and generally (but not necessarily) and allowed for more sophistricated tactic through disciplined collaboration. Pg. 21
-Campaldino shows much of what was said: pg. 14
Between Tuscan Guelf league led by Florence vs Ghibellines led by Arezzo in the valley of the Arno in 1289.
The guelf consisted of 1600 cav (1000 provided by Florence of which half were mercs led bt Amauri of Narbonne and the Agevins) and 10000 infantry. The Ghib had 800 cav and 8000 infnatry.
The Guelph battle order: vanguard of 150 cavalry followed by the main body of cavalry which was flanked on both side by the infantry. The infantry was placed slight further ahead than the main cavalry body making it a cresent moon like formation. The infantry included large number of crossbowmen protected by shield-berars and pikemen. Behind all a row of carts was deploed behind which troops could regroup if broken. Behind the carts there was also a strong reserve of cavalry and pikeman.
The Ghib formation: cavalry vanguard, cavalry main body, a third line of infantry (many pikes few crossbows), a rear cavalry reserve.
The Aretine forces sent their first three line crashing against the vanguard and main cav body of Florence. This cavalry was reinforced by the rear pikeman and kept in formation by the line of carts. As the melee stabilized, the Ghib caugst in a crossfire from the two wing of crossbowmen start panicking and flee. Meanwhile the Guelph reserve had swept around and encircled completely the engaged troops. Over half of Ghib army was killed or captured.
Triumph of an army still essentially of communal militias (who had adopted the new lethal and fundamental military technology), a strong contingent of merc was present that played a considerable role in deciding the battle.
-The art of war/military change of the 13th and 14th century in Italy were not a unique phenomenon created in isolation, it grew vvery much of the fusion of local and ultra-montane traditions. Pg. 24
-The merc scene progressively monopolized by Foreign adventurer: pg. 25-26
William della Torre, Catalan, in 1277 at Siena with 19 mercs, by 1279 constable, by 1285 at Siena commands 114 cav. In 1290 his company garrisons Tuscan castle for Flo for 2 years. Size of company flucture but never more than 100 and shifting compositions.
o In 1292, of 100 men – 53 have recognizable nationalities. 28 Provencals 8 from Northern France 2 Fleming 7 Italians 7 Spaniards 1 Englishman
o Not a permanent company, only the lead Williams was factor of continuity. His reputation won him employment.
Diego de Rat (Rata) was lent in 1305 to Flo by duke of Calabria. 8 year service. More stable company and larger more permanent employment – permanent nucles to Flo hosts and the Tuscan League shared army.
o 200-300 cavo 500 infantry
-First half of 14th century characterized by permanent mercenary forces (even in small numbers) in service of cities. Most of the soldiers of the period did not belong to the later hated great roving companies. Small group of merc, whose terms of service were stipulated in contracts, attached to
favoured leaders by communal authority and attached to armies whose bulk was made of mass militia levies which defined the period. Pg. 26
-The great companies and their development is the strking feature of the century. 3 defining features: size, foreign quality, democratic nature. Pg. 26-27
An amalgamation of many smaller companies who elected their leaders through general wide consultation among ranks. As such the contracts were signed by a large numbers of constable together with their elected leader. Booty then proportional to rank and service.
Causes: pg. 27o Demobilization during truce of major conflicts of century (i.e. 100 years war). 3
choices: retire and live off earning, find another war, create artificial conditions for war by themselves becoming instigating outlaws.
For Italian political exiles, no base to which live off during winter. Furthermore if winter came, likely that ongoing hostilities were to be halted and prospect of finding another ongoing war entailed a risky long journey. Banditry in their own territory, if conducted in bands (the larger the better) was a profitable profit.
Foreigners had a tendency to stick in larger bands as they would be operating in a stange land that they did not know (thus safety in number). This allowed the creation of large companies within predominantely foreign elements in their ranks.
o Foreign expeditions (German emp/Hungarian king/Angevins/Avignonese Popes) led large amounts of Foreigner soldiers on Italian soil.
o The wealth of Italy, reflecte in more profitable contracts or richer booty, attracted others.
o Also general lack of opportunies elsewhere in Europe. Particularly, German recession and unemployment made Italy a particularly attractive prospect for German soldiers (predominant race of mercs in Italy).
-The Company of Siena pg. 28
One of first great companies emerging in 1322. Either born around Sienese exile of the Tolomeo family or round group of German mercs sacked by Florence.
Exiles or disbanded soldiers have a tendency to be the starting point of any of the two companies.
The company was 500 cav and indefinite number of infantry. Was ravaging the Sienese and Umbrian countryside in 1322-23 until broken up because piecemeal employment opportunities opend up again.
-Company of the Cerruglio
Appears in 1329, 800 German cavalryman who deserter imperial ranks of Louis of Bavaria at Pisa and launched attack on prosperous Lucca.
Failed the city assault (and this was typical of the companies, little impact on walled cities as they lacked siege equipment or admin structure to resupply themselves to sustain a siege).
Through its loot of Luccan countryside, the company wintered in Italy at Cerruglio. They proceed to elect an Italian, Marco Visconti, as their leader (imperial envoy sent to negotiate
their return) and with him take Lucca through surprise. After despoiling it, Lucca is sold to the Genoese for 30,000 florins.
This endevours was their peak accomplishment, proceed to share the booty and disband.
--In Italy between 1320-60, 700 German cavalry leaders are known to be active in Italy and at least 10000 men at arms. Pg. 29
-Cavalieri della Colomba pg. 29
Named after the omonimous abbey close to which they established their base (near Piacenza) in 1334.
Objective was to loot the nearby area during their off-time. Possibility of employment emerges after Perugia engages in local war with Arezzo.
The knights employed by the Perugian move in Tuscany driving off the Aretine and proceed to sack small town in the area. Their effective service impresses the Florentine who took 350 in their service (breaking up the force.
-Company of St. George
Formed from the demobilized veterans of the Della Scala war in 1339, formed around the person of Lodrisio Visconti (a Milanese exiles).
Lodrisio collected 2500 cavalryman and 100 infantry (mainly Swiss) and led them across Lombardy and to the gates of Milan.
With him were two German officials (Conrad of Landau and Werner of Urslingen) who were to become the leaders of the two most important free companies in Italy.
Lodrisio ultimate objective heralds a future trend of the companies,++: the use of their strength for political and state-creation ends (Lodrisio wants to capture Milan from his cousins Azzo and Lucchino).
The strength of these Mercs is seen when the quantitively superior Milanese are routed by the impetus of the company’s assault (even unhorsing and capturing Lucchino).
The battle of Parabiago as well shows another trend developing in the city: the ever greater dependence of Italian authorities on the use of mercenaries to ensure the state’s survival (the countercharge of Ettore de Panigo, A Bolognese exile with 700 merc cavalry at his side, tips the scale in favour of the Milanes – results in company’s route, many dead, and the capture of Lodrisio himself). – unsure if they were merc knights
-Great Company, pg. 31-32
Formed by Werner out of the demobilised veterans of the Pisan-Florentine war of 1342. Lasts for about a years but heralds the rise of the Great companies of 1340s and 50s.
Bulk largerly German but a strong Italian element led by the Bolognese Ettor da Panigo (the one who broke Lordisio).
Contained as well Frencesco Ordelaffi, a representative of that caste of Romagan soldiers Princes who were to develop in the later condottieri.
o An ambivalent position as he was signore of Forli, shifting between member and employed of the Company.
The company was in 1342 was made of 3000 barbute (barbuta the name given German cav of the period or to cav who carried similar equipment as them – i.e a composite armour with some plate, a barbuta (conical helmet with simple nose piece) and accompanied by one retainer)
A serious problem in Italy, moving from territory to territory extorting from cities payments in exchange of peace, ravaging the countryside and fighting minor camapigns on behalf of anyone wh could employ them.
Stopped by a league (temporary alliance to face particular military threat or undergo a specific operation, feature of the period) organized by Bologna to prevent them from corssing Romagna . At ch Lamone, they established strong defensive position by planting sharp outwards facing stakes in the ground which counter the company’s cavalry (the main and most effective weapons).
o 2 months of successful defense result in a Truce that allowed the company to pass through Bolognes territory as long as they did no damage and agreed to the route.
Once in Lombardy one final rampage which resulted in enormous bribe from Lombard cities – Werner and his German followers retiring home while the Italians dispersed.
-The success of this company showed the strength an autonomous body of well armed troops could have in the politically fragmented north-central Italy (were no single state army could resist them).
It did show that a confederation of state mobilizing many militia forces employed in a prepared defense could halt the more professional companies.
While the former lesson had been learnt by the companies, the latter one was to be ignored (rarely Italian states could combine effectively in resistance to companies, only surviving them by retreating behind city walls).
-The ascension of the Hungarians under Lewis, coming down to avenge the murder of his brother arranged by his wife the Angevin Queen of Naples Joanna I, leads to new military development. Pg. 33
The Hungarians, light horseman equipped with bows and throwing lance, relied on spped to outmanoeuvre the enemy rather than the encumbering heavy armour of Western knights. Alarge number of these would remain in Italy after the end of the expedition and would form important element of new companies.
-Following the Hungarian withdrawl, Werner of Urslingen remained in Italy in 1349 with his German. Together with old colleague Conrad of Landau and Montreal d’Albano (aka Fra Moriale, a provencal knight), the 3 would form the largest and most powerful company yet seen Italy. Pg. 33-37
Defeat the Neapolitan feudal baronage at Meleto was the trial by fire of the company and extremely lucrative (half a million florins worth of booty and ransom was divided amongst the company, which split briefly in two after the battle)
Conrad and Werner went northwards to campaign in central Italy, Fra Moriale remained South plunder the kingdom of Naples in its confusion.
In 1351, Werner permanently retired and Fra/Conrad reunited the company under the former’s leadership.
Great Company’s operations under Fra Morial described by Matteo Villani (Cronica, ed. Montier, book II, pg. 146-48
Fra Moriale, according to Villani, pioneers a centralized administrative structure which essentially makes the company a roaming signorial state and the soldiers its paid citizens.
The company would number 10000 fighting men and 20,000 camp followers. The discipline and organization of this army was impressive and irresistible.
A systematic extorsion of Umbrian and Tuscan city, each buying immunity at astounding rate (Florence paid 3000 florins to company constable and 25000 to Fra Moriale – a great expense considering the 234 leaders meantioned in the argreement with Florence).
The personaility of Fra Moriale and his powers of organisation held this private army together, the existence of the company war paramount to its condottiero (allowing him to take a larger reward).
A system of debt and reinvestment of wealth in secure sources – the papacy owed him large sums for prior service, invested 60000 Florins with Venetian Merchants, the Company’s treasury was essentially a rolling bank.
In 1354, Fra leaves for Rome with a small bodyguard to collect the debt owed. He places command in the hands of Conrad of Landau. At Rome, the republican demagogue Cola di Rienzo had risen to power and seized the vulnerability of Fra Moriale (backed only by a small bodyguard) to arrest him and have him executed (increasing Cola’s popularity and fixing his accounts).
Conrad was to lead the company until his death in 1363. He ruled to together with another German Bongarten. During this period the companies had completed their transition from temporary associations to permanent military institution in the pay of one or another state. While ravaging the countryside and extorting immunity payments from the cities was still fundamental to their income, the companies now lived off their professional military capacity.
This army, though strong, was humiliated twice by the Florentine.o In 1358, after negotiating free passage with Flo to enter into service for Siena, the
mercs continued despoiling of the Florentine countryside forced an armed reaction by the state. The Florentine army made of peasant levies, Florentine crossbowmen and mercs strapped the company at the narrow Le Scallele vally, shattering it. The cavalry in such a narrow corridor was useless to the continuous volley of stones and bolts. The Floretine killed and captured the majority of the company.
o In 1359, they reformed in Romagna and moved on Florence for revenge passing through the more open and flat Arno vally. Here however the Florentine captain general Pandolfo Malatesta engaged a powerful merc army with routed them at the Campo delle Mosche.
In 1361 the Company met its end when the new rival company White Company (100 years war vets) appeared in Italy. In 1361 the WC were invited by the Marquis of Monferrat after Great Company deserted him. The WC crossed alps with 6000 men and defeat the GC in 1363 at the bridge of Caturino.
o Landau, deserted at the height by the Hungarians, was mortally wounded.o The shatter remnant of the GC was lead out by Bongarten were it remained in
service of the Milanese.
-The White Company, pg. 36-39
Known as the Inglesi as they took part on the English side during 100yearswar. Nationality of troop was mixed however. First commander German Albert Sterz and large number of his followers were Franco-German.
Employed tactics of warfare perfected by the English during and after the great battles of the century (Crecy and Poitiers) – edge over Italian warfare. These were introduced by the English element of the company, such as the leaders Hawkwood and Belmont.
The captain Sterz particularly had a communication advantage, spoke English which facilitated infra-company communication and also spoke Latin (enabling him to negotiate personally with Italian states).
Incorporated various free companies which had been operating independently in southern France since the peace of Bretigny in 1360.
Described extensively by contemporary chroncles Got their name from the impeccably polished armour worn by men-at arms. They wore
more plate armour than was common in Italy and had sufficient logistic apparatus to maintain it polished.
It reputadely introduced the 3 man lance formation (two men-at-arms and a page) to Italy. The lance however can be found earlier amongst merc cav in Italy yet the White company specifically developed that for men-at-arms fighting on foot (a revolutionary feature of English battle tactics).
Dismounted horsemen, a tactic introduced for defensive purpose (i.e. knight better standing their ground while saving horses from death), had also offensive purpose when advancing shoulder to shoulder lance in hand. Each heavy cavalry lance was held by the two men-at-arms who fought together and whent hey came to grips with the enemy they could fight back to back in support of each other. The pages instead held the horses at the rear and came forward with them when they were neeed to pursue an enemy or withdraw.
Introduced archer with long bow, greater effective range and quicker rate of fire than crossbow but demanded great physique and practice. For these latter reasons the methods and success of English archers was not easily imitated in Italy, the numbers of the initial English archer core declining as time passed with less ultra-montane recruits enlisting and none trained among the locals. A very temporary effect on Italian warfare.
A great espirts de corps and discipline than normal merc companies. Discipline in general terms was not perfect (behaviour of company while in Pisa) but for Floretine they were the best disciplined troops ever employed (officials reporting how they behaved well and paid scrupulously for their provisions). Their discipline in battle and endurance however was impeccable. The Italians were impressed with how used the troops was to ride at night, to fight deep into the winter, and by the facts that they were equipped for siege warfare (carrying collapsaible ladders and bombards).
Though effective and disciplined even they could contemplate the capture of an imposing walled city like Florence (contenting themselves with looting its countryside and collecting enormous ransoms while in service of Pisa).
After Sterz breaks off part of the company (joing with Borgarten to form the company of the star to harass Siena and Papal states), the compeny ends under command of the its most able leader Hawkwood.
o Rather than caring for money, he stress on building his person’s and the companies military reputation.
o Establishes a degree of unity and loyality in his company, acquires a reputation for fidelity and honesty (particular as he was no paragon of virtue, as such his rivals must have been very despicable).
o Did not reject the traditional immunity bribe and scantly respected the military-civilian boundary (raiding frequently civilians).
-By Hawk’s election, the time of free companies was passing. The number of leaders who sign the Flo contract in 1375 with Hawk is already reduced to 15, the company’s capacity at employment grew ever more depandant on Hawk’s generalship and reputation. Pg 39-40
-In 1360s Italiand characterized by employment four large companies (Sterz, Bongarten, Hawkwood, Visconti), at times in combination with each other but ultimately always in competition with one anothers. Pg. 40-41
Progressively the united force of Sterz and Bongarten is disbanded in 1366 witht the execution of the former.
Visconti and Hawkwood when cooperating proved an irresistible independent army (defeating together Genoa, Siena, and Perugia). However, once split up, Vicsonti was defeat by a combined papal-Neapolitan army and was finally killed in 1374 during a clash with peasant near Bergame in 1375.
Hawkwood is the only one to survive choosing a secure, but less profitable, policy of loyalty to employers (first Milan then Avignonese Pope). While fighting a two front war (reducing rebellious Romagnan cities to subjection while fighting Florence), Hawk sells immunity to the Florentine. Nonetheless Hawkwood obeyed papal orders unleashing his troops on the populations of rebellious Romagna when ordered too (Faenza, Cesena massacres in 1376-77 -> said to be very reluctant, saving some of the women, while the bulk of the killing was done by the new Breton company hired by the papacy, 5000 killed and moats filled with drowned civilians attempting flight ). –
-Hawkwood would leave papal service after Cesena entering into stable pay of the Florence (most of his career). Hawkwood as well grows to become a lord, receiving overlordship of the cities of Cotignola and Bagnacavallo as guarantees of his back pay by the papacy (becomes a papal feudatory). This start the process of attaching the mercenary leader, the condottiere, to the state by giving him a stake in the state he serves. pg. 41
-Albrigo da Barbiano and Company of St. George: pg. 42-43
Product of Great Schism of 1378, enlisted by Roman pope Urban VI vs Avignonese pope Clement VII (Robert of Geneva, mandante massacro cesena) and his Breton mercenary company.
A romagnol noble, whose company represented a revival of Italian military prowess over a century in which foreigners ruled Italian battlefields.
First of the condottieri or last but most worth of the Free companies. His triumph at Marino in 1379 was hailed as a liberation of Italy (celebrated by statesmen
and humanist alike). But nothing revolutionary in his company nor was 1379 a turning point in Italian military history.
Not first Italian leader of a free company (two other St. George Company led by Italians and made by Italians). Italians always an element in 14th century companies (employed as either soldiers, merc officials, or captain generals on behalf of a state).
His company was furthermore a merc company, loyal to himself and not a greater political design. The core of his outfit were soldiers from his very own estates in Romagna. They fought alongside German and Hungarian mercenaries and still devastated systematical the territory of Itlian states (like Florence). He even sacks in 1381 Arezzo in a way which much resembled the Bretons at Cesena.
A right moment, right time sort of situation: Alberigo had the good fortune and skill to defeat the Breatons (last of the the Great companies) and after his triumph the influx of foreign mercs and leaders started to naturally dwindle.
-The distinguishing feature of the companies of the first half of 14th century was their corporate quality, large pseudo-democratic bands of foreign mercs which roamed Italy and had no roots to the
territory (a tradition which continues to a slighter extent post 1370s like the second Company of the Star formed by Ettore Manfredi in 1379 and the Company of the Rose until 1410). Pg 43
-Mercs in Italian army during the century pg 43-49
Small contingents or individual employment of merc always permanent elements of Italian armies of century. Large company employment was exception expedient. By 1320s in Florence employment of mercs a high standardized and organized practice (complete and deterial regulation for recruitment and control of merc troops)
o In 1359, when Malatesta took on the Great Company, the militia cavalry had disappeared from army (the entirety of the 4000 cav was merc) but this number was made of many small contingentent hired directly by Florence or allies. Among these we find Germans, Hungary but also many Italians.
o The supreme military leaders of Italian states usually came from very promninent Italian families (i.e. the Malatesta and Florence). The same can be said the for the papal armies headed by cardinal Albornoz.
Survival of Flo Militia well into 14th century, remained main means of warfare if one Italian city wished to attack another:
o Communal cavalry survived as military obligation well into period.o Uses examples from Buoninsegna’s rendiconto for the war against Pistoia. Half cav
was Florentine, of 6000 infantry only 1000 were merc (remaining were crossbowmen, shieldbearers, peasant levies, and peasant pioneers conscripted around the state).
o Another example of widespread milita use, aided by small standing merc contingents, and led by Italian captain generals is the war over Montepulciano between Siena and Cortona vs. Perugia in 1357-58. Only well after the hostilities had started did the Sienese hire one of the major companies (that of Bongarten and his 1200 men). The Perugian mount a strong response (8000 men army of which the only foreign mercs were 400 Hungarian horsemen) and defeat the Sienese at Torrita. As a response of this escalation, Siena attempts to hire Landau’s Great Company but the unit’s arrival is stopped by their disastrous defeat against the Florentine at Le Scalelle. Ultimately Siena would win the conflict because of its greater resource.
Fight with own resources commanded by Italian captains -> escalation -> hiring of more mercs (even major companies) as a response -> despite success ultimately the richer city gains upper hand (but rarely enough to enter the rival’s wall).
Italy as well produced great soldiers such as: Castruccio Castracane, Guidoriccio da Fogliano, Francesco Ordelaffi and Ambrogio Visconti (by all means comparable to the leading foreign mercenary captains of the century).
o Castruccio was example of exile turned soldier, born of the noble family of the Antelminelli of Lucca, he was force to flee at 16 after the Guelphs took over. During his 17 years of exile, he visited the English court fighting in France for Edward I and served as mercenary for both the Della Scala of Verona and the Venetians.
o In 1314 he joins the army of the new Signore of Pisa, the Tuscan baron Uguccione della Faggiuola, who was now moving to conquer Lucca (which he would successfully conquer).
o In 1315, Uga’s army led by Castruccio defeat Diego de Rat and his mercs at Montecatini.
o In 1316, Castruccio, exploiting the support of his Lucchese, deposes Uguccione and become the new signore of the city.
o For the next 12 years, the leading Ghibelline in Tuscany, would dominate Tuscany through his sheer military brilliance crushing decisively the Floretines again at Altopascio in 1325 (now under a new Spanish general, Raimondo da Cardona)
o In 1328 Castruccio dies undefeated and would be glorified by Machiavelli as an example of Italian prowess (one of the few in the succeeding two centuries).
o Guidoriccio instead was another type of foreign captain, not necessarily a successful one, but one which unusually faithful and who behaved with extreme professionalism to his contractors. He was a paid functionary which fulfilled the prerogatives of his office and move onto his next giis (after Siena, he served the Della Scala and then fought for a time under Werner). A fore-runner of 15 th century condottieri’s (an instrument to an end).
o Francesco degli Ordelaffi instead fulfilled the typical soldier prince, ruler by inheritance of a city threatened by its neighbours (Forli’), he needed to learn how to defend himself and his state from threats. To do so he sold his military services as a merc to win wealth and experience (i.e. very similar to the Malatesta of Rimini, both Romagnols). He fought both for political ends (to recuperate the city after he was evicted by the papal legate, to expand his domain therough the conquest of Censena) and in the pay of others (Visconti against Imola, Pisans against Florence). He himself employed mercs (i.e. Great Company) and was employed as a merc himself. Eventually he and his family (wife and son who actively defended and defied papal force) were evicted and Fra was forced to spend the remaining of his life as a marc captain for Venice.
o Visconti was the last typical type of Italian captain of the time, the illegitimate son of a ruler (Bernabo of Milan) with a very large family (15 legitimate sibling and at least 5 illegitimate daughters). Thus born in a well endowed family he was also likely barred from enjoying any inheritable privilieges. Such status pushed him toward a career of arms. He formed the company of St.George and later joins Hawkwood in 1365. Is the leader of a great company and fights will but his fortunes fluctuate and, having no fiscal structure on which he may fallback, he is killed by some contadini during one of his predatory raids with his troop.
Italian battlefield were not dominated by foreigners. Rarely were there more than 3 major companies operating in Italy and few states could afford to hire even one.
-Bernabo’s marriage policy (wedding his 5 illegitimate daughter to the captains of the companys) shows to things: the growing status of said captains through their prestiges as military leaders and also an attempt of rulers to attach successful soldiers to their states and dynasties. Pg. 49-50
In these conditions, the days of the great impersonal and independent companies (those with elected leaders) were numbered.
Furthermore the development of mutual assistance leagues which commited members state to common military actions against companies and also raised and maintained a permanent military force seemed to signal the end of the great companies of venture. Permanent employment was an attractive prospect for many soldier, and the companies started to break up as merc soldiers and their leaders took service exclusively with individuals states.
-The growing reliance on merc permanently changed Italy: cost of warfare accelerated (as much as 60% of papal revenue went to war, applicable also for other Italian state) and frequency of war
increased (states wanting to use actively their exepensive employees). This meant increased taxation and a perfectioning of the administration of finances and of war. These two development attached to the costs of war produce the growth of an organised bureaucracy, fiscal and credit istutition and an ever more centralized political power (all to better cater to the needs of war). It was in this areas that 14th century warfare and in its geo-political meaning that warfare changed the most, the art of war in itself did not change dramatically (it saw developments brought by the connection of various types of warfare together in the same theatre but no groundbreaking changes occured). Pg. 50
-Marchionni, Eserciti Toscani Senesi e Fiorentini a Montaperti (English version)0pg. 28
-In fedual Europe, clashes consisted primarily in an engagement of two formations of heavy cav. A disorderly mob like clash rather than organized battle based on tactic.
-Infantry a marginal role, fleainging usually once the cavalry lines had been broken by enemy. The inefficieny of said body in feudal armies was usually because of inadequate recruitmen: peasants of low status or professional mercenaries.
Former an effective workforce for the hard labour tasks required whilst on campaign but uprepared materially and psychologically to fight on the open field.
Latter good for garrison work but in low supply and also had no real commitment/attachment to their employer’s cause.
-Heavy cavalry still fundamental to Italian cities and their effective use was a main factor behind victories of Italian cities throughout 12th and 13th century. The key different is that these North-Central Italian cities develop an efficient local infantry corps (a corps which would represent 50% of the army’s forces).
Trial by fire at Legnano, the bulk of the Imperial army (made of 2500 heavy cavalryman) had routed the 4000 Milanese and allied cavalryman – when the Germans move on to attack the Lombard Infantry, the Lombard infantry – who had formed a square around the Milanese carroccio – managed to the halt the Imperial cavalryman (who had grown tired and were disorganized in formation). When the German cavalryman were on verge of breakthrough, the Brescian cavalryman together with the rallying Milanese one, return of the battlefield and would decisively defeat Barbarossa.
-Though Italian cavalry inferior to feudal imperial one, the cohesive infantry body mounted an effective resistance that no feudal army could match.
Aided by the much greater amount of Italian soldier at Legnano (12000 mean between infantry and cavalry – the carroccio consisted alone of 900 well armed infantryman).
-Strength of Commune: en masse recruitment of inadequetly trained men vs. few fighting professionals of feudal armies.
-At Montaperti, though military tech had changed a bit, the tactical planning and structure of the army remained largely similar:
Upper class heavy cavalry corps sprinkled with mercenaries.
Large infantry body from middle and lower classes.
Pg 29
-Communal calvary weakness:
Lack of a light cavalry body (like feudal armies) that would enable probing attacks/skirmishes through which to explore the terrain before battle and that would allow the effective/speedy pursuit of fleeing enemies (phase in which most of the casualties/prisoners are inflicted). The existing communal cavalry was armed and designered for charging in the open fields.
Despite potentially high material standard of communal cavalry, because of wealth of upper classes, training remained generally poor for communal horsemen who were neither knights nor professional sodliers (they were all rich middle class citizens employed in some craft, trade or merchantry, they dealt with florins not warfare).
Professional mercenary bands could be recruited from penniless aristrocrats or political exiles of a city belonging to the loosing side. These troops were not reliable however during decisive moments, deciding to desert rather than risking to get wounded. As well there was a small supply of such mercenaries in 13th century.
-Communal infantry weakness
Rather glorified by Risorgimento rhethoric but unlikely better than cavalry. Mass recruitment, key edge to communal military strength, was hampered by class division
within the citizenry. Proletarians (proto-industry workers, labourers, serfs) never part of fighting militia – both to poor to afford basic equipment but also because arming the lowest and poorest classes could result in a threat to the established order: the plebeian classes are always the despot’s main ally, their participation in political life could cause too radical of changes. As such, the proletarians -who as well weren’t considered citizen for they didn’t own anything (ownership requirement to citizenship) – were relegated to unskilled labour.
Poor training
-Classes and role in warfare:
Middle Classeso The real fighting units were up of lower middle class people: artisans, shopkeepers
and small land owners who had equip themselves according to communal material prescription at their own expense.
o Equipment: some kind of a spear, shield, helmet and some kind of cuirass which for the first two rows had to be made of some sort quilted linen, leather, or chain mail (if affordable) – swords were rare while cleavers and large knives common.
Working classeso In light of their non-combat function, workers were divided into pickmen, hoers and
shovelers: they had to lay camps, dig mines and ditiches, erect fortifications, build bridges and war machines, cut down trees and lay waste to the enemy’s possessions and territory and destroy their captured fortifications (making them sappers).
o These were all things, according to chivalrous ethic, considered degrading and despicable. Yet such function made the worker the greatest contributors to victory of the communes in the long run (they had the fundamental role of crippling the enemy’s economic-military apparatus – preventing the military resurgence of
enemy – during a time where conquest could not happen all at once but had to occur piecemeal over several campaigns.)
o When on the field, these classes did not shared in civic zeal of their bourgeoisie counteparts and thus were discouraged from sacrificing themselves in battle for an established order which ultimately exploited them (they stood to gain more if their master died in a glorious defeat). Assuch these classes were left the lines and usually were not even recorded in chronicle accounts.
Pg 32
-While primarily the infantry was made of footmen fighting with These were made generally of professionals, as such many of the formations were made prevalenty of mercenaries. This was further encouraged by political considerations; arming lower classes with a weapon as powerful as the crossbow was a dangerous prospect spear and shield in tight formation- we see rise of specialized corps of foot-soldiers:
New missile infantry bodies, some archer ones but primarily crossbow ones.o (especially during frequent political revolt).o Effective for sieges, both attack and defence. Great weapons to support cavalry
charges. o Less effective if less in isolation to defend a position for their firing rate (very slow)
was not enough to stop a cavalry charge. Pavesi bearers, i.e. shield-bearers.
o Created to strengthen crossbowmen line and protect from enemy barrages. o A huge shield, nearly as tall as a man behind which crossbowmen could shelter while
firing and recharging. o Probably the shield bearer carried with him a spear, but soon became custom to
group with crossbowmen/shieldbearer a pikeman (as of 1363 sienese shieldbearers still carried a short spear).
-Communal army individual elements of poor quality. The infantry especially unless drawn up against a hill or the carroccio was unable to resist the enemy cavalry charge. The corps however, when combined, became a fearsome opponent if placed in favourable defensive terrain. Nonetheless, their attacking capacity remained scares.
-The Flo-Guelf Army at Montaperti 1:
Chroniclers and historians throughout the ages agree that the Guelf army was considrably more numerous. The figures given/estimated however differ consistently:
o Davidoshn: 70,000 – not reliable, no paleographic sources to confirm it. o 18th century copy of chronichle: 56,000 – objectively too high for a communal army
as well a text subject to several innacuracies (places battle on a Tuesday rather than a Saturday) that make it unreliable it unrealiable.
o Figures of Niccolo Sabino quoted by Orlando Malavolti: 40000 infantry and 8000 cavalry - Tommasi and Buonsignori saying that there were more than 40000 Guelfs on the field seem to use Sabino as well, giving credibility to his claim however though the Guelf could have mobilized 40000 infantyrmen, the 8000 cavalry is simply to unlikely of a number for communal army (even if it was a coalition army).
Pg 33
-The Flo-Guelf Army at Montaperti 2:
Estimates continuedo Reliable chronichlers:
Coppo Sefani: 35,000 GU infantrymen Villani: 30,000 GU foot soldiers and 3000 cav. Malapsini: more than 1000 GU cav and more than 30000 inf. Di Giovanni di Ventura: 30,000 GU on the field between Florentines and
allies. Sienes Aldobrandini or Porri: 30,000 men.
o A considerably unreliably estimate is the 18th c copy of anonymous Sienese chronchle of 14th c (quoted by Paoli): 20000 GU soldier at Montaperti
Most reliable estimates are those which place total GU army between 30-35,000 men. o Ventura’s chronicle as well gives an approximate number to all the contingents sent
by the Florentine allies to fight in joint army, this account for 25,000 men. o Depending on the estimate for the total size of the host, the Florentine at
Montaperti could have brought between 5000 and 10000 effective fighters. o Villani’s estimate at 33000 seems the most reasonable, meaing the Florentine
numbered 8000 at Montaperti. Florentine conscription mechanisms
o Conscription on territorial basis among men from 15 to 70 years old. A defensive force generally.
o Recruits had to be able bodied and had to be loyal (even if in appearance) to ruling party (i.e. the Guelfs for Montaperti).
o All had to be able to fulfil military material standards prescribed by communal authorities.
Territorial system and military organization of city infantry troopso The city divided into six districts (sestieri), each providing a quota of soldiers during
times of war.o The sestiere was a collection of parishes known as popoli (such name was also given
to the armed contingents these sub-districts supplied). There were 57 popoli of different sizes in Florence.
o The biggest popoli armed contingents were brought together under a common banner to total the numbers required for a company.
o Each popolo consisted in one or more military units of 50 men (cinquantine), 8 of these would make up each of the Florentine companies (400 men). The city could muster 20 of these companies meaning that, from the city alone, Florence could potentially raise 8000 men.
o The basic fighting unit however was not the cinquantina but the venticinquina (25-men).
Pg. 34
- The Flo-Guelf Army at Montaperti 3:
Territorial system and military organization of city infantry troops continued:o 4 comissioners per popolo were in charge of dividing each 50ina in two. As a result
of this division, one of the 25ine was to be used for military service, the other would be kept for rotation.
o As a result of this, at any one time, the Florentines would tendentially deploy on the battlefield half of their total potential for active service. It is likely that the Florentines were therefore comfortable with deploying at the very max 4000 of their 8000 city infantrymen on an open battlefield.
o Also it is was normal to mobilize only a part of the sestieri when it came to military expedition. Troops from one or more were generally left behind to garrison the city during times of war. Considering that each sestiere had to provide either 3 or 4 companies – Florence would tendentially mobilize between 3200 and 6800 men.
o The infantry district system does not take into account the unit guarding the carroccio, an independent number of cinquantine was assigned to this task (153 inf at Montaperti).
o There were also 4 companies of missile infantry fighting at Montaperti (2 with crossbows, two with bows). Each numbered 500 men, meaning the city could mobilize in total 2000 soldiers with ranged weapons. It is unkown if this corps was subject to the 25ina system and its rotation. We do know that a 6 cinquantine of such soldiers (3 cross, 3 bow) were left to garrison the city as such in the Montaperti host there could have been at the very maximum 1700 missile men.
o There were as well at Montaperti 3 units of shieldbearers, each made of men from two of the sesti, totalling 302 soldiers.
o There was also a number of pioneers and miners in the army (5 or 6 corps recruited fomr the lowest classes). These acted as shovellers, axe workers, marraiuoli (diggers), muleteers, and ribaldi (foragers).
o Their was as well a sapper body of 200 men whose job was to lay to wast Sienese territory - these were either picked from the above corps or were specifically hired wood cutters.
Territorial system and military organization of contado infantryo Lands outside the city walls were divided like the city itself into six territorial district
each governed by a city sestiere. Each district, known as piviere, was made of pieve (parishe) which consisted in a collection of popoli.
o Each piviere, proportional to its size, had to be supply the city with a number of troops (either on its own or in conjunction with other pivieri).
Pg. 35
- The Flo-Guelf Army at Montaperti 4:
Territorial system and military organization of contado infantryo According to Waley’s estimate, the countryside sent about 8000 men (this would
raise potential estimate of host to 40000-45000). However, the contado troops were mostly pioneers, foragers, sappers thus poorly equipped for open battle but suited for other non-combat duties (destroying territory, engineering, supply gathering).
o These contado units, like the urban working class, were more of a low-cost labour force to be used during military campaign. They were not real soldiers. As such many of inconsistencies in numbers between various chronicles is born from the fact that meny did not count these men within the army’s tally (some even recording only the number of cavalryman).
Cavalry service and organization
o Duty of all the wealthiest families in the commune to provide, according to their wealth, a number of cavalryman properly equipped. This compulsory service was known as the cavallata.
o The duty entailed other personal partipcipation to the expedition or hiring a substitute in your place (potentially a professional mercenary).
o These were not real knights, though wealthy enough to buy the right equipment to fulfil a knight’s tacital duties, thye lacked training/status/attitueds of arristrocratic knight.
o A numerous amount of middle class knights known as milities (without knighthood), those which had it were addressed as Dominos. Of the cavalryman of San Pancrazio, the only cavalry registers to survive for Montaperti, out of a total of 185 only 9 Dominos mounted in person the horse they supplied (and such title had recently been usurped by guild of judges, meaning that the men could likely be better at handling papers rather than swords)
o At Montaperti Villani places the number of cavalrymen at 1300 (800 cavallata men, 500 mercs), Waley places at 1600 (200 mercs, 1400 cavallata) by suggesting that the shield bearers from the San Pancrazio sestiere corresponded to 2/15 of the total force of Montaperti of shield bearers and it is reasonable to think that such proportion must be applied as well to the cavalry – meaing that the 185 cavalrymen registered must represent 2/15 of the total force (1387 therefore 1400).
Objection to Waley: cannot transfer the proportion of a specialized corps, whose members came from petty bourgeoisie/artisan class which also made up the rest of the infantry, to a one made up exclusively of upper class elements. One cannot be sure of this proportion as the upper class would not reflect proportionally the size of the lower class.
Pg. 36.
- The Flo-Guelf Army at Montaperti 5:
Cavalry service and organization continuation Villani’s number seem to be more consistent instead: by the next large
campaign, Campaldino, the number of cavallata cavalryman is 600 and that of mercs 400.
Waley’s estimate is though redeemed if the horsemen were subject to the 25ina rotation system, meaning that of the 1400 horsemen, 700-800 would effectively be deployed on the field, meaning that Villani’s and Waley’s numbers corresponded.
In total, accepting Villani’s estimate for Cav, Waley’s for infantry and allowing for relevant detractions, the Florentine host was made of: 800 city cav, 500 merc cav, between 3200 and 4000 infantries, 302 shield bearers, 1,700 missile infantry, 201 carroccio guardi, 8000 contrado troops. In total 1348 cavalryman, between 5355 and 6155 foot soldiers from the city and 8000 contado troops (who might have not fought).
o The figures of Ventura and Villani (based on accepting the 25000 men allied contribution given by Ventura) for the Florentine contingent in the Montaperti host place it in size at 5000 to 8000 men. This seem to correspond closely to Waley’s estimate of 6700-7500 effective Florentine (city) combatants.
Sabino’s theory placing the Guelf host at 40,000-45,000 men can be redeemed if it is suggested that Villani and Ventura did not account for the large non-fighting element within
the army (i.e. the 8000 Florentine contado troops and a further 3000 signalled by an Aretine chronoicle quoted by Paoli). This further 11,000 men - added to Ventura’s 30000 or Villani’s 33000 - would justify an estimate in the forty thousands.
o If such ratio of about 115 auxiliary troops to every 100 effective combatants is applicable to all allied contingents, then davidsohn estimate of 70,000 might be relevant after all (i.e. 33,000 fighters – 38,000 auxiliary therefore 71,000 soldiers).
Pg. 37
-Between 10000 and 20000 Ghibellina fighting men at Montaperti
Sienese was the main body, to find there number is to find a good estimate for troops there.o Like Florence, city divided in districts. There were 3 known as Terzi (Citta, Camollia,
San Martino). Each terzo was made of its own sub-unit, like the Florentine popolo, known
as contrada. 53 contrade by Montaperti for Tommasi but according to tradition there were supposed to be 42 military companies based on territorial circumscription thus we are unable to say that each contrada supplied a company.
This number may be established via oral tradition. Post victory, Sienes built St. George church (via pantaneto) and its tower wa supposed to have 38 windows (i.e number of military companies that fought in the great battle).
o It is likely that the number of infantryman presented by Ventura was inflated (Citta alone provided more than Florence by his estimate) by the auxiliary and allied contingents which were brought in the city for tactical/organizational motives.
The Sienese simply cannot be said to have mobilized more men than the Florentines (largest estimate 10,300 men). Siena not as reach nor populated as Florence and enlistment age was one year more compared to Florentines (16 to 70 years vs. 15 to 70).
To suggest that a company was made of 300 men (based on tradition that Nicchio contrada participated with 600 men and by then it included the territory of two contradas) then full mobilization of Sienes would put infantry at 11,400 Sienese which is ridiculous.
o More reasonable to say around 200 men (Based on Oca contrada, made of 2 ancient contradas, sending 365 men and the fact that the Count d’Arras led a contingent of 200 infantryman, probably the crossbowmen of Valle Piatta Company). Urban milita would thus consist of 7600 men (if 38 companies fought at Montaperti). In total they could raise 8400 urban militiamen (42 companies of traditional account)
Unlike the Florentines who were on the offence, and likely brought only each half of the cinquantines at the Montaperti battlefield, the Sienese were defending their walls and it reasonable to say that they used the overwhelming majority of the Militia they had available at Montaperti (with a small contingent left for defence vs internal coup).
pg 38
-Ventura seem to contradict/correct his 19000-infantryman statement after saying that the Sienese captured 15,000 Florentines and such number of prisoners exceeded that of the Sienese “men”.
The use of men is significant, it is not meant to qualify troops (he uses terms like infantrymen, footmen, citizen for those) rather it quantifies the male inhabitant population in Siena (including proletariat and underproletariate who did not fight).
From the 15000 male inhabitants and the fact that only citizens would be called up to arms, we can deduce that the figure of 8400 citizen militiamen is plausible.
-Despite Florence being much more populated than Siena, the fact that they could not raise an army at least 1/3 bigger than the Sienese (10300 vs 8400) is explained by the different social structure of Florence. Florentine wealth and hence citizenship was connected to to the textile industry while Sienese one depended on trading. Because of such burgenoing proto-industrial textile manufacturing, it meant that the Florentine had a proportionally larger number of proletarian who did not serve in the army.
-Cavalry:
Ventura puts the real Sienese number at 400, 200 cavallata and 200 from aristrocracy. There were also auxiliary or allied contingents within their ranks that provided several
hundreds knights:o At least 100 Aldobrandeschi feudal knights (South Tuscany) as established by
ancient treaty of 1221 (which also committed the feudal lords to provide a further 1000 infantrymen). Their presence seem to be confirmed by fact that Alsobrandino Aldobrandeschi led the Sienese army.
o The Pisan allies provided a further 300 cavalryman (anonymous Pisan chronicle published by Paoli in Appendix)
o About 100 cavalryman made of the Ghibelline exiles from Guelf cities (i.e. proved by the presence of Florentine Farinata degli Uberti who led a band of exiles and Guido Novello who led all exiles, which included famous astronomist/astrologist Guido Bonatti).
o Terni and Cotrana allied cavalrymen but these were few. o 800 German merc cav led by count Giordano d’Anglano who had been sent to aid
Fredrick II’s bastard son Manfred. The Ghibelline cav in total must have been between 1,600 and 1,800 men.
-Presence of considerable allied and auxiliary infantry with Ghibellines:
Malavolti claims that 3000 men were recruited from the contado of Siena, a further 2000 infantryman came with German mercs.
Paoli quotes Flaminio del Borgo and suggests that a further 3000 soldiers were to sent in aid of Siena (of which 2700 were likely infantry). Paoli quotes the Cortana chancerllery according to which the city sent 1300 fighting men.
-pg. 39
Ventura suggests that the Terzo Camollia was joined by many men, not only citizens, but soldiers both on foot and on horse, joined as well by a large number of monks and priests (some armed and some not) to help and comfort the brigades. These holymen likely numbered a few hundred/
Davidsohn records the presence of Saracen troops fighting with the Germans but doesn’t give a number.
-In total the Ghibelline host could be estimated at about about 19200-194000 men (of which 17600 were infantry and about 1600-1800 were cav).
-The weapons and equipment of soldiers in Italian varmies varied only minimally from city to city.
-There was no proper unfiroms for soldiers. Although Ventura records that footmen from of the Sienes Sesti wore vests of specific colour (green for those of Citta, red for San martino, black and white for Camollia) we can presume that soldiers on the whole dressed as they chose.
To thus recognize friend and foes in the heat of the melee, soldier customraily sew coloured emblems onto tunics and painted symbols on their shield (as knights already did). These coat of arms, unlike the dynastic ones of knights, indicated party, commune or military company to which they belonged.
Represented either easy to understand allegorical messages or more symbolical but cryptic ones.
However a minimum knowledge of heraldry was sufficient to understand most of them.
-Contrada Pantaneto, stemma con giaguaro.
-Longobards were ante-litteram Ghibelline whose king opposed tenaciously hegemonic ambitions of Church over peninsula. Also by the investitute conflict time, many noble and landed families in North-central Italy were of longoboard stock ratinin some of the cultural and mythological heritage of the ancient tribes.
-In German this is better expressed by the word Wut, linked to Wuotan (the Germanic continental odina), referring to the enthusiastic war-lie state induced by the obsession provoked by the God, who is invoked aloud by his warrior follower. The altered state of consciousness, typical of the bersekir, was also due to to the use of a mushroom with hallucinogenic properties, the amanita muscaria.
-Il sabato Di Montaperti, Dal Monte
pg 39
-Cavalry embodiment of highest virtue in western world: warrior virtue. Usama Ibn Mundiqh: among the Franks there is no human virtue which the appreciate more than martial virtue. Nobody (in there society) is as preeminent and high-ranking as knights. It is they who give advice, judge and command. Comparable to angels sitting around heavenly throne.
-Knighthood defined by certain rituals such as receiving one’s arms from vetern knight (adoubement) and through a trial of strength (the paumee, colee, accoldade) which are appropriated by aspiring communal knight and made into very pompous and self-celebrating rituals that satisfied their vanity
-From the second half of the 11th century, we have a widening of access to status/title of knight to men did not belong to knightly dynasties (the promotion was no longer determined by one’s ancestry, it could be won on the field.
-Italians abandon the fascinating Frankish rituals with the start of the communal period. They cease to have a powerful ideological and practical function, they exist only as an ornamental relic of the past celebrating a fake type of courage of those who could afford it (the rich bourgoesie and nobles). A trivial vanity of the rich.
Pagano de Pagani armed his young and inexperienced son, making him a knight, and this latter got mortally wounded at his first melee.
Pg. 40
-A common class consciousness emerging between noble and communal knights not based on material condition (still considerably steep differences between two) but on preserving their social position (those honoured for their martial virtue, who had received the sword and goldern spurs in recognition of this).
-First shift occurs end of 12th century, with the ascension of the bourgoesie who through their great wealth (and the fact that money was invading all mechnaisms of war) were threatening the restricted access to such status.
-Money becomes a fundamental requirement to war, for sustaining the martial lifestyle of princes, to fortify castles, to pay soldiers and dignitaries in charge of defending territories.
-Money ceases also to function only as a tool to equip knights with the tools of the trade and reward their valour, it serves to fuel the new war machine imposed by necessity (a knight must fight alongside an entourage, only with money can they recruit experienced wariors or adventurers from the masnade who have no formal obligation to his person).
Pg. 41-42
Opening further favoured in Italy by knightly aristocracy escaping to the city and mixing with the top echelons of the city elite (they too becoming entreprenuers). The title made its holder an enforcer of the political order in exchange for certain priviliges (i.e. towers in the city, prior to Montaperti 300) and benefices (all who could afford a couple of horses and armour were eligible to be dubbed knights, regardless of their obscure social extraction, and in exchange of a 25 lire bounty).
These were not men of status, they were simple humble men who could boast a title, Ottone of Frisingia was stupefied to learnt that Italian regiments were made of : youths of humble birth, craftsman of the most despicable manual crafts, men which in other country would be consider the plague of social life. The violation/murking of a sacred institution, falling victim to the corruption, clientelism and nepotism of the middling orders.
4 ways to make a knight:
Cavalier bagnati: promotion through a sumptuous, extensive and expensive quasi-religious ceremony.
Cavalieri di corredo: that is well armed and ordained/dubbed knights (dignita cavallersca), knights which fulfilled the principles of chivalry and descended from noble or heraldic families, people trained in the art of war not mere commoners with a horse – they do not require such a sumptuous ceremony. Acted as hedge knights, mercenaries.
Cavalieri di scudo: those made knights by the authorities to be, their function to defend their masters by taking up arms and armour. A knight/bannerman/bannatus, aknigh with his own vassal-client system who had the right to raise his own contingent and carry his own banner.
Cavalieri d’arme: those made knights on the eve of battle or gainig such status by gallantry on the battlefield.
-Ceases to be the reward/ coronation of one’s efforts for the long period of practice and the sacrifices undergone by the candidate since their youth.
pg 42.
-In Florence 2 cerimonies in particular:
That via bath (cavaliere bagnato), only few could aspire to such ceremony because of its elevated costs: the candidate needed very expensive silk attire and he also had to for a large entourage which accompanied him through the ceremony. Could result in very large debts which were guaranteed by the family’s patrimony.
That by receiving weapons (cavaliere d’arme), more spartan, simpler and cheaper. One was not expected to pay a dime for this and it was as significant and powerful as the former.
Both contained religious symbolism (they started in church while participants repeated psalms and litany) and ended at the communal balcony standing, on a vermillion carpet , with the joyous population applauding him below.
-In Italy, ceremony characterized by receiving a bounty following ones promotion: in Siena the commune offered the new knight a mass in the Duomo and 100 soldi each to buy a sword and spurs.
Pg. 43
-After Montaperti the knightly ceremony was further simplified by communal statuses: the rite became a simple formality. The simplification came with the introduction of the cavallate: an obligation imposed by the state onto citizens/knights who could affort to supply the war effort with a horse (and rider). Equi cavallatorun represented those knights who had to present more than a single horse part of their imposition (impositio equorum).
-The riders/milite in the service of the commune obtained the designation of equites cavallatarum (or habentes cavallatas).
-The cavallata did not merely consists in corps of horseman made from the city aristrocracy and righ bourgeosie, the term was used to define and distinguish what type of military action was expected to be performed by the horseman: certain terms were used for campaigns during which a siege with siege weapons was expected to occur, other terms were used when the military action consisted in a rapid incursion in the enemy territory – its primary end being the destruction of the agricultural hamlets of the enemy.
3 terms existed: oste, cavalcata, cavallata
Pg. 44
In Siena the term cavalcata and cavallata were used interchangeably, they were used to indicate militiamen on horseback.
-Eventually for the communes it ceased to matter who rode the horses, their necessity for horseback fighters made it irrelevant if the rider was a noble or a merchant who could afford all the necessary equipment.
-In as much as a man was able to mantin a horse for service to the Republic and in as much as he was able to ride it when it came time to wage war against the enemy of the Republic, it did not matter that the knight was of humble extraction (a usurer, an artisan, a shopkeep).
-Such cavallata obbligaiton did result in a more effective effective provision of horses for the war effort, however, it did not always provide horse-back fighters of the same quality as the ancient institution tended to.
For the knight of noble extraction, the profession of arms and death were a coveted prospect which granted prestige to his person and his family, for the burghers and pleb – scared and inexperienced, who are trained in the peaceful arts and crafts – such prospect did not sit well with his inclination.
As a result the number the civic horseman deployed by Florence sees a decline, 1260: 800, 1289: 600, 1325: 300 and finally in 1352 the institution was substituted with a tax paid by those who were once eligible for cavalry service (which raised a whooping 52,000 gold florins).
This last thing sealed the decadence of that one institution which served to strengthen and preserve the Republic up to then and that made into a respectable power.
No longer do the cavalryman fight in honour and in the name of their country, they fight for money (their new homeland), their end being not the preservation of the commonwealth but of extorting ransoms from captured prisoners (Ricotti).
-The old institution of cavalry, appropiated by the new bourgeosie magnate, merely consisted in a symbolical rite to solidify and legitimize the new political elite’s ascension.
-Provenzano Salvani , il maggiore di Siena and leader militare Ghibellino di Siena, grosso artefice loro vittoria.
-Common 1800s view/Flicker: that to military institution of the medieval period are inspired by the economic, political, and social conditions of society especially as conveyed in the jurisprudential understanding of the time. To talk about military history of the medieval period as a whole is hard, it is a very disconnectes when studied from society to society, subject to each one’s cultural influences. Pg 75
-Antiquity marked by the triumph of infantry, menahwile in the medieval period (with the return to more rudimentary/primitive lifestyles) is marked by the ascension of feudal (heavy) cavalry – ritterschaft.
-Differing opnion of medievalist on military history: period of infantry decadence (decadence not measurable because of obscurity of sources), rise of combined arms/corps operation with propert tactics and manouver, complete decadence of the subject of military history.
-While perhaps military history had its resurgence in 9th and 10th c by emphasizing and celebrating socio-culturally military virtue/use of weapons and the ever growing professionalization of the knight, it is with the 12th century – with the crusades, the importance of auxiliary regiments, the improvement of ranged weapons – that the art of warfare starts acquiring a ore complete form (with a more diverse composition of troops who were to support the main corps, that of cavalry). Pg 76.
-The communal armies did retain some remenant forms belonging to the intial feudal system on which their society was founded.
The separation between cavalry and infantry corps within communal armies not only a military one but reflected social dictonomy of nobles-bourgoeisie (thus very relevant during the communal period)
It was unthinkable for bouergoesie knights and infantry to fight alongside the nobles – this was the fundamental rationale that determined the composition of early communal army (this distionts between milita and popolo).
I.E. Siena was divided into two corps (comune): a comune mais aut militano sided by a commune peditum, integrated within the same host.
-Infantry organization and recruitment:
In cases of greatest danger for the commune, a real levee en masse from city and contado. In most major Tuscan communes, all men from 15 to 70 had to present themselves at the
established rally points at the. Only Pisa raised the minimum age requirement to 18 and had them swear an oath in which they promised to present themselves armed wherever and whenever the Capitain of the People or Elders called them to arms.
Some companies where trained for missile serice (crossbows, throwing spears or the Sardinian Javelin –Verga- essential a metal pole of particular form in use on the island).
Carroccio: an ox led cart on which the religious and civic insignas, standard and gonfaloni of the city were placed. Heavily defended, the Pisans assigned to it 1500 young men armed with Halberds. It was highly symbolical, venerated like a religious icon. Pg. 77
The existence of elite companies with high value tasks, the Sienese had a designated elite company (Croce Biana) made from the best men from each civic militia companed that defended the Palazzo of the Elders. Armed with the Pavese, a very large man-sized shield, and a crossbow.
Machievelli informs us that at all times the infantry host was superior in numbers to that of cavalrymen (because of much greater cost required to muster an appropriately armed cavalryman and the much pickier discipline/quality requirements – unlikely to find impetous youths or old men, frail and poorly reactice, in the heavily armed lances.
This was not necessarily a selection with very high quality standards and, because of this, many a days were won because the poorly trained infrantrymen did not hold on confrontation with the enemy.
Florentine military reform of the primo popolo led to new recruitment system: enlistment of 20 city companies and 96 contado units from the various parishes under Florentine authority. This further stressed the mass nature of the army rather than the quality one (the contado infantry in particular tendentially breaking off formation when the enemy was on the verge of charging, resulting in devastating routes).
Paoli admits that only the mercenaries possessed the necessary experience and vitality to resist the enemy impetus and overturn their situation in triumphant victories. These by no means were reliable, their service was excessively subject to material provisions (often resulting in mutinies or impromptu strikes when unfulfillec) and resulted in brutal acts of ferocity. Their quality both in material and training terms was uncomparable (especially to the contado units united in those larger Leghe del Contado units)
-Infantry training and equipment
Important to medieval mentality is that the concept of being well “armed” entailed both the possession of offensive weapons as well as the appropriate protections through which to ensure the incolumnity of the body (disarmed as exposed to the enemy’s strike). This mentality strongly inspired communal statues which sought to impose a minimum material standard, below this the contribute and combat capacity of troops became too inefficient.
o The weapon prescription for a city company (in the De Numero Peditum Habendorum quolibet sextu) indicates that there were 4 specialized type of units within company (20 crossbowmen, 20 pavesi-bearers, 20 pikemen/long lance, and
20 with aretine cleavers). This unit as well doubled as a rapid deployment force which could be used to repress brigandage and arrest political enemies. Pg. 78
o The defensive equipment requirement could entail a great expense (such as mail shirt, or body armour made of metale plate/with metal sleeves) if you could afford it - yet there were prescriptions which allowed footmen to armour themselves as most financially convenient to them, that entailed that a portion of footmen were armed in a shoddy manner/below standards – made sense since a corettum costed 4 liras, a panceria eight and a full armour (panceria de mambergis) was valued 12 liras – these prices were subject however to variation produced by the quality of the item, some could armour with the sleeves and guantles could be accessed for as little as 5 liras.
o In Montaperti the equipment was: pg. 79 Corsetto di cuoio cotto a maniche di ferro Maniche di ferro con busto di tela di canapa a piu doppi e impunitita con
all’intero squame di ferro imbulletattate e all’esterno pitturato con giglio rosso)
Casco of zucotto di lamiera di acciaio a protezione della testa Gorgiera o collare di ferro Lancia o scudo o grande tavola.
When it came to the training of this petty bourgoeisie infantry corps there knowledge was likely very limited: very probably knew how to march, they were able to perform a limited amount of manouvres such as transitioning from marching order to fighting formation or perform a full conver to the right or left.
o Such shortcoming was overcome with more rigorous selection progress, periodical training sessions and the use of infantry for every more expeiclized tasks.
o Enjoying a very strong spirit of comradery, cohesions and trust between the company infantrymen because of the subdivision by district/territorial unit of the various outfit meaning that all shared the same socio-geographic extraction entrenching in them a deep sentiment of solidariety.
Infantry Tactics
Among the companies temporary officials were appointed, primi inter pares (first among equals), who were by no means experts capable of commanding and manouvering units in such a way as to make the infantry an impactful body. This lack of knowledgeable and experienced leaders further relegated infantry to a supporting role to the cavalry body and gave it an inextricably defensive characterists. This corps was generally employed only after the day was won or lost: either to surround and eliminate the remaining pockets of resistance (capturing those of value and executing the rest if too many prisoners were captured) or to prevent further enemy pursuit and protect the carroccio if the cavalryman had been routed.
o No primary source shows/confirms the employment of a contemporary infantry body with clear strategic/tactical ends (such as baiting and engaging the enemy cavalry in sustained combat while their own cavalry proceeded to flank them).
Canestrini give some indication of Florentine troop deployment, pg. 80o Focused around the carroccioo Deployed in front of it was the the heavy cavalryo Behind it stood the light horseman who were the first to engage and would
withdraw to the carroccio after having successfully enticed the enemy to attack.
o A third line was made by the bulk of the infantry and the remaining cavalry who was grouped around the city’s bell
o Following were this stood to flanks made by the crossbows and pavesari (which , counterintuitively, Canestrini places behind the crossbowmen)
o Last but not least came the carters and their carts. Canestrini’s official battle order:
o 4 corpso 1st a vanguard of horsemen, feditori, sided by flanks made of crossbowmen and
shieldbearers and deployed in a creascent moon formation. o 2nd came the bulk of the infantry ready to maintain the enemy in sustained
angagemento 3rd came a line made of the baggage train made of carts and carters and many
infantryman, this line was to act as a defensive perimeter from further enemy pursuit and as a collection point for routed friendlies.
o 4th, a reserve to be deployed tempestively during emergencies or to win the day, made of primarily infantryman.
Canestrini’s ordering is somewhat excessively complex and counter-inuitive at times (shieldbearers behind crossbows, light cavalryman engaging and withdrawing back to the carroccio effectively preventing heavy cavalry from intervening), seemingly making it subject to heavy interpretation of the later historian. However, the Florentines did deploy their troops into four battelines.
As well the very pre-eminence conferred by the historian to infantry and the above deploymen is the product of influence the isolated success of Legnano had on modern mentality. This by no means reflected reality however.
Delbruck description of infantry deployment is more accurate: infantry was collected in a large mass and were grouped into a rectangular shaped formation or a square. The former tended to emerge on the field when the infantry, deployed in square formation, suffered greater pressure on its flanks. Ultimately then on the field you ended up getting a rectangular shaped formation with the width of the shape slightly shorter than its length and the corners of the formation being rounded. Pg. 81
o The expression cuneus (cono/cone) in med sources did not indicate a triangle but rather a rectangular formation whose whose length was greater than its width.
-The growing importance of infantry:
As time passes and the unending conflict in Tuscany continues, specialized outfits from the above battle orders and those mentioned in Florentine archieves (i.e. pikemen, crossbowsmen, pavesari, archers, sappers and pioneers) prove their loyalty to communal authorities and become ever more experienced in the art of war.
As a result the numbers of these outfits started growing constantly, they are more frequently employed for battles and are given a clear tactical mission.
The crossbowmen in particular become the specialist outfit by definition, their employment growing at unprecedent proportions (and survived well into later centuries as the main form of civic unit). By the 13th century this form of weapons ceased to be a rudimental and unreliable instrument of war. Rather they were complex and precise machines, made in a very specific and highly technical manner. Pg. 82
o Two prevalents forms cited in Tuscan sources are those loaded via lever or those reloaded by placing the top of the weapon the ground and placing one’s feet in crossbow’s stirrup attached to said top.
o The most common model was the a bolzoni of the French (a crossbow which shot a very large bolt, i.e. quarrel).
o Their equipment as a whole was not very different from the rest of the infantry, the only exception was that they had to wear armour (cinoferro) and had to carry with them at least 10 bolts and a war knife.
The Pavesario Carried a large human sized shield (of should length) which could be fixed to the
ground and moved around (mobile cover). It served to protect primarily friendly crossbowmen (but also pikemen) from enemy fire.
o They were part of a very fragile formation, protected only by maybe one or two lines of pikeman, and which had no real protection from the enemies heavy cavalry charge (with friendly crossbowmen generally routing or a least loosing their calm after an unwounded enemy knight got within a 30 m range to them and no tangible obstacle was obstructing them, the shields not enough to inspire security into them).
-The philosophy of battle was a clear one: it was the ultimate means to settle a dispute and its objective was the anhilation of the enemy so that local authorities may impose their will on the enemy. Pg. 81
-Mercenaries p. 83
It possible to start making certain generalization on mercenaries in Italy from the 11 th century and the Norman conquest of Siciliy.
Their rise was the product of longer war and the disappearance of feudal classes (and thus the noble heavy cavalry they used to make up). The knightly and chivalrous principles of noble cavalry start being replaced with the expertise and availability of professional horseback fighter (well-disposed to fight for anyone for the right price).
Both Fredrick emperors had enlisted german and bourgougnan mercs for their Italian campaigns, as well the foreign Podesta of the various city states used to bring numerous contingents of foreign knight and birri who maintain order in the city.
Mercenaries were paid on monthy basis according to contractual agreement which defined all aspects of their service (such as Manfredi’s and his knight in Sienese service, they would also win Montaperti for the city).
Exampleso Flo paid in 1208 lance of heavy cavalrymen from Umbria, specifically from
Montefalco, Bevagna, Collazzone and Castel Rinaldi. o In 1231 Orvieto paid 20 knights from Amelia o In 1231, Siena hired 400 Genoese crossbowmen to fight Florence. o A Matteo da Rieti, from 1240 to about 1260, hired out to the commune of Perugia a
20 men contingent of horsemen and footmen. o In 1225 the count of Savoy was contracted by Genoa to recruit and lead 200
horseman for a rate of 16 lire a month.o In 1277 Florence hires Inghilese of Saint Remi to recruited and lead 100 horsmen
from beyond the alps. Pg. 85
Recruited by emissaries of the communes who negotatited the contract on a case by case scenario and involved therefore a lot of direct negotiations which middlemen, entreprenuers, nobles and noble condottieri. Some bands and their soldiers preffered to negotiate directly their terms of service others preffered ot assign such task to a trusted member of the band.
o Not always did they establish all relevant terms, libro di Montaperti show that the 200 mercs from Romagna where hired without having defined the period of their service and a standard wage rate, showing that early on merc bands were limited in quantity and lacked cohesions. Pg. 84
Pg. 84 the author disagrees with claims made on the importance of political exiles to the creation of a large supply of mercenaries in Italy, who sold their services as a military necessity. This is a marginal argument and are not comparable to mercenaries for they sought a way to get back home and were not nomads driven by monetary gain. The origin of the captains of ventura was not political exile, rather it was the cadet system so common among noble families in which younger and bastard sons were unlikely/disqualified from a enjoying a potential inheritance. The continuous conflict between commune and their necessity for professional leadership/troops gives them a considerable opportunity to advance their status (even carving out an inheritance for himself and his family).
3 types of mercenaries prior to condottieri: the feudal signeur, the constabulary or masnada led by a professional soldier, fighters contracted on an individual basis. Though as well these bands acted as independent and parasitic entities like their 14th century counterparts, who exploited war to harm the territory as a whole, once their contract was done and they were paid they could be easily be removed from the territory (still to weak to do anything).
At Montaperti pg 85:o We have 50 horsemen under Pietro de Bazacape, ante-litteram condottiero, and 200
horsmen from lombary and Romagna.o All served at their own risk and fortune. Their equipment varied but all fulfilled the
minimum standard. o For more equipment carried prevalently by these men go to page 85.
They earned a considerable wage, a berroviere with 2 horses would receive a minimum monthly wage of 11 liras (a crossbowmen instead 2 lire and 5 soldi). They were as well entitled to keep all moveable loot plunder by their own hand and could stand to gain considerable sums by selling captured prisoners).
To Contamine’s definition of mercenary (a specialist, with a stipend and belong to no nation involved in the conflict) we must as well the knights of the court or masnada (masnadiero? Contado knight). Pg. 86
-On cavalry’s importance:
Main weapon/corps during military enterprises throughout the medieval ages. It was through them that the most significant victories of the age were won.
Its preminence however had been reduced in Communal Italy and elsewhere in Europe because of the growing use of infantry (more precisely, specialized outfit) and the improvements in siege weapons (which allowed infantry based city assults).
Progressively it loses it uniqueness/pre-eminence, becoming just one of many integral parts/corps of an army. Pg. 87
The cavary’s much greater power compared to infantry always ended up deciding the day for medieval armies (until techonological did not lead to the widespread introduction of
weapons -stouter pikes, more sophisticated crossbows and bows, firearms) which could nullify cavalry charges, either disorganizing their tight formation or even stopping them completely when reaching the final meters of their chage).
-On cavalry’s role:
Two features generally attributed to it speed and mounvrability. o Delbruck contests the speed aspect of their intervention suggesting that the
medieval cavalryman was slow and clumsy (because of the weight of his armour and lack of training/tactical discipline/collective excercise), ultimately reducing their shock capacity and their overall manouverability.
It is undeniable that throughout the 11th to 13th century there was a change in the defensive armament of knights of the time, replacing their lighters chainmail protection with the heavier steel plates. But as well the knight become ever more trained and used to military life from younger and younger ages meaning that their charges, despite being slowed down by the weight of the soldier’s and horse’s armour, remain their devastating since no they where conducted in tight formation and were accompanied by greater weight and noise (caused by heavier equipment) shattering enemies, physically and psychologically, more effectively.
Also the heavier weights were offset by the fact horsemen did not start their charge at great distance but reather advance at a slow pace, only accelerating at charging speed when 100m from the enemy.
The questions of discipline, tactical organization and collective exercise can perhaps be raised in a communal context, however generally the knights and cavalryman were trained from their youth and gain ever-more precious experience through the various socio-cultural activities which glorified the use of arms (tournaments) as well as the endemic warfare which plagued Europe (and which was always offering recruits important outlets from which to gian experience). Pg. 88
Cavalry always sided by auxiliar corps to aids efforts (Anna Commena) signals the use by the celts of very light horseback archers (Turcopoles) and specialized infantrymen (archers, crossbows, and pikemen) in support of the heavy cavalry.
The cavalry was deployed generally in a either a single line formation or multiple ones separated by ample distance.
The main weapon/method of charging was by couching the lance and spur the horse towards the enemy. Pg. 89
At montaperti the Florentine knights presented themselves with their:o Horses armoured with panerciam or asbergum i.e. chainmail shirts (picked out from
the 200,000 best shirts)o Their spurs or metal bootso With a great helm enclosed with very narrow eye-holes. o An armour made made metal plates to protect the body,o A lance of 350 cm made of specific wood, with a punta a doppio filo, and that
weighed between 15 and 18 kg)o A shield, targe or a large wooden shield in the english style (tabolaccium anglum),o An estoc sword (a double edged sword, 2 kg in weight)o A knife
-The new model army introduced by the popular government was an attempt to make the plebs/lower echelons (the classes which had supported/secured the ascendancy of the new popular government) into the core group around which to establish the new government’s military strength. Pg. 89
Ad-Hoc laws to prevent fraud and evasion of duties (especially those connected to horse service): pg. 90.
Difficulty in recruitment (evidenced by many excuses of carroccio chosen guard, an elite body of troops), the were too many excuses – the totality of them was impossible to evaluate by the armies administrative apparatus : pg. 91
An imposing administrative apparatus made of at least more than 200 notaries, pg. 92
An army of civilians who lacked that sort of veterancy required to sutain a battle on the open field and descisevely exploit a potential triumph, it is such shortage of expertise which justifies their hiring of 400 berrovieri and further Lombard mercs: pg. 92
Aspired to build a self-sufficient army, one which relied on its own troops and that of submitted communes, one which was led by the new political order (that had expelled tyrannical aristocratic knights of the older order): pg. 92
The commune of Siena was so wealthy that on several occasions they had could the weapons of the Germans merc who pawned them during their stay so that they could live it up: pg. 93
Even the Sienese had a military rotation by district (each terzo would in turn go on campaign to fight its enemies): pg. 94
Costringitori, sub-officials (sotto-ufficiali) in charge of the deployment of troops on the battlefield and mantaining them in formation during the fight – they are to maintain the troops morale: pg. 95
The Florentines and its allies raised the taglia, the common defence force of the Guelf cause made up primarily by Florentines (the main sponsor, guelf regional power) but augmented considerably by contingent from allied/Florentine-subjected communes: pg. 96
The Florentine host made several, and unexplainable, pauses (about 13 days) while marching on the walls of Siena – these allowed the Sienese to collect and organize its troops in an orderly manner. The Florentines failed to exploit the surpise element and the relative defensive unprepardness of the Sienese: pg. 96.
Apparent existence of information networks that allowed the Sienese to know very quickly the direction of the Florentine hosts (i.e. headed towards Montemassi to intercept the merc force of count Giordano and free the castle from his siege). This in reality was an attempt at dissimulation, by moving part of the army towards Montemassi, the Guelf managed to get the Sienes to split their less numerous force to respond to the threat (this would have been effective if the main column was not as slow as it was) : pg. 97
A strategic policy of Florentine army to eliminate potential enemy pockets forming behind them by attacking Sienese/Ghibelline settlement on the way of Siena (i.e. Casole e Menzano), slowing down their attack on the city principal objective of the campaign: pg. 97
The events of the battle of Montaperti:
1st part of the campaign:
An initial sortie ordered by Sienese to be performed by the 100-200 German knights who were staying within the city. These exited from Porta Camollia and attacked the Florentines while they were setting their camp. They were repelled and some were captured. Pg. 97
The Florentine set camp/siege the walls of the city (deployed in front of Porta Camollia where the monastery of Santa Petronilla was – antiporto of the city). Pg. 97
A second sortie launched by Uberto Farinata with the German mercs against encroaching Florentines, to delay the assault/full encirclement of the city as to allows the troops of count Giordano to return from montemassi and to allow the reinforcements sent by king Manfred to reach the city. An episode often omitted by Florentines – the Germans were prussured by Uberto into attacking Florentines by lowering their inhibitions through ample feasting and promise of gold and rewards. A mixed force of 200 horseman and infantry contingents led by Count Giordano’s marshal sallied forth launching a devastating charge on the enemy. The first lines of Guelf infantry were devastated and the lines following them took to flight. Eventually the lonely sortie force loses the impetus of the charge, and after a sustained melee, in which they are encircled, the enemy force is completely routed with little surviving. Pg. 98
This last move proved extremely effective (with the Florentine choosing to raise the siege and effectively interrupting the war). According to Davidsohn the Florentine withdrawal was not orderly resulting in many dead Florentines and the loss of important booty to the pursuing Sienese force (but unlikely that such great triumph took place yet the action did definitely result in the interruption of the military enterprise). Pg. 99
On their return towards Florence, the retreating Guelf force split up so that they could effectively sack and put to the torch the Sienese contado and its allies’/subjects’ territories (i.e Montelatrone) – did not result in Sienese reaction, an expected situation that could not be halted. Pg. 100
This was how the first Florentine expedition against Siena ended. The only significant consequences were the Sienese taking of Grossetto and the devastation of the Sienese contado by the Florentines. As well Montemassi was taken by the Sienese and its walls were destroyed while the Florentine subjects of Poggibonsi and Staggia surrendered and swore an oath of loyalty to the Sienese and King manfred (after hearing that the Florentine had been routed). Pg. 100
Preliminaries to the 2nd campaign:
Stupor Mundi (astonishment of the world)=Federico II By the second phase of the campaign, Manfred sent to the Sienes a colourful mercenary
force of Germans, Neapolitans, Greeks, Pugliesi, and Saracen to secure Ghibelline hegemony in Tuscany. These were very expensive, costing the commune at most 118.000 Gold Florins (donation of Salimbene dei Salimbeni, unlikely however they costed/he donated that much since the average montly wage of teutonic knight was of 8 gold florins and the communal yearly revenues were not that high) . pg 102-3
Despite the complete exhaustion of financial resources (with the Sienese Gran Tavola bank being in serious trouble, and the cost of money sky-rocketting – with interest rates on loans issued by commercial institution reaching 30% and those on private loans reaching 60%), Siena raised 800 new knights from its peripherical burghs. Pg. 103
2 monks were sent to Florence with the covert task to corrupt Florentine high gov officials and high-ranking officers. They appeared to have conveyed to Florentine authorities some dissimulating reports, sent by Florentine exile Farinata degli Uberti, in which Farinata promises to betray the Sienese for 10,000 florins. This seems to have encouraged the levying of a second host. Pg. 103
o This was done in the hopes of luring the Florentine on the open battlefield at an exact location, the Arbia river. Farinata told them to pass near Siena on the premise that they were to relieve the settlement of Montalcino from siege and, once there, the traitors would open the Sienese door of San Vito. Pg. 104
The Florentine knights greatly feared the German/Sienese one (as conveyed in the letter of merchant Giacomo di Guido Cacciacont to his French associates). Pg. 104
The continued siege by the Ghibellines of the Guelf rebel centre of Montalcino (which was on the verge of falling after having survived many assaults) really forced the Florentine hand. Pg .104
Montalcino (like its Ghibelline counterparts, Montepulciano and Colle) was suffering that type of economic warfare typical of the peninsula, while its troops were forced behind city walls the settlement witnessed the systematic destruction and plundering of its countryside/agricultural hamlets – taking a heavy toll on its population over-time.pg. 104
A febrile diplomatic activity by Florentines in an attempt to recruit royal/feudal knights after realization that a charge of just a few hundered of these could send en route thousands of footmen. Pg. 105
o Recruit Germans representatives of Corrado IV (rival claimant of Manfred) Corrado Bussarus and Corrado Kroff di Fluglingen to fight for Florence with a contingent of Teutonic knights (who flew the Imperial German banner somewhat paradoxically on the Guelf side)
o Sent delegations to Corrado IV and Alfonso King of Castiglia to descend onto Tuscany and aid the Florentine cause. These failed.
The Florentines had a divided politico-military leadership (were nobles and the leaders of the popular cause, i.e. Grandi popolani, were constantly at odds). Most problematically, they could not decide on the travel itinerary of the host and how to offer battle to the Sienese. Pg. 105
o In the end the populist demagouges triumphed over the more militarily experienced nobles by threatening them with sanctions and punishment (even the death penalty). As a result, the quicker but more dangerous route (that open to ambush) to Montalcino was taken. Pg. 106
The populist riled up the Florentines to such a point that when the second host was called there was en masse spontaneous adhesion to the war effort. Villani says there was no house in Florence that did not at least contribute a food soldier or horseman. Acutal most familiessupplied two or more soldiers, according to their wealth, to the war effort. Pg 106
An interesting Parenthesis on numbers: Settia places the numbers of the Guelf Army (that is the army made up of Florentines, its local Tuscan allies, and its allies in Lombardy) (based on the declaration of victory made by Florentine Ghibelline exiles to Manfred) at 7000 cavalryman and 20000 footmen. Because it is likely that the exiles wanted to emphasize the magnitude of the triumph, we would have to likely half and sensibly reduce Settia’s numbers. Pg. 106-7
o Delbruck also refuses a priori all estimates that put the Guelf army at about 3000 knights and 30000 footsoldiers (as it exceeds the demographic capacities of Florence).
o Any enterprise exceeding this would run in serious logistical issues (even if the area of operation was so close to the city-state’s borders).
It is indubitable that at the time of Montaperti, Florence (wanting to secure Guelf hegemony in the region and thus securing the party’s economic, territorial, and political interest) maximized its recruitment capacity so to field the largest host possible (this also applies to allied contingent contributions). Thus the host represents the highest bracket of the military capacity of the Florentines at the time. pg. 107
o A common chronicling consensus agreeing that the size of this Guelf host (i.e. including allies and probably non-combatant personnel) was unprecedented in Florentine history (poets and chroniclers alike remember it as something as great and imposing as the armies of Ceasar). It is because of this that statements like Villani’s, placing the numbers of the host at 30.000 foot and 3.000 knights, could be justified as plausible. Pg. 108
o Again estimate musts be moderated, the Florentien allies through the Taglia could not have mobilized more than 600 knights. Pg. 106
Guido Bonatti, the astrologist of Ghibelline exiles leader Guido Novello, places Sienese army at: 3200 knights, 13000 infantryman, and 300 crossbows (contraposed to 5000 Florentine crossbowmans, suggesting that his numbers are off) pg. 109
o We definitely know that communal authorities made 800 new knights from city confines, the Pisans came 3000 chosen soldiers, and Cortona brought a further 1300 soldiers.
o Numerous exiles were present in Ghibelline rankso There were 800 German and Italian merc knights led by Count Giordano and the
Count of Arras. These were sided by at least two companies of light infantry made of Manfred’s Saracen and Greek mercenaries.
o As such, it is likely that it disposed of at least 800 communal and allied cavalryman, 800 german merc cavalry, and about 6000 infantrymen (plus an undefined but considerable number of merc contingents).
o A qualitatively superior but numerically inferior army.
The Second campaign:
The Guelf host on their way encamped multiple times. These location would have unlikely been able to sustain a host of 20 to 70 thousand infantryman (since these would require and enormous baggage train, an enormous amount of carts and as many beasts of burden). Pg. 110
On approach, the Florentine send an ultimatum to the Sienese which was equivalent to unconditional surrender (i.e. each terzo would have been placed under a Signoria). Rejected pg. 110
On the night of the 3rd of the September, the Guelf leave their camp in Pieve Asciuta and set for a 16 km march to Montalcino. They seek to cross the Arbia river at Taverne sull’ Arbia, the only bridge that could probably support the entire column’s passage. In the proximity of the brige, on the 4th of September early in the morning, the Florentine recon spots the deployment of the Ghibelline army at 1 km west of the crossing (over the river). Pg. 111
Some confusion debate over the dating of battle (and even the prior dates): Salvini, “tale mancanza di documentazione afferma il Salvini dovrebbe sconsigliare la ricostruzione particolareggiata della vicenda, perche secondo le sue ricerche, nemmeno la datazione degli avvenimenti nelle due giornate precedenti avrebbe il crisma della certezza”. Pg. 112
On the 3rd of September heralds of Siena launch the muster call for Sienese Militia. The militias from the three terzi would leave the city in turn from the door of Santo Viene (Porta dei Pispini). Pg. 112
This mixed militia/foreign patron army was saluted by the citizens of Siena, the people suggesting that “se tutta Siena facesse cosi, si potrebbe aspirare all’imperio di tutta la Toscana. Pg. 113
Important to remember that perhaps Aldobrandino Aldobrandeschi was not perhapse supreme commander of forces bbut rather Francesco TOrghisio (a name forgotten by chronicles, except Malavolti). Aldobrandino despite being with the Sienese felt strongly hostile to the republic because of its invasion of his holding and the fact that they murdered his cousin. Only his commitment to the Ghibelline party, Manfred’s intercession, and the fact the Guelf threat would also threaten his position allowed his recent reconciliation with the city. Torghisio’ leadership further confirmed by fact that he was Podesta of the time (and the by the statutes in existence, no other office/authority could have subbed his leadership) and letter to Manfred at the time confirms his status. Pg. 113
“Do not makes prisoner until the enemy has routed” the directive given by the captain on the eve of the battle. Pg. 114
The battlefield is between 2 hills (the Monteropoli and Monselvoli). The 2 hills, which run parallel to each other although they are of different heigts, are the limits of valley (the point in which the valley extends the most). Within such space, the valley includes 3 river the Arbia, the Malena, and the Biena. The two hills come to a stop at about the place where the Biena river flows inside the Malena and the Malena flows inside the Arbia. The valley within the two hills is quite large and and deep. Within the valley their exist only a small hill which interrupts the plains (the Poggiarone) found in the easternmost part of the valley. Carlo-Francesco Carpellini Pg. 114
The Guelf army had taken the smalle castle of Montaperti (on the hill of MOntepertaccio) on the 4th of September, Saturday, after 14 days of heavy march (August sun). pg. 114
The deployment of the Sienese force a 1km was unexpected. The Florntine had expected to parade in front of the Sienese walls (while their forces remained holed up in the city), move onto Montalcino to raise the siege and once back they would have expected a field battle. The Sienese deployment however forced the Florentine hand and led a to the tempestive deployment in troops in battle formation. The immediacy prevented the Florentines from choosing an advantegous fighting position and the distribution of fighting companies was rash and disorderly. Pg. 115
The Florentine, who were on Monteselvoli, rapidly deployed their ranged infantry (protected by pavesari and some cavalry brigades) on the hills. The baggage train, carroccio and and infantry were quickly re-routed from road that led to Montalcino to that which led to Arezzo (i.e. parallel to the Montselvoli hill). Though a strong position, there was much room for the Sienese to outmanoeuvre the enemy (since the Florentine did not manage to send a strong contingent of troops to Monteropoli, a key location from which to control the movement of the Sienese). Pg. 115
The Florentine adopted a very static defence (a line which went from south to south-east compared to the position of Siena), concerned with defending positions deemed tactically and strategically fundamental (i.e. the Montesevoli hill and the MOntaperti castle). The army was deployed between the tower of Monteselvoli up to the castle of Montaperti (the line at its closest point distanced only 7kms from the walls of Siena – the Florentine cavalry was deployed as close as the small church of St. Ansano, see picture). The concentration of troops on the hill was also to avoid a cavalry attack from the South and keep an escape route
open (for it was expected that Manfred’s German knights were coming up from the road to Montalcino, attempting to block them on their way to lift the siege. This was a consequence of Florentine recon having not spotted their positions while scouting) Pg. 115
What the Florentine did not know was that Manfred’s cavalry had crossed the river and had deployed unbeknownst to the enemy in two lines ready to charge their backs on their signal. Pg. 115
On the night between the 3rd and 4th Sienese skirmisher engaged the Florentine for the entire night, keep them on high alert and preventing them from resting up. This also cajoled them in deploying their forces to face the enemy rather than withdrawing or moving on to their destination (montepulciano) Pg. 115
The morning after the Sienese deployed in front of Florentines along Monteselvoli and would destroy Florentine efforts and investments towards conquest of the city (i.e. 10000 gold Florins paid to Farinata to betray the city). Pg. 116
Their Sienese deployment was particularly effective as it anticipated the Florentine one by basing itself on the ample reports on the enemy host’s movement they obtained from Florentine Ghibelline agents and spies infiltrated within the enemy’s military apparatus. Such systems of information were a key feature of Italian warfare at the time, they collected reports given by spies who infiltrated both armies (i.e merchants who followed and resupplied the host, prostitutes, priests were able to collect important pieces of info) pg. 116
In the morning, on the carroccio bell ring, the Sienese took their position. The columns from each terzo started spreading along the Monte Rupoli and raising their banner/flags. It is said that the Florentine remained a bit surprised by the number of soldiers fielded by the Sienese. Pg. 116 – 117
Petrarcan fatalism/predestination: “sua ventura ha ciascuno del di che nasce” pg. 117 It was a hot warm day. The Sienese commander order that no signal that announces the
charge be given (no trumpet nor drums be played), rather they simply authorize the various commanders to attack Monselvoli. pg. 117
The Sienese victory depended on breaking through the centre thus preventing the much larger army from withdrawing. The Sienese infrnatry columns (made of pikemen and militiamen) advanced orderly on the enemy, preceded by their own ranged infantry protected by the shield bearers. Pg. 117
The Sienese communal, non-german mercenary and exiled Ghibelline cavalry deployed on 3 lines. These were to support the breakthrough at the centre and keep the enemy engaged in combat on the right flank. Pg. 117
The German merc cavalry instead manouvered around the Monselvoli, shadowing the enemy and bringing itself on the enemy’s left flank (ready to charge on signal). The Sienese strategy depended on the surprise attack of the German merc cavalry. Pg .117
As the Sienese move towards the Guelf, war cries and insults fill the air. To the Florentine shouts of “Piglia! Piglia!” (take it! Take it!), the Sienese -once close enough – responded “A la morte! A la morte!” (To the death! To the death!) signalling the start of their charge. Pg. 117-118
The first move consisted in a skirmish between ranged infantry, the pavesari of the Sienese and their allies advance, plant their shields and the crossbows and archers behind them start shooting on the Florentines. The Florentines and their allies respond in the same way. Pg. 118
On the left of Monte Ropoli, the Ghibelline cavalry advances at a light trot through the Arbia plains onto the slopes of Monselvoli – ready to face the Guelf cavalry already deployed in 3 lines. Pg. 118
o Rarely did knights kill each other in war, death being considered an incident of the practice of war. Nonetheless, death remained a constant fear, though repressed initially it always erupted at the first signs of the friendly army’s rout and especially as it was common costume for a knight to never flee from battle (one had to either win or die).
o After distributing the privilege of fighting in the 1st line (and supposedly allowing the potentially fictious character of Walter of Astinbergh to be the first to and face alone the Pratese captain Messer Zanobi, who he kills in a chivalrous duel, and who then proceeds to charge alone on the Guelf lines signalling the start of the action) , the Ghibelline cavalry charged onto the Guelf in tight formation. Pg. 119
o The initial lance charge (which results in the destruction of many lances) eventually turns into a horseback melee/brawl between the knights. These are then joined by the retinues and entourage inflating the magnitude of the brawl.
One the ranged skirmish ends in the centre, where no significant progress is made by neither side, the engagments becomes a very violent and brutual melee between the pikeman and infantryman of both sides. These are kept in line and are constantly incited by their captains and costringitori. Pg. 118
o The ranged infantry’s role was to weaken the first lines of the enemy lines with a constant barrage of bolts and arrows while slowly advancing by a few step with each shot (so to close the gap with the enemy). Once close enough to the enemy, the ranged infantry would open up as to allow the melee and pike infantry to engage the enemy. Pg. 120
The knights combat on the centre/left was some of most exhaustive melee action on the field. Because the Guelf cavalry manages to effectively repel the Ghibelline charges, we see that the knights 1st line of Ghibelline cavalry start withdrawing behind the second line, these last ones ready to take their place. Pg. 119-120
o The infantry columns as well follow the same pattern, as to allow fresh troops to take the field. Pg. 120
o This translates in renewed cavalry charges each time a new line enters combat. Pg. 120
The infantry lines on both side try to secure the terrain advantage (with the Sienese trying to advance over the hill’s slope while the Florentines try to hold the ground by repelling them and pushing them downwards). Pg. 120
o Everytime a sector on the line appears to stuggle, over-extend or collapse the costringitori and captain order an orderly withdrawal of the entire line, the various columns climbing back up on the hill and thus allowing each sector on the line to reform (thus protecting the integrity of the front). Pg. 120
The cavalry melee intensifies, with many noble or prestigious figures being struck down during it. It remains somewhat inconclusive however, with the violence of the combat escalating and renewed impetus being infused in the melee with each rotation of fresh soldiers. Pg. 120
o During the brawl, we see some ambitious seargent of humble stature trying to unhorse their noble and wealthy counterparts (in the hopes of capturing them and ransom them for a hefty sum). Pg. 120
At about nine however, the Guelf cavalry seems to be overcoming the Ghibelline one (as embodied by the unhorsing of Aretine Ghibelline leader Niccolo Bigozzi at the hands of Guelf
commander Aldobrandino da Pitigliano and the the trouble incurred by the heroic Walter of Astimbergh at the hands of Aldobrandino the Red). Pg. 121
o Furhtermore surrounding the carroccio was still the fresh Florentine heavy cavalry who still did not enter combat as the allied Guelf cavalry was doing so magnificently.
By the time the sun was very high, the fight had reached a position of complete stall. Suddenly, a cry fills the air. To the yell of “San Giorgio! San Giorgio!” the German cavalry, led by the count of Arras, charges at a gallop the left flank of the Guelf army. Pg. 121
o This was considered the most secure location on the entire battlefield, where the carroccio, communal bell (martinella) and the Guelf/communal standards were placed, were the Florentine heavy cavalry was waiting ready to seal the faith of their Ghibelline counterparts.
This shifted the balance of the battle: the palvesari in the centre and infantry behind them started losing composure, the Guelf cavalry was forced to withdraw and their attempts to reform were blocked from a collapse in morale (intimidated both by the continued presence of the Sienese/exiled Ghibelline cavalry and the sudden arrival of the German one). Pg 121-122
o To the shout: “Death to the Guelfs!”, all hell broke lose: pg. 122 The German cavalry charge was to be answered by the Florentine heavy cav
one. The ensuing combat resulted in the death of the Florentine captain Iacopino Rangondi da Modena, who supposedly died at the hands of the Count of Arras (his dead body being dragged on the ground by his horse).
Seeing this brutual secene many captains of the Guelfarmy, together with their retinue, start abandoning the field.
At the same time many knights on the Guelf side, conveniently re-discovering their old allegiance to the Empire, abandon the popular cause and join the enemy side (betraying their Guelf comrades on the field). In particular it was the actions of Messer Bocca degli Abati’s, who charges the Florentine Standard bearer Iacopo del Nacca of the Pazzi family cutting of his arm carrying the flag, that cause en-masse conversion of Guelf knights to the Ghibelline cause.
As well, with the fall of Florentine and Guelf standards, the remaining Florentine cavalry and much of infantry routes permanently (fearing especially the German cav’s second line charge).
The Florentine caroccio guard and some infantry columns remaining on the field, despite witnessing the route and betrayal of its comrade, fought unshakeably onto the death to protect this sacred symbol. pg. 122
o 3000 Florentine infantrymen and 50 knights forming a square around the carroccio, managed to force temporarily their way down towards the Arbia river. Yet, despite their great courage, the overwhelming enemy force surrounds and overcomes them (See Otto Frangipane di Altomena, the bell ringer, who keeps ringing the Martinella until he is hit mortally by a crossbow bolt).
Surrounded, to the yell “Niente Prigionieri” (No Prisoners!), the remaining Florentine troops were massacred. Pg. 123
o I.e. A lumberjack by the name Geppone of Val Di Biena, went in a frenzy chasing the routing Florentine troops and massacring 25 of them with his long axe.
The remaining allied militias (Orvietian, Lucchese, and Pistoians) fighting upon the hill of San Ansano were isolated from all friendlies. Their only option was to withdraw to the small castle of Montaperti. In doing so, they hoped to be able to negotiate their safe coundact.
Nonetheless the Sienese were in a blood-lust, they wanted revenge. The Guelf militias appeal were refused, and the castle defences were quickly overcome. Despite surrendering their weapons on arrival of the Sienese, and appealing for mercy, the Guelf were butchered by the Sienese. Pg. 123-124
o Despite this, Ghibelline “magnamity” spared many survivors and at a later date these were allowed to return to their hostile communes (the author then says that ironically these were to participate at the great Ghibelline defeat at Campaldino).
o The author proceeds to suggest that this was as ephemeral victory (and not a real triumph) and suggests that only the massacre of the Guelphs would have permanently archived their challenge to the righteous order.
-Consequences of Montaperti
The mercenaries in Guelf employment (i.e. Bazacape of Milan and the berrovieri) betrayed their employers, striking down those routing out of anger and taking weapons, horses, armour or anything of value (thus not even bothering to capture any prominent hostage). Pg. 124
Casualities: pg. 125o Villani, little number of guelf knights fell (for they avoided the charge of German cav
and also switched sides conveniantely). Those who suffered the most were the Florentine infantrymen, the Lucchese and Orbietani. 2500 were killed, 1500 cap (including many prominent Florentines)
o Marchionne Stefani and Leonardo Aretino: 4000 prisoners and 3000 dead.o Buonincontri: 4600 dead, 4600 capture.o Anonymous Pisan author: between dead and capped mas o meno 6000. o The Sienese Hagiographic bulletins records about 10000 dead and 20000
captured/wounded. The Obittarium Ecclesia Snensis says that over 10000 were killed, more than
15000 were captured, 4000 escapedo Chronicon de rebus in Italia gestis: 8000 dead and 10000 prisioner and 30000
captured beasts of burden. o A Florentine bulletin tells us 1200 were killed, 11000 were captured (of which 8000
perished in prison). 20000 beasts of burden were captured. o Mountauri: 600 prisoners from Cole di Valdelsa, 800 from San Gimigniano, 900 from
San miniato, 1000 from Volterra, 700 from Prato, 800 from Pistoia, the Aretine were 1550, Orivetians 1350, Pittigliano 400, Florence and Lombardy 2400 (other 10000 prisoner equate to the usual inflated sum given by hagiographic Sienese sources.)
-Il Rinascimento e La Crisi Militare Italiana
pg 205
-Medieval warfare suffered well known inefficiecies which prevented the development of well-fleshed out military tactics and strategy and ultimately did not allow for operations of resolutionary characters (thus prevented states from using their armies to decisively impose their will on their enemy).
Pg 207
-Features of medieval battle
Very limited in size 3, 5, 10, 15000 men are fighting on the battlefield at one time (at Bouvines, one of most important battles of age, its was 5000 combatants vs 8000).
Medieval armies are very mobiles because of their dimension and because of the great use of cavalry.
Mobility nonetheless is onstrained by continuous obstacles (bad roads, litte bridges, vast sways of forest and swampy lands.
Large amounts of castles in a state’s territory (especially around key travel areas) which prevent easy passage and out-manouvering the enemy since all must be taken by lengthy siege/costly assault. Movement further llimited by by natural obstacles.
-Because of this feature a defensive stategy/tactic is superior to an offensive one. Fedual cavalry is powerless to fortified areas (regardless if permanent castles or temporary fortified encampments). Medieval artillery (i.e. catapults or scorpions) and siege machines are improvised instrument of little effectiveness.
Because of this, if the enemy refuses an enagement on the open fields there is no actual way to force him into open battle.
As such war could be a very time consuming enterprise charachterised by frequent sieges and blockades of fortified positions.
-The objective of sieges was to cut off the enemy food supplies however medieval host were to small to surround effectively a city (even the small ones of the 12th and 13th century).
As such hosts were limited to place their camp next to the target, hoping to force a city gate or portion of the walls in the early days of the siege. If not forced to blockade the city through frequent day and night raids on enemy contado to prevent provisioning of the city.
Pg. 208
-Meanwhile enemies sorties are frequent and effective, during them the wooden siege weapons are burnt . Furthermore defenders still manage effectively to smuggles provisions and reinforcement in city gates.
-The besieging armies as such depend on the frequent betrayal, defection and interenal revolution by the besieged populations who exploit them to gain access to the city and intervene deceisively against the population.
-Feudual armies maintain their levies raised for periods of 3 to 6 months – with most, especially the knights, going back home by the onset of the bad seasons.
-Medieval warfare would require long, exhaustive campaigns that would make them essentially wars of attrition. However, armies are raised effectively for few weeks – their temporary nature further caused by factors like frequent defection, absence of provision, epidemics, political contention between its components. The attacking army would require a rapid and decisive victory through open battle while the enemy can withdraws to its fortification imposing on the attacker a slow war of attrition.
-Battles furthermore lack the strategic decisiveness characteristic of latter ones, wit the losing defender withdrawing to city walls and preventing/frustrating the enemy’s post victory designs. After battles, furthermore, the attacker’s army will often be reduced in number forcing him to besiege the enemy’s fortification with a smaller amount of people.
-Open field battles as well do not occur according to a rigorous tactical rationality. Their exists no well disciplined individual corps capable of adapting their order/tactic in accordance to their commander’s orders.
They are a loose grouping of soldiers - their number, material quality and tranining/discipline very different from one soldier to another.
Pg 209
The army’s horsmen fights on a single line – during battle, the two factions’ cavalry are deployed on the other. They intitially advance by trotting towards each other and, once close, they break into a gallop. They rarely manage to maintain formation, fractioning by the time they come into contact with one another.
Those most courageous and with better horse are generally the first to engage, chosing their individual adversary and engaging him.
Battle is thus reduced in a series of individual engagement, coordinated action (that occurring by an individual’s command) does not exist.
Individual attendants (stipendiaries or squires) then intervene at the aid of their masters, collecting him if wounded and joining into the melee between knights with maces, crossbows, or swords. Generally however only the attendants on one side intervene and only towards the end of the combat in aid of their nearly victorious master. These proceed to strike the final blow on wounded enemies, loot the field, and collect/deliver prisoners.
o Rarely do these interevene at the start of the combat, since knightly ethic prescribes that only knights fight among themselves, however they premature end of their employer might result in the attendant’s financial ruin.
o Rarely do knights and attendants fight altogether as a unit, the latter as flanking fighters (cacciatori). And an engagement never does start with an attendant’s melee.
-An army is made of 2 or 3 large squadrons but they do not act as a well coordinated organism nor does any possess the function of reserve with pre-established duties (Carefully studied and determined).
Factions’s squadron proceeds to engage their respective counterpart, one after the other (1 st
v 1st, 2nd v 2nd, 3rd v 3rd). This engagement between corresponding squadrons followed the whole philohophy of the
duel and judgement of God. For Villani it was very surprising when Charles of Anjou moves his second line to reinforce
the 1st one rather than enganging the enemy’s second line.
Pg 210
The whole idea of battle as a duel between two factions, which outcome is determined by the judgement of God, was so entrenched in medieval conceptions of warfare that the two armies established an agreed date and place for their confrontation.
Battle generally lasted 1 to 3 hours. There was no complex strategic or tactical philosophy to the engagement: such things required order and disciplined troops truly used and willing to follow their commanders orders (something which feudal individualism prevented). A destructive action also required a more ample and effective use of missile weapons, a more defensive attitude by the soldier, and an attempt to seek to conclude rapidly and decisively all individual engagement between knights (rather than allow each individual duel to carry on).
-Decisive battles which decide the destiny of a kingdom/state were rare and an exception to the general rule (like that between Charles D’Anjou and Manfred Hohenstaufen). As well - as the old aphorism goes - it is unlikely that a kingdom, which ended because of a single defeat in battle, did collapse only because of such military occurrence (Manfred’s kingdom was plagued by internal revolts).
Pg 211
The emphasis on sieges, blockades, plundering and devastation of the contado was also a product of the backwards nature of medieval conomy (with feudal knights having to provision themselves and their retinue with the necessary equipment and provisions), feudal individualism and communal particularism. This make warfare a very imperfect and contingent tool.
In Italy, armies and warfare are influenced by the peninsula’s unique realities but are not a mechanical spasm. The above factors are anaylzed by human intellect and are consciously exploited to achieve ultimate victory. Also the entire enterprise is still influenced by the fact that it is a shared human activity and thus is able to possess certain tactical and strategical principles which are largely shared in general by various societies, Delbruck)
Everywhere in the country, there exist cities full of exuberant citizens over which no feudal lord, king or emperor can impose his will over them.
Pg 212
The cities have great defensive capacities, cpable to withstand large scale offensive, but lack offensive capacity.
If on the field their cavalry is inferior to German imperial one, the Italian dismounted knight are as, if not more, effective when defending the walls.
Communal infantry, though still an auxiliary body on the open field, when behind city walls and animated by the spirit
PRO ARIS ET FOCIS (“For God and country" or literally "For altars and
hearths") is a very powerful force. In such cases, when besieged inside city walls, the communal militia do not suffer the same time constraint to their service as an expeditionary force would.
As well, communes loyal to the emperor, start receiving sovereignity over imperial castles of the area so that, by the time of Fredrick II, communes are fortified power houses with secure and exclusive of passageways and travel routes in their territory.
-The Italian landscape influences the military of German emperors first and later influences the communal armies themselves.
Barbarossa and Fredrick II initially extended the duration of military service of levies. Later they increase the number of hired knights (who become more intimately connected
with the emperor since he pays their wages) who are able to serve for longer periods. Their longer stay at arms increases their discipline through experience.
Pg 213
Such changes were pioneered to better cater to the war of attrition, it allowed armies to maintain sieges for longer, to maintain them also during the winters and to launch sustained and continuous raids through the contado regardless of the season. It required an enormous financial investment however (one which neither the Empire nor the kingdom of Sicily could sustain) and these could be easily bribed to fight against their original employer (especially by the communes who possessed a large and continuous cash flow).
-This need for longer standing soldiers could be offset by the development of better siege weapons but this did not really depend by the good will of a well disposed monarch but by larger technical and technological breakthroughs (yet to occur). Even after the intro of gun powder, it took a further 2 centuries to develop the gamechanging gun-powder based siege weapons.
Pg 214
During the communal period, the missile weapon was one that was used only from a distance. It served to delay the enemy and thus had a inextricable defensive capacity. Melee weapons instead where prevalently associated with offensive duty, with and through them an army could launch a short and decisive attack on the enemy.
Fredrick II, a strategically brilliant but tactically poor leader, had a light infantry made of Saracen archer from the Saracen colony of Lucera. These, little in number – around 7000 -, were armed exclusively with a bow meaning that they could not be used as an assault core but as an auxiliary body exclusively.
The communes, especially the Lombard ones, had by comparison a much better infantry capable of challenging the imperial cavalry
I.e. Legnano, the communal infantry rallied around the carroccio in tight formation withstood the german charge and allowed the routing Italian cavalry to re-form and counterattack the German flanks.
The Infantry themselves counterattacked in the centre. Thus the infantry became a body which could resist the much more mobile one on the open field and could counter-attack if engaged by them and in conjunction with other corps.
Not yet an infantry which can engage alone and directly the cavalry. Not a levee en masse but a selected core made of aritisans, shopkeepers, petty bourgeoisie.
Pg 215
Not yet made of various corps with specific tactical purposes. However, the army is recruited from a territorial system based on the city’s districts, the district leaders acting as the de-facto officers, making it much more than a randomly grouped body of infantry recruited en masse.
Furthermore it possesses in the carroccio a stable collection/fallback point around which the army’s tactical action can be organized.
The body forms a single compact square, its soldiers carry are both armed with a shield and short spear (2-3 m top)
Its main function is defensive, it delays the imperial cavalry pursuit and allows the routed communal cavalry to rally itself for a counter attack. It makes up a second line that supports the cavalry frontline.
o The formation at Legnano was: imperials – 2 lines, cavalry vanguard, bulk of cavalry. Communal forces – 3 lines, cavalry vanguard, bulk of cavalry, infantry with carroccio. The relative presence and absence of the 3rd infantry line in the two formations ultimately decides the day.
o Infantry action passive and delaying. VICTORY AT LEGNANO IS DETERMINED BY COMBINED AND COORDINATED USE OF BOTH
CORPS.
-Thus the fundamental development pioneered by the communal armies in the 13 th century is the development of a 3rd infantry line to armies which were primarily made of 2 lines of cavalry (vanguard and bulk).
Pg 216
-Inferiority of communal cavalry is compensated by the meticulous use of infantry and cavalry in combined and coordinated actions (both bodies, if used in isolation, would be however considerably fragile/weak). Together, these two bodies could face and defeat on the open field the powerful feudal armies.
-The other development that characterised communal armies of the 13th century was the integration of a greater number of missile units (primarily crossbowmen, who shot at slower rates but where firing a much more precise, and powerful/penetrating, bolt) within their ranks
This further relegates the infantry to a passive role. Rather than attempting to engage rapidly and resolutely the bulk of ranged shooters who chip at one’s force – communal armies start to amass ever-greater numbers of shooters, trying to outdo the enemy through superior firepower, and by placing them behind the pavesi (a large man sized shield which could be fixed to the ground) which acted as mobile cover.
We see that the specialization of a portion of the infantry as missile infantry entailed as well different forms of specialization for the remaining footsoldier. The remaining infantryman no longer carry short spear and shield but ever longer two-handed spears called in Italian lanzalong or gialda or known in Flanders as pike. The large shields mentioned above becaome the standard issue equipment of the remaining portion of the infantry, these are in charge of fixing said shield to the ground and thus to protect not only himself but also the pikeman and crossbowman paired with him.
This subdivision in roles of the infantry is not an attempt to transform it in a body capable of enganging and resisting more effectively the enemy cavalry nor one to be able to face the growing integration of sharpshooters within communal ranks (pikeman are not made to charge enemy shooters in a decisive and speedy way – they are to hide behind the shields of the pavesi bearers).
Pg 217
The infantry as well is split in 3 to 4 squares but this division has no tactical logic to it (since they are all grouped in the same second line).
-A new cavalry reserve line placed behind the infantry emerges and engages the corresponding enemy cavalry line. This new line again confers to the cavalry the preminence on the battlefield.
-As the petty bourgeoisie is eroded and either integrated in the higher trade or in the industrial proletariat we see that a growing number of infatryman is made of members of lower orders (true plebs) or from the contado. These are all poorly integrated in formation which lack the same civic zeal and pride of the older units. As a result only pavesari, crossbowmen and pikemen start developing greater degrees of professionalism.
Such improvements however have a short life span, they reach their apogee with Montecatini (in 1315) and by Altopascio in 1325 they have fallen in disuse (with the infantry square being made of exclusively pikeman, and not the aforementioned combination of troops).
It is surprising that the decline of communal infantry happens in the 2nd half of the 13th century after the military system of commune has been reformed resulting in the introduction of city companies and recruitment via military districts. However the new system is largely modelled on the prior informal ones which collected soldiers by vicinity and streets. Meanwhile, the city companies become nothing more but policing units which keep security within the city. Mercenaries do most of the campaigning.
If we understand modern infantry corps as not only being able to resist but also to engage independently enemy cavalry then no Italian communal infantry was able to conform to this standard of modernity. With and after Legnano, communal infantry’s were only able to fulfil the first part of the parameter – not the second. With the progressive decadence of the commune as a politicial form (and the erosion of its constitution) we see that its military forms (especially the communal infantry) start to faulter. Pg 218-219
The infantry corps has its already defensive nature emphasized by the new developments. Such occurrence further highlights the importance of fighting from fortified or advantegous positions. Between the difficulties of besieging a locality and the fact that rarely could an absolute victory be won on the field, the growing defensiveness made it nearly impossible to exploit any success had on the field. This further excerbated the attrition aspect of the wars of the period by extending the campaigns duration through lengthy sieges. Pg 220
-With endemic warfare and long campaign the internal unity of the communes was eroded, the general tiredness combined with demands for fairer division of military burdens and loot led to the rise of new forms of governance like the signory. Pg 220-221
Furthermore, the essentially defensive character of communal armies worked strategically and was ideologically viable until their conflict with the emperor remained a defensive struggle against imperial expeditions which sought to curtail communal autonomy. With the death of the emperor, a sudden vacuum of power emerges in the peninsula which allows the commune to expand at the expense of their neighbours and thus go on the offensive (requiring a new type of army). Pg 221
-Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European states
-Cities are regional economies, aroiund every urban cluster or gentres lies a zone of agriculture and trade (ans sometime manufacturing) that interacts with it. When capital accumulation and
concentration occurs together we have urban growth and the development of hierarchy between large centrers and smaller ones develop. Pg. 18
-Cities depend on others to raise their food and fuel. Pg. 18
-Those who calimed to rule in city-states often managed to exercise tight control over a single city and its immediate hinterland. Beyond that scale however they had no choice but to bargain with the authorties of competing centers. Even when Florance launches it aggressive expansion beyond municipal level, its leaders replaced the rulers of conquered with their own men (but these replacement were slected among the local patrician class). Thus their did not exist a mechanism through which to impose complete control over conquered city, rather considerable power and autonomy left to local potentates who were favoured by the conquerors. PG. 25
-Indirect rule/conquest system which often resulted in disloyalty, dissimulation, corruption and rebellion. Pg. 25
-No one deisgned principal components of national state (i.e. administration, treasuries, courts) these were all inadvertent by product of efforts to ccarry out more immediate tasks, especially the creation and support of armed forces. Other state especially, through competition and conflict, strongly affected the path of change followed by an particular state. Pg. 26
-The crucial matter, for cities to a region to achieve dominance, was a central position in the European network of trade, production, and capital accumulation. Pg. 47-48
J.C. Russell (and De Vries, though he provide a different ranking of cities) determined that the cities of Italy were denser and the region they dominated were smaller.
For Italy the regions of Venice (357,000 inhabitants), Milan (337,000 people), and Florence (296,000) dominated the pack.
The Mediterranean lands also hosted significantly more cities than those bordering the Altantic or Baltic.
-Financial advantage of statesthat operated in regions of abundant capital. Pg. 51
-Militar up to 14th century revolved around idea of patrimonialism: rulers drew armed forces from retainers, vassals, and militias who owed them serve (but with significant contractual limit). This had a correspondent economic apparatus there they general extracted capital needed as tribute or rent lands and populations under their control. This status would given to a system based on brokerage: militarily this meant that nations turned increasingly to mercenary forces supplied to them by contractors who retained considerable freedom of action, economically this meant that rulers growingly relied heavily on formally independent capitalists for loans, for management of revenue-producing enterprises and for collection by taxes (i.e. ascension of independent contractors). Pg. 53
-The military apparatus of states strongly defined by the “physiology” of state. By physiology, it is meant that the process by which a state acquires and allocates the means of carrying on their major activities. For most of history, the crucial means were coercive, the means of war. Coercive means obviously played a part in war-making (attacking external rivals), statemaking (attacking internal rivals), and protection (attacking the enemies of the state’s client). Pg. 54
To retain a monopoly over coercion (that is to retain exclusive control over that armed force of men who know how to use weapons), states have:
o Made the production of weapons an esoteric craft, which involves rare materials and substantial capital.
o Allowed only few groups with the independent capacity to mobilize large numbers of men.
o Limited the number of people who are able to access the secrets of how to combine effectively weapons with men.
-Military style of armed forces (which doubles as a police force against transgression of demobilized retinues of lords, bandits and state sanctioned pirates) pg. 55:
Monarchicalo Kings rarely had many more troops under direct control than their chief follower.o The logistics of feeding and maintain an army made it hard if nto impossible to
establish a permanently standing one.o Royal army were made generally by a small permanent retinue of the king
augmented by temporary levies he recruited from his civilian pop.o His presence created a personal connection among warriors and was generally
required on campaign (regardless of age, i.e. Otto III was 11 in campaign against Saxon).
o Royal army lived on requisition (technically items taken an repaid by monarchical treasury) and plunder but rarely was the dinstiction clear-cut/respected.
Citieso Organized citizen militias which acted primarily as a defensive and policing force and
would be summoned now and then to fight battles against the enemies of the city or its liege.
o But an engine of autonomy and advancement of personal interest (used to wrest themselves free from liege/royal authority and later to expand ruling class’s interests).
-Italian city-state begin their trajectories in the presence of substantial capital concentrations of capital but weak, intermittent armed force, only gradually moving toward permanent, concentrated military establishments. Pg. 60
-The position of cities within market hierarchies (i.e. international markets, regional markets, exclusively local markets) correlated with their size, their demographic impact on their hinterlands, the extent of their capital accumulation and their ability to build up and control an extended sphere of influence. It is only through such position on the market that they can retain their pre-eminence and hence autonomy. Pg. 60-61
-International connections also cut through city-states in Italy and these often articulated with domestic politics. Pg 163
13th century Florence for example divided bitterly over allegiance to the pope or the emperor. The struggles countied until the victorious Black Guelfs would exiles the White ones (including Dante).
In 1311 the Black guelfs would obliterated from the street of Florence the mean representation of the imperial eagle.
During the 13th and 14th century Florence would would devot an important parts of its public life to receive the princes and ambassadors of all Europe.
-Deductive argument from pg. 190 (explicit in page 65): because this was a time were commercialization and capital accumulation in the Italian peninsula were not overhwlemingly
concentrated among few agents, Florence did not have necessarily a definite war-making advantage over Siena. Furthermore smaller states existed still in a situation were the expenses they ran for defending themselves (were success in war did not yet depend on ever larger armies, heavy artillery, and extensive fortification – as it would later on) were yet to exhaust their available resources
-The concerns of the state pg. 131-2:
Armed men form states by accumulating and concentrating their means of coercion within a given territory, by creating an organization that is at least partially distinct from those that govern production and reproduction in the territory by seizing coopting or liquidating other concentrations of coercion within the same territory, by defining boundaries, and by excercising jurisdiction within those boundaries.
As rulers form states, they and their agent consumer large quantities of resources, especially resources that lend themselves to military applications: men, arms, transport, food. The key concern of the authorities is to extract these essential resources (which can be found throughout their domain, among their society’s organization and conventions) while ensuring that someone will reproduce and yield similar resources in the future.
Florence in the 13th century, through is merchants and rrentier, managed to extract quite effectively such resources by excersing extensive control over land, production and trade in its contado (making more of a metropoli than Genoa for example).
The higher a city’s market position, the more likely that anyone building up concentraed force had to negotiate with the capitalists based there or even be on of them. The great the city’s economic control fo the hinterland, the lss likely a separate group of landlords would serve as the city-s counterweight or enemy in an process of state formation.
In early state formation in Europe, a city that dominated its own hinterland and occupied an international market position had a strong probability of constituting it own autonomous state, whether a city-state like Milan or a city-empire like Venice.
-Greci, Eserciti Cittadini e Guerra nell’Eta di Federico II
-Emphasis on fragmented network of cities of Padania (the area between Milan and Bologna). These by then shared many sensibilities, socio-political institutions and were connected through stable connections. This also was one of the principal war theatres for Fredrick II. Pg. 344
-Academic emphasis on communal militias of the 12th century when their apparition heralded important changes in fighting styles (in Medieval Europe) and also translated in the political self-affirmation of Italian cities.
-The first half of 13th century was historiographically assessed as the middle-age for Italian communal militia: a period of little military change/significance which stood between the days of the heroic militiamen who defeated Barbarossa (i.e. the rise of the communal militia) and the later mercenary crisis (the downlfall). An unfair criticism for the author, war during this period had a significant impact on Italian military and societal institutions. Pg. 345
-13th century militia system: pg. 345-347
A generalized system of military obligations which seeks to mobilize all eligible males through a district subdivision of the city (i.e. by nearest gate or by neighbourhood).
o Allowed for an effective mobilization of troops, by dividing the city in district and mobilizing a number of these based on the threat presented by the enemies to the city, war did not bring the economic life of the city to a standstill.
o It entailed the centralization of certain military practices/organizational aspects - for example the equipping of soldiers, and mantainance of such arms and armours during war, was brought under governmental authority
New features which appear in such a system in first half o 13th century ( as recorded in Bolognese document, like the communal statues of 1245-67 or the “atti alle armi”):
o The extension of military obligation to all males within a specific age range (i.e. 18-70 or 15-70 for Florence) and the introduction of specific groups exempt from service (those who suffered physical disabilities or were permanently sick, those absent because of prior unshakable commitment – had to however provide a substitute), those with socially privileged jobs – teachers, both those of higher education and elementary schools, and ecclesiastics),
o New laws and statutes which determined not only methods of recruitment of city but also established the roles individuals would have during military service – this came with prescriptions that determined the equipment of the conscripts, their function and position in the combat unit. Such individuals were also placed firmly under the command of officers appointed by civic authorities.
o The extension of the district system of the city to the contado, with the contado being subdivided along the same geographic lines as the city districts (i.e. each city district had a correspondent contado district).
o The establishment of mechanism which led to the formation of a military bureaucracy capable of registering precisely and systematically military affiars. Proof of high level of organization reached.
An incongruency between theory and practice: rarely was full potential of system mobilized nor did the highly organized structure mandated/introduced by statutory norms results in an effective/practical military advancement.
o The new features in themselves did no represent a major breakthrough compared to the rest of peninsula.
o The innovative organization would only be more incisive if there was better coordination among citizen armies yet this was strongly hindered by the political bonds and dynamics of the time.
-Regarding limiting of potential inherent to military apparatus of citizen armies: pg. 348
The military (i.e. manpower) capacity of the contado was more hypothetical than real.o A product of the feudal-city conflict, in much of the contado local land-lords
retained strong control over areas which were under the city’s sphere of influence. To bring such localities into the fold, city authorities often had to strike deal with the local signeurs in which the latter were granted considerable concessions (given ample control of sectors of contrado) in exchange for military support. i.e. the Malaspina’s and the commune of Piacenza in 1212 or the Frignano family and Bologna in 1234.
The frequency and type of conflict between pro-imperial and anti-imperial cities – i.e. short and partial campaigns in which speed was privileged and were thus generally fought by citizen cavalryman - creates a disparity in practice and skill between contingents which were continusoly mobilized and those which were left at home. Thus only communal cavalryman, who were more likely to be called to arms, developed an espirt de corps. Such binding spirit however could not be found among composite and mixed armies which included a cavalry and infantry element.
-Scarce existence of practical stimulus/spirit that could lead to military breakthroughs: pg. 348-349
Military innovations and breakthrough did not really depend on the circulation of German/imperial knowledge or bookish know-how. These were rather the product of a practical experience gained during war (something which Italian cities were in a privileged position to gain because of frequent and uninterrupted conflict which plagued the peninsula) pursued by an intellectually/economically maturing population.
o No real progress in military practice of cities of the peninsula caused by the employment of
siege weapons/machine by Fredrick II’s armies. These did not consist in a major breakthrough military breakthrough in battles and sieges, cities were still won through blockades or betrayal.
o Actually it would be more accurate to ascribe the perfectioning/improvement of war machine to Italians, albeit these were not major breakthroughs.
o Having said this, even when witnessing for example the superior siege machines of the Bolognesese, the Parmesi after winning and capturing these machines at the battle of San Cesario did not seek to understand and rporduce these machines, they rather kept them as a war trophy.
No real progress in fighting tactics of citizen army since absence/scarcity of large fielded set-piece battles (those which generally generate new practical intuitions that subverts consolidated conventions): tendentially war between cities collapsed into small skirmishes, large brawls, sieges, and devastation of enemy territory.
o The few larger field battles, like Cortenuova, also signal -rather than an improvement - a set-back. The aforementioned battle occured in such absolute chaos that even the basic tactical scheme of Legnano (that which won the militia renown) was worsened.
-Regarding the prescriptions of the time: pg.349-350
Bolognese statutes did not reflect military/tactical needs of the time rather an attempt to impose a centralized authority of ruling echelons along disciplinarian and economics lines.
o When it considers the neighbourhoods as the basic fighting unit (each with their own cavalry, infantry and corresponding officers/commander), the statutes highlight how each unit might fight and maintain maximum cohesion during battles. If one were to abandon unjustifiedly his comrades or officers on the battlefield he would stand to gain no indemnity if harmed or injured. This need for cohesions was camouflaged as a tactical need, in reality however it served to ensure that citizens remained on the field.
o As well, battle order often appear to have take the form of: cavalry contingent -> infantry contigents -> cavalry contingents. This seems to absolutely contradict the tactical needs of the time, which privileged speeds,by locking a slower contingent in the middle of two faster ones (effectively slowing down the closing cavalry contingent).
-Cities suffered when it came to politico-military coordination of their war-effort when left to their own devices (excessive infracity conflict/disagreement). Pg. 351
-The willingness of some cities to deploy their army under the aegis of another city’s carroccio sided with insistence to fight alongside an ally but under their own carroccio shows that in the Italian peninsula there was still a mixed reception to the idea military-political on a grand scale. The
Lombard League, not groundwork for permanent confederation rather a pragmatic alliance vs. imperial encroachment. Pg. 351-2
The excessive political autonomy and scarce cohesion of the League (born from the differing the political aspirations and objectives among each member-city) translated in its military inefficiency.
Not anymore merely a desire to protect their immediate autonomy from common external threat, rather all had differente economic interest and conflicting expansionary ambitions.
-Military efficieny further harmed by inter-citizen political conflicts, the social dynamism of the city (combined with the absence of an stable political order) generated political turmoil where various orders attempted to impose their hegemony. Pg. 352-3
When no compromise/accommodation was found (Cremonese pacification of first decade of 1200s, or the Milanese constitution reform of 1214), entire factions would be exiled/abandon the city depriving a city of part of its military forces (often it was the precious cavalrymen) or exposing it to external attacks born from the plotting of the exile with rival cities.
This remained a major threat to integrity/health of citizen armies. Could cause en masse desertion of a portion of troops, belonging to a particular faction, while on campaign. I.e.in 1228, while the Bolognese army was en route to siege Bazzano, a portion of the infantry belonging to the popular class left the host against the Potestata’s orders.
The growing importance and change in cavalry and especially in horse archers in communal armies, pg. 354
First change was the product of the introduction of the crossbow. Unlike for infantry, who kept using bows well into 13th century, horseman completely substituted bows for crossbows from the 1220s.
The rise of horse archers is communal armies not born from Fredrick II use of sarcens, an elite body of horse archers. Documents attests the existence of such bodies in Italy prior to Fredrick II’s ascension (i.e. 1190s documents)
-The adoption of crossbow and presence of siege machines as well resulted in changes in the armour and personal defence of soldiers (which in turn changed individual expenses of war): pg. 354
New armours had to protect a soldier from enemy projectiles while also guaranteeing the mobility of the soldier (regardless if on foot or on horse).
Documents of the 13th century attest this widespread diffusion of more practical and more effective armour (those composed by separate pieces which were lighter, flexible and less encumberant). However this transition started staking place already at the end of the 12 th century.
We see that the traditional hosbergum (a chain mail shirt which extended to most of the body - i.e. alone it covered head and arms through a hood and sleeves – and paired with chain mail leggings - gambiere de maliis) ends up being paired the new panceria (a smaller and lighter body armor which was combined with the capirone et cirotecis ferries”).
-The defensive armour of a soldier depended on the soldier’s role and his financial capacities and was determined according to precise guidelines issued by communal authorities Pg. 355-56
In the 1250 statutes of Bologna: An infantryman who had an estimo of more than 200 lira had to have a hosbergum. One with an estimo between 100 lire and 200 had to have a
panceria. Those who had less were allowed a more simple equipment according to more loose regulations (i.e. ‘alia arma’ among which we can find pieces of armour made with some piece metal but also cloth and wood and offensive weapons which consisted in everyday harvesting tool, i.e. wood axes, cleavers).
At the starts of the century of the 13th century, an infantryman belonging to the average income bracket usually had a defensive equipment which included the panceria.
Wealthier infantryman generally gcould afford the hobsbergum, as their cavalry counterparts could, such element distinguished them as wealthier both at the start of the century and after/by the 1250s.
After the 1250s howoever the average infantryman was armed with the typical equipment of a member of the armed companies of the peoples. Such loadout as well was very common among cavalryman from the 1290s. The loadout included: panceriam, casetum et colaretum de ferro, baciletum cum nasal or capellam de ferro, schineriaas or gamberias.
This last feature seems to suggest that the infantry had a strong influence over the cavalry. Also not merely a simple adoption by the latter of the former more effective style’s, rather it seems to suggest the the popular party and its members had hegemonized/monopolized the entirety of the citizen militia apparatus.
-On the popular faction and its impacts upon military organization: pg. 356
The armed (popular) companies became a fundamental constitutional instrument to maintain many of the newly established orders among Italian cities. These were made primarily by populares/pedites.
The cavalry, which grew in importance during the conflict with the German emperor, saw its ranks largely expanded thus including many more social classes compared to the original order of the milites. With such expansion in access by 1291 it became fundamental to impose precise military obligations on the cavalryman (something which was unthinkable prior to 1250 with the old miles since military service was considered the natural and basic function/role of the knight).
-Thus by 1st half of 13th century we have a military force made of an infantry belonging to the popular faction which, though still tactically important, falls a bit in disuse (because of the nature of conflict) and becomes more of an internal policing instrument (establishing autonomous societies of arms, companies which existed parallel to the rest of the citizen army). We know also see the rise of a much more socially diverse cavalry corps whose practices/being are/is standardized by communal authorities. Pg. 356
-The more aristocratic knights attempt to impose clear distinction between their class and the growing number of non-noble equites (whose pretensions grew as they performed the same military function of the aristrocratic knights). This was an attempt to prevent the impact changing military dynamics were having on the political landscape of society. Pg. 356-7, 363
This was achieved by introducing laws which postulated a generic social and heredityary privilege knights had and, in light of this, the non-extension of fiscal privileges to the non-noble cavalryman could be justified.
The above attempt at restriction entailed the development of precise techniques of military and fiscal registraction that ended up prescribing precise and uncommutable military olbligations.
-Modification of military apparatus where born and rooted in the need to use violence for political necessity. Pg. 357
The new model army will abandon the usual venticinquine and decine and would be organized around the highly politicized societies of arms (giving the army evermore the function of a political police).
This new configuration, plus the relative exile or alienation of a portion of the city’s military force in light of their political views, as well encouraged the adoption and employment of professional soldiers with no attachment to local politics.
-On rise of mercs: pg. 358-60
A growing practice throughout the 1200s which become a consolidated custom by the end of the century.
The growth of phenomenon depended on availability of competent soldier. A phenomenon facilitated by important cultural shifts occurring between 12th and 13th centuries: nobles, who remained the most military experienced and competent stratum of the population, start to equiperate the possession of wealth to land holding within their ethical codes and this allows them to reconcile mercenary service with their morals.
The imperial armies, because of its frequent wars along vast sways of territory, has to constantly fallback on mercenary troops from the 1240s onwards. These were primarily german mercenary knihts paid either with the resources of the kingdom of siciliy or through adhoc financial dispositions or through loans struck by the king with privates (i.e. Roman bankers). If this is true then imperial military patterns did not herald/influence Italian ones military wise, since in Italy the presence of merc in the peninsula and hiring of merc militias by cities is a well attested phenomenon (with documents going back to the prior century).
o Facilitated by demand of wealthy cities for competent fighters controlled by non-military social classes.
o Facilitated by the economic necessities of large number of expert milites in Italy who are inclined to put their services on the market.
Examples:o 1197, Milan supplies Genova with 50 citizen horseman for 3 months at the rate of
50 soldi per month (plus travel expenses). o This was not merely done out of solidariety to Genova, Milanese horsemen were
found in employment by pro-imperial Piedmontese cities (that is in service of cities which went against traditional and official Milanese policy).
In most contract great landed lords often appear to offer said merc service to Italian cities or other lander lords in Italy(see contract between Tommaso I of Savoia and Genova in 1215, count Manuel di Ventimglia and Genova in 1220, the Catalonians sent by Alfonso X of Castiglia to the Marquis of Monferrato or the imperial German cavalryman sent to Ezzelino da Romano)
-There exists a considerable shared military knowledge base between imperial and citizen armies, one which results in similar practice, techniques, and military culture among the two competing sides (i.e. chroniclers of the times describes the armies of the two sides with a shared terminology and with great naturalness). Pg.360
-The military apparatus however is also influence by unique socio-political-economic realities of two different types of society. Thus it is unlikely that organizational method suitable for Fredrick II’s
military needs could be imposed/adopted by cities with cities (who likely had/required a more advanced system of organization). Pg. 360-61
The empire’s military lacked the same advances logistical and administrative apparatuses that the cities had:
o war financing and supply could only be extracted by the immediate presence of the emperor with his army (i.e. Creamona in 1238), he then took only what was sufficient for the short-term functioning of the army (i.e. supplies for 4 months).
o This system does not appear able to finance the army with a regular and sufficient resource necessary for the functionin of the army throughout an entire campaign.
o This system was not viable for cities.
-Absence of a war-centered/mongering ideology/conception/values both in empire and city during the conflict with Fredrick II: the conflict is qualified by Fredrick II as a “iuris execution” and battle/fighting remained a non-loved “necessitas” (a dispute over rights). The office of the Podesta himself (both communal and imperial one) is not emphasized as a military (even if he did perform military functions). His was a judicial office (the military of a city was subordinate to the judicial power), his duty (as advanced within a Cremones request for an imperial Podesta) was to ensure public peace through resolution of conflict/quarrel thus ensuring superior justice. As the Parmese Podesta Enrico Testa shows, the military obligations of the Podesta were of secondary importance compared to his civic responsabilities (he was a civic officer first, who descended on the battlefield only when required of him), Pg. 361-2
-Abbandonment in the city of the more spontaneous military organization that dones by city gates or neighbourhood in favour of the a more centralized organization (which came with a more precise and ecompassing administrative/bureaucratic apparatus and the impositions of well-defined financial hierarchies). Pg. 363
-The military potential of the armies of the cities of the time (which were not an institution which reflected merely military realities of the time, these were strongly affected by the socio-political realities of the city) suffers the most from socio-political instability born from the overturning of old but stable social order and the incapacity by new government to re-establish social stability within their cities. The manifestation of contrasting political ambitions between the inhabitants of the city ultimately encourages the ever-greater employment of merc militias. Pg. 363
-JCM VIGUER, Cavalieri e Cittadini
-Exercitus includes the entire male population: both knights/cavalryman and amples amounts of specialized infantry. Infantry however also takes part in those more limited operations (speditiones or cavalcate) which were fought primarily by cavalryman. Pg 65
-As concluded by Pieri, Infantry had primarily a defensive role throughout the pitched battles of the duecento until Altopascio. There are efforts, albeit timid ones, in which military authorities attempt to coordinate the operations of the two bodies into unified offensives – an attempt to stimulate initiative among infantrymen which ceases completely by the start of the next century (and is again jumpstarted by the triumphs of Castillian and Swiss infantrybodies in the Quattrocento). (1325) pg. 65-66
-Types of Ops: pg. 66-69
Based on a common terminology shared between primary sources
o Exercitus, operation that mobilizes the entirety of the communal military strength to perform military actions which range from the devestation of the enemy’s territory up to the pitcheId battle which seek to annihilate the enemy army.
o Cavalcata/Speditio, a limited type of offensive or defensive action generally performed by the milites only but to which also a few specialized infantry bodies may be attached to.
This terminiology was used to define the type of troops which would take part to their mission and the role/nature of their activity.
o The latter mission was characterized by the predatory action of the cavalryman. Despite being sent to conquer or control specific localities/castrum, it is the prospect of looting and plundering their target which propels said mission. As described by Piacentine chronicler Codagnello an anonymous Viterbse chronichler, the cavalcata was characterized by the “guasto” (destruction/predation) of the enemy territory.
o The difference in practices of the exercitus vs. the speditiones is not as clearly marked as is the terminology which differentiates them. The difference which do remain are:
The mobilization structure, the exercitus is summoned through a very rigid procedure which eliminates the risks which comes with improvisation or with a rushed mobilization. Speditiones on the other hand can be decided from one day to another, instigated by senior milites who have their material interests at heart and without the need of proper communal deliberations.
A specific quantity of of infantry and cavalry troop together is mobilized when the exercitus is summoned (i.e. whole male pop, ¾ of male pop, a specific number of districts).
The exercitus was also summoned to face a clear threat to larger communal/communitarian interests (an obstacle to its autonomy or expansion).
The summoning of the exercitus is meant to consist in an efficient response to the threat. As such the exercitus must decisively defeat the enemy. It is also understood that victory by the host over the enemy will not result in his anhilation, something which often goes beyond communal capacities, but will weaken significantly the enemy’s military and economic potential (so to delay or cripple permanently his future intiative).
Its objective is to engage a large concentration of enemies, usually through pitched battle, and defeat them so as to at least temporarily bend the enemy to the victor’s will.
i.e. Perugia vs. Assissi, Gubbio and Citta di Castello. The former achieved regional hegemony through its numerically superior exercitus.
The mobilization procedure is characterized by a ritual and practices full of symbolism. Pg. 70
o But similarities do remain: The exercitus is largely a body which is as temporary (if not even more) as
the cavalcate, it can only be raised and maintained for about 3-4 weeks. The exercitus behaves largely like the speditiones, the only difference being
that the exercitus is not a milites exclusive action. It is rather a communally
sanctioned expeditionary forces which embodies the whole military might of the city.
-The hostilities between Florence and Siena (up to the 1229-35 war) were exacerbate largely through speditiones, actions which affirmed the rivalry between the two communes but did not damage excessively Florentine or Sienese economic interests. These repeateds actions occur every year without the two cities ever declaring war on each other, eventually however the tension generated by these erupts in a formal declaration of war, the mobilization of the exercitus and open battle. Pg. 70
-Through the Biccherna financial documents, we are able asses the conduct of the war of 1229-35 (especially the first 3 years for which the document survive in full): pg. 70-71
Through those 6 years the two communes mobilized their exercitus 3 times each, their campaign on average did not last more 3-4 weeks (except in 1230, harshest fighting years, were the Florentine host was raised for about 7 weeks).
During the first 3 years the war was the principal, if not the only, object of Sienese fianancial register – both in terms of income and expenditure (especially during campaigning season, march-april and sept-oct). Most of the expenditure goes to specialized infantry bodies, milites, crossbowman, garrison and to build/strengthen forts (that act as advanced bases from which to attack the enemy).
The major factor that increased the expenses of Siena was not the fact that they had to mobilize often the exercitus for 3-4 weeks but rather because they were fighting a war on 3 fronts (Firenze, Montepulciano, Oriveto). To defend itself Siena had to maintain large garrisons of cavalryman and crossbowmen for several months (and these are paid on a monthly basis). Furthermore the informal convention of the winter truce is not as respected anymore meaning that Siena cannot enjoy periods of respite from its military expenses.
The necessity to have semi-permanently standing garrisons and fighting in the winter is synonym of the growing importance/totality of war. For the first time within the minds of communal administrators of both side, this is a war fought with the intention of imposing complete hegemony/supremacy over the enemy. As such the conduct of war cannot be ed by tradition and custom or be conducted according to the particular interest of the urban milites. The war effort occur in a continuous and unrelenting fashion.
Now the exercitus is still subject to limitations (i.e. campaign occurs only during the appropriate seasons) yet these limitations are loosened in as much as possible (acceptable campaigning period extended by several months – they end late autumn and start early spring and epxeditions are organized during the middle of the winter period).
-Features from the war between the Guelf coalition and Ezzellino da Romano, 1256-59: pg. 72-77
When Trevisan Guelf exile milites attack the city who is controlled by the da Romano, they are aided by expeditionary forces from distrungentled Veronese and Vicentines and reinforcements from Padua and Venice. Among the we find many infantryman and crossbowman, specialized infantry bodies typical of Venice. According to chronicler Rolandino (main source for war) the cowardice of these is the reason for the Guelf defeat.
The war was characterized by continuous speditiones and the respective “guasto” of enemy lands.
The declared intent of most expeditions according to Rolandino was to enact retaliation following a defeat or wrong suffered. This is likely to be a big factor behind the milites mentality and their speditiones. Having said this Rolandino always makes very clear that
behind their more noble prerogative the milites always fight war (both offensive and defensive ones) with material gain in their minds (their objective is to loot as much movable wealth as possible from their enemy while putting to the torch everything else).
As well, unprecedently there is the harming/crippling of prisoner to the point that they cannot rejoin their faction’s fighting force (24 prisoners from Ezzelino’s side are brought to Padua, 21 of them are blinded while 3 are spared so that they could lead back their comrades to Vincenza – this was not a unanimously taken decision, many Paduan feared retaliation on relatives held in the prisons of Ezzelino).
The battle in 1258 between Ezzelino and the coalition army of pontificial legate Filippo Fontana (archbp of Ravenna) ends in disaster for the latter (a quantiatively and qualitatively superior force). The bravado of the Guelf leaders, who don’t want to hear about a tactical withdrawal, results in the guelf taking up an unfavourable engagement. The battle is decided essentially by the first charge, when Brescian contingents of the Guelf army lay down their weapons after it and send the antire army into a panick. The Mantua Podesta and many knights of the city (major contributers in numerical terms to Guelf host) are also captured. Ezzelino’s victory becomes triumph with the capture of the pontificial legate.
The next year however, 27 september 1259, Ezzelino suffers the same fate and is captured during the pitched battle of Cassano d’Adda which could have potentially won him hegemony over the entirety of Northern Italy. This time the Geulf where superior in numbers and were led by experienced men at arms. Ezzelino troops further suffered a clear morale loss because of Ezzelino undecisive leadership (who unable to choose an approach allows panick to spread through the army – likely product of an injury he just received, he took an arrow to the foot but decided to remain on the field) and because of the dubious behaviour of the Brescian cavalry (the newest component to Ezzelino’s army). Most of his troops are routed, and only his most loyal support fight until the bitter end. Ezzelino is capture while attempting to escape to Bergamo and eventually dies from his wound.
-Battle in this period appear to take the form of disorganized and confused brawl which appear destined to end in a stalemate except when an unexpected but pivotal event occurs along the fighting lines which changes the balance of power in favour of one of the two factions. Pg. 77
-Because of the uncertainity of open battle, we understand why military leaders of the time appeared to shun them unless odds where clearly on their side. Pg. 77
-Armies, because of their slow movement especially, are thus conceived more as a slow moving bull-dozer or locus swarm (i.e. a glorified body of sappers) rather than an effective fighting force. It has to despoil the entirety of its surrounding to feed itself and in not a sustainable entity in the long run. It is because of its slow speed and weight that it makes the exercitus a much more effective destructive force than the more mobile speditiones. It is in terms of such desctruction that we must then evaluate the effectiveness of an army campaign. Pg. 77-78
-Chronichles remain best way to understand the nature and quantity of war actions of the time. The scope of military actions is determined by communal authorities and their concerns: conquest and extension of the contado, defence or retaliation vs aggressive external action, support of allies with expeditionary contingents, suppression of rebellious clients. Pg. 109
-The motives which justified the knights mobilization however are not always made clear: often we’d think that they are an outfit, part of a greater communal military structure, which mobilized on command of communal authorities. In fact this can only be said to be true when communal authorities gave order of general mobilization (i.e. when the exercitus is called to arms). This a rare
occurrence, a citizen is unlikely to be called upon for general mobilization more than 4 or 5 times in his life.
-War was fought primarily through frequent speditiones (expeditions), cavalcate and sudden sleight of hands (i.e. betrayal). This types of conflicts are fought by knights who have material gain as their final objective.
-Most of the times these materially driven knights act on consent or order of communal authorities, yet their authority over the milites military enterprise was more nominal than anything. Though they had to respond to the multiple call to arms issued by authorities over the course of a year, the milities reatained an enormous amount of libery and autonomy on the field (able to conduct operations at their own liking). They chose the marching order, the military objectives and the ways to reach/achieve them. Pg.110
-Thus the commander’s role was not as fundamental as one would think: he was in charge of choosing the deployment order in fielded battles and was in charge of maintaining a minimum of cohesion when the host moved or was setting camp.
-Thus there does not exist a cavalry corps completely at the service of communal authorities rather a body of troops made by a specific segment of the citizen population of a city (that is that segment of people with an extensive military background/traditions, capable of fighting on horseback) who offer their service and competences to communal authorities. Such skill and talent was not offered solely in the name of advancing communal interests rather knights used their service as a way to advance their material/political condition (an informal albeit accepted custom between authorities and these troops). This condition however would be eventually limited and then abolished with the ascension of the popular regime.
3. Primary Sources
-Florentine Statutes: Codicetto Militare, Dal Libro di Montaperti (LATIN) – On hold, very hard to translate.
o Issued during Jacopinum Rangonis tenure as Florentine Potesta. o They establish regulations for both infantry and cavalry of the commune Florence.
-Statuti delle Compagnie del Popolo della citta di Firenze e delle leghe del Contado, translated in 1355 in vulgar by Tommaso Da Gubbio.
o Rubrica XVI, on those eligible for service It is the duty of an appointed Gonfalonierie di compagnia, Priori (?), his
councillors and restrignetori (?) (which to qualify for these positions one must be an inhabitant of the burgh or suburb which makes up the company) to register the names (and an identifying name – pronome) of all people -between the ages of 15 and 70 - from every city quarter assigned to their company (eligible for service)
Two books shall be produced at the expense of the Florentine Commune, one kept within the archives of the commune and the other kept by the Priori and Gonfaloniere.
Within this books no one, no matter the pretext, can place the name of the “greats” (grandi) of the city or the contado of Florence, nor of their family
members or servants, nor foreigners, nor Ghibellines (even those who are reasonably suspected of being a member of leader of their faction by the Gonfaloniere).
Those who are inserted despite these proscription have to be removed and cannot stand to gain any benefice nor monetary reward from service.
And he who has inscribed his name voluntarily and had later sworn on the integrity of the document will be fined for 200 livre of Florentine ‘denari’.
Important info: Priori: members of an executive and representative assembly of
variable dimensions elected only among 21 corporations/guilds of the city (Corporazione delle arti e mestieri).
Restrignitore: non-commissioned officero Rubrica XVII, on the number of foot infantry each company must have.
Each company (through its priori and gonfaloniere) must appoint 20 soldiers armed and wielding ‘pavesi’ shields, 20 with crossbows, 20 with lances and 20 with cleavers (in the Arezzo style).
These shall wield a panziera (or coretto) with metal sleeves, armour (or lamiere), a bascinet (cervelliera grossa), helmet (elmo) and a gorget (gorgiera).
Everybody else shall arm themselves at their best capacity, in accordance to their financial condition and social status.
Some companies must have at least four crossbows loaded on two feet or loaded by lever or loaded by cranequin.
Everyone is made to swear oath promising to respect the mandate of their gonfaloniere and follow his commands.
Important info:
o Rubric XVIII, that each company must follow his Gonaloniere All must group and follow the Gonfaloniere of their company if and when
the bells (of the Priori or Gonfaloniere della giustizia) raise the alarm or when ordered by the Priori delle Arti or the Gonfaloniere di Giustizia or by the Podesta’ and Capitano del popolo.
All must group at the time and location which shall be commanded to them. If any member of a company (made up of their Gonfaloniere di compagnia,
councillors/non-commissioned officer, 80 specifically armed soldier and all remaining troops) shall fail to rally behind the banner or with his company at the prescribed time, they shall be punished in accordance to their means, that is :
The gonfaloniere shall pay 500 livres of small Florentine denari His councillors/restringetori shall pay 200 … The specifically armed soldiers shall pay 100 … Everybody else shall pay 50…
Each shall pay based on the number of times the offence was committed and according to the judgment of the Esecutore (degli ordinamenti di giustizia?) based upon the condition and quality of the offender.
Each Gonfaloniere di compagnia shall send men at the gates and on the fortifications (at the doors of the fortifications? – postierle) of their district (closest to them?) in order to guard that no one enters or exits the city without the permission of the Priori or Gonfaloniere (di Giustizia).
Each company shall remain at arms and at the ready within their districts, the companies shall be in charge of the defence of their district.
All shall desist, regardless of their status, in causing offence to members of the companies
o Rubric XXXIII, establishing a district armoury for the company (bottegha) All companies, in accordance to their leadership’s judgement, shall
possess/requisition a house (as long as it is not a house of one of the great Florentine families) which shall act as armoury for the company.
In here a company shall store at least: 10 pavesi 10 cleavers (in Arezzo style) 10 lances 4 large crossbows 10 helmets or kettle hats A painting of the coat of arms of the company 10 Long Graffi di Ferro (harpoon like weapon used for defensive
purposes). 10 torches (Lumiere) An undefined number of bricks of animal fat (sevo). 104 hatchets And other things necessary to the company
The weapons and things of the necessity shall be bought by the chamberlain of the company from the common funds assigned to it. These items must be judged by the GC (gonfaloniere of the company), ensuring that they are of good quality and condition, apt for the defence of Florence.
The GC and Chamberlain must as well hire someone to paint the coat of arms of the company on each entrance on the side of the street of the armoury building in such a way that the men of the company can recognize immediately the armoury building.
These building must remain open every day and an artisan (artefice, hired by the company) must always remain on guard and ready to serve the GC and his NCOs needs.
Failure to comply to these prescriptions will result in a fine for the GC and chamberlain of 25 livres of Florentine denari exacted by the esecutore, who will routinely check that said armoury fulfils prescribed standards (meaning that his check/investigation occurs regardless of the existence of an accuasation).
All weapons owned by the Companies and their GC must be recorded in a written document by the GC and a notary and must be stored within the registers of the Esecutore.
Each GC must then pass on the standard bearing the company’s coat of arms to his successor, failing to do so means will result in the GC being forced by the Esecutore to return it or compensate the company for its loss.
o Rubrica XXXIX, no company shall paint on its equipment any other arms other than that of its company or that king Charles.
Failing to comply so will result in a fine of 10 livres of Florentine denari for whoever does so and for each time they repeat the offence on a piece of equipment. The fine being paid to the Florentine commune.
Each company member must ensure that its shield (i.e. pavese, scudo o targa) must portray, and only portray, the coat of arms of the company (with the exception king Charles emblem) in accordance to his means. Failing to do so will result in a fine of 100 livres of Florentine denari, the payment being exacted upon the company’s finances and paid by the GC through the chamberlain for each soldier who does not bear the company’s emblem on his shield.
o Rubrica XL, all GC must hire a notary to record the affairs of the company. The company must hire a notary to record all things which require to be
written down and all things deemed important by the GC. The salary the GCs shall receive from the city, who will employ them for a
period of 4 month, will be of 14 livres of Florentine denari. The salary the notaries shall receive from the city, who will employ them for
a period of 4 month, will be of 13 livres, 6 soldi, and 8 denari of Florentine denari.
The Gonfalone shall also have two messengers whose salary shall be paid by the city and will amount to 4 livres of Florentine denari per month.
The messangers and noratries shall not receive anything more unless they demand further compensation from the Commune or GC in virtue of the nature of their office.
These salaries shall be paid from the state coffers by the chamberlain of the commune.
The notaries and messengers shall be elected by GC among the district/people placed under his charge.
o Rubrica LXII, On the oath of the leghe del contado (countryside leagues, LC) and districts of Florence
Provides long list of LCs, larger administrative military units made from smaller units (pivieri, comuni, popoli, specific localities/districts of the countryside).
A special mention is made to the lands of S. Gimignano which will make up a league of its own right and will be captained by the same man who will be Podesta of the commune (of Florence) and the local men of S. Gimignano. None of the captains’ authorities shall be disputed.
Any commune or popolo or district not placed under a league shall be placed under the league closest to it (in cases where the distance is equivalent for multiple league, the non-placed district can choose under who it wants to be).
And every 6 months (in April and October) the Priori delle Arti and Gonfaloniere di Giutizia shall appoint 12 men, already gonfaloniere di compagnia of the people of Florence, with the task of electing the captains of each league.
Each appointee must be a man, native and citizen of Florence, and must be truly committed to the Guelf cause.
His office will last 6 month, from the calends of may up to the kalends of November. He cannot be elected as captain for his same league for an entire years and cannot be elected for another league for the next 6 months.
His salary will not be paid by the leagues but by the chamberlains of Comune of Florence for a sum of 40 soldi of small Florentine denari per day.
Each league shall promise to maintain, serve and execute the statutes of the justices of the people of Florence and those of the Commune of Florence and obey the orders of the Podesta, captain, Esecutore degli ordinamenti de giustizia, of the Priori, of the Gonfalonieri de la Gisutiza and of the Commune of Florence. They shall also seek to preserve the interests of the Commune, of its people and of its largely Guelf inhabitants.
They shall also ensure the peace and tranquillity of the city, its countryside and its district and when failing to do so each league will be fined for 1000 livres of small Florentine denari, each popolo under it will be fined for 500 livres and each individual within the league will be fined for 100 livres.
Each league is charged with hunting and exiling brigands (and their heirs) from its territory.
If such abuses are allowed to continue, or if the children of the brigands manage to settle again in the former homes, each league shall be fined for 500 livres.
Each league shall elect for an yearly tenure a Gonfaloniere, Pennonieri, Councillor, one or more Chamberlain. Each officer shall be paid and each league shall obtain its funds from the levies raised in the territory of each league and fractions of the Commune of Florence. These funds can be spent freely in as much as it is done based on the deliberation of Pennonieri and Councillors of the league.
Each officer shall swear to use his office loyally and usefully, if he fails to do so he shall be fined by the Esecutore for 300 livres.
Each popolo or comune must then proceed to provide their league with new officers by the month prior to the end of the old administration’s tenure. Failing to do so will result in a fine of 300 livres for each officer which was not provided. Each officer must be a guelf of good social extraction.
All former officers cannot run for the next two years and all their relatives cannot run for the next years from the end of the former officers office.
No league or league officer can pretend the dissolution or weakening or impose any harmful imposition of/on another league under a fine of 500 livres for each offender and for each instance (half of which goes to the city of Florence and the other half to the offended league).
If any alarmed is raised no league shall dare to report to any of the great magnates/individuals of Florence, the countryside, or its district and submit itself completely to his authority. They shall act in favour of the commonwealth, for the benefit of Guelf faction and report and obey the commands of the Priori and the Gonfaloniere della Giustizia or defend their own territories (in the absence of further commands). Failing to do so will result in a fine of 2000 livre for each minor commune with the league, a fine
of 1000 livre for each popolo of the league, and a fine of 200 livre for each individual citizen.
Each league shall be tasked with raising the alarm locally and pursue all rebels and enemies of the state within its jurisdiction and under the above fines.
The Captains, councillors and Pennonieri are allowed to impose and provide eligible men within its jurisdiction with the necessary arms to fight. These men are obligated to follow their officer’s orders and fight, non-compliance will result in 25 livres fine per man per each time the offence is committed. Half of the fine goes to the offended League and half goes to the city of Florence.
-Statuti delle Compagnie del Popolo di Pisa, 1300-1303o Rubrica I, On the mantainance of the companies of the city of Pisa and its districts
and the oath of the Captain. (Starts with a long oath in 1st person made by the captain whom swears that
he shall protect and maintain the honour and interests (ragioni=reason of state) of the commonwealth of Pisa (universita’)).
He shall as well ensure that, within a month from his inauguration, all people between the ages of 18 and 70 have sworn an oath of obedience to the people, the captain himself and to the elders of Pisa (thus making them eligible for levy).
All people who are recorded (thus paid for the estimate) in the cadastre of Pisa and whom pay “date et prestanze” (‘date’ being direct levies and ‘prestanze’ being the forerunners of public debt obligations that is voluntary, later forced, loans on which the state initially gave back the entirety of the capital to the loaner and later only interests on it) for 3 years will be made to swear the oath like the citizens of Pisa.
No man of the various captains of the chapels of Pisa shall be made to swear the oath of the Captain of Pisa unless he had paid ‘date et prestanze’ as said above. If he has sworn, his oath shall be cancelled and he will not be obliged to offer service.
o Rubrica II, on the duties of those who swore the oath of obedience to the captain of the people and elders (?)
The sworn man shall always rally with or without arms to a prescribed location and date whenever he is called upon by the captain of the people or elders.
The sworn man shall ensure that all people and companies placed under the captain’s command suffer no wrongdoing during his service.
The sworn man will have to do those things which the captain of the people or elders order him to do.
Every contravention shall be punished by the Captain of the People with a fine from 20 soldi up to 100 lire of danari (varying on the status of the offender and gravity of his crime).
o Rubrica X, on the companies of the countryside. Within a month from his inauguration, the CP will raise a company within
the district of Valdiserchio (capitania) of 500 or more men, in accordance to the will of the elders of the city. The company shall be made of the best and
most valiant men, those who truly cherish the peaceful Pisan commonwealth. From each sub-districts (sestiere) which make up the aforementioned district, the Pisan elders will appoint two deputies with the task of choosing the two captain, four councillors, and two Gonfalonieri for the company ( a captain and a gonfaloniere from North of the Serchio, the other 2 south of the Serchio).
The same shall be done for the collection of pivieri of Valdarno (a ‘pieve’ being a church with a baptistery which acted as an administrative subdivision/unit, forerunner of the parish system). A company of 500 or more (in accordance to the wishes of the elders) shall be raised among the Pivieri (the Valdarno appears to be made of 3 of these). The elders will appoint 4 deputies from each piviere tasked with choosing for their piviere the 3 Gonfalonieri (1 for each group), 3 captain (1 for each group ), and 6 councillors (2 for each group) of the company.
Continues listing the amount of men the CP must raise from each district within a month from his inauguration. (In reference to Capitania delle colline di sotto) They shall bear the gonfalone (heraldic flag) of the camera del commune di Pisa as all other companies from the countryside do (and potentially the insignia of the ‘Croce Bianca in Campo Rosso’, the white cross on the red field) and its components shall be enlisted according to the methods listed above:
A ‘company of the Cross’ from the Comune of Calcinaia of 100 men. A company from the locality of Trevalda and its lands of 200 men. A company from the Capitania delle colline di sotto of 200 men. A company from the Capitania di piemonte of 150 men. The elders
of Pisa shall appoint 3 deputies among the 150 men tasked with electing one Gonfaloniere, one Captain, two Councillors.
(Later on at end of rubric we have following mentions) A company in the Valle di Calci of 150 men
(Later on at end of rubric we have following mentions) A company in Monte Magno of 50 men
The Gonfaloniere shall be given the Gonfalone and each shall be made to swear that, whenever called upon by the CP or the elders, they shall rally at the Palazzo del Popolo e degli Anziani (i.e. Palazzo della Carovana – Piazza dei cavalieri) with sufficient arms/troops and promise to follow and obey the orders of the CP (and by extension of his authority, those of the elders).
In case of death, any men shall be replaced/subrogated with another so that the prescribed size of the company shall be maintained.
The CP also is tasked with recording all names and surnames (sopranomi) of the men, of the Gonfalonieri and of the captain of each company within a book kept by him.
o Rubrica XX, of those not eligible for levy Those ineligible for service:
No Cavaliere (i.e. noblemen, knighted noblemen?), nor his sons. Nor anyone who received an inheritance from an ancestor who had
been a Cavaliere from the time of Podesta’ Alessandro up to now.
Nor anyone who received an inheritance from someone who wasn’t of the populo/people or belonging to the popular faction from the time of Podesta Galasso up to now.
Nor anyone suspected of harmful intention by the Company, the Captain or the people of Pisa.
Those who take the oath but are revealed to be ineligible will be kicked outby the CP, his obligations cancelled and they will be ultimately fined for 25 lire of denari.
The CP shall punish those captain of companies and elders who allowed those ineligible within their company with a fine from 20 soldi up to 50 lire of denari (based on the gravity of the fact and status of the person).
Those who have been received in the companies shall be recorded by the CP within a document which signals their parentage (natural sons, bastards, legitimate) and passed on to the giudice del popolo (people’s judge, high judge) and read to the maggiore consiglio and minore consiglio.
o Rubrica XXVII, appointment requirements for captains, gonfalonieri and councillors of each company
Must be born in Pisa Must have paid “date e prestanze” for 10 years. The Gonfaloniere’s (and implicitly all other offices) election must occur
through an open ballot, done within a Church, and confirmed through bell toll.
The offices shall last 6 months and no more. The election of each office shall occur under the aegis of the CP who shall
send his judges or knights to ensure that the election for each company occurs.
Those elected shall be recorded in a book by the CP’s notary, the book later read to the electors.
o Rubrica CXXX, on the company of the cross Everyone must have sufficient and necessary weapon for their role. And
among their weaponry it is fundamental they carry a targe or pavise with a large white cross on a red field painted on it.
If fighting breaks out within Pisa , the company with its arms and state-issued crossbow must present itself at the house of the company’s Gonfaloniere.
Once rallied, those of the Ponte neighbourhood will occupy St. Sisto square, those of the “Quartiere di Mezzo” (Middle Neighbourhood) will guard the Palazzo del Popolo, those of Foriporta will defend the San Paolo all’ orto square, those of Kinsica will defend the neighbourhood’s church St. Sebastiano.
Everyone else belonging to other companies must rally at the neighbourhood where their Gonfaloniere resides or to the house of their Captain (if he resides in their neighbourhood) and then move on to their assigned defensive position (this mobilization prescription also apply for night time attacks).
Continues with a long list of mobilization destination for each neighbourhood (emphasize whether they must rally inside or outside the city walls):
None is able to depart from their rally location without the Captain or the elder’s orders.
No inhabitant/civilian of Pisa and its burghs and suburbs is allowed to leave his home or loiter within public streets (punishable both in terms of a fine and imprisonment – pena sul avere e della persona)
Both Captains and Gonfalonieri must have all those registered under his command with him once the alarm has been raised, their presence must be recorded.
The office of Gongaloniere and Company Captain last 4 months, his successors will be elected by the elders.
o Rubrica CXXXI, statues for the new and old companies of Pisa and its countryside, 1302.
All new companies must rally, when the alarm is raised, with their weapons (that is crossbowmen with their crossbows, everybody else with lances or what is available to them) at their Company’s armoury.
When their they shall not leave without permission of the CP or Elders.
They will communicate the completion of their mobilization via bell toll or via messenger.
Exception: All the companies from “Quartiere di Mezzo” - after having rallied at their company’s armoury - will move onto the palace of CP and the Palazzo del Popolo and preside it until the CP or elder’s further orders.
Exception: New companies which rally outside of the city walls must move on and defend the prescribed city door (from the outside) and preside them until further order.
Provides a list of doors and which company will defend them (and highlighting how the presiding forces will be augmented by old or local/nearby companies).
The old companies must rally with their weapons at the house of their gonfaloniere and once the majority of them are present they must defend their prescribed city gates or other key strategic positions (some inside the city walls, others outside).
Provides a list (clearly specifying how each company must go by its task, sometimes prescribing to a single company multiple defensive locations – sometimes both inside and outside the city walls).
In cases that the alarm was raised because of fire, the old companies –except those guarding city gates - must move onto the location of the fire.
Those not at their post will be charged. All belonging to the old companies must possess a targe shield with
company’s arms painted on it. None of those suspected by the commonwealth as enemies of the state
(those inscribed in the ‘libro del confino’) or seen as seditious must dare leave his house when the alarm has been raised (regardless if he is with or without weapon in hand) – an offence punishable both materially and corporally. He can’t be part of any new or old company.
Those of Vlardarno, Piedimonte and Valdiserchio, once the alarm has been raised, must leave their houses fully armed rally in the public street of common use and wait there till further order by the CP or Elders.
Some exceptions/Clarifications are mentioned:o The new Companies of the Cross and of the pivieri
Vlardarno, Piedimonte and Valdiserchio must rally within the city of Pisa (unless ordered otherwise) and wait there till further order.
o In case of alarm raised by fire, they must report to the master stonemasons and woodworkers with axes and other instruments.
Those of D’Asciano who live in the burgh of St. Zeno, in Parlascio street or the parish of S. Trinita will form a new company with 2 captains, 1 gonfaloniere, 1 chamberlain. They will rally at S. Zeno and church and be given a coats of arms different to those of the new companies.
All nobles of Pisa, either on foot or by horse, must rally regardless of the time of day at the location of the old companies of their neighbourhood and stay there until further order.
None of those suspected by the commonwealth as enemies of the state (those inscribed in the ‘libro del confino’) or seen as seditious must dare leave his house.
No tavern, once the alarms has been raised, can stay open or serve drinks. Nor can any gambling occur in times of alarm.
The family of the captain is charged with grouping up all those they found around the city that running about and not rallied with their companies.
o Rubric CLXVIII, on the bell of the palazzo del popolo A 12000 pound bell must be rung on order of the captain of the people
when the Companies must move towards the palazzo del popolo.
-Statuti delle Comapgne Del Popolo Di Siena, Del Principio Del Secolo XIV
o Statute I On behalf/appointment of the Government of Nine and the Orders of City (i
quattro provveditori di Biccherna, i quattro consoli della Mercanzia[3] ed i tre consoli dei Cavalieri o Capitani di parte, Bowsky, “City and Contado”, pg 89 the orders, which together with the nine made the highest signory, were the 4 provveditori of the Biccherna, the consuls of the mercanzie (merchant guild), and the captains of the guelf party or consuls of the knights as the last also were called), each Terzo (District of city of Siena, i.e. a third of the city – Bowsky, contado, pg 83: Terzo pf Cammolia in the north, Terzo of Citta’ in the southwest, Terzo of San Martino in the southeast) shall see the appointment of a gonfaloniere, without a commission, carrying the gonfalone of Commune. Once called the Gonfaloniere must carry the gonfalone to the palazzo dei Signori Nove, del Podesta e Capitano del Popolo or any other location as ordered to them by the Nine.
Their office shall last 6 months and shall be renewed by the Nine once it is completed.
o Statute II Each GONF shall have 3 councillor, without commission, and one of said
councillor shall replace the GONF and take the city’s insignia if the latter is indisposed.
o Statue III The city and its burghs shall form a company for each of its boroughs. The companies will be made of the good and faithful of siena. Thus foreigners that do not live in the city and who do not have possession
within the city or its countryside shall be ineligible. However, people eligible for service include: any foreigners or citizens who
lives in the city and are registered as a citizen and are part of the city’s faction (the popular and Guelf one) or those foreigners who have immunity (non-interest, non-involvement) within factions or those who have not been inhibitants from being continuous residents of the city within the city and those people from the great families who suffered a wrongdoing from the enemies of the state.
The companies be formed on the order of the Government of Nine and the Orders of City.
o Statute IV The Nine and Orders shall appoint a captain, gonfaloniere and 3 councillors
for each company of the city. Their office shall be of 6 months and they must have at least 30 years of age
and have a house within the district of their company. o Statute V
All company soldier shall swear that they will obey their company and follow him and the company’s banners
Those who contravene their oath shall be fined by their captain for 25 libre (based on the condition of the person and gravity of his offence). The fine shall go to the funds of the company and the offence shall be judged with the help of the Capitano del Popolo and Potesta.
o Statute VI Each men of each company shall be armed according to the desire and
prescription of their Company’s officero Statute VII
Each Terzo shall have a gonfaloniere maestro (GM) with his councillors (statute I). Every other district company shall follow, with their gonfalone, the GM of their Terzo once the alarm is raised. Each Terzo shall raise a militia of 1000 men.
The office of the Pennoniere shall be discontinued.o Statue VIII
Company officers and its soldier shall promise obey the Nine always and shall always respond to the call of the city while in office (both with arms or without). They shall promise to ensure the integrity of their office and of the city against all person.
Failing to do shall result in a fine of 500 libre of denari for the officer and 200 libre of denari for any element of the company. Those who fail to pay shall be kept in prison until they do.
o Statue IX Whoever keeps an officer or soldier from rallying with their company or
reaching a designated destination once a call to arms or order has been issued (that is company soldier with arms or armed people, by blocking
streets or by shooting crossbow at them or any other likely impediment) shall be fined for 3000 libre of denari.
If he fails to pay said fine within 15 days he shall be decapitated. If single company individuals are impeded from reaching their designated
destination, the offender shall be punished in accordance to the other statutes of Siena which discuss ‘impedimento o fare offesa’ (Impediment or individual offence).
o Statute X The Capitano del Popolo (CP) shall be the principal captain of all companies
and defender of Siena’s vicariates and giurisdication. All other officers, both of the Terzi and of each company, shall be under his jurisdication and command.
The CP shall be the main defender and executive authority of the city, charged with ensuring the survival of the government of the Nine, the enforcement of jurisdiction and peace within the commune, and assigning /issuing the gonfaloni, orders, and prescription to each company.
A captain shall be fined fir 100 libre of denari for every time he neglects his aforementioned duties.
o Statute Xi All company officers or other relevant deputies/vicars and soldier shall, and
swear to be, Guelfs and true patriots of Siena. Any contravention shall be fined for 100 libre of denari and
collected/exacted by the CP on behalf of the Nine. Those who disobey order shall be fined by the CP for 50 libre of denari,
varying on the persons condition and gravity of the fact. This will be subject to an enquiry performed by the captain and his official, failure to do so will result in fine of 50 libre di denari.
He shall ensure that only Guelf are appointed and deputized and ensure that all Ghibellines are removed from office.
All those unable to assemble on call because incapacitated (by physical or mental distress – gravezza) shall provide appropriate reason for their inability.
Those who move from a district to another shall be enlisted and swear to obey the authority of their new district company and shall be freed from all obbligations of their prior company.
o Statute XII Within and without the company’s armoury (that is the building
requisitioned to act as the company armoury, ridocti) no one shall dare to play or hold any dice games, punishable with a fine of x libre of denari for all those involved in the game and for each time they were caught.
Half of the fine shall go to the men who reports the crime, and all men can report said crime and his name shall remain secret.
o Statute XIII The CP shall ensure that all men possess appropriate arms and that at least
once during his office he must examine the material condition of all companies in accordance with the desires of the nine. The examination shall occur without impediment or hindrance and shall occur over several days under the aegis of the nine and the CP.
Hindrances shall be fined for 100 libre of denari. o Statute XIV
The CP shall aid/advise the various officers under him in the execution of their office. Those remissive or disobedient shall be punished by him.
The CP and Podesta shall cooperate against those who seek to infringe the city’s justice.
The Companies shall aid each other in ensuring the defence of the city and, in cases where the companies are called to arms, they shall be free to move everywhere in the city.
No single men shall be allowed to leave his standard unless given permission by his captain, non-compliance shall be fined for 100 libbre of denari.
o Statute XV The CP shall ensure that each company armoury and its militiamen be
supplied with the necessary weapons and equipment. No weapon and equipment can leave the armoury unless it is taken for the
defence of the city or to arm a fighting force for the honour of Siena. In these case the company captains are free to take the weapons as they wish.
o Statute XVI Every Company Captain shall ensure that his armoury is supplied, during the
entirety of his office, with: 10 cleavers (mannaie) 10 crossbows 10 pavesi shields 4 torches (lumeniere)
Once a month the CP must inspect the armoury for these items and their write amount.
If said armoury were not supplied, the Captain of the Company shall be fined for 10 soldi for each missing weapon by the commune of Siena and, if it was because of negligence, the captain shall be fined for a further 25 libre by the chamberlain (of which 4 the chamberlain may retain)
The CP must as well ensure that, on petition of the Company Captains, single individual return the company’s weapons to the armoury. Non-compliance will be fined by the CP for x libre of denari.
o Statute XVII Each newly elected company Captain, GONF, and councillor shall appoint
each 1 of 3 company men (their names recorded by the Notary of the CP in January and in July – simultaneous to end of 6 month office of officers ) who have to complete the following duties within the first 15 days of the new officers terms :
Inspecting the content and conditions of weapons and tools within the armouries which shall be passed on to the new captain. Missing items will be signalled to the CP who shall hold responsible the old captain for such shortcomings and will force him to return or provide new weapons in reparation to this.
The chamberlain of the commune, the other official deputized by the Sienese Chamber, shall ensure that every company captain has 50 panecti (that is 50 blocks of flammable material) within his armoury. And, if these blocks shall be used for the operations of the company, the chamberlain
must resupply them ensuring that 50 panecti are always present in the company armoury.
If the Chamberlain refuses to resupply his companies with the necessary panecti, the company captains can inform the CP who will force him to sign over the materials.
o Statute XVIII The four men de la Biccherna (the magistrate or chancellery of Finance from
the 13th to the 14th century for the republic and then city of Siena, the four refers to the 4 provveditori i.e. overseers/magistrates), shall -under oath- ensure that each Company Captain shall receive 100 soldi every 6 month from the state treasury, failing to do so will result in a fine 25 libre of denari for each.
This sum shall be used for the necessary expenses of the company, paying the rents of the armouries or for the preparation of weapons within them.
And the CP shall ensure, after having received the oath of the company officers, that they use the funds -that they have or will receive- as their predecessors did for the benefit of the company.
o Statute XIX The Nine shall as well take two men per company, identified within and by
each company as being zealous patriots truly devoted to the wellbeing of the city and who have further relatives or children which will continue serving within the company, who will be tasked with assembling at the palazzo dei Signori Nove during times of alarm. These men shall arrived armed at the palace and shall swear newly to the CP that they shall preside exclusively the palace and shall not leave until given licence by the Nine.
Failing to do so will result in a fine of 100 libbre of denari for each repeated offence.
These men shall be recorded within two books, one held by the Nine, the other by the CP.
These men shall assemble every time the alarms is raised and the record shall be consulted by the CP every time they assemble or the CP must personally inspect them, eventually punishing all those who refused the call.
The guard, known as the cerna, shall be renewed every January. Each company must give to one of its appointed and company armed cerna
guards the banner of its company. This man shall be the leader of all those belonging to the same company and all other member within the cerna from the same company shall obey him as if he were the captain of the company. These things must be executed within 8 days of the election or they will result in a 25 libre of denari fine for the company captains.
o Statute XX All men and officers of the Company di Sancto Salvadore di Salicotto di sopra
dal Campario al Casato must, in times of alarm, assemble armed and carrying their banner at the palazzo dei Signori Nove. They shall not leave without their licence.
These men, whose name shall also be recorded in a book held by the Nine and one by the CP, shall swear a new oath to the CP promising to induct their sons as members of said Company with all the honours and privileges and graces conferred to the them by membership to any company (as
established by company charters). No further requirement for eligibility shall be necessary.
o Statute XXI All companies and their officers must elect a man to act as company
Chamberlain under a penalty of 25 libre of denari each, exacted by the CP. His office will last a year and starts on the Calends of January. He shall receive all funds destined for the company expenses (armoury and
the such) as assigned by the Communal Chamberlain or the Biccherna Four. The money shall be spent with the knowledge and consent of all or most
Company officers.o Statute XXII
All chamberlain must, within a month from completion of their yearly office, justify their expense in the presence of threee good/sworn men of the company, elected by the company officer. The Chamberlain must as well deliver onto his successor his ledger, all money and items received during his office.
This shall be done under threat of a 25 libre of denari fine which the CP shall exact on the offending chamberlain.
o Statute XXIII All companies must have two books in which all names of the men of the
companies must be recorded and one shall be held by the Chamberlain and the other by the company Captain.
The books shall be open and can be shown to all officials (i.e. Podesta, CP, magistrate) who request them every time they ask for them.
o Statute XXIV If an alarm were to be raised within the city or its burghs - and a call to arms
was given either by messenger or herald of the Nine or through the ringing of the bell of the communal palazzo - every men must then assemble armed at their company’s armoury and stay there until further order by the Nine or unless commanded before through a communal messenger or by further bell tolling or further licence by the CP and GONF.
This shall be enforced with a fine of 100 libre of denari for each person who fails to remain assembled with his company at the designated location until further order.
o Statute XXV Specifies exceptions for Statute XXIV where companies or portions of
companies (in accordance to the designation of their officers) do not have to remain assembled at their armoury until further orders but are allowed to move on to specifically designated key defensive positions.
Proceeds providing a long list of key defensive position that must be presided by each Sienese company.
o Statute XXVI Those assigned to such defensive position shall not leave them unless
ordered otherwise by the Nine or their officers. The CP is required by oath to demand from the officers whose companies’
guard the above mentioned gates (the key defensive positions) a report specifying the name of each men of the company who will be defending the
gate and which men and how many are believed to be necessary for the defence of the gate. The men defending the gate shall be at least 10. Those in the list shall be called by the CP to be sworn to secrecy on their duty/These men must then, every time the alarm is raised, assemble at their designated door and will not depart unless ordered down by the Nine, the CP or the local company command.
If they fail to execute the order, the detailed soldier shall be fined by the CP for 25 libbre of denari. Meanwhile the company captains swear to report within 8 days from the alarm to the CP all those who do not rally at their companies’ armoury and these shall be punished by the CP with a 25 libbre or less fine for each instance of the offence (according to the means of person and the gravity of the fact).
Anyone who is not part of the company must not leave their homes when the alarm has been raised under threat of a 100 libbre fine (or unless they have the licence of the Nine).
o Statute XXVII No person, during times of alarm, can leave his house to go to one of the
houses of the great nobles of the city or any single individual within the city or his neighbourhood without the permission of the Nine (as outlined above)
This shall be punished each time with a 1000 libbre fine by the CP and every Captain, GONF, councillor, company soldier or single individual who will contravene this shall be punished with a fine of 50 libbre.
Sketches further juridical procedure to legitimize the accusation and process the claim.
The CP must as well, under threat of a recurring 500 libbre detraction from his salary for each infringement, process diligently every single claim brought fourth when the alarm is raised and implement the above fine within 10 days.
All witnesses’ names shall remain anonymous (unless certain requirement are met: that is the claimants/witnesses accuse someone known to be his enemy, in that case the accused can ask for a copy of the report, be given the name of the witnesses and also a convenient time frame to disprove them).
Sketches further juridical procedure to legitimize the accusation and process the claim.
This procedure and process must be done within 10 days of the alarm and if the captain fails to do and act according, the duty will fall on the Podesta. If the Podesta fails himself to act and process the claims accordingly he will be fined for 500 libre of denari.
If both the CP and Podesta have been negligent let both be punished with a fine of 500 libre di denari exacted by the Chamberlain and the Biccherna four.
o Statute XXVIII The Nine and the City orders must appoint for each parish a captain. He
must be a native and must be sided by a notary and a messenger.
These officers shall be present within their parishes for at least 6 days per month or more (if and when ordered by the Nine). The captain shall be given a horse, servants, and a salary as established by the nine and the orders.
Their salary shall be paid by the companies of their parishes (i.e. by public funds assigned to companies) and their office shall last for 6 months or more or less according to the wishes of the Nine and the guilds.
And these captains shall be responsible for public order in their district and shall report to the Podesta and the Nine and the local company official shall aid the parish captain in their role (under threat of previously established penalties).
o Statute XXIX The CP must ensure each June of every year, under threat of an unspecified
fine exacted by the Chamberlain and Biccherna Four, that each new company captain swear an oath of loyalty.
The CP also makes the company captain swear an oath were he promises to make all men of their company swear an oath of loyalty within his first 15 days of office, the captain also promises he will obey the responsibility of his office according to form and manner. Anyone who breaks their oath shall be fined for 10 libre which will go to the commune of Siena.
The company captain also promises to report anyone who recuses himself from taking the oath to the.
Those who refuses to swear the oath shall be first fined for 20 denari and the fine shall increase by 1 denari for each day he refuses to swear the oath.
The Company soldiers as well must swear to obey their officers, failure to do so shall result 25 libre fine or less (according to the means and gravity of the offence) which will be erogated to the company captain and added to the company’s treasury. The exaction shall be done by the CP or Podesta on behalf of the company Captain to ensure its efficient exaction.
-Villani’s Chronicle: Weakness: Villani’s chronicle is a didactic work in praise of civic virtue and mingled with this
there was a strong element of nostalgia. The mid 13th century Florentine patriot in Villani is a golden age myth. This effect would trickle down on later Florentine citizens like Machiavelli: ‘ tanta virtu era allora in quelli uomini, e con tanta generosita d’anima si governavano’ (nearly in the Roman Stoic fashion). Waley, Daniel, “the Army of the Florentine Republic”, pg 108 and Villani VII, 131
-More Canestrini boyCanestrini, pg. 50-53: Condotta Capitan Ugo Mellchin ed Ermanno di Vinden (Compagnia del Fiore)
1363 In the service of Florence, the company must lead 1000 cavalrymen (under 58 constables) of
which at least 800 must be well armed. By the end of the month the commanders must register the 1000 men and ensure that these
have an able horse (not blind, not lame and without heave lines). The horses must be registered/described in documents by the colour of their fur, be marked and have them estimated in accordance to Florentine guidelines. The horse cannot be worth less than 8
gold Florins and if he was than its rider was not eligible to receive compensation if the horse was injured during service.
If a horse was lost during service, the rider must notify communal authorities and produce the relative of proof of said loss within 12 days of the loss of the horse if lost in Florentine territory. If lost on enemy lands, they shall have 1 month to make their claim.
The cavalryman will be paid 6 gold florins a month, and their payment shall start once captain Ermanno has arrived in Florence with the majority of his people. His contract shall last 2 months.
The two captains shall be paid each 150 gold florins a month. The company must have at least 4 blacksmiths with them and between all they shall receive
260 gold florins for the two months. Their must 58 constable in the company who shall receive each 20 gold florins a month (14
for their person and 6 for their horse). The company shall have 12 councillors who shall have for the two months in total 400 gold
florins between them (plus any aforementioned wage they were eligible to receive). The company may increase its size by 320 men, in as much as they pay the new recruits the
rates established and do not increase their own rate and those of the blacksmith and their councillors.
The company must be gifted 400 lances from the commune. They must obey the captain of war, and ride with him and must advise the captain of any
internal disputes the company may have. They shall give the 10th part of the loot to the captain If they win land or castle, the lands, prisoners and walls must be conceded to the commune. If they defeat an army 500 horseman or more, those who fought shall receive double pay
premising their delivery the prisoners captured to Florence. All the ultramontane mercenary registered in the brigade shall be exempt from warrants,
exiles and debts currently held against their person so that during their two-month contract, and 6 days from its termination, the cavalrymen are exempt from any punishment that may interrupt his service.
Various leaders of the company, not able of resuming hostilities against Pisa, shall have licence to remain in friendly territory.
They shall have military access, outside walled settlements, and shall pay for their provisions.
The company has with them 2 trebuchets masters, and other craftsmen, who each shall receive each 10 gold florins for their service a month.
The money shall be paid in the following manner: they shall receive half of the complete sum owed to the company within 8 days from the start of their service, they shall receive the next ¼ by the 15th day, and the final quarter shall be paid after a month and 25 days of service.
They shall present themselves for inspection twice a month. They have to swear that, after finishing their contract, they cannot be hired to fight Florence
for a least a year. When the contract is signed Matteo de Federigho, a Florentine citizen (prominent, in 1375
he is gonfaloniere giustizia for his quartiere – delizie), must be present so that he may know what was agreed to. As well he shall be aware if all the grievances the commune may have against the contract or the company in general.
Canestrini, pg. 61-70: Lettere scritti sui movimenti degli Inglesi (all letters 1364)
From San Miniato, Niccolo Buondelmonti to the Signoriao At San Miniato, a defecting Andrew Belmont (Andrea Belmonte) and Ser Ricciardo
and other of the company’s corporals– who left Hawkwood while in service of Pisa – offer their service to services to Florence (especially after hearing that count Rodolfo da Varano, the Florentine captain of war, was dying and that the Germans were hunting them) .
o If the signoria where to offer securities, they would be happy to join them in their fight against Pisa (either together with their men or as individual officers).
o This offshoot is heading towards San Miniato for they need a location where they can rest within walls, for it has become too cold to encamp and too cold for the horses (they do not have the same insurance the Germans have on their horses thus they can’t risk losing them).
o The band has brought with them from Pisa, between Hungarians and English and the men of Count Nicchola, 800 horseman who need will need provisioning.
o The official write to ask the commune what it would like him to do and where he shall direct them to (since the company does not to want to stay outside anymore and would like to reside in a location/burgh/houses –as chosen by the commune -where they can stay all together and also would like to paid by them).
o They promise to be more loyal than the soldiers Florence already has in its employment and if the they went everybody to come they shall and will not return to the Germans.
o They as well say that they rather be in service of Florence during their war with Pisa or others for 100000 gold Florins rather than to be in contracted without war for 300000 gold Florins.
o As well, the town informs the Florentine authority that in their resupplying of Altopascio with provisions, armour, weapons they have incurred a debt of 300 gold florins. As well they recommend to resupply the English with provisions – and such expense they would not be able to support and would require further aid.
o They strongly recommend to hire the company and send money to do so. From San Miniato, Letter of Giorgio di Ricciardo
o The Florentine sent their ambassador who found the company who was camping at Santa Agonda and other nearby burghs (close to san miniato).
o They explained that they could not stay in the location they first arrived to (Ciecina) for it was too open and cold for their horses.
o They remain at Santa Agonda, as commanded to them by the Florentine authorities. However, they ask that they allow the company to move in certain estates of San Miniatese in the suburbs, potentially on the Arno, so that they may easily access water and be far away from the town (thus avoiding the creation of conflict between the local townsmen and the company).
o The official confirms, and is corroborated by the locals, that this is the best behaved mercenary company the region has ever seen. The cause no damage, they pay for everything, and hold in the highest regard the Floreintine Signoria.
o The Florentine official as well proceeded to communicate the local authorities reaction to the request of the company. They answered while aware of the cost and potential damage of having the company on their lands, out of reverence for the Florentine authorities, they would do everything in their power to maintain the company. They agreed to supply the company with as many provisions they could, in
regards to the movement to the suburb estate they had not yet decided (but they were seemingly opposed to this). Regardless they also ask that the communal authorities move the company from their lands.
From Pescia, Letter of Jacopo degli Albertio Jacopo, held the Podesteria of San Gimignano in 1361 and two years later he in
charge of the defence of the foritification at Lanciolina. By 1361, he was the commissar of the Val di Nievole (east of Lucca) tasked with re-occupying the castles just ceded by Pisa to Florence.
o After visiting Pietrabuona, the commissioner concludes that this locality is the key to the entire valley. He argues that this location should be reinforced as much as possible, constructing there a small fortification and garrisoning it as much as possible.
o The existing structure was heavily damages by the Pisan castellan, many of its structures destroyed and plundered by them.
o The local populations seem well disposed to the Florentine, induced to work by the conciliatory promises/words of the commissioner. They promise to be as loyal as they with Pisa (and the commissioner says they may be trusted).
o He says that the stones and wood necessary for building can be found aplenty there, and that if they hire a good master (one that does not want to build a new colosseum) the expense for building it should be small for the chamberlain. He again recommends to build the castle as fast as possible.
o He comments as well on the values of certain prisoners the archbishop Nardo di Francesco has that belong to the town and on the value of a prisoner he holds that Francesco is very much interested in redeeming (worth 200 florins) . He concludes that the exchange was not worth it both because the ransom was too small (100), he was the son of one of the most prominent Ghibelline rebel of the area and that the prisoner held is guilty of the murder of one of the priors of Pietrabuona. He leaves the final choice to the communal authorities.
San Minato, letter of Niccolo Buondelmontio The letter includes the decisions made by the Florentine in regards to the English
offshoots: a certain disarmed number of them are allowed entrance to the towns.o The official as well confirms that they pay regularly and courteously for their
provision (even when it is sold to them within their own encampment and not inside the city walls).
o As well, the area in which they are encamped (where they take very little space up) has seen no damage to property or person.
o He as well communicate that the English strongly fear the German mercenary company, suggesting that the commune give no help to the Germans (remnants of the Great Company under Borgatern) vs. the English.
o The commissioner ultimately recommends to avoid conflict between the two company but as well avoid excessive inactivity. The English as well appear to be very loyal to the Commune and its ordinances.
o The commissioner as well tells the Florentines that the English company has raised the communal flag together with their own during these peaceful times because they feel safer.
Letter of Niccolo Buondelmonti
o Contains the response of the English after the communal authorities requested that the company departs their lands and give back the communal insignias.
o The officer, despite Andrew’s absence, summoned the company council to communicate the commune’s decision, to which they answer by asking that the flag be left until Andrew’s return and by asking for a 4 day extension (for they wait from Pisa their people and things, for which they sent twice last night).
o He as well re-iterates how the company has always avoided harming locals, pay regularly for their things and act loyally towards communal authorities and that they ultimately should satisfy their rquest.
o He also communicates that after leaving Santa Ghonda, as established by the local Priors under menace of stopping the supply of provisions, part of the company has moved towards Maregnano in su L’Elsza menacing to burden the Florentine contado if the Florentines keep soliciting their departure. Just a single day of their stay in the Florentine contado, the comissioner argues, harmes the commune more than 10 days of them staying at San miniato.
o Already after leaving camp, this caused some friction with the local people, resulting in death of two mercenaries as the hand of the locals. It was a great struggle for the commissioner to stop the band from retaliating: they felt that because Florence does not keep their word, they do not feel bound to respect the pacts either.
o The commissioner has only calmed the band by saying that they should wait for tha answer to the letter the city officials.
From San Miniato, letter of Niccolo Gianfigliazzi o To facilitate the move of the company the commune orders that the possession of
the company be returned to their owners (returning the horse of Messer Anichino di Bongardo, leader of the Germans of the Great Company)
Letter of Niccolo Buondelmonti o Again, though he is committed to execute his orders to evict the company, the
commissioner again argues that the San Miniato people are in the wrong and the company should be allowed to stay.
o The insignias as well are yet to be returned to the commissioner for they are still waiting for Andrew.
Letter of Coppo di Medici on reforming the militia of the Leghe del Contado. o The Leagues’ captaincies should be free from nepotism and should not mix
jurisdictions. o The statutes/orders of the League have to be reformed according to military
guidelines, that is by men knowledgeable on war, and then must be made a common standard (by having them read to a council to which all captains participate so that nobody can make mistake or plead ignorance).
o In light of the fact that contandini militia tended to be poorly armed, it is the opinion of the Medici commissioner that the recruitment of rural militiamen should occur by selection. That is for every 100 contadini, 4 would be appointed for every 100. These, he estimates, should amount to 6000 well-armed militiamen in total.
2000 of these, chosen among those truly committed to the Guelf and popular cause, would make a sort of revolutionary/city guard. This selection would include men only who were sufficiently capable of arming themselves, able to sustain the expenses of military service and able to travel to Florence on request of the priors.
The other 2000 would be used for garrison service of the frontiers of the Florentine state
The last 2000 would follow the Captain in the Florentine hosts. Canestrini: pg 497-549: Statuti sulla Condotta 1337
o Pg. 498-498 Born out of a commission to reform the existing provisions of the condotta
office, remove contradiction and obscurities through it. This as well came with the power of creating new provisions.
They are granted absolute legislative power, as confirmed both by the Priors and the Gonfaloniere della Giustizia, to regulate the service of the stipendiary soldiers of the commune.
These ordinance shall be followed by all stipendiary soldiers, their captains and constables alike.
o On the election/appointment of the officials of the condotta in charge of all soldier (knights and footmen alike) and their notaries
-Il Libro di Montaperti Preface
o On the battle pg. ix-x and Cronica, VI, 55, 78 After a Florentine victory in the endemic wars between the two communes
(where the Florentines were on the verge of conquering Montereggioni), a “perpetual” peace and league between the republic was signed in 1254.
Yet the continuous expansionary drive of the republic made the peace fragile. The Senese in particular flirted with the Ghibellines of the city and neighboring communes and, after the faction’s exile from Florence in 1258, the Florentine Ghibelline had entered in alliance with Siena.
The hosting and poltical asylum to the enemies of the state resulted in the breaking of the agreements between the two countries.
o The document, pg. xi-xiv Only official document remaining regarding that specific battle. Describes day by day the prescriptions, intinerary, political and military facts
of the host engaged from the 9th of February to the 3rd of September 1260. Soldiers employed came from at least 80 discernible trades and crafts
among which we find medics, barbers, bakers, tailors, smiths, and all the workers connected to textile production.
More than 4000 people’s names are registered. Taken as a prize by the victorious senese army who kept it within its archive
as a trophy of war. A faithful reproduction by C. Paoli, which reproduce it exactly as found
keppy graphival anomialies and material error contained within it. Took occasional liberty to fix errors deemed necessary (when done the original passage is kept as a footnote). Any addition of words by the authors or any external abbreviation is contained within parenthesis.
Indexes: the first is chronological, the second is by topic, the third is topographic, the fourth is onomastic.
o Contents of the document, pg. xv-xxviiI Various registers, documents, papers which were used by the administrative
and military apparatus of the host.
The events recorded start from the 9th of February of 1260, 2 months prior to any move by the army. The documents lead up to the 1st expedition against Siene terminating with the battle of Santa Petronailla of the 17-18th of May which ended undecisevely for both factions.
Documents following this deal with the preparation of the second expedition which culminated with the disaster at Montaperti on the 4th of September.
These documents were eventually reunited in a single book compiled by the victorious Sienese. The ordering within this book war arbitrary and the documents chronology within it were often confused. It was only reordered in 1872 by the authorities in charge of the Tuscan archives.
The original book contains within its first page an incision by an anon Senese author made in the first half of the 16th century:
This is the remnants of an entire archive not a single document, a compendium of multiple papers.
Principle types of documents contained within it: Category one: Statutes, Deliberations, Elections/Appointment of
officials, Acts emanated by the Florentine high command (the Potesta, the 12 citizen captains, and the Elders Of the People – Anziani del popolo – among the ranks).
Category two: Books regarding supples, war material, and cattle heads/beast of burden.
Category three: Registers and review reports on f2ighting militias. Summary
Part 1 and 9 of the Book contain documents of category oneo Part 1, Quarterni stantiamentorum. Refer to the first phase
of expedition. Contains also some, but very little, documents that refer to second expedition.
Contains as well the officials in charge of the various militia companies, militia services, and corps d’elite (soldati del Caroccio, e pavesari della citta). Also contains list of men from the coantado and other places designated for specific military duties (i.e. auxiliary support or garrisoning of particular areas) Pg XVI and pg 63, 76, 110.
2
Contains election, deliberation and acts describing howed the army shall conduct itself (i.e. prescriptions regarding the marching, making camp, patrolling the city and contado, and military and political facts during the two expeditions). Pg XXX
o Part 9, Statuta et Ordinamentao Both complete, or virtually complete, and in good order.o At page 37-38 we see mentions to the Acta Communis/Acta
et Quaternus Communis (i.e. the lost archives of the Commune) when discussing the elections of certain captains in the pivieri of the Florentine contado.
o To prove inability to answer the call to arms the Montaperti papers refers notarized document which acted as proof to justify absence.
o As well there likely existed a book of precept/prescriptions made by the Potesta which also was lost in all likelihood (Libro dei Precetti del Potesta).
o Part 9 contains that statues and ordering of the army. These were emanated by the Potesta and Captains on the 11th of March and approved by a public parlament held on the 5th of April. A further parchment contains the additions to these statutes passed on the 6th of May. Pg xlii
Part 2 and 3 of the Book contain documents of category twoo Little remain and are very frammentary. o Rgarding the Prommission on the supply for the Battle of
Montalicno we miss the registed for the Sesti of Porta San Pancrazio and that for the Duomo is frammentary.
o For the Libri del Mercato we do not have those for Doltrarno, Piero Scheraggio, Broga, Porta San Pancrazi.
o Il servizio del Market, the logistical servicing of the comapnies, was a function assigned to 3 companies (2 per Sesto) under a Banderaio (aka Signore del Mercato) and his assistant (the coadiutore) and with the aid of a notary
This role was assigned to Salvi di Chiaro Giorlami for Oltrarno and S Pancrazio
Cerra di Gianni del Massaio for Piero Shceraggio and Borgo
Borgognone d’Alberto of the Borgo of S.Lorenzo for Porta del Duomo and S. Piero.
o Only the registers for the last Bandiera, that is that of Porta del Duomo and S. Piero, remain. These documents signal the date and locations, that is the travel intinerary, the host took during its expeditions.
o From this extant register we may deduce that every bandiera notary kept a register for the sesti assigned to its bandiera.
o Part II has the portion of documents containing promissory notes and agreements given by various parishes and communes on the amount of grains to send for the provisioning of Montalcino pg xxxv
o Part 3, I libri del mercato, contains the names of the the merchants of contado onto whom the obbligation of provisioning the army and Montalcino befell. It contains as well the guarantees that they issued and the delivery order that were issued on arrival of porvisions. To accomplish this 2 officials and a notary were appointed for every 2 sesti – the document go from the 6th of August up to the 1st of September. Pg xxxvi
Part 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 of the Book contain documents of category three. Pg XVII
o Includes registers of people called to arms.o Regarding the first expedition little remains other than the
election of great number of notaries in charge of registering the infantry and cavalry fighting for Florence (other than that little remains for the city). For the contado similarly we have only the election of registering officials/i.e. notaries (officials and notaries for all various sesti, in different proportions, in charge of registering the men from the communities of Florence within the army) . and pg. 73-74:
8 notaries for Oltrarno 8 for Scheraggio 3 for Borgo 4 for S. Pancrazo 4 for Duomo 4 for S. Piero.
o For the second expedition we have two books of the Cavallate for S. Pancrazio (IV and V) where the first registers the delivers of horses which were maintained on obligation by citiens on the 25th of August the other records the excuses for absence between the 28th of August and 1st of September. For the contado as well have have some troop reigsters (Companies of 25 from the Contado of Sesto of S. Pnacrazo and men from the contado and of Porta. S. Piero – Part 6 and 8).
o Part 4 and 5 contains the deliveries of horses by citizens of S. Pancrazio as dictated by the cavallata obligation. It also list the rider, sometimes it was the same individual who delivered the horse other times it was a sub. There are divided in companies of 26 horses each under a captain. Part 5 referes to the cavalry obligation of the same sesto, it contains the excuses of citizens who could not deliver the horses. Pg xxxviii
o Part 6 contains the register of inhabitants of S. Pancrazio called to arms and divided in groups of 25 with their captains. Part of names contains distinction by parish, in another part (the first one) such distinction is omitted – this reinforces the idea that portion of such registers is incomplete. Pg xxxix
o Part 7 refers to to two notes written in regards to two citizens of Porta S. Piero and of Borgo who presented themselves onf the 27th of August and 1st of September. Pg xli
o Part 8 contains the names of men from the Contado of Florence (that belonging to the Sesto of Porta S. Piero) which presented themselves at the camps in Ricavo and Monsanese between the 29th of August and 1st of September. These were recorded by a single notary for the 2 officials of the city in charge of them. The men are divided by piviere and parish. Pg xli
o Details regarding the army, There were 2 elected chamberlains (Bonelle and Venture) sided by 2
notaries (Imghilberti Aciarii e Ranerius Vinci). These were all paid by the Potesta and Captains, their contract/office starting after the host left for the expedition. A book of the Chamberlain recorading payments must have existed but was lost. Pg xx.
Il servizio del Market, the logistical servicing of the comapnies, was a function assigned to 3 companies (2 per Sesto) under a Banderaio (aka Signore del Mercato) and his assistant (the coadiutore) and with the aid of a notary. Pg. xxii
This role was assigned to Salvi di Chiaro Giorlami for Oltrarno and S Pancrazio
Cerra di Gianni del Massaio for Piero Shceraggio and Borgo Borgognone d’Alberto of the Borgo of S.Lorenzo for Porta del
Duomo and S. Piero. To further aid the provisioning of the army their existed another permanent
and stable offices: pg XXIII and check pg 31, 47, 62, 65, 71 One made of 6 officials and two notaries who stayed in Florence and
sent provisinoning to the army One made of 2 officials with a notary in the Colle di Valdesla to
receive the supplies One made of 2 ufficials and 4 assistant in charge of sending bread to
the army One made of 2 official, 1 notar, and 4 assistants that was charged
with receiving and guarding/storing the bread. The provisinioning of war material and beasts (and their guarding,
maintanence, distribution) was a task assigned (and executed in accordance to the orders of the Potesta or captains) to offices made of state officials and notaries, these were separated in the following manner: pg. xxiii-xxiiii and pg 29-30, 31
6 officials and a notary in charge of crossbows
2 official and a notary in charge of the pavesi 4 officials and a notary in charge of the seattame (i.e. arraws/darts) 2 offcials and a notary in charge of beasts of burden. All notaries had to record the transactions and erogation of
materials from their office’s resources. This supposedly “triumphant, powerful, victorious” army was made
primarily of city and contado militia plus some stipendiary soldiers and those sent by Sympathetic guelf communities of Tuscancy (these latter troops were an independent expeditionary force and not included within the records). This latter force is only mentioned peripherparlly in the Statutes of the Potesta and those of the Captains of the army (i.e. pg. 83, pg 94). All others however who serve the army and are integrated in their ranks, regardless of their status (i.e. levy, foreigner, mercenary, volounter), were recorded in the archives. This men were recorded in the state registed by notaries – who produced an official document. These notaries could not refuse or recuse themselves from such state office under threat of 50 or more lire fine (applied by the Potesta and even when their was job done negligently, ppg 371). Pg xxiiiv-xv and Conrica, vi, 79
All those citizens and contadini between the ages of 15 and 70 had to report to a local official and register their names within the service lists. Failure to do so could result in fines chosen at the discretion of the Potesta (pg. 378). Pg. XXVI
Attempts to dodge the draft or failure to uphold’s one’s military obligation (i.e. maintaining a horse, borrowing equipment) would result in fines rangin from 25 to 100 lire. 12 further officials, under the Potesta, were appointed to ensure the enforcement of military prescriptions. Pg xxvi and pg. 76, 373.
There exists no register for stipendiary militias. Two type foreign stipendiary militia and city volounteer militias. Pg. XXVIII-XXX
Of the second category we have some crossbows, archers, and pikemen who were hired on condotta contracts and had to move with city knights. These paid volounteers were recorded and inspected by two official an a notary in February and by a group of 6 officials (task commuted in the end to the two initial officials with the aid of 4 or more already registed soldiers from the Sesti) in March (pg. 35 and 41).
Of the second category we also see mentioned that there was a company of citizen cavalry hired on a condotta contract placed under two officials and aided by a notary and a black smith (and pg. 42).
Of the first category we know from a deliberation of the 8th of May that 2 officials where chosen to record/inspect stipendiary militias that were in the service of Florence, their horses and their arms. (pg. 83) – no archival source remains.
Of the first category we also have references to the berrovieri of Lombardia and Romagna (pg. 38-40) and of a cavalry forces led the Milanese Pietro de Bezacape (pg. 45-47) – little sources remain on them other than the initial contract agreement and some inspection reports done by the Florentine military official.
o Codification: pg xxx-xxxvii, xl-xli Names sided by a letter “i” in cursive shall be considered as present while
those absent, legitimately excused or substituted do not have the letter. Often this letter is also used for people who turn out to be absent or excused and substituted, this can be explained by a later mutation (that is an inspection carried later on after the register). This indication is often missing next to the name of captains and gonfalonieri but not for their assistants and helpers suggesting that it is they who were doing the registration.
In conclusion the ample use of the signature I suggests that the registering parties (notaries and captains) used it quietly largely and loosely applying to all those who did not explicitly present a notice of excuse (that is applied even to people who were expected to be there but were not for these did not present a notice of excuse or let authorities know of their absence).
i. = absence of notice of absence on first registration. Iu=iuravit (sworn), applied to officers in charge of the army’s artisans and
chamberlains. b/ba=balistarius (crossbow), the pavesari often doubled as these. a= aracator, the pavesari often doubled as these. Ab=absens, used to refer to the gonfalonieri of 3 spade/hoes companies
which did not leave with the expeditionary force on July 15. F=firmum, used to refer to the gonfalonieri of 3 spade/hoes companies were
assigned to the expeditionary force and hence left the city limits on July 15. A symbol to confirm participation to expeditionary force. The symbol’s same function of confirmation is used again when chosing the components of that force which was exonerated from field service and had to preside their contrade of Mugello.
P.s.p.a= presentavit. salmam. Panis. Anone – bread and foods was presented to the officer in charge of provisions.
Et p.r + Madat remain undeciphered by the author but are related to bread, in particular to the delivery.
Asinus = refers to means of transportation used to carry supplies, that is a donkey used for bread.
a/b/c= In the later army registers indicates the date on which each soldier of the 25 men company presented themselves (ie. a= 28 july, b= 29, c=30). The inclusion of point and commas after the letter ndicates a special service or duty. pg xl.
Le sigle a./b. usate per San Donato in Poggio per il 26 e 27 Agosto non hanno significato comprensible. pg xl.
La sigla n. si riferesca all guardia del campo fiorentino presso la Pieve Asciata nella note dal 2 al 3 settembre e che a quella guardia non furono. pg xl-xli
Each of the Florentine districts shall have two Captains. These captains are appointed by the
Potesta, in this case Iacopini Rangoni, in the year 1259. (pg 1) o Each of the 6 Sesti will see appointed two captains (Ultarni, Sancti Petri Scradii,
Burgi, Sancti Pancratii, Porte Domus, Ponte Sancti Petri) o The start of the command of these captains was Monday (?), the 9 th of February
Together with district captains, a series of company gonfalonieri in charge of cavalry will be appointed, these will be sided by their distringitores and councillors. The aforementioned district captains shall appoint 2 councillors and 2 distringitores. (pg 2)
o The had to serve unless their absence could be justified (i.e. sickness, absence of horse, on diplomatic misscion).
As well the army shall appoint further company gonfalonieri in charge of the infantry, these will be sided by their distringitores and councillors. The distringitores and councillors of the infantry gonfaloniere shall be chosen by the gonfaloniere himself. (pg. 3)
o The concillors and restringitores could be elected from the Florentine contado.o The had to serve unless their absence could be justified (i.e. serving in the
Carroccio(. As well the army shall appoint further company gonfalonieri in charge of crossbowmen,
these will be sided by their distringitores and councillors. They will be sided by a single councillor and a single restringitore chosen by the district captains. (pg 4)
o It appears that the appointment could be delegated to a substitute as seen for the ranged gonafloniere of the sextus of San Piero a Scheraggio - Aldobrandinus Mangiatroie call upon his son Bindus (the pg 5).
As well the army shall have officers in charge of the archer companies, each sided by a single councillor and distringitore (who are elected by the district captains). (pg. 6-7)
o Service could be avoided because of age or because the appointed officer already held a post in the army (i.e.. Ruggero Minterbetti was already the gonfaloniere of San Pancrazio a Masus was elected in his place).
The army shall as well appoint 6 officers, one from each district, who shall be in charge of the Posta Campi, - the unit in charge of general policing. (pg 7)
As well the army shall appoint a gonfaloniere of the knights of the carroccio who will be side by a councillor and distringitore (appointed by the district captains). (pg. 7).
As well the district captains appointed on knights within their district to defend the carroccio: (pg 7-9)
o The Oltrarno sextus appointed 10 men (1 absent,1 sick) o The San Piero Scheraggio sextus appointed 9 men (1 sick, 1 lacked horse and rather
was chosen for crossbow duty).o The Borgo appointed 8 men (1 on diplomatic mission, 1 because he is a doctor is
substituted). o The Porta S. Pancrazio appointed 7 men (1 excused and substituted because he had
no horse, 1 came but didn’t take oath because sick, 1 substituted because already captain in the Florentine contado).
o The Duomo appointed 7 men (1 substituted as his horse was inappropriate for war and his other horse was shared with a man who was also called for cavalry duty as such he was subbed, 1 substituted for his left hand was incapacitated and was sick).
o The San Piero doors appointed 7 men (1 was substituted, 1 was absent and unable to attend until easter, 1 excused as he was in charge of a local jail).
As well the army shall appoint a gonfaloniere in charge of the carroccio infantry (Uguccione Davini di Porta Duomo) and the foot soldiers serving under him. (pg. 10-15)
o The Oltrarno provide 29 soldiers o The San Piero Scheraggio provided 30 soldiers o The Borgo provided 19 soldiers. o The Porte San Pancrazio provided 20 soldiers.
o The Porte Duomo provided 26 soldiers.o The Porte San piero provided 25 soldiers. o The had to serve unless excused by age, health, or being already conscripted in
another unit or aborad/diplomatic or were dead or because they covered a fundamental role for the army (i.e. carpenter or company smith).
The army shall appoint Captains of the Market in charge of the victuals for the army, these will be sided by 2 men (a solicitor/assistant and a notary) chosen by the district captains. (pg. 15-16)
o Each captain represents 2 of the Florentine sesti One represents Oltrarno e San Pancrazio One represents San Piero Scheraggio e Borgo One represents Porte Duomo e Porte San Piero
The army shall appoint officer in charge of the sapper units and shall be sided petty officers. Each officer shall be in charge of the sappers for two sesti: (pg 16-17)
o Each captain represents 2 of the Florentine sesti One represents Oltrarno e San Pancrazio One represents San Piero Scheraggio e Borgo One represents Porte Duomo e Porte San Piero
As well the army shall appoint further company gonfalonieri in charge of shield-bearers units (i.e. pavesarii). Each officer shall be in charge of the shield-bearers for two sesti: (pg 17-27)
o Each captain represents 2 of the Florentine sesti One represents Oltrarno e San Pancrazio
The Oltrarno shall provide 60 shield bearers The San Pancrazio shall provide 40 shield bearers
One represents San Piero Scheraggio e Borgo The San Piero Scheraggio shall provide 62 shield bearers The Borgo shall provide 40 shield bearers.
One represents Porte Duomo e Porte San Piero The Porta Duomo shall provide 50 shield bearers The Porta San Pietro shall provide 48 shield bearers.
The Florentine host had a series of logistic companies in charge of supplying items connecting to engineering tasks pg 28
o These items included clevers, saws, axes, pickaxes, hoes and shovel. o These companies were placed under the authority of two officials, sided by a notary,
who will superintend the delivery and the custody of said tools. Pg 29 As well the Florentine host appointed two officers each in charge of provision for the 3 sexti.
Each officer was sided by two aids for each sextus chosen by him and upon agreement with the captains. Pg. 28-29
o One officer was in charge: Oltrarno, Borgo, San Pancrazioo One officer was in charge: S Piero Schieraggio, Duomo, Porte S Piero.
The Army shall have 2 chamberlains, which are already chamberlain for the city, who will be appointed by the captains of the army. These shall be sided by 2 notaries elected by the Captains.
The army shall appoint officials in charge of crossbows, that is in charge of the supply of crossbow bolts and the maintanence of the machine. They will be appointed by the captains and shall number 6 officials. Pg 29-30
The army shall appoint 3 officials in charge of Pavesi, elected by the captains. To guard and prepare/maintain these shields for combat. Pg 30.
6 officialis, 1 per sesto, shall be appointed by the captains and these shall be in charge of electing the gonfalonieri for every village of the Florentine contado while also appoint those in charge of around the clock guard duty. Pg 30.
2 Smiths, appointed by the captains, shall be in charge of providing useful items for the army and shall have their own bellows, anvils, hammers and all other items useful for servicing the army. Pg 30.
The army shall appoint 2 officials, elected by the captains and sided by a notary, in charge of procuring and conducting the mules and the beasts of burden necessary for transporting the victuals and the equipment of the army. Pg 31
The captains shall appoint officials, 1 per sesto and sided by 2 notaries, who will stay in Florence and shall oversee the shipping of provisions to the army. Pg 31.
The captains shall appoint 4 officials and 2 notaries in charges of the supply and distributions of bolts and arrows. Pg 31.
The captains shall appoint 6 officials, divided in 3 groups of 2, in charge of readying the defences in specific parts of the contado along the border of Siena. The locations are Poggibonzi (burgo Podiii Bonizii), Sancto Donato in Pocis (San Donato in Poggio), and Monteguarchi (Montevarcho). Pg 31-32
The Potesta Iocopino Rangonis appointed the 6 messengers, 1 for sextus, which stayed with captains of the army for set periods of time. Pg 32-33
Following the call to arms, the captains were not at work (for 24 days). Pg 33. The city of Florence, that is the high judge under the postesta, appoints captains to 4
neighboring communes (Gangalandi – Lastra a Signa , Pontormo - Pontorme, Monteguarchi - Montevarchi, Montelupo – same name) and assigns to them a banner and a pavilion – all these military imposition come out of the city’s own funds in order not to burden their own and neighbouring communities. Similarly this applies to the Commune of Certaldo. (pg 33-35), 43-44
The captains appointed 2 officials and a notary in charge of finding and recruiting paid crossbowmen, archers and pikemen from the city and who had to be armed and ready for service and had to be ready to move ay any time with the city knights. Pg 35-36
o Their salary, as decided by the Potesta and in agreement with the captains, when in service outside of the city shall be of: 3 soldi (about 36 denari) per day for crossbowmen, 32 danari for archers per day, 30 denari for the pikeman per day.
o Regardless of being in active service, these stipendiary troops received a wage of 10 soldi per month while in the city’s itself.
o Pg. 83 the stipendiaries shall be subjected to a review made by 2 officials appointed by the commune who are themselves fighting horsemen.
The city of Florence, by order of the elders, must levy from the neigboring communes of Gambassi and Catignano horsemen (if this has not been done yet). This was done again for the Commune of Puliciano and Montevolteraio Pg 36, 38, 40
o The process was undertaken by 2 florentine officers appointed by captains.
The city as well shall keep on appointing to the pivieri’s (that is localities of the contado) attached to the districts of Porte San Piero and Borgo captains whose employment and wages are determined by the city. Each captain shall bear a banner and receive a pavilion from the city. Pg 37.
o As noted in the cases of Uberti de Rovinoso and Baldese di Bonaccorso dell’Antella, military expenses started increasing to the extent that these captain were appointed with a single salary to oversee two pivieri.
We see that for Monteguarchi, 4 minor pivieri are placed under its authority (Poci, Villole, Ocierano, Moncione). Similar for Spugnola and Coldipietra are put under larger pivieri (respectively San Piero Sieve and Ripoli di Greti). The commune of Collegonzoli e Petroio argue that , in order to reduce military expenses, they should be put under captain of the piviere of S. Giovanni in Greti, his gofalaone and paivliion. Again for Santa Maria Val D’arno places itself under the command of the Piviere of Gropina (this authority shall be over military affairs and shall not endager the existing liberties/status of the subjected communities). Pg 38, 42, 44-45, 52-3
On order and in accordance to the captains of the army, 1 good men together with a notary shall travel to Modena (in Lombardy?) and shall hire for a condotta 100 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modenaberrovieri under 2 gonfalioneri and 4 captains. Each gonfaloniere and 2 of the captains shall be in charge of 50 riders, and said gonfalioneri and captains must have 3 horses each while each rider must at least have one horse. Pg 38-39
o The communal representatives must hire them for 3 months while attempting to obtain the best possible terms for the city.
o If no berrovieri are found in Modena, they represnative shall move onto Reggo, Parma and Fregnana to fill said ranks.
o A further 100 berrovieri shall be seeked for in Romagna region and shall be hired in accordance to the aforementioned methods.
The contract of the berrovieri: pg 39-40o Each hired berroviere must already posses horse and weapons, readied for service. o Each berroviere must have prejudice against the city of Florence.
o All the enemy prisoners captured must be delivered onto Florentine authorities such as the Podesta, the Captains, or the Elders or people designated by the Florentine government. And all those prisoners they obtain must be exhibited and those Florence would be intrx`ested in shall be traded for a sum of 10 libras. If the city does not want such prisoners, it is the right of the berrovieri to do with them as they like.
o All spoils captured from the enemy by the berrovieri can and shall be kept by the horsemen.
o If captured by the enemy’s of Florence, those berrovieri shall be traded for those prisoners captured by them and not yet paid for by the city of Florence.
o If during their contract the soldier’s horse will be killed or is injured they shall received an indeminity. The sum of indemnity shall be determined by people appointed by the Commune of Florence.
o This contract is subject to modifications by the elders. The captains decree that all men in the contado must be registered and they must serve in
the sesto to which their contado locality belongs (regardless/not withstanding where you are when summoned) and they will serve as crossbowmen, archers, pikemen or in charge of the supplies or earthworks. Pg 41
There is precedent (i.e. Capraia) where control of the local military band was devolved onto the inhabitants of the commune, allowing them to chose their own captain and assigning them a banner and at the same time they would be burdened with the expense of setting up their own pavilion (because they were so few) – potentially author mistaked assigning two different dates to the same document i.e. in text 4th of march (Sunday), in appendix 3rd of March. Pg 41.
The city hired within its bounds further horsemen who were to serve for pay under specific terms. These were recruited and the terms established by 2 officials, a notary and a blacksmith. Pg 42-43
o The horsemen must be loyal and useful to the cityo They must serve with a horse valued at 30 soldi or more. These troops must be
subjected to a state-mandated inspection of their horse and weapons to check that they are at least matching the set valutation.
o These troops were to serve on the promise of payment, for this they swore an oath of loyalty to their contractor.
o This troops shall serve at their personal and material risk/fortune and nothing shall be asked in restitution from the city unless with cause and reason.
o Their contract shall last 4 month. They shall start their service immediately for the coming 2 month at a rate of 9 libre per month. They shall be receiving the same rate for the remaining months. Their wages will be deducted by 18 denari per day during times where they are not in active duty until the army is mobilized again for an expedition.
o All prisoners captured among the enemies of Florence shall be presented and delivered to Florentine authotities (i.e. Potesta, Captains, or Elders or any other person designated by the city). If the city is interested in them, these prisoners shall be exchanged for a bount of 10 libre for each knight and 5 for each foot soldier. If not interested, the soldier who catpures such prisoner is free to demand ransom or free them at his pleasure.
o All spoils captured from the enemy by the horsemen can and shall be kept by the horsemen.
o If captured by the enemy’s of Florence, the horsemen could be exchanged for prisoners captured by them – unlike the berrovieri, even if the commune had already paid a bounty for these prisoners, the horsemen could still be exchanged for their previously captured prisoner (in as much as they gave back the bounty paid out to them)
The military organization revolving around the Florentine contado was enacted under threat of potential finnes decided by the Podesta (i.e. Pasignano commune). Pg. 44.
2 officials and a notary are in change of paying all standing troops who were garrisoned within city limits a salary of 20 soldi each for 17 days (while the rest of the army is marching). Pg 45
The contract with the Milanese Piero de Bazacape for his band of 50 cavalrymen: pg 45-47o The Florentine commune promises to him and his band immunity from all past
crimes with the exception of murder, purgery, rebellion, theft, arson or betrayal committed against the city during their service for Florence
o The horseman ride at their own material and personal risk and thus will not obtain restitution or compensation for any loss unless justified. As such, as established within the pact, the horseman shall receive compensation for a dead, injured, or lamed horse or for a lost weapon while fighting under the banner of the city or any other ally of the city (as order by Florence itself).The compensation of weapons and horses will be based on an estimate made from an expert appointed by the city, in no other case there will be restitution.
o All prisoners captured among the enemies of Florence shall be presented and delivered to Florentine authotities. If the city is interested in them, these prisoners shall be exchanged for a bounty of 10 fiorini piccoli. If not interested, the soldier who catpures such prisoner is free to demand ransom or free them at his pleasure.
o All spoils captured from the enemy by the horsemen can and shall be kept by the horsemen.
o If captured by the enemy’s of Florence, these horsemen shall be traded for those prisoners captured by them and not yet paid for by the city of Florence.
o Their service shall last at least 2 months and can be extended by the commune, if they to. Their wages shall be of 8 libre of fiorini piccioli for each month and for each horse.
The captains shall elect 2 officials and a notary who will reside in the city and in charge of sending bread to the army. 3 furthers officers within the host shall be elected and tasked with receiving, guarding and selling the bread. Pg 47.
6 men were assigned by the captains of the army to defend anf fortify the contrade of the muggello (entryway through the Appenines). Soldiers from neighboring communities are appointed to specific posts from which to defend the territory. A set of precise instructions are given with the understanding that they can be changed by the vicar of the Mugello. Furthermore an emergency squadron is nominally created to further aid the guarding of the contrada. Pg 48-50
From the central government we see the establishment/creation of specific dispositions regarding the defensive conduct/preparation of the army of the Mugello. Pg 51-52
o Those who live or reside at Borgo San Lorenzo shall rally on the banks of the Sevis river and between those Faltona and the Moscie river.This zone shall be presided as
well by the men from Colognolo and Acone. All those of San Pietro all Sieve shall rally all men between the Faltona and the Florentine side of the Sieve river (together with those of Montanea and all the people of Cersine). Those residing at Montecroci and and their fractions shall rally at Gagliano together with all the men of montefiesole and monteregi. All those of the vicariat of Valmarina shall rally near the high street of Latera.
o All men belonging to vicariate, who are not ordered to take part within the host, shall swear to defend and preside those areas they are assigned to by the vicar of the Mugello. The instructions specify a flexible quota of man which must defend a series of redoubts along strategic locations and those of officials.
o A great of latitude is left with the local vicar, able to modify the deployment of troops. These rights, duties, and instructiona are confirmed through the letter of the city of Florence.
o The vicar’s power and the above instructions must be communicated via pubblic messangers to the entirety of the contado and other interested locations.
Troops called at the Mugello shall present themselves to the Vicar a day before the deparature of the army (or even before if the vicarious decides) with crossbows, bows, and provisions. It will be the responability of each eligible individual to present himself for service, so that the Vicar may leave them. Such obligations must be respected and will be enforced by sanctions or imprisonment. Pg 52
3 Army appointed medics shall take care of the wounded of the host. Pg 53. People who offered valuable service to the army (i.e. blacksmiths) are exempted from
frontline service. Pg 53. The supply of the army was dependeant (as seen by a latter written directly by the Potesta
of Florence to that of Poggibonzi) on the provision arrangements made by local communities loyal to Florence. Preemptory orders were issued to ensure that each locality were the army shall transit shall have enough food, breads, and victuals and other necessary items for its provisioning. This community was in charge of its own defence against the common enemy. Similar letters were sent to the Commune of Colle, Castellano and San Donato in Pocis. Pg 54.
The mobilization of Florentine was on such large scale that arrangements were made were only one miller and porter per mill shall remain at home, while all other shall be called to arms. If there is more than one miller in the mill, the oldest one shall stay in the mill. Pg 54
From page 54, 55, 56, various reasons for not having to serve within the army (I,e, age, infirmity, covering an important service for the city – i.e. curing the lion of the city, in charge of maintaining the mills of the city like those of Santa Lucia or Florence – or being used for garrison service rather than as expeditionary troops -i.e. list for the Mugello).
The army shall elect 6 commanders of the Caraccio among veterans who already for the unit. Each commander will be appointed from each of the Sesti. As well the captains of the carrocio appoint 4 masters. Pg 56-57
The captains of the army order that the merchants not belonging to the vicariate of the Mugello, but who had been stationed there at the time the army was there, shall now follow host and bring theme the necessary provisions. Pg 57
Agains they Florentine system has some tactical flexibility, allowing for the movement certain unit from a designated location to another (i.e the men of Valmarina from Latera to Combiate). Similar thing for half of the men of Calenzano, moved from their preassigned fort to Combiate. Likewise the men of Trevalli shall not move from Trevalli. Pg 57.
Strict laws regarding service, so much so that to defend ones homes (i.e. the house of Bussa called Capaccia in Mugello, at Colle in Padule) one need licence by the Potesta and company (which allowed to defend the house with 6 men in so much as it had also tactical value). Pg 58. At pg 66 Guido Piovani and his family are exempted from following the host and allowed to defend in the Val d’Arno (with many meny).
At pg 58-59 we have a letter establishing defensive protocols for the vicariate of Mugello and Val Marina. This protocol establishes mutual assistance in case of attack and the defensive of Mr. Bussa’s Casa di Capaccia which is to double as a stronghold for the local people. He also establishes that vicariate of Mugello give Bussa and 6 men an exemption from general service in the army to protect his home. These 7 men however will still be under the command of the vicar and during the day they will have to do as ordered to them (in the evening the can go back and guard the house).
A similar letter is sent at pg. 59-60 for the vicariate of Val Marina, establishing how the vicar with his force will have to garrison the territory, how they have to preside important houses in their territory, and how they will have to assist the Muggello vicariate when in need (in the same way that Muggello people have to do for them). A list of men from vicariate is also attached requesting that this present themselves to Florence the day before the army moves, these shall reside with the marching and train the army during their stay.
Pg 60, 68 exemption for tailor from service for 8 days from Sunday to finish to sew the covers for horses. A further exemption of 8 days is given.
Pg 60 permission granted to the carroccio guard to elect a further notary, 8 messangers, 4 masters/artisans in addition to those already elected.
Pg 61, 63, 64 it was ordered that 200 men from Montemurlo and its garrison be sent to the host and also all merchants with their provision must join them. These men shall be chosen by Ruggero di Faalcone della Vaccaia. All remaining shall stay to garrison the local fort and do not have to come with the host. A similar provision for Montevarchi is made were 100 men and merchant shall be sent to the host, the others remaining to garrison their location. Half of the men of Montelungo, Tasso, Caposelvi shall remain to guard their lands - the other half plus the local merchant shall join the host. The same half and half disposition is valid for the commune of Pulicciano (half defending castle, half joining the host).
Pg 61 Officer Spigliato del Riccio, in charge of the shields maintanence and custody, nominate 4 further men to aid him in his task.
Pg 62 To further facilitate the job of provisioning officers, 4 messangers for services and mule to carry their tent and trabacco are assigned to them. 2 furthers statutes are issued which establish that the carroccio and that the market purveyors have respectively 4 mules/2 carts and 4 messengers/ 1 mule per banner (i.e. per company).
Pg. 63 the bannerman for the expedition (Gesta or Giesta) and his associates shall be given 100 spears to attack the enemies of the commune of Florence (and the Chamberlain of the commune shall given to them).
Pg. 63, 64, 65, 66, 67 to aid of job of the munition officers they shall be given a state mule to carry the munitions and the shelter fo such officials. To aid the job of the two smiths of the army 2 mules shall be given to them. A series of further mules are assigned to various corps in the army to facilitate their tasks.
Pg. 64, 68 the men of Montedicroci, rather than remaining to garrison their village and the Mugello with the men of Cologinole and Acone (specifically the Gagliano), shall join the host. Those of Colognole and Acone are confirmed to remain at Gagliano (except the merchants those shall follow). On request of the Sinbaldo Tornaquinici, Podesta of the burgh of poggi bonsi for the commonwealth and ambassador of it, it is recognized that it useful for the
Commune to keep the local men, during the time of the expedition against Siena, with the burgh to garrison it.
Pg. 64 The potesta and captains of the army forbade that the Potesta of the Commune San Miniato from allowing the exiles and their associate of the Burgh of San Fiore and Toore Benni to reside or enter his district. He has to expel them in any possible way in light of their attempts of harming the commonwealth of Florence.
PG. 64 an estimate for the cost of maintain a horse can be deduced by the fact that the gonfalonieri of spade and hoes are given a subsidy of 3 lire per horse (as their predecessor were during the army raised at Vernia).
PG 65, 66, 68, 70, 101, 102 the army very clearly a complex network of communication of messangers as seen by the fact that basically every single corps of the army (including non-combatant personnel) were given “nuntii”.
o The shall be paid from the dates of Monday 19th of april until Sunday 25th 16 denari each per day. And from then on they shall be paid the same.
Pg 67 The berrovieri are taken care by the commune of Florence, who are allowed a mule to bring their equipment and things.
Pg 68, 69, 72, 95 The Carrocio guard and their wages and other personnel attached to it:o The carroccio guardians and messanger from the dates of Monday 19th of april until
Sunday 25th shall received 2 soldi each per day. And from Sunday thereafter 12 denari (that is 1 soldo) per day.
o The masters/artisans of the carrocccio shall be paid from the dates of Monday 19th of april until Sunday 25th 2 soldi and 6 denari each per day. And from Sunday thereafter 18 denari (that is 1 soldo and 6 denari) per day.
o The pickaxemen of the carroccio shall be paid from the dates of Monday 19 th of april until Sunday 25th 2 soldi each per day. And from Sunday thereafter 12 denari (that is 1 soldo) per day.
o The grulli (simpletons) of the carroccio, in charge of leading the beasts of burden, shall be paid from the dates of Monday 19th of april until Sunday 25th 2 soldi each per day. And from Sunday thereafter 18 denari (that is 1 soldo and 6 denari) per day.
o The guardian of the oxen of the carroccio shall be paid, for each of their two oxen, 4 soldi .
o The 20 infantrymen guarding the carroccio shall receive in total each a sum of 10 soldi for their service.
Pg 69-70 The vicar of Semifonte (Salice from the Sesto of D’Oltrarno) swears under a potential fine of 1000 lire (guaranteed by Ugolino Bennevienni of San Iacopo D’Oltrarno who has already given the collateral) that he shall, after receving the letter of Potesta, come with the people of his vicariate to the host. He shall be obliged from Wednesday to join the army with all his people except 200 men. These latter, who shall be the most loyal enemies of Siena, are allowed to garrison the lands of the vicariate and a list shall be prepared by the vicar and deliver to the Potesta.
Pg 70, 78, 83, 84, 85, 88-89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96 Wages of personnel of communeo The communal messengers shall be paid from the dates of Monday 19th of april until
Sunday 25th 16 denari each per day. And from then on they shall be paid the same. G o The executioner of the the commune shall be paid (in addition to his wage of 2 soldi
per day while in peacetime service of commune) from the dates of Monday 19 th of april until Mondaaid by the Chamberlain. y 26th 12 soldi per day. This adds up to a
total of 3 soldi per day (usual salary plus wartime salary). This increased salary will be increased until the end of May.
o When transporting those charge of moving wood, tents and bell of the army shall be paid 2 soldi (when moving said items) or 12 denari (1 soldo) when at rest per day until the host is raised).
o Those in charge of constructing the fortifications of Casole shall be paid 20 denari per day (1 soldo and 8 denari), their messanger shall be paid 12 denari (1 soldo) per day.
o The extra 100 marraioli (hoeman) hired by the commune shall be paid, when working, 12 denari per day.
o The Doctors of the army shall be paid different sums. The magister (master) Rogerio was paid 3 lire in charge of both wounded and sick, the other 3 doctors, only charge of the wounded, were paid 40 soldi.
o The heralds of the army shall have salary of 5 soldi per day each until the duration of the expedition.
o For the payment of all the hoeman a sum of 20 lire was dispensed to their official so that he may pay them for the time served. A further 10 lire is given (at pg. 94)
o The scouts/guides of the army shall receive horse and money from the Commune. Each shall have 1 horse, shall be provisioned by the commune and shall receive a salary of 6 soldi per day. They are owed 10 days of salary from the day of the statute and shall be paid the same from then on.
o Pg 93, the engineers/masters who destroyed the walls of Abbazia di Isola (Abbadia Isola) shall be paid 25 lire fore their service.
o Pg 94-5, all those transporting pavesi shall be paid 30 denari for each day of service. The days of service shall be recorded by the officer in charge of pavesi and large crossbows (Macha Donzi) and his notary.
o Pg 94-5, all those who transports large crossbows shall be paid each 30 denari for each day of service. The days of service shall be recorded by the officer in charge of pavesi and large crossbows (Macha Donzi) and his notary.
o Pg 95 considering that a total of 25 libre was erogated for the payment of pavesari and large crossbowmen, we can estimate that the army was employing a grand total of 120 personnel in charge of transportation of palvesari and large crossbowmen.
o The two smith of the army shall be paid in total 20 soldi (to be divided between them).
Pg 71 the potesta of forte Casole is assigned by the city 10 footmen, chosen by him, 4 of which who shall reside in the tower of the fort for its defense, 6 of which will reside with his person in his defence. Each shall have a salary of 20 soldi for the period of a month work (paid immediately) during the mobilization and after the dismissal of the host they shallll remain and receive 40 soldi per month.
Pg 71-72, 80 in the submission of the commune of Casole to Florence they surrender all their fortification and Castole itself to the Florentines and shall act as subordinates of the Commune paying the usual tribue to Florence and shall align itself diplomatically and militarily to Florence (protecting Florentine interests, property and people within its confines). They shall enforce said agreement under a fine of 1000 marks of silver (i.e. about 8000 ounce)n guaranteed by the property of people of cognola. A similar agreement is made by the commune of Menzana with Florence swearing to be subservient and loyal to their new Potesta (a man loyal to Florence) and completely repudiating their former lords of
Siena and refusing to taken on or offering refuge to Senesi or any exile or rebel of Florence. These provision are enforced with same fine menaced onto Casole.
Pg 72-73, 78, 83 again the army of Florence employed a large non-combatant personnel (such as heralds, notaries and persone who went to Florence to get the material for the refitting of saddles and the such) to be employed in various functions by the army.
Pg 73-74 important to the army is the appointment of a series of notaries, who will follow the host, who are in charge of recording the knights and footmen who present themselves from each sesto.
o Oltrarno appoint 7 notaries. o San Pietro Scheraggio appointed 8 notaries. o Borgo appointed 3 notarieso Porte San Pancrazio appointed 4 notarieso Porte Duomo appointed 4 notarieso Porte San Pietro appointed 4 notaries.
Pg 75 the Army of Florence as well as providing medical treatment of wounded as well expanded the duties of medic to cure the sick as well.
Pg 75 the Army appoint 6 officers in charge of sappers and sabouters actions (1 per Sesto)o The sappers were quite a requested role with 200 extra ones to be contracted by the
commune and paid 12 denari (thus 1 soldo) per day for each – only when employed for military actions, these shall be recorded and paid by a notary selected by the aformnetioned officials.
Pg 76 2 officer per sesto are chosen for the inspection of the horsemen of the army, chosen on the basis that they know the soldier presenting themselves, in order to avoid fraud or people trading fraudulently places.
Pg 76 + G.Villani, Come i Fiorentini assediarono e guastarono intorno la città d'Arezzo + G. Villani, libro 10 Come i Fiorentini grande oste per soccorere la citta di Pistoia, e come castruccio l’ebbe a patti a series of officials are appointed to build all the siege engines (including ladders, grilli – armoured covered to transport troops closer to the wall -, gatto – armoured troop transports that is mobile cover - , and siege towers) to take the fort of Menzani (Mensano, later taken by agreement). 1 official per sesto was appointed
o Each was paid 4 soldi for their work on the machines Pg 76-77 we see the appointment of those in charge of the big crossbows, their subdivision
was as follows:o Oltrano, appoints 6o San Pietro Scheraggio, appoints 6o Port san Pancrazio, appoints 4o Porta san Pietro, appoints 6o Borgo, appoints 6o Duomo, appointments are missing or might have not had any large crossbowmen.
Pg 78, 85, 92 the state shall provide a loan up to 200 libre to provision agents to thus ensure that the army is well provisioned.
o On the 10th of May a further 200 lire loan was granted to those who carted the provisions (for they could not afford to buy both food themselves and their animals).
o A further salary of 40 soldi per mule given to these. Pg 78, 95 part of the costs of war were devolved to the subjected lords of the commune or
their subservient communal allies (i.e. count Ildebrandino da Pitigliano) who were responsible to pay the Florentine troops/seargents under them (i.e. Ildebrandino was
employing Florentine for the defense of Montemasso). These were to receive their entire pay for their service by such lords (i.e. the pay of May for those of Motemasso) and not the commune but could be employed as these lords chose. The men of Montemurlo in the Florentine host shall be paid by their own commune and not Florence.
o Ultimately the wages were paid by the commune who gave them 45 soldi for their 23 days service in defence of the castle, they were then paid a wage of 34 soldi and 6 denari each for first part of May and they will receive for the remaineder of the month of May a payment of further 3 lire each.
o In total (considering the reward for their courage) they shall receive a total of 7 lire 14 soldi and 6 denari.
Pg 78-79, 84, 90-91 the Florentine army as well rewarded courage and upstuanding conduct while at arms with a financial reward, the commune and Potesta (with relative approval from other high officials) ordering that a certain Cambio da Cuorle be rewarded with 6 lire for his courage. A similar reward was given to the captain of Montemassi (Tancredi), one defending the fort for Ildebrando da Pitgliano, for his courage during the Siege by the Senesi – he was given 25 lire in denari. Equally, the Florentine seargents defending the castle shall be rewarded 3 lire each for their courage. Giunto son of Compagno di Lonciano shall receive (but collected by his father as his on is captured by the Senese employed Germans) a reward for his defence of Montemassi of 3 lire.
Pg 79, as a symptom of Florence’s burgeoning imperialism they appoint their man as Potesta of Menzana (Gualterone del Pace). To further reinforce their grip on their new holding Florence takes 13 hostages from Menzana.
Pg 81-83 a large number of officials are appointed for each sesto to review and register troops of the contado.
o From Oltrarno 9 of which 3 notarieso From Pietro Scheraggio 9 of which 3 notarieso From Borgo 9 of which 3 notarieso From Pancrazio 9 of which 3 notarieso From Duomo 4 of which 2 notaries.o Frrom Porte San Pietro 12 of which 4 notaries.
Pg 83, the order of battle takes the following form:o Archer and Crossbowmen shall be deployed in the front lineo These followed by the militias of 3 sesti: Oltrarno, Borgo, San Pancrazio and shall be
augmented by the Pratesi troops. o These are to be followed by their “popolo” (people?).o After these “popoli” their shall be the militia of the other 3 Sesti.o After these the militia from Lucca shall follow in their own line. o And all the remaining “popoli” shall follow these. o Followed by these their shall be the allied cavalrymeno And finally these shall be followed by the “popolo” of said allies.
Pg 84, 25 men are left to garrison the castle of Linare Val D’else, who shall not be called to follow the host. Of these 25, 4 shall be infantrymen.
Pg 86 the horses of two berrovieri were estimated at respectively 15 lire of small florins and 20 lire of small florings.
Pg 86-87 election of officials that must ensure that the rear-guard shall march in formation. 2 officials per sesto were appointed.
Pg 87, instance were the state refuses to buy off from the modenese mercs the 3 prisoners captured, in doing so they give full authority to mercs to do as they please with them (for Florence is not interested in paying them).
Pg 89, all captains when an assembly is called shall rally under the Potesta’s tent – the people who don’t come shall be fined 20 soldi and tardiness shall be fined 12 denari. Meanwhile councillors of the sesti who are absent shall be fined 10 soldi, tardiness 12 denari.
Examples of Payments for troopso Pg 89-90, 2 cavalrymen stipendiaries for the commune of Florence shall be paid each
for the month of May 7 lire and 10 soldi per month.o Pg 90 a senese archer with the mercs hired by Florence will be paid 50 soldi
(important as could indicate mixed mer companies). o Pg 92 the vlounteer horseman and cavalryman of the army (that is not conscripted
stipendiaries from florences) shall be paid, in accordance to the judgment of 2 officials of Florence, as established by the Potesta and Caaptains.
o Pg 95 a soldier in the army who was made knight/cavalrymen by the Potesta (Ranerio Gioia) shall receive 10 libras.
o Pg 96, the 12 Berrovieri of Romagna shall be paid in total a sum of 20 soldi each. Pg 90, 94 it is likely that the Senese were employing German mercs during the conflict as
indicated in the statutes of 13th may. Further reference to this is suggests in the monetary rewards given to those Florentines who captured prisoners or Germans.
Pg 91 always the prospect that the officials attached to the army might attempt to appropriate lecherously funds of the state (as Tancredi captain of Montemassi did who did not erogate the sums owed to the his soldiers as rewards for his bravery).
Pg 91, again, fearing ambushes on the road, the commune arranges that Raniero Scuarcialupi (under a punishment at the discretion of the Potesta) shall guard the road and his own home and tower so that those who use of road (especially for the provisioning of the army) do not have risk or impediments. He shall be held responsible for any breach in security.
Pg 93, as the army marched we see the creation of infrastructure to supports its descent (with the appointment of 6 official to expand the roads of the campo).
Pg 94 captured horseman/knights shall be worth 10 libras, and footmen shall be worth 100 soldi (if they were citizen of the enemy). Those from the contado shall be worth only 3 lire.
Pg 96, to preside and defend Poggi Bonsi near Siena – the vicar of Semifont (under a personal fine of 200 lire and 1000 for the vicariate) shall send 400 of his vicariate to garrison the burgh for 4 days. A similar order is given to vicar Borgogni vicar of San Donato in Poggi and Chianti, under a fine of 200 lire to his person and 500 to his vicariate, to send 20 infantrymen at Castellina and Trebbio (between Fonterutoli and Croce Firoentrina).
FROM 96 WE SEE THE END OF DOCUMENTATION RELEVANT TO THE FIRST EXPEDITION VS SIENA.
Pg 96, with the election of new captains for 2nd expedition we come to now that the captain of the people is Filippo Vicedomini. Again election of 12 captains, however some names are missing and their distribution by Sesto is not known. It is likely that these were appointed 2 per sesto, as their name are paired in the documents. Together with them 3 messangers are appointed.
Pg 97, the knights of the contado onto whom the cavallata obligation was imposed (and delivered the horse to the commune) were to reside in the city armed, with horses and with
all the necessary equipment (except those residing on the frontiers). 3 official are elected to enforce this orders plues with the aid of Thomaso knight of the Potesta.
Pg 97, the archers and crossbowmen could commute their service by paying a bounty. A citizen crossbow had to pay 30 soldi per crossbow, a contado citizen will pay 15 soldi per crossbow. An archer for the commune instad had to pay 10 soldi for bow. These would guarantee them exemption from service and fines attached to refusing to serve. Those who offer enough crossbows to the war effort shall be absolved from said payments. 6 officials were appointed in charge of such deliberations. Those who shall want to carry personally those crossbows imposed in the army shall receive weapons from the army of certified quality, if available. Those who shall serve personally and receive the crossbow from the army shall be paid exactly as much as the sum of the tax of the balestra. These sames diposition apply to the contadini. These dispositions serve to raise a force of 1000 crossbowmen between citizens and contado dwellers.
Pg 98, 6 officials are elected so that they summon all rectors of the contado and those on which the commune imposes the archery obligation. Of those summoned only a quarter of the force from each circumscription shall be chosen -> the officer shall chosen they see as younger and more apt in archery. Those not chosen shall pay 10 soldi to their rector who will then pay the chosen archer. Those who pay shall be exempted from service and absolve from sanctions until next January.
Pg 98-99, 2 officials are appointed to choose - between all hoeman and shovelers - a force of 600 hoeman (who shall carry as many hoes) and from the remaining pool they shall choose 600 sappers with good axes and hoes.
Pg 99, with the permission of two part of the captains (1/3?), let those who have promised to carry a crossbow in substitution of someonelese be accepted if sufficient and idoneous and let them be paid for service until next 1st of January. Let them have appropriate weapons and crossbows. On the other hand if these prove insufficient or are not approved by the captains or are absent, then he on whom was imposed the crossbows, because who he promised was not apt, can either be paid to carry the crossbow or he has find and appoint another good substitute.
o As well those on which small horse were imposed shall be paid so that they may accompany (and carry things) for the crossbowmen or any useful and appropriate equipment
o As well those crossbowmen guarding the city shall be paid. o As well all those crossbowmen mentioned above and below shall be paid.o As well the masters of Commune and master builders shall be paid, an all those who
were carrying the crossbows in place of those who had been chosen. o Merchant, record and found in the Book of Merchants, shall be absolver from the
crossbow duty. Pg 99, more than two parts of the captains have ordered that 3 banners of crossbowmen, 3
bands of archers and 3 banners of hoeman shall remain in the city. Each group of 3 banner shall be subdivided between the sesti of the city: one residing in Oltrarno and San Pancrazio, one residing in San Pietro Scheraggio and Borgo, and one residing in Porta Duomo and Porta San Pietro. All other shall depart
Pg 99, all those contributing a horse of 45 lire and owing a new crossbow to the commune, the imposition of the crossbow shall be cancelled and removed for them. If the horseman co-owns the crossbow, only he shall be exempted from the imposition – his co-owner or co-owners shall instead the 30 prescribed soldi for each ballista.
Pg 100, each sesto shall have a blacksmith in charge of horseshoes, he shall be obliged to follow the cavalcata and bring horsehoes and nails in abundance and his tool for shodding the horses. He must bring all iron so that nothing shall be missing for the cavalcata. If a blacksmith owes a horse or 45 lire he will have to bring a rouncey to carry his iron and he shall have a cart and he shall from the city 2 soldi per day of small florins. He who does not have a horse, shall have a for himself and rouncey 5 soldi per day. If they shall fail in their duties they shall be fined 100 soldi for each infringement.
Pg 100, those who are imposed both bow and the crossbow, shall pay only the crossbow and be absolved from the bow, and in their place someone else shall be chosen by the rector. If someone is captured by the enemy shall not pay the imposition on the crossbow or bow. To someone who owes a bow in two circumscriptions, shall owe service in the place he lives and be absolved forever from the other place (but in his place the rector shall pick someone else). He who owes a crossbow in the city and the contado, he shal pay and absolved from the imposition of the contado and, since a crossbowmen is lost, the rector shall provide a substitute.
Pg 100-101, there 3 gonfalonieri for crossbows (2 per Sesto Oltrano/San Pancrazio, Scheraggio/Borgo, 2 Porte). There are 3 bannerman for archer (same combo), ther are 3 gonfaloineri for hoeman (same combo).
Pg 101 , there exist a signal system through bonfire. Enemies seen across the Elsa signalled with 1 fire. If a small force of about 200 crosses the elsa 2 fires shall be lit and twice they shall be covered and uncovered. If a large force or army shall engage us they shall lite 3 fires thrice they shall be covered and uncovered (at that instance as well you shall send a fast messanger on horse to the Potesta to confim the news). A large fire shall be kept on for a long time, until they receive further notice, to be sure that all of ours can see it everywhere and our troops shall not remain hidden If enemies come during the day you should make smoke according to the rules above.
Pg 102, 3 officers in charge of munition (one of which is in charge of the mules carryin the ammo).
Il codicetto militare (pg. 369-376) http://theharniac.net/castellan/feudal_troops_cavalry_ref.htm
o The Potesta, together with the 12 captains from the Florentine Sesti, have established the following statues and orders.
o Florence’s captain of the people (and elder) at the time was Phylippi Vidomini. o All soldiers, city dwellers and contado inhabitants of Florence, wherever they are,
between 15 and 70 years old must come and serve in this army. Exempted are those guarding the prisoners, those garrisoning the city, and
those garrisoning the fortress of the commune (all shall remain in service fore Florence).
Exampted are those who have licence from the Captains and Potesta and the Captains and Elders of the People.
Those called to arms but absent will have to pay a fine to the Commune of Florence. If they are knight they shall pay 50 lire of small fiorini, if footmen they 25 lire of small fiorini. Bannermans on horse shall pay 200 lire of small fiorini for absence, bannerman for foot instad shall 100 lire of small fiorni. These are not exemption, those called to arms must join the host and pay part of the debit by then
If not present within the camp by the assigned date, you shall be banned to serva any pubblic office in perpetuity. He shall also be ineligible to receive
any privilege from the commune of Florence. Furthermore he shall be punished at the discretion of the Potesta (these punishment are immutable and cannot be revoked).
The milites and peditus who do not register themselves and are within the age range for service shall pay a fine of 10 small florins. In truth footmen shall pay only 100 soldi (that is half of the above sum, since 10 liras=200 soldi) but can be charge more or less at the discretion of Potesta.
These fines shall cumulate with any tehr existing or future fine. Those knights who do not respond to the call and remain in their respective
city district or contado distrct of Florence, their village or borough in which they reside shall be fined a sume of 50 small florins plus further fine, whose sum shall be decided by the Podesta, if the community does not report the remissive soldier.
Those footmen who do not respond to the call and remain in their respective city district or contado distrct of Florence, their village or borough in which they reside shall be fined a sume of 25 small florins plus further fine, whose sum shall be decided by the Podesta, if the community does not report the remissive soldier.
The house in which the knight draft dodger is found shall be destroyed unless pay a further fine of 25 lire (potentially 500 small florins).
The house in which the footmen draft dodger is found shall be destroyed unless pay a further fine of 10 lire (potentially 200 small florins).
There was an obligation for chaplains and rectors (chaplin being in charge of civil records, doubling as administrative entities ever since the pragmatic sanction of Justinian in italy) as of the various communal districts and contado ones to report and accuse draft dodgers. Failing to do so shall result in a fine of 10 lire for each draft dodger found in the circumscription plus an additional sum established by the Potesta.
To further increase knowledge of the call to arms, from the first Sunday of each month after the call to arms, the priests shall name during the sung mass the names of draft dodgers – as well the Potesta shall have the said names read aloud at least once a month during the public council sessions.
They only way to be excused can be through having licence from all 4 main communal offices (i.e. Potesta, Captains of the People, Elders, and Captains of the Amry), this licence has to recorded in a public and notarized legal written document.
o Once at camp those with the cavallata obligation shall present those horse being held on imposition of the Commune of Florence.
Whenever the army is called, whoever dares to sell to anybody (who is not a Florentine citizen) a horse or tries to ship such horse outside the city of Florence shall be punished. If the horse is one called for army service, he shall be fined 50 lire of small florins (or more to the discretion of the Potesta). If it is not called for army service he shall be fined 25 lire of small florins (or more to the discretion of the Potesta). Regardless - ff the horse, being maintained on cavallata obligation, is sold without the written and notarized publice licence of the Potesta he shall be fined 100 lire of small florins (or more to the discretion of the Potesta).
o The potesta have ultimate power within the army.
o Those called to be notaries for the commune of Florence to record the names of conscripts cannot recuse themselves or perform such task negligently under punishment of 50 lire fine of small florins (or more to the discretion of the Potesta).
Those notaries or functionaries who commit fraud shall punished with a fine of 100 lire of small florins (or more to the discretion of the Potesta).
o Gonfaloniere and company shall rally at the designated locations together, at the same time.
If any gonfaloniere shall rally at a designated location, before the company rappointed to it does without the licence of Potesta or the Captains of the army, he shall be be fined 25 lire of small florins (or more to the discretion of the Potesta).
If any single persons shall rally without their bannerman to the designated location he shall be fined 40 soldi of small florins if a knight (or more to the discretion of the Potesta) and 20 soldi of small florins (or more to the discretion of the Potesta) if a pedites.
o Who builds their padillion, tent or “trabacca” or any other form of shelter before that of the Commune will have his structure burnt down. Furthermore he shall be punished according to the podesta’s discretion.
o Whoever sets a fire to wood, straw or bushes while the army is on the field shall be fined by the Potesta for 10 lire of (or more to the discretion of the Potesta). Half of the fine shall be paid to the accusant, and the other half to the commune. Those who are to poor to pay, shall be caned and fustigated by the army and shall punished at the personal discretion of the Potesta.
o All have to raise and maintain their tents and have to place them with those of their sesto under a punishment or pecuniary fine at the discretion of the Potesta.
o The sesto and companies of the sesto shall be separated and divided one from the other and in such away that the knight, footmen, beasts, horses and mule can go back forth easily and freely.
o If any cavalryman or footmen of any gonfalone shall leave the formation or shall attack at any provocation or leave the field without licence of the Potesta or his assistants or a captian of the army he shall have his weapons and horse burnt if a knight. He shall have his weapons burnt and also punished at the discretion of the Podesta.
o If anybody shall fight or shall act within the army in such a way that God would punish, he shall punished in person at the discretion and will of the Potesta.
o If anybody who remains at home, rightfully as said before, or others who are exmpeted rightfully by evident handicap or sickness (or any other impediment) turn out to be horsemen or crossbowmen for the city, he has to present either his horse or horses and substitute horsemen or horsemen or crossbow or crossbows and substitute crossbowman or crossbowmen to the district or city in which he resides. Failing to do so shall be punished at the discretion of the Potesta.
o All those who have been called for crossbow, bows, hoes, spade, pickaxe or saw duty they have to present themselves to those who are in charge of the respective companies (to which they are assigned). For whoever does not show up, the above mentioned people shall have pay for each miss person 5 soldi to the Commune of Florence (or more at the discretion of the Podesta).
o 2 notaries and 2 goodmen shall be appointed in charge of archers and crossbowmen, in front of whom the absent ranged troops must present themselves and in front of whim no bad deed must bbe committed. These shall rule on each case until the commander of archers and crossbowmen shall pardon them.
o The mercatores of the army, whever they are, they have to come and bring from the market abundant provisions. Those who don’t shall pay the Commune of Florence 100 soldi of small Florins (or more at the discretion of the Podesta).
o All knights, infantrymen, shieldbearers, archers, sappers, homean, pickman, sawmen and all peoples of the army (from both the city and districts) have to follow their bannerman and banners under punishment and fine at the discretion of the Podesta.
o All captains, gonfaloneieri, and distringitor have the authority to command lead all individuals who serve under them.
o Anyone of the city or districts of Florence who has written the names of an absentee or covered, in writing, for someone else has to pay the city 25 lire of (or more to the discretion of the Potesta).
o If anyone with the cavallata obligation brings or makes someone bring, conducts or makes someone conduct a substitute horse or signs, represents or delivers a horse for another person he shall be punished with a fine of 100 lire of small floring and by forfeiting the horse. The person who which he writes for he shall be fined a further 100 lire of small florins for every time he write his name in substitution (or more at the discretion of the Podesta).
o Every foreign Florentine citizen or contado inhabitant of the age between 15 and 70 years old that are not found in their registers and his name however recorded in the register of the local rector or chaplain or those in charge of such function, shall be punished at the discretion of the Potesta (unless within 10 days of the publication of this edict he records his name).
o All those who have a horse for the Commune of Florence, either from the city or the contado, has to bing a saddle for the horse, covers for the horse, a panziera or hauberk, shoes or iron boots, kettle helmet, breastplate or curaiss, lance, shield or targia (targe), or tavolaccio (great board). "In 1260 Florence expected its knights to possess a panziere or haubert, mail leggings (stivaletti), a steel helmet, lamières or a breastplate and, to complete protection of the torso, encased in the haubert, a lance, and a buckler called a shield, targe or tavolaccio (tabolaccium: great board)."
Those who do not have said equipment, like said, shall be condemended and punished for the missing a saddle a fine of 20 soldi of small florins, for horse cover 60 soldi, for the panzeria or haburek 100 soldi, for the shoes or stivaletti di ferro 20 soldi, for the kettle helmet 20 soldi, for breast plate or curaiss 20 soldi, for lance 20 soldi, for shield, targe or tavolaccio 20 soldi.
o All the infantrymen of the city must wield a panzeria or coretto with iron sleeves, metal sleeves with curaiss, kettle helmet or cervelleria (skull-cap), gorget or irona collar, lance, shield or great tavolaccio.
Those who do not not have equipment shall be punished and condemened for absence of the panzeria or coretto or curaiss with metal sleeves with a fine 20 soldi, for the kettle helmet or cervelleria 10 soldi, for the gorget or collar 10 soldi, for lance 10 soldi, for shield or tavolaccio 10 soldi.
o All crossbowmen anr archer of the city and contado of Florence must have to bring in this army all those arms that are required and necessary to them under a penalty dictated by the Potesta.
o It must be reminded that the Potesta has the authority to punish all those person, at his will and desire, who commit wrong or fraudulent doings, from the day of the call to arms to the day of the return of the expedition. Nobody in the army or during the call the army must hinder it.
o On the 6th may an addendum on encampment rules is approved whereas the punishment for raising the tent before the city’s one (i.e. before having helped to raise the city ones), over and above the burning of the dwelling, shall as well be punished with 10 a lire fine for knight and 100 soldi one for footmen.
o All those who carry the pavesi shield shall always be behind the crossbowmen line and that the officialis in charge of the shieldbearers shall enforce such procedure.
o The gonfalonieri of the shieldbears and the shieldbearers themselves must, when the camp moves, go and be in the correct position so that they may quickly collect their shields if necessary (and be deployed). Whomever of the gonfalonieri does not do this shall be punished with a 100 soldi fine for each instance of infringement (or more at the discretion of the Podesta). The shieldbearer who does not do this shall be punished with a 10 soldi fine for each instance of infringement (or more at the discretion of the Podesta).
o Those who carry the large crossbow (loaded by Tornio) must be carried in the correct position relative to the pavesi (so that they could should behind them https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281148807_Archi_e_balestre_Un_approccio_storico-archeologico_alle_armi_da_tiro_nella_Toscana_meridionale_secc_XIII-XIV_Archeologia_Medievale_XXIX_pp_455-487) and the officials in charge of the large ballistas must make sure that those are carried as it is ordered.
o Thos who had been ordered and moninated to carry the large crossbow they must alwaus move and be, when the camp moves, in the right position for large crossbows and must always by ready to take those items if necessary. He who doesn’t do that shall be fined for each instance 10 (or more at the discretion of the Podesta).
o And a beast of burden, loaded with the projectile for the large crossbow, must always be moved in a correct position to the above mentioned large crossbow. It is the task of the officers in charge of munitions to ensure that such arrangements are taken care of,
o And the beast carrying the tents of the Commune, the pavesi shields, the large crosssbows will and must go and carry said objects on the same street on which the horsemen, crossbowmen and archers go on (and not on the way of the rest of baggagetrain).
o And all the baggage train, except the aforementioned pack animals, must go and be conducted one way and people with weapons must go a different way as it expedites the armed people allowing them to reach quickly the enemy.
o And on the way taken by the baggage train with the mules and beasts of burden there be no more than one person per animal and he shall be without lance, crossbow or bow. And who doesn’t do thiss shall lose the animal and all theing that on it, furthermore he shall be punished physically and financially at the discretion of the Potesta.
o And that none dare to allow the beast of burden to carry the crossbows and bows when moving camp. He who goes against this role shall lose the beas and all things on it. he shall be punished physically and financially at the discretion of the Potesta.
o Crossbowmen and archer must follow their banner and never leave them without licence from the Gonfalonierre and if the camp is not in position before. And such soldiers must carry their ranged weapons at the ready. Those who do not shall be punished with 10 soldi (or more at the discretion of the Podesta).
o Equslly knights, footmen, crossbowmen and archer must go with their banner and strick strictly to their formation and they must not enter in the camp in no occasion without their banner. Who infringes this shall be punished if a knight with a fine of 40 soldi for every infringement (or more at the discretion of the Podesta), if a footmen/archer/crossbowmen punished with a fine of 20 soldi for every infringement (or more at the discretion of the Podesta)
o Every gonfaloniere, footmen, knight, archer or crossbowmen must go and stand guard, day and night, and must participate in raids if request by his superior officer or by messenger of the Commuen. And he who doesn’t do this if a knight of the gonfaloniere shall be punished with 25 lire for every infringment (or more at the discretion of the Podesta). If simply a knight he shall be fined for 60 soldi for every infringement (or more at the discretion of the Podesta). If an infantrymen, crossbowmen or archer of the gonfaloniere he shall be fined for 10 lire (or more at the discretion of the Podesta). If simply a infantryman, crossbowman or archer he shall be fined for 20 soldi for every infringement (or more at the discretion of the Podesta).
o The latter addendum were issued while in march and were approved in the tent of Commune of Florence (already near Siena, since issued in their Contado at Villa Verniano).
-Expenditure Report for the Florentine Army against Pisotia in 1302 The host was a product of white and black guelph rivalry. With the arrival of Carlo of Valois
to Florence the Black Guelphs managed to kick out the White ones. As a result the Whites took refuge at Pistoia, mounting incursions against white led Florence. To dimanstle the threat to the new order the Black Guelph raise a host against Pistoia. pg. 3 -4
Villani recalls that said host was made of “1000 cavalieri, 6000 foot from Florence and from Lucca 600 cavalieri and 10000 pedoni”. Pg 4 and Villani, VIII, 52
The siege lasted 23 days, resulted in the destruction of the surrounding countryside (but the Pistoiese under To of smalllosano degli Uberti managed to defend the city sucesfully). The Florentine host later split on one side to siege the Castle of Servalle with the Lucchese – the other other to siege the castle of Pian Trevigne of rebel Carlino de Pazzi. Pg 4.
The Document states pg 4-o A commission of 6 official examines (and officially approves) the conduct and
reasons for Bonisegna’s payments during his time as the officer in charge of wages of the host.
o Bonisegna’s office was a special assignment, he was a special commissar representing the Signoria directly in charge of payment of all troops and attached services ( including particular persons sent to be with the host, foreign footmen, and the 10 knights of Duccio Todini).
o Boninsegna was with the army for 14 days.
o The army was made of: 497 cavallata cavalry, 117 balestrieri with arbalest, 644 crossbowmen/pavesari, 3961 infantry from the contado (provided by the Commuene of Signa, and vicariate of d’Oltrarno, San Prancrazio, Porta San Pietro, Siero Secheraggio and Borgo), 977 support troops and sappers, 1058 foreign footmen under several captain, 10+1 knight of Duccio Todini.
o The total numbers of the host is likely to be smaller than that recorded in the register (but the sum is not to discrepant with that given by Villani).
o The register also indicates that contrary to what is argued by Ricotti which pinpoints the battle of Certomondo (1289) (part 1 chapter 4 Ricotti) as the last one in Tuscany were citizen militias exceeded mercs, city militias were still widely enlisted in the Florentine army.
o While the merc cav is not rerpresented by the Todini 10, we can reach a rough estimate using Villani (1000 horsemen in the host minus the 497 of the cavallata in the register thus about 500 cavalry men). The infantry that total 5780 troops is also prevalently made up by militiamen.
The 500 merc cavalrymen are not included in Machiavelli’s payments as these were paid by the Chamberlain of Chamber of Commune of Florence (which was a sort of implicit rule later codified in the Code For Stipendiaries/Condotta of 1337 (and Canestrini 532-33).
o The sappers not only acted as the engineer companies but also to destroy/sabotage enemy structure. These companies followd the host in great numbers (which makes sense since the host’s actions focused on raiding/de qting the enemies countryside/contado – as the 23 day campaign against Pisotia ended up doing in 1302, since its castle sieges all failed).
o 113 stonemasons/carpenters, 8 officers of the Chamber of Commune, various messengers for all institutions connected to host, 42 porters, 6 coachmen, 4 tailors, 4 trumpet players, 1 in charge of wake up call, 1 in charge of the bagpipes, one notary of the captains, 2 officers of the market who stayed in Florence and sent provision from the city – these worked together with 8 other officers of the market who followed the host and received shipment.
This last office and its officers acted like the Sienese officers of the Vendita – as such the task of provisioning the army and the supply of bread was issued to specific individuals who established the selling price.
o The line which describe a few messangers as “nuntiis consistentibus in exercitu cum domino Ptestate” suggests that the Potesta conducted personally the army (Potesta Cante de Gabrielli da Gubbio).
The report was done in the name of the Potesta and Captain of the People of Florence. The document contains the sums of money erogated by the commune for its knights and
footmen as confirmed by its six officials (and accounted for by Boninsegne d’Angiolino Machivalli) and recorded by the notary and scribe Aldobrandino Uguccione dei Campi.
The 6-1 officials formed a commission which had to evaluate and judge the accounts of Boninsegne d’Angiolino Machivalli (the accountant attached to the army host which departed to fight against Pistoia).
During the campaign Angiolino held absolute responsibility for the finances/payments of the host paying troops, support personnel, and arranging all other necessary expenses for the host.
Camera=administrative apparatus of the chamber/
The records include payment for: pg 10-14o 497 horsemen which were paid 9 gold florins each for a grand total of 4473 gold
florins. xo Duccio Todini, who served with 10 horsemen, were paid a total of 100 gold florins. xo 113 master carpenters were paid 1 gold florin each for a sum of 113.zo 117 crossbowmen with large crossbows (arbalest?) paid 1 gold florin each for a sum
of 117. X o 174 diggers and sappers paid 1 gold florin each for a sum of 174. xo 215 footmen from the Commune of Signe shall be paid 1 gold florin each for a sum
of 215. xo 8 chamberlain/officials of the Commune of Signe paid 1 gold florin f.a.s. of 8. xo 5 Communal messenger (who had in that army 1 hores each) who were 3 gold
florins each f.a.s of 15. xo 10 messengers of the army (commanded by the Potesta) paid 1 gold florin each f.a.s
10. xo 5 admin messengers (which equalled the number of officials of the host) paid in total
5 gold florins. xo 4 officials (of undiscernible office) paid 3 gold florins each f.a.s of 12 xo 42 porters within the army as 1 gold florin each f.a.s 42 florins. xo 4 officials in charge of the ancampment paid 1 gold florins each f.a.s of 4o 4 tailors paid 1 gold florin each f.a.s of 4. o 8 messengers for the officers of the market (agency in charge of supply of army) who
received the shipment of victuals from the two officers staying in the city, paid 1 gold florin each f.a.s of 8 florins.
o A notary for the captains of the army paid 3 gold florins.o 3 messengers of the captains of the army paid 1 gold florins each f.a.s. of 3o 4 trumpeteers paid 3 gold florins each f.a.s. of 12o 1 responsible for the rouse of the army and 1 in charge of the bagpipe paid 3 gold
florins each f.a.s. of 6. o 1058 foreign footmen, under a variety of captains, paid 1 gold florins per day each
f.a.s. 1058. xo 5 coachmen with 15 mules paid in total for 25 gold florins, 3 soldi and 9 denari. o 2 officers of the market in charge with shipping provision to the army paid 20 gold
florins.o 1 coachmen, which serves with 3 mules and an assistant for 15 days, supposed to
paid for a total of 22 libre and 10 soldi of small florins of which he received 8 gold florin and 48 soldi of small florins.
o For the travel, the permanence and the return of Bonisegna, with his notary Amidei, he spent a total of 35 libbras (gold florins), 16 soldi and 2 denari of small florins. They have received 14 gold florins, 17 soldi and 2 denari of small florins.
o The notary shall be paid for his services of 14 days a rate of 20 soldi of small florins a day f.a.s of 14 gold florins.
o Boninsegna was also refunded by the city after 7 gold florins given to him where of incorrect weight. As a result he received 7 soldi and 5 denari of small florin as a refund.
o 1164 footmen drafter from oltrarno were paid 1 gold florin each f.a.s 1164. These payments are recorded in the acts of Paniccio Ducci, a notary and official of the city in the aforementioned report. x
o 976 footmen from the vicariate of San Pancrazio (of the contado) were paid each 1 gold florin f.a.s. 976. The transaction is recorded in the acts of notari Filippo son of the defunct Icaobi de Campi, official of the city. x
o 517 sappers, diggers, hoemen and sawmen paid 1 gold florin each f.a.s 517. These payments are recorded in the acts of Tomasi Banchi de Canello, a notary and official of the city in the aforementioned report. x
o 371 footmen from the vicariate of San Piero (of the contado) a 1 gold florin each f.a.s. 371. . These payments are recorded in the acts of Bonaffedis Caleffi and Martini Amidei (the company notary), notaries and officials of the city appointed for the registration of such payments x
o 644 crossbowmen and pavesarii recruited among all sesti at 1 gold florin each f.a.s. 644. These payments are recorded in the acts of Dietaiuti Coli di Moentemurlo and ser Martini (the company notary), notaries and officials of the city appointed for the registration of such payments x
o 114 footmen of the vicariate of San Pietro Scheraggio (of the contado) paid 1 gold florin each f.a.s 114. These payments are recorded in the acts of Venturi Fredi de Poggibonzi, a notary. x
o 286 footmen, sappers, sawmen, diggers and hoemen paid 1 gold florin each f.a.s 286. These payments are recorded in the acts of Tomasi Banchi de Canello, a notary and official of the city appointed for the registration of such payments x
o 1121 footmen of the vicariate of borgo (of the contado) at 1 gold florin each f.a.s. 1121. These payments are recorded in the acts of Ricoveri Aldobrandini ce Campoli and ser Martini (the company notary), notaries and officials of the city appointed for the registration of such payments x
The total expenses of the above mentioned payments, made by Boninsegna, amount to a grand total of 12,093 golden florins, 6 soldi irand 4 denari of small florins. Pg 15
The commission 6-1 approved, in the name of commune, its people and the fractions attached to it and its Priori and gonfalonieri of justice of the people of Florence, the payment of the sum originally exbursed by Boninsegna for the host. Such sum shall be paid to Boninsegna in part by the city city treasury (11,000 gold florins) and in part by ser Rustichello (1200 gold florins), notary of the city. With the remaining surplus of about 107 gold florins Bonisegna shall settle the remaining debts of the commune (i.e. to repay the 6 coachmen who he partially paid and still owed them 28 soldi and 6 denari of small florins) and on the 4th of August he returned the extra money to the city treasury. Having done this he was absolved and commended for his conduct. Pg 15
On the 16th August an official reports on his conduct was released by the commission of 6-1. Pg 16.
-Ciucciovino Armed Conflict Instances 1300 Tuscan (found in Ephemerides Urbev – Cronaca Domenico Manenti – Online July 7, pg
334) guelfs take Radicofani and have to face the relieving force of conte Guido of Santa Fiore. The Guelf army’s nucleus is made of Sienese combatants – 150 cavalrymen, led by Ghirardello de Tode – and many men at Arms from Orvieto. The count routs the Guelf kills 400 of their troops.
In 1301 when Florence request a relief/putive force from Bologna to repress the Gibelline, Bologna sends 400 knights. As well, fundamental for their success, the Guelf party arms the people of the Contado and allows City Guelf to carry weapons freely. (DAVIDSOHN; Firenze; vol. III; p. 210.)
When Faneza wants to aid a guelfic league captained by Bologna, it plans to send 200-300 cavalrymen. (Annales Forolivienses; p. 58.)
-Santini Documenti Costituzione Firenze In the 1171 Pisan agreement with Florence state that Pisans will aid actively Florence for all
war with its neighbors (with the exception of the bishop of Volterra, count Ildebrandino and count Alberto). The Pisans agree to stay in the war with Lucca unless they have the consent of the consuls of Florence or whomever is in charge of the city. The Count Ildebrando and Bishop of Volterra shall aid Florence in good faith and without fraud. Pisans agree to send to Florence 400 knights, at its expenses, in as much as operation remain within Tuscany. (pg 5)
In 1174 the act of submission by Ildebrandino de Martignano (and his son Bernardus) promises to defend the Florentine city, goods, burghs, and suburb/contaod in the same way Pisa does. They shall wage war with the present and past enemies of Florence on the order of the consuls or they rector (ib the formed are absent). These shall raise a host and a cavallata every time it is requested of them by the city of Florence (i.e. via consuls, rector, messenger or by letter with their intentions stated). (pg 10)
In 1182 Empoli promises to aid Florence against all people (except count Guidone) – it promises the persecution of all people with the jurisdiction of empoli who cause damage or harm to a Florentine they will as well make restitution. These shall raise a host and a cavallata every time it is requested of them by the city of Florence (i.e. via consuls, rector, messenger or by letter with their intentions stated) within 8 days of request. The host shall be shall anywhere the city of Florence desire and against whomever (except count Guidone). This also translated in a yearly tribute of 50 libre of Florentine accepted coins to the city. The years agreement they shall also a pay lump sum of 100 lire and 100 soldi of good standing coincs. (pg 17)
In 1182 the submission of Pogna result in their promises to aid Florence against all people and whever they desire. They also promise not to construct any castle or any other structure in Semifonti or any other location. In exchange the Florentines promise to defend Pogna. (pg 18-20)
1184 the Lucches promise that they will uphold Florentine interest, unless these go against Lucchese ones or those of their consuls, and thus will aid Florence in all of its wars within 15 days from their summon (by the consuls, or the regent, or by letter with arms of Florence) and only for a period of 20 days (when fighting between May and October). They shall as well join the Florentine war effort against Pistoia, serving whenever and wherever, for period not exceeding 20 days. They will provide the city of Florence with a force of 150 horsemen and 500 troops (between men at arms and ranged infantry) – these shall be paid by the city of Florence at a rate of 3 soldi for cavalryman and 12 denari for foot soldier. These troops shall be compensated for any loss or injury by the Lucchese themselves. The provisioning of the force shall only be subject to tariffs chosen in common by the market agents of Lucca and Florence (thus likely leading to an exemption, facilitating their purchase). The offensive actions and raids shall be conducted in conjunction by the Lucchese and Florentines. All levies gained through military actions have to be divided according to the agreement between the cities. Furthermore citizens both cities promise to respect each other and make amends if wrongs were committed. (pg 20-24)
In 1200 we know that Count Albertus commits his force of “con militibus et peditibus et sagiatriis” to the struggle against Semifonte (pg. 48)
Thr bishop of Voterra promises, like in other instances, to defend and aid Florence (unless Florence sends people to attack the bishop). The bishops promises to aid Florence in its struggle against Semifonte, actively, within 15 days from his summons. He and his men shall stay with the Florentine host for the necessary time. The bishop shall aid Florence in all its war with 200 cavalrymen and 1000 footmen and shall rally from Elsa with the above mentioned men who shall serve for 15 at his expense and financial repsonability (mendum). The bishop is willing to prolong his and his host stay at Florence’s expense in as much as the Florentine keep their levies raised with him at the same time. They shall stay at arms and at war with Semifonte unless they have the permission of the Florentine Potesta. They promise not to have any transaction or pact or commercial relaitonship with the people of Semifonte, especially resupplying them, until they are at war with the Florenticne. (pg. 57)
In 1201 the Florentine promise to defend the Commune of Siena from Montalcino, they shall rally within 15 days of their summons. The Florentine shall intervene with an expeditionary force 100 cavarlymen and 1000 footmen at Florence’s expense and financial repsonability (mendum). Their service shall last 1 month and will be prolonged at the rquest of Siena and in as much as Florence is not at war. If at war, Florence shall give 100 horsemen and 1000 foot troops (between men at arms and archers) within 4 days of their summons. (pg 63-64)
-Le Cronache
-Il G. Vil:
7, CXXXI, 457-461: o In 1289 (1290), for offenses received by the Aretine, Florence moved a host against
the city (captained by Amerigo di Nerbona). There 1600 cavarlyman and 10000 infantryman of which 600 were city cavalry, 400 were mercenaries. The remaining cavalry, and part of the infantry, were from the Florentine allies (Lucca, Prato, Pistoia, Siena, Volterra, Bologna, Samminiato, Sangimignano, Colle and Magnhinardo da Susinanana – a Romagnol war captain with his soldiers).
o They proceed to enter the Casentino (east of Florence) territory laying waste to the lands of Guidio Novello (the Poesta’ of Arezzo).
o Guido and his Ghibelline captrains rally 800 knights and 8000 infantryman to counter the Florentines. The Ghibelline captains included the best captains of the imperial parts party from all other Tuscany, the Marca, of Romagna, and the Ducato. Despite the numerical inferiority it is said that the Ghibelline ridiculed and criticized the quality of the Guelf cavalry.
o The battle/conflict was further forced by the recent pact struck with the bishop of Arezzo through which Florence received by betryal Bibbena, Civitella, and all its castle (which were to be delivered by Messer Marsilio de Vecchietti) in exchange of an annual bounty of 5000 gold Florins for the rest of clergyman’s life. The plot was interrupted the bishops newphes to end that the bishops might not be slain by the Ghibellines. Nonetheless he was take towards the battle site and slain there for his betrayal.
o Eventually the Florentines accept the Aretine engagement deploying its troops in orderly fashion. Both factions deployed on the Campaldino plain in the most orderly fashion Italy had ever seen.
o Proceeds to describe that formation (already described in secondary sources): 150 vanguard hoseman (of which 20 were newly dubbed knights, their rite being celebrated on the eve of battle). Furthemore, shamed by virtuous display of a city officer (Vieri de’ Cerchi) who was tasked to appoint citizens from his Sesto to the vanguard, he chose himself, his sons and his nephews to serve in the vanguard shaming many citizens in serving in the front lines as well. The flanks of the vanguard were sided by a number of pevasari, crossbowman and pikeman. Then followed the bulk of the cavalry again sided by a large number of foot-soldiers. After it the baggage train’s cart were deployed (to hold the two front lines). Behind the carts 200 knights and many footsoldiers from Lucca, Pistoia, and other foreign localities were deployed and placed under the leadership of Ser Corso Donati (Podesta of Pistoia) who was tasked with charging the flanks of the enemy if necessary.
o The Aretines deployed much more vanguard cavalry (300, of which 12 were some of the most importart corporals of the army, the paladins) and these charged with great courage (followed by the rest of their troop, i.e. the cavalry bulk of 500 knights – of which 150 belonging to Guido Novello who were to act as a flanking reserve defected, withdrawing to the castle – and the infantry).
o The charge was so unrelenting that the Florentine avanguard was liquidated, many Florentine unhorsed, and the Aretine pressed on to the bulk of the Guelf infantry (on the verge of breaking it). The bulk however held, and progressively the side flanks made of pike, shields, and crossbow start enveloping the enemy. A furious melee ensues.
o It was Corso’s Donati intervention, one which directly contravened orders, that won for the Florentines the day. He moves his reserve, completely surrounding his enemy, and charged the Aretines – breaking their host.
o The aretines lost 1700 men (between foot and horse) and a further 2000 were captured (many released out of a spirity of friendship or in exchange of ransom). Ultimately 740 arrived captures soldiered arrived in Florence (among these and the dead many of the Ghibelline and greats of Arezzo could be found, the captains of the host, members of the Montefeltro, Uberti and Griffonia families, and other exiles from Florence). The Florentine on the other hand lost few men of renown but many citizens and foreign-fighters were injured.
-Il M. Vil (ricorda citare questo) https://condottieridiventura.it/fra-moriale-montreal-d-albarno/
1, XLVII, XLVIII, 55-58o Seeing the threat posed by the Hungarian forces remaining in the kingdom of
Naples, king Louis I summoned his barons to face this shared threat. The barons mustered 3000 horseman and the count of Minerbino brought as well 300 German cavalryman.
o Already Foggia and Corneto (two of the recishest centres in Puglia) had been taken by the German mercenaries and plundered.
o Konrad Wolfhardt (Corrado Lupo), Werner of Urslingen and the Conte Lando (the 3 mercenary leaders known to be great masters of war) had with them them many Germans and at least 700 Hungarians and there were also many Italian infantryman (attracted by the prospect of plunder). They were under the command of the king’s vicar the voivode Stefano Lackfi
o Leaving a garrison in the conquered city, the mercs depart from Foggia with 1600 or more german and Hungarian knights and many footmen. These arrived at Aversa (8 miles) from the unwalled Naples.
o This town was not guarded but had a very big and strong castle. The citizens were then unexpectedly plundered (thinking that such crimes would not be committed by the vicar of the king and his men).
o The men proceed to ride to Naples offering battle to the king, this one refuses to field his baronial army, waiting for reinforcement coming in each day to the city and waiting for the right moment to strike.
o Seeing that their challenge went unresponded, the mercs move at a distance of 4 miles from Naples. There they start spreading false rumors suggesting that their was trouble and agitation among the German and Hugnarian ranks with soldiers menacing a general desertion.
o The barons and knights, hearing this and other rumors (like the scarcity of supplies that was forcing the enemy to withdraw), armed themselves against the king’s order and left Naples to meet the bickering challengers.
o They met on the plains near Meleto, the mercenaries already in formation (having heard the enemy riding for them). The mercenary first line kept a sparse formation allowing the enemy to engage them, despite being less, so that they committed a large amount of the enemy force to the melee. The second merc line, led by Landau, meanwhile flanked the enemy engaging in the side and back. In a few hours, without excessive combat efforts, the mercs had surrounded the enemy force. Most of their captains were captured, few were killed. Those who managed to flee were left unpursued, being too close to the city.
o The merc victory was a major one, for relatively little effort 25 of the major counts and baron of kingdom were capture as well as many rich Neapolitan knights, righ burghers, nobles attendants and minor barons.
1, XCVI, 114-15o To solidify their control over Pistoia in 1351, the Florentine priors decide to secure
their signory over the city through deceit and surprise.o To do so the commune mobilized a great many men both on foot and on horse, as
well some of the leagues of the contado. Their mobilization was hidden through deceit (said to be summoned for non-belligerent purpose) and they were order to move onto the city with cover of night.
o Their objective was to subsistute the Pistoian captain, to loyal to the city interest, with a more pro-Florentine one and install a Florentine garrison within the city.
o Command of the host was given to a Florentine citizen, Piergo Gucci (nicknamed Mucini) who nothing more than a notary of the Condotta office (he was a man of words not actions, lots of promises little success).
o Promising certain success he and his host depart at night, and reach the city with scaling walls ready to send troops over the Pistoian walls.
o Part of the dismounted knights and infantryman climbed the walls successfully, the enemy none the wiser for all were sleeping (and the Pistoians as well were not on alert), expecting to have the help of the rest of the host (they being only the vanguard).
o Yet the soldier inside the walls were left without leadership and support, the notary having returned to his hotel at Prato to sleep.
o Eventually the men are discovered, especially after the Messer Ricciardo – a political exile from the town - launched a loud war cry. Fearing a political coup (especially after seeing the armed Florentine, though unaware of their involvement), the Pistoiesi took to the street and assaulted the invading troops.
o Injuring and capturing all soldiers, the Pistoiesi soon learnt from their prisoners of the Florentine involvement and mobilize troops against them.
o When the situation was communicated to Florentine authorities the notary was heavily berated and physically punishment by his fellow citizen, his person only spared because of the intervention of his officer who justified his behaviour (fearing they themselves for their own peron).
1. XCVII, 115-118o Threatened now by the Pistoiesi (and fearing the expansion of the Visconti to which
the city might fall to – giving the Milanese lord a foothold into Tuscany), it is decided that the city shall be take by force
o To do so the Florentine levied/conscripted the largest possible force of cavalry it disposed and many infantryman.
o Furthermore they even promised a permanent respite for political exiles if they serves in the hosts (allowing them to return to the city).
o In 3 days, the commune raised 800 cavalryman and 12000 infantryman and was sieging Pistoia (isolating it from its conatdo and allies).
o The city as well raised a further 16 banners containing 2000 citizen, primarily armed as cavalryman.
o 8 siege forts were raised around the city.o The city contained only 1500 citizens capable of carrying arms to defend the city
walls as well as a series of mercenary bands (both on foot and on horse) that were technically in Florentine pay and who ultimately were inactive/neutral (neither raising turmoil inside city walls nor harassing the besiegers).
o Because of the little number of defenders, both the Florentine and Pistoiesi were expecting that the siege would be resolved with an assault. As a result, the Pistoiesi started organizing a series of counter-measure (including temporary defensive contructions on their tower, supply each sector of the wall with the projectiles i.e. stones to drop on assaulters, boiling large quantities of water to drop on the enemies and heating large amounts of lime -sticky- to drop on the assaulters).
o Villani begrudgling respect this, a great example of marshal virtue despite their city being plagued by political disorder.
o Because of their refusal to come to terms, the Florentines in the meantime devastate the Pistoian contado.
o Seeing this, the Pistoian deliberate that they will fight for their land and to prevent any possible betrayal from inside they order that the mercenaries under the command of Andrea Salmoncelli (those in Floretine pay) leave the city. These go and join the besieging host.
o Siege weapons are built and all necessary equipment for wall fighting is supplied. Seeing this, the Pistoian resolve starts wavering. Sienese ambassadors, i.e. Florentine allies, are sent to try and negotiate with the besieged but their intervention all of a sudden reinvigorated the defenders’s will (and consequently the attackers hatred)
o On the day of the battle however the Pistoian Guelf, and a Ghibelline minority, came to their senses seeing the imminent danger they were in. They agreed, during parliament, that the Florentine would be allowed to install its own garrison (with its own captain of the guard) and build a citadel (at Florentine expense) within the city while also giving the control of the castles of Seravalle and Sambuca (though this last castle could not be secured by the Floretines) to the besiegers all in the name of the Guelf cause and to guarantee peace and security within the city.
2, IX (but references to VIII and chapter X) and XI, 127-129, 131-2o The Milanese under the leadership of archbishop Giovanni Visconti, co-ruler and
later signore of Milan (referred to as the tyrant), had been undertaking serious expansionary efforts in North-Central Italy.
o While undertaking war in the Romagnan region (tryng to expand his domanins there through his foothold in Bologna), he lulls the Florentine in a false sense of security (making them think he no hostile intentions in Tuscany). Suddenly however he arrests many Bolognese citizens who are made to confess to a grand conspiracy to overthrow the archbishop led by the Florentine.
o As a result the Milanese send an expedition, led by Giovanni Visconti da Oleggio, to attack Tuscany while his Ghibelline allies in the region are agitated in general insurrection against the Florentine and the Guelf alliance.
o Giovanni da Oleggio manages to lead his host down to Pistoia un-disturbed, since the Florentine (a bit in denial) believe there is peace the two states. Only when close to the city Pistoian city limits do the Florentines send a delegation asking for his intention. Their they learn of the Visconti bellicose intentions, rapidly returning to their city to communicate the sudden state of war they found themselves in.
o Florence found itself in a poor situation, their naivete had allowed the Visconti to get near Pistoia and those lands had been left with insufficient guard. And now even worst, the host was on the verge of entering a demobilized Prato (in which 1/3 of the potential manpower of Florence resided in).
o Florence as well found itself in one of those period were no foreign stipendiaries were in the pay of Florence and as well they had not captain of War.
o Worst of all, the captain had many Florentine Ghibellines with him who were aware of this position of weakness of Florence. These encouraged him to rapidly close on Florence with the host (a large one of 5000 german cavalryman, 2000 further knight, and 6000 infantryman).
o Giovanni however was not well provisioned with supplies, hoping to fulfil his logistical need by raiding the Florentine contado (as he did when he conducted his army through Pratto and into the estates of Campi, Brozzi, and Peretola – today metropolitan Florence).
o At prosperous Campi, he sets his well defended camp and starts harassing the city’s contado (each raiding expedition being made of at least 1000 horseman according to the captain’s dispositions).
o The city took completely by surprise had trouble in mounting an effective response, finding itself crippled especially by the lack of provisions and defensive counter-measure.
o The grandi and popolani grassi took it upon themselves to react ot the threat summoning all of the city’s gonfaloni (banners). Unable to give an armed response on the open field, they set to reinforce the city’s defences while also ordering that
that the doors of the city be closed and guarded by loyal citizen during the day and at night.
o Luckily for Florence the logistical organizaiont of the Visconti was poor quickly exhausting the plundered resources. The large quantites of beat obtained from the contado’s cattle were being ruined both the because of the great heat and the lack of salt, all the grain requisitioned instead was useless since all nearby windmill had been devastated during the raids (preventing its refinement in flour). Meanwhile the supplies sent from Bologna were continuously targeted by the raids of Guelf knights left behind in Pistoia. The will of the invading host was soon eroded by their material condition.
o To thus prevent the imminent ruin, the host opts to move out through the plains of San Salvi (Villa Salviati, Villa Ginori). Fearing this the Florentines, not able of stopping them through direct confrontation, sought to contain them by cutting them off en route. The Florentine rapidly move many crossbowmen and militmen to Montelungo, a locality on the Milanese war path. Meanwhile word was sent to Pistoiese to bar the Milanese path from the other side (through the destruction of roads, and the creation of obstacle i.e. ditches and chopped trees). To ultimately prevent any further penetration, the Fiesole castle (a major fortification on the way) was reinforced and guarded (together with the neighbouring contado).
o The harassed host seeing all this withdraw to Calenzano. The contadini, without any order from the commune, thinking that the Milanese were retreating occupied the mountains of the Val di Marina (on the border with Bologna) which were in their path. This effectively contained/put under siege the enemy host who had to camp in Calenzano, living off the meagre resources they just plundered from the area.
o Lucky for the Milanese, the pass of San Salviano (i.e. the entrance and exit to the Mugello) was undefended by the commune and when the local german captain of the Mugello sends a Medici with 200 infantrymen and 50 knights to see if the pass was defendable, ultimately the man rules out its defence forcing the general evacuation of the estate. This was a mistake since the pass was so narrow that only a single filed of dismounted man leading their horses could cross it with any ease.
o With only a few brave locals denfeding the pass, the Milanese quickly learnt about their potential exist route. Quickly theu overrun the defenders and are capable to cross what would have been an impenetrable pass if properly defended. Seeing this the Milanese greatly ridiculed the Florentine marshal virtue, their cowardice and inexperience/ignorance on the facts of war lost them what could have been a golden chance.
2, XIV, 133-134o In a situation of war, we see that the garrisoning of important locations (i.e.
Scarperia) is put under the commands of foreign merc captais (like the German Iacopo di Fiore, who already was captain of the Mugello).
o This man is given 200 knights (citizens “eletti di buona gente”) and 300 mercenary men at arms (whome were all under constable who where Florentines). These were supplied with a years worth of provisions, weapons, crossbows and munitions . As well material and master craftsmen were sent to reinforce the castle.
o We see as well well that the city official in charge with the provisioning of war starts to recruit and provision mecernaries both on foot and on horses (in as much as the city could afford).
2, XVI, XVII, 135-137o We see that with the escalation of the hostilities the amount of stipendiaries rapidly
increases in Florence and these paid reinforcemetns are sent to the castles/passes on the Mugellan frontier (Spugnole, Scarperia and Monte Giovi).
o These garrison manage to stabilize the war, preventing the enemy from crossing the frontier and riding for Florence with the large horseman expedition of 1000 to 2000 horsemen at the time.
o Their efforts were further aided by the condatdini who would group and ambush the invaders at the various passes, killing many enemies.
o Castles like that of Pulicciano (which was a minor castle, defended by a mere palisade) were to mount a vigorous defence by its inhabitants against overwhelming force. The village inhabitants, augmented by 100 mercenary soldiery, would resist a force of 2000 german cavlaryman, 1000 infantryman and as many crossbows. Their defence lasting many hours was so effective and incessant that the enemies had not been able to damage a single stake of the palisade.
2, XXI, XXII, XXIII, 142-145o As Milan could not find any ally in Tuscany which could allow them to gain an
entrance within Florentine territory, they Milanese decide to force the pass at Scarperia.
o The assults escalated, devastating the castles surrounding territory through continuous as well as the building within walls and its fortification (by hurling great sontes against them).
o This and the continuous state of alarm took a toll on the defenders: they write to Florence and pass their message through their German mercs who could mix themselves with the Germans already fighting for Milan and get to Florence with less trouble.
o By then Florence had in its pay 1800 mercenary cavalry and 3500 Italian mercenary infantry plus the support of 200 Sienese knight, and 600 en route from Perugia. This were aided by a large amount city soldier. The host would set off once the Perugiasn had arrived for Borgo of San Lorenzo in Mugello (a locality under the Scarperia in which they would have an advantegous position from which to engange the besieging enemy).
o The issue was that the 600 Perugians knight were defeated en route by the Milanese troops (specifically by the 400 horseman and 2000 commanded by Peri Saccone Tarlati on behalf od doge Rinaldo Tedesco, allies of the Visconti) discouraging the Florentines from sending the relief force.
o The castle on the verge of collapse was saved by the brave Giovanni Vidomini who with 30 trained/disciplined men at arms managed to snaek through the besiegers’ lines and join castle’s garrison. Again another brave citizen, this time a unnamed Medici, with 100 men and a guide who new the shifts of the guard manages to partially pull off the same stunt. He and other 80 men, 20 were caught and had to retreat 20 the the mountains, managed to pass through the enemy campy and joined their besieged comrades.
2, XLVI, 171-172o Fearing the Milanese expansionism, in 1351 (1352) the Florentine sent ambassadors
to Perugia, Siena and Arezzo to organize a parliament in Siena,
o Their they formed a league with an army of 3000 knights and 1000 masnadieri (men at arms) against anyone who would wage war against the league members.
o Florence furthermore, proportional to its strength, provided the most cavalrymen and mercenary out of anyone.
o To support the cost of mercenary, 20 citizens were elected to maximize the communal revenue by communting the useless service of the contadini in a monetary payment. They had to pay for the service of 5 infantryman, 10 soldi per day thrice a year, for each 100l measured in their yearly estimo (estimate of capital and income of a citizen). This tax was of course removed if their service was required. This system resulted in a new revenue flow of 52,000 gold florins from the contado.
o A further tax was place on clergyman, paid in gold florins, to help with defence costs of the state. There was an increase in the revenues of the gabelle, which doubled in number, bringing in an increased tax revenue of 360,000 gold florins.
o As well the Florentines would enact a poll/head tax (capitation tax – according to https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=JHroX0PR6UcC&pg=PP272&lpg=PP272&dq=gabella+de+fumanti&source=bl&ots=wUOvwsX6Xb&sig=LCJKfG9dIglkBWlz4HghiN4vKKk&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjDj4b5y-_dAhWI6aQKHYt9CkwQ6AEwC3oECAIQAQ#v=onepage&q=gabella%20de%20fumanti&f=false ) in which every head of household was to be taxed a certain number of denari per day and all together this brought 140 gold florins a day for the commune for a grand total of about 50,000 gold florins a years (this was an una-tantum tax).
3, XL, 237-38o Follow the Hungarian expedition, the provencal corporal fra Moriale remained in
italy holding the city of Avera (Campania Nord).o Eventually the King of Naples Louis (Louis I of Anjou likely) send his vicar to get rid of
Fra Moriale (A Maltesta of Rimini) with 400 horsemen. Fra Moriale quickly retreats to the keep thinking himself secure, but the Maltesta rapidly closes on the castle giving start to a full bown siege (surrounding it with a moth and stakes).
o The castle ultimately sold the castle for 1000 gold florins and safe conduct for he and his soldiers, leaving as well behind the plunder from his raiding for the king.
3, LXXXIX, 280o Moriale d’Albarno, known as fra Moriale (brother Moriale, for he was a knight of the
of the order of St. John, a hospitallier thus holding an ecclesiastical status), had resulted to brigandage after the war in the kingdom of Naples ended (1351).
o As mentioned he was kicked out from the castle of Anversa he conquered while also losing all his financial gains.
o He established a new company of 500 german cavalryman and 1200 infantryman with which he served the papal legate Cardinal Albornoz against the prefect Giovanni di Vico (a prefect who been capturing many localities in the papal state).
o Eventually fra switches side, joining the prefect and sent to siege the town of Todia. The town gives heavy resistance and fra, seieing that the prefect could not pay, left his service to establish the Gran Compagnia.
o Fra starts recruiting men from all parts of Italy, among which he recruited many infantryman, and starting raiding all territories he passes through.
o This for M.Villani is the starting pont of the free companies which were to devastate Italy.
o Many of his soldier were penniless men from Tuscany, Romagna, the Marche. Some were on horse and others were on foot but regardless all expenses were to be taken care by the company and they were to be paid a good wage.
o In little time, fra had raised 1500 cavalryman and 2000 infantryman. And the first order of the business was to take vengeance of Neapolitan kingdom’s vicar the Malatesta. The vicar, who was on the verge of successfully besieging Fermo, was to be forced to abandon his endeavour (after the city’s tyrant da Mogliano and the Captain of Forli, enemy of Malatesta, offered him guarantees and allowed him to pass through their territories).
o From this point on the company kept growing and growing. 3, CVI, 295
o Following the war with Pisa over Lucca, Florence owed more than 600000 gold florins to its citizens. The prestanze, the old institution through which the money was borrowed, requisitioned a sum (which varied according to individual wealth) from its citizen. The sum owed was paid in total at an exact due date, sometimes with interests and sometimes not.
o Not being able to repay them, the state purged the debt and reduced it to 504000 gold florins. It then proceeded to transform the debt in a monte and registered all creditors in 4 books by quartiere.
o Unable to repay full sums owed to citizens, the monte was to become essentially a perpetual obbligations with a fixed interest rate of 5%, fully guaranteed, untaxed and transferrable. Which entitled its holder a monthly income of 1 denaro for each lira lent to the state.
o This revenue was inalienable (it could not be taxed, used to pay a debt, or a dowry) and could not be taken away (regardless of one’s status, i.e. exiled).
o Such privileges and immunity were to be transferred to a disgnated successor.o This institution was started in 1345 and was so popular that it went on to pay an
interest rate of up to 15%. (NEED HELP). 3, CVIII, 298-99
o Fra Moriale’s band, after Fermo, rode throughout the Marche (Rimini and Ancona) looting many castles and localities, and raiding the burghs and contado of the peninsula.
o The band would kill the men defending various localities and dwell for months on end in the captured places.
o The word of their success got out and many castles out of fear would surrender and do their bidding (i.e. Montelupone)
o Even more astounding is that many soldiers, despite finishing their contract, would keep following him (and many had to be kicked out) – (Need Help)
o Fra’s band had a truly centralized administration: he would register his soldier and in an orderly fashion would distribute each a part of the plunder. He would also sell the products of his brigandage, offering as well guarantees to the buyers, ensuring good relations with merchants (Need Help). He also appointed chamberlain in charge of payments, as well as councillour and secretarie with which he shared the administration of the host. By all measure he was the lord of a state on wheels,
ruling and settling dispute among the ranks. His soldier obeying him as if it was his birth-right.
o In particular his action harmed messer Malatesta (one of the many Malatesta Malatesta dynastic leaders) the most, the lord lost to the band 44 castles under his jurisdiction. Furthermorre he had as guarantees of the payments promised to him one of the sons of the captain of Forli as well as Gentile da Mogliano (member of the dynasty of the Fermo tyrants).
3, CX, 299-301o Seeing his lands ravaged, Messer Malatesta of Rimini – who knew quite well the art
of war- was sure that he would defeat the company if aid by the Tuscan communes. o Meeting personally with the authorities of Perugia (Tuscan sphere of influence),
Siena and Florence he highlighted how Fra Moriale was a common threat to their region and asks them to contribute troops to his war effort against the band.
o Malatesta, who already could muster 800 knights from his territories and had a clear territorial advantage, promised to break the band in little time if supported by the communes.
o The Tuscan however still perceiving the band as a far away threat, ultimately contributed nothing to Malatesta’s force (i.e. Siena and Perugia said they’d do what Florence, Florence decided to lend him a 200 cavalryman contingent, despite this Siena and Perugia don’t keep their promise and ultimately the 200 cavalryman leave as well).
o Abbandoned by the Tuscans, Malatesta was forced to bribe/negotiate with Fra paying him 40000 gold Florins (half cash, half in guarantees i.e. his son) to leave his lands for a certain period of time.
o Malatesta proceeded to fire his own army, and many of these went on to just join with the Great Company. The company becoming ever larger and also being field with barons, counts, and constable started calling itself the Great Company.
o While marching through central Italy, the company as well decided to reconfirm its loyalty to Fra Moriale. Despite being many prominent german counts fighting in the ranks of the company, the captaincy of the company was given again, by popular approval, to fra Moriale. However he also was to be sided by 4 knightly secretaries (Landau, a baron with a large following by the name of Fenzo di … , count Broccardo di…, and messer Amerigo del Canaletto) and 4 Italian infantry constables. These were to act as the restricted/upper council of the company (those who chose the direction of the company). The company as well appointed other 40 councillors, a treasurer (who was to collect all the booty plundered and was in charge of payments and loans, in accordance to the captain’s will)
o This soldier emperor was in charge of a well disciplined troops. He could order his men to ride 25-30 miles a night, have them plunder a location and return and deliver all the loot obtained without any objection.
o They employed so many men that their strength was comparable to that of the signori and commune and despite such parity of force the band was also able to extort great sums of money from the Italian states. (Chiedi)
They extorted from King Louis of Naples a promission of 40000 gold Florins (which he did not pay and would pay dearly for it).
From the Captain of Forli and the Da Mogliano they had 30000 gold florins From the Malatesta they had 40000 gold florins.
o They were as well highly demanded the archbishop of Milan wanting to hire them against the Tuscan Guelf, the Tuscan Guelf wanting to hire them against Milan, and at the same time the had a contract with the prefect of Vico against the Papal legate.
4, XV, XVI, 316-318o By the time Fra descended on Tuscany, the Tuscan had in its service many mercs
because of a league.o These men were taking a toll on public order yet were fundamental when mustering
the common league force. The Florentine provided 1200 cavalryman to the Tallia while the Pisans 800. By the time of the league the communes had raised the necessary men.
o The band, being at Arezzo, was entertaining the idea of entering Lombard service sending delegates to Florence for consent and passage. The Florentines are unresponsive and the people of the Valdarno start hiding their harvest and the frontiers were heavily garrisoned.
o Seein this the company chooses to move to Siena (which resupplied them with bread) and gave them passage through burgh of Staggia and then Abbadia a Isola. By then the company had 7000 cavalryman (of which 5000 or more were riding on horse, thre reamaing ones fought dismounted), a futher 1500 Italian infantryman and 20000 camp followers (which included mercants, artisans, and women) who lived on their raided earning.
o These last ones were to play a fundamental function in the group, fulfilling a variety of non-combat function (like the women washing the clothes of the company and cooking the company’s bread out of the the wheat they grinded personally) and encouraging the development of a very abundant provision train.
o Florence fearing for its safety appealed to its allies to provided their portion of the common army agreed to in the recent League. They sent ambassadors to solicit the 800 Pisan knights (who sent back a citizen with 80 hired knights) as well as requesting the support of Siena and Perugia (who refuse for they had an agreement with the company).
o Betrayed Florence chooses to negotiate, sending ambassadors to the band seeking an agreement which would have spared the Florentine contado. Though received, the ambassadors are never receive a conclusive response to their offer. The band proceeds to reach S. Casciano in Val di Pesa (in the Florentino contado) and burns and loots the locality under Florentine jurisdiction.
o After this the Florentines bribe each of the company’s corporals with 3000 gold florins so that they may induce the company’s leaders to reach an agreemen. FFlorence agreed to pay 25000 gold florins to the company for immunity. The Pisans as well followed suit bribing the corporal and paying the company 16000 gold florins. After the appropriate guarantess were given, and safe passage was given to the company by the Florentine and Pisa, the company agreed not to re-enter their territory for a minimum of 2 years.
o They have a brief stop in the Citta di Castello (Umbria) to collect what was owed to them by the Malatesta, captain of Forli and the de MOgliano and agree to leave for Lombardy and serve the League of Lombardy (led by Venice and the signory of North Italy) against the Visconti’s Milan at a rate of 150000 for 4 months service.
o However, fra Moriale with general agreement of his captain leaves the company under the authority of Landus (made vicar) so that they may fulfil their agreement with the Lombard League while he travels to Perugia where he may oversee the administrations of his and the company’s assets (he had family there who looked after his affairs) and to be made citizen.
4, XXIII. 324-6o What is amazing of Fra is that this humble brother hospitaller managed to lead and
command many barons, captains and knight and integrate them in his band of brigands.
o His great strength lied in his marshal virtue and a great understanding of the Italian political-military situation (an awareness that the state was doing most of its fighting with foreigners while the citizen sought to avoid it).
o He was also convinced (and he convincence his own men of this as well) that the band under his leadership would be so powerful that no one would dare to face them on the open field.
o With these convictions in mind, they set to conquer some moderately strong Italian cities by force. Such accomplishment scared the various states of Italy into paying them tribute.
o Seeing his success, Germans, Burgundians, and any other foreigner all sweared loyalty to this effective leader (they became linked to his person).
o To thus allow his company to winter at the expenses of other, he took the Lombardy’s League money while he left for Perugia with a small contingent (500 knights and 300 infantry). Soon after he immediately wishes to establish the company’s next stop on its travel intinerary, sending some contingents under his brother to contract with Cola di Rienzo (the Roman tribune who recently returned frome exile on papal and popular demand). The brother decide to advance Cola Rienzo a bounty of 8500 gold florins to pay the Romans troops sieging Pallestrina.
o As well rumours of him reaching an agreement with the Roman prince family of Colleonesi to overthrow Cola were going around.
o To thus collect his debt and dispel these rumors, Cola himself travels to Rome. Cola invites Fra, his brothers, and the 40 constables with him at the Campidoglio and there he arrests Fra (and all the attendants that are with him) on the charges of treason and for his brigandage throughout the Northern-Central Italian states (principe di ladroni).
o He and his attendants were all decapitated (some say that Fra was quartered and burnt).
o Villani criticises Cola for he did not do this out of a sense of justice but out of avarice and ingratitude (for he decapitated fra’s innocent brother and proceeded to confiscate his earnings).
The tribune confiscated the 100000 Florins belonging to the personal treasure of Fra.
The pope intimates the venetians to confiscate the cargo depots fra moriale held with some local merchants (worth 60000 Florins) and donate the revenue to the apostolic chamber.
Florence writes to perugia to confiscate all money held by the condottiero in the city and use it to pay reparations to those who suffered at the band’s hands.
6, 522-524, 526o The GC which now was under Landus, arrived in Romagna where conflict was
ensueing between the papal forces and the secular princes. Their arrival put a halt to the hostilies, both parties fearing the intervention of the band on either side and attempting their best to woo him.
o Meanwhile the bands plunder the Ravenna contado, its tyrant Bernardino da Polenta (the commander of the pontificial forces who had just recently withdrawn from the siege of Cesena to the Faentino because of the band’s arrival) refuses to pay the immunity bounty to the bands (12000 gold florins), preffering to amend personally each citizen who had been damaged by the band (an important shift in attitude for now the companies were damaging their only means of survival for nothing, without said bounty maintaining the company and its soldier’s loyalty became harder).
o Hearing of the descent of the Company in Romagna, the Florentines (aware that their immunity was about to finish) hired many knights to protect the narrow mountain entrances from the Mugello.
o As well the state levied from the city and contado many crossbowman, which by July numbered 2500 and sent them to the various passes. This were well trained crossbowman, each armed with Brigandine (a heavy cloth, canvas, or leather armour lined with small oblong steel plates riveted to the fabric). Their number was further increased to 4000.
o To allow for preparation (and to avoid the the suspicion of the band) the Florentiens sent ambassadors seeking, falsely, to contract company contingents under several of its constables thus delaying the band’s potential descent.
o This allowed Florence to collect all its harvest and place it safely within castle walls, foritify locations, and garrison the mountain passes which gave entrance into Florentine territory.
o This done, and the company learning about the Florentine garrisoning, was then discouraged from enterting Tuscany to exact it usual tributes. The company was force back into Lombardy to fulfil its contract.
o This new body of crossbowmen, well like by the city authorities, was maintained. From the city the state would levy a body of 800 proved crossbowmen from
each of the 16 militia companies. These were rallied in groups of 25 and placed under a constable. The crossbow and armour for these troops was to be reviewed by the commune
As well every locality in the contado had to provide for each 100 (lire?) of their estimo a crossbowmen and each commune, estate or castle was to provide crossbowmen according to their means, so much so that the outers districts of Florence provided the Florentine with 4000 crossbowmen.
Those selected for service, regardless if in active service or not, would receive a regular wage from the commune. Each crossbowmen would receive during peactime 20 soldi each month and the constable would receive 40 soldi per month. While at war, the crossbownmen would receive 3 gold florins a month and their constable 6 gold florins a month..
All men had to remain at the ready, for they could be summoned by the commune at a moments notice. All crossbowmen were to be undergo a review of their equipment every 3 or 4 months. The review date was chosen
and the equipment inspect by the 2 civil officials in charge of their quartiere’s crossbowmen. The officials in the city (as the well as those of the contado) had to as well hold a regular shooting competition among the men from each gonfalone, the winner of which was to be rewarded with a new and prized crossbow (to win the crossbowman had to score three shots, in a row, on target). This was done regularly to drill and practice the crossbowmen (so much so that every day of festivity would be as well celebrated with a crossbow competition).
9, XXVI-XXXI, 211-221o Following a truce struck by the legate with Francesco Oderlaffi at Cesena (ally of the
band) and the payment of a further 30000-50000 florins to the company, Landau leaves for the Abruzzi. There he is actively resisted, forcing him to turn back to Tuscany (by passing through Umbria)
o The Peurugian pay him a further immunity bounty (4000 florins p.a. for 5 years), provisions him and give him passage into Tuscany (the Sienese and Pisans follow suit as well).
o By then, the company’s number are inflated by the many soldiers met on the way: these included those fired by the papal legate’s army, Perugians, the Sienese and other Italian. In 1359 he enter Tuscany 5000 knights, 1000 hungarians and 2000 infantryman.
o Once in sight of the Florentine frontiers, but still in the Perugian contado, the company wrote to many of the Florentine allies. They hoped to find a potential employer who would could also sway the commune in giving them passage through the lands (which had been strongl fortified). Ambassadors from the House of Monferrato arrive in Florence looking to hire the company and promising considerable bounties and guarantees to Florence. The Florentines, despite the many flatteries of their allies, refused to allow passage to the company (in the name of defence and security of the state). (CHIEDI AIUTO).
o As this was happening the Florentine forces were being reinforced both by recruitment of mercs and by calling upon allies. The Kingdom of Naples under Louis I sent the count of Nola, an Orsinisi, with 300 knights to support the Florentine.
o Hearing of this, Landau with a 1000 horsemen went to Bettona ready to jump him. Hearing of this through his spies, Orsini quickly turned onto Spoleto and was given refuge there. This greviously threatened the Perugian’s relationship with the company since the Spoletan captain was their citizen. Nonetheless Landau grew disinterested and Orsini managed to sneak with his troops in Florence.
o More and more nobles citizens from all over Italy join the Florentine cause against the company (such as the Neapolitan knight of Capovana and Nido brining considerable contingents with them, in total providing 50 very well armed knights and their relative attendants).
o The company, who had been staying on the Perugian contado more than what was promised, eventually depart for Todi which they devastate (and the small town is forced to pay them an immunity bounty as well). Once on at Buonconvento and Bagno Vignoni, the Sienese resupply the company and allowed them passage.
o The Florentine confident in their captain of that time, Pandolfo Malatesta (who enjoyed the reputation of being a great warrior), desidered to face and extinguish this glorified bands of brigands. In preparation of this, the Florentine conferred the
communal insignia to the host it had rallied. In this very symbolical procession we see that in an attempt to create comradery and a sense of trust within this very mixed army many, prominent foreigners and allies are give important standards and honours (i.e. Niccolo de Tolomei da Siena give an honour which I cant discern CHIEDI AIUTO, Orlando Tedesco, a loyal german merc was assigned the banner of the vanguard so that to stress that despite fighting a company of prevalentely Germans, they should not shy away from conflict and that not all German people were untrustworthy).
o To further stress the authority of the captain, the Florentine’s trust in him and the general awareness civilian authorities had regarding about military matter, the captain was not given any citizen councillor of tutor that might hamper his efforts.
o The Florentine host then proceeded to depart to mmet the enemy, with them they had 2000 hired cavalryman, and 2000 contado infantrymen and 500 hired Hugnarians, 1200 cavalryman hired by Bernabo Visconti (400 of which where the Visconti’s own knights CHIEDI AIUTO), 200 cavalryman of the Marquis of Ferra, 200 of the Signore of Padova, 300 of the king of Naples of Louis, a further 300 belonging to the papal legate, 50 hired Neapolitan knights, ser Lupo da parm with his 30 hired knight, 80 hired knight and 80 infantrymen from Arezzo, 200 infantrymen of count Robert, 12 knights and 300 infantryman from Pistoia, and 300 infantryman from local allied communities . They were as well waiting for further Visconti reinforcement (about 1000 infantryman) All in all the Florentine had 4000 horsemen and as many infantryman.
o Both hosts move around a lot, the Florentine trying to mimick the movements of the company so that they may intercept them in favourable position. The host arrive at a distance of 2 miles of each other however the company desists from attacking learned that the Florentine host was led by a very talented men at arms. After 5 days of face to face, the company departs looking for a more favourable position. While moving the Florentine captain sends a 500 man cavalry force to harass actively the enemy and prevent them from marching too far out.
o Eventually the company stops at Pieve a Nievole, a very open plain near the Florentine host. Landau, knowing that the company enjoyed the support of a considerably numerous Pisan contingent (800 hired knight and 2000 infantryman) which was nearby (Montechiaro), decides to launch an official challenge to the Florentine Captain Malatesta (a bloodied glove with a letter asking for battle). The battle is accepted. The Florentines grew even more confident for now they had the support of 300 Florentine cavalryman raised from the city as well as the arrival of a futher 100 infantryman and 500 knights from the Visconti (under Ambrgiuolo, bastard son of Bernabo). As well some of the members of the family of the Ubertini, exiled from Florence as rebels, asked to serve for the glory of the city (and were graciously accepted) bringing to the host a further 30 well armed knights. These would serve valiantly, like Biordo, who would fight so strenuously that once the battle was won he became sick and died in Florence a few days after.
o No actions happened for many days until one night the company sent a small raiding party (300 knights, 300 infantry) to plunder Castelfrano, coming back with nothing the ran into 3 Florentine citizen and Empolesi merchants who were captured and redeemed for a ransom (after that no more raiding expedition were attempted on the contado).
o Eventually Landau and his captain, feeling dishonourable for having challenged the enemy and yet not engaged in battle, deploy the host in formation during mid July. Seeing this the Florentine rapidly organize with great skill their ranks, face the enemy and start advancing towards the plains of Campo alle Mosche (a hill surrounded by many creeks and steep climbs, making it a very disadvanteous position to attack). The band, despite having challenged and menaced the Florentines, refused to leave the hill rather reinforcing themselves in that position by employing the many sapper/labourers Pisa gave them. Seeing this the Florentine move onto the company’s old camp location and waited. Despite the many probing attacks by the company’s Hungarian horseman launched in an attempt to force the Florentines to commit themselves to a battle on unfavourable terms, Malatesta waits and bides his time.
o The Sienese recognizing the Florentine success in dealing against the company, quickly change their stance, asking for forgiveness and contributing to the Florentine host 300 hired cavalryman.
o Seeing that the Florentine would not fall in their trap and seeing how they were well rested and well armed while the company’s men were tired and poorly supplied and seeing also how the enemy was being constantly reinforced and fearing that their escapes routes would be cut off and hearing that the Florentines had sent many crossbowman and infantry to the mountains in Lucca and knowing that the companies provisioning depended on wideranging raids while right now they were forced in a state of passivity since they were in a state of siege and finally considering that the Pisans had supported the company for more than what was agreed to, the company was forced to make a choice. They could either starve or surrender while suffering on top of their hill, give battle and likely lose or escape. On the night of the 23 of July, the company snuck out and gave fire to their encampment and quickly departed in a disorderly fashion (as if they were routing). They reach the colle delle Donne, in Lucchese territory, 6 miles from the Florentine. The Florentines and the captain not wanting to breaks the peace with Pisa and Lucca decide not to pursue the routing army in another’s state territory, allowing to get the away.
o Villani suggests that like with the German army at Stalingrad, the victory at the Campo alle Mosche taught all Italians alike that these large ruthless well-trained companies were not invincible but could be defeated.
11, xxiii, 419-420o The Florentine capture of Peccioli caused much controvery between communal
authorities and its mercenary troops.o Certain Italian noblemen in service of Florence (Niccolo da Urbino, Guolino de
Sabatini, Marcolfo da Rimini) with a great following instigated together with the merc paymasters of the German troops a revolt of the German mercenary soldiers.
o They soldiers demanded that that the commune reward their capture of the town with double pay and that they wanted guarantees for such payment. If not, the mercenary threatened, they would stop fighting. They send ambassadors to Florence to let their demands be known.
o The communal authority ruled that these demands were not reasonable and send back the ambassadors to the soldiers.
o Furious the 3 counts Niccolo, Ugolino, and Marco placed a hat (kettle-helmet) on top of a lance and asked the soldiers that those who wanted double play should come and stand under the lance. In a few hours the counts had collected around their person many brigades and many german and Burgundian corporals so much so that their ranks number at least 1000 cavalryman.
o The captain unable to do anything does try a last ditch attempt reminding them of their oath to Florence. These persist in their opposition and force the captain and the remnants of the host to withdraw.
o The mercenaries, now fired, formed a new company in Arezzo named after their theatrical gesture: the compagnia del Capeletto. The company grew its ranks very quickly.
11, XLVIII, 439-440o The White Company, under Alberto Tedesco, was a large company of 3500
horseman and 2000 infantryman which had come to Italy for the Marquis of Monferrato hired them against Galeazzo Visconti.
o The marquis eventually cannot afford anymore their services and the company passes to the Visconti.
o The Visconti who was ally and protector of Pisa had recently struck peace with Florence and was bound by truce. As such while he could not help directly Pisa against the renewed hostilities by Florence he could recommend the newly available White Company (since they had just finished their contract with the Visconti).
o The Florentines learning about this quickly try to swipe the mercenary band from the Pisans. Through their friendship with the English kingdom and many countryman on the Island, they open negotiation with the English band. The band happy to serve the Florentines even reduced their rate by 10000 gold florins.
o The band, putting on hold their condotta negotiations with Pisans, were ready to leave for Florence – the communal authorities just needed to give their go-ahead.
o At a council meeting of the commune, communal authorities asked Pietro da Farnese, the current captain of the War for Florence, his opinion on hiring the English band. He was in favour of their employment suggesting that the English, as put by Ceasar, were a people pre-disposed to war, knowledgable about the matter and who conduced themselves very well (giving whoever had them in their employment a definite edge).
o This said, with the council and officials of the city, the gonfaloniere of giustizia asked “and who will pay?” such statement carried great authority and delayed the Florentine from hiring the band. The window of opportunity eventually closed, the English band choosing to enter Pisan service for four month at 10000 forins a month.
-Codice Stipendiari della Rep Fir
Pg/ 315
-All the mounted squad-leaders of the mercenaries of the city, that are serving and will serve for Flo, will have to be equipped at all times while in pay with the following offensive and defensive weapons: greaves, cuisses, musacchini (shoulder protection), brassards/armlets, gorget/chainmail sleeves and coif and other chain connectors (habergeon), armour, helmet (barbuta), metal gauntlets, long sword, knife, lance and a buckler. They must as well have a plated or mail armour for their horse.
-And mercenaries while in service of Florence must be at all times equipped with the aforementioned items.
-For those who where armed in the English style (that is wearing more plate armour, mallet pg. 387), they accepted as if armed in the aforementioned manner.
-Mercenary cavalry men of the above corporla shall be armed with the following equipment: greaves, cuisses, brassards/armlets, chainmail with sleaves, gorget, habergeon, helmet (barbuta), armour, metal gauntlets, longsword and knife.
Pg 316
-These cavalryman are allowed to retain a chain mail in as much as there are no more than 3 cavlaryman for every squad of 16 with said piece of eqipment.
-The English soldiers, like their constables, shall be armed with the following equipment: greaves, cuisses, chain-mail, a chest armour piece made of connecting metal plates kept together by metal chains, brassards/armlets, metal gauntlets, barbute, long sword, knife, lance.
The English archers shall be armed with chainmal or curaiss, a kettle helmet, metal gauntlets, long bow, arrows, sword and knife.
-The German and Burgundian and Italian soldiers (or from any other locality from which they come), except the English fighting in the lance formation, must be armed like the English corporals or as described about. That this soldier of these nationality, or any other, (unless of cours English) must be armed with the following equipment: chainmail or armour, kettle helmet or barbute, mental gauntlets, sword, knife.
-The Hungarian soldiers and corporal in the following manner: Metal armour, metal gauntlets, metal hat, bow or lance, longsword or knife. The corporals must as well have chain mail, chest armour piece made of connecting metal plates kept together by metal chains, longs word, knife, metal gauntlets, kettle helment, bow and barbuta.
Pg. 317
-The Hungarian cavarlyman must have bows, arrows, sword, knight and metal gauntlets.
-All stipendiaries, exception English and Hungarians, which are found without the aformentioned weapons from their captains or communal official or when they fail to present said equipment during inspection, shall be punished by the communal authorities by having deducted from their wage a fine according to the following prescriptions:
For missing armour, 2 libras small florins For the barbute, 2 libras small florins For any of the weapons, 1 libras of small florins.
The English shall be punished according to the following prescriptions:
Chainmail, 2 libras small florins Chest protection, ibid. Barbute, ibid, For any single piece of weapon, 1 libras of small florins.
For the Hungarians:
For chainmail, 2 libras small florins For bow and arrows, 2 libras small florins For any single piece of weapon, 1 libras of small florins.
-All stipendiary footmen shall be armed with all offensive and defensive weapons prescribed by the officials in charge of the condotta, so much so:
Crossbowmen, shall be armed with brigadine, cervelliera, knife, crossbow, belt hooks, bolts and quarrels and a quiver.
The infantryman shall be armed with cervelleria or bacinet, brigandine, brassards/armlets or chain mail sleeve, long sword, knife, pike and pavesi shield. The attendant of the corporals and constable shall be armed in a similar manner.
Every other foot soldier of the company shall be armed with ceverleria, sword, knife, paves or shield, and pike.
Pg. 318
-All stipendiary cavalryman in service of the commune
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