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Impacts and Actions Resulting from the August 14, 2003 Blackout Cornell University David W. Hilt January 20, 2005
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Impacts and ActionsResulting from the August 14, 2003 Blackout

Cornell UniversityDavid W. Hilt

January 20, 2005

2

Summary of August 14 Blackout

● ImpactsOver 50 million people 60-65,000 MW30 hours to restoreManufacturing disrupted400+ Generators tripped

● StatisticsLine trips began at 3:05 PMCascading began at 4:06 PM− Lasted approximately 12 seconds

Thousands of discrete events

3

1:31:34 p.m.1:31:34 p.m.

August 14, 2003What Happened?

765kVDC

Voltage

MontrealOttawa

Toronto

DetroitCleveland

AkronCanton

Buffalo

New YorkPittsburg

Toledo

2:02 p.m.3:05:41 to 3:41:33 p.m.3:45:33 to 4:08:58 p.m.4:08:58 to 4:10:27 p.m.4:10:00 to 4:10:38 p.m.4:10:40 to 4:10:44 p.m.4:10:44 to 4:13:00 p.m.

4

Every Blackout has Impacts● November 9, 1965 – NY Blackout

30,000,000 people and over 20,000 MW of demand –up to 13 hours

● July 13, 1977 - New York City9,000,000 people and 6,000 MW of demand – up to 26 hours

● July 2, 1996 – Western US2,000,000 customers (10 % of the Western Interconnection) and 11,850 MW of demand for up to several hours

● August 10, 1996 – Western US7,500,000 customers; 28,000 MW of demand for up to 9 hours

5

Recommendations● The three Ts

ToolsTreesTraining

• Need to implement throughout the industry

6

Investigation Organization OverviewSteering Group

MAAC/ECAR/NPCC Coordinating Group

MAAC

ECAR

NPCC

MEN Study Group

Project Planning and Support

Sequence of Events

Data Requests and Management

Investigation Team Lead

System Modeling and Simulation Analysis

NERC & Regional Standards/Procedures

& Compliance

Transmission System Performance,

Protection, ControlMaintenance & Damage

Operations - Tools, SCADA/EMS

Communications Op Planning

System Planning, Design, & Studies

Root Cause AnalysisCooper Systems

Generator Performance, Protection, Controls

Maintenance & Damage

U.S – CanadaTask Force

Vegetation/ROW Management

Frequency/ACE

Restoration

Investigation Process Review

7

Causes of the August 14 Blackout

● Inadequate situational awareness ● Ineffective vegetation

management● Inadequate diagnostic support●Failure to follow NERC Operating

Policies and Planning Standards

8

Near-Term Actions

● Voltage and Reactive ManagementEnsure sufficient voltage support for reliable operations

● Reliability CommunicationsStrengthen and implement communication protocols between Control Area Operators, Reliability Coordinators, and ISOs

● Failures of System Monitoring and Control Functions

Review, update, and train on plans for loss of monitoring and control systems

9

Near-Term Actions

● Emergency Action PlansReview, update, and train on emergency plans and actions

● Train for EmergenciesConduct emergency training drills

● Vegetation ManagementConfirm that ROWs are clear of obstructions

10

Key Findings● Inadequate system planning

and design studies, operations planning, facilities ratings, and modeling data accuracy

● Operating with insufficient reactive margins

● More effective system protection and controls could slow or minimize spread of cascading outage

11

Key Findings

● Compliance requires objective measurements and concrete actions to resolve violations

● Problems from prior blackouts were repeated

12

NERC Blackout Recommendations

● Corrective Actions● Strategic Initiatives● Technical Initiatives

Goals:1. Correct root cause deficiencies 2. Address contributing factors3. Identify objective and

measurable actions

13

Corrective Actions: FE● Voltage criteria and

reactive resources● Operational

preparedness and action plan

● Emergency response capabilities and preparedness

● Control center and operator training

Juniper 345kV

-1000

-900

-800

-700

-600

-500

-400

-300

-200

-100

0

100

200

300

400

500

0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1

Voltage PU

Reac

tive

Pow

er (M

VAR)

15-05 Chamberlin-Harding

15-32 Hanna-Juniper

15-41 Star-S Canton

15-45-40 Canton Central-Tidd

15-59 West Akron 138kV Lines

14

Corrective Actions: Reliability Coordinators

● PJMCommunications protocols and procedures

● MISOReliability toolsVisualization toolsOperator trainingCommunicationsOperating agreements

15

NERC Strategic Initiatives

● Strengthen compliance● Readiness audits● Vegetation-related

outage reporting● Track implementation

of recommendations

16

Performance Reviews

● Strengthen NERC Compliance Enforcement Program

Regions to submit results to NERCProvide list of non-compliant entities

● Confidential reports to the NERC BoardSpecific violationsResults of audits

● Release of confirmed violationsIdentification of violators

17

Readiness Audits

● Audit control areas and reliability coordinators

● Conduct on a 3-year cycle

● Report to the Board

18

Readiness Audit Program Status

● On target to audit one-third of control areas and reliability coordinators in 2004

● Audits Completed as of October 14, 2004

57 Control Areas6 Reliability Coordinators1 Transmission Operator

19

Vegetation-Related Outage Reports

● Report tree contacts to the Regions (230+ kV)

● Regions report to NERC● Regions to conduct and

report on annual vegetation management surveys

20

Recommendations Tracking

● NERC and Regions will track:Implementation of recommendationsCompliance auditsReadiness audit recommendationsLessons learned from system disturbancesUse regional processes as model

21

Technical Initiatives

● Forward looking to preventfuture blackouts

New standards, procedures, protocolsExisting technologies to be consideredNew technologies Changes in system planning, design, and assessmentChanges to operator training programs 40 20 0 20 40 60

20

40

60

80

100

Sammis-Star 345kV @ Sammis 1606:03110

10−

Im ZBCx( )Im Z1l( )

7040− Re ZBCx( ) Re Z1l( ),

The Gory Details

Really Interesting Plots for Engineers

22

23

NY to Ontario 345kV Line Flows at NiagaraProgressively Worsening Stability Conditions

New York to Ontario 345 kV Line Flow at Niagara(does not include 230 kV line flow)

0.00

200.00

400.00

600.00

800.00

1000.00

1200.00

1400.00

1600.00

1800.00

2000.00

16:0

5:43

16:0

5:49

16:0

5:54

16:0

6:00

16:0

6:05

16:0

6:11

16:0

6:16

16:0

6:22

16:0

6:27

16:0

6:33

16:0

6:38

16:0

6:44

16:0

6:49

16:0

6:55

16:0

8:55

16:0

9:00

16:0

9:06

16:0

9:11

16:0

9:17

16:0

9:23

16:0

9:28

16:0

9:33

16:0

9:39

16:0

9:45

16:0

9:50

16:0

9:56

16:1

0:01

16:1

0:20

16:1

0:26

16:1

0:31

16:1

0:37

16:1

0:42

16:1

0:48

MW

200.0

220.0

240.0

260.0

280.0

300.0

320.0

340.0

360.0

380.0

KV

Niagara KV

PA301&2 MW

Sammis-Star 345 trip

East Lima - Fostoria Central 345 trip

Thetford-Jewel, Hampton Pontiac,& Perry - Ashtabula 345kV lines trip

Argenta - Battle Creekdouble circuit 345 trip

24

Detroit Units Slip Poles

25

Severe Under Frequency Condition

26

View Into Detroit from Lambton

27

Frequency in Ontario and New York

28

Next Steps

● Implement strategic initiatives and recommendations

● Readiness audits● Enact reliability

legislation – mandatory standards and compliance enforcement


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