Impala Rustenburg 14 Shaft Fire Jacey Kruger Shaft Conveyor Fire 22 Jan 2016 AMRE.pdf · We...

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Impala Rustenburg

14 Shaft Fire

Jacey Kruger


Index

• Overview

• Fire 22 January 2016

• Conveyor rehabilitation


Impala Rustenburg


Impala Rustenburg Lease Area


Introducing 14 Shaft Impala

• 14 Shaft is one of the “Big 5” shafts

• 2 x Sections:• Upper Section

Conventional• Decline Section B&P and

conventional

• Daily tons planned at 7 275 per shift (BP16)

• Conventional UG2 : 31% • Conventional Mer : 34% • Bord & Pillar (Hybrid ):35%

• 36 Half levels mining


14 Shaft Impala Infrastructure

15 LEVEL

16 LEVEL

17 LEVEL

18 LEVEL

19 LEVEL

20 LEVEL

21 LEVEL

22 LEVEL

23 LEVEL

24 LEVEL

25 LEVEL

26 LEVEL

27 LEVEL

28 LEVEL


Mining Methods

• Conventional narrow reef mining:

• 65% of the Weighline tons are mined conventional, both Merensky and UG2.

• Two shifts, day and night.

• Scraper cleaning on night shift.

• Support, drilling and charging up on dayshift.

• Predominantly conventional double sided breast mining.

• Footwall drives, 18m - 24m below reef.

• Rse/Wze connections, 180m and 250m apart.

• Panel Face length varies between 15m – 30m.

• Panels are separated by 6 x 3m grid pillars with 2m ventilation holings.

• Stoping widths, 1.1m - 1.3m .

• Stoping team size: 13 people at work.


Mining Methods ( Continue )

• Bord and Pillar Hybrid mining:

• 7 x 7 meter, bord and pillar.

• It contributes 35% of the weighline tons, only Merensky tons.

• Two shifts, day and nightshift.

• LHD cleaning on nightshift and tipping on follow-on strike belts.

• Making safe, handheld pneumatic drilling of faces, roof support with bolters and charging up, on dayshift.

• 1 x blast per bord in a 24 hour cycle. (2 x 8 hour shifts and re-entry period)

• Each dayshift team consist of 5 team members, excluding the Miner and nightshift.

• Average stoping width 1.9m


14 Shaft

Fire Incident on 22 January 2016


Surface

14 Shaft 14A Shaft 14B Shaft

IMPALA PLATINUM - NO.14 SHAFTGeneral Ventilation Layout - Existing System

21 Level

27 Level

28 Level

560 kg/s[23.2 m/s ]

515 kg/s[ 10.5 m/s ]

370 kg/s[ 12.4 m/s]

26 Level

25 Level

24 Level

22 Level

23 Level

355 kg/s[ 17.8 m/s ]

Level Distance Below Collar

Surface 0.0 m

15 Level -620.3 m

16 Level -675.3 m

17 Level -730.3 m

18 Level -785.3 m

19 Level -840.3 m

20 Level -895.3 m

21 Level -950.3 m

22 Level -1005.3 m

23 Level -1060.3 m

24 Level -1103.3 m

25 Level -1164.3 m

26 Level -1199.3 m

27 Level -1235.3 m

28 Level -1290.3 m

19 Level

17 Level

15 Level

16 Level

18 Level

14 Vent Shaft


Merensky Fire Detection Heads

CO

COCO

COCO

COCOCO

COCO CO

COCO

COCO

14V Shaft

2 x 1050KW Fans343m3/s

14 Shaft

14MW Plant458m3/s

14A Shaft

2 x 2.2MW Fans512m3/s

14B Shaft

12MW Plant387m3/s

Merensky Reef Horison CO and Smoke Detectors


q

Conveyor Fire Detection Heads

T1

T2

T3

T4

C1

C2

C3

C4

C4 tail

23 Decline RAW

23 TM3 RAWCOCO

COCO

CO

CO CO

CO

CO

COCO

CO

CO CO

CO

14A Shaft

2 x 2.2MW Fans512m3/s

14B Shaft

12MW Plant387m3/s

Conveyor Decline CO and Smoke Detectors


Description of Accident

• On Friday, 22 January 2016 at approximately 17H02 the CO detection head at themain dip conveyor tail end failed to safe (200 ppm) and lost communication.

• This activated the fire suppression systems on the belt and alarmed at the ShaftControl Room and Central Control Room.

• From here onwards a number of CO detection heads alarmed which activated the firesuppression systems on the belt installation and alarmed in the Shaft Control Roomand Central Control Room.

• At approximately 17H27, the 23 RAW CO detection head alarmed in Shaft ControlRoom, Central Control Room and also in the Banksman’s cabin.

• The centralised blasting commenced from the control room at approximately 18H05although all the fire detection heads had not cleared.

• The three hour re-entry period expired at 21:05 and despite the fact that three of thefire detection heads in the lower section was in alarm, the night shift was lowered tothe top section at 21:18.


Description of Accident

• 144 employees proceeded underground to the top section of the mine.

• After the instruction was issued to withdraw all employees from underground, 140employees were safely evacuated and 4 employees were overcome by noxious gases.

• The emergency control room was established at 22:55

• The fire is the subject of an enquiry in terms of the MHSA and cannot comment on thecause of the fire and any related matter.


Locality plan


14 Shaft Control Room


14 Shaft Bank


Position of deceased

Shortest route for air to travel to 19MNA =17 min


q

Settlers

14A Ventilation Shaft

14 B Shaft

CO21 Level

CO SM CO SM

CO SM CO SM

CO SM CO SM

CO SM

CO SM CO SM

CO SM

CO SM

CO

Total Underground Power Failure occurred at 02:29


14 Shaft

Conveyor DeclineRehabilitation


Conveyor decline layout


Conveyors schematic

Level

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

Tipping on C4

Tipping on C3

14# Surface

COB

(46 m)COC

(46m)

C1 (194 m)

C2 (410 m)

C3 (950 m)

C4 (980 m)

T1 (110 m)

T2 (110 m)

T3 (110 m)

T4 (110 m)

Total Conveyor Lenght: 3 066 m

Belts on Dip: 2 626 mBelts on Strike: 440 m


Physical Damage

• On 22 January 2016 a fire started in the conveyor decline in the vicinity of T4 on C4 conveyor and burnt up and down the excavation.

• The conveyor excavation extend from 21 Level through to below 28 Level –3 076 m of excavation.

• The excavation was originally supported with grouted rebar tendons and expanda bolts as well as 50 mm fibre-crete lining – heat caused failure of expanda bolts and expansion cracks in lining

• The conveyor excavation houses the conveyor structure (1 350 mm steelcord belt), the diesel mono rail system (DMTS)and all services e.g. fibre optic, control and LT cables and piping (water, compressed air)

• The complete conveyor up to 150m from the tail-end of C4 belt was damaged (all belt destroyed and structure deformed)

• All services were damaged (burst pipes, electrical and instrumentation cables destroyed)

• Two monorail units damaged and rails distorted in some areas


Damage to excavation


Damage to structure


Damage to services


Damage to DMTS


Access Safety

• Risk assessment conducted on safe making process– Make safe from level into conveyor excavation– Barring only to be done from the top down– From scaffold - dress and waterjet loose rocks – Progress scaffold 2.5 metres– Bar and sound till solid from scaffold – waterjet clean– Replace failed and protruding bolts – Do coring of shotcrete lining for test– Perform pull test on bolts and replace where required– Do full cover shotcrete

• Risks identified– Falling objects/rocks– Falling from height– Dust– Live electricity– Heavy equipment handling(motors, gearboxes, pipes, conveyor belt, pulleys)


Scaffolding


Water jetting


Re-install support


Rocks after barring


Rehabilitation


Shotcreted Workshop and Excavation


Structural Rehabilitation


Completed areas


Labour Strategy

Before fire After fire

Total Employees 4156 2989

Total Vertical 1586 1980

Total Decline 2209 669

Teams 85 63

Tonnes 7275t 3210t


Scope of this Project

Rehabilitation and reconstruction of the No 14 shaft decline conveyor and services broadly comprising:

• Rehabilitation of the conveyor decline primary and secondary

support.

• Rehabilitation of cable, fibre and piping in the conveyor decline

• Installation and commissioning of the service DMTS.

• Stripping, removal and reconstruction of the burnt C0B, C0C, C1,

C2, C3 and C4 conveyor belts


Procurement Schedule


Progress on Decline Rehabilitation

• 1824 metres made safe

• 1318 metres shotcreted

• 1040 metres cleaned

• 1062 metres structural steelwork completed


Current Progress

• T1 conveyor completed.

• Temporary “relay” pumping system installed and commissioned to

accommodate water from waterjets.

• Second Diesel Shunting trolley delivered and commissioned underground.

• Redesigns for C3 transfer box, C2/C1 transfer box, C0c and C0b pendula's.

• C3 conveyor currently 53% complete.

• Gearboxes and Motors for C3 refurbished and delivered.

• All C3 bearings replaced.

• Lagging - 7/15 pulleys for C3 completed.


Opportunities Identified

• More access points for safe making.

• Appears that only 60% of steelwork need replacement.

• Refurbishment of long lead items e.g. motors, gearboxes, VSD panels,

transformers will reduce lead times.

• Additional DMTS shunter will alleviate logistic delays and assist with

handling of heavy components – approved by insurance

• Pulley bearing replacement and lagging will be done in situ.

• Two steel work erectors will work concurrently on stripping/replacement.


Shunting Trolley


Project – Milestones

Key MilestoneDue Date

Completion Application Approved Commission C3 Commission C0C Commission C0B Commission C4 Commission C2 Commission C1

March 2016 24th Oct 2016 13th Dec 2016 14th Dec 2016 13th Feb 2017 17th Feb 2017 10th Mar 2017


Rehabilitation Schedule

48


Interim Measures

• Commission C3 during October 2016.• Discharge through temporary orepass to level – capacity

approximately 1300tonnes/day• Tram to shaft orepasses• Will allow 24 level to start up

– B&P : 17 Stoping and 9 Development teams– Conventional : 5 Stoping teams


Early start-up

Phase 1Phase 2


QUESTIONS

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