Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: ICR00004581 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT LOAN NO. IBRD-79800 ON A LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF US$30 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA FOR THE NHAI TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT December 28, 2018 Transport Global Practice South Asia Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
Transcript
Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Report No: ICR00004581
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
LOAN NO. IBRD-79800
ON A
LOAN
IN THE AMOUNT OF US$30 MILLION
TO THE
REPUBLIC OF INDIA
FOR THE
NHAI TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT
December 28, 2018
Transport Global Practice South Asia Region
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
(Exchange Rate Effective June 30, 2018)
Currency Unit = Indian Rupee (INR)
INR 68.44 = US$1
FISCAL YEAR
April 1 – March 31
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BBIN Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative BOT Build-Operate-Transfer CGM Chief General Manager CPF Country Partnership Framework CRRI Central Road Research Institute DPR Detailed Project Report EPC Engineering, Procurement, and Construction EPFO Employees' Provident Fund Organisation of India ERP Enterprise Resource Planning ETC Electronic Toll Collection FM Financial Management GAAP Governance and Accountability Action Plan GHG Greenhouse Gas GIS Geographic Information System GoI Government of India GST Goods and Services Tax HAS Highway Advisory Services HAM Hybrid Annuity Model ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IRC Indian Roads Congress ISR Implementation Status and Results Report IT Information Technology LEEP Logistics Efficiency and Enhancement Program LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging LMNHP Lucknow-Muzaffarpur National Highway Project M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MCA Model Concession Agreement MoRTH Ministry of Road Transport and Highways NHAI National Highways Authority of India NHDP National Highways Development Project NHIDC National Highways Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited NHIIP National Highways Interconnectivity Improvement Project PAD Project Appraisal Document
PD Project Director PDO Project Development Objective PMIS Project Management Information System PPP Public-Private Partnership RAMS Road Asset Management System RD&T Research Development & Technology RFP Request for Proposal RO Regional Officer SESA Strategic Environment and Social Assessment SI System Integrator SRTU State Road Transport Undertaking STA State Transport Authority TA Technical Assistance ToR Terms of Reference TOT Toll-Operate-Transfer V-BOT Variable Build-Operate-Transfer V-TOT Variable Toll-Operate-Transfer WBTA World Bank Technical Assistance Activity
Regional Vice President: Hartwig Schafer
Country Director: Junaid Kamal Ahmad
Senior Global Practice Director: Guangzhe Chen
Practice Manager: Shomik Raj Mehndiratta
Task Team Leader(s): Arnab Bandyopadhyay
ICR Main Contributor: Alan G. Carroll
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DATA SHEET ......................................................................................................................... 1
I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ........................................................... 6
A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL .........................................................................................................6
B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION ................................................................8
II. OUTCOME ....................................................................................................................... 10
A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs ............................................................................................................ 10
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY) ...................................................................................... 11
C. EFFICIENCY ........................................................................................................................... 15
D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING .................................................................... 16
E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS ......................................................................................... 16
III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME .................................. 17
A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION ................................................................................... 17
B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION ............................................................................. 18
IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .... 20
A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E) ............................................................ 20
B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE ..................................................... 22
C. BANK PERFORMANCE ........................................................................................................... 23
D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ....................................................................................... 25
V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................ 25
ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 27
ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION ......................... 32
ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 34
ANNEX 4. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROJECT ............................................ 35
ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS ... 57
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DATA SHEET
BASIC INFORMATION Product Information Project ID Project Name
P121515 NHAI Technical Assistance Project
Country Financing Instrument
India Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category Revised EA Category
Not Required (C) Partial Assessment (B)
Organizations
Borrower Implementing Agency
The Republic of India National Highways Authority of India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways
Project Development Objective (PDO)
Original PDO Assist NHAI to adopt appropriate practices that would enhance its program management and operational efficiency. Revised PDO Assist MoRTH and NHAI to adopt better program management and operational practices.
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FINANCING
Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$) World Bank Financing IBRD-79800 45,000,000 30,000,000 24,014,005
Total 45,000,000 30,000,000 24,014,005
Non-World Bank Financing Borrower/Recipient 10,000,000 7,620,000 5,975,376
Total 10,000,000 7,620,000 5,975,376
Total Project Cost 55,000,000 37,620,000 29,989,381
KEY DATES
Approval Effectiveness MTR Review Original Closing Actual Closing 30-Nov-2010 21-Mar-2011 22-Apr-2014 31-Jul-2016 30-Jun-2018
Change in Project Development Objectives Change in Results Framework Change in Components and Cost Cancellation of Financing Change in Financing Plan Reallocation between Disbursement Categories Change in Disbursements Arrangements Change in Safeguard Policies Triggered Change of EA category Change in Legal Covenants Change in Institutional Arrangements Change in Financial Management Change in Procurement
13-Apr-2016 4.65 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) 30-Jun-2017 10.23 Change in Loan Closing Date(s)
Change in Implementation Schedule
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SECTORS AND THEMES
Sectors Major Sector/Sector (%)
Transportation 1
Public Administration - Transportation 1 Themes Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%) Private Sector Development 32
Business Enabling Environment 15 Investment and Business Climate 15
Jobs 7
Job Creation 7
Public Private Partnerships 10
Public Sector Management 26
Public Finance Management 13 Public Expenditure Management 13
Public Administration 13
Transparency, Accountability and Good Governance 13
Urban and Rural Development 39
Urban Development 7 Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 7
Rural Development 32
Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 32
Environment and Natural Resource Management 15
Environmental policies and institutions 15
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ADM STAFF
Role At Approval At ICR
Regional Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Hartwig Schafer
Country Director: N. Roberto Zagha Junaid Kamal Ahmad
Senior Global Practice Director: John Henry Stein Jose Luis Irigoyen
Practice Manager: Michel Audige Shomik Raj Mehndiratta
Task Team Leader(s): Rajesh Rohatgi Arnab Bandyopadhyay
ICR Contributing Author: Alan G. Carroll
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I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES
A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL
Context
1. In 2010, when the project was originated, the World Bank had been assisting the development of national highways in India since 1985 through a series of investment operations. The four most recent of these,1 starting in 2000, supported various elements of the National Highways Development Project (NHDP), the flagship initiative of the Government at that time to augment the capacity of some 45,000 km of strategically important highway corridors through upgrading, rehabilitation, and widening, initiated in 1998. The National Highways Authority of India (NHAI), established in 1995, was the main implementing agency for the NHDP. The first three of the four prior World Bank-financed projects with NHAI included both physical investments and institutional strengthening.2
2. The rapid increase of the scope of the NHDP, and thereby the mandate of NHAI, was creating problems. Despite efforts to provide capacity-building support to NHAI, national highway contracts continued to suffer from chronic shortcomings, including poor quality of planning and design; significant delays in preconstruction activities; large variations during construction; ineffective contract administration; high numbers of contractual disputes; human resource constraints; lack of safety awareness; and large time and cost overruns.
3. These issues had generated detrimental effects on the performance of all the four prior World Bank-financed national highway projects.3 In particular, serious problems in the LMNHP4 motivated the formulation of the NHAI Technical Assistance Project, with the aim of addressing NHAI’s systemic limitations of institutional capacity and effectiveness.
4. A further important factor at that time was a growing concern about the vulnerability of the sector to governance risks at the national and state levels. The PAD for the NHAI Technical Assistance Project addressed these extensively and included a Governance and Accountability Action Plan (GAAP).5
5. As a result, the NHAI Technical Assistance Project was designed to focus on priority institutional changes needed in NHAI, primarily in the following areas: (a) project preparation and management, (b) corporate governance, (c) resource planning, (d) asset management, (e) road safety management, and (f) research, training, and capacity building.
1 Third National Highway Project (2000–2007); Grand Trunk Road Improvement Project (2001–2008); Allahabad Bypass Project (2003–2009); and the Lucknow-Muzaffarpur National Highway Project (LMNHP) (2004–2012). 2 The fourth project, the LMNHP, did not include institutional strengthening because this was already being provided by the prior ongoing project. 3 See Implementation Completion and Results Reports (ICRs) for the four projects mentioned in footnote 1, respectively: Report No: ICR0000807, October 1, 2008; Report No: ICR0000978, March 31, 2009; Report No: ICR00001251, January 28, 2010; and Report No: ICR00002475, December 12, 2012. 4 The specific problems of the LMNHP included non-availability of land, inaccurate identification of the land to be acquired, delays in receiving permissions to cut trees, deficiencies in Detailed Project Reports (DPRs), poor performance by several contractors, and two fatal construction accidents. See Restructuring Paper, LMNHP, March 31, 2010, Report No: 54090-IN. 5 See NHAI Technical Assistance Project PAD, Annex 7.
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Theory of Change (Results Chain) for the Original Project
Figure 1. Theory of Change for the Original Project
Project Development Objectives (PDOs)
6. The original objective of the project was “to assist NHAI to adopt appropriate practices that would enhance its program management and operational efficiency.”
Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators
7. According to the Project Development Objective (PDO), the project’s outcomes would be twofold: enhanced program management and operational efficiency. However, the key PDO indicators were not formulated to measure these outcomes. Rather, the PDO indicators were framed as intermediate results, as in table 1.
Table 1.
Original PDO Indicators Target Values at Completion 1 Implementation of Enterprise Resource Planning
(ERP) successfully completed Complete rollout of ERP in NHAI
2 Design review process established and adopted at NHAI
Design review process successfully adopted and in Operation
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Original PDO Indicators Target Values at Completion 3 Implementation of Accident Information and
Management System and Network Safety Management successfully completed
Reduction in fatal road accidents and construction site accidents on selected network
4 Successful implementation of GAAP actions and adoption of mitigation measures within the project period
Initial reviews of various aspects, described in GAAP, will identify many specific mitigation measures to be adopted by NHAI. The achievement of the indicator will be measured in terms of percentage of measures adopted by NHAI
Components
8. The project had only one component, “institutional strengthening and capacity building” covering seven “areas of concern”: (a) project planning, preparation, and implementation; (b) documentation control, timely availability and accessibility of information, decision making, internal controls, and contract administration; (c) skills gaps in the areas of research and development and contract administration; (d) corporate governance; (e) asset management; (f) safety awareness; and (g) sustainability. These were further divided into numerous technical assistance (TA) activities coded as World Bank technical assistance activities [WBTAs] with indicative cost estimates. See Annex 4 for details of the original activities proposed in the PAD, and their respective codes. The approach was intended to be flexible, to allow for adaptation to new circumstances. The original financing plan called for an IBRD loan of US$45 million and a Government of India (GoI) counterpart contribution of US$10 million.
B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION
Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets
9. The GoI and the World Bank recognized starting in 2015 that the project needed a major overhaul to save it from failure. During its first five years the project achieved minimal results and had limited disbursements.6 In the formal project restructuring approved in December 2015,7 the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) was added as a second beneficiary and implementing agency. Also, in view of the limited time remaining in the project’s implementation period, it was determined that the project could not deliver the originally stated final outcomes. Rather, the project would be responsible for the adoption of new practices resulting from the completion of the TA activities. Accordingly, the PDO was changed to “assist MoRTH and NHAI to adopt better program management and operational practices.”
Revised PDO Indicators
10. The revised PDO was accompanied by modified key and intermediate indicators (see annex 1 for details). All but one of the original PDO indicators were dropped and replaced as in table 2.
6 An advance of US$4.5 million was released to the Designated Account soon after the project’s effectiveness, but this was not disbursed, because during the five-year period before the December 2015 restructuring, only US$110,00 was actually spent on incurred, eligible expenditures. 7 Restructuring Paper, NHAI Technical Assistance Project, Report No: RES16403, November 24, 2015.
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Table 2.
Revised PDO Indicators Status Target Values at Completion
1 New financing options and contract modalities developed and adopted
New Yes
2 Asset management system developed for national highways
New Yes
3 Improved project preparation and design review process adopted
New Yes
4 Implementation of GAAP actions and adoption of mitigation measures within the project period
Original retained Implementation of GAAP
Revised Components
11. In the restructuring of December 2015, the single component “institutional strengthening and capacity building” was retained, but some of the original TA activities were dropped, and 10 new ones to be implemented by MoRTH were added. Notably, the ERP System, the single largest activity in the original project, was dropped. Details are presented in annex 4.
Other Changes
12. The December 2015 restructuring also included (a) cancellation of US$15 million from the loan as a result of dropping the ERP System from the project; (b) triggering of World Bank policies OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) and OP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement); (c) change in the environment category from C (not required) to B (Partial Assessment); and (d) associated changes in project costs, financing plan, disbursement arrangements, and legal covenants. At the time of this restructuring, the closing date of July 31, 2016, was not extended, pending review of the degree of progress made in the subsequent months.
13. In April 2016, as part of the second restructuring, the closing date was extended by 12 months, to July 31, 2017.
14. In June 2017, a third restructuring was approved to extend the loan closing date by another 11 months, up to June 30, 2018, and to add 4 TA activities under NHAI and 12 under MoRTH, mostly intended to implement the recommendations of the ongoing studies. See annex 4 for details.
Implication of Changes on the Original Theory of Change
15. Under the 2015 and 2017 restructurings, the theory of change was substantially revised. The PDO was changed to adopting better program management and operational practices. Enhanced program management and operational efficiency were dropped as project outcomes. The project’s activities were expanded to cover three new categories: environmental protection and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, logistics, and sector strategies. The higher-level outcomes remained the same.
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Figure 2. Revised Theory of Change as a Result of the 2015 and 2017 Restructurings
II. OUTCOME
A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs
16. At appraisal, the project was deemed highly relevant to the priorities of both the GoI and the World Bank. On the GoI side, the importance of national highways was demonstrated by the priority given to the NHDP (see Section I above). On the World Bank side, the World Bank’s sustained engagement with NHAI was consistent with the country strategy at that time (FY09–12), which focused on helping India address the interrelated challenges of achieving rapid and inclusive growth, ensuring that development is sustainable, and increasing the effectiveness of service delivery.8 The project was fully in line with the country strategy’s sectoral guidelines for engagement in national highways.
17. As of the project’s closing date, the NHDP had been recently ended, but national highways remained a high priority for the GoI in the context of the Bharatmala Pariyojana, an initiative launched in July 2015 that aims to improve the “efficiency of freight and passenger movement across the country by bridging critical infrastructure gaps,”9 through investments not only in highways but also in logistics parks and connections to multimodal nodes.
8 Country Strategy for The Republic of India for the period FY2009-2012, November 14, 2008, Report No. 46509-IN, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association, International Finance Corporation. 9 https://www.india.gov.in/spotlight/bharatmala-pariyojana-stepping-stone-towards-new-india
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18. Under the new World Bank Group Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for FY18–22,10 the World Bank’s approach in the transport sector is to improve connectivity and logistics, under the focus area of “enhancing competitiveness and enabling job creation.” The World Bank’s support, through lending and knowledge services, will cover a range of transport modes, as well as multimodal solutions.
19. In this regard, the project’s objectives (original and revised) of helping NHAI and MoRTH become more efficient and effective remain decidedly relevant to the World Bank’s new CPF. It is worth noting that once MoRTH was brought into the project as a coequal beneficiary and implementing agency, the project’s content became more relevant to the World Bank’s current approach in the sector. The restructuring of 2015 added several activities under MoRTH related to mobilizing private sector finance for highways, reducing the carbon footprint of road projects, and enhancing the logistics efficiency of transport. The restructuring of 2017 added further activities related to private sector finance and climate change. See annex 4 for more details.
Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating
20. Based on the above-mentioned reasons, the relevance of project to the current World Bank Group CPF and the GoI’s present priorities is rated High.
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)
21. The formal revision of the PDO and key outcome indicators in 2015 calls for a “split evaluation” in which the assessment of project outcomes is carried out for both the original and revised PDOs and targets, and then the two ratings are weighted based on the shares of actual loan disbursements made in the periods before and after approval of the restructuring.11 An advance of US$4.5 million was released to the Designated Account soon after the project’s effectiveness, but this was not a true disbursement, because during the five-year period before the December 2015 restructuring, only US$110,00 was actually spent on incurred, eligible expenditures.12 This amounts to 0.46 percent of the total actual loan amount disbursed (US$24.014 million), which renders the split evaluation moot to a certain extent but ensures consistency with the Guidelines. It is presented in this section (see paragraphs 42 and 48). Given that the weight of the revised PDO and targets is 95.5 percent, the assessment of outcomes that follows focuses on them.
22. The revised PDO committed the project to the more realistic outcome of assisting “MoRTH and NHAI to adopt13 better program management and operational practices.” Thus, for this ICR, the achievement of the PDO is evaluated against evidence that NHAI and MoRTH have taken initiatives of
10 Country Partnership Framework for India for the Period FY18–22, July 25, 2018, Report No. 126667-IN, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Finance Corporation, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency. 11 The World Bank Guidance, ICR for Investment Project Financing Operations, July 5, 2017, Appendix I, Application of Split Ratings. 12 Eleven TA activities were awarded and started (and two, WBTAs 09 and 13, were delivered) before the December 2015 restructuring, but the consultants typically started work without receiving advance payments, and payments on their invoices were substantially delayed while their interim or final products were being reviewed. 13 The key word is “adopt,” which is defined as “choose to take up or follow an idea, method, or course of action” (Oxford English Dictionary) or “take up and practice or use (Merriam Webster Dictionary).”
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their own to actually utilize or apply the TA outputs (studies, activities, tools, or capacity building) produced by the project.14
23. Annex 4 presents a catalogue of all the project’s TA activities, including their outputs and outcomes. The outcomes of each activity are the facts about the degree to which the outputs were utilized or applied.
Achievement of PDO According to Key Indicators
24. The first three of the four revised PDO indicators had target values of ‘yes’, without any further specification of what this would mean in practice.15
25. PDO indicator 1: New financing options and contract modalities developed and adopted. This indicator was supported by activities carried out under WBTAs 13 and 41 under NHAI and WBTAs 18, 19, 20, 24, and 35 under MoRTH. WBTA-13, “Piloting new contract modalities including new forms of public-private partnerships (PPPs),” helped NHAI to adopt two PPP modalities—Hybrid Annuity Model (HAM) and Toll-Operate-Transfer (TOT)—which have since been launched and successfully implemented. WBTAs 19 and 20, “Adapting the Model Concession Agreement (MCA) for expressway projects and tunneling projects,” provided concession models that are expected to be applied under the Bharatmala program and to other access-controlled highways. In addition, the findings during the preparation of these MCAs have also contributed to improvements in the existing MCAs for national highways, especially with respect to the HAM model. WBTA-41, “Program management consultants to support the NHAI Member Finance,” facilitated the rollout of TOT as a program and also suggested alternative mechanisms for fund raising, such as ‘INVIT’, a proposed infrastructure investment trust for road projects, which would be listed on the stock exchange. WBTA-18, “Financing Options Study for national highways development,” directly followed up WBTA-13 in furthering the adoption of HAM and TOT as key contracting modalities, through which 50+ projects worth US$7.4 billion were awarded by MoRTH under both modalities. This TA also contributed directly to the issuance of rupee-denominated Masala bonds listed on the Singapore and London stock exchanges, which raised US$460 million from the market. WBTA-24, “Organization and processes transformation in MoRTH and its implementing agencies (Phases I and II),” supported further improvements of the contract models for prevailing concession/contract agreements for Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC), BOT, and TOT and new models for Variable-BOT (V-BOT) and Variable-TOT (V-TOT).16 WBTA-35, “Transaction advisory for TOT,” directly facilitated awarding of the first bundle of projects (nine stretches) under TOT in April 2018. An additional six bundles totaling about 4,000 km are expected to be bid out. Based on the preceding, PDO indicator 1 is deemed fully achieved.
26. PDO indicator 2: Asset management system developed for national highways. The Road Information System, developed by NHAI before the project, had limited coverage and use. WBTA-12, “Strengthen asset management capacity of NHAI and MoRTH,” was intended to reinvigorate the road information system to a sustainable Road Asset Management System (RAMS), including a data collection
14 The PDO refers to the adoption of better “program management” and “operational” practices. These terms are not clearly defined in the PAD or elsewhere, and conceptually they are closely related and overlapping. Thus, no value added is judged to accrue in trying to assess them as distinct objectives. 15 The Restructuring Paper of 2015 stated that the assessment of the degree of achievement of each indicator would be done through the end-of-project evaluation. See Restructuring Paper, November 24, 2015, page 7. 16 ‘Variable’ refers to the possibility to extend or reduce the duration of the concession period based on traffic volumes to reduce traffic risk.
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framework. Three years of pilot data for about 3,100 km of highways were collected into the system. However, the system could not transition to an institution-wide planning and budgeting tool, as it was only set up with pilot data. NHAI subsequently invited two bids, one for expanding the data collection to an additional 27,000 km and the other for establishing a ‘RAMS Cell’ to manage the system, both of which had to be cancelled due to very limited market response. While NHAI is reviewing the scope of work and market capacity and interest to ensure wider participation in the planned rebidding exercises, MoRTH and NHAI are also working closely in starting to integrate the RAMS with the asset management module in the ERP currently being developed by MoRTH. Additionally, applying the RAMS principle, NHAI is developing a data room for the 4,000 km of national highways, currently being concessioned out on the TOT model. Overall, this indicator, therefore, is judged to have been partially achieved.
27. PDO indicator 3: Improved project preparation and design review process adopted. In Phase 1, WBTA-02, “Review (Phase 1) of project preparation and design review process,” carried out under NHAI produced a Project Preparation Manual, model technical schedules for EPC and PPP projects, and a final report with recommendations on improving the design review and monitoring systems, including organizational changes, improved DPRs, supervision of consultants, land acquisition, and forest clearances. In Phase 2, implementation was taken up as WBTA-24, “Organization and processes transformation in MoRTH and its implementing agencies (Phases I and II)”. This produced several reports and several training events, resulting in significant business process changes (see annex 4 for details). The most important of these changes were development and subsequent upgradation of GIS based PMIS to create executive-level dashboards and reports for project monitoring, plus officials/staff trained to collect data and use the system, currently being actively used for 3,000+ projects. The system has not only helped to foster significant improvements in project administration in the national highways sector, but also to create interest and demand for similar systems in other infrastructure sectors/ministries. Some of the noteworthy outcomes of the organization and process transformation process are: (a) 150 percent increase in award rate and 95 percent increase in road construction rate over five years17, (b) >80 percent of focus (problem) projects identified in 2016 put back on track, (c) 33 percent reduction in time to award projects of less than INR 1000 million through delegation, (d) US$ 21 million annual interest savings through single Competent Authorities Land Acquisition account adopted in 2016. Based on the above, indicator 3 is judged to be fully achieved. 28. PDO indicator 4: Implementation of GAAP (Governance and Accountability Action Plan) actions and adoption of mitigation measures within the project period. The final report of WBTA-08, Corporate Governance Study, proposed a detailed action plan for NHAI covering various areas relating to internal audit, board governance, risk management, etc. This WBTA covered four of the five consultancies of the GAAP but did not cover sanctions regimes for the vendors found to engage in misconduct. However, a pilot TA for developing a performance evaluation system for contractors and concessionaires, WBTA 37, was subsequently undertaken and currently is in progress with strong senior management support of MoRTH. A complementary TA for IT infrastructure security audit, WBTA 17, was also undertaken by NHAI, and some of the key recommendations on improving the system transparency and remedying misuse have since been implemented. User engagement and safety related social accountability were also implemented, though partially, through WBTA 21, the Highway Advisory Services and the Hello Highway Radio, initially by MORTH and then by NHAI. NHAI also took a few actions recommended in these studies
17 Awards in 2017–18 were 17,000 km as compared to 5,095 km average for the five years before the project, that is, 2011–12 to 2015–16. Construction in 2017–18 was 10,000 km as compared to 6,680 km average for the five years prior to the project, that is, 2011–12 to 2015–16.
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toward improved governance and accountability: (a) revamping the NHAI website for public interface, (b) establishment of public information offices at headquarters and field offices and establishment of appellate authority in dealing with the Right to Information Act, (c) appointment of a general manager for management of public grievances, and publicly disclosing the contact details on the website, and (d) establishment of a toll-free corruption hotline, in addition to the ‘whistleblower’ hotline already existing before the project started. In terms of actual adoption and implementation, these actions represented only a small part of those recommended. Accordingly, indicator 4 is assessed as being marginally achieved at project closure.
Other Contributions of the Project to the Achievement of the PDO
29. The project completed several other activities even leading to formulation of some large National programs, mainly through development of necessary background materials and cabinet notes, not captured by the four PDO indicators, that contributed to the PDO.
30. WBTA-25, “Logistics Efficiency and Enhancement Program (LEEP),” gave recommendations on integrating logistics with infrastructure development, including development of green and brownfield freight corridors, development of multi-modal nodes and logistics parks, and seamless interstate movement, which are being fully or mostly adopted as part of the new National Highway/Corridor development initiatives under GoI’s Bharatmala and Sagarmala programs. The study also developed a whole set of recommendations for modernizing the trucking industry.
31. WBTA-22, “Effective Interventions to reduce carbon footprint in developing highways,” is a pioneering initiative in the highway sector that delivered a model for analyzing the carbon emissions of highways, which MoRTH is in the process of mainstreaming. According to senior ministry officials, the study has contributed to (a) identification of nine new highway corridors that are more direct, potentially saving travel time and GHG emissions; (b) considering opportunities to acquire land only on one side of the right-of-way for expansion; and (c) the possibility of renewal coats of roads to be laid with recycled materials. The study has also influenced a new IRC initiative for developing new codes and standards for climate mitigation and adaptation in the highway sector.
32. WBTA-27, “Passenger Mobility Enhancement” has helped to develop a national program for intrastate bus transport reform through its recommendations on adoption of a regulated competition regime, enhanced competitiveness of State Road Transport Undertakings (SRTUs), modernization of bus fleets and infrastructure (bus ports, wayside amenities), and technology enhancement. This study has also helped pilot intermodal passenger hubs in two fast-growing cities. In addition, it has created opportunities for new dialogue/knowledge engagement between MoRTH and the World Bank on the ‘‘Green Mobility” program being formulated currently, and a Reimbursable Advisory Services on urban transport/bus services.
33. WBTA-33 “Strategy for hill transportation and Infrastructure utilization/creation” developed a master list of potential ropeway sites in two hill states and a three-year prioritized implementation strategy and road map for two projects. The Ministry and the two involved states are finalizing two locations for developing tourism hubs and developing a three-year implementation strategy for this. It is reported that other recommendations would likely feed into the Government’s new flagship proposed Parvatmala program for hill development.
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34. Several activities implemented under the project did not result in the adoption of new practices before the closing date but have significant potential. One of these is WBTA 34, “Comprehensive Strategy to improve Road safety and Capacity Building of Road safety cells”. The four regional stakeholder consultations on the draft National Strategy have been very successful. This study holds potential towards contributing to India’s road safety management, a critical negative externality challenge the highway sector faces. Finally, the ongoing WBTA-31, “Preparation of national road transportation strategy,” covered 40 initiatives under four categories: (a) access and connectivity, (b) increasing passenger and freight speeds, (c) reducing unit costs of freight, and (d) environmental and economic sustainability. Of the corridors recommended under the access and connectivity bucket, five are being taken up under Phase 1 of Bharatmala, and seven in Phase 2. It is still not clear whether initiatives under (b), (c), or (d) would be adopted and taken up soon, but if adopted could have a transformational impact on the sector.
35. It is notable that for both NHAI and MoRTH, the TA activities that had High or Substantial adoption were primarily oriented toward policy and program linked to delivery of key highway, freight and public transport development e.g. Bharatmala, LEEP or PME. The TAs that focused on reforming institutional governance and internal management systems, tended to have relatively slower adoption, even if they were completed well before project closure (for examples, WBTAs 01, 08, 23, and 26).
Justification of Overall Efficacy Rating
36. If one were to apply the original PDO and its key indicator targets, the assessment of outcomes would be as follows:
Original PDO Indicator Targets Actual Achievement 1 Complete rollout of ERP in NHAI Not achieved; ERP was dropped from the project in
December 2015 2 Design review process successfully adopted and in
operation Achieved; see paragraphs 28-30 above.
3 Reduction in fatal road accidents and construction site accidents on selected network
Not achieved; there was no measurement of this indicator, and it was not realistically attributable to the project’s activities.
4 Successful implementation of GAAP actions and adoption of mitigation measures within the project period
Marginally achieved; see paragraphs 32-34 above.
Considering the above, the achievement of the project’s original PDO and targets is rated as Modest. Based on the evidence presented in this section, the achievement of the revised PDO and targets is rated Substantial, taking into account that (a) two PDO indicators (1 and 3) were fully achieved, (b) one was partly achieved and one was marginally achieved and (c) the project accomplished significant adoption and implementation of additional practices beyond the scope of these indicators.
C. EFFICIENCY
Assessment of Efficiency and Rating
37. As it consisted purely of TA activities, the project did not have an economic/financial analysis. Therefore, the assessment of efficiency is based on time elapsed.
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38. As noted in Annex 4, during the first five years of the project, the only work carried out was procurement and some contract awards. During this time, there were virtually no disbursements and very few products delivered. Almost all the project’s substantive outputs were delivered in the final 30 months between January 2016 and the closing date of June 2018, and this required two extensions totaling 23 months.
39. It is reasonable to judge that it should not have taken seven and a half years to carry out this project and that the first five years of no outcomes represents an inefficient performance. Senior officials and technical staff members of NHAI, MoRTH, and the World Bank18 expended significant amounts of time and effort during the first five years, largely on managing protracted and sometimes troublesome procurement processes, as well as addressing problems related to NHAI’s and MoRTH’s high turnover of key positions and constrained absorptive capacity. Slow implementation during the early years could be partly attributed to procurement delays, as explained in section IV.B. This became much less of an issue when MoRTH was added as an implementing agency.
40. Based on the preceding, the efficiency with which the project achieved its results is rated Modest.
D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING
41. Applying the prescribed methodology for split evaluations, the overall outcome ratings would be:
• For the original PDO and targets: High relevance, Modest efficacy, and Modest efficiency, resulting in an overall outcome rating of Moderately Unsatisfactory.
• For the revised PDO and targets: High relevance, Substantial efficacy, and Modest efficiency, resulting in an overall outcome rating of Moderately Satisfactory.
Accordingly, the overall weighted outcome rating is Moderately Satisfactory, based on the following:
1 Outcome ratings MU MS 2 Numerical value of the outcome ratings 3 4 3 Actual disbursements US$0.110 m. US$23.904 4 Shares of actual disbursements 0.458% 99.542% 5 Weighted value of outcome ratings (row 2 X row 4) 0.0137 3.982 6 Final Outcome Rating 0.0137 + 3.982 = 3.996 rounded to 4.0 = MS
E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS
Green Highways and State Public Transport Initiatives
42. The World Bank’s sustained engagement with MoRTH and NHAI through the project helped to enable the launch of two important new initiatives. One is the preparation of a new project supported by a World Bank loan, the Green National Highways Corridor Project (GNHCP, P167350). This operation would enhance the institutional capacity of MoRTH to adopt and implement green and climate resilient construction methods as part of its strategy to enhance the connectivity of the national highway network. This project is tentatively scheduled for approval in FY20. The second is the Reimbursable Advisory Study 18 According to World Bank data on internal expenditures, about US$350,000 was spent on project supervision during the first five years; this does not include the time of managers.
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to (a) assist MoRTH in helping states to improve their public transport policies, (b) support SRTUs to improve their service definition and planning, and (c) help to increase the capacity of state public transport systems through innovative contracting methods and of providers to deliver safe and affordable services.
III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME
A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION
43. Genesis of the project. As noted in section I, the context for the project’s genesis was a series of cumulating problems in the World Bank’s portfolio of national highways projects, which manifested themselves most critically in the last of these World Bank-financed projects, the LMNHP. The LMNHP was found to have shortcomings in its financial accounting and reporting systems, and it experienced two fatal worksite accidents in 2008. An ensuing investigation by the World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency identified significant evidence of potential sanctionable practices by certain construction contractors and supervision consultants.19 This backdrop motivated the formulation and design of the NHAI Technical Assistance Project as an urgently needed remedy for what were seen as systemic institutional challenges for NHAI.20 The project was rushed from the concept stage to Board approval in only seven months, with apparently minimal, if any, formal quality or decision reviews before negotiations.21
44. Appraisal of commitment by NHAI. The commitment of NHAI to the project was greatly overestimated at appraisal. According to project documents and discussions held for this ICR, the World Bank did not anticipate this problem, did not adequately appraise NHAI’s implementation capacity or ownership, and failed to build in adequate mitigation measures. These lapses led to the five years of no disbursements after the project’s approval (see section III. B. Key Factors During Implementation).
45. Design of project implementation arrangements. Project implementation was entrusted to the existing management and staff of NHAI. This approach was considered essential to ensure proper contract management and absorption of the TA outputs. The project was to be managed by a high-level Core Group headed by the member (administration). The Core Group was to be supported by a working group. Procurement and management of all TA activities was to be handled by the relevant nodal officers in the concerned technical or functional units. A project coordinator/procurement coordinator was also appointed to liaise with the World Bank. These arrangements proved to be ineffective, because (a) key decision-making responsibilities remained unclear and diffused, and (b) they were unworkable given the enormous pressures on NHAI’s limited human resources to deliver on the NHDP output targets.
46. Adequacy of risk assessment. The risk assessment of the project and its overall rating of M-I (High Impact Low Likelihood) was inadequate.22 Implementation agency risks were greatly underestimated, and the related mitigation measures proved insufficient. As mentioned earlier, stakeholder support risks were 19 See ICR, LMNHP, Report No: ICR00002475, December 12, 2012. 20 These circumstances coincided with a series of reforms of NHAI that had been started because of a report of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on the Restructuring of NHAI approved by the Union Cabinet in 2008. http://planningcommission.gov.in/sectors/ppp_report/3.Reports%20of%20Committiees%20&%20Task%20force/Power/12.Report-on-Restructuring-of-NHAI.pdf 21 The World Bank’s Operations Portal shows no dates for either a quality enhancement review or a decision meeting. In 2010, when the project was approved, the two options for project processing (simplified Track I for lower-risk projects and regular Track II procedures for higher-risk projects) had not been introduced. 22 The PAD used the Operational Risk Assessment Framework mandated by the World Bank at the time.
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missed altogether. Some of the proposed mitigation measures for governance risks were dependent on the adoption of certain modules of the ERP system, which proved to be highly unrealistic. The expectation that NHAI could largely carry out procurement through its existing staff and procedures was also a significant lapse.23 The appraisal of procurement risks did not give sufficient attention to NHAI’s existing heavy workload, the limited capacity of the staff to take on new tasks, and NHAI’s insufficient familiarity with the World Bank’s and GoI’s rules for TA procurements (other than for works supervision).
47. Role of MoRTH. In designing the project, both the GoI and the World Bank failed to appreciate the importance of engaging with MoRTH and including it in the project, because it was felt that the immediate issues to be addressed were mainly implementation-oriented.24 In fact, during the project’s preparation, MoRTH was not engaged in the dialogue about the problems (discussed in section I) that had led up to the project.
B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION
48. Commitment and ownership by NHAI and MoRTH. NHAI’s ownership of and commitment to the project during the first five years was weak. NHAI’s management and staff were preoccupied with meeting targets for delivery of the NHDP, and the project received low priority. In addition, NHAI experienced high turnover in its senior management during 2010–14. These factors caused procurement processes to be very slow and key decisions to be delayed.25 During 2010–14, MoRTH also was disengaged from the project despite attempts by the World Bank to convince the Ministry to be more involved.26 As of 2015, this situation began to change, with the newly elected Central Government becoming much more involved in the project and actively concerned with improving NHAI’s performance, especially in resolving cost overruns and delays. MoRTH became the World Bank’s main interlocutor for injecting new energy into the project and restructuring it to reflect the Government’s reform and development agenda for the national highways. The performance of NHAI improved significantly from 2016 onward, in part due to the change of Government, but also because of the assignment of overall project implementation responsibility to NHAI’s Member Finance.
49. World Bank’s engagement. The World Bank’s management became increasingly concerned about the project’s nonperformance during 2010–15. The project was continuously rated Unsatisfactory for both progress toward its development objectives and implementation performance for about three years between the end of 2012 and early 2016. The World Bank management considered suspending or even cancelling the loan. However, these steps were not taken, in part because of the World Bank’s large portfolio of state highway and road projects, for the sake of which the maintenance of positive, strategic relationships with NHAI and MoRTH was deemed essential.
23 The PAD assessed the procurement risk as ‘High Likelihood Low Impact’. 24 NHAI’s stated core mission is “the development, maintenance and management of national highways.” The stated mission of MoRTH is “formulating and administering…policies for road transport, national highways and transport research with a view to increasing the mobility and efficiency of the road transport system in the country.” 25 NHAI’s lack of urgency and engagement were cited in the Aide Memoire of November 2014 as follows: “As many studies are ongoing and consultants are submitting deliverables, it is of paramount interest that these deliverables are reviewed by various units and senior management [of NHAI] so that implementable recommendations of such studies can be initiated.” 26 The very first Aide Memoire of August 2011 (eight months after Board approval and five months after effectiveness) noted that close collaboration between NHAI and MoRTH was needed to achieve optimal results, which should be accomplished by restructuring the project and creating a new coordination mechanism. However, nothing came of this until 2014.
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50. Restructuring of objectives, scope, and implementation arrangements in 2015. As noted in other sections of this ICR, the restructuring of 2015 gave the project more realistic objectives and targets, renewed the project’s scope, downsized the loan amount, and gave MoRTH a leading role in implementation. A dedicated Project Implementation Unit was constituted at MoRTH. The Member Finance of NHAI was given overall implementation responsibility, with a Chief General Manager (CGM) level officer designated as the Project Director for activities implemented by NHAI; the Joint Secretary Highways, MoRTH, was made the Chief Project Director; and a ‘Project-Level Empowered Committee’ headed by the Secretary, MoRTH, constituted to review project progress. The new arrangements contributed to a major acceleration of the project’s implementation although more so for the MoRTH-implemented activities. Implementation arrangements at NHAI did not prove to be as efficient because responsibility remained diffused and the designated project director was already occupied with several other activities.
51. Procurement problems. Delays in procurement were highlighted, with increasing urgency and details, in all the Aide Memoires and Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs) starting 2011. Procurement delays were caused by various factors, as discussed in section IV. B. NHAI managers and staff lacked experience with consultancy procurement other than for works supervision. This, together with NHAI’s weak ownership of the project, meant that its officials often turned to the World Bank for validation and facilitation of procurement processes, which contributed to delays and sometimes placed the World Bank in a position of going beyond its formal role. In addition, there were various instances of confusion caused by NHAI being reluctant to follow the World Bank’s procurement procedures, in accordance with the Loan Agreement.
52. Enterprise Resource Planning. The financing and implementation of the ERP were initiated under the Lucknow-Muzaffarpur National Highway Project (LMNHP) and was expected to be continued as part of the NHAI Technical Assistance Project. However, the ERP was eventually dropped from the LMNHP due to severe procurement delays. The ERP was originally considered central to the NHAI Technical Assistance Project’s aims, to the extent that successful implementation of the ERP was one of the project’s original PDO indicators.27 In the event, NHAI’s interest in and capacity to handle the ERP proved inadequate. Before the project, NHAI’s IT systems were fragmented into various disconnected applications. Originally a consultant had been hired to design the overall platform. After two to three years, procurement was initiated for installation and implementation of the approved solution. There were extensive debates about the correct procurement process to use. Eventually a vendor was selected, but negotiations failed because the price quoted significantly exceeded the budget estimates. In the second round, one of the vendors filed a complaint with the Central Vigilance Commission. Soon after (2015), the decision was made to drop the ERP from the project, because (a) it was judged to be too late for the ERP to be implemented within the remaining life span of the project, and (b) NHAI had failed to build adequate internal IT capacity.28 The proposed ERP to be implemented at MoRTH would cover NHAI. The National
27 The PAD noted, “ERP implementation will require a business process reengineering of NHAI and change management, which in any organization is a considerable risk. The risk mitigation will require continued support and monitoring from senior management and a dedicated internal change management team facilitated by a change management expert.” NHAI Technical Assistance Project PAD, paragraph 32. 28 The Aide Memoire of May 2014 stated, “The mission noted with concern that NHAI is yet to deploy IT professionals in the areas of ERP implementation, data center hardware, and network security. The mission reiterated that NHAI needs to enhance its internal capacity to be in a position to successfully implement the ERP project and evolve an ICT organization/cadre going forward.” This was repeated in Aide Memoire of November 2014.
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Highways Interconnectivity Improvement Project (NHIIP) includes a subcomponent to support the rollout of an ERP for MoRTH, but this is defined as being for the non-national highway systems.29
53. Delayed payments. The Aide Memoire of November 2014 contains the first of many citations of payment delays to consultants, which remained a constant issue for the consultancies under NHAI during the remainder of the project’s duration. This is attributed to NHAI’s long delays in reviewing and approving deliverables, due to (a) NHAI’s own lack of clarity about the purpose of many of the studies (as mentioned earlier), which led it to seek inputs and approvals from MoRTH and the World Bank; (b) frequent changes of nodal officers, so that the new incumbents needed extra time to gain familiarity with the contracts and products; (c) NHAI’s hierarchical decision making, involving multiple levels of approvals; and (d) NHAI’s resistance to adopting the use of partial payments for approved drafts. These problems, which contributed significantly to slow disbursements as late as 2017, were never adequately resolved.
54. Further changes in scope and second extension through the 2017 restructuring. A further restructuring of the project in 2017 added a range of new TA activities to use savings of about US$17 million of loan proceeds resulting from appreciation of the U.S. dollars against the Indian rupee and the lower-than-estimated value of some earlier contracts awarded. The project was also extended by a year (the second extension after a one-year extension in 2016) to address the initial implementation delays. While the contracts for most of these new activities were awarded by early 2018 and most of the outputs substantially delivered by the closing of June 30, 2018, some spilled over beyond the project’s closing. A small number of these are proposed to be taken up by the GNHCP. MoRTH also plans various actions for dissemination/knowledge repository creation of the project TAs.
IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME
A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)
M&E Design
55. The original PDO committed the project to “enhance [NHAI’s] program management and operational efficiency,” which were extremely ambitious outcomes to achieve within the project’s duration. Perhaps if NHAI had been highly committed to reform itself and to hold itself accountable for such outcomes through objective performance metrics, this PDO might have been achievable. But, as it turned out, this PDO was unrealistic.
56. Even if the PDO had been achievable, the original key indicators would have been inappropriate. None of the four original PDO indicators measured enhanced program management or operational efficiency. Rather, two of them were outputs30 and two were indicators of adoption of new practices.31 The third indicator on road safety did have an outcome-oriented target (“reduction in fatal road accidents
29 PAD, National Highways Interconnectivity Improvement Project, Report No: 58166-IN, October 2, 2013, paragraph 23. 30 Implementation of ERP was successfully completed, and implementation of accident information and management system and network safety management were successfully completed. 31 Design review process was established and adopted at NHAI, and implementation of GAAP actions and adoption of mitigation measures were successfully completed within the project period.
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and construction site accidents”), but this had no quantitative targets, and the road accident reduction was both difficult to achieve within the project period and beyond the scope of the project.
57. The restructuring of 2015 produced a more realistic PDO, “assist MoRTH and NHAI to adopt better program management and operational practices.” However, the practical application of this PDO was hampered by a lack of clarity as to the definition of “adoption” and the decision to set the baselines and targets for all of the three new PDO indicators32 as “no/yes.”
58. The original Results Framework lacked specific indicators and targets for the institutional governance objectives that so strongly motivated the formulation of the project. These remained vague, as they were subsumed under the general headings of ERP and GAAP implementation. A part of this agenda was lost after the dropping of the ERP in 2015.
M&E Implementation
59. Because the indicators were about outputs and their adoption, data collection was very simple and straightforward. The original and revised PDO indicators and targets started being tracked in ISR #4 of November 2012. However, the reporting up to ISR #10 of October 2015 was limited to information about the status of procurement and implementation of the activities related to each indicator. From ISR #11 of February 2016, the revised indicators were tracked, but the information provided in the ISRs was limited to ‘yes’ or ‘no’ with no explanatory text. Some details of important results were presented in the ‘Key Issues and Actions for Management Attention’ section of the last two ISRs.33 But the reporting on indicators in the Results sections of the ISRs did not add value.
60. In ISR #13 of November 2016 and ISR #14 of January 2017, the Country Management Unit expressed concern that the yes/no indicators would be insufficient for evaluating the project and requested more substantive information on the degree of achievement of the project’s objectives. Supporting details on the indicators were then provided in the Restructuring Paper and subsequent ISRs.
M&E Utilization
61. It is not evident from the project documentation that the indicators were used to inform project management and decision making. Rather, NHAI, MoRTH, and the World Bank were guided mainly by information on procurement progress, submission and reviews of reports, and disbursements.
Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E
62. Based on the information provided in this subsection, the quality of M&E is rated as Modest. It is important to note that assessing the outcomes of institutional development projects is inherently difficult. The challenges faced in this project were typical. On one hand, institutional performance outcomes usually depend on various exogenous factors, not just on the provision of useful TA from a single project. Also, institutional performance outcomes tend to be achieved over the medium term, often after a typical project has ended. On the other hand, using the degree of adoption of recommendations to measure the
32 New financing options and contract modalities were developed and adopted, asset management system was developed for national highways, and improved project preparation and design review process was adopted. 33 ISR 15 of September 2017 and ISR 16 of June 2018.
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achievement of TA objectives, while more practical, reduces the exercise to reliance on intermediate results, not the real outcomes being sought.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE
Financial Management
63. The financial management (FM) rating remained Moderately Satisfactory throughout the entire duration of the project. It was less than fully satisfactory due to chronic slow disbursements and minor lags in financial reports and other actions. According to the Aide Memoires and discussions with the World Bank’s FM specialists, both NHAI and MoRTH had generally good FM performance. The project experienced no serious FM problems.
64. Loan disbursements were virtually nil until 2016, following the first restructuring. Even after that, disbursements were slow because of time lags for the delivery of outputs after contract awards and long periods of time taken by NHAI and MoRTH to review draft outputs and approve final outputs.34 By January 2017, only US$7.95 million had been disbursed. Disbursements grew to US$11.74 million by September 2017 and reached US$17.92 million by the closing date of June 30, 2018. As of November 12, 2018, US$24.014 million had been disbursed, out of a revised loan amount of US$30 million (80.0 percent).
Procurement
65. The project suffered from serious procurement delays from its start until the restructuring in 2015 and was rated as Moderately Unsatisfactory. The procurement performance improved subsequently and was rated moderately satisfactory. Until the mid-term review, NHAI had been able to award only seven consultant contracts in the previous three years of implementation. The following factors contributed to the delays: (a) inadequate competition for some contracts, (b) insistence of NHAI in applying its internal procurement policies rather than those contained in arrangements agreed in the Loan Agreement, (c) setting qualification requirements too high for Expressions of Interest and requiring extensive documentation, (d) delays in making procurement decisions and inflexible interpretations of rules during evaluation processes, and (e) using budget allocations, rather than estimates prepared based on the terms of references [ToRs], for testing the reasonableness of quoted prices.
66. In the early years of the project, divergences between NHAI’s preferred procedures and the World Bank’s processes caused significant delays.35 This became much less of an issue after MoRTH became involved in 2015. In any case, NHAI and MoRTH preferred to seek the World Bank’s review for practically all consultancy contract selections. This was useful, but it required very large expenditures of time and effort by the World Bank staff, who advised NHAI and MoRTH on numerous occasions that its prior review was not necessary except for defined stages of the contracts above the prior review thresholds.
67. The project did not experience any serious cases of misconduct in procurement.
34 As mentioned earlier, NHAI and MoRTH often requested and waited for World Bank concurrence or approval even though this were not necessary. Payment delays by NHAI were especially pronounced due to a lack of coordination at managerial levels. Toward the end of the project, NHAI formed a special committee of three general managers to resolve the bottlenecks. 35 For example, before 2017, the GoI rules provided for least cost selection of consultants, in contrast with World Bank rules that called for quality- and cost-based selection.
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Environmental and Social
68. As a purely TA operation, the original project did not trigger any environmental or social safeguards policies.
69. On the social side, in view of NHAI’s increasing mandate under the NHDP, the project was originally designed to support certain relevant TA activities, most of which were carried out. Much later, as part of the 2017 restructuring, the project added TA on “Improving efficiency of land acquisition and dispute resolution” (WBTA-38 under MoRTH), for which reports were delivered but not reviewed before the closing date. On the environmental side, the PAD noted that NHAI’s mandate under the NHDP generated various issues related to consumption of natural resources, tree-cutting, soil erosion, air, soil and noise pollution, water quality and quantity, drainage, forest areas, other eco-sensitive areas, and cultural property. The project included several relevant TA activities, most of which were done.
70. During 2015 loan restructuring, it was decided to trigger World Bank policies OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment) and OP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement) and change the environment assessment category from C (not required) to B (Partial Assessment). The rationale was, “Although activities under this [restructured] project themselves do not have direct adverse environmental or social impacts, the outcomes of the implementation of the recommendations of the [TA] studies may lead to specific project/investment operations having significant environmental and social implications, entailing risks and potentially inducing adverse impacts.”36 These changes led to the addition of one new activity that was not part of the original project, a Strategic Environment and Social Assessment (SESA), initiated in July 2016.37
71. The SESA met the objectives of recommending measures to facilitate the screening of the project’s other activities and sensitizing NHAI, MoRTH, and consultants, especially to the need for upfront consideration of environmental and social issues at the design stage. MoRTH has indicated that it is interested in taking up some elements, such as the use of recycled materials. The GNHCP, planned for Board approval in FY20, will take forward some key aspects of ‘green’ planning, design, and implementation on about 1,000 km of existing national highways in selected states and will also support institutional capacity building for improving climate resilience of road infrastructure.
72. There are no known pending safeguards issues following the screening of the project-supported TAs. The environmental performance of the project is rated as Satisfactory. The social safeguards performance of the project is also rated as Satisfactory.
C. BANK PERFORMANCE
Quality at Entry
73. The project as appraised was strategically relevant, simple in design, and technically and financially well-founded. However, as discussed in various sections earlier, the World Bank did not give
36 Restructuring Paper, NHAI Technical Assistance Project, November 24, 2015, page 8. 37 The SESA aimed at analyzing the potential social and environmental impact that might arise out of the implementation of any recommendations, new policy frameworks or prospective investment suggested/resulting from the project-financed technical assistance, with emphasis on indigenous peoples, scheduled tribes and scheduled castes, as well as land acquisition and involuntary resettlement.
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sufficient attention to several important elements at entry. The project was formulated based on the World Bank’s perception of urgent need, but this sense of urgency was not shared by NHAI or the GoI. NHAI may have appreciated the potential usefulness of some of the TA activities, but for the most part, it received the project as an imposition. This was the root cause of the project’s nonperformance during its first five years. The project’s original implementation arrangements were deficient. Other implementation agency risks—notably procurement capacity—were underestimated, and the related mitigation measures were inadequate. The World Bank failed to appreciate the importance of engaging with MoRTH and giving it a role in project implementation. Finally, the project’s original M&E design was faulty, with an unrealistic PDO and key indicators that did not align with it. Some of these deficiencies might have been avoided or lessened if the project had not been rushed from the concept stage to Board approval in only seven months, apparently without the usual formal quality or decision reviews.
Quality of Supervision
74. The World Bank’s task team carried out regular supervision, including during the difficult period between 2010 and 2015. As the task team leader and most of the other team members were based in the India Country Office in Delhi, supervision consisted largely of constant engagement with clients, rather than discrete missions. ISRs candidly recorded the PDO and implementation progress ratings as Unsatisfactory from 2012 through early 2016. The World Bank team filed 16 ISRs, and 9 detailed Aide Memoires (fewer in the first three years of the project and more during the final four years). The Aide Memoires reflect detailed supervision of procurement and FM. Documentation of informal supervision, in the form of memos, Management Letters, and the like, was not filed and could not be obtained for this ICR.
75. The World Bank implementation support initially focused on overcoming delays and expediting procurement and administrative steps. After 2015, the World Bank team endeavored to provide timely and effective advice to counterparts to address issues as they arose. As mentioned in section III. B, before the 2015 restructuring, the World Bank did not take actions toward suspending the loan, reportedly to avoid jeopardizing its strategic engagement with the GoI in this sector. However, the available documentation does not discuss this. A project restructuring was first proposed in ISR #6 of November 2013 (three years after approval). Restructuring was mentioned again in ISR #7 of May 2014, though the GoI had not formally requested restructuring up to that point. After 2016, the World Bank team took proactive steps to obtain a formal request from the Department of Economic Affairs on the further extension and on reaching a firm time-bound agreement with MoRTH and NHAI to expedite pending payments.38
76. In retrospect, it is difficult to find fault with the World Bank’s approach of tolerating the project’s poor performance for five years and eventually restructuring it, as opposed to formally suspending or cancelling it. Whether the latter would have produced a more positive overall result is questionable, given the circumstances at that time.
Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance
77. Despite the significant shortcomings in quality at entry, the World Bank’s overall performance is rated as Moderately Satisfactory because of the World Bank’s sustained, patient, and constructive
38 ISR #14 archived on January 26, 2017.
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engagement with NHAI and MoRTH at both the project and policy levels during implementation. These efforts eventually paved the way for a major and beneficial project restructuring, which in turn enabled the generation of substantial results.
D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME
78. The current National Government has placed a very high priority on delivering major road infrastructure investments. As discussed in section II. B, the results of various project TAs related to this goal have been accepted and adopted. To the extent that they further the GoI’s major highway construction programs (for example, the TAs on new contract modalities, HAM/TOT, financing options, project preparation and design review, LEEP), the project’s benefits, in terms of adoption of useful recommendations of the TAs, are likely to be sustained. On the other hand, the record indicates that TAs addressing institutional reforms and difficult internal, operational issues of NHAI and MoRTH have found less acceptance and may be challenging to sustain. Examples include TA 17 on IT infrastructure security, TA 26 on Strategic Environmental and Social Assessment, TA 28 on value engineering, TA 34 on road safety, TA 37 on performance rating of contractors and concessionaires, and TA 38 on improving efficiency of land acquisition and dispute resolution. Gaining traction on these and similar issues will require the World Bank’s further sustained and intensive engagement.
V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
79. Potential of TA Loan. The early outcomes of this TA Loan demonstrate the impact such loans can make in formulation of new ideas, policies and programs in a reforming sector in an aspiring middle-income country. Several transformational logistics and connectivity initiatives in the last four years including Bharatmala, Parvatmala, and Passenger Mobility Enhancement Program, had their genesis in various TA studies undertaken in this project. The National Highway sector’s emerging knowledge needs and priorities were also met by several studies including the Carbon Footprint Study, Value Engineering Study and Asset Management Study. As GoI and other infrastructure ministries (e.g. Ministry of Shipping) are mulling over requesting similar TA loans, the World Bank should seriously explore use of such instruments in deepening reforms in other infrastructure sectors.
80. Client Ownership and alignment. While the adoption of TA recommendations was significant in formulation of new infrastructure, freight and passenger service programs and areas with cutting-edge- knowledge needs, there was little take-up of initiatives in the areas of core institutional reform and corporate governance. It is, therefore, crucial for the World Bank to candidly and carefully assess the client’s commitment to a project and its objectives. It is not enough, and indeed, it can be detrimental, to develop a project mainly based on perceived need, without equally confirming demand.
81. Choice of instrument. Stand-alone TA loans, especially large ones like the subject project, spanning over 5-7 years, may have some limitations in achieving significant improvements in institutional performance. The World Bank should consider a range of options—such as a series of TA loans, smaller, focused nonlending TA, TA components embedded in larger lending operations, reimbursable advisory services, or even development policy lending—and carefully tailor the choice to the specific circumstances. Moreover, frequent changes of senior officials and key staff mean that windows of opportunity for institutional reform are very limited. Projects with such objectives should be designed to move fast—within two to three years at most—while ownership and commitment last.
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82. Introduction of e-governance. The idea of introducing ERP in NHAI was a bold and ambitious move. However, its repeated failure and eventual exclusion from the project was necessitated due to a combination of lapses including: (a) failure to build up the internal IT capacity of NHAI, (b) inadequate market sounding and market capacity assessment, and (c) focusing exclusively on NHAI rather than adopting a sector wide approach. Moreover, for institutions that have deep-rooted cultures and ways of operating, an incremental approach to change, which builds upon past gains and mixes “low-hanging fruit” together with bolder aims, may be more effective. The fact that significant progress has been made in implementing specific IT systems like PMIS during the same period demonstrates this. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to note that the development of a sector-wide ERP system (including MoRTH, NHAI and NHIDCL), has now gained significant momentum.
83. Implementation arrangements. It is a mistake to assume that TA projects are easy to implement because they only involve consultant contracts. In fact, consultancy contracts, especially ones related to institutional change, can be as challenging to procure and manage, if not more so, than works or goods contracts. Implementation arrangements must be carefully analyzed and appraised, with special attention to ensuring that the client agency has the requisite technical skills, absorptive capacity, and clear lines of accountability and decision making. In these aspects, it is also extremely important to consider the role of other institutions besides the primary client. Moreover, according to the World Bank staff involved, the project would have benefited more from enhanced mobilization of the World Bank’s own subject matter experts in areas such as asset management, IT, performance monitoring, road safety, infrastructure finance, and logistics, among others. Such inputs potentially would have helped to provide quick, ‘just-in-time’ inputs at crucial stages to facilitate the formulation, implementation, and absorption of the TA activities. In some specialized areas, such as specific IT systems, the World Bank should consider mobilizing third-party expertise.
84. Dissemination. Disseminating TA findings and their links to practice have often been an afterthought. Too often, findings are not communicated to relevant line ministries, states, and other stakeholders in forms that are practically useful. With the rapid turnover of key personnel in government agencies, the knowledge generated, if not captured in a repository, is likely to be lost. Dissemination of information should be built into the project design and not be a one-time, end-of-project activity. Several such dissemination activities were planned under the NHAI Technical Assistance Project, but ultimately the pressure of completion pushed many of these to the back burner.
.
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ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS
A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: Assist MoRTH and NHAI to adopt better program management and operational practices
Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
New financing options and contract modalities developed and adopted.
Yes/No N Y Y
10-Dec-2015 31-Jul-2016 30-Jun-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): Fully achieved, see ICR text.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Asset Management System Developed for National Highways
Yes/No N Y Y
10-Dec-2015 31-Jul-2016 30-Jun-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): Partially achieved, see ICR text.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
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Improved Project Preparation and Design Review Process adopted
Yes/No N Y Y
10-Dec-2015 31-Jul-2016 30-Jun-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): Fully achieved, see ICR text.
Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Implementation of GAAP actions and adoption of mitigation measures within the project period
Yes/No N Y N
10-Dec-2015 31-Jul-2016 30-Jun-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): Marginally achieved, see ICR text.
A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators
Component: Institutional strengthening and capacity building
Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Organization and process transformation study completed
Yes/No N Y Y
10-Dec-2015 31-Jul-2016 30-Jun-2018
Comments (achievements against targets):
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Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Model Concession Agreements for Tunneling and Expressway Project Developed
Yes/No N Y Y
10-Dec-2015 31-Jul-2016 30-Jun-2018
Comments (achievements against targets):
Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Independent Quality Audit System adopted
Yes/No N Y Y
10-Dec-2015 31-Jul-2016 30-Jun-2018
Comments (achievements against targets):
Indicator Name Unit of Measure Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Target
Actual Achieved at Completion
Performance Evaluation System of Consultants and Contractors established and in operation
Yes/No N Y N
10-Dec-2015 31-Jul-2016 30-Jun-2018
Comments (achievements against targets): Outputs delivered but not adopted by the closing date.
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B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT
Objective/Outcome 1: To assist NHAI to adopt appropriate practices that would enhance its program management and operational efficiency (Original)
Outcome Indicators
1. Implementation of ERP successfully completed 2. Design Review Process established and adopted at NHAI 3. Implementation of Accident Information and Management System, and Network Safety Management successfully completed 4. Successful implementation of GAAP actions and adoption of mitigation measures within the project period
Intermediate Results Indicators
1. Percentage of NHAI staff trained in accordance with the agreed annual training plans under the project 2. Performance Evaluation System of Consultants and Contractors established and in operation
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)
1. Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building: Recommendations for new or improved practices; new or improved systems or models; support for implementation of recommendations; systems and models; training
Objective/Outcome 1 (Revised): Assist MoRTH and NHAI to adopt better program management and operational practices (Post-restructuring in 2015)
Outcome Indicators
1. New financing options and contract modalities developed and adopted 2. Asset Management System developed for National Highways 3. Improved Project Preparation and Design Review Process adopted 4. Implementation of GAAP actions and adoption of mitigation measures within the project period
Intermediate Results Indicators 1. Organization and process transformation study completed
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2. Model Concession Agreements for Tunneling and Expressway Project Developed 3. Independent Quality Audit System adopted 4. Performance Evaluation System of Consultants and Contractors established and in operation
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 2)
1. Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building: Recommendations for new or improved practices; new or improved systems or models; support for implementation of recommendations, systems and models; training
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ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION
Gaurav D. Joshi Environmental Safeguards Specialist
Sangeeta Kumari Social Safeguards Specialist
B. STAFF TIME AND COST
Stage of Project Cycle Staff Time and Cost
No. of staff weeks US$ (including travel and consultant costs)
Preparation FY10 11.050 17,933.34
FY11 8.880 24,255.70
Total 19.93 42,189.04
Supervision/ICR
FY11 14.630 38,237.68
FY12 12.675 93,019.66
FY13 19.675 79,908.83
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FY14 18.325 96,474.64
FY15 20.569 98,185.93
FY16 23.509 153,731.73
FY17 49.816 426,040.37
FY18 37.102 242,886.19
FY19 6.335 87,735.58
Total 202.64 1,316,220.61
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ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT
Components Amount at Approval (US$, millions)
Actual (US$, millions) Percentage of Approval
Institutional Support and Capacity Building 45.00 29.99 66.6
Total 45.00 29.99 66.6
Cum.
Expenditure to date (INR)
Reimbursable from WB (INR)
GoI expenditure (INR)
Cum. Expenditure to
date (USD million)
Reimbursable from WB (USD million)
GoI expenditure (USD million)
MoRTH 1666046391 1332837113 333209278 24.86
19.90
4.96
NHAI 343032272 274425818 68606454 5.13
4.11
1.02
TOTAL 2009078663 1607262931 401815732 29.99
24.01
5.98
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ANNEX 4. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROJECT
WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
1. WBTA-01
Prepare training plan and develop cooperative programs for research, standardization, and development
PAD JPS Associates
0.5 (PAD), 40
0.10 (RP15 and RP17)
0.04
June 2014– September 2016
Training needs assessment and comprehensive training plan for NHAI submitted February 2015 (Deliverable 2). Included a capacity development road map, institutional arrangements for training, and provisions for evaluation. The contract was terminated prematurely and closed.
No evidence of any utilization or implementation. The original intermediate indicator “% of NHAI staff trained in accordance with the agreed annual training plans” was dropped in the 2015 restructuring.
2.
WBTA-02 & WBTA-03
Review (Phase 1) and implementation (Phase 2) of project preparation and design review process
PAD CEG India 3.0 (PAD), 0.91 (RP17)
0.33
July 2013–April 2017
Phase 1 carried out; Phase 2 cancelled and taken up as WBTA-24. Phase 1 final products approved in 2017 after 4 years delay (draft Project Preparation Manual first submitted September 2014, went through various iterations, last submission March 2017). Phase 1 involved 5 initial reports on various topics plus stakeholders’ workshop for draft manual; final submission of the manual. Identified a variety of types of projects at different stages. Identified deficiencies
Project Preparation Manual approved by NHAI. Current usage unclear/selective. DPR and bid documents/schedules of work standardized. Remaining study outputs/ outcomes subsumed under WBTA-24.
39 Expenditure as of October 29, 2018, for MoRTH and NHAI projects; INR 68.44 = US$1 as per exchange rate on June 30, 2018. 40 INR 44.57 = US$1.
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
of DPRs and how to improve them; also improvements in the supervision of consultants, land acquisition, and forest clearances. Stakeholder workshop held in 2015, whose recommendations were well-received. Final Manual included model technical schedules on EPC and PPP.
3. WBTA-04
Appropriate technology for topography survey and capturing land records
PAD SD Baveja
0.15 (PAD), 0.02 (RP17)
0.02
July 2013–June 2017
Final report with recommendations on adoption of modern survey technology
Some of the modern survey technologies suggested (for example, LIDAR) are being used by NHAI for topographical surveys
4. WBTA-05
Topography Survey and Capturing Land Records for NH Corridor about 1,500 –2,000 km
PAD — 3.5 0.003 — Dropped in 2015
restructuring —
5. WBTA-06
Developing and operationalizing an e-tool as a monitoring system for preconstruction activities and LA and RR process
PAD — 0.2 0.01 — Dropped in 2015 restructuring —
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
6. WBTA-07
Establishing performance monitoring and rating system
PAD Deloitte 0.3 (PAD), 0.28 (RP17)
0.20
December 2013– June 2018
Final Report on System Architecture and implementation strategy; Final Case Study Report; user manuals for administrator portal, reviewer portal, and vendor portal
Study outputs/portal designed; subsequently reviewed and taken up by WBTA-37
7. WBTA-08
Corporate governance assessment of NHAI
PAD Deloitte 1.0 (PAD), 0.56 (RP17)
0.47
June 2013–June 2016
Final Report on Corporate Governance Assessment of NHAI
Not utilized
8. WBTA-09
Review of the existing audit mechanisms and develop independent quality audit system
PAD CEG India 0.5 (PAD), 0.4 (RP17)
0.43
July 2013–September 2015
Final Report on Review of Existing Mechanisms and Development of Independent Quality Audit System for NHAI; RFP for Consultant for Conducting Independent Quality Audit of the National Highway Development Projects; monitoring system.
NHAI has substantially accepted the recommendations centering on improved quality standards for audits and using independent national institutes for audits (Indian Institutes of Technology and National Institutes of Technology have been pre-selected). Monitoring system has been installed. No evidence of any actual audits undertaken yet under the new standards by the third parties.
9. WBTA-10
Developing network safety management approach and analysis
PAD — 0.5 0.01 — Dropped in 2015 restructuring —
10. WBTA-11
Services of Media Agency to design and implement publicity campaign for
PAD — 1.0 0.01 — Dropped in 2015 restructuring —
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
Road Safety and HIV AIDS
11. WBTA-12
Strengthen asset management capacity of NHAI and MoRTH
PAD HIMS/SATRA
1.0 (PAD), 2.72 (RP17)
2.57
November 2014–January 2018
Pilot asset management system developed for 3,000 km of national highways. Final report on consulting services for TA to strengthen asset management capacity of NHAI and MoRTH; RAMS installation manual; RAMS user manual.
NHAI is inviting bids for expanding the data collection to 20,000 more km in five zones. A RAMS Cell is being set up in NHAI. So far, the system is not being used for budgeting or other decision making. Future need to integrate RAMS into the broader PMIS.
12. WBTA-13
Piloting new contract modalities including new forms of PPPs
PAD E&Y 1.5 (PAD), 0.21 (RP17)
0.17
September 2013–June 2015
Final Report on Contracting Modes
Helped channel NHAI’s focus into two PPP modalities—HAM and TOT, which have since been launched and been successfully implemented.
13. WBTA-14
Road safety advisor
Added after project appro-val
— 2.0 — — Dropped in 2015 restructuring —
14. WBTA-15
ERP implementation
PAD — 20.0 — — Dropped in 2015 restructuring; Rolled into NHIIP as eDISHA
—
15. WBTA-16
IT Infrastructure Security Audit
RP15 — 0.17 — — Same task as WBTA-17. Until RP 2015, it was referred to as WBTA-16.
—
16. WBTA-17
IT Infrastructure Security Audit
RP17 KPMG 0.08 0.08
March 2016–June 2018
Final Reassessment Report on Information Security Gaps
Recommendations on fixing IT infrastructure and procedural security “bugs” are being implemented very slowly by NHAI. NHAI does not yet have a dedicated cyber security function, which should be independent of IT, directly reporting to management. Training
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
and awareness raising of staff were not part of the scope of work.
17. WBTA-41
Program management consultants to support Member Finance
RP17 Deloitte 0.28 0.28
September 2017–June 2018
Program management support provided to NHAI; no reports
According to Project Management Consultant, this assignment helped in the following areas: • Rollout of TOT from framing of
concession agreement to engagement of technical and financial consultants, and eventual bidding, and conversion of TOT into a program
• Rollout of tolling contracts to include ETC which has helped get more quality agencies at the toll plazas, raised the percentage of electronic tolling from 5–6 percent to 22 percent, and to publicize the ETC program
• Framing Solicitations of Proposals which have been posted on the NHAI website
• Dispute resolution • Suggesting alternative mechanisms for
fund raising such as ‘INVIT’, a proposed infrastructure investment trust for road projects which would be listed on the stock exchange. This would require creation of Special Purpose Vehicle, hiring of investment manager, structuring the contract, and so on but has been deferred until after successful rollout of second bundle of TOT.
18. WBTA-42
Transformation of ETC and highways operations in India (after
Added after approval of RP17
— 0.15 — — Cancelled —
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
cancellation of prior WBTA-42 using same number)
19. WBTA-42
Use of data collected by IHMCL41 biannually for purpose other than traffic count
RP17 — 0.15 — — Cancelled —
20. WBTA-43
Integrating ETC with GSTN42 to improve indirect tax compliance
RP17 — 0.20 — — Cancelled —
21. WBTA-44
Creation of NHAI software to take the role of acquirer in the ETC model
RP17 — 0.25 — — Cancelled —
22. —
Knowledge workshops/seminars/technical events, study tours/ training/exposure visits and engagement
RP15 — 0.33 (RP15) 0.03 —
According to NHAI, this line item was used toward incremental costs related to newspaper advertisements for NHAI projects and toward a joint study tour with MoRTH to Australia on tunneling.
—
41 Indian Highways Management Company Limited 42 Goods and Services Tax Network
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
of domain/subject experts (RP 2015)
23. TOTAL - NHAI 5.01
24. WBTA-18
Financing Options Study for National Highways Development
RP15 McKinsey
0.9 (RP15), 0.73 (RP17)
0.81
June 2015–March 2017
Final report (Financing Options for Developing National Highways) submitted and approved (June 2018 Status of Deliverables)
Contributed to adoption of HAM as a key contracting modality, through which 50+ projects worth US$7.4 billion awarded by MoRTH (Aide Memoire May 2018). Contributed to Rupee-denominated Masala bonds (MoRTH) being listed on Singapore and London stock exchanges; raised US$460 million at coupon rate of 7.3 percent for 5-year tenure (Aide Memoire May 2018). Bonds placed with LIC and EPFO. TOT model successfully launched.
25. WBTA-19
Adapting the MCA for expressway projects
RP15 Deloitte
0.58 (RP15), 0.10 (RP17)
0.12
October 2015–April 2018
Final versions of customized MCA documents for BOT (Toll), BOT (Annuity), and HAM modes, RFQ, RFP documents and recommendations on ToRs submitted and accepted by the technical committee and approved as of November 2018.
The MCAs are expected to be applied under the Bharatmala program and for access-controlled highways, once they have reached the required stage of development. Moreover, the deliberations/findings during the preparation of these MCAs have also contributed to improvement in the existing MCAs for National Highways especially with respect to the HAM model.
26. WBTA-20
Development of MCA and an enabling framework for
RP15 GEODATA Engineering SPA
0.58 (RP15), 0.22 (RP17)
0.18
October 2015–March 2018
Final versions of customized MCA documents, RFQ, RFP documents and recommendations on ToRs submitted and accepted by
Planned to be taken up with program backing. Workshops on preparation of DPR, construction, maintenance of tunneling projects especially in the Himalayan region planned by the Ministry.
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
tunneling projects
technical committee. Sent for Interministerial consultations. Under review as of November 2018.
27. WBTA-21
Highway Advisory Services (HAS) Phases 1 and 2 (Phase 2 shifted to NHAI after signing of contract)
January 2016–October 2016 (Phase 1) May 2017–May 2018 (Phase 2)
Under Phase 1, the pilot project ‘Hello Highway’ was developed and implemented, which provided live traffic updates and other types of information to road users on National Highway 8 (Delhi-Jaipur). Phase 2 was expansion to 12 highways in 13 states. Final report on impact of HAS and fulfilment of project objectives submitted and approved.
Could not obtain the radio spectrum initially. Hope to do this eventually. Follow up has been rolled over to the NHIIP. Operations Research Group Pvt. Ltd. was engaged to measure the impacts of the HAS study on selected highway stretches. Overall awareness of the HAS was around 83 percent; main source of knowledge about HAS was radio; messages on traffic rules were found most useful and information on road repair/accidents least useful. Feedback from users indicated scope for improvement in terms of providing more real time information and advance information. This feedback has been incorporated into Phase 2.
28. WBTA-22
Effective interventions to reduce carbon footprint in developing highways
RP15 TERI
0.5 (RP15), 0.11 (RP17)
0.12
January 2016–November 2017
Final report on reducing carbon/GHG footprint and enhancing climate resilience submitted and approved. National Highways carbon emissions model and instructions submitted
Study’s recommendations were well received during consultations with stakeholders (NHAI, CRRI, IRC, and so on), but MoRTH has not authorized the study’s dissemination. Study recommended a training and capacity building program for the tool developed, which is yet to be initiated. According to Secretary, the study has contributed to (a) identification of nine new corridors that are more direct, saving travel time, and GHG emissions; (b) considering opportunities to acquire land only on one side or right-of-way
43 HAS Phase 2 expenditure is counted under NHAI expenditure but shown here for ease of reference
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
for expansion; and (c) possibility of renewal coats of roads to be laid with recycled materials, whose application at an economical scale requires much equipment acquisition. The study has reportedly influenced a new IRC initiative for developing new codes and standards for climate mitigation and adaptation in the highway sector
29. WBTA-23
Review of Institutional Framework of Standardization and Research in Road Sector
RP15 TRL
0.5 (RP15), 0.4 (RP17)
0.46
March 2017–August 2018
Report on Broad Contours of Research Development & Technology (RD&T) Policy and Vision in the Road Sector and Review system of inviting, evaluation, and approval of sponsored RD&T projects submitted and reviewed. Report on Institutional Review of Existing Standards and Research Wing of the MoRTH, submitted and reviewed. Report on Strengthening of Highway Research Board and Review System of producing standards, codes, manuals by the IRC submitted approved. Report on proposing an institutional home for management of data
Unclear whether any recommendations of these studies on strengthening the institutional structure of research will be adopted by MoRTH or other relevant institutions.
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
resulting from RD&T projects and review institutional mechanism for CRRI submitted and approved. Final report on Institutional Framework and Action Plan submitted and approved.
30. WBTA-24
Organization and processes transformation in MoRTH and its implementing agencies (Phases I and II)
RP15 RP17 BCG
3.58 (Phase I) (RP15) 3.13 (Phase II) (RP17)
7.6 (both phases)
October 2015–November 2016 (Phase I) November 2016–April 2018 (Phase II)
Phase I submitted and approved: (a) Final report on overall role definitions for MoRTH, NHAI, National Highways Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (NHIDCL), state public works departments; (b) Design and implement the program management office for tracking and implementation of initiatives; (c) Completion of review of ERP DPR and finalization of RFP requirements and bidding documents; (d) Training for the program management office and relevant stakeholders for onboarding of tracking system; (e) Final report on organization structure, performance management,
The following results can be directly linked to activities undertaken under WBTA-24: • PMIS has been developed with
multilevel dashboards and rolled out to cover 3000+ projects at NHAI and MoRTH.
• An Executive Monitoring Cell has been established under the NHAI Chairman with dedicated staff.
• Supported MoRTH (through NHAI) in the upgradation of the PMIS to create executive level dashboards and reports for project monitoring. Also conducted multiple rounds of trainings and workshops across the country to collect and upload data into the PMIS and train ROs, PDs, and National Highways Divisions on upgradation of the database.
• 170,000+ km of highways, projects, toll plazas, traffic survey points mapped in the GIS. The TA collected data required for populating this GIS interface, and then program-managed GIS specialists from BISAG (a Government organization
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
workforce planning, capability development, and international benchmarking; (f) Final report on improving process and operational efficiency across MoRTH, NHAI, and NHIDCL; (g) Completion of training workshops for all CGMs and ROs, and project managers; (h) Update the tracking system of program management office with new initiatives; and (i) Implementation of operational efficiency initiatives for MoRTH, NHAI, and NHIDCL. (g) Final project report on implementation of initiatives and future road map Phase II submitted and approved: • Final report on
improving maintenance operations across completed assets
• Final report on business blueprint for technology solution
• Final report on performance management, capability
based in Gujarat, which was co-opted for this task by the Ministry) to develop this GIS interface, and integrate it with the PMIS.
• Standards for DPRs and RFPs for supervisory engineers and supervisory consultants have been revised to include latest technology.
• Existing concession/contract agreements for EPC, BOT, and TOT refined and new models for V-BOT and V-TOT defined. MoRTH has accepted and incorporated some of the changes to the existing documents and is in the process of submitting the V-BOT model for Cabinet approval.
• 60+ stand-alone tools and solutions being integrated into one technology solution. The TA studied the existing standalone tools and solutions being used by the Ministry and its agencies, conducted workshops to identify approximately 3,000 functional requirements from an integrated technology solution, prepared the RFP for system integrator procurement, and had assisted the Ministry with the procurement process. An SI is now on board, to take forward the implementation of the system, and manage operations and maintenance for the next 7 years.
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
development, workforce planning, and financial efficiency
• Final report on preconstruction excellence for priority programs
• Final report on financial efficiency, project tracking, DPR, land, document digitization and ITS, training plan, wave 2 deliverables for ITS
Phase II submitted and approved: • Final project report on
implementation of initiatives and future roadmap
The TA made distinct contributions to the following outcomes as part of broader efforts by MoRTH and NHAI: • 150 percent increase in award rate and
95 percent increase in road construction rate over five years44
• >80 percent of focus projects identified in 2016 are back on track
• 33 percent reduction in time to award <INR 100 crore projects through delegation
• INR 150+ crore annual interest savings through single Competent Authorities Land Acquisition account
• 500+ NHAI officers’ performance being tracked online through digital tool ‘Lakshya’
31. WBTA-25
Logistic Efficiency and Enhancement Program
RP15 AT Kearney
2.5 (RP15), 2.41 (RP17)
2.58
March 2016–July 2017 (Phase I) July 2017– Decemb
Phase I: Final report submitted and approved Phase II: Final report on Implementation Status of Logistics Parks and Future Road Map submitted and approved.
Study recommendations regarding freight corridor upgradation, logistics parks identification and development, ETC, and seamless interstate movement are being fully or mostly adopted for application under Bharatmala and Sagarmala.
44 Awards in 2017–18 were 17,000 km as compared to 5,095 km average for the five-year period prior to the project, that is, 2011–12 to 2015–16. Construction in 2017–18 was 10,000 km as compared to 6,680 km average for the five-year period before the project, that is, 2011–12 to 2015–16.
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
er 2017 (Phase II)
65,000 km of corridor network identified under Bharatmala Pariyojana and under implementation/to be implemented. 35 locations identified and prioritized for multimodal logistics parks development; DPRs being prepared for 6. Policy and implementation mechanism finalized for multimodal logistics parks. Identified upgradation needed in land ports to facilitate trade with other countries. Identified modifications needed in the BBIN Motor Vehicle Agreement. Defined guidelines and policies to promote adoption of ETC and supported design of action plans and documents for initiatives. Designed interventions needed to enable
Recommendations regarding BBIN and vehicle modernization are being partially adopted.
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
seamless interstate movement through documentation standardization and information and communications technology deployment. Detailed Policy and Concept Note developed for voluntary Vehicle Fleet Modernization Program, including finalization of target vehicle segment and incentive structure; defined key enablers for implementation including process, IT deployment, and marketing.
32. WBTA-26 SESA RP15 PwC
1.25 (RP15), 0.37 (RP17)
0.43
July 2016–June 2018
Submitted and accepted: (a) Report on as-is process on current Environment and Social Management across existing projects. (b) Report on National Highways Program Future Scenario including • All possible scenarios • Major implications • Multi-media
presentations Submitted and approved: Stakeholder Consultation Report including issues identified through structured
MoRTH senior officials reported that they did not find the work relevant or useful.
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
interactions, capacity-building requirements Submitted and approved: Final report on identified key strategic areas, prioritized action plan, and recommendations
33. WBTA-27
Passenger Mobility Enhancement
RP17 AT Kearney 2.39 2.72
September 2016–June 2018
Submitted and approved: • Report highlighting key
outcomes from two city/ SRTUs deep-dive and long-list of issues/ root cause factors/ preliminary solutions themes for passenger mobility enhancement through improved road transport
• Draft report on ‘Transformation scheme for SRTUs, co-locating rail/ bus ports, development of way-side amenities’
• Draft report on ‘Technology enablement to improve road safety, developing a mobile application to improve passenger convenience, key imperatives for government’
Recommendations not adopted/implemented: • Transform STAs into planning
and regulatory bodies and set up bus port authorities
• Training and capability development for STAs and SRTUs
• High capacity air-conditioned bus deployment
• Safety and passenger convenience Recommendations adopted and being implemented: • Intermodal station development • Wayside amenities development • Bus ports development
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
Submitted and approved: • Final report having end-
to-end design and implementation plan
• Inception report detailing project approach and methodology including set up of PMO, IT Dashboards and process for reviewing/ tracking solutions designed
34. WBTA-28
Value Engineering program for National Highway Design and Construction
RP17 TRL 0.60 0.54
December 2017–June 2018
This ongoing study is identifying value engineering initiatives to reduce cost, accelerate speed of highway/structure construction identified. (Aide Memoire May 2018) Various reports submitted and final reports under review: Draft Reports on material and technology recommendations, final report on global best practices, final diagnostic report on current technologies, and so on)
No indications of likelihood of adoption of any recommendations
35. WBTA-29
Assessment of Vulnerability of Highway
RP17 — 0.25 — — Cancelled —
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
Bridges to Natural Disasters and Climate Change, and Potential Adaptation Options— Andhra Pradesh And Odisha States
36. WBTA-30
Impact of Goods and Services Tax (GST) and new tax regime on road transport
RP17 E&Y 0.60 0.38
August 2017–March 2018
Various reports (cost of freight transport in India, analysis and mapping of incidence of taxes, Impact of GST, and so on) submitted and approved.
No indications of likelihood of adoption of any recommendations
37. WBTA-31
Preparation of National Road Transportation Strategy
RP17 BCG 2.24 1.83
November 2017–August 2018
Final reports submitted and under review: • Key bottlenecks for
efficient passenger and freight movement in the country
• New road transportation technology for freight and passenger movement
• Cost performance for transportation and logistics in the country
• Optimizing energy consumption by road transportation sector
• Institutional and
Study covered 40 initiatives under four “buckets”: (a) access and connectivity, (b) increasing passenger and freight speeds, (c) reducing unit costs of freight, and (d) environmental and economic sustainability. Corridors under access and connectivity bucket being taken up under Bharatmala. According to MoRTH, the study identified 33 key links. Of these, 12 were recommended; 5 are going ahead in Phase 1, and 7 in Phase 2. Unclear as to whether any initiatives under (b), (c), or (d) are being adopted and taken up. Much of the fourth bucket sustainability agenda goes beyond MoRTH.
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
governance framework to drive integrated transportation
• Transport landscape in 2030
• Road transportation road map 2030
38. WBTA-32
Use of aerial and satellite technologies in road transport and highway sector
RP17 — 0.30 — — Cancelled —
39. WBTA-33
Strategy for hill transportation and Infrastructure utilization/creation in synergy with Bharatmala/Chardham
RP17 McKinsey 2.24 1.42
November 2017–June 2018
Various final reports submitted and under review: • Passenger and freight
movements and baseline transport infrastructure in prioritized hilly areas
• Technology assessment for alternate transportation in hilly areas and business plan creation
• Benchmarking of global projects and identification of sites for transport augmentation
• Preliminary Feasibility Analysis for alternate transport modes in hilly areas
Helping develop a master list of potential ropeway sites in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand and prioritize and prepare a three-year implementation strategy and road map for two projects. Finalizing 2 locations for developing tourism hubs from a preliminary list of 10 hill-based locations and developing a three-year implementation strategy for this. Likely to feed into the Government’s proposed ‘Partvatmala’ program for hill development.
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
• Identification and prioritization of hill-based locations for tourism/event driven development
• Future road map for implementation
40. WBTA-34
Comprehensive Strategy to Improve Road Safety and Capacity Building of Road Safety cells
RP17 PwC 1.19 (RP17) 0.31
December 2017–June 2018
Various final reports submitted and under review: • Findings of secondary
data analysis and primary surveys
• Benchmarking of legislation, key road safety initiatives
• Recommendations for improved data capture, accident prevention technologies, and black spot identification
• Strategic Framework for Road Safety in India, detailed Road map for implementation
Workshop to consider various dimensions of road safety from various stakeholders planned. Very challenging to do a comprehensive strategy because it is so multifaceted. The apex structure for road safety is a Supreme Court committee.
41. WBTA-35
Transaction advisory for TOT
RP17 KPMG 1.49 0.16
August 2017–March 2018
Various activities, reports, and other outputs completed: Pitch book, financial models, investor profile, model RFP, and preparation of pre-bid replies and bid evaluation.
The first bundle of projects (nine stretches) under TOT awarded in April 2018. Bundles 2–7 totaling about 4,000 km expected to be bid out shortly (Aide Memoire May 2018). MoRTH Secretary indicated that a bundle of TOTs is planned to be bid out every quarter.
42. WBTA-36 Not found — — — — — — —
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
43. WBTA-37
Pilot Project on Performance Rating of Contractors and Concessionaires
Added after appro-val of RP17
QCI 0.29 0.12
January 2018–July 2018
Various final reports submitted and under review: • Review of Deloitte
Assessment Portal • Modifications to existing
software • Incorporation of
performance ratings in bidding process
• Awards for the best performers in road projects and toll plazas
• Final Report on Performance Rating of Concessionaires, Contractors, Consultants, and Recognition for best performers
According to Aide Memoire of May 2018: Study to establish performance monitoring and rating system from WBTA-07 under NHAI requires coordination with the pilot study underway at MoRTH under WBTA-37, through which a third-party agency has been appointed to rate 20 projects and suggest a framework to integrate the
Too early to see any adoption or take-ups
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
performance rating with the procurement process for appointment of DPR consultants, Independent Engineer ( IE)/Authority Engineer (AE), concessionaires, and contractors.
44. WBTA-38
Improving efficiency of land acquisition and dispute resolution
RP17 AT Kearney 1.34 1.53
November 2017–July 2018
Various final reports submitted and approved: • Land Acquisition
Diagnostic and Final Reports
• Program Management Reports ---Dispute Resolution Diagnostic and Final Report
Too early to see any adoption or take-up
45. WBTA-39 Not found — — — — — — —
46. WBTA-40
Onboarding of all states and their capacity development for implementation of VAHAN and SARTHI projects
RP17 — 0.45 — — Cancelled —
47. WBTA-45
Assessment of job potential and associated issues in the road sector
RP17 E&Y 0.37 0.02
April 2018–August 2018
Study aimed to identify opportunities for employment generation and skill upgrading in highway projects, with a view to
Too early to see any adoption or take-up
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WBTA No. Name of TA Origin Consulta
nt
Estimated Cost (US$,
millions)
Actual Final Cost (US$,
millions39)
Dates Awarde
d and Complet
ed
Outputs Outcomes
develop a strategic framework and action plan. Various final reports submitted and under review: • As-is assessment • Report on Employment
Potential and Skill Gap Analysis
• Final Report
48.
Provisions for further studies supporting the PDO
RP15 — 0.42 — —
According to MoRTH accounts, this amount was later consumed under the new studies that were added in RP 17
—
49.
Knowledge workshops/seminars/technical events, study tours/training/exposure visits and engagement of domain/subject experts
RP15 —
1.17 (RP15), 0.75 (RP 17)
0.60 —
According to MoRTH accounts, this amount was spent on study tours (2 to London, 1 to Australia, 1 to USA), 3–4 knowledge workshops, and hiring of subject matter experts in those workshops
—
50. TOTAL - MoRTH 24.34 51. TOTAL – NHAI + MoRTH 29.36
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ANNEX 5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS
Comments from NHAI:
1. “World Bank NHAI Technical Assistance Project Loan No. 7980-IN has helped NHAI in many ways, more particularly for Strengthening asset management capacity of NHAI (WBTA-12), Piloting new contract modalities including new forms of PPPs (WBTA-13) and Highway Advisory Services (HAS) phase 2. However, the Project implementation could have been more efficient, if it was to be supervised by one CGM and nodal officers at the level of GM/DGM, as CGMs as Nodal Officer were pre-occupied and WBTA programme was not a priority for them.”
Comments from MoRTH:
File No. H-24036/44/2018-P&P Dated 17th December 2018
To Shri Arnab Bandyopadhyay Senior Transport Specialist, The World Bank, New Delhi
Subject: Implementation Completion and Results Report- NHAI TA Loan No. 7980
Kindly refer to your email dt. 5.12.2018 enclosing Implementation Completion and Results Report
- NHAI TA Loan No. 7980 and requested for the comments on ICR. The comments on the World Bank
Reports on the projects executed by MoRTH are placed at Annexure-A.
2. The World Bank report mentioned that the efficacy rating, indicators 1 and 3 are deemed to
be fully achieved. For Indicator 2 is partially achieved however while rating, project planning and
finance management tools like PMIS, PFMS and E-Disha ERP Project which achieved wave-1 made live
recently should have also been considered. Currently, the rating only focuses on RAMS, whereas the
current version of PMIS and other achievements are also major outcome of a WBTA study. Given that
these tools have enabled detailed monitoring and planning of projects at a central level, the indicator
should have been judged by World Bank as fully achieved. Indicator 4 is majorly pertaining to NHAI, and
there is limited scope to the improve the rating, with the rating given as marginally achieved. However,
as an outcome of WBTA-37, the pilot program for rating of concessionaires has started delivering results
and will soon be made a standard part of MoRTH practices. Additionally, as part of WBTA-21, MoRTH
completed an assessment of the user acceptance of HAS, which will be taken forward for
implementation at a national level. Finally, MoRTH is working on revised guidelines for increasing scope
and responsibility of concessionaires (EPC contract, which has been implemented.) and DPR consultants
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(New DPR guidelines). As measures are already under implementation, the indicator may be marked as
partially achieved.
3. With regards to the efficiency rating, as the parameter is judged purely on the basis of time
elapsed, it is a more objective parameter. However, the rating has been given by combining pre-2015
and post-2015 periods. Both should be considered separately as there is a major difference in the scope
and achievement of targets after the 2015 restructuring. Given the volume of disbursements achieved
and number of projects operating, the rating for efficiency of post-2015 period may be increased from
“Modest”.
4. In terms of the outcomes and achievements of the projects, the World Bank report is largely
in line with our own observations. The additional factors has been added in the outcome report
wherever necessary. However, the efficacy and efficiency of the studies for the post-2015 period may
be improved given the high impact and speed of completion.
5. The World Bank requested to consider the comments of the MoRTH for its inclusion in the
report.
(Sanket Bhondve) Deputy Secretary (Highways) cum
PD WBTA Projects
Annexure -A Achievements indicated by World Bank and Comments of MoRTH
Sr. No Name of Project/ Consultant
Achievements indicated by World Bank
MoRTH Comments
1.
Financing Options Study for National Highways Development- WBTA-18 -M/s McKinsey
Contributed to adoption of HAM as a key contracting modality, through which 50+ projects worth US$7.4 billion awarded by MoRTH (Aide Memoire May 2018). Contributed to Rupee-denominated Masala bonds (MoRTH) being listed on Singapore and London stock exchanges; raised US$460 million at coupon rate of 7.3 percent for 5-year tenure (Aide Memoire May 2018).
The 112NH projects with estimated cost of Rs. 1,26,750/- crores (6,325 km.) has been awarded under HAM. The model minimizes risks to lender and developer/concessionaire and as such, has made a very good start.
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Achievements indicated by World Bank and Comments of MoRTH
Sr. No Name of Project/ Consultant
Achievements indicated by World Bank
MoRTH Comments
Bonds placed with LIC and EPFO. TOT model successfully launched.
2.
Adapting the MCA for expressway projects -WBTA-19 - M/s Deloitte
The MCAs are expected to be applied under the Bharatmala program and for access-controlled highways, once they have reached the required stage of development. Moreover, the deliberations/findings during the preparation of these MCAs have also contributed to improvement in the existing MCAs for National Highways especially with respect to the HAM model.
NHAI has used the Expressways base MCA (for HAM projects) to award 5 projects having a total length of about 125 kms on the Ahmedabad - Vadodara Expressway on HAM basis. The Estimated project cost of these projects is about INR 7000 crores.
3.
Development of MCA and an enabling framework for tunneling projects- WBTA-20—M/s GEODATA Engineering SPA
Planned to be taken up with program backing. Workshops on preparation of DPR, construction, maintenance of tunneling projects especially in the Himalayan region planned by the Ministry.
MOU between NHIDCL and NGI (a no profit organization of Norway) has been approved for a more comprehensive and integrated approach to tunneling projects.
4.
Highway Advisory Services (HAS) Phases 1 and 2 (Phase 2 shifted to NHAI after signing of contract)- WBTA-21—M/s All India Radio/ Audio World
Could not obtain the radio spectrum initially. Hope to do this eventually. Follow up has been rolled over to the NHIIP. Operations Research Group Pvt. Ltd. was engaged to measure the impacts of the HAS study on selected highway stretches. Overall awareness of the HAS was around 83 percent; main source of knowledge about HAS was radio; messages on traffic rules were found most useful and information on road repair/accidents least useful. Feedback from users indicated scope for improvement in terms of providing more real
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Achievements indicated by World Bank and Comments of MoRTH
Sr. No Name of Project/ Consultant
Achievements indicated by World Bank
MoRTH Comments
time information and advance information. This feedback has been incorporated into Phase 2.
5.
Effective interventions to reduce carbon footprint in developing highways -WBTA-22—M/s TERI
Study’s recommendations were well received during consultations with stakeholders (NHAI, CRRI, IRC, and so on), but MoRTH has not authorized the study’s dissemination. Study recommended a training and capacity building program for the tool developed, which is yet to be initiated. According to Secretary, the study has contributed to (a) identification of nine new corridors that are more direct, saving travel time, and GHG emissions; (b) considering opportunities to acquire land only on one side or right-of-way for expansion; and (c) possibility of renewal coats of roads to be laid with recycled materials, whose application at an economical scale requires much equipment acquisition. The study has reportedly influenced a new IRC initiative for developing new codes and standards for climate mitigation and adaptation in the highway sector
The studies recommendations have been examined and several steps have already been taken for environment -friendly practices and procedures
6.
Review of Institutional Framework of Standardization and Research in Road Sector -WBTA-23—M/s TRL
Unclear whether any recommendations of these studies on strengthening the institutional structure of research will be adopted by MoRTH or other relevant institutions.
To promote and smoothen the research activities in the highway sector, Ministry has already constituted a committee namely Highway Research Strategy Committee on line with the recommendation of M/s TRL. This committee has to identify various thrust areas on which research is to be conducted and to facilitate sanction of research scheme to various research organisations/ academic institutes so that time bound research could be carried out in the new/emerging field of roads/highway development. To encourage use of new material/ technology so as to minimize the
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Achievements indicated by World Bank and Comments of MoRTH
Sr. No Name of Project/ Consultant
Achievements indicated by World Bank
MoRTH Comments
dependency on scarce natural resources, we are also issuing various guidelines/ circulars as has been recommended by M/s TRL such as for fly-ash, geo-synthetic etc.
7.
Organization and processes transformation in MoRTH and its implementing agencies (Phases I and II) - WBTA-24—M/s BCG
The following results can be directly linked to activities undertaken under WBTA-24: • PMIS has been developed
with multilevel dashboards and rolled out to cover 3000+ projects at NHAI and MoRTH.
• An Executive Monitoring Cell has been established under the NHAI Chairman with dedicated staff.
• Supported MoRTH (through NHAI) in the upgradation of the PMIS to create executive level dashboards and reports for project monitoring. Also conducted multiple rounds of trainings and workshops across the country to collect and upload data into the PMIS and train ROs, PDs, and National Highways Divisions on upgradation of the database.
• 170,000+ km of highways, projects, toll plazas, traffic survey points mapped in the GIS. The TA collected data required for populating this GIS interface, and then program-managed GIS specialists from BISAG (a Government organization based in Gujarat, which was co-opted for this task by the Ministry) to develop this GIS interface, and integrate it with the PMIS.
As noted
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Achievements indicated by World Bank and Comments of MoRTH
Sr. No Name of Project/ Consultant
Achievements indicated by World Bank
MoRTH Comments
• Standards for DPRs and RFPs for supervisory engineers and supervisory consultants have been revised to include latest technology.
• Existing concession/contract agreements for EPC, BOT, and TOT refined and new models for V-BOT and V-TOT defined. MoRTH has accepted and incorporated some of the changes to the existing documents and is in the process of submitting the V-BOT model for Cabinet approval.
• 60+ stand-alone tools and solutions being integrated into one technology solution. The TA studied the existing standalone tools and solutions being used by the Ministry and its agencies, conducted workshops to identify approximately 3,000 functional requirements from an integrated technology solution, prepared the RFP for system integrator procurement, and had assisted the Ministry with the procurement process. An SI is now on board, to take forward the implementation of the system, and manage operations and maintenance for the next 7 years.
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Achievements indicated by World Bank and Comments of MoRTH
Sr. No Name of Project/ Consultant
Achievements indicated by World Bank
MoRTH Comments
The TA made distinct contributions to the following outcomes as part of broader efforts by MoRTH and NHAI: • 150 percent increase in
award rate and 95 percent increase in road construction rate over five years
• >80 percent of focus projects identified in 2016 are back on track
• 33 percent reduction in time to award <INR 100 crore projects through delegation
• INR 150+ crore annual interest savings through single Competent Authorities Land Acquisition account
• 500+ NHAI officers’ performance being tracked online through digital tool ‘Lakshya’
8.
Logistic Efficiency and Enhancement Program -WBTA-25—M/S AT Kearney
Study recommendations regarding freight corridor upgradation, logistics parks identification and development, ETC, and seamless interstate movement are being fully or mostly adopted for application under Bharatmala and Sagarmala. Recommendations regarding BBIN and vehicle modernization are being partially adopted.
Multimodal Logistics Parks were proposed as a result of this study. Currently being implemented
9. SESA-WBTA-26—M/s PWC
MoRTH senior officials reported that they did not find the work relevant or useful.
The recommendations might have limited applicability at this instance, but can be revisited by MoRTH in future on various aspects like the use of alternative materials for road construction, the augmentation of the E&S specialist, use of Multi Criteria analysis for road alignment; during the
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Achievements indicated by World Bank and Comments of MoRTH
Sr. No Name of Project/ Consultant
Achievements indicated by World Bank
MoRTH Comments
course of the National Highway network augmentation over the next 5 years.
10. Passenger Mobility Enhancement -WBTA-27—M/S AT KEARNEY
Recommendations not adopted/implemented: • Transform STAs into
planning and regulatory bodies and set up bus port authorities
• Training and capability development for STAs and SRTUs
• High capacity air-conditioned bus deployment
• Safety and passenger convenience
Recommendations adopted and being implemented: • Intermodal station
development • Wayside amenities
development • Bus ports development
• Detailed bus leasing model concessionaire agreement developed for inter-city bus leasing incorporating best practices and addressing current issues in bus leasing contracts in India – ready for roll-out when scheme is finalized
• Key routes identified for implementation roll-out
• Detailed funding model and benefits estimation ready for scheme justification and approval
• DPRs in final stages, detailed business case, MCA, RFP developed and near final pre-tendering stages for Nagpur. Project expected to be ready for award in the coming months.
• Detailed MCA, RFP and other bid documents prepared - tendering completed for first wave of 34 sites; next wave of sites in progress; co-branding agreement developed for Highway Nest
• Detailed scheme and implementation model ready for roll-out once state governments are ready to participate in the scheme and a pilot city / town has been identified per state
• Detailed RFP ready for mobility app; however, initiative was deprioritized for implementation
11.
Value Engineering program for National Highway Design and Construction- WBTA-28-M/S TRL
No indications of likelihood of adoption of any recommendations
Following recommendation are under consideration of MoRTH: a) Construction of road project - Design of flexible pavement can be further be modified as mentioned in IRC 37: 2012, with the following consideration of pavement layers HBM base & Asphalt Asphalt surfacing - Wearing course (BC) + DBM
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Achievements indicated by World Bank and Comments of MoRTH
Sr. No Name of Project/ Consultant
Achievements indicated by World Bank
MoRTH Comments
HBM Base - Hydraulic Bound Material (with Cement/ Fly ash/ Slag) Granular Sub Base - As per UK Flexible pavement design code HD 25/ HD 26 Volume 7 b) Construction Integral Bridges Integral Bridges may be adopted for minor bridges initially, which eliminates the expansion joints. The wear and tear of the bridges will be minimal as compared to the conventional bridges using bearings, expansion joints etc.
12.
Impact of Goods and Services Tax (GST) and new tax regime on road transport - WBTA-30-M/S E&Y
No indications of likelihood of adoption of any recommendations
13.
Preparation of National Road Transportation Strategy -WBTA-31-M/S BCG
Study covered 40 initiatives under four “buckets”: (a) access and connectivity, (b) increasing passenger and freight speeds, (c) reducing unit costs of freight, and (d) environmental and economic sustainability. Corridors under access and connectivity bucket being taken up under Bharatmala. According to MoRTH, the study identified 33 key links. Of these, 12 were recommended; 5 are going ahead in Phase 1, and 7 in Phase 2. Unclear as to whether any initiatives under (b), (c), or (d) are being adopted and taken up. Much of the fourth bucket sustainability agenda goes beyond MoRTH.
1. The scope of the project included identifying transportation roadmap until 2030. Hence, while a set of initiatives have already been included in formal program, the rest have been accepted and will be taken up while designing future programs at MoRTH. 2. The roadmap developed in this study for developing a position on alternate fuels for the country will be implemented by MoRTH and in collaboration with other ministries.
The dashboard for identifying gaps that hamper freight flow has been finalized and optimization of corridors completed.
14.
Strategy for hill transportation and Infrastructure utilization/creation in
Helping develop a master list of potential ropeway sites in Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand and prioritize and
As noted.
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Achievements indicated by World Bank and Comments of MoRTH
Sr. No Name of Project/ Consultant
Achievements indicated by World Bank
MoRTH Comments
synergy with Bharatmala/Chardham -WBTA-33-M/SMCKINSEY
prepare a three-year implementation strategy and road map for two projects.
Finalizing 2 locations for developing tourism hubs from a preliminary list of 10 hill-based locations and developing a three-year implementation strategy for this.
Likely to feed into the Government’s proposed ‘Partvatmala’ program for hill development.
15.
Comprehensive Strategy to Improve Road Safety and Capacity Building of Road Safety cells - WBTA-34-M/S PWC
Workshop to consider various dimensions of road safety from various stakeholders planned. Very challenging to do a comprehensive strategy because it is so multifaceted. The apex structure for road safety is a Supreme Court committee.
Three stakeholder-consultative workshops in discussion with the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MoRTH) were conducted in Kolkata, Ahmedabad and Hyderabad on 9th, 12th and 16th October 2018 respectively. The agenda of the workshops was to highlight, present and discuss the identified pillars of draft National Road Safety Strategy and action points under each pillar, with all stakeholder departments under State/UT Governments and other agencies. Participation covered representation from the Transport Department, Public Works Department, Health & Medical Department, Education Department, Urban Development Department, Traffic Police, Rural Development Department. Additionally, relevant stakeholders from the Ministry (Regional offices of Ministry and NHAI), Education (Directors from Indian Institute of Technology), NGOs and research institutions undertaking road safety in each of the States and UTs were also invited. The workshop structure was consultative in nature and inputs (key views and recommendations) from respective state/UT officials and regional level stakeholders were taken to integrate into the final National Road Safety Strategy. The workshop witnessed participation from
The World Bank NHAI Technical Assistance Project (P121515)
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Achievements indicated by World Bank and Comments of MoRTH
Sr. No Name of Project/ Consultant
Achievements indicated by World Bank
MoRTH Comments
more than 250 stakeholders from all relevant departments. The Ahmedabad workshops also witnessed participation from The World Bank and the inputs will be incorporated in the final road safety strategy document. A final round of discussion with the stakeholders is being planned in Delhi in the month of January 2019 in discussion with Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. The road safety strategy is being developed in discussion with the key stakeholder departments viz. Transport Department, Public Works Department, Health & Medical Department, Education Department, Urban Development Department, Traffic Police, Rural Development Department etc. In addition, aspects like road safety management, road safety advocacy and monitoring & evaluation are part of the pillars to account for the multi-faceted requirements of road safety strategy. A National Road Safety Board is proposed.
16. Transaction advisory for TOT - WBTA-35-M/S KPMG
The first bundle of projects (nine stretches) under TOT awarded in April 2018. Bundles 2–7 totaling about 4,000 km expected to be bid out shortly (Aide Memoire May 2018). MoRTH Secretary indicated that a bundle of TOTs is planned to be bid out every quarter.
As noted.
17.
Pilot Project on Performance Rating of Contractors and Concessionaires - WBTA-37-MS/ QCI
Too early to see any adoption or take-ups
The third part (Framework for selection of best performing road assets & toll plaza) has been completed and the recommendations have been accepted by MoRTH. Based on the model proposed by QCI & with the Key Performance Indicators (KPI), the first cycle of MoRTH's Annual Awards for excellence in highways were executed this year. The first and second part (Performance Rating of Consultants, Concessionaires & Contractors and Framework for factoring
The World Bank NHAI Technical Assistance Project (P121515)
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Achievements indicated by World Bank and Comments of MoRTH
Sr. No Name of Project/ Consultant
Achievements indicated by World Bank
MoRTH Comments
the scores in evaluation bids) are under process - the pilot study for 4 projects has been completed via offline mode. Currently in the process of conducting the pilot study for remaining 16 projects. Once the pilot study is completed, the results and proposed roadmap for adoption of the performance rating framework will be shared.
18.
Improving efficiency of land acquisition and dispute resolution - WBTA-38-M/S AT Kearney
Too early to see any adoption or take-up
1. Suggestions incorporated on Bhoomirashi portal. Speedy notifications achieved in L.A now. 2. Guidelines for DPR consultants under process
19.
Assessment of job potential and associated issues in the road sector -WBTA-45-M/S E&Y
Too early to see any adoption or take-up
The World Bank NHAI Technical Assistance Project (P121515)
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ANNEX 6. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
1. Project Appraisal Document, NHAI Technical Assistance Project, Report No. 57479-IN, November2, 2010, World Bank, South Asia Region.
2. Project Information Document, NHAI Technical Assistance Project, Report No. AB5889, July 15,2010, World Bank, South Asia Region.
3. Integrated Safeguards Datasheet, NHAI Technical Assistance Project, Report No. AC5592,September 30, 2010, World Bank, South Asia Region.
4. Loan Agreement, NHAI Technical Assistance Project, December 22, 2010, World Bank, South AsiaRegion.
5. Project Agreement, NHAI Technical Assistance Project, December 22, 2010, World Bank, SouthAsia Region.
6. Procurement Plan, NHAI Technical Assistance Project, Report No. 75766, March 4, 2013, WorldBank, South Asia Region.
7. Procurement Plan for Consultancy Services and Goods, NHAI Technical Assistance Project, ReportNo. 84704, February 14, 2014, World Bank, South Asia Region.
8. Implementation Status and Results Reports, NHAI Technical Assistance Project, 2011–2018, World Bank, South Asia Region.
9. Restructuring Paper, NHAI Technical Assistance Project, Report No. RES27387, June 2017, WorldBank, South Asia Region.
10. Restructuring Paper, NHAI Technical Assistance Project, Report No. RES16403, November 24,2015, World Bank, South Asia Region.
11. Implementation Completion and Results Report, Lucknow-Muzaffarpur National Highway Project, Report No. ICR00002475, December 12, 2012, World Bank, South Asia Region.
12. Implementation Completion and Results Report, Third National Highways Project, Report No.ICR0000807, October 1, 2008, World Bank, South Asia Region
13. Implementation Completion and Results Report, Grand Trunk Road Improvement Project, ReportNo. ICR0000978, March 31, 2009, World Bank, South Asia Region.
14. Implementation Completion and Results Report, Allahabad Bypass Project, Report No.ICR00001251, January 28, 2010, World Bank, South Asia Region.
15. Country Partnership Framework for India for the period FY18–22, Report No. 126667-IN, July 25,2018, World Bank, South Asia Region.
