Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in
the Islamic Republic of Iran
Mr. Yukiya AmanoReed College
March 30, 2012
Outline• Paths to the Bomb• Iran’s Nuclear Facilities• Recent Failures• Recent Progress• Outstanding Issues• Further Reading• Conclusions
Paths to the Bomb
FEP(5%) + PFEP (20%)54000 SWU planned9156 SWU installed8808 SWU operating4500 kg LEU (3.5%)100 kg HEU (20%)
FFEP3000 SWU planned600 SWU installed14 kg HEU (20%)
HWR40 MWth
LWR1000 MWe
LWR360 MWe
Recent Failures• Qom Enrichment
Facility– Work apparent 2002,
2004, 2006– Iran claim allocated to
AEOI in second half of 2007
– 3000 IR-1 Centrifuges– Iran in violation of
Code 3.1 of safeguards agreements
Recent Progress• September 2011
– Ahmadinejad offers to stop producing 20%
• February 15, 2012– Iran agreed to take
part in six-party talks (France, Germany, UK, China, Russia, US)
• March 6, 2012– Conditional visit to
Parchin
Outstanding Issues• Iranian safeguards 1976
– Suspended Code 3.1 (DIV)
– Need Additional Protocol• Clarify
– Uranium metal document– Procurement and
production by military-related industries
– Weaponization and delivery systems studies
• Compliance– Suspend enrichment– Suspend construction of
HWR, FFEP– Access to HW plant– Access to Parchin site
Further Reading
Conclusions