Implementing the principle of policy integration: institutional interplay and the role of...

ORI GIN AL PA PER

Implementing the principle of policy integration:institutional interplay and the role of internationalorganizations

Avidan Kent

Accepted: 30 August 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Abstract The implementation of the sustainable development principle of integrationimplies that economic laws should not be designed solely for the purpose of maximizing

financial profits, but also with the object of improving human well-being, and addressing

social and environmental concerns. International organizations, in which international

treaties are being negotiated and created, will have to support this type of cross-disci-

plinary approach. International institutions, however, were not originally designed to cope

with such a cross-disciplinary effort. Rather, most international institutions have emerged

in line with the premise of functionalism, according to which their role is limited to

supplying specialized services, usually as a solution for emerging needs and as a result of

historical events. These specialized institutions have thus emerged with little coordination

or common planning and have resulted in a global structure that has been referred to as an

accident of history. The role that international organizations should and do fulfil with

respect to the implementation of the principle of integration is reviewed in this paper. This

paper concentrates on trade and investment organizations (the World Trade Organization

and the Energy Charter Treaty); it reviews the channels through which non-trade/invest-

ment considerations may, or may not, penetrate the decision-making processes of these

organizations; the ways these International organizations engage with interdisciplinary

issues and how the objectives of other institutions are reflected in their work.

Keywords Institutional interplay International organizations Integration Trade Investment Climate change

AbbreviationsCTE Committee on Trade and Environment

ECT Energy Charter Treaty

IGO Intergovernmental organizations

MEA Multilateral environmental agreements

A. Kent (&)Wolfson College, Barton Rd., Cambridge CB3 9BB, UKe-mail: [email protected]

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Int Environ AgreementsDOI 10.1007/s10784-013-9224-3

PEEREA ECT Protocol on energy efficiency and related environmental aspects working

group

TED Trade and environment division

WGTTT Working group on trade and transfer of technology

WTO World Trade Organization

1 Introduction

The sustainable development principle of integration was defined by Schrijver as possibly

the most innovative of all international law principles concerning sustainable development

(Schrijver 2008, p. 203). Elsewhere, it was described as perhaps the most essential of all

seven principles of sustainable development (Jodoin 2005) and as the heart of sustainable

development (Ellis 2010).1 In a nutshell, this principle reflects the interdependence of

policy areas such as environmental protection, economic development, human rights, and

social development and that the implementation of such policies must be done in an

integrated manner. The recognition of this principle can be found in international docu-

ments such as the 1987 United Nations World Commission on Environment and Devel-

opments Brundtland Report, the 1992 Rio Declaration, the 1992 Climate Change

Convention, the 2002 ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law

Relating to Sustainable Development, and the 2012 (Rio ? 20) United Nations Conference

on Sustainable Developments outcome document (The future we want). Recently, this

principle was also stressed as an integral element of the term green economy, when this

term was defined by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as one that

results in improved human well-being and social equity, while significantly reducing

environmental risks and ecological scarcities (UNEP 2011). Elsewhere, the green

economy has been described as an economy that offers the promise of growth while

protecting the earths ecosystems and, in turn, contributing to poverty alleviation (UN-

DESA et al. (2012), p. 4).

One of the main challenges in implementing the principle of integration, therefore, is to

design laws and policies that not only promote specific goals, but more importantly strike a

balance between numerous considerations from a variety of fields. The objectives of

international trade laws, for example, should no longer be the mere elimination of trade

barriers, but rather reflect an equilibrium between the benefits of international trade and the

less desirable effects of liberalized trade on issues such as environmental protection, public

health, and well-being.

International institutions, within which international treaties are being designed and

negotiated, will have to support and adopt this type of cross-disciplinary approach.2

However, the current architecture of international institutions imposes several difficulties

in this respect. Most notably, international institutions were not originally designed to

reflect, or cope with, such a cross-disciplinary effort. Rather, most international institutions

have emerged in line with the premise of functionalism, according to which the role of

the institutions is limited to supplying specialized services (Brown 2004, p. 69; Hey 2008,

1 See more about this principle in Cordonier Segger and Khalfan (2003), p. 103; Rieu-Clarke (2005), p. 84.2 The terms cross-disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity are used in this paper in order to describe aprocess of interaction and cross-fertilization between different policy areas.

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p. 8), usually as a solution for emerging needs and historical events (Benvenisti and Downs

2007, p. 597598). These specialized institutions have thus emerged and developed with

little coordination or common planning and have resulted in a global structure that has

been referred to by some as an accident of history (Benvenisti and Downs 2007, p. 598).

This situation is problematic as each institution tends to focus its work on its own limited

goals and often also prioritize the interests of its main actors.

This state of affairs is aggravated by the fact that in many instances, the individuals

encircling and acting within each institution share very similar backgrounds, expertise,

perspectives, and even the same ethos. As David Kennedy has remarked in this respect

(Kennedy 2007, p. 650):

When we public international lawyers look out the window, we see a world of nation

states and worry about war. We remember the great wars of the twentieth century.

We were traumatized by the holocaust, fear totalitarianism and are averse to ideol-

ogy. [] Trade lawyers, by contrast, look out the window and see a world of buyersand sellers struggling to deal. Their trauma was the great depression.

Koskenniemi adds in this regard (Koskenniemi 2006 p. 4):

To be doing trade law or human rights law, or environmental law or

European lawas the representatives of those projects repeatedly tell usis not

just to operate some technical rules but to participate in a culture, to share prefer-

ences and inclinations shared with colleagues and institutions who identify them-

selves with that box.

Kennedy and Koskenniemis descriptions correspond with theories on epistemic communities

(i.e. networks or communities of experts) and their impact on how states identify their interests

and accordingly also act. Haas explains in this respect that these epistemic communities often

share normative beliefs, according to which value-based rationales are determined. Further-

more, experts communities often also share common ideas towards causeeffect relationships,

notions of validity (explained by Haas as internally defined criteria for weighing and validating

knowledge in the domain of their expertise), and common policy enterprise (explained by Haas

as a set of common practices associated with a set of problems; Haas 1992, p. 3).

Therefore, one way to support the implementation of the principle of integration is to

establish a variety of bridges between the different worlds, in order to enable a multitude of

interests and perspectives to play a part in the negotiating and drafting of new treaties. As

reviewed below, international governmental organizations (IGOs)3 can play an important

role in this bridge-building task by promoting cross-disciplinary thinking and facilitating

interdisciplinary dialogue. More specifically, they can manage a specific type of interplay

that is critical to the future trajectory of global environmental and economic politics.

This paper will elaborate on this process. It will first explain the term institutional

interaction and will briefly review the ways in which institutions can affect one another. It

will continue with an overview of several channels through which the objectives,

knowledge, and perspectives of one institution can flow into the decision-making process

3 International governmental organizations (or intergovernmental organizations) are defined as anorganization composed primarily of sovereign states or other intergovernmental organizations. IGOs areestablished by treaty or other agreement that acts as a charter creating the group (definition provided by theUnion of International Associations, http://www.uia.org/faq/yb3). Organizations were defined by some aspossessing actors qualities, and they are often considered to include, inter alia, specified rules andprocedures, organizational support (staff, offices, etc.), and the ability to enter into legal contracts. SeeOberthur and Stokke (2011), p. 3 and Oberthur and Gehring (2006), p. 24.

Implementing the principle of policy integration

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http://www.uia.org/faq/yb3

of another, and thereby support a better informed multidisciplinary dialogue. The focus in

this respect will be on channels related to IGOs in the fields of international trade and

investment, and how non-trade/investment considerations may, or may not, penetrate the

decision-making processes of these organizations. This paper will conclude with the

argument that the reviewed channels can potentially facilitate cross-disciplinary decision-

making and consequently can make an important contribution to the implementation of the

sustainable development principle of integration.

2 Institutional interaction

2.1 Introduction

Since the end of World War II, the regulation of international law has proliferated at an

unprecedented rate. The increasing regulation of international activity is mirrored by a

growing density of specialized, issue-specific institutions. As the density of international

institutions increases, the interrelation between them becomes more complex (Young

1996). The growing number of institutions has resulted on many occasions in an overlap

between them and in instances where the functional scope of one regime protrudes into the

function of others (Rosendal 2001, p. 458). Those instances in which one institution

affects the development or the effectiveness of another have been defined by International

Relations (IR) authors as institutional interaction (Oberthur and Gehring 2006).

Based on the examination of over 150 singular interactions between international

institutions, Oberthur and Gehring have designed certain models for institutional interac-

tion, on the basis of which they have proposed a useful method for analysing this inter-

action. In a nutshell, they explain that any institutional interaction includes a source

institution (the influencing institution), a target institution (the influenced institution),

and a causeeffect relationship that will demonstrate that indeed interaction took place

(i.e. that without the influence of the source institution, the target institution would not

have been affected; Gehring and Oberthur 2009, p. 127; Oberthur and Gehring 2006, p. 6).

The source institutions influence flows into the target institution via actors (i.e. states,

NGOs, IGOs, individuals, etc.). In essence, it is explained that influence flows between two

institutions in three steps: (1) the source institution (or events related to it) somehow affects

actors; (2) consequently, the actors modify their behaviour and preferences under the target

institution, which leads to (3) the target institution being influenced (Gehring and Oberthur

2009, p. 129130).

The effort to design and influence the ways in which institutions operations interact, with

the object of promoting better systemic integration, is referred to as interplay management

(Oberthur 2009, p. 373; Stokke 2001, p. 11). This process focuses on improving and

managing the interaction existing between independent international institutions in cases

where no clear hierarchy or central governance exists (Oberthur 2009, p. 374).

As mentioned in Introduction to this paper, the implementation of the principle of

integration requires a cross-disciplinary approach. As reviewed below, synergies between

international institutions can facilitate this process and provide those negotiating interna-

tional laws with a broader perspective and wider cross-disciplinary knowledge, enabling

them to address a wider range of considerations. This paper will review some of the actors

and mechanisms through which interplay management takes place and explain how greater

synergy can be achieved. However, it is first necessary to review the more relevant models

of institutional interaction, namely ideational interplay and cognitive interaction.

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2.2 Ideational interplay and cognitive interaction

IR authors, such as Stokke, Gehring, and Oberthur, have identified several models

according to which institutions interact. The most relevant to this paper is the ideational

interplay model, which was described by Stokke as a process of learning (Stokke 2001,

p. 10) in which information originating from sources external to the institution affects

actors and accordingly also the target institution. A somewhat wider, yet similar, version of

this interplay was referred to by Gehring and Oberthur as a cognitive interaction (Obe-

rthur and Gehring 2006, p. 8; Gehring and Oberthur 2009, p. 132), in which knowledge

produced by the source institution (whether a report, institutional method, or any sort of

information) alters the perspectives of the target institutions decision-makers and conse-

quently impacts the negotiations and the output it produces (Gehring and Oberthur 2009,

p. 133). Gehring and Oberthur further explain that unlike other cases of institutional

interplay, this type of interplay does not necessitate an overlap between institutions

covered issues or members, as different kinds of knowledge are often also useful with

respect to non-overlapping issues (Oberthur and Gehring 2006, p. 8).

The importance of ideational/cognitive interplay is emphasized if what Kennedy and

Koskenniemi have pointed out is accepted, namely that the people negotiating international

agreements are inherently different from one another in their perspectives, knowledge, and

backgrounds, as such interplay leads to mutual learning and increased dialogue between

functionaries operating in different institutions. Moreover, if, as some studies demonstrate

(e.g. Michel Petit et al. 2001), fragmentation exists also within states, and at least in some

cases, different ministries of the same state may not be coordinated (or even pursue

conflicting strategies), any learning process taking place on the institutional level can assist

in overcoming this fragmentation on the international level.

Unlike other models of institutional interplay, the effectiveness of the ideational/cog-

nitive interplay should not be measured according to the existence of a noticeable impact

on the target institutions outcomes. As the focus of this interplay is on the learning process

and the flow of information, the lack of noticeable impacts (such as the amendment of

treaties) in itself should not necessarily reflect a failure. For example, it could well be that

the learning process actually did occur, and the parties were well informed, but yet chose to

reject the trade-offs embedded in accepting the new knowledge. Effectiveness in this

context should be evaluated in the light of the creation of an effective dialogue and the

successful flow of information between the different worlds. As mentioned by Depledge

in this respect, [a]ctively deciding not to accept or endorse new input is not necessarily a

sign of ossification, but failure to even consider the information, or to decide anything at

all, probably is (Depledge 2006a, p. 2).

Lastly, the limits of the cognitive/ideational interplay in comparison with other models

of interplay should be stressed. While other interplay models described in the literature

[such as utilitarian interplay (Stokke 2001) and interaction through commitments (Oberthur

and Gehring 2006, p. 37)] impose costs on states or otherwise affect their benefits, the

cognitive/ideational interplay process is based on persuasion. As such, it is lacking the

immediate incentives that motivate states to change their behaviour and preferences.

The following section will concentrate on the role IGOs can play in supporting idea-

tional interplay and consequently opening channels for learning between the different

fragmented islands in which international law currently operates. For this purpose, the

author will focus mainly on two organizations, one in the field of international trade [the

World Trade Organization (WTO)] and the other in the field of international investment

[the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)], and focus on the channels through which non-


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commercial considerations (mostly environmental considerations) may, or may not, pen-

etrate their decision-making mechanisms.

The channels presented below, however, are relevant not only for the ECT and the

WTO but for any organization wishing to enhance its interplay management with other

institutions and to better address its linkage with other policy areas. It is argued that where

applied full-heartedly, with sufficient resources and mandate, these channels can signifi-

cantly support the ideational interplay and improve the decision-making processes taking

place within IGOs.

3 International organizations

3.1 Introduction

Institutions can influence one another in several ways. As demonstrated below, IGOs can

play a role in facilitating this flow of influence, mainly by allowing the transfer of

knowledge from one institution to another and by creating relevant issue-specific knowl-

edge. Knowledge, as explained in the first part of this study, can influence actors pref-

erences and behaviour and consequently impact the decision-making processes in target

institutions.

Furthermore, the notion of organizations as active, influencing entities will be stressed

in this following part. Although according to some perceptions, IGOs are no more than

empty shells or impersonal policy machinery to be manipulated by other actors,4 an

increasing number of academics suggest that such a reading is inaccurate, as organizations

do possess some levels of autonomous powers (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). These

powers, originating in part from their Weberian bureaucratic authority (explained below),

emphasize the need to treat organizations as potential drivers of influence.

The most relevant, although by no means the only, forms of institutional interplay in

this respect are Stokkes ideational interplay (Stokke 2001) and Gehring and Oberthurs

cognitive interaction (Oberthur and Gehring 2006, p. 35). The following part reviews

some of the ways in which actors such as organizations secretariats and subsidiary bodies,

and mechanisms such as institutional cooperation agreements, can facilitate this process.

As already mentioned, the author will focus mainly on two organizations: the WTO and

the ECTs investment protection regime. The WTO includes 159 Member States and

regulates, inter alia, the international trade in goods and services, and elements related to

trade such as intellectual property, subsidies, and more. The Energy Charter Treaty

includes 53 Member States (mostly the EUs Member States but also states such Japan,

Australia, and Russia) and ten observer states (including the United States). The ECT was

established in order to promote long-term cooperation in the field of energy and covers

issues such as investment, trade, and transit of energy.

The author decided to concentrate on these two organizations for several reasons. Most

notably, the two are, in essence, economic institutions that regulate policy areas that are

highly relevant for non-economic issues, such as environmental protection, social well-

being, and health.5 The two are also criticized for not reflecting a sufficient balance

4 See a description of economic and regimes theories in Barnett and Finnemore (1999), p. 704.5 Much has been written about the interaction between international trade or international investment andsustainable development related issues, such as environmental protection and social development. See forexample Gehring and Cordonier Segger (2005) and Cordonier Segger et al. (2010).

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between economic interests, on the one hand, and non-economic issues such as environ-

mental protection, on the other.6

Furthermore, the two institutions represent a similar set of perspectives and interests,

namely the ability of industry to penetrate foreign markets and expand globally. The two

regimes also rely on similar legal principles, mainly the prohibition on nationality-based

discrimination. Often enough, international investment and trade regimes regulate similar

actors, namely multinational corporations, who choose in certain instances to enter a

foreign market by setting up a production facility (i.e. international investment), and in

other cases simply by exporting their products (i.e. international trade). Indeed, due to

these similarities, many trade treaties also regulate foreign direct investment.7

Despite these similarities, the ways in which the ideational interplay is being managed

under these two organizations differ. While the WTO presents a relatively activist approach

with respect to its interaction with environmental institutions, the ECTs approach seems to

be much more restricted, both in scope and in mandate. As the ECT is currently striving to

increase its interaction with environmental regimes (most notably with respect to climate

change; ECT Road Map 2010), the model presented by the WTO can serve as a useful point

of departure on which the ECT (and other organizations) can base its efforts.

3.2 Secretariats

The first actors to be reviewed in this paper are organizations secretariats. The ability of

secretariats to influence policies and affect decision-making processes has been studied by

academics over the past 20 years (e.g. Depledge 2006b; Andersen and Skjrseth 1999;

Bauer 2006). In the following part, secretariats role as actors in the cognitive interaction/

ideational interplay process is reviewed. It is argued in this part that, at least theoretically,

secretariats can serve as intermediaries or drivers of influence between institutions, most

notably due to their ability to produce knowledge and facilitate cross-disciplinary dialogue.

3.2.1 Secretariats bureaucratic authority

Secretariats are bureaucratic entities. As such, they are usually deprived of any explicit

political and decision-making powers and at least theoretically should not be in a position

to affect the outcome of negotiations. Secretariats influence, however, can be derived from

other sources. Some authors attribute secretariats of IGOs with bureaucratic authority

(Bauer 2006; Barnett and Finnemore 2005), an implicit form of power, which originates

from secretariats technical and scientific expertise, diplomatic experience, and their

control over the flow of information within, from, and into institutions (Bauer 2006;

Barnett and Finnemore 2005). Secretariats bureaucratic authority, therefore, enables

them to impact the negotiating parties and affect the designing of international laws.

Barnett and Finnemore divide bureaucratic authority into three categories (Barnett and

Finnemore 2005, 2004). Firstly, delegated authority is the authority explicitly granted to

organizations in their mandate. For example, in some cases, secretariats are requested to

inform the Member States on the issues being negotiated, and even to suggest ideas and

proposals (Depledge 2006b). Through such tasks, secretariats are in a position to educate,

6 See critique on the regulation of investment law in general in Sornarajah (2006) and more specifically onthe ECT, in Sussman (2010). For discussion on the interaction between international trade law and sus-tainable development, see Gehring and Cordonier Segger (2005).7 See for example the Energy Charter Treaty or the North American Free Trade Agreement.


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inform, and consequently also influence the negotiating parties preferences. According to

some, even where only administrative or procedural functions have been delegated [such as

agenda management or control over the participation of external actors (NGOs, experts,

etc.)], the secretariats work may still affect and shape the parameters of the substantive

negotiations (Depledge 2006b, p. 55).

The second category is the secretariats moral authority, namely the authority derived

from the fact that organizations represent the Member States and are supposed to promote

their treatys goals and defend those relevant values promoted and supported by all

Member States. Secretariats in this respect are the representatives of the communitys

interests or the defender of the values of the international community (Barnett and

Finnemore 2004, p. 23) and are thereby conceived to be acting with moral authority.

Lastly, secretariats expert authority is derived from the technical and institutional

knowledge possessed by those who staff international organizations. In the context of

secretariats, this authority is often mentioned with respect to their ability to produce

information and control the flow of information into and from institutions. Institutions

secretariats have indeed been referred to by some as the motor of both internal and

external information flows and as knowledge brokers (Oberthur 2009). As mentioned by

Jinnah, expert authority is especially meaningful where secretariats are better equipped

than Member States to perform knowledge-related tasks, as their ability to convince

states increases in such cases (Jinnah 2010, p. 60).

Secretariats authority can be applied not only officially (by producing information, for

example), but also unofficially. If equipped with charismatic and active leadership, sec-

retariats can influence institutions activity behind the scenes (Bauer 2006). With respect

to the WTO secretariat and its influence over the work of the Committee on Trade and

Environment (CTE), one developing country state-delegate (interviewed by Jinnah)

remarked: The secretariat has backdoor influence through influencing the Chair; this

happens to a great extent (Jinnah 2010, p. 66). The delegate gave the example of the

secretariats influence over setting the issues discussed by the committee.

In the following part, it will be explained that the secretariats of the WTO and the ECT

indeed possess bureaucratic authority and that such authority is being applied, to a certain

extent, in order to integrate environmental perspectives and information into these orga-

nizations activities.

3.2.2 The WTO secretariat

The WTO secretariats official role (or its delegated authority) includes, inter alia,

technical and professional support for the various councils and committees, to provide

technical assistance for developing countries [] and to provide information to thepublic and the media [] (WTO website a). The WTO secretariat deals with knowledge-related tasks, such as research, communication with Member States and external bodies,

and technical support.8 In this respect, the WTO secretariat indeed resembles a motor of

both internal and external information flows (Oberthur 2009, p. 378).

With respect to the interaction between trade and environmental protection, the sec-

retariats Trade and Environment Division (TED) provides WTO Member States with

technical assistance, reports on trade-related activity conducted under other institutions

[mostly multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)], and maintains dialogue with

8 See for example reports produced by the WTO secretariat, e.g. Tamiotti et al. (2009); See also eventsorganized by the WTO secretariat, e.g. WTO Website (2010).

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NGOs and the private sector (WTO website 2013b). To this end, TEDs functions can

indeed be seen as those of a knowledge broker or as an importer of environmental

knowledge into the trading system.

TEDs activity has undeniably influenced Member States during the years (Jinnah

2010). For example, as explained by Jinnah, TED has assisted states to overcome domestic

policy incoherencies by providing trade representatives with knowledge about environ-

mental institutions and their activity. This was achieved, inter alia, via the preparation of

reports and the provision of technical support. The knowledge transferred by TED can be

seen as a good example where the secretariat, through its expert capacity, has contributed

to shaping trade representatives understanding of environmental problems and the inter-

action these may have with international trade (Jinnah 2010, p. 64).

Beyond the expert, and delegated authorities described above, in recent years, the

WTOs secretariat has also attempted to develop some level of leadership with respect to

the relationship between trade and environment. In the past, as mentioned by the authors of

the Sutherland Report, the WTO secretariat tended to view its role as solely one of

support, not of initiative or even institutional defence of the WTO system (Sutherland

et al. 2004, p. 73). The authors of the Sutherland Report contrasted the WTO secretariat to

the leadership presented by past Director Generals of the GATT, who were sometimes

regarded virtually as spiritual leaders of the system (Sutherland et al. 2004, p. 74).

However, since the publication of the Sutherland Report in 2005, WTO officials, most

notably former Director General Lamy, have been far less timid. An outstanding example

of Lamys active approach with respect to the relationship between environmental pro-

tection and trade can be found in his speech titled Climate First, Trade Second: GATTzilla

is Long Gone, which opened with the following words (Lamy 2009):

In 2007, I attended the Trade Ministers meeting in Bali on the relationship between

trade and climate change. In Bali, I sent a simple message: climate first, and trade

second. And that message still stands today. It was, and continues to be, a message

that is designed to uphold the Copenhagen Climate Summit at the end of this year.

By explicitly prioritizing climate change over trade, an approach far from that of many

WTO Member States, it can be seen that the timidness complained about by the

Sutherland Report can hardly be attributed to its current leadership. More recent literature

does in fact mention the influence administered by the WTO secretariat (e.g. Jinnah 2010;

Schaffer 2005), which is now described by some as an active participant that member

states depend on to help shape this area [trade and environment AK] of WTO governance

(Jinnah 2010, p. 62).

3.2.3 The Energy Charter Secretariat

The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is a multilateral international organization (comprised

of 51 Member States and 24 additional states with observer status) which aims to promote

cooperation in energy-related issues. It includes provisions on investment protection, trade,

energy transit, and energy efficiency. The ECTs secretariat is staffed by experts in the field

of energy, and its main function includes administrative support, monitoring the imple-

mentation of the Treaty by its Member States, providing expert information (reports,

analysis), and representing the ECT in its relations with external bodies.9 At least

9 See ECT secretariat website, under activities.


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theoretically, all three components of secretariats bureaucratic authority (delegated,

moral, and expertise) can be found in the work of the ECTs secretariat.

The ECTs secretariat acts as a knowledge broker in producing information con-

cerning the interaction between the ECT and climate change. The ECT secretariat reviews

policies applied by states concerning energy efficiency (ECT Secretariat 2008) and iden-

tifies successful policies and barriers in this field. By doing so, it allows other states to learn

from the reviewed states experience and improve their performance. The ECT secretariat

also reviews developments in new climate-friendly technologies (ECT Secretariat 2009a)

and provides states with alternatives for the regulation of these new technologies.10

Because the ECT secretariat also represents the ECT in its relations with other institutions

(ECT Secretariat 2011),11 it therefore also maintains some level of control over the

information imported into this institution from others.

The ECT secretariat can also attempt to influence the ECTs agenda by proposing the

fields on which it should concentrate. With respect to climate change, the secretariat

suggested in its 2011 Work Programme to continue its work in the fields of technology

transfer, trade in clean energy technologies and goods, and to promote experience sharing

(ECT Secretariat 2011, p. 11). An active approach is also noticeable in the ECT secre-

tariats proposal to stimulate cooperation between states through the exchange of infor-

mation in the field of energy efficiency in order to enhance the process of learning (ECT

Secretariat 2012, p. 13).

Another example of the ECT secretariats contribution to interdisciplinary dialogue can

be found in events organized by the secretariat, such as the ECT Annual Policy Confer-

ence, in which the voices and perspectives of representatives from other organizations are

being heard. For instance, in the 2011 event, representatives from the UNCTAD, the

European Development Bank, and from academia and private industry were invited to

present their views.12 Their presentations concentrated on, among other themes, climate

change-related issues such as low-carbon investment and renewable energies.13

The ECT secretariats role as a knowledge broker with the power to impact the

integration of the green economy within the ECT was emphasized recently, when it was

requested by the Member States to research the interaction between the ECT investment

protection regime and climate change (ECT Road Map 2010). As part of its (2012) Work

Programme, the secretariat undertook to engage in the further assessment of investment

protection provisions and to examine how these provisions could support climate change

policies (ECT Secretariat 2012, p. 19). Among other efforts, the ECT secretariat has

commissioned a thorough study on this topic from a distinguished academic.14

3.2.4 Secretariats: conclusion

To conclude, it can be seen that both the WTO and the ECT secretariats enjoy some level

of bureaucratic authority due to their delegated work, their expertise, and their active

approach in ensuring that environmental language is not absent from the economic

10 See below on the activity of the PEEREA Working Group.11 See also the ECT secretariat website, online: ECT http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=45; Accessed8 July (2013).12 For programme and presentation, see online: ECT\http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=465&L=0[.13 See presentations by James Wilson and Gianpiero Nacci, ibid.14 In an interview conducted with members of the ECT secretariat on 23 April (2012), it was mentioned thatProfessor Peter Cameroon was commissioned by the ECT secretariat to perform such research.

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http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=45http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=465&L=0

discussion that takes place within these institutions. Secretariats, it can be understood, can

serve as drivers of influence and information and possibly even lead to a change in the

perspectives of the Member States operating within economic organizations.

It should be noted, however, that due to restrictions such as the lack of resources and a

limited mandate from the institutions Member States (as seems to be the case mostly with

smaller secretariats, such as the ECT secretariat), the activity of secretariats if often

restricted.15 Furthermore, the limited time and resources that secretariats can dedicate for

cross-disciplinary issues are often divided on a wide range of topics. Secretariats work on

issues which are not directly related to their institutions main goal, therefore, can at times

be regarded as superficial or anecdotal.

Member States increased awareness of organizations capabilities to support the

implementation of the principle of integration can improve this state of affairs, especially if

such awareness will lead to the allocation of resources and an increased delegated

authority with respect to secretariats work on cross-disciplinary issues that are related to

other policy areas. For instance, Member States can allocate special funds for cross-

disciplinary studies, for the organization of cross-disciplinary events (e.g. conferences, side

events, etc.), or even for hiring secretariat staff that will work exclusively on cross-

disciplinary issues. Member States can also instruct secretariats to identify those elements

of the green economy most relevant to the institutions work and accordingly invest some

of their resources towards the research of such intersections.

3.3 Subsidiary bodies

Another channel through which influence can flow and cross-disciplinary dialogue can be

facilitated is subsidiary bodies, agencies, and subcommittees, established by some insti-

tutions in order to focus on specific issues relating to interplay management. The activity of

these divisions can be seen as enabling interplay management (Oberthur 2009, p. 377), as

they often act as forums in which representatives from other institutions explain their

perspectives and attempt to convince actors from the host institution to modify their

preferences, with the aim of impacting the host institutions laws. Furthermore, on some

occasions, these divisions also act unilaterally by producing information concerning the

intersection between the different fields and even drafting policy recommendations. In the

following section, several examples in which institutional interaction is taking place via

subsidiary bodies established by the WTO and the ECT will be reviewed.

3.3.1 WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE)

The WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) was established in 1994 in order

(inter alia) to identify the relationship between trade measures and environmental mea-

sures [] and make appropriate recommendations [] (WTO 1994). In 2001, the CTEwas requested to focus its efforts on three topics: (1) the relationship between environ-

mental requirements and market access, (2) elements related to intellectual property and

the TRIPS agreement, and (3) labelling requirements for environmental purposes (WTO

2001, para 32). As part of its work, the CTE facilitates communication between envi-

ronmental institutions and the WTO in several capacities. For example, the CTE has

invited several secretariats of MEAs (including from institutions such as CITES, CBD,

15 This point was raised by secretariat officials in an interview conducted by the author.


123

UNCLOS, and the UNFCCC) to participate in joint sessions (WTO CTE 2007, p. 45).

These sessions, it should be noted, were mostly informative in nature.

The CTEs work also supports the discourse between the WTO and other actors, such as

states and NGOs. For example, the CTE receives submissions from Member States con-

cerning the interaction between climate change and trade, often leading to discussions

among the Member States (e.g. WTO CTE 2011). The CTE also facilitates dialogue with

civil-society organizations, allowing their voice and perspectives to be heard.

Opinion concerning the effectiveness of the CTEs work seems to be divided. Some

researchers claim that the CTEs work is key to the institutional interplay between the

WTO and other institutions. For example, Stokke and Coffey argue that at least on some

occasions, the CTEs role in the cognitive interaction process was successful. They

mention in this respect the fact that FAO officials have successfully raised awareness for

sustainable fishing and its relation to subsidies through their participation in CTE meet-

ings.16 Others have positively mentioned the cooperation made through the CTE between

the WTO and institutions such as the CITES (Lanchbery 2006, p. 164), the WHO, and the

Codex Alimentarius (Cossy and Marceau 2009, p. 375).

In an interview conducted by the author, an official of the UNEP commented with

respect to the CTEs effectiveness that, despite being less dynamic than it used to be, it is

still the only venue for continuous discussion on the relationship between trade and the

environment, and as such, it is unique and important.

But not all consider the work of the CTE to be a story of success. Several authors have

described the outcomes of the cooperation achieved under the CTE as weak, too general

and inconclusive, and as lacking in any substantive results (Palmer et al. 2006; Gabler

2010). In the authors view, those criticizing the CTEs effectiveness are doing so based on

the CTEs failure to impact WTO laws with respect to environmental issues. It should be

emphasized, however, that, as mentioned in the Introduction to this article, when dis-

cussing ideational interplay, the lack of change in the target institutions output in itself

should not necessarily reflect a failure. For example, it is possible that, despite the exis-

tence of a successful learning process, the acquired knowledge did not affect the institu-

tions outcome as the trade-offs embedded in accepting this new knowledge were not

accepted by the Members States. The failure of the WTO Member States to agree on the

issue of environmental goods and services (EGS), for instance, can be attributed to many

commercially related disagreements, but hardly to the lack of environmental knowledge, or

for not understanding EGS contribution to environmental goals. By establishing the CTE

as a forum for discussion, the WTO Member States have ensured that a dialogue will take

place. The CTEs work therefore should be regarded as successful at least in this respect.

3.3.2 The WTO working group on trade and transfer of technology

The need for technology transfer, its relevancy to trade, and its general importance for

development were all recognized by the WTO Member States in the 2001 WTO Minis-

terial Declaration (the Doha Declaration; WTO 2001, para 37; WTO 2005, para 43).

Following the Doha Declaration, the working group on trade and transfer of technology

(WGTTT) was established as a forum in which the relationship between international

trade and technology transfer could be examined. The work of the WGTTT includes the

analysis of the relationship between trade and technology transfer, and the production of

16 The reader should note that WTOs rules, however, did not change. See Stokke and Coffey (2006).

A. Kent

123

recommendations concerning how to increase technology transfer, mainly to developing

countries (WGTTT 2011).

The WGTTT serves as an important forum for cross-disciplinary dialogue. For example,

the WGTTT works closely with, and is highly influenced by, other organizations. In past

WGTTT reports, the output (reports, presentations, etc.) of organizations such as the

UNCTAD, UNIDO, FAO, UN ECOSOC (WGTTT 2009), and the World Bank (WGTTT

2008) were mentioned as important and supportive for the work of the WGTTT. More

recently, the WGTTT 2010 report mentioned that the work of the WGTTT in this year was

largely based on presentations and reports submitted by the Food and Agriculture Orga-

nization (FAO) and the UNCTAD (WGTTT 2011, para 34, WGTTT 2010). It was

further mentioned that due to their satisfaction with these organizations involvement,

Member States have requested that similar contributions from other institutions should also

be made in the future.

With respect to the FAOs presentation, the WGTTT 2010 report mentioned that it had

highlighted the positive linkage between the technology transfer and the gains in trade and

productivity and that it contributed specialized information (WGTTT 2010, para 7). With

respect to the UNCTADs presentation [based on a report produced by this organization

(UNCTAD 2010)], it was stated in the WGTTT 2010 report that it generated a useful

discussion, raised key issues, and suggested specific recommendations (WGTTT 2010,

para 1718). The WGTTT 2010 report also expressed the Member States disappointment

with the OECDs inability to make a presentation before the WGTTT (WGTTT 2010,

para 22) and suggested that other relevant organizations, such as the UNEP (with respect to

technology transfer provisions in MEAs) and WIPO contribute similar presentation in the

future (WGTTT 2010, para 2324). In general, it seems that the WTO Member States were

very satisfied by the cross-disciplinary dialogue facilitated by the WGTTT, and indeed,

much of the WGTTT 2010 report was dedicated to this issue.

It is interesting to note that despite the obvious relevancy, the issue of climate change

does not seem to play a central role in the work of the WGTTT. The documents produced

by the WGTTT hardly mention climate change, and the presentations made by guest

organizations (at least according to descriptions provided in WGTTT documents) did not

address this issue either. On the other hand, the WGTTT did request the participation of the

UNEP in order to discuss technology transfer-related issues and their relevancy to MEAs.

It is possible therefore that climate change-related issues will be discussed in the future

within this forum and that such discussion will be framed by input produced by envi-

ronmental organizations, such as the UNFCCC or the UNEP.

3.3.3 The ECTs working group on energy efficiency and related environmental aspects

The ECTs working group on energy efficiency and related environmental aspects (also

known as the Energy Charter Protocol on energy efficiency and related environmental

aspects working group or the PEEREA working group) is a sub-institutional body,

established in order to hold discussions and cooperate on issues relating mostly to energy

efficiency. The PEEREA Working Group serves as an important forum for debate and

exchange of information and experience. Furthermore, the PEEREA Working Group is

also engaged in research, producing Member States reviews as well as thematic reports.17

17 For a list of studies produced by the PEEREA Working Group see online: ECT\http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=41&L=0L %200 %2041%200%200%2016%20067673%200673 [ .


123

http://www.encharter.org/indexhttp://www.encharter.org/index

The PEEREA Working Group also serves as a forum for communication with other IGOs,

mostly in the field of energy (for example, IEA, IPEEC; ECT Secretariat 2011, p. 15).

The role of the PEEREA and its capacity to enhance interplay management between the

ECT and external institutions has recently been defined by the ECT Member States as an

objective and should be developed further in the future. In the 2010 ECT Road Map for

the modernization of the energy charter process (ECT Road Map), the ECT Member

States requested with respect to energy efficiency that (ECT Road Map 2010, p. 8):

[A]ctivities within the Charter be developed in partnership with other international

organisations to ensure constructive synergies and avoidance of overlap. Cooperation

with other organisations working on matters related to the work of PEEREA needs to

be developed in a winwin context looking to maximise the effects of current

activities within each organisation.

The ECT Road Map suggests in this respect that common areas of interest and criteria for

cooperation should be identified and that models of cooperation (including joint events

and joint reports) should be explored (ECT Road Map 2010, p. 8).

To conclude, the PEEREA, like the WTO CTE, is engaging in some level of ideational

interplay. It both produces information and maintains relationships with other IGOs. The

PEEREAs limited mandate, however, restricts this interplay in terms of both scope (only

energy efficiency is currently explored) and partners. The lack of dialogue with environ-

mental institutions is noteworthy in this respect.

3.3.4 Subsidiary bodies: conclusion

From the above review, it can be seen that by establishing specialized subdivisions,

international institutions can enhance interplay management. Most notably, these subdi-

visions support ideational interplay or cognitive interaction, either by producing infor-

mation relevant to the interaction between the host institutions work and its impact on

other fields or by serving as a forum for dialogue with external experts and institutions. The

capacity to conduct interplay management and enhance cognitive interaction, therefore,

definitely seems to exist. The WGTTTs example in this respect is perhaps the most

striking, as it appears that inter-organizational cooperation is not only actively sought by

this agency, but on some occasions has also dictated its agenda.

With respect to the promotion of the implementation of the sustainable development

principle of integration, however, several aspects seem to limit the effectiveness of the

examined subsidiary bodies. Most notably, on some occasions, the choice of partners

seems to be problematic. In the case of the PEEREA WG for example, the participation of

MEAs (most notably of climate change organizations) is rather limited. It should be noted,

however, that the fault in these cases should not be attributed only to the host organi-

zation, as guest organizations are not always inclined to accept invitations (see above

discussion on the WGTTT WG), often due to their own time and resource limitations.

3.4 Horizontal inter-institutional cooperation

Another tool by which interplay management can be enhanced is official horizontal

cooperation, often regulated in agreements between international organizations. These

agreements may provide for, inter alia, the conducting of joint meetings between insti-

tutions officials, regulate the granting of observer status, or facilitate the collaboration

between institutions secretariats and technical assistance. In short, such inter-institutional

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123

cooperation can facilitate the flow of technical knowledge and perspectives between

institutions and ensure that a multitude of interests and perspectives are being discussed

within the walls of specialized organizations.

3.4.1 Inter-institutional cooperation: WTO

The official horizontal cooperation model is not new in the field of international economic

law. Horizontal cooperation has indeed been mentioned in the past, in historical contexts

such as the proposed 1948 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (The

Havana Charter; ITO 1948a), under which drafts of cooperation agreements between the

proposed International Trade Organization (ITO) and other international organizations,

such as the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Food and

Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), were prepared (ITO 1948b).

The WTO seems to follow the Havana Charters approach concerning inter-institutional

cooperation. The WTO is currently cooperating with 69 organizations, which include

financial, environmental, and social organizations.18 The WTO has also signed several

cooperation agreements, inter alia, with the UN, WIPO, and the UNCTAD (WIPO-WTO

1995; UN-WTO 1995; UNCTAD-WTO 2003). The cooperation between the WTO and

other institutions is mostly focussed on five fields: research, statistics, development,

technical assistance, and capacity building (WTO Report by the Director General 2011).

Perhaps most notably, the WTO maintains a close working relationship with the other

Bretton-Woods institutions: the IMF and the World Bank. As part of Article III of the

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (Marrakesh Agree-

ment), the WTO Member States have decided that (WTO Marrakesh Agreement 1994):

With a view to achieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making, the

WTO shall cooperate, as appropriate, with the International Monetary Fund and with

the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and its affiliated

agencies.

Consequently, cooperation agreements between these organizations were signed in order to

increase coherency in policies and cooperation (WTO, IMF, and World Bank 1996). The

three organizations cooperate on several levels. For example, the World Bank and the IMF

actively participate in WTO technical assistance and capacity-building activities. They also

conduct trade-related research and policy analysis, and the secretariats of all three

organizations are engaged in information and data exchange (Auboin 2007; IMF Factsheet

2013). Furthermore, secretariats staff members (including high officials) meet regularly in

order to discuss cooperation between these organizations. This cooperation, according to

Auboin (a WTO secretariat official), has proved, by and large, to be an effective

framework for the expansion of activities, programmes, and initiatives conducted by the

three institutions at staff level, aimed at promoting coherence in global economic

policymaking (Auboin 2007).

With respect to cooperation with other institutions, Article V of the WTO Agreement

instructs the WTO General Council to pursue effective cooperation with institutions that

have responsibilities related to those of the WTO (WTO Marrakesh Agreement 1994). As

mentioned above, cooperation agreements were concluded between the WTO and several

other institutions, most notably the UN, the UNCTAD, and WIPO. The agreement with the

18 A list of these organizations can be found in the Annex to WTO Report by the Director General (2011).


123

UN, for example, includes provisions on exchange of information, reciprocal representa-

tion in institutions meetings, and cooperation between secretariats. These agreements may

also instruct the parties to meet regularly. For example, the memorandum of understanding

between the UNCTAD and the WTO prescribes, inter alia, the conducting of regular

meetings between the heads of both organizations (every 6 months), and also between

officials from lower levels (no less than four times per year; UNCTAD-WTO 2003).

With respect to environmental institutions, the collaboration between the WTO and

MEAs secretariats was defined under the Doha round of negotiations as one of the three main

environment-related themes on which negotiations should focus (WTO 2001, para 31(2)).

Consequently, the WTO is now cooperating with several MEAs in a number of capacities

(WTO CTE 2007). Examples of inter-institutional cooperation are side events, as well as

technical assistance workshops organized by the WTO during MEAs COP meetings or as part

of regional seminars, in which trade rules are explained and information is exchanged (WTO

CTE 2007, p. 6). Regional seminars also have additional benefits in this respect, as the WTO

encourages states to send representatives from trade and environment ministries in order to

overcome domestic fragmentation in domestic decision-making processes.

3.4.2 Inter-institutional cooperation: the Energy Charter Treaty

The ECT cooperates with several institutions. Most notably, ten international organizations

possess observer status with the ECT,19 according to which they have the right to attend

meetings of the ECT governing body (the Energy Charter Conference) and its subsidiary

groups. These organizations are also entitled to receive relevant information from the

ECT.20 As part of this cooperation, the ECT secretariat organized an event in 2011 under

the WTO Public Forum on the topic of International Governance of Energy Trade, in

which the need for inter-institutional cooperation between these two organizations was

emphasized ECT Secretariat (2009b).21

With respect to energy efficiency, the majority of inter-institutional cooperation is

taking place under the PEEREA (ECT Secretariat 2011, p. 15). Despite the fact that the

ECTs Member States are recalling the UNFCCC in the preamble to the ECT, the

UNFCCC does not have an observer status with the ECT. Interestingly, however, climate

change issues can also be raised through cooperation with non-climate change organiza-

tions. In the above-mentioned event organized as part of the cooperation between the WTO

and the ECT for example, the participation of academics, like Professor Thomas Cottier in

this specific event, did lead to some discussion on this issue.22

The Member States of the ECT, it should be noted, have stated their will to see

increased inter-institutional cooperation in the future. For example, one of the objectives

stated in the 2010 ECT Road Map for the modernization of the Energy Charter process

(ECT Road Map) was defined as follows (ECT Road Map 2010, p. 8):

Member states have requested that activities within the Charter be developed in

partnership with other international organisations to ensure constructive synergies

19 The ASEAN, BASREC, BSEC, CIS Electric Power Council, EBRD, IEA, OECD, UN-ECE, WorldBank, and the WTO.20 See online: ECT \http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=18[.21 For information on this event, see the ECT website, http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=548&L=0.Accessed 9 July 2013. See in particular the opinion of Professor Peter Cameron.22 See Professor Cottiers presentation at this event online: \http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Conferences/2011_Sept/Prof_Thomas_Cottier_WTI.pdf[.

A. Kent

123

http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=18http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=548&L=0http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Conferences/2011_Sept/Prof_Thomas_Cottier_WTI.pdfhttp://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Conferences/2011_Sept/Prof_Thomas_Cottier_WTI.pdf

and avoidance of overlap. Cooperation with other organisations working on matters

related to the work of PEEREA needs to be developed in a winwin context looking

to maximise the effects of current activities within each organisation.

As an output of this objective, it was indicated that common areas of interest and

criteria for cooperation should be identified. It was further stated that forms of cooperation

may include suitable modules of cooperation, such as hosting joint events, producing joint

or complimentary reports, exchanging deliverables in support of each others work or using

each others communication networks to progress on own agendas; [] Practical andmutually agreeable options, including the necessary political and technical arrangements,

to explore synergies between the Energy Charter and the IEA/OECD [] (ECT RoadMap 2010, p. 8). The goal of extending inter-institutional cooperation is also mentioned in

the ECT secretariat Work Programme for 2012 (ECT Secretariat 2012, p. 2).

3.4.3 Inter-institutional cooperation: conclusion

Cooperation agreements follow the joint interplay management model (Oberthur 2009,

p. 375) and represent active, official, and mutual efforts to create policy synergies between

institutions from more than one issue area. While the level of a cooperation-agreements

effectiveness depends on its scope, it can be seen that, at least potentially, these agreements

can facilitate interplay management by creating a fixed, ongoing framework for dialogue,

and exchange of information.

Cooperation agreements can be regarded as a higher level of interplay management than

the other models reviewed above for several reasons. Firstly, they represent a mutual,

reciprocal effort, rather than a unilateral attempt to manage the interplay. Most of the other

channels reviewed in this part, it should be noted, are controlled by the host institution and

accordingly designed to answer its own interests, while other institutions are considered as

unequal guests who may speak only upon invitation. Cooperation agreements in this

respect grant other institutions certain contractual rights to participate. While the exact

scope of these rights depends on the specific agreements, they may include different types

of observer status, regular meetings, joint research, and (as seen in the proposed ITO

agreements) even the possibility to suggest agenda items.

Furthermore, cooperation agreements can generate stable, ongoing relationships. This

kind of working environment is advantageous for two reasons. Firstly, it enables the parties

to raise their issues of mutual concern on a regular basis and maintain constant dialogue.

This form of communication allows for better continuity and more detailed discussions

than those achieved in random presentations before sub-institutional committees or in side

events conducted by secretariat members. Such regular cooperation may also enhance

personal relationships between the institutions staff and support networks of experts from

different fields.

Lastly, officials from the WTO and the ECT that were interviewed by the author

emphasized the expertise possessed by secretariat officials from other institutions as

contributive to the interplay management process. It was mentioned that as secretariat

officials from economic institutions are first and foremost experts in issues such as trade

(WTO) or energy (ECT), other secretariats expertise has been useful for tasks such as

informing delegates and the preparation of joint studies23.

23 Interview conducted with officials of the ECT secretariat on 23 April 2012 and with an official from theWTO on 4 July 2012.


123

4 Conclusion: institutional interplay via international organizations

To conclude, there is no doubt that IGOs can play an important role in the implementation

of the principle of integration by supporting the promotion of cross-disciplinary thinking

and facilitating interdisciplinary dialogue. Through ideational/cognitive interplay, negoti-

ating parties are better informed about the full impact that the laws they are about to

conclude may have and are better positioned to understand the real trade-offs embedded in

promoting their goals on the international arena. The tools reviewed in this paper, even

when not leading to an actual change in the target institutions laws, at least bring foreign

perspectives into the consideration of the target institutions Member States and therefore

should be regarded as effective.

The current absence of organizational structure in many fields, most notably in inter-

national investment law,24 inhibits attempts to penetrate investment regimes, as it limits

the channels through which cross-disciplinary issues can be discussed. Indeed, the vast

majority of investment treaties do not address environmental or social issues at all or only

address these issues on a very limited level. The example of the ECT, however, reveals

some aptitude for interplay management in this organization. While at the moment the

ECT engages with other institutions only in a very limited capacity (this is true especially

concerning MEAs), in light of the above-mentioned developments (especially those con-

cerning the activity of the ECT secretariat) and the content of the ECT Roadmap, this state

of affairs could well change in the future.

The WTO, on the other hand, seems to engage in interplay management in a more

developed manner. Supported by the mandate given by the Doha Declaration,25 its sec-

retariat is relatively active with respect to the trade and environment interaction; it possess

several committees which serve as forums for cross-disciplinary discussions and learning

and is cooperating with other institutions to a certain extent. Even its dispute settlement

body, notoriously known for rejecting the submissions of amicus curiae briefs (mostly

intended to comment on environmental matters), has recently taken a step towards a more

open approach by allowing a university and an NGO to intervene in the Tuna-Dolphin

dispute (Tuna-Dolphin dispute 2011).

The models described in this chapter are not without fault. But as the ECTs Member

States expressed their will to improve elements related to interplay management (also with

environmental institutions),26 the channels presented above can nevertheless serve as

point-of-departure models, upon which better tools for interplay management can be

designed. The way forward in this respect should start with Member States acknowl-

edgement of the important role IGOs can play in this process, most notably by allocating

appropriate resources and by providing a clear and wide mandate for organizations staff

with respect these activities. Academic research can also play an important role in the

future development of this field, mostly through researching the effectiveness of the dif-

ferent models and suggesting additional, improved models through which IGOs can

facilitate cross-disciplinary dialogue.

24 The field of International Investment Law is founded on over than 2750 bilateral investment treaties,mostly with no organizational backup. Past attempts to create a multilateral international organization in thisfield, most notably by the OECD and the WTO, were rejected.25 Officials interviewed by the author specifically mention the Doha Declarations mandate as an importantelement of the successful cooperation between the WTO and the UNEP. Interview conducted with anofficial of the UNEP secretariat on 26 July 2012.26 ECT Road Map (2010).

A. Kent

123

This conclusion is valid not only for the ECT or for economic institutions in general, but

also for any institution in which the will to integrate policies from other policy areas exists.

The ideational interplay model of interaction reflects the exchange of information, an act

that can support any attempt to improve the interplay management between any two or

more institutions. As such, the experience of the WTO and the ECT in the application of

the channels presented above is of interest not only for economic institutions, but for any

institution wishing to implement the principle of integration.

Acknowledgments This paper is based on the authors PhD research work, funded by the CambridgeOverseas Trust. The author would like to thank Michael Kent, Cairo Robb, and Elizabeth Campbell for theirediting assistance.

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