Improving drought response in pastoral areas of Ethiopia

8/13/2019 Improving drought response in pastoral areas of Ethiopia

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Improving droughtresponse in pastoralareas of EthiopiaSomali and Afar Regions and Borena

Zone of Oromiya RegionSara Pantuliano and Mike Wekesa

Humanitarian Policy GroupOverseas Development Institute, London

Prepared for the CORE group(CARE, FAO, Save the Children UK and Save the Children US)

January 2008

hpgHumanitarian

Policy Group


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About the authorsSara Pantuliano is a Research Fellow with the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas DevelopmentInstitute (ODI).

Mike Wekesa is a Senior Consultant at Kesarine and Associates.

AcknowledgementsThe authors would like to thank the staff of the four agencies which commissioned and supported this studyfor their input throughout the research in-country, particularly Getachew Demesa and Mirafe Solomon (Savethe Children US), Geraud Laval (Save the Children UK), Gedlu Mekonnen and Gijs VantKlooster (FAO) andAbay Bekele and Cary Farley (CARE). Adrian Cullis (Save the Children US) deserves special mention for thetime and energy invested in initiating and designing the study and supporting every dimension of theresearch.

The authors would also like to extend their gratitude to the many people who contributed in numerous waysto the study, including research support, provision of documents and materials and revisions of earlier drafts.Particular thanks to Yakob Aklilu and Andy Catley (Tufts University), Ingo Wiederhofer (World Bank),Mathewos Hunde and Dagninet Yimenu (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development), Mesfin Arega

(PCDP), Getachew Gebru (ILRI), Beruk Yemane (Oxfam), SeonYeon Im (WFP), Jane Mcaskill (FEG), Seydou Dia(UNICEF), John Graham (USAID) and Lammert Zwaagstra (ECHO). We are particularly grateful to the people ofAfar and Somali regions as well as those of Borena Zone in Oromiya region for participating in this study byproviding local knowledge and experience of the drought. Key informants in Addis Ababa, Afar and Somaliregions and Borena zone gave generously of their time to be interviewed, for which the authors are mostgrateful.

Finally, the authors wish to thank CARE, FAO Ethiopia, Save the Children UK and Save the Children US forproviding financial support to the study. Save the Children US deserves particular gratitude for the logisticalsupport provided to the study team.


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ContentsContents ................ ................... .................. ................... .................. ................... .................. ................ 1Acronyms .................. .................. ................... .................. ................... ................... .................. ............. 3Introduction and methodology ................ .................. ................. .................. .................. .................. ...... 51. Pastoralism, vulnerability and drought .................. .................. .................. .................. ................. ...... 6

1.1 Livelihood systems in pastoral areas................. .................. .................. .................. ................... ... 61.1.1 Livelihoods in Oromiya Region ............................................................................................................ 61.1.2 Livelihoods in Somali Region .............................................................................................................. 71.1.2 Livelihoods in Somali Region .............................................................................................................. 81.1.3 Livelihoods in Afar Region ................................................................................................................... 81.2 Pastoralists risk .......................................................................................................................... 81.3 Risk management strategies .................. ................... .................. ................... .................. ............. 91.4 Underlying causes of vulnerability in pastoral areas ................. ................... ................... ............. 10

2. The response to the 2005/2006 drought............... .................. .................. .................. .................. .... 112.1 Introduction................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. .................... 112.2 Overview of the drought response... .................. ................. .................. .................. .................... . 122.2.1 Timeliness......................................................................................................................................... 122.2.2 Appropriateness................................................................................................................................ 132.3 Pastoralist perceptions of the response ................. ................. .................. ................. ................. 142.4 Saving lives through livelihoods: quantifying the benefits of livelihood-support interventions . ..... 15

3. The current response system ................. .................. ................... ................... .................. ................. 173.1 Drought Cycle Management ................. .................. .................. .................. .................. ............... 173.2 The institutional framework for drought management in Ethiopia .................. .................. ............. 183.3 The Drought Early Warning System ................... .................. ................... .................. ................... . 183.4 Contingency planning and financing ................ .................. ................. .................. .................. .... 213.4.1 The National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Fund ................................................................. 213.4.2 The Pastoral Community Development Project................................................................................... 22

3.4.3 The Pastoral Livelihoods Initiative ..................................................................................................... 223.4.4 The Pastoral Productive Safety Nets .................................................................................................. 223.4.6 Other contingency funds ................................................................................................................... 233.4.7 The Humanitarian Response Fund ..................................................................................................... 23

4. Towards an improved response: key issues for consideration ................. .................. ................... ...... 254.1 Contingency planning, politics and institutions .............. ................... ................... ................... .... 254.2 Capacity issues .................. ................... .................. ................... ................... ................... .......... 254.3 Coordination................... .................. .................. .................. .................. .................. ................. 274.3.1 Initiatives for pastoralists: PLI, PCDP and PCI .................................................................................... 274.3.2 Government coordination.................................................................................................................. 274.3.3 UN coordination and the cluster approach ........................................................................................ 28

4.3.4 Donor coordination ........................................................................................................................... 285. The policy environment ................ ................... ................... .................. ................... .................. ....... 295.1 Government policies .................................................................................................................. 295.2 Donor policies.......... .................. .................. .................. .................. ................... ................... .... 296. Conclusions .................................................................................................................................... 336.1 An agenda for policy change .................. .................. .................. ................... .................. ............ 336.2 Recommendations for action ...................................................................................................... 34References .................. ................... ................... ................... ................... ................... .................. ....... 37


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AcronymsACDI-VOCA Agricultural Cooperative Development International/Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative

AssistanceAPDA Afar Pastoral Development AssociationBRP Business Reengineering ProcessCAHW Community Animal Health WorkerCAMELIS Capacity Added by Mending Early-warning and Livelihood Information Systems in pastoral areasCARE Cooperative for Assistance and Relief EverywhereCBO Community Based OrganisationCERF Central Emergency Response FundCRS Catholic Relief Services16DAG Development Assistance GroupDCM Drought Cycle ManagementDFID Department for International DevelopmentDoFLM Department of Fisheries and Livestock MarketingDPPA Disaster Prevention and Preparedness AgencyDPPB Disaster Prevention and Preparedness BureauDPPC Disaster Prevention and Preparedness CommissionDRR Disaster Risk ReductionEB Ethiopian BirrEWS Early Warning SystemEFSR Emergency Food Security ReserveEPDaGoN Ethiopia Pastoral Development and Governance NetworkEWD Early Warning DepartmentEWWG Early Warning Working GroupFAO Food and Agriculture Organisation (UN)FIC Feinstein International Center (Tufts University)FSCB Food Security Coordination BureauGHD Good Humanitarian DonorshipGOE Government of EthiopiaHEA Household Economy ApproachHRF Humanitarian Response FundICRC International Committee of the Red CrossIFAD International Fund for Agricultural DevelopmentIIED International Institute for Environment and DevelopmentIIR International Institute of Rural ReconstructionILRI International Livestock Research InstituteINGO International Non-Governmental OrganisationsJHA Joint Humanitarian AppealKFSSG Kenya Food Security Steering GroupLCPI Livelihood Protection Cost IndexLEGS Livestock Emergency Guidelines and StandardsLEWS Livestock Early Warning SystemLIU Livelihoods Integration UnitLPF Livestock Policy ForumLRRD Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and DevelopmentMDG Millennium Development GoalMoARD Ministry of Agriculture & Rural DevelopmentNDPPC National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness CommitteeNDPPF National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness FundNFI Non-food Items


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NPDPM National Policy on Disaster Prevention and ManagementOCHA Office for Coordination of Humanitarian AssistanceOFDA Office for Foreign Disaster AssistanceOPADC Oromia Pastoral Area Development CommissionPARIMA Pastoralist Risk Management ProgrammePASDEP Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End PovertyPCDP Pastoralist Community Development Project (World Bank)PCI Pastoralist Communication InitiativePLI Pastoralist Livelihoods InitiativePSNP Productive Safety Net ProgrammeRED/FS Rural Economic Development and Food SecurityRTE Real Time EvaluationSC-US Save the Children United StatesSC-UK Save the Children United KingdomSNNPR Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples RegionSDPRP Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction ProgrammeTWG Thematic Working GroupUNCT United Nations Country TeamUNICEF UN Fund for ChildrenWFP World Food ProgrammeGlossary of Local TermsBelg short rainy season, eastern highlands (March to April)Meher main cropping season following the kremt long rainy season, central highlands (Jun to Oct)Guu light rainy season in Somali Region (April to June)Deyr heavy rainy season in Somali Region (October to December)Ganna long rainy season in Borena zone of Oromiya Region (February to April)Hagaya short rainy season in Borena zone of Oromiya Region (August to October)


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Introduction and methodologyThis study was commissioned by CARE International,the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), Savethe Children UK, Save the Children US and, hereafterreferred to as the Core Group. The overall purpose ofthe study was to provide an overview of the timing,

appropriateness and efficacy of interventions in thedrought that affected the pastoral lowlands ofEthiopia in 2005/2006. The study also soughtto identify mechanisms to initiate more timelyand appropriate interventions to protect andsupport pastoral livelihoods. The study hasidentified mechanisms, systems, capacitiesand institutions which need to be strengthened inorder to trigger more timely and appropriatelivelihood-based responses to drought. The studyalso explored donor interest in resourcing thesechanges.

The study worked with communities, NGOs, UNagencies, the government, donors, the private sectorand specialised projects such as the PastoralCommunity Development Project (PCDP) and thePastoralist Communication Initiative (PCI). Theconsultancy team held several meetings with theCore Group. Fieldwork was conducted in selecteddrought-affected areas of Afar, Oromiya and Somaliregions: Yabello, Arero and Mega (Borena zone,Oromiya Region), Moyale (Oromiya Region), Moyaleand Hudet (Somali Region) and Chiffra woreda(AfarRegion). The study combined participatoryapproaches with conventional sampling methods.Statistical exercises were not the focus of the study;instead, participatory results from different toolswere used to cross-check secondary data. Due totime constraints, secondary data on the drought in

s

the SNNPRS region was used. Semi-structuredinterviews were carried out to cross-check and proberesponses.

A comprehensive literature review was also

undertaken on drought management in Ethiopia andin the region, including the impact assessmentscarried out following the 2005/2006 drought.Considerable work is ongoing in terms of integratinglivelihoods knowledge into drought management.The study reviews this work with a view to collatingavailable information on drought cyclemanagement. It is hoped that this report will notonly contribute to the institutional memory of the2005/2006 drought response in Ethiopias pastoralareas, but will also be used by key stakeholdersinterested in supporting pastoral livelihoods in the

Greater Horn of Africa region.

The report is organised into six chapters. The firstchapter provides an overview of the study and thepurpose of the report, and summarises the differentlivelihood systems in the pastoral areas of Ethiopia.Chapter 2 looks at the interventions implementedduring the drought, examining their timeliness,appropriateness and efficacy in protectinglivelihoods. Chapter 3 looks at the current droughtresponse system in Ethiopias pastoralist areas,including early warning mechanisms andcontingency planning. Chapter 4 discusses the keyissues that need to be addressed in strengtheningthe response system currently in place. Chapter 5examines the policy environment, while chapter 6presents the studys conclusions andrecommendations.

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Map 1: Map of Oromiya Region

Map 2: Map of Somali Region


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1.1.2 Livelihoods in Somali RegionSomali Region is the largest of Ethiopias pastoralregions, with a population of about four millionpeople (Devereux, 2006). Most are pastoralists,though there are some agro-pastoralists and purefarmers, and about 14% are urbanised. Livelihoodsare complex. Save the Children UK (SC-UK, 2005)and the Regional Disaster Prevention and

Preparedness Bureau (DPPB) divide the region into17 food economy zones. Of these, eight arecategorised as pastoralist, six are agro-pastoralistand three are agricultural food economy zones.

Household income surveys have shown that SomaliRegion is the wealthiest of all Ethiopias ruralregions, with the lowest poverty headcount 38% in1999/2000, lower than the national rate of 44%(Devereux, ibid.). This relative wealth derives fromthe regions high levels of livestock product exports

and imports of consumer goods for resale. Theeconomy is more closely integrated with the Gulfstates than other parts of Ethiopia, including AddisAbaba. However, the updated livelihoods profileundertaken by DPPB and SC-UK shows that about5% of middle wealth groups have shifted to poorwealth groups.

Livestock-dominated livelihoods and dependenceon cross-border trade are sources of wealth, but alsoof vulnerability. Over the last decade, Somali tradersand pastoralists have faced a succession of

livelihoods shocks, including three severe droughts,two bans on Somali livestock imports by SaudiArabia (following outbreaks of Rift Valley fever in theHorn of Africa), a ban on contraband trade imposedby the government of Ethiopia and bans on the useof Somali currencies inside Ethiopia (Devereux,ibid.).

1.1.3 Livelihoods in Afar RegionAfar Region, with a population of about 1.3 million,is a lowland area in north-eastern Ethiopia. It hasinternational boundaries with Eritrea to the north

and Djibouti to the east. Within Ethiopia, it hasboundaries with Tigray and Amhara regions to thewest and with Oromiya and Somali regions to thesouth-east. Of the total population, 80% areclassified as pastoralists. Livestock holdingsdeclined markedly (by up to 50% in some woredas,according to some observers) during the recentdrought. There are indications that long-termlivestock population trends may be declining, whilethe human population is rising.

Map 3: Map of Afar Region

Most land is used for pastoral purposes, althoughmuch of the land in the Awash valley in the riverinezone has been turned over to large irrigated farms.Land alienation continues, with 150,000 hectares

reserved for irrigation schemes. The damage theselosses have caused to pastoral livelihoods has beencompounded by the spread of Prosopis spp.,commonly known as mesquite, from the farms intothe surrounding rangelands. This plant, originallyintroduced to stabilise the banks of irrigationchannels, now infests about 700,000 hectares(Behnke et al., 2007).

1.2 Pastoralists riskPastoralism is uniquely well adapted to dryland

environments. As an economic and social system, itoperates effectively in low and highly variablerainfall conditions. However, in Ethiopia pastoralistlivelihoods systems are becoming increasinglyvulnerable. Human populations are rising, theclimate is changing and international markets aresetting ever-higher barriers for access. Infrastructureis poorly developed, education and literacy levelsremain very low and competition for scarceresources is increasing.


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According to discussions the study team held withpastoralists during field visits to Oromiya, Afar andparts of Somali Region in April and June 2007, it isapparent that the risks populations in pastoral areasface are characterised by one or more of thefollowing:

1. Loss of productive assets(livestock/farming/irrigated land) due todrought, floods, disease and livestock theft.

2. Declining sustainability as livestock holdingsdecrease and the human population grows.

3. Declining livestock and agricultural productivitydue to poor husbandry practices andtechnologies.

4. Environmental degradation and deterioration ofnatural resources to the point that productionmay decline below recovery levels.

5. Breakdown of traditional institutions and socialrelations.6. Inability to access markets and achievemaximum prices for livestock products.

7. Low socio-economic empowerment of womenand youth.

8. Geographical isolation in terms of infrastructure,communications and basic services.

9. Increasing impoverishment of communities andhouseholds.

These findings are supported by the pilot pastoralPSNP reports prepared in early 2007 (Behnke et al.,

March 2007). From these field visits, it was apparentthat the vast majority of respondents felt that theirproduction system was under increasing strain.Work by the Pastoralist Risk ManagementProgramme (PARIMA, 2004) in southern Ethiopiashowed that 91% of 600 households studiedindicated that traditional pastoralism could nolonger support their communities.

1.3 Risk management strategiesIt is important to understand how pastoralist

communities manage the risks they face. Thestrategies presented below are not exhaustive, andhave been generalised across the regions studied.

Diversification of livelihood strategiesThe field visits showed that there is a strong desireamong lowland populations to diversify into non-pastoral economic activities, although there aredifferences according to economic status. The poorfelt that they had insufficient livestock assets to

diversify, while the middle class and the wealthy feltthat their main constraint was lack of information onavailable options. Research conducted by PARIMA2(2004) shows that few households have businessinterests in towns. Markets were only important forselling livestock or purchasing food and otheressential items. Most of the major forms ofdiversification focused on cultivation and petty

trade.

Use of informal transfersComplex social networks reinforce clan solidarityand provide a social safety net that offers someprotection against risks. Informal transfers includethe redistribution of food and cash, mainly throughremittances or soft loans and the redistribution ofproductive resources such as livestock and sorghumseeds. Systems are developed in a participatorymanner involving all community or clan members

and are highly respected and adhered to by all. Theenforcement of these distribution mechanisms isgenerally strict and impartial.

Childrens educationIn all the communities visited, families sought to putat least one child through school in an effort tospread risk. Supporting childrens education is seenas an investment which presupposes that aneducated son or daughter will in the future be ableto find paid employment and support the family withresources not dependent on rainfall and other

unpredictable factors.

Improving the availability of basic services andresourcesMost communities have a strong desire forknowledge and skills to improve production andproductivity, such as training community animalhealth workers and acquiring new technologies forirrigated agriculture or new methods to control bushencroachment.

Employing coping strategies

Mobility is a primary way of managing livestock-related risks. Communities also adjust thecomposition of their herds to the externalenvironment. For example, communities in Oromiyahave always been predominantly cattle owners. Butthere is evidence that camels, which are moredrought-tolerant, are increasing in number. Herd

2PARIMAs research focused on Borena zone.


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diversification also enables pastoralists to minimiselosses from disease. Other coping strategies includereducing the amount of food consumed duringdrought periods, borrowing, eating wild foods,making market purchases and seeking support fromrelatives. Remittances from the diaspora play animportant role during times of stress in SomaliRegion.

Managing gendered risksIssues of gender and age can influence riskexposure. Women and youth are often undulyexposed to risks and can be among the firstcasualties of shocks. Female-headed householdsare usually amongst the first to be forced to diversifytheir income-generating activities to survive. Undercustomary law, in many lowland populations it is theresponsibility of the clan and the elders to ensurethat vulnerable women and children are taken care

of.

Managing risks related to land tenure (use, accessand property rights)A body of customary rules determines access to anduse of natural resources in pastoral areas. Currently,much of Ethiopias rangelands are governedby common property regimes, but growingcompetition in land use is forcing traditional naturalresource management institutions to rethinkland ownership patterns in an effort to minimiserisks.

1.4 Underlying causes of vulnerability in pastoralareasThe loss of productive assets and increasinghousehold food insecurity due to drought havebecome defining features of lowland poverty inEthiopia. While chronic and acute vulnerability tofood insecurity may be caused by factors such asland degradation, recurrent drought, populationpressure and low agricultural productivity, there isgrowing evidence that the impacts of these

problems on food security are underpinned by

economic, social and political factors of vulnerability(CARE, 2003).

The ability of pastoralists to market their livestockproducts in a timely fashion and at a fair price isessential to improve risk management at thehousehold level; it fosters monetisation, savingsand investment, and lessens the threat of

environmental degradation through overgrazing.One key element of marketing is price risk. If pricesare relatively stable, lucrative and predictable overspace and time, planning horizons for producersand traders are improved and marketing efficiencycan be enhanced. If, however, prices are relativelyvolatile, low and unpredictable, this providesdisincentives for producers and traders and marketdysfunction can occur. There is compelling evidencethat pastoralists are becoming increasinglydependent on markets for livestock and cereal/grain

products, especially during droughts.Overwhelmingly, populations in pastoral areas wantto improve their access to markets throughconstruction of access roads, provision of wateralong stock routes and improved security alongmarket routes. Pastoralists are keen to see moremarkets open, a reduction in price fluctuations andthe removal of barriers to access.

Social factors, including the way households andcommunities deal with poverty and food insecurity,are closely related to vulnerability, but may not be

as well understood as environmental and economicfactors. Vulnerability can also be politicallydetermined, as populations are marginalised andhave no access to basic services, knowledge andinfrastructure to enable them to exercise commandover basic necessities and rights. The failure toprotect land rights is a case in point.

Unless underlying causes of vulnerability areunderstood and addressed, the resilience ofpastoralist communities to drought in Ethiopia willcontinue to decline, and crises such as the one in

2005/2006 will become more common.


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2. The response to the 2005/2006 drought2.1 IntroductionDrought response in Ethiopia is regulated by thegovernments 1993 National Policy for DisasterPrevention, Preparedness and Management(Government of Ethiopia, 1993).3 According to this

policy, each woreda is tasked with preparingdrought contingency plans. In normal times, thefocus is on investing in structural development andbuilding local resilience (Hogg, 1997). This entailsinvestment in fodder production, pasturedevelopment, water supplies, veterinary care,markets and mobile abattoirs. In theory, the

3These phases refer to the Drought Cycle Managementmodel, which is presented in section 3.1.

policy provides a strong basis for effective droughtmanagement. In practice, however, progress hasbeen slow in many pastoral woredas. NGOs such asSave the Children UK and CARE in Somali and Afarregions, and Save the Children US and CARE inSomali and Oromiya regions,

have supported the development of early warningsystems and some drought contingency planning,but this has not been coordinated. Developmentand disaster response mechanisms inmany woredas are still weak, and investmentin development and disaster management isminimal.

Table 3: External interventions in response to the 2005/2006 drought

2. The response to the 2005/2006 drought


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2.2 Overview of the drought responseIn 2005-2006 drought affected an estimated 1.7million pastoralists and agro-pastoralists insoutheastern Ethiopia (OCHA, 2006). The worst-affected areas in pastoral regions were Afder andLiben zones and parts of Gode zone in SomaliRegion and southeastern parts of Oromiya Region

(OCHA, 2006). Emergency levels were reached inmany woredas in these areas. During the study itbecame apparent that many felt that the scope ofthe crisis had been in some cases exaggerated,particularly in Somali Region where the governmentsought to make capital by spreading the responsethroughout the entire region. Findings from thefieldwork for this study suggest that the droughtresponse in most pastoral areas was largely late andless effective than it might have been. The defaultemergency intervention was food relief, and

livelihoods protection and emergency livelihoodsinterventions were limited. A summary of the maininterventions implemented in Oromiya, parts ofSomali and Afar regions is presented in Table 3.

As the table shows, the interventions implementedwere both life-saving and livelihoods-support based,but life-saving interventions were significantly largerin scale and budget. Data from the JointHumanitarian Appeal 2006 show that in response tothe drought the Ethiopian Government, UnitedNations and humanitarian partners appealed for

US$166 million in emergency assistance. Becauseof a significant carry over of food pledges and stockfrom 2005 (amounting to 240,000 metric tons) andthe implementation of the PSNP, the majority offunds (72% or $111 million) were requested forlifesaving non-food interventions in health andnutrition, water and sanitation, and agriculture.However, overall allocations for food aid largelyexceeded those of any other sector (Grunewald et al,2006).

2.2.1 Tim elinessOverall, the drought response, particularlyinterventions aimed at saving livelihoods, arrivedlate. The first signs of a drought emergencyappeared as early as July 2005 in parts of Borenazone, yet substantial interventions did not start untilFebruary 2006. Table 4 sets out the timing ofinterventions and action by CARE in Borena zone.

Analysis by the Overseas Development Instituteshows that early warning signals were not in

Table 4: Timeline of action in response to thedrought in Borena and Leban zones (CARE)Timeframe ActivityWeek 1 CARE monthly drought monitoring

report triggers the convening of theEmergency Coordination Meeting

Week 2 A rapid assessment is undertaken,

led by government zonal authoritiesWeek 3 Assessment report discussed at the

Emergency Coordination MeetingWeek 4 Report forwarded to Oromiya

Regional Government for discussionWeek 5 Oromiya regional government

discusses report and forwards tothe federal government

Weeks 15 CARE and others undertake anutritional survey in affected areas

Week 6 CARE presents the nutritionalsurvey report to the EmergencyCoordination Meeting. Federal andthe regional authorities holdconsultations with the zonal team

Week 7 The federal and regionalgovernments assemble anassessment team to visit the field.This assessment team is joined bythe zonal team

Week 8 The Federal and RegionalAssessment teams providesfeedback to the Zonal Coordination

MeetingWeek 9 Assessment report submitted to the

federal government and discussedWeek 10 The federal government issues an

appeal and allows response byzonal, regional and federalagencies. CARE had begun watertrucking for domestic use before thegovernment appeal and declarationof emergency.Woredaofficials werealso undertaking water trucking.Under normal circumstances, NGOs

must wait for a federal declarationand appeal before they canintervene.

question in most countries in the Horn of Africaduring the 2005/2006 crisis (ODI, 2006). Why thenwas the response in Ethiopia so tardy? Institutionalinertia and rigidity were seen as a major constraintto prompt action. Procurement procedures in mostagencies were not responsive and flexible enough,


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and coordination was poor, particularly amongstNGOs (with the possible exception of coordinationmeetings in Borena zone). Agencies in Borenastated that too many NGOs were trying to dothe same things in the same locations (see section4.4).

2.2.2 AppropriatenessIt is widely accepted that inadequate attention wasgiven during the 2005/2006 drought to protectingand strengthening livelihoods. The main problemappears to be the lack of systematic application ofbest practice and the absence of effective policy,institutional and legislative mechanisms to supporttimely livelihood support interventions.

A number of organisations, mainly NGOs, didhowever undertake livelihoods interventions inresponse to the crisis. These included commercial

de-stocking, slaughter de-stocking, supplementaryfeeding of livestock, livestock treatment andvaccination, supplementary feeding of vulnerablegroups, food aid distribution, human healthinterventions, water supply, market-support andafter the drought livestock re-distribution throughrestocking.

The activities introduced by PLI partners includingACDI-VOCA, CARE, Save the Children UK and Savethe Children US, Tufts University, such ascommercial and slaughter destocking, were

perceived by the pastoralists interviewed during thestudy as amongst the most innovative andbeneficial interventions. The PLI is a two yearprogramme with a focus on pastoralist areas ofEthiopia. It combined field level implementation andlearning with the development of nationalguidelines for livelihoods-based livestock reliefinterventions with the Ministry of Agriculture andRural Development. The initiative, the design phasefor which took place prior to the drought, wasfunded in October 2005 by USAID as a droughtmitigation and preparedness programme. These

funds, together with FAO monies from theGovernment of Belgium, provided an opportunity totest livelihoods-based relief interventions inpastoralist areas, including: emergency animalhealth (both vaccination and treatment); commercialand slaughter de-stocking; supplementary feeding(of breeding stock); and, with the return of the rains,restocking as a means to accelerate the drought

Box 1 Afar Pastoral Development Associationssupplementary feeding of livestock in 2005-06During the 2005-6 drought the Afar Pastoral DevelopmentAssociation (APDA) undertook a supplementary feedingprogramme for livestock. Cattle were the preferredspecies and two breeding animals were selected fromeach vulnerable household and were fed on concentrate

feeds acquired from factories in Addis Ababa. A total of800 households benefited from this intervention whichtook two months before the rains came. Each animal wasgiven 1.5 kg of concentrates every day for two months.De-worming and other veterinary treatment were carriedout alongside feeding and water trucking implemented toprovide adequate water for livestock. The total cost of thisintervention came to about Ethiopian Birr (EB) 800,000(USD 89,500). To restock 800 households with two cowseach, it would cost nearly EB 4.2 million (USD 470,083). Itis much more economical to protect the current assets ofpastoralists.

In 2006, APDA again provided concentrate feeding to2,300 households from vulnerable families. Each familyidentified 10 breeding goats. The families who benefitedcame from kebeles that were hard hit by the drought. Foursuch kebeles were selected. The severity of the droughtwas determined by the Afar peoples Daagu system ofsharing information. The system is one of passinginformation from one person to another. If complementedby the EWS, this would form a very good droughtmonitoring system. Each goat was de-wormed andcovered with antibiotics to prevent opportunisticinfections. Water was provided and each goat given 80grams of concentrates. The breeding animals remained in

the homestead where children were. After five days offeeding, the milk from the goats rose from 0.25 liters to0.5 liters per day and this provided great nutrition foryoung children and the elderly from those families. Therewas no need for supplementary feeding of the childrenfrom UNICEF or any other agency. The concentrates werenot free. APDA started an Animal Feeds for Workprogramme. Households constructed four water pans withtools and implements provided by APDA. Pasture andbrowse sprouted in some of the water harvestingstructures constructed. Whenever milk was in excess in aparticular home, they made butter, which sold at EB 70(USD 7.8) per kg in Semera. Butter making started after

two months of supplementary feeding. The total cost ofthis intervention was approximately EB 500,000 (USD55,962). The communities have not forgotten theseinterventions and they really value this form ofassistance. The cattle feeding intervention was in zone 4while the goat intervention was in zone 1 near theEritrean border, where goats are dominant. APDA works in17 woredas in the region.


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Box 2 Lessons from the commercial destockingprogramme in Moyale WoredaDuring the 2005-6 drought in Moyale Woreda ofOromiya Region, Save the Children/US supported acommercial de-stocking programme within thePastoralist Livelihood Initiative (PLI). This was aimed atremoving animals from communities during the

drought before they died or body deterioration madethem worthless. The underlying assumption was thatthis initiative would remove droughted animals andhelp ensure that pastoralists got some money for theiranimals instead of another dead carcass best safetynet for pastoralists lies in protecting those resourcessuch as livestock which support their livelihoods.Private traders were introduced with the support of theDepartment of Fisheries and Livestock Marketing,MoARD, and SC/US to communities wanting to selltheir livestock. The traders mainly used their ownmoney. Some key lessons were drawn from the

experience (Abebe et al., forthcoming):

A total of 54% of household income came fromsale of livestock. Although the purchase of foodaccounted for the highest single proportion ofexpenditure (28%), pastoralists also heavilyinvested in safeguarding their remaining livestock(37%), feed (19%) trucking of livestock to othersites (12%) and veterinary care (12%).

A total of 79% of cash from sale of livestock wasused in purchases for household use and for

livestock. People were also able to pay schoolfees, pay off-debts, support relatives and save.This means the intervention strengthened thepurchasing power of households.

Commercial de-stocking was the third mostpreferred intervention in terms of overallperformance in protecting and building up pastoralassets (particularly livestock).

There was varied participation of the differentstakeholders in the planning and implementationof the intervention; sometimes traders did notappear in designated areas, often because theycould not access those areas due to poor roadsinfrastructure. Transport subsidies for traders werenot tried because fuel was not easily available. Insome cases destocking centres were too far fromthe livestock keepers while in others destockingstarted late. However, in view of the context,stakeholders are agreed that this intervention wasappropriate.

recovery phase. PLI-interventions and responsemechanisms were not only praised by pastoralists,but were seen as providing guidance and leadershipby a number of agencies involved in planning andresponding to the drought. The interventions,though delayed, form a major basis for scaling upfuture livelihood-based support in the pastoralistareas of Ethiopia.

InBorena zone, the de-stocking implemented by PLIwas appropriate and resulted in 20,000 cattle beingde-stocked. Oxfam also tried to support a localpartner in de-stocking in Borena.

2.3 Pastoralist perceptions of the responseAlthough food aid was the dominant mode ofresponse, the study found that food was never thetop priority among pastoralist populations, albeit in

the course of the drought the importance of foodincreased as prices began to rise. Participatoryexercises with pastoralist communities in all theregions visited revealed that food aid was the leastpreferred intervention. In Mega woreda, for instance,pastoralists in a Focus Group Discussion observed:

Food relief is the opium of pastoralists,given by the government and donoragencies to ensure that pastoralists donot think of alternative livelihoods andbecome dependent on food aid so that

they can be easily controlled by theinternational community and theregional government. It is expensive andit does not help make pastoralistsstronger in the long term.

The group argued that cereal price stabilisationthrough cereal banks, even on a commercial basis,would have been a more cost-efficient intervention,and would have helped households protect theirassets. Cereal banks were not in place during the2005/2006 drought, apart from limited support by

AFD to banks in Borena.

Pastoralist communities in Moyale, Mega and Areroworedas expressed appreciation for a number oflivelihoods-based interventions, namely commercialdestocking and supplementary feeding.Supplementary feeding of breeding small stock wasranked second after cereal banks for its potential tosave livestock. Pastoralists in Walensit (Arero)expressed willingness to purchase concentrate


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feeds at full cost if these were available. They alsosuggested that support could be provided toentrepreneurs to manufacture feed closer to pastoralareas, to reduce transaction costs. Pastoralists inArero and Mega ranked commercial destocking astheir third preferred intervention at the onset of adrought, though they stressed that it would only bevaluable as long as remote areas were also reached,

local traders participated and the intervention wascorrectly timed, with early and clear information andcommunication provided to pastoralist households.They also stressed the need for investment in accessfeeder roads.

Pastoralists also attached great importance tointerventions aimed at enabling access to keypasture and water resources. In all the pastoralregions of Ethiopia, critical natural resources arelocated along or across international borders.

Insecurity due to competition over these resourcesor raiding and counter-raiding is a severe problemamong the tribes and clans living in these areas.Conflict in Oromiya Region has resulted inthousands of hectares remaining unutilised duringdrought. In field visits, pastoralists suggested thatlocal NGOs working with traditional institutionscould help free up access.

Interventions such as slaughter destocking, watertrucking and the excavation of contingencyboreholes in dry season grazing areas were also

favourably received, though pastoralists were awareof the high costs associated with the latter two.Cash transfers were seen as less costly, butquestions were raised about the sustainability,security and usefulness of cash in remote areas,where goods and services may not be readilyavailable. There was little enthusiasm for livestockvaccination as most pastoralists believed thatvaccinating animals during drought underminedtheir resilience.

In terms of what pastoralists themselves did during

the drought, the study team was told that the mainresponse strategy remained mobility, withpastoralists moving livestock to areas where thegrazing was better and surface water was morewidely available. In addition, Save the Children staffobserved new drought responses, includingpastoralists hiring trucks to transport their breedinganimals out of drought-affected areas and the earlycutting of irrigated maize to supplement livestockfeed.4

2.4 Saving lives through livelihoods: quantifyingthe benefits of livelihood-support interventions 4Much has been written about the need for urgentaction early in a crisis to protect livelihoods (Akliluand Wekesa, 2001; Lautze, 2003). Earlyinterventions can mitigate the effects of drought onpastoralists, reducing the need for major life-saving

emergency response. By helping to protectpastoralists assets, it may also prevent furthervulnerability in the livelihoods system. Lautze hasargued that the saving of livelihoods needs to berecognised as being as important as saving humanlives in emergencies (ibid.: 31). As noted, whilstthere is increasing recognition in government circlesand within aid agencies and donors of theimportance of early livelihoods interventions,particularly in pastoral areas, the system is stilloverwhelmingly geared towards post-disaster

responses largely centred on food aid.

The costs associated with delayed interventions inpastoral areas have been quantified by the PastoralRisk Management Project (PARIMA) of the GlobalLivestock Collaborative Research SupportProgramme, led by the University of California incollaboration with the International LivestockResearch Institute (ILRI). Based on extensiveresearch in the Borena plateau, PARIMA investigatedthe extent to which drought and high stocking rateshave contributed to cattle mortality and estimated

economic losses from cattle deaths. PARIMAobserved longer periods of gradual herd growthinterposed by sharp crashes in 198385, 199192and 199889, when between 37% and 62% of thecattle population perished (Desta, 2001). PARIMAargued that cattle losses were due to starvation,rather than to sales or slaughter. The monetary valueof the losses during the 17 years under investigationwas estimated at $6,523 per household and $893per person. When extrapolated to the entire Borenaplateau, PARIMA estimated that total losses mayhave exceeded $300 million (Desta, ibid.). Such loss

of capital could have been mitigated withinterventions aimed at facilitating acceleratedofftake at the onset of crash periods.

4 An SC/US survey of 60 households in Liban zone ofSomali Region found that the average household spent$460 on fodder during the 2005/2006 drought. Thefodder was fed to lactating cattle and the milk consumedby family members and sold to finance the purchase ofmore fodder.


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3. The current response system3.1 Drought Cycle ManagementThe concept of Drought Cycle Management (DCM)was developed in Kenya by Jeremy Swift in the mid-1980s under the EU-funded Turkana RehabilitationProject. It was adapted by IIRR, Cordaid and AcaciaConsultants in 2004, and is becoming increasinglyaccepted as the dominant drought managementmodel in East Africa and the Horn. The concept wasdeveloped following the realisation thatconventional responses to drought in the regiondealt with development and disaster responses inthe same pastoral areas as separate issues. Droughtwas seen in most cases as a major disaster event inneed of ad hoc responses which would inevitablyaffect development activities and be implementedwith costly delays (IIR et al, 2004). DCM

was designed to identify appropriate activitiesfor each of the four phases of the drought cycle:normal, alert, emergency and recovery.

Given the difficulty in strictly differentiating betweenthe four phases, recent discussions of the DCMmodels emphasise the importance of flexibility inthe selection of activities.

In Ethiopia, SC/US and other PLI partners have made

the DCM model central to their work. Donorsincluding ECHO and USAID recognise its value, andsenior government officials are familiar with theconcept. Behnke et al.(2007) recommend that DCMbe made a complementary component of the pilotphase of the extension of the Productive Safety NetsProgramme (PSNP) to pastoral areas, even thoughdrought cycle management is not in the direct remitof the PSNP. In order to implement themodel successfully, agencies need to betterintegrate development and emergency responses.

Currently, however, there remains a rigidseparation between the different elements of thesystem.


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Effective drought cycle management calls forappropriate actions to prepare for drought, manageits impacts and assist affected households torecover. Ideally, the system should include thefollowing (adapted from Behnke et al., ibid.):

strong institutional, management andcoordination structures at all levels;

effective early warning and information systems; drought contingency planning at all levels; easily accessible drought contingency funds at

central, zonal and/or woredalevel; and

the capacity to implement timely droughtresponse measures and to provide support todrought recovery interventions.

This chapter examines in detail the effectiveness ofthe current preparedness and response system inEthiopia against the parameters listed above.

3.2 The institutional framework for droughtmanagement in EthiopiaEthiopia has invested heavily in improving itssystem of disaster preparedness. Lautze (2003)observes that there is an impressive array ofgovernment institutions, policies and processesdesigned to identify, respond to and mitigatedisasters. The Disaster Prevention and PreparednessAgency (DPPA) is responsible for overseeing disasterprevention and preparedness, including earlywarning, as well as managing disaster response.Since the creation of the Food Security CoordinationBureau (FSCB) in 2004, however, DPPA has beenrestricted to responding only to emergencies and tothe acute needs of the unpredictable food insecure(Grunewald et al., 2006). The FSCB is charged withimproving long-term food and livelihood insecurityof chronically insecure beneficiaries through theproductive safety nets and other food securityprogrammes. Accordingly, the DPPA has focused onneeds assessments to determine both food and

non-food responses to emergencies, reducing itsfocus on prevention and preparedness.

DPPA and FSCB offices are merged at regional leveland in most woredas, but they are not integrated atthe central level. Although they both report to theDeputy Prime Minister (who is also the Minister ofAgriculture and Rural Development), the twoinstitutions do not work in close partnership. Thismakes coordination more difficult for NGOs and UN

agencies, and creates an artificial separationbetween chronicproblems and emergencies. Someof the needs presented in the annual humanitarianappeal prepared by DPPA are actually chronicproblems which might be better addressed throughmulti-year, multi-sectoral strategies based ondevelopment approaches and principles. Many ofthese chronic vulnerabilities are the result of

inadequate attention to specific post-crisis recoveryneeds, including asset replenishment and thepromotion of alternative livelihoods (Devereux,2006).

Senior government officials who were interviewed bythe authors articulated the difficulties betweenDPPA and FSCB, and some hoped that theseproblems would be addressed through the BusinessReengineering Process (BRP) in which thegovernment is currently engaged. The BRP is

intended to restructure the current system ofdisaster prevention, preparedness and responseand streamline responsibilities and mandatesbetween specific agencies, bureaus and lineministries. The BRP Design Team explained that itplanned to model the new system on the DisasterManagement Cycle, shifting the emphasis fromcrisis management to Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR),including strengthening the capacity to implementearly livelihoods interventions. Although it is notclear whether this process will entail a merging ofDPPA and FSCB, most senior officials recognise that

Ethiopia needs a more integrated disastermanagement capacity. The BRP Design Teamemphasised that an important part of the process isredesigning the Early Warning and Preparednesssystem to strengthen its capacity to trigger earlylivelihoods responses in droughts, particularly inpastoral areas.

3.3 The Drought Early Warning SystemThe Early Warning Department (EWD) in DPPA isresponsible at the national level for early warning

activities. It is supported by the Early WarningWorking Group (EWWG), with members from lineministries, UN agencies and NGOs. Sandford (2002)records 33 different early warning and food securitysurveillance systems in Ethiopia, and the picture islittle different today, with a proliferation of systemsusing different assessment mechanisms andmethodologies. Box 3 lists the main types of triggermechanisms identified during the study. Lautze(2003) observes that most EW systems are failing to


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Box 3: Different drought response triggermechanismsBiannual multi-agency assessments: The governmentcarries out two multi-agency, multi-sectoralassessments each year to guide it in declaring anemergency and making an international appeal.

The rainfall/stocking ratio mechanism: This triggermechanism is specific to the Borena plateau, wherePARIMA and ILRI have found a strong correlationbetween rainfall and stocking rates of cattle.

The EWS trigger mechanism: Run by the DPPA, with SC-UK support.

EWS run by NGOs: CARE and other NGOs run localiseddrought early warning systems.

Communitys own traditional early warning system:Based on experience and observation of seasonal

rainfall levels, bird behaviour and the condition ofpasture, water and livestock, pastoralists are able todetect risk.

Nutritional assessments: Nutritional assessmentsmeasure the nutritional status of vulnerable groups,particularly under-fives. Malnutrition rates determinewhether further action is necessary.

Agency staff on the ground: Agency staff usuallymonitor the situation and carry out situational analysisof drought status, enabling agencies to startdiscussing a changing situation and take action. CRS

staff working in Borena undertook water provisioninterventions on the basis of staff observation, makingthis a form of trigger mechanism for response.

Declaration of emergency by the federal government:An emergency and appeal for international support isissued; usually this is done after extensiveconsultations and field-based assessments, and mayat times be politicised. It typically takes between eightand 12 weeks after the onset of an emergency for adeclaration to be issued.

generate a meta-analysis out of the copiousvolume of data being generated. The BRP aims toharmonise and streamline the differentmethodologies and align them to the systemcurrently being piloted by the EWD, with the supportof a number of external actors.

The DPPA early warning and surveillance system isbased on regular monthly monitoring of key

indicators at woredalevel. These feed into bi-annualjoint assessments with relevant line ministries andhumanitarian agencies following the meher and belgrains (deyr and guu rains in Somali Region andgannaand hagaya rains in Borena zone). There arealso ad hoc assessments following the onset of acrisis. The monthly monitoring is conducted by localgovernment officials against a set of indicators,

including food production, prices, human andanimal health and the onset and distribution ofrains. There is however a lack of trust in thisinformation at the federal level, as it is felt thatworedaofficials tend to exaggerate needs in order toreceive more relief resources, very largely food. Theseasonal assessments are said to involve protractednegotiations between assessment teams andworeda officials to agree beneficiary numbers,despite a centrally agreed methodology to conductthe assessments (Sandford, quoted in Haan et al.,

2006; interviews at DPPA, June 2007). The lack ofconfidence in grassroots data collection results inadditional seasonal assessment exercises forverification purposes (Grunewald et al., 2006). Inthe presence of an impeding emergency, the need torepeat the assessments prevents timely responses.This was the case in the 2005/2006 drought. Thetimeline presented in Figure 1 outlines the delays inthe response to the crisis.

The limitations of the official early warning andassessment system include:

sampling bias and geographic coverage; inadequate baseline information; overemphasis on cereal production; imbalance between quantitative and qualitative

information;

delays in the conversion of data into beneficiarynumbers and food aid needs; and

lack of distinction between chronic andtransitory food insecurity (Haan et al., 2006).

Modelled as it is on highland agricultural areas, thesystem is ill-suited to pastoral areas.

Various organisations, including Save the ChildrenUK, are involved in strengthening the early warningsystem and response components at the federal,regional and zonal levels. Meanwhile, DPPA isreviewing the system with a view to developinglivelihoods baseline information disaggregated atzonal level. The new system is based on the


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Household Economy Approach (HEA) developed bySC-UK, which is set to become the official foodsecurity assessment methodology. HEA is currentlyused in the SNNPR Region, where baselines havebeen completed for all 40 livelihoods zones and 100woredas. This work is supported by USAID, whichhas funded the establishment of the LivelihoodsIntegration Unit (LIU) within DPPA and the PLI-EWproject, implemented by SC-UK in pastoral areas.The LIU has conducted training for DPPA and localworeda officials in the use of HEA and livelihood

zoning, and is planning to extend the developmentof baselines to Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, Harar,Benishangul and Gambella. In 2007, themethodology was applied during a seasonal needsassessment (June) to identify expected emergencyrequirements in SNNPR and Somali Region, usingthe livelihood baselines available. In December2007 the methodology was also to be applied inAfar, Tigray and Amhara Regions, supported by LIUand SC-UK. However, some in the EWWG feel thatthe HEA methodology is too complicated and tootime- and labour-intensive (Haan et al., 2006). DPPA

shares some of these concerns. There is alsodisagreement over the appropriate response whengroups reach the Livelihood Protection Threshold,as opposed to the Survival Threshold identified bythe HEA.

WFP has been working on an index for triggeringcontingency planning when an emergency isdetected. This is the Livelihood Protection Cost

Box 4: The Household Economy ApproachThe HEA approach investigates how different groups ofhouseholds adapt to economic stress. Households areused as the unit of analysis, and their economicactivities at different periods in the year are examinedto model the sum of ways they make ends meet fromyear to year, and how they survive (or fail to) throughvarious economic shocks. HEA is implemented in twostages:(1) Baseline analysis is used to understand howhouseholds categorised according to different levels ofwealth have survived during a 12-month period orreference year in the recent past. This analysis, basedon key informant interviews, secondary data andcommunity interviews, includes how householdsobtain food, generate income and organiseexpenditure. The baseline is the starting point forinvestigating how access to food changes as a result ofhazards (e.g. drought, conflict or market dislocation).(2) Scenario analysis uses information on hazardsand households documented coping strategies toforecast likely future access to food and other items athousehold level. This helps identify which areas and

what types of households are likely to cope should ahazard strike, and which will need assistance; whattypes of interventions will be most appropriate; andwhen and for how long they should be implemented.

Source: Livelihoods Integration Unit, DPPA.

Index (LPCI), a weather-based index aimed atproviding an objective, independently verifiable andreplicable indicator of livelihood loss. The index is

Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Ju n Ju l Aug

Early warning

GoE rapid needs

assessment

GoE emergency

appeal

Multi-agency

assessment

Funding appeals

Response capacity

building

Life-saving

interventions

Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Ju n Ju l AugAug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Ju n Ju l Aug

Early warningEarly warning

GoE rapid needs

assessment

GoE rapid needs

assessment

GoE emergency

appeal

GoE emergency

appeal

Multi-agency

assessment

Multi-agency

assessment

Funding appealsFunding appeals

Response capacity

building

Response capacity

building

Life-saving

interventions

Life-saving

interventions

Figure 1: Timeline of the response to the 2005-06 drought in Ethiopia

Adapted from ODI, 2006.


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Box 5: The Livestock Early Warning System(LEWS)The Livestock Early Warning System subproject in theUSAID Global Livestock CRSP aims to provideinformation in a timely manner to allow pastoralistsand national and international agencies to respond toemerging drought conditions. The LEWS technology

suite utilises weather satellite sites to acquiretemperature and precipitation data. This is linked to aforage production model to create a detailed mapshowing plant species, soil conditions, livestock levelsand movement. The system can generate data for a 30-year period (see http://cnrit.tamu.edu/lews).

Source: Hess, 2007.

developed by evaluating historical weather data anddetermining its correlation to crop yields andrevenues (Hess, 2007). One possible application of

the LPCI to pastoral areas is being discussed,whereby weather data could be correlated to grasscover and forage conditions using the LivestockEarly Warning System (LEWS) methodology.However, to date the LEWS has not been able todevelop an effective link between the informationgenerated and pre-planned response (Lautze,2003).

The LPCI is being developed within the context ofcontingency planning for the Productive Safety Nets.

Efforts are ongoing to link the WFP LPCI with the HEAdatabase. Links are also being developed with otherearly warning systems and food securityclassification systems, such as the Integrated FoodSecurity and Humanitarian Phase Classification(IPC). Efforts to refine early warning and strengthendisaster management capacity are beingaccompanied by a process of policy revision,supported by USAID. Particular attention is beingpaid to policies focused on improving earlylivelihoods responses to drought in pastoral areas.

Draft policies are due to be completed by June 2008;a process of consultation with relevant stakeholdersis envisaged.

3.4 Contingency planning and financingTo be effective, EWS need to be combined withstrategies that enable governments, donors and aidagencies to respond in a timely fashion to the onsetof a drought. A good drought preparednessplan includes appropriate programming options and

Box 6: The Integrated Food Security andHumanitarian Phase Classification (IPC)The IPC was developed by the Somalia Food SecurityAnalysis Unit (FSAU) run by FAO. It combines foodsecurity, nutrition and livelihoods information toassess the relative severity of a food crisis and theimplications for humanitarian response. Crises are

classified into five phases, from generally food secureto famine/humanitarian crisis. The IPC is not in itself amethodology, but uses existing data and informationdrawn from various studies and assessments toclassify food security according to reference indicators(e.g. on nutrition, livelihoods, coping strategies). Fromthis a risk map is created showing actual and predictedhot spots. FAO is working with donors and partners torefine and roll out the IPC in a number of pilotcountries. Critics contend that the IPC is too dependenton available indicators fitting the key reference table;is too subjective; its single classification for chronic

food insecurity is too limited; and thresholds from onephase to another can potentially be difficult to apply.The IPC has nonetheless generally been seen in theHorn of Africa as a useful instrument to attractattention to impending crisis using existinginformation and analysis.

triggers for action, as well as predetermined rolesand responsibilities amongst different actors (ODI,2006). In order to act upon these plans, adequateand easily accessible contingency funds must be

available. The lack of effective contingency planningand funding mechanisms during the drought of20052006 was one of the critical elements behindthe delay in the response. Unlike in Kenya, Ethiopiahas no national preparedness plan. However, aplethora of different contingency planning processesand funds exist both at the local and federal level.They are not coordinated and there is no commonapproach to developing and resourcing these plans.

3.4.1 The N ational Disaster Prevention andPreparedness FundThe National Disaster Prevention and PreparednessFund (NDPPF) was established in 2000 as a non-food emergency intervention mechanism for rapidresponse, to complement the Emergency FoodSecurity Reserve (EFSR). The Fund is managed by theNational Disaster Prevention and PreparednessCommittee (NDPPC) within the Prime MinistersOffice. The NDPPC has a budget in excess of $13million, much of which is contributed by thegovernment (Anderson and Mowjee, 2006). These


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funds constitute a cash reserve for loans tohumanitarian actors.

Since its creation the NDPPF has been accessed onlytwice (Grunewald, 2006), and very few NGO and UNofficials appeared to be aware that funds could beborrowed from it in the event of a crisis. By contrast,borrowing food aid from the EFSR was reportedly

common (Grunewald, ibid.). The EFSR was accessedduring the 2006 drought response. Officials in DPPAadmitted that they had been reluctant to activate theNDPPF for fear that any loans would not bereplenished. It was also felt that the cumbersomeguidelines regulating the fund may havediscouraged its use. There was an interest withinDPPA in working with NGOs to remove potentialobstacles to access. Government officials felt thatthe creation of the Humanitarian Response Fund(HRF, see below) had also undermined the NDPPF. In

addition, the fact that the fund is based in Addislimits its effectiveness. Members of the PastoralBureau in Afar suggested that it should bedecentralised and held at the regional or zonallevels, and released by the regional authorities,without having to wait for a national declaration ofemergency.

3.4.2 The Pastoral Commu nity DevelopmentProjectThe Pastoral Community Development Project(PCDP) is a 15-year initiative jointly funded by IFAD

and the World Bank aimed at improving thelivelihoods of pastoralists living in 32 woredas inthe Afar, Oromiya, Somali and SNNPR regions. Theobjectives are to provide capacity building andestablish effective models of public service delivery,investment and disaster risk management inpastoral areas that address priority needs ofcommunities and their vulnerability to disasters(PCDP, 2003). The project is housed in the Ministryof Federal Affairs, under the responsibility of thePastoral Development Department.

The project has the following components: 1)sustainable livelihoods; 2) Pastoral RiskManagement (PRM); and 3) gap analysis. The PRMcomponent was only activated at the beginning of2007, apparently because of problems in allocatingresponsibilities across government departments. Atthe regional level, the PRM has been working inpartnership with SC-UK. The project is planning tosupport the DPPA/FSB regional offices inimplementing early warning systems in the 32 target

woredas, before expanding to other areas. The EWSwill be linked to woredaDisaster Preparedness andContingency Plans. It is envisaged that contingencyfunds will be established at woreda level onceofficials approve the plans.

3.4.3 The Pastoral Livelihoods InitiativeCARE has developed contingency plansin severalworedas using a common model developed inpartnership with Oxfam. Although CAREs plans areclearly focused on early livelihoods interventions,CARE officials are aware that they are not linked toan adequate financing mechanism. The project hasa reserve of EB 20,00050,000 per woreda to beused in the event of drought, but this would beinsufficient to cover the plans in case of anemergency. CARE and other PLI partners hope that,in the event of a drought, other actors will help fundthe plans. CARE is working to ensure that regional

governments can take control of the management ofthe plans (including regular updating) and link themto adequate financing. However, especially in lightof the imminent closure of the PLI, there are doubtsover the feasibility of this process. In this regard,establishing links with the PCDP/PRM appears to beall the more urgent.

3.4.4 The Pastoral Productive Safety NetsThe establishment of a drought risk financingcomponent is envisaged for the second phase of theProductive Safety Nets project (20082010). The

idea is to finance an Early Livelihood ProtectionFacility based on a sequential combination of 1) acontingency fund of about $50 million; 2) acontingency debt/credit; and 3) insurance.5Payments from the contingency fund would betriggered by the Early Livelihood Protection Index(see 3.3 above) or other triggers agreed ex-ante. Thefund would be donor-financed and could be eitherEthiopia-specific or part of an existing global fundsuch as the Central Emergency Response Fund or theECs FLEX, but with monies specifically set aside forEthiopia. The contingency fund could be

complemented by a contingency grant or debt andby insurance, which would be triggered should thefund be insufficient to cover needs (Hess et al.,ibid.).

5 In 2006 WFP piloted weather-based insurance, withencouraging results. The intention was to prove that therisk of drought could be transferred to internationalmarkets. For more details see WFP, 2007.


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In January 2007, the World Bank approved a $175million grant to finance the second phase of theProductive Safety Net Programme, $25 million ofwhich was to cover the Livelihood Protection CostIndex (Hess, 2006). At the time of the studydiscussions were ongoing about the modalities forthis risk financing strategy, with a view to finalisingthe mechanism by 2008. This will not be

immediately applicable to pastoral areas, since theProductive Safety Nets project is only just beingpiloted there. However, people involved in thedesign of the facility are thinking of basing thetrigger index on the LEWS, which has shown limitedeffectiveness in triggering early livelihoodresponses. It is also unclear what activities the EarlyLivelihood Protection Facility would finance, andwhether it would be limited to cash responses forexisting PNSP beneficiaries. The LPCI planningdocument talks of localised budgeted contingency

plans, but it is not clear what kind of contingencyplanning process will be developed, or how this willlink with processes initiated by the PCDP, the PLIand others.

3.4.6 Other contingency fundsOther NGOs have also been active in this area. FarmAfrica, for example, has established a communityemergency programme. Under the plan, earlywarning committees are to have access tocontingency funds for early livestock interventions,including animal health and destocking. The

intention is that funds will be managed by the earlywarning and food security desks at woreda level,though Farm Africa is aware of the limited capacityand lack of resources of these bureaux. Farm Africais also planning to link these funds to communitydevelopment initiatives.

3.4.7 The Humanitarian Response FundThe Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF) wasestablished in March 2006 to provide quick andflexible funding for emergency needs in Ethiopia. Itis a pooled funding mechanism managed by the UN

Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), to which five donorshave been contributing so far (the Netherlands,Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the UK). So far thefund has disbursed $16.3 million. There is a ReviewBoard comprising representatives from DPPA, UNDP,UNICEF, WFP, FAO, WHO, IOM, UNHCR and NGOs,though ultimate authority for the use of the fundrests with the HC. OCHA acts as the secretariat and

Box 7: The Pastoral Productive Safety NetsProgrammeThe overall objective of the pilot Pastoral PSNP is tocontribute to reducing household food insecurity inOromiya, Somali, SNPPRS and Afar. The purpose of theprogramme is to provide alternative approaches toimprove food security through resource transfers (cash

or food), using public works and direct support (forthose unable to do physical work) as transferinstruments. Funded by the government and eightdevelopment partners, the Pastoral PSNP will gothrough a 18-month pilot in 21 pastoral woredas.Based on the results, the full PPSNP will be rolled outin more woredas. Expected features of the PSNP are:

1. The creation of public works schemes such as roadconstruction, water harvesting and schoolconstruction, with participating households orindividuals earning income or food.

2. Provision of direct support using cash or food forhouseholds or individuals with low labourcapacities.

3. Implementation of complementary interventions,such as drought cycle management.

4. Creation of a framework through which food-insecure pastoral households can rebuild theirassets and eventually graduate out of foodinsecurity and effectively participate indevelopment.

The pilot PSNP is due to start in January 2008 (Behnkeet al., 2007).

interventions. The Guidelines also state that themanages the funding process. The HRF Guidelinesstate that the HRF is not limited to humanitarianassistance, but should also fund early livelihoodsresponse should build links with longer-termmechanisms and programmes (OCHA, 2006). Fundscan be disbursed before an appeal is launched bythe Ethiopian government. The emphasis on earlylivelihoods interventions makes the HRF a promisinginstrument to help protect assets in future drought,provided that effective trigger mechanisms are putin place. Some organisations point out that there isa conflict of interest in the handling of the HRF, sincethe fund is managed by the UN HC with the supportof OCHA. However, many NGOs were happy with thefunds performance, and it appears to have adopteda more inclusive approach than is evident in similarmechanisms in neighbouring countries.


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4. Towards an improved response: key issues for consideration

4.1 Contingency planning, politics andinstitutionsThe proliferation of contingency planning andfinancing mechanisms needs to be addressed. Atpresent there are no commonly agreed criteria forthe disbursement of funds across the differentcontingency mechanisms, many of which are yet tobecome operational. Responsibility for linking upthe various instruments lies with DPPA, but there islimited capacity to effect such coordination, andsome mechanisms (such as the PCDP) have been setup at woreda level, often without central oversight.There is much discussion about where to establishfunds; some feel that the zones would provide amuch better institutional home, although issues ofcapacity, accountability and representation are

equally significant at this level (see 4.2).

Many in Ethiopia see the contingency planning andfinancing mechanism adopted in Kenya under theaegis of the Arid Lands Project, where droughtpreparedness plans are in place at district level, as amodel. There is need for caution here. The Kenyancontingency planning mechanism did not work veryeffectively during the response to the drought in2006. The funds deposited at the local level wereinsufficient to cover the type of early livelihoodsresponses required by the crisis. Some useful and

timely interventions were carried out on a limitedscale, such as destocking and water tankering (ODI,2006). The system worked well in its early stagesbecause it was on a small scale and enjoyed thesupport of a committed donor, which provided theresources necessary for early action (StephenSandford, personal communication, 2006).However, when the scheme expanded its geographicscope to cover most of Kenyas arid lands, there wasno special provision for emergency funds to respondto the information generated by early warning

systems, and good warnings at the district levelwent unheeded. In order to make the rapid responsemechanism at district level work, contingency fundsshould be deposited with the districts, and not heldcentrally (Jeremy Swift, personal communication,2006). Changes to this effect are being implementednow with the support of ECHO (see 5.2).

It is important to bear in mind that, whilst the searchfor efficient contingency financing mechanisms

linked to early warning is important, it is not per seapanacea for appropriate drought responses. Thereare also important structural impediments. The lackof a functioning banking system in most pastoralworedas means that funds will have to be kept

elsewhere, most probably in a regional capital, andthe application of any contingency plan will bedependent on political decisions made at the centrallevel. Woredas or zones will probably be unable toinitiate responses without central endorsement, butpastoralists are not well represented in decision-making processes and their ability to push for swiftand effective responses is limited. These difficultiesare particularly acute in areas like Afar and Somaliregions. Funds could be channelled and put to useby NGOs in the short to medium term, but it iscrucial that pastoralists take part and possibly

control decisions which have such a direct impacton their livelihoods.

There was a feeling during the study that pastoralistcommunities in Borena have made greater progressthan elsewhere in calling for more appropriateinterventions from their administration, probably asa result of greater external presence, capacity-building initiatives and the fact that Borena issmaller than Somali Region or Afar. The zonaladministration is also said to be sympathetic. Thissuggests that a decentralised, coordinatedcontingency planning and financing system could betested in Borena. In Afar and Somalia, however,institutional processes are not yet mature enough:external support would be better focused oninstitution-building within pastoralist communities,and building government capacity to intervene in atimely and appropriate fashion in the event of adrought.

4.2 Capacity issuesDrought response in Ethiopia faces a number ofcapacity constraints. First, many governmentofficials, both at central and regional levels and inthe woredas, are still unfamiliar with the concept ofprotecting livelihoods assets. Food aid is still seenas the natural response to drought. There appears tobe a greater understanding of the centrality oflivelihood action at woreda level, whererepresentatives of local pastoralist communities arepresent in the local bureaux. However, these

4. Towards an improved response: key issues for consideration


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officials often lack the technical skills to conductproper livelihoods assessments. Many offices lackstaff, with poor communication facilities and highstaff turnover. In some woredasstaff are said to berecruited on the basis of clan quotas and sometimesinclude illiterate people. The remainder are oftennon-pastoralists. The overall level of skills isgenerally poor, especially in remote areas. Local

NGOs are also weak.

Such limitations are also a problem for the PastoralPSNP. This is still being largely implementedthrough federal mechanisms, although thedecentralisation process envisages that regionsshould oversee and implement programmes withoutreporting to federal ministries. PSNP donors arelooking into developing more direct contacts withthe regions and focusing more closely on buildingthe capacity of woredas.

There are differing views as to whether regions,zones or woredas are the best planning unit fordrought cycle management. Some feel that regionswould be better equipped than woredas to driveemergency responses, but that there is moreelasticity in policy making at woreda levels (forinstance, the privatisation of vet drugs andCommunity Animal Health Workers in SomaliRegion). Administrators awareness of drought cyclemanagement and livelihoods responses variesdepending on the region, with Oromiya/Borena

being ahead of Afar and Somali. A number of NGOstaff feel the zones could play a more useful role asan appropriate planning unit. Zones play animportant bridging role between regions andworedas(Benhke et al., 2006).They are particularlyuseful in that they compile information coming froma given number of woredaswithin their jurisdictionand pass it to the regions. Zones appear to be acritical linking element of coordination between themeso and the local level. However, the role of thezones in pastoral areas is much weaker than in thehighlands. In Afar, for example, they exist in nameonly. More attention should be given tostrengthening zones so that they can play amonitoring and follow-up role and provide thenecessary backstopping for woredas and kebeles(Behnke et al., 2006).

Capacity constraints are not limited to governmentoffices. Many international organisations also havelimited capacity to implement early livelihoodsinterventions, largely because emergency sections

in NGOs and UN agencies are unfamiliar withlivelihoods programming (ODI, 2006). The lack ofintegration and cross-fertilisation betweenemergency and development sections in manyorganisations appears to be a key limitation to theimplementation of livelihoods-based emergencyresponses. These difficulties exist even inorganisations that have emergency personnel with

good livelihoods background, as is the case with thePLI NGOs. The PLI faced significant difficulties inimplementing livelihoods interventions swiftly in2006 because of internal bureaucratic impediments.In particular, procurement systems were notadequate to facilitate the speedy purchase of inputssuch as hay or to smooth the progress of sub-contracting (for example of the traders involved inthe destocking intervention) with faster tenderingprocedures. Donor restrictions, for instance sourcingdrugs and vaccines only from companies with

certain specifications (e.g. nationality), also delayedinterventions. Oxfam GB, with its one programmeapproach and greater flexibility in terms of funding,appears to have overcome many of thesedifficulties. Drought often strikes in the middle of adevelopment intervention. Oxfam found that havingan integrated programme allowed flexibility in theapproach and minimised management constraintsas the operation would not change hands at theonset of drought. This experience offers usefullessons to other organisations working in drought-affected environments.

The PLI implementing agencies, currently funded fora one-year cost extension, have started working onthe lessons learned from the 2005/2006experience, and CARE is preparing guidelines tostreamline operational procedures for livelihoodsinterventions in drought response, including lists ofvetted providers. The food aid system is tried andtested, whereas livelihoods programming inemergencies is a relatively new andunoperationalised approach. It is thereforeimportant that experiences are recorded and

lessons distilled and embedded withinorganisations in order to raise awareness aboutpractice and build common approaches that can berefined through further experimentation.Standardised approaches could also facilitate moreeffective cross-border work, which is of particularimportance in many parts of the Horn of Africa andmany other dryland areas.


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4.3 CoordinationThe effectiveness of drought responses in pastoralareas could be greatly enhanced by more strategiccoordination amongst the various actors. A numberof coordinating bodies exist, but none providesoverall leadership.

4.3.1 Initiatives for pastoralists: PLI PCDP andPCIThere would be enormous benefits in closercollaboration between the PLI and the PCDP,especially to allow PCDP to learn more from the PLIexperience with drought risk management andlivelihoods interventions. The PLI could alsostrengthen its policy work through closercollaboration with OCHAs PastoralistCommunication Initiative (PCI). At present there islimited collaboration and coordination between

these three major initiatives. The links created bythis study between PCDP and SC/US and CARE mustbe built upon, and SC-UK can play a useful bridgingrole through its involvement in the PLI and itspartnership with PCDP as part of the CAMELISproject.

The PCI focuses on developing better relationsbetween pastoralists and the state through helpingpastoralist customary institutions find theknowledge they require to interact with the state,and supporting dialogue and negotiations between

pastoralist and government leaders (UNOCHA-PCI,2006). The PCI played an important role in thedesign of the PCDP and has strong links with civilsociety organisations and pastoral representativesin the region where it operates. However, theinitiative is seen as detached from the work of othernational and international organisations, particularlyin Addis. These concerns were echoed by theMinister of Federal Affairs in a coordination meetingorganised by PCDP which was attended by amember of the study team. Greater coordinationbetween the PCI with other actors, especially

national organisations, could strengthen policy workand harness complementarity in pastoral regions.

4.3.2 Government coordinationThe Pastoralist Development Department in theMinistry of Federal Affairs is mandated to coordinateand oversee interventions in pastoral areas, startingwith the PCDP, for which it has a specificmanagement role. There are pastoralistDepartments/Commissions at regional level, but not

in the woredas. Coordination efforts to date havebeen ineffective. Coordination roles are not welldefined and there is confusion between DPPA, theMinistry of Agriculture and Rural Development(MoARD), including the Food Security Bureau, andthe Ministry of Federal Affairs over responsibilitiesfor interventions in pastoral areas. In theory DPPAshould coordinate the emergency response, but as

discussed earlier its role often stops at issuing earlywarning and launching appeals. There is little effortby DPPA to coordinate with MoARD livestockdevelopment policies and programmes. TheAgriculture and Livestock Task Force chaired byMoARD was widely praised for its coordination andleadership du

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Improving drought response in pastoral areas of Ethiopia

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