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Defence R&DCanada

R et D pour la défenseCanada Canada

I mproving Shared Situational Awareness in Complex Terrains

+ Selected DRDC and DND/ CF NEOps Related I nitiatives and Plans

Paul Labbé Head S&T Foresight* , Chief Scientist Office,

Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC)

* previously Head S&T Capability Management

IDGA’s NCW 2010 Summit: Network Enabled Operations, 25-28 January 2010, Crystal City, Arlington, VA

2

I tinerary

• I ntroduction to Defence R&D Canada (DRDC)

• I mproving Shared SA in Complex Terrains

– Some definitions wrt Shared SA and Complex Terrains

• Mobile radio networks

– Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs)

– Wireless sensor networks (WSNs)

• Performance of a simplified location/ position algorithm (MAP)

• Collaborative electronic support measurements

• Radio geolocation Kalman filter measurement models

– MAP: Position model

– I nter-node range measures: TDOA model

• Dead reckoning models (DRMs) improved track data sharing

– Dead reckoning models for geographically distributed simulations

– Potential gain of dead reckoning models for geographically distributed applications

• Observations

• Some DND-DRDC Activities wrt NEOps

– I SSP

– JFS

– CF NEOps Core Activities

– CF Cyber

– EWS

– Secure MANETs

– SAMSON

N.B.: Some of the views expressed are the author’s views.http:/ / www.forces.gc.ca/ site/ focus/ first-premier/ June18_0910_CFDS_english_low-res.pdf

4

DND ADM(S&T) is DND Chief Scientist, Functional Authority for the Defence S&T Enterprise, Public Security S&T Lead, and CEO of DRDC

aa

Defence R&DCanada

R et D pour la défenseCanada Canada

Could I mproving Shared Situation Awareness in

Complex Terrains I ncrease Mission Success?

9

I mproving Shared Situation Awareness in Complex Terrains

Motivation:

Improved shared situation awareness depends on a variety of factors

spread over different domains, from cognitive psychology to

information technology.

Research on the latter has resulted in improvements in networks,

networked sensors, geolocation, data fusion, information management and information sharing which were found to

improve shared SA.

This part of the presentation will focus on the items in bold.

But first what does the above title mean?

10

Situation Awareness (SA)

• Situation awareness, or SA, is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. I t is also a field of study concerned with

perception of the environment critical to decision- makers in complex, dynamic areas from aviation, air traffic control, power plant operations, military command and control — to more ordinary but nevertheless complex tasks such as driving an automobile or motorcycle.

• Situation awareness (SA) involves being aware of what is happening around you to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact your goals and objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (e.g., Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991; Merket, Bergondy, & Cuevas-Mesa, 1997; Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Thus, SA is especially important in work domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions may lead to serious consequences (e.g., piloting an airplane, functioning as a soldier, or treating critically ill or injured patients).

• Having complete, accurate and up-to-the-minute SA is essential where technological and situational complexity on the human decision-maker are a concern. SA has been recognized as a critical, yet often elusive, foundation for successful decision-making across a broad range of complex and dynamic systems, including aviation and air traffic control (e.g., Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden 2005), emergency response and military command and control operations (e.g., Blandford & Wong 2004; Gorman, Cooke, & Winner 2006), and offshore oil and nuclear power plant management (e.g., Flin & O’Connor, 2001).

• Situation awareness ::: From Wikipedia, the free encyclopaedia

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Team SA

Team SA can be determined by examining the goals and SA requirements of all team members (adapted from Endsley & Jones, 1997, 2001).

Team SA is defined as “the degree to which every team member possesses the SA required for his or her responsibilities” (Endsley, 1995b, p. 39; see also Endsley, 1989). The success or failure of a team depends on the success or failure of each of its team members. I f any one of the team members has poor SA, it can lead to a critical error in performance that can undermine the success of the entire team. By this definition, each team member needs to have a high level of SA on those factors that are relevant for his or her job. I t is not sufficient

for one member of the team to be aware of critical information if the team member who needs that information is not aware.Wikipedia: Image used with permission of author: Mica Endsley, Ph.D., President, SA Technologies

13

Complex Terrains

• Military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT) is defined by the Department of Defense (DoD) as “all [operations] planned and conducted across the range of military operations on, or against objectives within, a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain, where man-made construction or the density of non combatants are the dominant feature.”1

• An urban environment features three main characteristics: a complex man-made physical terrain; a population of significant size and density; and an infrastructure that supports the population and perhaps the region or nation.2

1. Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment (J8) , Joint Publication 3-06 Joint Doctrine for Urban Operations (Washington D.C.: Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate, J7, Joint Doctrine Division, 16 September 2002)

2. Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment (J8)

Source: Assessing C3I in Support of Dismounted Operations in Complex Terrain STRATEGI C PERSPECTI VES I NC MCLEAN VA - 2002

Human terrain of an operational theatre adds to the complexity of the topography and man-made structures in urban and semi-rural landscapes.

14

Hypothesis

For the motivation stated, shared SA in complex terrains for dismounted combatants can be improved by the potential synergy gained by integrating technologies/ measures in such a way that the probability of failures of any component does not unduly reduce the overall performance. This synergy results from integrating the following:

• advanced mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) ,

• wireless self-healing autonomous sensing networks (SASNet) ,

• radio location measurements,

• collaborative electronic support measurements (ESMs) ,

• Global Positioning System (GPS) ,

• inertial navigation system ( I NS) based on higher-precision low-cost miniature inertial measurement units ( I MUs) ,

• geographic information system (GI S) , and

• capable handheld devices for command and control (C2) and information management ( I M) with interfaces to users such as touch-screen displays usable in cold, hot, dusty, wet, low-light and full-sun environments.

15

Cross-layer Design Leveraging Network Layer I nformation and Messaging in Advanced MANET

SIP

HOLSR

MPRSTopology

Messaging & MPR forwarding

Service Discovery

Simplified Multicast

ForwardingIP Forwarding

UDP

Transport

Location discovery message embedded in HOLSR messages with protocol backward compatibility

Applying topology view for SI P node tracking

I n an advanced mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs)Multipoint Relay Service (MPRS)

User Datagram Protocol (UDP)Session Initiated Protocol (SIP)

Hierarchical Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (HOLSR)

17

Performance Evaluation

Negligible protocol overhead due to highly efficient cross-layer design

0.00%

0.05%

0.10%

0.15%

0.20%

0.25%

0.30%

0.35%

one two three four

group size

SD

tra

ffic

ov

erh

ea

d i

n

tota

l ro

uti

ng

tra

ffic

(MANET of 31 nodes with 20 new nodes entering dynamically in groups)

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Performance Evaluation

New node entering the network coverage area is automatically tracked, located and can be connected to commander immediately after the routing table is established

Session Connection Delay

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1Time (s)

CD

F

19

Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) & Hierarchical OLSR (HOLSR) Protocols

HOLSR Control Packet Sent Breakdown

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

0 150 300 600

Pausing Time (s)

Packets

/s

HELLO TC HTC

Overhead due to HOLSR control traffic versus topology control

Topology Control (TC) Hierarchical Topology Control (HTC)

For HELLO at every 0.5 s & a dismounted combatant running at 7 km/h, the systematic error in shared position reporting is below 1 m (one meter).

20

Radio Network Based Cooperative

Node Localization

Currently under development at CRC:

Apply high precision radio signals such as UWB or spread spectrum signals for distance measurements (e.g., TDOA)

Compute local map of relative positions within one or two hops of neighborhood at possibly each node

Merge local maps into a bigger or even a global map and translate map coordinates into GPS or other standard system as needed to obtain absolute positions, using minimum number of anchor nodes

Map results are input measures to the Kalman filter to assist the integrated INS-GPS location system

21

Example of a Hierarchical MANET Architecture

22

Self-healing Autonomous Sensor Network (SASNet) Architecture (CRC-DRDC)

CF Tactical Command & Control

Headquarters can receive the fused data and query for information

Fusion CentresUsers can receive a certain class of fused data and query for information

Fusion centres / gateways

Sensor NodesLarge number of disposable unattended sensors

Disposable small sensors

Low-power radio link

Low-latency, high-bandwidth link

Long-haul Communication

Recall DARPA Smart Dust, then Nano Air Vehicle (NAV) ? NanoBots

23

Simulations Showing the Performance of a Simplified CCA-MAP Algorithm

Nodes randomly placed within 10 % of 100-grid positions

uniformly distributed in a square area

0

0.01

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

0.06

0.07

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

Connectivity Level

Med

ian

Err

or

(r)

Positional error as

function of node

connectivity

Curvilinear Component Analysis (CCA)

24

Radio Geolocation Kalman Filter Measurement Models

Now we have networks that cooperatively build up a map of the

relative location of all communicating and sensing units.

From that, two possibilities for computing improved estimated

geolocation of each unit are explored. Radio map, Global Positioning

System (GPS) and inertial measures are combined in order to obtain

and maintain accurate geolocation in adverse conditions such as

during GPS denial.

MAP: The first option computes the relative positions and passes the

results to the navigation component of each unit.

TDOA: The second option consists of sending the estimated

distances between the units to a navigation component and then

develops a geolocation map of all units.

25

Navigation I ntegration

• Limitations of GPS navigation and positioning in urban environments, complex terrains or under jamming, can be mitigated through the addition of external information.

• Flexible, statistically optimal improved geolocation capability can be achieved by combining GPS information with that from a Micro-Electro- Mechanical Systems (MEMS) Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), a radio transceiver, plus other sensor and non-sensor information such as geographic information system (GIS).

• Tried-and-true Kalman filter. IMU navigation data derived from integrated high-rate rotation and velocity rate data acts as the dead-reckoning basis of the Kalman filter formulation. Information from the GPS receiver, radio and other sources are used to update the filter, reducing or slowing the growth of IMU errors.

26

Kalman Filter Measurements

Sensor Measurements

GPS 3-D positions 3-D velocities

Radio-network 3-D positions LORAN-C 2-D positions Compass Heading Baro-altimeter Height None (the IMU acts as a ZUPT detector)

Zero velocities

LOng RAnge Navigation (LORAN-C)zero velocity update (ZUPT)

27

Kalman Position Model (MAP)

INSAID

INSAID

INSAID

p

zz

yy

xx

z .

AIDINS

E

INSAID

E

INSAID

g

p

hh

R

R

zcos

in terms of latitude ( ), longitude ( ) and height (h)

Or

28

Kalman TDOA Model

jririjrijz AIDr

222

222

INSiINSiINSi

INSiINSiINSi

zzzyyyxxx

zzzyyyxxxir.

Then one can derive the range equations as in terms on local coordinate…

29

Dead Reckoning (DR) to I mprove Accuracy at Low Cost

This addresses the users’ exploitation of the improved

network to share information that contributes to better

SA and maintain its currency by using dead reckoning

(DR) position prediction to reduce the rate of position

report updates while maintaining the desired accuracy

and currency of shared information.

30

Dead Reckoning Models for Geographically Distributed Simulations

IEEE distributed interactive simulations (DIS) and HLA

dead reckoning techniques or models (DRMs)

reduce communication traffic between geographically

distributed participating computing nodes while

maintaining the specified positional accuracy.

The same could be done for blue-force-tracking and

sensed theatre information as for collaborative ESM.

0000 ),0,0,( ptavppp

tvptavppp 00000 ),0,,(

2),,,(

2

000000

tatvptavppp

31

DRM Potential Gains

From a simplified example with 100 entities (20 stationary, 40 at constant

velocity and 40 at constant acceleration during the one-minute interval

imposed for updating all entities including the stationary ones), the total data

to be sent to all the remote computing nodes if we assume no DRMs is about

28 times the amount of data exchanged when using DRMs. So using DRMs

reduces substantially the total amount of data required to maintain the

accuracy of the dynamic entities evolving in the hypothesized operational

theatre. In fact it costs only 3.5 % of the required traffic without DRMs,

i.e., 46 kbits versus 1 308 kbits.

So using DRM may require 28 times less data exchange while sustaining the same required accuracy

32

Tracking data + Dead-reckoning Error Model

33

Potential I mpact

• The possibility of combining geolocation (pervasive and persistent blue-forces tracking) with GIS has a tremendous impact on the effectiveness of conducting a variety of operations where correctness and timeliness of information and decisions mean saving lives and securing people and assets.

• A self-aware radio informs its user about communication quality and geographical position, while providing similar information to fixed or mobile operations centers.

• A unit uses the radio to receive task orders and other information from an operations center or another unit.

• The unit sends updates on local observations, situation reports and requests for operational data.

• Staffs at the mobile center use the positions, situation reports and qualitative data to improve the management of the communications assets, to plan and monitor courses of action as well as prepare operations reports for other agencies or for superiors.

• Exploiting the exchanged timely data and dynamic picture of blue-force tracking, the mobile operations center staff and task heads would be better informed to optimally assign tasks to units for the desired coordinated and synchronised effects.

• Previous studies showed that sharing improved tailored information1 can increase mission success rate substantially (20 to 60 % as per references) .

+ tailored information contributes to improved situation awareness

34

BFT, by offering automatic pervasive and integrated

view of own forces in the COP, allows focusing on

potential hostile targets providing less support for a

false induction.

Consequently it may protect civilian and own force

elements with a potential reduction of fratricides.

In the context of these concept papers, BFT is in

addition to more precise (better georeferenced and

currency) sensed data of the ops theatre static and

dynamic features and entities.

37

Some DND-DRDC Activities wrt NEOps

• I SSP

•JFS

•CF NEOps Core Activities

•CF Cyber

•EWS

•Secure MANETs

•SAMSON

38

I ntegrated Soldier System Program ( I SSP)I ntegrated Soldier System Program ( I SSP)

39

I ntegrated Soldier System Project ( I SSP)

40

I SSP Contributes Significantly to NEOps

• ISSP is a cyclical project. In the first cycle ISSP will increase the SA (Blue, Red, and Neutral) to the dismounted soldiers. A distributed peer-to-peer network over radio to pass SA, including images, and limited motion imagery will be deployed to the dismounted soldiers in company 'bubbles'. Adjacent (Canadian) companies will be able to pass info to each other.

• Future cycles will increase amount of info to be passed as well as interconnection to higher and allied forces. Policy (security) restricts this data transfer now1 and thus this capability is not part of cycle 1.

• Possible end state depending on technology (guards to permit data transfers higher) would have an infantry commander (or rifleman) being able to pass information such as photos while on a patrol in theatre of operations all the way back to national assets such as intelligence analysts and then have the national assets pass interpretation back to the commander on the ground.

• http:/ /www.forces.gc.ca/admmat-smamat/projects-projets2-eng.asp

By taking care of the first mile! Closest to where enduring effects may occur.

1 See SAMSON in this deck

41

Soldier Systems Technology Roadmap (SSTRM)

This site invite you to collaborate in this future and provide the followings:http:/ / soldiersystems.collaboration.gc.ca/ eic/ site/ sstrm-crtss.nsf/ eng/ homeThe Soldier Systems TRM project is a unique industry-government collaboration to develop a comprehensive technology roadmap to support Canada's soldier modernization efforts.

I Cee Tool: A wiki type collaboration tool which provides you with an effective way to tap into industry, academia or government expertise on soldier systems technologies.

About the Soldier Systems TRM: More information about the roadmap

How Can I Participate in the Roadmap: I nformation on the various ways to be involved

Workshops and Events: Key dates, topics and how to register

I ntroduction to Roadmapping: How roadmaps work and their benefits

http:/ / www.ic.gc.ca/ eic/ site/ trm-crt.nsf/ vwapj/ sstrm-crtss_eng-revised.pdf/ $file/ sstrm-crtss_eng-revised.pdf

http:/ / soldiersystems.collaboration.gc.ca/ eic/ site/ sstrm-crtss.nsf/ eng/ home

Next Soldier Systems TRM C4I-Sensor Workshop: 9-11 March 2010, Montréal, Canada

42

Soldier Systems TRM Key Stakeholders

DND/Army(client)

Support CF

modernisation

& get industry

engagement

OtherDepartments

(NRC, DFAIT, PWGSC)Specific interests

& capabilities

DRDC(S&T leadership)

Subject matter

experts

Technology watch

Focused R&D

Technology

transition

IndustryIRB

Niche technologies,

Schedule of capabilitiesto market

CF & global

market access

IndustryCanada

(catalyst)TRM expertise

Ind. base reinforcement

through innovation

Industry interface

Trusted partner

AcademiaEmerging technologies

research

InternationalPartners

Facilitatorsupporting

workshops

reports

44

External Sources

Non-organic

Internal Sources

Organic

Fusion/assessment

Displayed information

Shared information

Information t/ t l

Own Data

if

Measure value dd dif then display and

h

Own Recipe

if

I ncest- free Data Fusion

External Sources

Non-organic

Internal Sources

Organic

Fusion/assessment

Displayed information

Shared information

Information t/ t l

Own Data

if

Measure value added

if then display and

share

Own Recipe

if

I M/ fusion Recommendations for I mproved Network Enabling Activities such as in GI G/ NCW/ NCO/ NEC/ NEOps and JFS

46

I nformation Age Warfare … Domains of Conflict

Source: Office of Force Transformation, The I mplementation of NCW

50

Role of CEW in Network Protection

• I n the 20th century, radar and Radar Electronic Warfare evolved to provide situational awareness and platform protection.

• I n the 21st century, Communication EW will evolve toprovide radio spectrum awareness and network protection for the Network Centric Warfare force.

Excerpt From TTCP Electronic Warfare Systems (EWS) Group Workshop Presentation

Approved for Unlimited Distribution

51

Communications Electronic Warfare

• CEW is comprised of three related disciplines:

– Communication Electronic Support (signal interception, emitter locating, analysis)

– Communication Electronic Attack (jamming, deception)

– Communication Electronic Protection (anti-jam radios)

• Communication Electronic Support (CES) provides:

– Surveillance of the radio spectrum

– Identification of radio signals and spectrum usage

– Recovery of message content

– Geolocation and tracking of emitters



52

CEW Radio Spectrum Monitoring

Detect all signals in range of sensor

Direction-Find and geo-locate

emitters

I dentify signal types and spectral

usage

I ntercept signals of interest



53

CEW Emitter Map

Geo-location and tracking of emitters

Associate radio signals to emitters over time for area of

interest

Classify emitters

Identify network structure of

emitters



54

Radio Spectrum Awareness

• Need Input from the “network”

– Blue Force Tracking (who, where, when)

– Wireless networks and spectrum usage

– Reports of outages and interference of wireless links

• Need to know the RF environment

– Map local, civilian use of the spectrum

– Model radio propagation environment

– Detect and track changes in spectrum usage

• Need sufficient Communication Electronic Support (CES) capability

– Quantity of sensors required to cover area of interest

– Continuous frequency coverage over all comms bands

– Ability to identify all types of radio signals

– Geo-location of emitters



55

Summary of TTCP EWS Workshop on NCW

• There are potential vulnerabilities to Network Centric Warfare and network-enabled systems.

• Detailed understanding of all potential vulnerabilities, including technological, organizational, and human-related, is essential to developing and operating NCW systems that are robust, reliable, and effective.

• I t is particularly important to address asymmetric attacks against the network.

• Significant research is required to properly investigate the vulnerabilities of NCW systems and assess levels of robustness.



56

Security and Trust in Dynamic ad hoc Networks

•Objectives:

•Create side channels in MANET communications, simultaneously denying them to others

•Develop and refine techniques for attack detection

•Extend authentication/ trust models into the wireless ad hoc domain with tactical scenarios in mind

•Push mobile agent research into a MANET environment to enable security services

•Build a trust model for secure routing in MANETs

•Use policy-based control mechanisms in MANET architectures for security/ analysis of traffic flow

•Technologies:

•Mobile ad hoc networks ; Mobile Agents

•Capabilities:

•Ops: Conduct Operational, C2 Operational

•Outputs/ Deliverables:

•New algorithms for attack detection

•covert channel discovery methods

•strong authentication protocol with direct user-to- node binding

•Secure routing enhancement for tactical MANETs

•Outcome:

•A strong security-focused body of research that will allow trusted deployment of next-generation Mobile ad hoc Networks

•Project Duration:

•Apr 2008 – Mar 2013

Le Bar aux Folies-Bergère, 1882, by Manet

57

Secure Access Management for Secret Operational Networks (SAMSON)

•Outputs/ Deliverables:

•Exploitable Results:

• specify an enterprise architecture for secure accessmanagement

• demonstrate an open, standards based, Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) and interface specification

• deliver detailed stakeholder requirements in the areas of: 1) I dentity Management; 2) Authentication; 3) Authorization; 4) Labeling; 5) Policy based access control and 6) Audit

• I ntegrate current DND baseline COTS software to enable a privilege management infrastructure.

• deliver two exploitable contract options to a capital project to study business transformation ($5M) and scalability studies ($8M)

• demonstrate I AP accredited SAMSON system on a live operational network

• validation of Labelling techniques and blinding of the metadata to the data

•Desired I mpact:

• exploitation by DI MEI / I M Gp project on an operational network to reduce the number of deployed CEO caveats

• adoption of architecture interface standards in OASI S or W3C

• I nitial Authority to Process ( I AP) Accreditation on an Operational network

• exploitation of contract options by I M Gp project or Director I nformation Management Engineering and I ntegration (DI MEI )

•Project Duration:

•April 05 to Apr 12

•Objectives:

• integrate and demonstrate secure access and dissemination capabilities for selected applications, including document sharing, email exchange, database access, web services, GCCS and chat.

• demonstrate these capabilities on a live operational network

• leverage previous DRDC and Canadian industry collaboratively developed technology.

• leverage international efforts in secure access management.

• bridge demonstration R&D project to a capital activity

• build certification accreditation testing into project deliverables

•Desired Outcome:

•Prototype system demonstrated on an operational network, including certification accreditation.

58

Acknowledgements

The author of this presentation, Paul Labbé, wants to express special thanks to all experts, managers, and military officers who directly or indirectly contributed to the material and the thinking of this presentation. Here is a short, not all inclusive, list of these supporters (my apologies to any I omitted in this list): Louise Lamont, Li Li, Ying Ge & Dale Arden (for coauthoring papers such as the “Cooperative blue-force tracking (BFT) and shared situation awareness (SA) in complex terrains” which are the foundation of this presentation), Tricia Willink (on context aware radios), Major B.W. Steinke, LCol Mike Bodner & Gilles Pageau (on ISSP-SSTRM), Major Chris Mullins (on CF Core NEOps Initiatives), Mélanie Bernier and Joanne Treurniet (on CF Cyber Operations in the Future Cyber Environment Concept), Derek Elsaesser on EWS, Mazda Salmanian, Peter Masson, Daniel Charlebois & Paul Béland (on “Security and Trust in Dynamic ad hoc Networks” and “Secure Access Management for Secret Operational Networks”).

In addition my special thanks to Thomas Engelman, Program Director, Institute for Defense & Government Advancement (IDGA) as a co-sponsor with DRDC for my participation at this summit.

59

Radio Range Ratio as a Function of the Carrier Frequency Ratio

hb (m) =

2

4

6

8

10

12

5 10 15 20

fr (fc1/fc2)

dr (d

2/d

1)

1 10 30 100 300

60

References and Notes (1)

• http:/ /www.crc.gc.ca/ fr/html/manetsensor/home/publications/publications :several references including: Paul Labbé, Louise Lamont, Ying Ge and Dale Arden, "Cooperative blue-force tracking (BFT) and shared situation awareness (SA) in complex terrains", NATO SET-104 Symposium, Antalya, Turkey on 1-2 October 2007.

• Assessing C3I in Support of Dismounted Operations in Complex Terrain, Edward Brady and Stuart Starr, JUN 2002, “Complex terrain such as forests and cities are 3-dimensional environments that restrict ground maneuver and reconnaissance.” In the area of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, we are currently limited in our ability to perform this function in urban areas because of the complexity of the topology (e.g., sewers, large buildings). Results: Impact of Communications (perfect over no comms) on Floor Clearing Effectiveness: Red/Blue Loss Exchange Ratio (LER) improvement % as function of Red Force intensity: 68% at low, 274% at medium and 5% at high Red force intensity.

• The Battle of Fallujah: Lessons Learned on Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) in the 21st Century, by Tao-Hung Chang, 2008, Advised by Maj. K. T. Saunders, Department of Naval Science::: “proved that with the proper use of technologies, MOUT is no longer an equivalent of disaster.” From Fallujah, the counter-insurgency came to a new page as Gen. Mattis said: “Shoulder to shoulder with our comrades in the Army, Coalition Forces and maturing [ Iraqi] Security Forces, we are going to destroy the enemy with precise firepower while diminishing the conditions that create adversarial relationships between us and the Iraqi people.”

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