Improving Tactical Maneuver With Digital Situational Awareness

7/27/2019 Improving Tactical Maneuver With Digital Situational Awareness

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IMPROVLNG TACTICAL MI W E W E R WI'W1)IGITAL SITUATIONAL AWAREh'LSS

. A thesis prescntcd to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyComnland and Gcncral Staff Colleg e in partialfulfillnient of the rcquiremenu for thedegree

ARTIIUR S. DEGIIOAT, MAJ, U SA13.A.. Scton Hall University, 1984

Fon Lcavenworfh. Kansas1997

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.


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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE. . . .

1. AGENCY U SE ONLY (Laeve !dm&) 2.REPORT DATE 3.REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED6 June 1997 Maser 's Thesis , 4 A u g 9 6 - 6 June 19974. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERSImproving Tactical Ma neuver W ith Digital Situational Awareness

6.AUTHOR(S)M ajo r A n h ur S . D eg ro a~ . S. Army

7.PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND AD DRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATIONU.S.Army Comm and and General Sraff College REPORT NUMBERA T M : A TZ L- SW D -G DFort Leavenworth. Kansas 66027-1352

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAM E(S) AND ADDR ESS(ES) 10.SPONSORING I MONITORINGAGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION I AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b.DISTRIBUTION CODEApproved for public release; disfribution is unlimited A

I13.ABSTRACT (Madmum200 words)This study lnvest~gates he uu f digital situational awarene ss to improve tactical maneu ver functions of armored andI . 'mechanrzcd compa ny teams. Th e concep t presented conclude s that all maneuver functions realize a w u nt ia l for imorovedexecution by enhancing the Operators ability to perceive, compr ehend and predict future states of his;nvimnment by'cmployingadvanc ed comman d and control system s to create digital situational awareness. Th e Army is expendin g significant effort towanmaking qualitative improve ments to the lethality, tempo and survivability of warfighting organizations as it develops the forcefor the 2 ls t Century. Central to this effort is an initiative to digitize the battlefield by applying advanced informationtechnologies to the battle comman d system s of the combined arm s team. This study explains how and why tactical maneuv er isimproved by digital situational awareness. This study examines current tactics, techn iques and procedures (lTP), findings fromArmy Advanced W arfighting Experim ents (AWE) and Situational Awareness Theory from Human Factors psychology todetermin e the nature of performanc e improvement. For the Army to re al ix the enhancem ents it is seeking, it must fullyunderstand the effec ts that digital system s have upon small units executing tactical maneuver.

14. SUBJECT TERMS I15. NUMBER OF PAG ESI wareness. B attle Command. Tactical M aneuver 16. PRICE CODE+17. SECU RITY CLAS SIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY C LASSIFICATION 20.LIMITATION OF ABSTRACOF REPORT OF THIS PAGE OF ABSTRACT


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MASTER OF MII.ITARY ART AND SCIENCETlIESIS APPROVAI. PAGE

N;~ mc f Candidntc: XiAJ Arthur S . DcGroatIh es is Title: Improving Tncrical hfancuvcr with Digital Sitclatio!ial Aw xc nc ss

Approved by:

-. ,Thesis Commiltcc ChairmanLTC Steven L. Davis, M.A.

- -, hlemberhlAJ Kevin D. Poling. M S .

- .Member. Consulting FacultySFC John T. Droom. Ph.D.Accepted [hi s 6111 day o f Ju nc 1997 by:

,Dircclor, Graduate Dcgrcc Prog ramPhilip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

T l ~ c pinions and conclusions expressed hercin are thosc of the student author and do notrcprescnt the views of the U.S. Amiy Conlmand and Gcneral Staff College o r any othergovernmental agency. (Kefercnces to this study should include the foregoing stntcment.)


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ABSTRACTIMPROVING TACTICAL MANEUVER WITH DIGITAL SITUA TIONA L AWAR ENESS, by

MAJ Arthur S. DeGroat. USA, 77 pages.This study inv estigates the use of digital situational awareness to improve tactical m aneuverfunctions of armored and mechanized com pany teams. The concept presented co nclud es that allmaneuver functions realize a potential fo r improved execution by en hanc ing the operators abilityto perceive, comprehe nd and predict future states of his environmen t by emp loying advancedcomm and and control systems to create digitel situational awareness.Th e Army is expending significant effort toward making qua litative improvem ents to thelethality, temp o and survivability of warfighting organizations as it develops the force for the21st century. Central to this effort is an initiative to digitize the battlefield by app lying advancedinformation techno logies to the battle commancl systems of the com bined arms learn.Th is study explains how and why tactical maneu ver is in~ pro ve d y digital situational awareness.This study exam ines current tactics, techniques and procedures (TIT), indings from ArmyAdvanced Warfighting Experiments (AW E) and Situational Awareness Theory from HumanFactors psychology to determine the nature of performance improv ement. For the Army torealize the enhancem ents it is seeking, it must fully understand the effects that di g i~ al ystemshave upon small units executing txtical maneuver.


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Completing this thcsis has been a significant cliallengc worthy of thc effort expended. Iexpress sincere t1i:inks to a11 of those who huvc supported my effort and inspired me to worktow,irds deve lopir~ g olutions to the Arniy's challenges of the future.

First, I wish to acknowledge my nicntor, MG (K ) Lori E. Maggart, former Chief ofArtnor and Cavalry, for instilling ir i me thc passion. wisdom and commitment to work towardsPI-epar ing or the f ~ ~ i i ~ r ef mounted conlbat. His efforts to accelerate the transformation of ou rForce to Army XXI erve as a guiding light for those w l ~ o ~ nill follow along the path he hasl~c lped et.

Secondly, I wish to thank SFC Jolin T. Broom. Ph.D. for his efforts as a mcmbzr of myresearch cornmittce. lIc has singularly providcd me the greatest support in this effon and by hisexample, serves to remind me of the awesom e power of a soldier's intellect. '

Next. 1wi>h to acknow ledgc the men and worncn of the sonibincd arm s team who mdeserve nothing but tlic k s t warfighting capability our Nation can p rovide. It is from theirsacrifices that I draw cncrgy for ninking the Army of the future bztter than i t is today.

I remain solely responsible for any errors or faults in this thesis.


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TABLE OF CONTENTS

AI'PKOVALPAGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CKNOW1.EDGEMENTSCIIAPTER1. INTKOI)UCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .L.ITERATUREKI5VIEW3. METIIODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ANALYSIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CONC:LIJSIONS

TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .BmL.IOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .INITIAI. DIST RIBUTIO NLlST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


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The United States will be the first nation to pass through the InformationRev oluti on. cmcrging with different strengths that can give us an edgeacross the entire spectrum of contingencies against which the nation mayneed to commit its military.' Admiral William A. Owcns. USN

Introduction- --The United St;ltes Arm y is going to extciisive efforts to irnprove thc w y actical units

will fight i n the twcnty-first century. Since 1989, the U.S. Army has k c n p orsl~ ing n effolt to"reconccptunlizc and redesign the force at all ecl~clon s, rom foxhole to the m ilitary i~l du st ri dbase. to meet the needs of a volatile and ever changing w o r ~ d . " ~his process of transforming theUS. rmy is known as Force XXI. The Force XXI process secks to conceptualize, develop.experiment and field new warfighting technologies, orgm iwt iona l dzsigns, and doctrine toinsure that the U S . Army renxiins the w orld's dominant land force in the future. Centr al to thiseffofort is the concept of digiri:urion of rhe hutrli~field.

D ~ j i z a t io n f the Battlefie ld"Digitizing the battlefield" is the cerilral initiative of this trcmc ndous underta king. The

Army is currently inserting advanced information trchnologics (digital) into combined a nn s unitsin order to enhance th eir lethality, te rnpo, and survivability for future operations. Recentexperimentation and operational tesu indicate that digital command and control systems providetactical commander5 with unprecedented amounts of information necdcd for planning andexccuting tactical maneuver. To date, combat infonnadon, when distributed over digital data


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networks and whcn graphically prescrited i n rnultimcdia formats, has ( I ) enhanced thecommander's awarencss of the tactical situational, (2 ) crcatcd a shared or conimon view of thebattlsficld wit11 other mctnbers of his unit. and (3 ) assistcd conlnlandcrs in the task of visualizingfi~ tur e tatcs and actions. The A rmy refers to the product of this ncw capability as digicnlsitrrarior~al w nrcness.

?h e capability to prov idc digital siturrtional awareness to Anicrican soldiers is fullyendorsed by the Army's senio r lc a d m duc to its potential f or enhancing battlefield performance.General William Hsrtzog. the Training aiid Doctrine C omm and Co ~n ma ndc r,tated that"Digitiz.ation and situational aw;lreness arc thc hciirt of futurc w n rf ig ~ it in ~ ." ~n r e sp nsc to aCommand and Gcncnil Staff Collcge stud cnt's question rcg arJi ng Army mcxlernization funtling,General Ilcnnis J . Rcimcr. Army Chief of Stiiff smted that. "The potenti;il of digitimtion is sogrcat that we (tlie A n y ) must stay thc course."' While thc Army's commitnlcnt to this conceptis firmly establizhcd. not all is known about ik potential effec t upon tactical mancuveropcrations.

Di&il Situation Awareness. - . -.- -Digital s i t d o n awac rncss is a s rnonu~ne~ ~ta lchang e in comlndnding and controllingmaneuver operations as was the development of the wird ess radio. While thc Army considersthis capability as an evolutionary step i n battlcficld technological development, the ptentialeffects of this new capab ility may be revolutionary if applied cffcctivcly . Digital situationawareness. i n thc curre:lt military application, is the capahility to automatically share friendlyand enemy position locations, terrain data. targcting information, and logistics status over digitalcomlnonications nctwo rks or t(zcrical irtrcmcrs. Data burst transmission o f grapliical overlays.dynam ic situation displays, and au tomatic combat repo rting may providc tactical leaders and


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soldicrs with more essential information needed to perform many critical man cuw r functionsfiistcr than ever possible with current a ~liilog voice-only radio) systcnis. Thc challenge the A ~ m ycu i~cn t lyaces is dder inin ing how to best apply tllic new inforni;itional capability to dcrive amaneuver advantage over potential futurc advcrs;iries.

Entohasis on Mancuvcr-The Army has been sccking to insurc maneuver dominance for the past two decades.

The Ammy's capstone warlighting doctrine of Ficld Manual IW-5. Acny Operatioils (1993).contiriucs tlic evaluation from attrition-oricntcd warfare to establish a primary emph:~sis on the

role of mmc uvc r to achieve dcc is im . This enipllasis on the conccpt of maneuver supporls thecurrent U.S. Joint doctrine for land-based warfare. Joint Publication 3.0, Joint O p a t i o n s(1995), states "that the focus of land-based warfare is to rcndcr opponents incapable of resistingby shattering the morale and physical cohesion (their ability to fight as an effective coordinated\vhole) rather than to destroy them physically by att ri ~i on ." ~t is upon this conceptual basis thatthe Am y' s Force XXI cf fo r~ s re focused on developing improved rnaneuvcr capabilities for itstactical units.

"Thc line of thought [hat digitizing the battlefield is only automating the corninaid andcontrol function for improving the speed and accuracy of information is only paltially ~ o r r e c t . " ~What the Army is seeking to gain by d igitizing its force is tlic net gai n of corn ~nn nd nd corltrol(C2) cnhancements of every lowcr-echelon w arfighting unit, re al i7 d as greater combat pcwcrfor forniations os a whole. Simp ly stated, the Army seeks to derive grcater combat power fromits units by enhancing C2 functions that will enable a net gain in perfomlance of ':criticalelements of combat power--maneuver, fircpowcr, protcction and leadm hip."' These desircdi~n pro ve me nts re measured in terms of increa ses to lethality. surviva bility, and the ability toincrease and rcgulnte the tempo of battle.

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The Army defines maneuver ah both a system and a function. M me uv er drrivcs itsconccptual basis from FM l(X)-5 as a battlcfield operating system. Rattleficld o peratin g sy w ln sare defined in FM 100-5 as the mnjor/lrnc tio~rs erfo rn~ cd y the force on the battlcficld tosucccs\fully execute battlcs and engagcnlents i n order to accon~ plishmilitary objecti\.es directedby the operational com n~a nde r.

The Army further specifies rnw cuve r as a function in T iU I> OC Pamphlet 11-9.Bl=ijit of the Battlefie ld (19 94) . Th is definition is provided latcr in this cha pte r. This.paniphlct srrve s as a conin ior~ efevmcc source for tllc development of all Army warfightingfunctions and is used by field com man ders, cornbat dcvclopers, analysts, planners, do ctrinedevclopcrs, and ~ra iner s.This resc,u.ch uscs the TRADOC Pm ph le t I 1-9 methodology fo ran;~ly zing ombat functions duc to its status as th e Army-wide standard frm ~e wo rk ord~. vclo pin g octrine, niatcriel, and training.

Force XXI Exjcr!~!cnIationIn an effort to accc.lerxe the developnicnt of enhanced concep ts and battlcfield system s.

the U.S. rmy is undertaking a large-scale exprim entalion program. This program is a n~;ijoraxis of cffort within the Force X XI process and is centcred around the condu ct of ad vanc ed.warfighting experimcnis (AW E). Based upon results from scvcral battalion-sized AWES, theArmy is currently preparing to conduct two major AWFJ in 1997 and I99 8 at the brigade anddibision Icrcls. 1 1 c primary purpose of these AW ES is to examinc the potential of digitalsituation awareness. Thc Army designated the 4th Infantry Division (Mechani7d) at Fort IIood.Texas, as t11c Expcrimcntal Force or (EXFOR) for thesc experiments.

Thc EXFOR'S success du ring these AWES will bc mcasurcd by how well they can utilizetheir digital infomation advantage to out think, dccide and act over the Oppo sing F orce(OFF OR). It is irnpcrativr that the EXITOR optimize their advanced information systenis to

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producc digital situation awareness and im pr ow critical tactical functions such as mmcuvzr .n i e U.S. rniy's Test and Expcrimcntion Com mand (T EXC OM ) is the lead agency responsiblefor "determining whethcr (tx ti ca l) capahilitics arc increased or the timc line (to cxccutc bartlctilsks) is reduced by [he technology being t c s ~ e d . " ~ critical stcp towards optimizing thcsc r~ cwcapabilities will be the continued dcvelopmcnt and refinenlent of tactics, techniques, andproccdurcs for tactical maneuver. The intent of th is study is to support this dcv elop men ~al . .proccss.

In sun~rn;~ly,niproving tactical nime uve r is a furidarne~ital bjective of the 1J.S. Arnly'sdigitiration effort. Ilow cvtr, dcveloprnental work to date has nor ideotified prcciscly how loapply this new 'apnhility to m,axi~n izc ts potential a i t h i r ~he function of t:ictieal maneuver. Thisthcs is inrends to suppo1.1General Ifn ~izo g's irective to " Optilnize the utility of the digitizationcapabili~ieshat we are putting into the force t o d ; ~ ~ . " ~

Definition of thc Problem--rile purpose of this thcsis i s to idcntify relationships between digital situational

awareness and tactical m:mruvcr f~~nctiowsll older to support the Army's effort to dcvclopdoctrine, tactics, techniques and proccdurcs (DTI'I') ford igita l warfighting. The prinlaryresearch qucstion that this thesis serves to answ er is: What specific tactical mancuver fimctionsand tasks ciin be i m p r o d by providing lcadcrs and soldiers with digital situntional awarene ss?h4ore specifically, this research seeks to idcntify potential applications of digital situationalawarene ss capabilities to improve the functions of tactical m ancuvcr for the mounted(mechanized and armorcd) comb ined arnis company teams.

In order to answer the primary rcsearch question, the following five secondary questionsrequire rcscxch and analysis:

1 . What arc nianeuvzr functions for tactical units?5


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2. \Vh;~t s situational awareness in the tl~cor etic al nd military conte xts?3. What nleasures of perfor~narlce(X10P) onstitute improvcn~en to current nxineuver

functions?4. What spccific siti~ationnl wareness capnbilities arc produced by digital co rn~ nan tl nd

control systcms at the brigade level and bclow?5. Whnt are the current tactics, techniques, and procedures for digital situational

awarcncss snd do thcy ilnprove tactical inancuvcr functions?

)&!&gradIn ordzr to c~tablish contcxt for t h i 5 rcsexch, i t is essentiill to first review the grrlcsis

of this research prohlc~n,hen briefly exanli;ie :he digitization effort of the Force XXI BattleConl~nand-Brigade nd Below (FDCD2) F~ og rum , nd the Army's process for developing TI'Pfor digitally equipped units. The purpose of this review is to pr o\ ide ;in account of thedcvelopment of this research problan. as w l l as background information rrgarding the FTICF.2program and 'lTP dcvelop ment as thcy relate [o the research proble m.

The problem of dcvcloping op tin ~a l ;rt isa l ;~pp lications or new battlcficld technologiesis not new to the U.S. ~r ny . Iowcvcr, thc scope of the digitbation initiative is orders ofmagnitude greater in complexity th;m the Amy's past experiences in integrating newcapabilities. This increase in cornplzxity n~n nife sts tself into every clem ent of foic cdcve lopl ~len t--dm rine, raining, leadership, orgarliwtionnl design. materiel, and soldier systems(DTLOMS). For the p l ~ r p o ~f this study, thc prirn;~ry oncern is d e v e l o p r ~ ~ ~ n tf doctrine andTIT'. This increase in complexity is c:~used y at least five factors.


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A Co. g I ~ & I r c n .The first cause of increased complexity in dc\eloping new tactical n~et;~odss the new

and imique nature of digital systems. Digital system s rcprescnt new ways an d mea11s ofperforming battlefield functions. This is contrasted to the U S . A m y ' s pas1 experie nceintegr;~ting rodirct-in~proved r enhmced versions of existing systems, such as the prxess ofclianging from an MI tank to an MI A 1 lank.

Sec ond , the developinent of prc!totypc systenls for experim ental purpo scs pnr;lllel to thedc.vclop~nc.nt f ohjecrive systems produces profound program challengcs gi v w current resourcecoi~straintswithin the Army nio dcmiz ttion effort. The Army's digitiration effort is one of thefirst rnodz rni7~ tion fforts perfoimcd within the new req uirci nen t~ etermination processins~itutcd n 1995-1996. Undcr this new process, the Chicf of Staff, U S . Army h ~ splaced [heTRAD OC Cornmandcr as the approval authority for all Army warfighting requirem cno."'O Bydoing so, TRADOC is the primary agent for managing the conlplexity of balancing thedigitization programs that meet contemporary operational needs of the ficld comin;mders for goto Nar systems, xith the development of future systems based upon concepts andexpcrimcntation. Suppor~inghe si~nult;~neou sevelopment of two separate, but convergingdigital systems with tactics, techniques and procedures remains a daunling task for theforeseeable future.

Third, effort to dcvelop optimal applications of digital capabilities given the currentnlethod of horizontal technology iiitegration (IlTI) of commercial-based technologies intoniilita ~y ystcms is problematic to many force development precesses. This is problematic due tothe inherent, rapid pace of change associated with this strategy. "While 1lTl has the potential toprovide force improvements in order of rnagnitude k y o n d old ways of doing business, i t chmges


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thr, environm ent and processes by which the Arm y modemi7.cs."" On e of these criticalprocesses affcct~ds the developincnt of optim al doctrine an d TIP.

Thc fourth factor causing increased com plexity of tlcvcloping military applications ofdisital c;lpabilities is the dynamic manner i n which the U.SArmy defines the conceptual andphysical ellviroilrnents of a. future battle. The significant intellectual work per fo rr ~~ cdithin themilitary over [he past four years has resulted in the establishment of several visions of what afuture battle may entail. ,411 documents, such as the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of St af fs JO'IHVision-010; TRADOC Pamphlet 52.5-5; Force XXl O p r r s t i m ; TKADOC Black Book L&Co111Ixit n the 2l st Century; and operational concept wargalnz rcports rrom [he Office of the.Secretary of Defense's (OSD) Kwo luti on in M ilitary Affairs (RIMA) program, p rovidedescriptions of the operational environment within uhich units will fight with digital systems inthe future. Whilc these visions prov ide focus to the overarclling digitization initiative,cu~ lccp tua l ispa'rities and lack of cons ensus am ong Army 1c;iders as to their impact upon thedevelopment of tactics exaccrhates the prohlerii of designing optimal ?TP or digital warfighting.

Last, the current low to mid-lcvcl of maturity of both the co mp ~~ tat ion alndcon~municution;IIechnologies requircd for military ;ipplicaiiuns inhibit development of new,o p r im l tactical metllods. A s General Hart zog stated, "We have made great progre ss inidentifying those technologies rcquired for the future but we are not over the techno logical hump

,912yct. The Arniy's recent A W E Focused Dispatch validstes this challenge by determining that"shortf;~llsn interi.onnec~ivityamo ng currently fielded digital systems imposes more of aburden on the uscr than they return in tenus of useful capability and improved forceeff~ctive ness."" Dzspite increasing maturity and usability of digital systems, the developm ent ofoptimal TIT will remain a difficult task until the U.S. rmy p ropels itself over this hum p.


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Developirig TIT for Forcc XXI is a critical task. To meet this task the U.S. Army hasuridcrtaken profound s t e p to deal effectively with new strategic complexities that influence thepath of Arm y in odc rr~i zatio n. "In the last several years, the rapidly increasing pace of change inboth world conditions xid technological advancer~~entas prompted the Army to not only clinngcitself but change the way it changes."" The U.S. TRA DO C, chartered by the Chief of Staff, U.S.Amiy, as the "architect" for the future A m y , established "a sct of dynamic, audaciousorganizations to identify the physical and mental clcm cnts of c!iange required by the A A ~o\ray i n front of 1115 bow-wave of chan ge in this WO I-Idn which our Army works."lJ Theseorganiz;~tionswere establis!icd i n h h y of 1992 ns the Battle Lab Prograr~i.

The h t r l e Lab Program is primarily rssponsiblc for identifying conccprs andrcquircincnts for new doctrine, training, leadcr dcvelop mcnt, organization$. ~~ ia te ri cl ,nd soldiersystems. As such, the Battle Labs pcrfomi the central role in "documenting the TI'P of how tool)c"a~c n the digitized banlcfie~d."'~o date, the Rattle h b rogram has developed two sets ofdigital TIT --di ffere ntia ted as operational (go to war) nnd experimen tal. The oper;ltional sct ofTTP was developed to support the fieldi ~lg f M IA 2 digitally equipped ranks to the 1st CavalryDivision :it fo r t Hood. Texas. The cxpcrirncntal set of 'IlT's was developed for t!ie EXFO R.

What is Force XXI Battle Comm and B rigade and Below?One of thc Army's programs responsible for developing this digital capability is the

FnCB2 program. It is imperative to understand the basic elements of the FBCH2 program as itrelates to this research. FB C8 2 is a program dcvclopcd "to prov ide the Army with near-femidigital command and control capabilities to Forcc XXI units at brigade and subordinatecchcloiis."" Thc FEiCR2 system is comprised of: ( I ) app liqu e @olt-on) and embedded systemliardwxe, (2 ) FBCB 2 software, (3) position navigation and reporting capability. (4 ) interface toI.md and/or sate llite-base d communications system, and (5) A combat identification capability.

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T i c pri nc ip l significance of this program is its effect upmi the devclopmcnt of Amiycommand and control systems. The FUCR2 program, initintcd by tlic dcvclopnicnt of the MIA2tm k as thc Army's first front-line digital system. "rcorientcd thc development of the di gl ~a lbattlefield architccturc from the boltom-up instead of from the t ~ ~ - d o u n . " ' ~onsequently, theFRCB2 is the fil-st Amiy commnnd arid control system being developed to optiniiz e theinforniationnl needs of thc lower-echelon warfightcr. while designed to be fully interoperablewith existing and emerging higher-echelon C2 systcms. Thercfo~c,he tactical pcrfornianceenli'ancemenfs, o r value-added from digitizatio n, will most likely be rcalizcd within lo?ver-echelori \vaf ight ing functions. This will require detcrmin:~tio~ if optimal warfighting 'ITP.

In order to appreciate the program ohjcctives of FUCB2, i t is instructive to considz r thecxisting brigade and &low command and control systerri s l i o r ~ f d l ~hat FBCB2 is a t t enp ing toovercome. The Army's approvcd User Functional D cscriptiori (UFD) (TRADO C,1996) forFF3CB2 dcscribcs existing C 2 system shortfalls as:

1. Inadequate rncans to disseminate bnt ~lef ield nfomintion higher, lower and Ialerally.2. Primary reliance on voice communications.3. Antiquated or obsolete informati011 echnolo gies at the tactical lcvel of war.4. No capability to receive or transniit imagcrylgraphics.5. hlanual-only mcans of sharing podion information and combat idcntifica~ion.6. No mcans of accessing military and non-military distributed databases.7. Liniited functionality to support C 2 of logistical functions.This same source cnunicratss h e cq~abil i t icshat the objcctive FBCI32 system will

providc. This list is found at Tablc 1. Wlierc the Fl3CB2 program dsvelops what the futureArmy will fight with, TTP will detcrminc how the Army will light. Therefore, understanding thedigital-ITP dev clop~ncn tal rocess is esscnti;~lo this research.


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How Does the Army Dcvclop Iligital Tactics, Tc ch niq ~~ cs.nd Procedures?As previously stated, the U.S. Army T lW D OC has dcvelopcd both expcriment;tl and

operational 7 1 P for the employment of digital systems to command and control tacticalopcratiions. This 7 1 P has been developed in en iterative manner ov er the past three years. Aftcrevery major test, experiment, or fielding of ;I new system o r version of software, subjcct-matterexperts and users have rolled feedback back into the 1 T P literature to reflect new discovcrics ofhow c o ~ r ~ ~ n a n dnd control functionr are improved. While this "rolling b;~seline" pproach hasbccn generally effective fo date, the resulting TTP s fo ct~ sed rimarily on the encrblit~gfrrncrionof command and control - not on tactical maneuvcr itself. W ~ i l chis work is essential f o hedevelopment ofdigitnl warfighting, i t is insufficient to fully dc tern ~in ehe effect of this ncwcapability upon the primary funcfion of factical maneuver.

Another challenge to developing effecfive niethods for employing digital situationalawareness tools is overcoming existing pc~ fo r~ na nc crob le~ ns f executing convenfional(nondigital) l T P . The current versions, or baseline. digital Tl'P is based upon conventional TI'Pand thus contains some inherent execution shortcomings. Numerous empirical studies exist thatdescribc unit pr fo rn ~ a n c e hortcomings regarding execution of fnctical oycrations in bothtraining exercises and in actual co~ nb al .An e xtensive analysis was performed after OperationDesert Storm to irlcnfify the s h o ~ ~ c o ~ n in gf current techniques, particularly as they wcreemployed under conditions deemed applicable to n~od crn,wenty-first century batfle.Additionally. lcssons learned through [he Arm y's C ombat Training Centers ( C K ) highlightsystemic challenges units have in executing tactical opcraticms today.

Conseque ntly, the Army's effort to idenfify and re a li x [he potential of digitization willrcquire continurtl work to optimize new capabilities towards enduring battlefield functions, suchas maneuver. This will require overcoming existing execution short fdls while developing


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optimal m ethods ofeiilploying digital situational awarencss tow ards enhancing the Army'stactical mancuver cqxlbility. The Army , through TR ADO C. inust provide digitally cquippcdunits with dtj ni riv e tactics, techniques, and p rocc d~:rc s hat enab lc thern to exploit thc uniquecapabilities they pos sess to ma ncu ver thcir lmits on tl:c riiod'rn battlefield to achicve dccisivevictory.

AssumJ!i


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'typc as the nzounterlforce. While aviation and dismounted forces arc in tc gr ~l lcmcnts of theco~lrbined-'mns m n , they arc beyond ihe scope of (his res exc h.

2. S i x of Military Force. This research will limit its scopt: lo company-sized units.3. Type of Digital Systems. lhis study is limited to t l~ cornrn:ind and control and

ni;lncuver systcins inhcrent to tile FBCH2 program. PI-im arily,FBCB2 is organized with thehl lA 2 tilnk's Intervcl~icular nformation S y s tm (TVIS), the Xlilne~~v crontrol System (Phoenix\.arinnt), and the FDCB2- Appliq ui system. These digital sytterns are currently fielded to bothexperimental and opt:r:~tion;~linits.

4. Tiine. 'I'liis rescarch is liri~ited o the nc:tr-term dcvclo pincnt:~ I eriod of l k c c XXI asdcfincd i n tl ~ c orce XXI Campaign Pla!~ TRADOC, 1095) as 1995 to 2003.

01)cr~t ionaI f in&ojsSevcral opcn tio na l tcrrns require definition fo r the purpose of this study. Due to the

experimental nature of many of these new concepts and programs, doctrinal delinitions do notyet exist. Where doctrina l definitions exist, thcy habe been uscd. \$liere they do not exist.official U.S. Arm y source s werc uccd to providc acct:ptable definition s. The fol!owingopcr;llion;lI definitions apply to tzrrns that ;ire intcgral to this study.

Tactical Maneuver. Tactical maneuver is tlcfincd i n TKADOC Pam 11-9Blucyrint~f. -- -a lrtlefield (1994), as "the cmploynient of forces on the battlefield through movenicnt anddirect fire in com bination with li re support, or fire potential, to ach ieve a position of advantitgc inresjxct to enemy ground forces in ordcr to acc~'nip1ish he mission." TKADO C Pamphlet 1 1-9dc co rn pr es the tactical nlaneuvsr syslern into four critical functions - m ow , engage encrny withdircct lire, control battle space, and inkg rate direct fire with maneu ver. These functio ns are theb ai s o lrhis rcsc.uch. A detailed listing of thcse functions, along with dx xd in; !te tasks is foundat Table 2 of this thesis.


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Digitization of the Battlefield. Di git i7~ tio n f the b;~ttlcfield s one of the ccntral--initiatives of the Ar my 's >fidern ization Plan. Digitization of the battlefield, or digitizatio n, isdcfincd in the Unitcd Sta tcs Army Posture S t a t c ~ n ~ ~ ~ tor Fiscal Year 1997 as,

The application of information technologies to acquire, exchange, and employ timelybattlcfield infornl;ltion throughout the entir e battle space. It enables friendly forces to sharea relevant, common picture of the battlefield while communicating and targeting in real ornear-real time. It will reduce the fog of war and d ec re ae decision making time byoptimizing the flow of cornmand and control infonnntion."!)&jtal Cornnl1111ications.Ca rJinc (1994) lrccuratcly defines digital comm unication s as:

Thc encoding of any information into a discrete or discontinuous signal by partitioning thesignal and assigning i t a numerical binary code (one or zero) value. T h e odes arc lesssensitive to noise, intcrference from other frequencies, signal distortion and fading, and havegreater transrnirsion efficicncy than continu ous vw iahlc (analog) signals. Becau se thesesigi~als re i n a ncmerical code thcy can he processed by com pt~t ers sing mathematicalalgnrithms to nmip ul:lt e the information for many purposes. Conversion of the digital signalinto an analog signs1 is done by use of a mo ilula tor-d cn~ dula tor modem) device. Th isdigital technology and the analog-to-digit:~l nd digital-to-analog conversions are thc physicalbasis that pcnnit thc transnlission and processing of vast amounts of data by computers andis the cnabling technology of the Information Revolution.

Battle-.- o r n n d . Rattle command is the U.S. Army's new command philosophy. Thisphilosop hy provides the conceptual fra ~n ew or k or the integration of intellectual, organiza tional,procedural and technical aspects of com ~n an di ng oldicrs and units in battle. U.S .A rmy Fieldblanual 100-5,O p a ti o n s (June 93). defines Haulc command as,

The art of battle dccision-making, leading and motivating soldiers and their organizationsinto action to accomplish missions. It includes visualizing the current and future states ,formulating concepts o f operation to get from one lo another, and doing so at least cost.Assigning missions, prioritizing and allocating resources, selecting the criticd time and placeto act, and knowing how and when to make adjustments during the fight are also i n c ~ u d e d .~ 'Situational Awareness. The Army e nt ap ri se strategy is thc unified vision statement for-. -- - . - -

the m odc rniu tion of Army comm and, control, communications, computers, and intelligence(C-11). I'his document dcfines situational awarcncss within the current niilitary con text . It isdcfined as.


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The p p l i i c and instantaneous knowledge of your own location a nd the relative locations offriendly and enemy forces in your area. For l o w r echelon s dou-n to combat crews, situationawareness is essential for survival and combat effecti~eness.~TR..ZDOC Paniptilet 525-5, F orce X XI 01x rations ( 1 August 1994). expands this definition toinclude, "creating 3 common, relzvnnt picturz of the battlefield scaled to specific levels ofinterest and special needs."23

A r g v Rattle Cornmand.Systzln. The Army R attle Com man d System (BCS) is defined i nthe US Army 1:ieltl hi:inua l 24-7. A r~ nv attle Com ~iiand vstcr11hfiin _:~e me nt echniques(1995), as thc ovcrarching systeni that consists of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures(?TI') arid tools uscd to com ma nd and con!rol forces on thc tactical b attlefield. The ABCSprovitles the ri iex ~s equipment and procedares) to: ( I ) collect m d or ga ni x large amounts ofinformation. (2) combine information from multiple sources. (3) prwess information to analyzetrends, (4) develop courses of actions based on situntio~ial actors. ( 5) exc hange informationefficicr~tly mong and within command posts (CP) and ( 6 )present information as graphicaldisplays and textual summaries.

The ABCS is the keystone of the digitimtion of the battlefield effort that provides theconimaridzr an integrated digital inforrnation network that sup port s warfig hting systems andensures co ~iim and nd control decision-cycle superiority.

Taelical Dec isi on- ha kin c Proce.3. This research references the two prin~aryactical..- --decision-making processes uscd m ort often at the brig~ ide nd belo w level, the Combat Decision-hlaking Process (CDM P) and Troop Leading Procedures ('I'LP). Ac cord ing to US A m yComm and and Gcneral Staff Colleg e (CGSC) Student Text (ST) 101-5, Cbnim.md and StaffDecision Process. "the CDMP is an abbreviated form of the deliberdte decision-making process(DDMP) uscd by commanders and staffs in combat situations to plan quickly."24


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'T ro o~ m d i n e Proce.du-. The TLPs are an eight step procsss used to be combat--leadc.rs (x ithout staff support) to pl;in, prepare, and cxecute tactical operations. TLPs aregenerally enlployed by sniall units, comp.mies, and platoons, and they complement the CDhlP ofhigher echelon units, such as battalions and brigades.

Tactical Internet. A tactical internct is an integrated battlefield communications network- - .modeled after the commercial Internet. This network will provide reliable. seaml ess, and secureconiniun icatio~is onnectivity required to support systems of the F IK IJ 2 program. Informationflow within this network is based upon the exchange of common tactical message sets that havek e n devclopcd for use by most tactical data systellis uscd by A rmy and other services an dagencies. The t;tctical internet is a critical enabling capability for devdoping a sharcd picture ofthe hattlcfield among elenlcnts of digital units.

Sisnificance of the StudyDesert Storm showed the potential with only the first generation ofsystem s and concepts. Today the U.S. s moving to the secondgeneration and developing the upcrational concepts, doctrine and tacticsthat go with it.

Honorable William T. Peny. Foreign AffairsThe purpose of this research is to advance the Army's effort towards realizing the

tactical w ~r fig hl in g otential of digital situational awareness. This study intends to add to thebody of rcscarch of this ricw area of strategic irnportancr, to the U.S. Arniy. Prior to one of theArmy's advanced warfighting expcrimcnts, LTC Joseph E. Orr, Conimandcr of Task Force 2-33An nor , one of the Ammy's first digitally equipped units, cha llenged his troops "to be a part ofsomething greater-a digital team."25 This study is an attempt to support the Army's effort inrriaking digitization som ething g reater.


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The complex nicthod of conceptualizing new digital TIT' requircs focused analyticresearch to supplement the milititry judgment of the 'lTP developers involvcd i n this process. Todate, little analytical research has been conducted to support this essential undertaking.

This study's resulting recommendations provide a concepto;ll perspective to support thedevelopment of the next generation of digital, maneuver-oriented TIT. Thi s study, whenir~cludedwith other analytic al research, experimental findings, and expert military judgment. willassist the Army i r ~ealizing its goals and objectives for Force XXI.

~~

I Wi!!iam A. O wens, Dom inant B a t t l es g e K o e Washington, DC: NationalDciense Unircrsity Press, 1995). 3.. ,'US . Army, F3rc1: XXI, A m c r ~ c a A r 1 1 1 ~ ~ f . t h cls t CC@!IQ. (R. onroe, VA: Officeof thc Chief of Staff, Arm y, (January 1995), 1.

'William W. artzog, discussion with m thor , notes, Ft. Monroe, VA. 28 November1995.4Dennis J. Reimer, authors address notcs. Ft. Leavenworth. KS. 25 October 1996.5U.S. D epartment of D efense. Joint Publication 3-0,J~u.OgerationsWashington, DC:Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1995), N 8-9.

7U.S. A m y , FM 1100-5.Army O~cra t ionsWashington, DC: Dcpanmcnt of the An ny.1993), 2-19.' ~ e n n i s teele. "Countdown io the Next Century." .&IJ (November 1996): 20.9 ~ i l l i a n i . Hanzog, discussion with author, notes. Ft. Monroe, VA, 28 November1995.%.s. Amiy. Rg ui re m cn ts Deternlination. (Ft. Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training andDoctrine Comm and, March 1996). preface.I ! U.S. Arnmy, !996 Modernizat ion Plan (Washin gton, DC: Depar tme nt of the Army,1996). 15."u.s. An ny, Land Combat i n the 21st Century (Ft. Monroe, VA: U.S. rmy TRADOC,1996). preface.


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1 3U.S. Anny. AWE FO C II SC ~iya tch : Final Kcport (Ft. Knox, KY: MountedUattlcspace Battle Lab, June 1996). 1-5.14U.S. Army, Battle Labs: Defininx the Future, (Ft. Monroe, VA: U S . Anny TRADOC .

hla y 1995), preface.

"u.s. Arniy, US.Armv Di~itiz3h.n X la s tc r P b (Washington. DC: Anny Digit izationOffice, March 1996). 6- 1.l S ~ h r i s t ophe r. Cardine. D i g i t h i o n of the Battlefield (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U S .Army War College, 1995),2 1.

"u.s. Army, l!?j!~t Venture Campaign Plan (Ft. M onr w , VA: U S . Army TKADO C,April 1995). 3.2 0 ~ . ~ .rmy, U S . Army Post~~ret i l m e n tN 97 (Washington, I X : Dcpartmcnt of the

Army. 1996), 68.

2 ' ~ . ~ .rmy, U S . Armv E n t e r i s a (Washington. DC: Office of the Secretaryof the Ann y. July 1993). 18.2 3 ~ . ~ .rmy, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations (Ft. Monroe. VA: U.S.

Anny TRADOC. 1994). 2-1.' 4 ~ . ~ .rmy, CGSC Srudcnt Text 101-5, &nml;ind and Staff Dx isi on Prme ss (Ft.Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Anny Comnlarld and General Staff College, 1996), 3-5.25U.S. Army, AWE Focused Dis ~a tch :Final Re~ortFt. Knox, KY: Mounted

Battlespace Battle Lab, June 1936). App A.


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C H A P T I 3 21.ITERATGRE REVIEW

Innovation is fostered by information gatliercd from new connections;from insights gained by journeys into other disciplines or places; fromactive, collegial nctworks and fluid, open boundaries. Innovation arisesfrom ong oing circles of exchange, whe re information is not jw taccu ~nu l;itcd r stored, but created. Margxet J. WheatleyInadershie and the New Sc.ir:ncc (1994)

PLDThis chapter rcviews relevant literature regarding key facets of the rcscarch question.

The purpose of this review is to examine published literature that; ( I ) identifies authoritativeworks in the field , 2) provides essential information on spccific subject areas, and (3 ) answersseveral; secondary research questions. This rcview provides definitive information of thefollowing three areas of this research:

1. Current maneuver 1I'P for digital company tcxns.2. Results of Advanced Warfighting Experiments.3. Situational Awareness T heory.

MzthcdThis chapter begins with an o:-erall description of the project's informational needs that

are satisfied by this literature review. This is followed by ;in exan iination of the Arm y's digitalTTP nianuals that des cribe curren t applications of digital situational awareness. Next, this


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rcview pro\'idcs relevant insights fioni scveral of thc Arm y's Advanzcd W arfighting Experimen ts(AWE) that establish a PI-elirninarybaseline of psrfornmce indicators of current digital TIT.Finally, this chapter concludes with an overview of Situational A ~ a r ~ n c s sheory in order toestablish a foundation for analyzing the Army's current utilization of this concept.

In fo rm ation N eeds and A v : t i l a iTh e following questions must be answered in order to determine the current state of

digital TI'P:1 . What arc currcnt digital l T P applications for thc m out~ led ornpany team?2. What insights have bcen gained by recent Advanced Warfighting Ex p i m c n t s that

indicatc thc effcct th;it digital situ;ttional awarcncss has on nlaneuver functions?3 . What principles of Siluation A wareness Theory effec f the Army's intcgrntion of

digital technology into TI'P?This inform ation is available through three sources. First, current digital TTP s

available through HQ, TR AD OC 's Joint Venture Office at Fo n Monroe, Virginia. Secondly, theBattle Command Battle Laboratory and the Centcr For Army Lessons L e m c d , both at FortLeavenworth, Kansas rnai~~tainxpr.rinicntal data and repolis from the Army's AdvancedWariighting Experiments. Thc third source of infortnation is thc Army Research Institute FieldOffice at Fort Knox, Kentucky where current lirerature on Situational Awareness Theory andHuman Factors Rcscarch is maintained. These three sources provided thc information containedin this study.

CurrentDiQ itaI Tactics. Techn iaues and Procedures (TIT)There arc two pr i~n ary ources for 1 T P for U.S. Army digital units at thc compan y lean1

level. I h ey are:


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1. S T 71-1-1,TTP for the Digit ized C om ~a nv eam (1995).2. ITKS?vi7 1- 1- 1 (AppliquC),TTP for t h e ~ p l q ~ i C - E o ~ i i ~ e ~ - C p ~ ~ . n ytatn (1 996).Ench of these m anuals is written for a different user. The Special Text (S Tj is writt?n for

compan y teams with M IA 2 tanks and Rradley It~fan lty ighting Vehicles ( L W ) digitally-equipped with the Inter-Vehicular Information System (IVIS). The Fort Knox Supplem entalh1atcri;rl (FKSM ) is written for AppliquC-cquippcd company teams of the EX FO R. \Vhilc the1VIS and App liqui units have different capabilities at the present time, the objective digitalsystem as described in thc FRCD2 program will comprise the cnpi~bilities f both of thesesystems. Therefore, the this study examines both of these sources.

ST 71-1-1.1TP for the Dipitizcd Co i i i ~ ) m ~eam cont;~ins 7 new tsclics. tcch ni q~ m rprocedures that employ digital situ;ilional awarm css capabilities for m aneuver functions (SeeTable 3 of Appendix). Ill es c new 'lTPs span the planning. preparation and execution over thespectrum of tactical missions that a company team performs, including attack , defend and otheroperations such as passage of lines and ~it hd ra w al .The distribution of these 27 new 1T P s overthe four maneuver functions of TP 11-9. Rlueprint of the Rattlefield is:

1. Movemcnt -- 8 new TIR.2. Engage the Enemy -- 6 new TI'Ps.3. Control Ba ~tl e pace -- 6 new 'ITPs.4. Integnte Dircct-Fire \\it11 hiancuver -- 7 new Trl's.

The ne;~rly qual distribution of t h m new 'ITPs across the 4 maneuver functions indicates thatdigital s it~ia tion al wareness has a significant impact upon compan y team m aneuver.

A review of this manual identifies several general applications of digital capahilities thatrequ ire mention. First. all of the new ?TPs arc characterized as significant improvem ents toconventional prilctices. These im pro ven ~cn ts re dcscribcd ;is the capability to:


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1. PCI-form arious ste ps of tactical tasks sintrrlratreorisly.2. I'ufonn cliticnl tasks earli er within the sequence of Iargcr processes.3. Perform functions with rnorc accurate aid tinlely informarion.4. Collabor~rrivrly crforni tasks with higher. lower and adjacent nnits.5. Pcrform critical leader tasks while physically rrnrore from the unit.6. Maintain a more acc ura le orien rdio n of the situation.7. Di sw nin ate critical infortnation precisely using gra phi cal rrprrsr ntut ions .Sccondly, the MI A2 tank's fw ta rg ct designation capability impacts upon TT P equally

as niucli as the digital information system doss. Far-tnrget designation entails the use of thevcbiclc navigation system, l a w range finder and microprocessor to auto~~iaticallyeterminetarget locations and generate icons on the infdrniation display. The se i m ns can be h bcle d andnear-instantly passed to other units to orient them toward enemy targets, haz;wd areas and tertainfeatures.

Presently. I3 of the 27 ncw 'ITPs i n this manual integrate the use of the far-targetdesignation capability of the MI A 2 tank with the digital information system (IVIS) to improvecritical nianeuver functions. Th e specific functions effec:ed are engagi ng ene my targcts.controlling battle space an d integrating direct rue with nxmeuver. T he only mancuver TIT hatdoes not comb ine the use of far-targe t designation and 1VlS is the movemc nt functio n. Thi sfinding is significant to this rcsearch bccause i t su ggo ts th;~ t t the company team level, the fartarget dcsign ation capab ility, while not a feature of the FBCR2 program, is an csscntial enablingcapability to achieving ilnprovcments in tactical maneuver through digital situational awareness.Moreover, the lack of far-target designation systcnis in the EXFOR niay prove to be a significantlimit over the effec tiveness of the digital capability they possess.


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Lastly, tl ~ is ource identifies new TTP s that were previously not feasihlc to perform. Th eability to digitally diss


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While tlic combat identification system gives the Applique cornpany team ail increasedfratricide prevention capability over the rVIS company team. thcir lack of a fa- tar get design;itionsystcm on their combat platforna reduces their ability to rapidly and precisely derive targetlocation s. A rev iew of the AppliquC 7Tl's clearly indicate the limitation s that manual targetdc.terminatio11 rocedu res place upon the unit as they conduct m aneuve r and employ direct fires.

Another variation of significance is that this source describes a technique where. "theability to know where the friendly forces are without having to maintain visual contact enablesthe company team to maneuver along several axes, thus moving up to an objective and massingcoinbat power rnore rapidly on thc enemy."' Th is 7TP represents a much bolder approach to thecorlduct of company level mancuvcr than the other source. However. this tactic is not fullydescribed in this manual.

I11 sum rim y, the ST and FKSM both represent the currcnt state of TTP development forthe digitized company team. l l i s review has determined the level to which digital situationalawareness systcms have been integrated into the four functions of tactical rnaneuvcr.Additionally, variations between the capabilities of the uniquely equipped digital units wereidentified to highlight thc inlpxts that ancillary systems, such as far target design;ition and BCIS,have upon the use of digital information systems. Th i s review of 'ITP is not sufficient alone todetcrniinc the current state of digital operations. Therefore, t!iis study examined relevantAdvanced Wrufighting Experiments to complete this review.

Results f Advanccd Wa~&h&ng E x~ er in ie nt s Arn )There arc two primary sources for information regarding experimental insights from

digital maneuve r operations at the battalion-level and below. The se sources are:Final Report of AWE Desert IIa~ nm er, 1994)1:inal Report of AW E Focused Ilispa tch, (1996)

24


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This revizw of experimentation prov ides insights into the effects that new T I'P s and systcmshave upon tactical maneuver.

Advanced Warfighting Experiment Operation Desert Ilan~mer I (AW E O DI-I-VI) wasconductud at the National Training Center. Fort Irwin. California during 2 - 24 April 1994. Thiswas the U S . Army's first large-scale, field experiment aimed to "examine the bartlcfield impactsof a battalionltask force possessing digital communications across all Baflleficld OperatingSystem s (BOS)."' This import;mt experiment was predicated upon a central hypothesis that " abattalion/task force using Fo rce XXI Rattle Cornrnand (systems) would outperform a unit withoutsuch comm unications.'" Jn add ition, num erous, subordinate hypotheses were developed in thearcas of battlefield lethality, survivability and tempo, the bartleficld operating systems (UOS).and the force development systems of doctrine, training, lendership, organi7ationc. materiel andsoldier support (DTLOlMS).

Overall, the central hypothcsis was neither validated nor refuted. Th e AW E Fin;tl Rc p mstates technical immaturity of these digital systems (many still in prototype stage), insufficientquantities of digital equipment for all vehiclcs and an inability to establish hascline data forcomparison were cited as contributing factors to the inability to answer the hypo thesis.Additionally, this report establishes that ( I ) current digital systems prov ide limited improvements-in lethality, survivability and tem po, and (2) despite the inability to answer the centralhypothr.sis, this experiment was extremely successful in gaining warfighter insiglirs into thepotential value-added by digitization.

This rep011specifics 7 improvcm cnls observed of the A W E Task Force that relatc tocori~panyeam m aneuver functions. Thcse inlprovements cite digital ? T F s emp loying situationalawareness ca pabilities as causing:

1. Increased flexibility and ability to react to unexpected actions.


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2. Increased ab ility to integrate direct tircs with obst;icles.3. Increased ability to nlancuver CSS assets securely.4. Reduction in the num ber of critical navigation errors.5. Increased num ber of fighting vehicles that participate in decisive engagen icnts,6 . Dccrease in the time expzndcd to complete actions upon contact7. Incrcnsed ability to hand-offtargets to other elements to engage.While lnnny 1 T P s wcre validated as feasible during this experim ent, many were not due

to technical sh or ~f al ls f the syste ms provided. Most of thcse centered around the lack ofintcroprsbilily (intcrconncctivity) between the mnneuver, intelligence, firc support and airdefense systems. In the c a w where important TrPs were not fully evaluated. sornc threads offeasibility were subjectively derived by thc Suhjcct-M attzr Expcrts ( Sh lE ) [hilt observed thee x p i m e n t . It was upon this basis that thercpon recommended "continuing development ofdoctrine and training literature through itcralive AWES." and "continuing materiel developmentof thcse systems."5

Where AWE Desert H am me r VI focused on the broad areas of imp roving lethality,survivability and tempo. A W E Focused Dispatch focused specifically on training support andTm for digital warfighting at the small-unit level. Major General (Retired) Lon E. hiaggart.then chief of Armo r and Cav alry, stated, where;^ luTC 94-07 (AWE Desert tlarniner VI) provedthat digitized systcms arc powerful, the new AWE (AWE Focused Dispatch) was charged withfiguring out how to k g i n maximizing that powcr."6

AWE Focused Dispatch was conducted 14-31 August 1995 as a series of expe rim en~ s'rnploying cons tluct i\e. virtual and live siniulations at both Fort Knox and the Army NationalGuard Western Kentuck y Train ing Area in Grecnville. The final report states the ovemrchinggoal of the experim ent "w as to refine the digital tactics, techniques and procedu res (TTP)or


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hand-off to the Experimental Force (EXFOR) p atici patin g in the follow-on Task Force AWE. Itwas ;~ccon iplislicdby focusing on the processes of how to best employ digital t~ h n o lo g y ." '

The AWE Focused Dispatch Final R cp o ~ is the most con~prchensive ork describing thepe~for~i i ; incef digital 1TP to date. Foulteen compan y ream. maneuver TTF s werc exaniined inthese experiments. Of these fourteen TTPs. thirte e~iwcrc validated as feasible and effective.One TTP was refuted due to the inability of current systems to send a digital contact report i nadcq uale rime to initiate an engagem ent. Wh ereas these TTP were validated for continucd use bydigital units, their status as iniprorernenrs over conve ntional 'ill's werc nor determined by thisAWE.

Comparable to AWE Desert Hammer VI, significent technical shortfalls existed thatlimited the interconnectivity required bctween digital systems to optimizc their effectiveness.This report declares that "the stovepipe legacy systcm s used i n this AWE dcrnonstrated thatsystems without seamless int?rconnectivity and integration impose more of a burden on the uscrthan they rctum in tcmis of uscful capability and improved force elfecti~cness."~ his finding ismost valid when applicd to the battslion/task force lcvel. AWE conclusions of co n~ pa nyeamoperations wcre gmcrally much more favorable, primarily because they wcre not directlyeffccted by these stovepipe systems.

The Focused Dispatch Final Report makes several conclusions about digital 7TP orcom pany tcmm maneuver that are important to this study. They arc:

1. Current hartlw;~re esigns inhibit usage during vehicle niovcment.2. Digihl systems allow more efficient use of the IeaJers tirnc.3. Digital situational awareness reduced uncertainty for thc company cornmander.

resulting in efficicrit niovcmen t and rapid respon sc time.


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4. Current co ~n ba t ct radios are insufficient to moiv requircd digital information. Far-target designation systems are essential to optinlizc digital 'ITP.

5. Current Val-iablc hlessag e Formats (VMD arc too lengthy to use du ring contact.6. Comp uter icons arc sim pler to use than conventional graphical con trol measures.To sumrn;~rizc, the final rcports of these two AWE S provide information that establish

the current cffectivcness of digital IT P s. These sources also identify critical technicalshortco ming r that limit the potcntial of digital systenls for impro ving tactical man euver. Perhapsthe grcatest value of these rcports i b the effort plx c d in articulating the "art of thc possible"gained by extrapol;tting potcntial capabilities and TITSbased upiln subjective corlclusions of thecurren t sietc. Exploring tlicse potcntialilies is the aim of [his rcsearch.

Situational Awareness Theory- - -- -.This section of this literature review examines the current state of Situation Awarene ss

(SA) research from the scientific field of Hu mm Factors Psychology. Th e objec tive of thisrcvicw is to dctcrn~incwhat principles or insights may relate to the Army's ef fo ns to crcatedigital situational awaren ess To meet this objective the following qucstion s niust be answered:

I . Wl~a ts the origin of SA theory?2. What is thc definition of SA from psychological and military pcrspectivcs?3. What research findings and theoretical principles may relate to the A m y applica!ions?

The Origins of Situation Aw;~rencss SA)SA as a cognitive and behavioral study originated in the U .S. military. Flach (1995)

states "the term situation awareness originated with fighter pilots of the U.S. Air Force as theyattcniptcd to aniculatc the difficulties of managing the complex information processing dernandsof air combat. The term has mo re recently been em braced by thc huma n fa ctors comtilunity to


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define a domain of research wliose goal is to study cognition as i t occurs in complcx, dynamicwork e~lvironmcnts."~

The tcrrn situation awareness spread rapidly throughout the Air Force and intoco~rln iercial vi:ltioo literature. In April of 1994, then Air Forcc Chief of Staff, General blerrillA. hlcPe ak tasked Arnmstrong Laboratory to define SA , and to detcnnin e whether it can bemeasured and ~earncd. '~he L aboratory organized a team of researchers as the situationAwareness Integration Team (SAINT ) to conduct the inquiry and answer General McPe:ik'sqw stio ns. SAINT 'S technical report was submitted and briefed to C en cn l McPeak and the AirForce Science board in Jun e of 1994. This report included a literature review of human factorsresearch in this field of psychology and proposed an operational definition of S A for Air Forceuse. Mo re importantly the team determined p ositively that SA could be measured and learned.

Th eori gin of U.S. Arnly applications of situation awaren ess theory is traced to twoArnly R esearch Institute (AR I) projects initiated in 1989 as "Research in Future Batt lefieldConditions and the Comhat Vehicle Comniand and Control (CVCC) Program."" These researchefforrs were aimed to support the Army movement toward vehicle-baed automated commandand cor ~t ro l C2) systems, and to identify new challenges sn iall unit com man ders w ill f:ice inmanaging battlefield inform ation.

The A m y R esearch Institute's Field Unit at Fort Knox, Kentucky conducted basic andapplied research to "enhance soldier preparedness through identification of future bactlcfield .coriditions and to develop training methods to meet those conditions."" Additionally, the CV CCprogram aimed to identify "the information management performance of leadersequipped with a future comm and and control syste~ii.""

To sumninrize, SA theory resides primarily in the field of Human Factors rcsc;trch as abranch of psychology. Th e migration of this research into the military was first officially


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recognized in aviation applications by the U.S. Air Force and then to ground conibat applicationsby the U.S. Army a s p;ut of the digilization initiative. The signific ance of this origin is thatIluinan Factors ~rsearchs a field of science relevant to current military developmen tal effortstowards enhancing battlefield awarenes s and information m anagement through technology andtraining.

Situation Awareness D efinedBillings (1995 ) i n an effort to describe SA as a ficld of research states !hat "we must

re inc rn kr that in m any cnscs we are no longer able to appreciate the true situation without theaid of machines. Arid if this is true, however, then those nu ch ine s must tell us more of what weneed to know. and must do i t more effectively and less ambiguously than they have do ne todate."" For reasons previously stated in this study. these assertions are the basis of theU.S.Arniyy's igitimtion effort.

Situation Awareness is dcfined by Endsley (1995) as "the perception of elements in theenvironment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the

projection of their status i n the near future."" Th is definition is citcd in nearly all major worksin the field. Endslcy furthe r declares SA as both a process and a product by add ing that"situation awareness is a state of knowledge, while situation assessmmf is the process used toachicvc that ~ t a t e . " '~

Endsley makcs several other statements regarding the definition of SA. First, heniaint;lins that "SA does not encomp ass all of a person's knowledge. It refer s to only that poltion

pertaining to the state of a dy namic cnv ironine ~it."~' n other w ords it is situaritmul. Secondly,l-:ntlsley states that SA is "explicitly recognized as a co nstm ct separare from decision-nxlkingand performance; and that SA , decisio n-nu king and ptxformance arc different stages withdifferent factors influencing them and with w holly different approach cs for de di ng with each of

30


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them."" Lastly. End sley statcs th:it SA exists as a construct at both the individual and collectiveor cw w levels.

The U S . Air Force's SA IXT rcport defined SA as:a pilot's coriti~iuous erception of self rind aircraft in relation to the dynamic environment offlight, threats. and mission, and the ability to forecast, then execute tasks based on that

Furthermore, this rcport states that most rche;irchers "have written extensively on the cognitiveunderpinnings of the SA co~is truc t s a mm u l n~ocl e l . "~ ~lie SA INT report recommen ds that theU.S. Air Force emphasize the cognitive nature of this construct; and to view the role ofinformation technology as a enabling effort that supports the constluct.

Simp ly sti~ tcd , ll of the variations of SA definitions point to "knowing wha; is goingon." Scv cral critical distinctions arc established by these definition s that directly relate to Armyapplication s of this construct toward dcvelo ping digital situational awareness. 'Ihes c are furtherexamined in Chapler 4.

Research Findings Applicable to US Army EffortsT3is review of SA research resulted in identifying nine compelling insights that may

relate to the Amiy's effort of creating digital situational aw areness cap abilities as a riieans ofimpro ving pcrformnn ce of tactical tasks and functions. While thcse insights we inti-oduced ariddescribed below, analysis of their implications arc addressed later in this study.

Ins ight #I . n i c I lirce L ev~d s f SA. Endsley (1988) describes the three levrls of SAcomprising this construct as "perception of the cnvironmcnt (level 1 SA) , cornprehension of thecurrent situation (level 2 SA) and projection of future status (level 3 SA)."" Thcse levels of SA

arc commonly used by researchers and information system designers to dcvrlop applications thatenhance this cognitive process.


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Insight #2. Th e elenicnts of SA. Pew (1995) defines SA as "comprising five elements ofaw ar~ nes s." '~ hey are:

1. Spatial a w a r e n e s kcep current with the physical a s p c ts of the envilonrncnt.2. hliss iod go al aware ness: keep current with c~lr ren t hase and goals of the mission.3. System awareness: tr xk in g the ope ntional status of information systcms.4. Resource awareness: keeping track of physical and hu~nnn esources involved.5. Crew awareness: kn owledge of current activities of other crew mem bers.

Pew believes that most autom ation system s arc developed primarily for enha ncing spatialawareness, howevcr automation can objectively en h a ~ ~ c ell other elements a s w ell.

Insight #3. The States of SA . Pcw (1991) makes all important distinction in dcfining thethree statcs of SA as irlral, at;ainable artd acf uu l. Billings (1995) delines ideal SA as "a perfectmatch between the real situatio n and the observer's mental model of that situation."" "Theattainable cace , which is ncv er ideal, represents the bcst level of awareness in a perfect obsemerwho assimilated all of the infonnation available about thc ~ituation."~'He continues to defineactual S.4 as "what we a5 fall ible n~ortals ctually have at any given m ~ m e n t . " ~

1 % ~1994) tskes his model one st ep further by analyzing two possible relationships.These rcl;~tionships re valid a s the Army examines its digital applications. Pew proposes that ifoperators arc found cons istently to have a ctu al SA that is inadequate compare d to that which is~~t to innlde ,e have either an information transfer problem, or we have a training prob!embecause wc havcn't taught op erator s how to gain and use information. ti e further posits a designproblem when ntta i~t ab le A falls short of the ideal because the information available to anoperator is not i n a useful format. The last situation is caused when information w as ncver madeavailable to the operator because the sy.\te~n esigner ncver Lhought the operator needed the


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information. This condition is described i n the AWE reports as a major shortf;dl of currentdigital battle comm and system s.

Insight #4. Beitcr Distribution of Attentio n. A research study by Cu r v and Ephrath(I 977) finds "that monitors (operators) of an automated system actually performed hcttcr thanmanual conrrollers (in a f l i g h t t a ~ k ) . " ~his finding confirms m any othcr studies in the SA fieldthat determine that operators using automated information systems to support their SA arc able tobetter distribute their attention across othcr systems and information sources to aid in kskperformance.

Insight #5. Effects of SA on Cognitive Workload. Studies have determined thata u r o ~ x ~ t e dA systems can either increasr: or decrease cognitive wo:-klcad depending on theirdesign. Billings (1991) found that automation can improve SA by reducing excessive workload.I k slates that ai~torn ated A can r d u c e cognitive workload "by relieving the operator of innerloop control, by providing i nteg ntcd information and allow ing the operator to operate at a higher~ r v e l . " ~illings (1991) also found cases where automation has made "h e informationacquisition and assessment tasks more difficult because of the plethora of information nowavaili~ble , ome of i t not well represented."" This rcsearch sugge sts that design is critical to theeffectivrnc ss of automated SA systems--which can either enhance or degrade the operator.

Insight #6. SA and Knowledge and Technical Ab ility. Research indicates that highdegrees of level 1 SA (percep t~ml)!om ,lot improve performance if the opcmtor docs not possessthe knowled ge and technical ability to comprehend or apply the information he possesses. Inothcr words, an increase to one's perceptual SA does not, per se, result in increases incomp rehens ion or projection abilities. There fore, Endslcy (1995) suggests that "good SA canthcreforc be viewed as a factor that will increase the probability of good performance hut cannotnecessarily gu.uantce it."m


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Insight #7. Information-Bascd Task Pe rfo rn im x. Endslcy (1995) determined that thevalue added by the SA concept is that a uto ~na tzd icans can be designed to bettcr provideinformation to operators to aid in task perforin;mce. He states that the SA concept "provides ameans of moving from a focus o n providing o pcrators with (Iutu to providing opc rators withinfornmtion. When focusing on data, all of the intcgration, comprehension and projection is stillup to the operator. When focusing on information, the design focus is on presenting what theoperator really needs to know in the f o m a t that it is needcd in, thus allowing the olx rat or toachieve more SA at a given level of wo r k ~ o n d ." ~his finding is critical to the Army's continueddcvc loy~n ent f battlc commnntl systems that empower, not cncumber h e soldiers that operatethzm.

Insight #S. SA and the Effects of Stress. Autoination supported SA sy stem s have beenfound to effectively offset thc negative effects that stress places upon human perfo rman ce. Themost widespread finding of the effects of stress on operator SA is that people tend to narrowtheir field of attention. Sher idan (1 981) has termed this effect "cognitive tunnel vision"''Rcscarch has found that this oftcn results in operators coming to premalure closure, and arrivingat decisions without considering peripheral information. Additionally. when und cr stressoperators have been found likely to focus rnohtly upon ncgative information. disregarding thepositive aspects that coinc ide with the situation. Many SA rcsearchcrs believe this an area wlisreautolnatcd information systcms may enhan ce SA i n dynamic environments of stress .

Insight tf9. SA and Out-of-th e-Lo op Performance Problems. Endsley and K iris (1995)conducled a study to examine out-of- the-loo p perfo rn~a nce roblems in situations whereoperators dcrive information from automated sy st m s. This research determined that opcr atononly trained on automaicd systems are ,nore likely to be handicapped when the ir system s failthan operators of automated systems that have 1e;uncd task performance first by manual means.


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Secondly, this research found that full-automation of SA tends to chan ge the nature of operatoractivity from ocriw infornlatiorl processor to passive. This passivity was found to negativelyeffect SA by reducing operator vigilance in mo11ito1-inghe system, as well as inducingcotnp lacency. Endsley and K iris conc ludc [hat "lhis shift from active to passive processing byas111ost likely rcsyonsible for decreased S A under automated ~ o nd it io n s. )~ his important studyfurther concludes that partial-automation of SA is a better design approach than full-automationbecsuse i t requires the operators to actively process information.

Concludinv OlservationsThis literature review co ncludes with [!w e observations:1. Digital situational aw areness (DSA) near-cqually effects all four functions of tactical

maneuver (moving, engaging, conrrolling battle space and integrating direct-fire with maneuver).2. While both IVIS-based and AppliquC-based TTPs are similar, some differences exist

resulting from differing ennbling ciipobilirirs such as BClS and far-larger designation.3. Far-t.uget designation systems are critical en ablers of digital TTP at the compan y

.team level and below.4. Maneuver 1T P s are enhanced by application of DSA because of an:

Increased capability to orient oncself and to orient others.Increased amou nt of precise information lo base decisions and actions upon.Increased ability to provide con text for critical data throllgh the use of graphical

imag es of friendly, targcts and terrain.Incr'aed interaction betwecn leaders and subordinates during tvecrrtinn of tasks,

even when physically remote from each o ther.5. AWE insights conclude that despite tcchnological problems, c urrent TIT' applications

are valid.35


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6. AW E findings rcport that digital situational awareness generally results in a moreflexible, tactical unit that is capable of adapting to ri~pidly hanging situations without loss ofeffcctiveness.

7. AWE reports posit that dctcrmining optimal TTP applications of DSA are notpossible until the Army rcsolves technical problems such as stovcyiping of systclns, lack of intcr-connectivity, and bandwidth limitations.

8. Currcnt DSA ap plications niake l ~ r o c c s s f l c ie n c i es that rcduce the time rcquircd fortask p cd or ~n an ce , nd ultim;itcly results in a grcnter ability to recporrd e ffective ly in dynamiccnviron~nents.

9. The U.S.Amiy application of situ:itional awareness is consistcnt with thc HumanFactors definition of SA. However, tlicrc is little cviJcncc t l ~ the Army is intcgrating the otherstructures of SA theory, such as the three stirks of SA, five elements of SA and individual andcrew S A, into its effort to create digital situational aw areness.

10. SA rcsc;uch findings extensibsly address the ncgativc effects ofa uto ma tcd sy stem sused to develop and maintain SA. AW E rcports suggest that the Army may be red is cove^-inglessons already learned in this field.

U S . Arniy Annor Center. Spccial Tcxt 71-1-1 Tactics. Technioues and Procedure oftheD/gitized>mp:w Team (Fort Knox, KY: US Army Armor Ccnter. 1995), 3-1

U.S. Army Armor School Fort Kmx Swdcmentd Material 71-1-1 Tactics. Tzcl~niquesand Procedure of the A I , D I ~ ~ L I ~ - E ~ ~ ~ L ~ D U C ~ompany Team (Fon Knox, KY : Mounted BattlespaceBattle L ab, 1996), 3-7.'U S . Arniy Armor Center I : ina!-Kq~rt Advanced W a r f i~ h t i n ~xwrin3ent O~cra t io t~Desert IJarnmcr VI (Tort Knox, KY: Mour~lcdWarfighting Battlespace Lab, 1994 ), exec su m- 1.-I Ibid., exec sun]-3.' bid., abstract.


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' S . Army Arrnor Center Final Rm ort Advanced Warfi&ine Expcrimcnt Fo a ~ se dDisp3m:l' (F or t Knox. KY: Mounted Warfighting Battles pace 1. A . 1996). introduction.-.7 hid . . iv.

Ibid., 1-5.John M. Flach, "Maintaining Situation Awareness when Stalking Cognition in theWild." P ra-eedine s of the International Conference on Experimental A nalvsis and Measurementgf Situation Auweness , d. Daniel J. Garland and Mica E ndlsey, (Daytona Beach. FL Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Press. 1995). 25.

10Grant R . Mshli llan, "Report of the Amlstrong Laboratory Situation AwarenessIntegration Team," Sitr~ationAwarcnc.rs: Papers and Annotated RibliomghalJCF-TR-1994-085,ed . M. idulich . C. D orn ing ~w , . Vogel and G. McMillan. (Wright-Patkrson Air ForceBase, Ohio: Armstrong L h r at o ry . 1994), 37."Carl W. Lickteig and Cathy D. Emcry. lnforniation Man arcmen t P zrfonnnncc ofFuture Platoon lxu_d~.~~:n Initial 1 n w s f i ~ ; g ~Technical Report 1000. (Alexandria. VA:. . .- - -U.S . An ny R esearch Institilie for thz Bcl1;lvioral and Social Science s. Jun e 1994), v.l 2 b i d .13 bid . . I."C harl es E. Billings, "Situation Awareness Measuremsnt and Analysis: AConnmmt:uy." ~ r o c c e d i n ~ ~ o fhe International Conference on ~ x w ri m e n t a l nalvsis and ,Mcnsurement of Situation Aw aren ess, ed. Daniel J. Garland and Mica E ndsley, (Daytona Beach,. --FL: Embry-Riddle Xcronautical University Press. 1995), I .

Mica A. Endsley. 'Tlleorctical Unde rpil~nings f Situalion Awareness Theory: ACritical Rcvicw," Proceedings of li e International Confe rence on Exrxrimcnml Analysis and&ts i~ rc rnen tof Situation Aw areness , d. Daniel J. Garland and M ica Endslcy, (Daytona Beach.FL: Emhry-Kiddle Aeronautical University Press, 1995). 18.

. I d hlic a A. Endsley. "Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems"Humm Factors 37 (Janunry 1995), 33.- .- -I' Ibid. 36.l 8 h i d .l9 McMillan. 38.m Cy n t h i a - ~ o m i n g u e z .Can SA be Defined?," Situation Awareness: P a ~ e r sndAnnotated B ib lb r& v AIJCF-TR-1994-0085, ed . M. Vidulich. C. Dominguez, E. Vogcl and G.- - --Mchlillan Wright-Patterson Air Force Rase, Ohio: Armstrong Ia bo nt or y. 1994). 9.


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" Endsley, 'Toward a Theory," 36z Richard W. Pew. The State of Si~u atio nAwarenrsi Measurement: Circa 1995."Procecdixs of the Intern?~ignalCon fermc e on Ex~crimnentalAndySLand .b&s~c~nenUf

Situ atio n A w a r . e ~ s .ed . Daniel J . Garland and Mica Endsley, (Daytona Beach, FL: Embry-Riddlc Aeronautical University Press. 1995). 8-9."Billings. I .'' bid.25 Ibid.26 Mica A. Endsley and Esin 0. iris, "Thc Out-of-the-Loop Perfo ni~ anc c roblern andIxv el of Control i n Automation" fluman Fact01:~ 7 ((lan~~.uy995), 384.27 Ibid.28 Billings. 4.

Endsley. 'Toward a Theory." 40.M~b id . .1.

. Ibid., 52.32 Enddey and Kiris, 394.


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CHAPTER 3b1ETHODOLOGY

We m ust have freedom of mind, no prcjudiccs. no prepossession, nofixed ideas, no opinion ncceptcd without discussion and merely kcausei t has always bcen heard or practiced. Them should be only one test-reason.

Marshal of F rance Ferdinand Foch, quotcd i nLiddcll Hart, F oc h: T he h h f Orleans ( 1931 )

Pu p m-This chapter describes the analytical approach used to "arrive at a dependable solution"'

to the research question. The organization of th is thesis pape r parallels the research methodused. F ~ c hhapter of this study presents information gained through specific research stzps andserves as a building block fo r following procedures. Therefore. thi s work follow s a logical.scquentinl process of gutlicring facts and evidence, performing analysis and culminates informulating co nclusions and m aking recommendations.

Rescarch DesignThis study is most accurately charactcrizcd as a rlt.scripfive comparison form of rcsearch.

An eight-step analytical process was designed and uscd in this effor t. The eight steps of thisrcsearch design are:

S t e ~: Definition of the Problem. P rc li m in q inquiry resulted in the development of ace~itralssue characterizing a problem in the development of d igital warfighting TIT'. 'Ihis


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central issue was fu rther exarnined and structured as a primary research question based uponverification of the problems existence. The preliminary research pe~fonneilo establish theexistence of the problem identified compelling indicators as to the importance of this researclt tothe field of contempo rary military scimce. Cb i~ pt zr ne rccordcd the results of this preliminaryprocess.

S t 3 2: Determination of Variables to the P d e m . The next step of the research dcsignaimed to deterniine the critical elements, or variables, of the problem. A more detailed reviewof relc vm t literatu re assisted in isolating and refin ing the va riables that m'ake up the rescarchproblem. Thc se variiibles are FBCR2 capabilities and man euver functions and tasks. This stepresulted in identification of precise infornintionnl needs for this study. Tlicse informationalnerds became the focus of the liter at~ ~r ecview . Addition ally, this step also resulted in a severalrevisions o f the primary rese;uch q uestion. This step was al so addressed in Chap ter one.

Identification of Current State of the Variables. A focused literature review was:pcrfolmed and resulted in mcering the studies information needs arid providing answers tosecondary research questions. This step was critical in thc determination of the current state (orw l ~a ts)of the variablcs nceded later in the research process for deriving conclusions andrecornniendations for potenrid (o r w h t could be) applications of digital SA. Both Chapters oneand two provide the results of this step.

Steu 4: E1;tiibIishnicn1 f a Relational hlod el of F BC R2 C aix~b ilities ncuverfunctions. After determination of the current states of each of the variiibles, i t was essential to--relate them to o ne another. In this study, the FBCB 2 capab ilities were rclated to the tacticalmaneuver functions. The outcome desired is the identification of which I-BCB2 capabilities areinvolvcd in the pcrforrnance of each of the maneuver function s and tasks. Both subjective andobjective data w ere uscd as evidence proving the existence of these relationships. This data w as


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Th is s;ep results in establishing both scop e and sign ificance for the answ cr to the primaryI-cscarchquestion. Conclusions made of this comparison arc expresscd in Chapter five.

S l e , 8 F orm ulate R ec om nic ~id rlt ions o r P ote ntia l ~ ~ A p ~ l i c a t i o n snd FurthccResea rch. Th e last step of this research dcsign is thc form ulation of recommendations based.upon the answer to the primary research qucstion. Additionally, rccomniendations arc made forfurthcr rcsearch in this field. Recommendations arc found at Ch apter five.

This rcsearch would be incomplete witlrout a mechanism for drawing conclusions as tothc validity of thc rescarch design itself. T o cornplcte this rcse:~rch,conclusions are made inCl~aptc rive that address the following coriccms:

1. Did the rcscarch dcsign adequately addrcss thc rcsearch question?2. Did the rescarch design accurately define the variab les?3. Can the results of the study be generalized to larger tactical echelons?

This scction provides an overview of the measu rcmcnt theory used to answcr thercsearch qucstion of this study. Specifically, a nica~urenientheory describe s "a set ofassum ption s about the w3y thc world of tlicory is related to the world of obscrvalion." Fo r thisstudy, a measurcmcnt theory was dcsigned to logically relate FB CB2 d igital situationalawarcncss capabilities to the funclions and tasks of tactical n ianeuver to produce a set of FB CB2-ena ble d maneuver functions. Then, the FRCB 2-en abled maneuver functions were examinedagainst screening criteria that indicate the prcscnce and naturc of improvement. In a practicalsense. the measurement system of this study is used to determine causal relationships betweenobservations and the thcorctical underpinnings of the digital situational awareness concept mapplied to the ground maneuver.


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The specific measurement p r ~ e d u r e evised and employed is e o ~ n p o s ~ df Stcp 4(dzvelop relational model) and Step 5 (apply evaluation criteria) of the overarching researchdesign addressed earlier in this chapter. First, a relational model was developed to link specificF H C B ~apabilities to each maneu ver function and task. Th e basis for these linkag es are:evidence of applications in current 'ITP,observations from AWES, and s ubjective judgnlentsfrom military experts.

The product Ste p 4 is a modcl showing FBCB2 -enabled maneuver functions and tasks.Thus, this model only sh ow s the logical "I-elatedness" of tlie two variables and doc s nut make an yjudgments as to the nature o r value of these relationships.

The objective of Stcp 5 of tlie measurement priredure is thc? identification of the natureof the relationships iron1 the rel:~tionalmodel. Specifically. this step app lies screening criteria toidcntify current or potential i ~~i pro vcm en tsor each maneuver function and task. The product ofthis step is a matrix that identifies improved FRCB 2-enabled maneuver func tions and tasks.

This research procedure recognizes [hat these causal relationships are not mutuallyexhaustive, meaning that other variablcs are involved that may influence performance in additionto FHCB2 situational swar enc ss. However, this liniitation does not inhibit the search for a validanswer to the p ri m i q res ejrch question. hforcover, this measurement procedure looks only toexamine maneuver function s where evidence of improverncnt potential exist. There fore, theidentification of negative e f f c t s of applying digital situational awareness to m aneuver are notwithin the scope of this research . Thus , the outcomes of this measurement proced ure allow thedetermination of logical, casual relationships (if they exist) that indicate potential performanceincreases for maneuver TrP at the company team level.


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Improving Tactical Maneuver With Digital Situational Awareness

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