Improving the Security of GNSS Receivers

Portland, Oregon | September 23, 2011

Acknowledgements Thanks to Lisa Beaty (ION Executive Director) and

John Betz (Panel Session Track Chair, ION Fellow) for inviting this panel to convene.

Thanks to Kyle Wesson, Daniel Shepard, Zak Kassas, Jahshan Bhatti, and Ken Pesyna (University of Texas Radionavigation Lab) for organizational support.

Thanks to Phil Ward, Terry McGurn and

Brent Ledvina for input prior to panel.

Format

Each panelist will give a 10-minute presentation followed by 10 minutes of Q&A

There will be an extended Q&A period just before the break and before adjourning

Schedule

Round 1

•Logan Scott

•Javad Ashjaee

•Mark Psiaki

Break

•10:05 to 10:35 morning break

Round 2

•Humphreys presents Pozzobon slides, etc.

•James Farrell

•Felix Kneissl

Ground Rules

Focus on solutions for defense, not recipes for attack.

Keep is brief to allow time for lively discussion: Good things, when short, are twice as good (Gracián).

Logan Scott• 32+ years of military and civil GPS systems

engineering experience

• Holds 33 US patents

• President of LS Consulting since 1991

• Pioneered approaches for building high-performance, jamming-resistant GPS receivers

• Developed cross-system interference mitigation strategies that led to the FCC awarding Omnipoint, a cellular carrier, a Pioneer’s preference license for the New York MTA

• Research interests span the areas of precision indoor navigation, jammer location system, and location-based encryption and authentication

• B.S. Electronics Physics, University of Tehran

• M.S. Mathematics, University of Iowa

• M.S. Electrical Eng., University of Iowa

• Ph.D. Electrical Eng., University of Iowa

• Pioneered high precision GPS technology at Trimble Nav.

• Introduced the first GPS receiver for high precision applications that didn’t require an atomic clock

• Introduced the first GPS+GLONASS receivers

• Founded Ashtech and Javad Positioning System

• Founded JAVAD GNSS, the only company offering Galileo, GPS L5, L1C, L2C, and GLONASS L3 enabled receivers

• Added the spectrum analyzer feature in GNSS receivers, which shows situational awareness of interference in GNSS bands in 3 different ways

Javad Ashjaee

• B.A. Physics, Princeton University

• M.A. Mechanical & Aerospace Eng., Princeton

• Ph.D. Mechanical & Aerospace Eng., Princeton

• Professor at the Sibley School of Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering at Cornell since 1986

• Author of 90+ refereed journal and conference papers with 6 best paper awards at AIAA conferences and ION Burka Award for a best paper in a volume of Navigation

• Research interests span the areas of estimation and filtering, GNSS receivers, spacecraft attitude and orbit determination, aerospace vehicle guidance, numerical trajectory optimization, and dynamic modeling of satellites, rockets, aircraft, and wheeled vehicles

Mark Psiaki

• B.S. Electrical Eng. Marquette University

• M.S. Electrical Eng., UCLA

• Ph.D. Electrical Eng., University of Maryland

• Held teaching appointments at Marquette and UCLA

• 35+ years of industrial experience at Minneapolis Honeywell, Bendix-Pacific, and Westinghouse

• Author of “Integrated Aircraft Navigation” and “GNSS Aided Navigation and Tracking”

• Author of 80+ journal and conference papers, a number of book chapters, and technical columns

• Served as a co-chairman of RTCA Working Group for GPS Integrity

• ION Fellow

James Farrell

• Diploma in Mathematics, Technical University in Munich

• Doctoral candidate, Aerospace Engineering, University of the Federal Armed Forces Munich in Neubiberg

• Held teaching assignments in satellite methods

• 12+ publications

• Research associate at the Institute of Space Technology and Space Applications of the University of Federal Armed Forces in Munich

• Research interests span the areas of GNSS integrity data processing, GNSS signal monitoring, and GNSS user and signal authentication

Felix Kneissl

Problem 1: Weak GNSS signals easily overpowered by interference

Problem 2: Civil GPS signals are unauthenticated, can be spoofed

DHS Directives under NSPD-39 (2004)

Ensure mechanisms are in place to identify, understand, and disseminate timely information regarding threats associated with the potential hostile use of space-based positioning, navigation, and timing services within the United States ...

... develop and maintain capabilities, procedures, and techniques [...] to ensure continuity of operations in the event that access to the Global Positioning System is disrupted or denied;

November 2010: US PNT EXCOM (National Executive Committee) requests DHS conduct a comprehensive risk assessment for civil use of GPS

February 2011: US DHS Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) begins assessment process September 2011: DHS HITRAC completes risk assessment, produces two reports:

RISK

MITIGATION

The DHS risk assessment has confirmed earlier warnings that GPS disruption could have serious economic consequences. Now what?

How do we secure civil GNSS?

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AlternateAccepted

Humphreys, Ledvina, Psiaki, O’Hanlon, Kintner, “Assessing the spoofing threat.”

Recent uptick in num. of suggestions: ION Papers on GNSS Spoofing

Scott, L., “Anti-spoofing and authenticated signal architectures for civil navigation systems.”