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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BANGALORE
ON THE 3RD DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2012
BEFORE
THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE RAVI MALIMATH
WRIT PETITION NOS.40725-40726/2010 (GM-CPC)
BETWEEN:
1. M/s. United Estate,No.16, Railway Parallel Road,
Kumara Park East,Bangalore – 560 001,(Represented by its Director,Mr. Santosh Kumar C.L.)
2. H V Gowthama,
Chartered Accountant,Gowthama and Company,23/57, 41st Cross, East End,C Main Road, 9th Block,Jayanagar,Bangalore – 560 059. … PETITIONERS
(By Sri K. Anandarama for M/s.Anandaram PrashanthVikram, Adv.)
AND:
1. M/s. Pebble Bay Developers Pvt. Ltd.,Raheja Chambers, Linking Road,& Main Avenue, Santa Cruz (West)Mumbai – 400 054.
Branch Office at: Onyx Centre,
No.5, 4th Floor, Museum Road,
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Bangalore – 560 001,Rep. by its Managing Director,Mr. Deepak Bhagwandas Raheja.
2. Mr. Aditya Raheja,Director,M/s. Pebble Bay Developers Pvt. Ltd.,Raheja Chambers, Linking Road,& Main Avenue, Santa Cruz (West)
Mumbai – 400 054.
Also available atOnyx Center, No.5, 4th Floor,Museum Road,Bangalore- 560 001.
3. Avani V. Raheja,Director,Raheja Chambers, Linking Road,& Main Avenue, Santa Cruz (West)Mumbai – 400 054,
Branch office at:Onyx Center, No.5, 4th Floor,Museum Road,Bangalore- 560 001.
4. Vijay Bhagwandas Raheja,
Director,Raheja Chambers, Linking Road,& Main Avenue, Santa Cruz (West)Mumbai – 400 054,Branch office at:Onyx Center, No.5, 4th Floor,
Museum Road,Bangalore- 560 001.
4. Wachovia Securities,Functioning in the name ofWellsfargo Bank,
No.301, Windsor, Kalina,
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Santa Cruz East, Mumbai,Rep. by its Nominee Director:James Hillyer Boice III. … RESPONDENTS
(By Sri Ajesh Kumar.S. for M/s. A K S Law Associates,Adv. for R1 & R2. R3 & R4 – Served.Shri P. Udaya Shankar Rai, Adv. for R5)
These writ petitions are filed under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution of India praying to call forrecords in O.S.No.25412/2010 and further pleased toset aside the orders passed on I.A.No.II dated18.09.2010 at Annexure – F in O.S.No.25412/2010 onthe file of the City Civil Judge, Bangalore.
These writ petitions coming on for Preliminaryhearing in B-Group this day, the Court passed thefollowing:
ORDER
The petitioners/plaintiffs filed a suit in OS
No.25412/2010 seeking recovery of a sum of
Rs.12,05,56,134/- along with interest thereon. During
the pendency of the suit, the 5th defendant filed an
application - IA-2 under Order I Rule 10 read with
section 151 of CPC on behalf of Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association, seeking deletion of its name from
the array of parties. By the impugned order, the same
was allowed. The 5th defendant was ordered to be
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deleted from the cause title. Aggrieved by the same, the
plaintiffs have filed these Writ Petitions.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioners
contends that the impugned order is bad in law and
liable to be set aside. That the Trial Court mis-directed
itself in allowing IA 2. The citation relied upon, while
passing the impugned order is not applicable to the case
on hand. The Trial Court has erroneously held that the
defendant No.5 is neither a necessary nor a proper
party to the suit. He further contends that defendant
No.5 is not only a proper but he is also a necessary
party. In support of his contention, he relies on the
plaint averments to contend that defendant No.5 is a
proper party. In support of his case, he relies on the
judgment reported in (2012) 6 SCC 613 in the case of
Vodafone International Holdings B.V. Vs. Union of
India and another, with reference to para 274 of the
order to contend that the control of a company vests in
the voting powers of its shareholders. Shareholders
holding a controlling interest can determine the nature
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of the business, its management, enter into contract,
borrow money, buy, sell or merge the company. In so
relying, he contends that the reliance placed by the Trial
Court on the decision reported in 1984(55) Company
Cases 737 Calcutta in the case of Purna Investment
Ltd., Vs. Bank of India Ltd., and others is a wrong
reliance.
3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the
5th defendant defends the impugned order and contends
that there is no error committed by the Trial Court that
calls for interference. He submits that while
considering an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of
CPC, it is the plaint averments that is to be considered
and nothing beyond that. In support of his case, he
relies upon the judgment reported in JT 1992(2) SC 116
in the case of Ramesh Hiranand Kundanmal Vs.
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others,
in particular refers to para 13 and 14. He further
contends that what makes a person, a necessary party
is not merely that he has relevant evidence to give on
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some of the questions involved, that would only make
him a necessary witness. What is necessary is that a
person must be directly or legally interested in the
action i.e. he can say that the litigation may lead to a
result which will affect him legally i.e. by curtailing his
legal rights.
4. He also relies on the judgment in the case of
Purna Investment Ltd., Vs. Bank of India and Others
reported in 1984(55) Comp.Cas. 737 Calcutta, which
has been relied upon by the trial court, in support of his
case. Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the
Supreme Court reported in 1955(XXV) Comp.Cas. page
1 in the case of Mrs. Bacha F. Guzdar, Bombay Vs.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay wherein the said
view was affirmed. He further contends that a
discretion having been exercised by the trial court, the
same should not be interfered by the appellate court. In
support thereof, he relies on the judgment reported in
1990 (Supplement) SCC 727 in the case of Wander Ltd.,
& another Vs. Antox India Pvt. Ltd., in particular refers
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to para 14 and contends that the appellate court would
normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise
of discretion in appeal solely on the ground that if it had
considered the matter at the trial stage, it would have
come to a contrary conclusion.
5. Reliance is also placed on the judgment dated
18.4.2012 passed by the learned Single Judge of this
court in Criminal Petition No.2090/2011 and connected
matters, in particular with reference to para 3 of the
order. In the said proceeding under the Negotiable
Instruments Act, defendant No.5 herein was issued with
process. The same was quashed by this court holding
that the averments of the complaint, accepted at their
face value does not bring the petitioner namely the 5th
defendant within the purview of Section 141 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act. Hence, he pleads that he
needs to be deleted from these proceedings.
6. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 & 2
supports the case of defendant No.5. He too relies on
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various judgments in support of his case. The first one
is the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in
MANU/SC/0663/2012 in the case of Vidur Impex and
Traders Pvt. Ltd., and Others Vs. Tosh Apartments
Pvt.Ltd., and others. He relies on para 36 of the
judgment to re-iterate the broad principles which
should govern disposal of an application for
impleadment. Reliance is also placed on the judgment
of the Supreme Court reported in
MANU/SC/0427/2010 in the case of Mumbai
International Airport Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Regency Convention
Centre and Hotels Pvt. Ltd., and Others, in particular
reference to para 8 & 12 of the judgment. With
reference to para 8 of the judgment, his contention is
that it is only a proper and necessary party who can be
impleaded. With reference to para 12 of the judgment,
he contends that a ‘discretion’ when applied to courts of
justice, would mean discretion guided by law. It must
be governed by rule, and not by humour; it must not be
arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular.
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7. Heard learned counsels.
8. Reliance was placed by the trial court on the
decision rendered by the Calcutta High Court in the
case of Purna Investment Ltd., Vs. Bank of India Ltd.,
and Others reported in 1984(55) Comp.Cas. 737
Calcutta, which followed the judgment reported in
1955(XXV) Comp.Cases page 1, in the case of Mrs.
Bacha F. Guzdar, Bombay Vs. Commissioner of Income
Tax, Bombay. By placing reliance on the said judgment,
the Trial Court concluded that defendant No.5 is neither
a necessary party nor a proper party to the present suit.
Placing reliance on the said judgment, the reasoning
has been assigned by the Trial Court. 1955 Volume
XXV Comp.Cas. page 1, arose out of a question referred
by the Tribunal to the High Court of Judicature
at Bombay on a substantial question of law as
to: ‘Whether 60% of the dividend amounting to
Rs.2,750/- received by the assessee from the
two tea companies is agricultural income and as such
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exempt under section 4(3)(viii) of the Indian Income Tax
Act.” It was a substantial question of law, that was
required to be answered by the High Court and the
question was taken up in appeal to the Supreme Court.
In so deciding the question of law, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court incidentally referred to the right of a share holder
in the property of the Company. In relying on page 5 of
the said judgment, the trial court extracting a part of
paragraph, concluded that in view of the observations
made, the share holder in a company on buying shares,
becomes entitled to participate in the profits of the
company in which he held the shares if and when the
company declared dividends subject to articles of
association. That the profits or any portion thereof
should be distributed by way of dividends among the
shareholders.
9. The question before the Supreme Court was a
question of law. It was not concerned with the rights of
the share holders. The issue involved pertained to the
question of availment of dividend. It had nothing to do
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with the rights of the share holders. Therefore, the
entire basis on which the trial court has passed the
impugned order is erroneous.
10. A reading of the entire judgment, would
appear that it was the only consideration of the trial
court. There is no other reasoning given by the Trial
Court, except placing reliance on the said judgment.
Even though in the next para, the Trial Court states
thus:
“13. Admittedly, the entire claim of the
plaintiff is against defendant No.1 – Company
and directors of defendant No.1 Company i.e.
defendant No.2 to 4 are already impleaded in
this case, either as an investor or share
holder. Defendant No.5 is not either
necessary party nor a proper party to the
present suit.”
11. The relief sought for by the plaintiffs is for a
judgment and decree against the defendants jointly and
severally. The trial court held that admittedly, the
entire claim of the plaintiffs is against defendant No.1
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Company and its directors. It is incorrect. By so
holding, the Trial Court further states that since the
entire claim is against defendant No.1 – Company i.e.,
defendant Nos.2 to 4 were already impleaded in this
case, either as an investor or share holder, defendant
No.5 is not either a necessary party nor a proper party
to the proceedings. The material on record is different.
The finding of the Trial Court that the claim is only
against defendant No.1 is incorrect. The prayer in the
plaint is contrary to the finding of the Trial Court.
Hence, on this ground also, I’m of the considered view
that the Trial Court has mis-directed itself in passing
the impugned order.
12. In appreciating the scope and in considering
the provisions of Order I, Rule 10 of CPC with regard to
deletion of defendant No.5, the averments of the plaint
would necessarily have to be considered. In paragraphs
5, 6, 10, 11 and 31 of the plaint, it is averred that:
“5. The Fifth Defendant Company is a
foreign investor in the First Defendant
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Company holding 49% share in the First
Defendant Company. Since the Fifth
Defendant is a share holder in the company it
is represented by a Nominee Director in the
First Defendant Company to look after its
interest in the said company. The First
Defendant is also in charge of and
responsible for the affairs, administration of
the Fifth Defendant Company in the matter of
conduct of the Fifth Defendant business
affairs. Further, it was mainly on account of
the investments made by the said foreign
investor into the Project, that the Second and
Fourth Defendants were able to undertake
execution of the Pebble Bay Project.
6. It is pertinent to note that the Fifth
Defendant is a foreign investor, whose main
aim and purpose is to invest in the Fifth
Defendant Company in order to enable the
second and the fourth defendant to execute
the project. Post execution of the Project and
after realisation of the investor returns, the
Fifth Defendant has no other long term
interest in the project. However, the 5th
defendant as long as it remains as the
Investor in the Fifth Defendant Company,
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would hold the post of a nominee director and
is therefore responsible for all the major
decisions of the First Plaintiff Company.
Currently the nominee director of the Fifth
Defendant Company is Mr. James Hillyer
Boice III.
10. The Pebble Bay project is situated
at A 11, PID No.100/12/A-11-Ward No.100,
NTI Layout, 1st Stage, Nagashettyhalli Sy.
No.6, 17, 18, 19/1 to 19/11, 20/1 and 35,
Bangalore-560 094 and is proposed to be a
luxurious high end residential apartment
(‘Project’). The Project was initially
conceptualised in January 2006 and the
construction work on the Schedule Property
was launched around March 2006. The First
Defendant right from day one of the Project
has been incurring various problems on the
Project. On account of various problems
countered by the Defendant’s and also being
unable to successfully resolve the said issues
the defendant No.2 and defendant No.4
approached the First Plaintiff in the October
2006. The defendants were keen to utilise
the experience and expertise of the First
Plaintiff (i.e. United Estates) with respect to
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successful investment of the foreign funds by
the Fifth Defendant into the First Defendant
Company, so as to enable the Second and the
Fourth Defendant to execute the Project (i.e.
Pebble Bay”). The First Plaintiff was informed
by the defendant No.2 and defendant No.4
that the project to be constructed under the
name of Pebble Bay Developers Private
Limited was a very important highly
prestigious Project for the First Defendant
Company and that the Project was also one of
the first of its kind being undertaken by the
Defendants in the city of Bangalore. After
much of negotiations and discussions, the
First plaintiff agreed to render its services to
the First Defendant as regards the said
project.
11. The First Plaintiff agreed to render
its services to the second and the Fourth
Defendant and accordingly, the First Plaintiff
carried out a series of meetings and
negotiations with the Fifth Defendant during
the period October 2006 to January 2007.
The Fifth Defendant based on the various
meetings and negotiations carried out
between the First Defendant Company and
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the First Plaintiff, agreed to invest in the First
Defendant Company. It is pertinent to note
that it was based on the said assurance of
investment into the First Defendant, that the
second and fourth defendants were able to
undertake investment in the Pebble Project
wherein the said cost of the Project is not less
than a sum of Rs.150 crores (Rupees One
hundred and fifty crores).
31. The First Defendant Company is
registered under the provisions of the
Companies Act and the Defendant No.2 to 5
are the directors of the first Defendant
Company and are responsible and in charge
for the day to day affairs and the conduct of
the business of the first Defendant Company.
The cheques have been issued with the
consent and knowledge of the defendant No.2
to 5 hence all the Defendants are jointly and
severally liable to pay the Plaintiff’s the
following sums.
A First Plaintiff Rs.11,95,18,812/-
B Second Plaintiff Rs.10,37,502/-
C Interest @ 18% perannum from
12.6.2009 till date ofsuit.
Rs.1.44,46,940/-
TOTAL Rs.13,50,3,254/-
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The defendants are jointly and severally
liable to pay the aforesaid sums along with
interest as claimed as on the date of
payment.
13. On a careful reading of these paragraphs, it is
evident that the case of the plaintiffs is that the 5th
defendant is a Foreign investor in the first defendant –
Company holding 49% of shares and as a share holder
in the first defendant – Company, where the main object
of the 5th defendant is to invest in first defendant –
Company in order to enable the 4th and 5th defendant to
undertake to execute the first defendant’s project. On
such execution, 5th defendant would not have any other
long term interest in the project. As long as 5th
defendant remains as an investor in the first defendant
Company, he would hold the post of a nominee director
and therefore, responsible for all major decisions of the
first plaintiff. The defendants were keen to utilise the
experience and expertise of the first plaintiff i.e. United
Estates with respect to the successful investment of the
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foreign funds by the fifth defendant into the first
defendant Company, so as to enable the second and 4th
defendant to execute the project. Various meetings and
negotiations were held between the first plaintiff and 5th
defendant during the period October 2006 to January
2007 and on the basis of which, the 5th defendant
agreed to invest in the first defendant Company and
that the cost of the project is not less than a sum of
Rs.150 crores. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that
the 5th defendant along with other defendants are
responsible and incharge of the day to day affairs and to
the conduct of the business of the first defendant
Company. Therefore, all the defendants are jointly and
severally liable to pay the plaintiffs. On these and other
pleadings, the suit was filed seeking for a judgment and
decree against the defendants jointly and severally. The
provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC, provides that only
a necessary or a proper party may be added. A
necessary party is one without whom no order can be
made effectively. A proper party is one in whose
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absence an effective order can be made but whose
presence is necessary for a complete and final decision
on the question involved in the proceeding. 5th
defendant would be a proper and a necessary party to
the adjudication of the suit. The provisions of Order 1
Rule 10 CPC refer to the presence of such defendant
which may be necessary in order to enable the court to
effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all
the questions involved in the suit. The court would
necessarily consider the averments in the plaint. The
averments in the plaint culled out above show that the
5th defendant is a necessary and proper party for the
adjudication of the suit.
14. As held in the case of Mumbai International
Airport Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Regency Convention Centre and
Hotels Pvt. Ltd., & Others reported in
MANU/SC/0427/2010, the exercise of discretion
should be sound. It should be governed by Rule of law
and not humour. A reading of the plaint averments
would lead to a conclusion that the discretion exercised
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by the trial court would not satisfy any of these
requirements to show that the 5th defendant would not
be necessary for the just and final adjudication of the
suit. On a reading of the plaint averments it would not
show that there have been either vague or fanciful
claims against the 5th defendant. The claim is legal and
regular. Even applying the said judgment, I’m of the
considered view that the trial court has committed error
in rejecting the application.
15. With reference to the judgment reported in
1990 (Supp) SCC 727 in the case of Wander Ltd., and
another Vs. Antox India Pvt. Ltd., what is sought to be
pleaded is that an exercise of discretion, should not be
interfered lightly by the Appellate Court. If the
discretion has been exercised by the trial court
reasonably and in a judicial manner, the fact that the
appellate court would have taken a different view, may
not justify interference with the trial court’s exercise of
discretion and the Appellate Court is refrained from
reversing the same. Firstly, the jurisdiction exercised
21
by this court is a supervisory jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution of India. It is not exercising any
appellate court jurisdiction. Further, as held
hereinabove, the entire reliance placed by the trial court
is based on the judgment reported in 1984(55) Company
Cases 737 Calcutta. As detailed herein above, the
reliance was totally misplaced. The discretion therefore
in real terms has not been exercised by the trial court.
It has merely followed the dicta of the Supreme Court in
the said judgment and therefore, allowed the
application. Under these circumstances, applying a
different discretion that what the trial court has
exercised would therefore not arise. No second
discretion is exercised by this court which is contrary to
the discretion of the trial court. The order of the trial
court is wholly based on a judgment and not its
discretion.
16. On the other hand, the learned counsel for
the petitioner by relying on the judgment reported in
(2012) 6 SCC 613 in the case of Vodafone International
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Holdings BV Vs. Union of India, the judgment reported
in 1955(XXV) Comp.Cases 1 was also considered,
wherein it was held at para 257 as follows:
“257. The legal relationship between a
holding company and WOS is that they are
two distinct legal persons and the holding
company does not own the assets of the
subsidiary and, in law, the management of
the business of the subsidiary also vests in
its Board of Directors. In Bacha F. Guzdar
Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (AIR 1955
SC 74), this Court held that shareholders’
only right is to get dividend if and when the
company declares it, to participate in the
liquidation proceeds and to vote at the
shareholders’ meeting. Refer also to Carew
and Co.Ltd., Vs. Union of India [ (1975) 2
SCC 791 ] and Carrasco Investments Ltd., Vs.
Directorate of Enforcement [ (1994) 79 Comp.
Cases 631 (Del) ].
17. He further relies on para 274 of the judgment
which reads as under:
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“274. Shares, we have already
indicated, represent congeries of rights and
controlling interest is an incident of holding
majority shares. Control of a company vests
in the voting powers of its shareholders.
Shareholders holding a controlling interest
can determine the nature of the business, its
management, enter into contract, borrow
money, buy, sell or merge the company.
Shares in a Company may be subject to
premiums or discounts depending upon
whether they represent controlling or minority
interest. Control, of course, confers value but
the question as to whether one will pay a
premium for controlling interest depends upon
whether the potential buyer believes that one
can enhance the value of the company.”
Therefore, in the said paragraph, even the extent of the
right of the share holders has been clarified in the said
judgment. That the share in the company should be
subject to the premiums or discounts depending upon
whether they represent controlling or minority interest.
Hence, even on that ground also, the discretion
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exercised by the trial court in relying on the said
judgment is erroneous.
18. The 5th defendant has also placed reliance on
the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this
court on 18.4.2012 in Crl. Petition No.2090/2011 and
connected matters. He relies on para 3 therein which
reads as follows:
“3. The learned Counsel for petitioner
submits that petitioner M/s. Wells Fargo
Bank is a company registered under the
Companies Act and it can not be a Director of
first accused M/s. Pebble Bay Developers Pvt.
Ltd., The averments of complaint, accepted at
their face value do not bring petitioner within
the purview of Section 141 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. Therefore, the learned Trial
Judge should not have issued process to
petitioner.”
Therefore, he pleads that a finding has been recorded
that the 5th defendant cannot be a nominee director.
However, as could be seen from the said paragraph,
that is not, what this court has held. With specific
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reference to para 3, the court has only held that in so
far as the averments of the complaint is concerned, they
do not bring the 5th defendant herein within the purview
of section 141 of the NI Act. Hence, the judgment would
be of no avail to the 5th defendant.
19. In considering an application filed under
Order I Rule 10 of CPC, the parameters as laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case reported in
MANU/SC/0663/2012 would have to be followed. In
para 36 of the judgment, the parameters are so
mentioned. It is stated therein that at any stage of the
proceedings, the court can direct impleadment of any
person as a plaintiff or a defendant or whose presence is
necessary for the effective and complete adjudication of
the issues involved. That such a person is necessary for
an effective decree to be passed. That the proper party
is one whose presence would enable the court to
completely and effectively and properly adjudicate on all
matters and not necessarily a person against whom a
decree is to be made. That if a person is not found to be
26
a proper or necessary party, the court cannot have the
jurisdiction to order for impleadment against the wishes
of the plaintiffs. That in a suit for specific performance,
the court cannot order impleadment of a purchaser
whose conduct is above board and who files an
application for being joined as party within reasonable
time etc., and lastly, that if the applicant is guilty of
contumacious conduct or is a beneficiary of a
clandestine transaction or a transaction made by the
owner of the suit property in violation of the restraint
order passed by the Court or the application is unduly
delayed then the court would be fully justified in
declining the prayer for impleadment.
20. All these facts would necessarily follow that
these para meters stands attracted to the 5th defendant.
The plaint averments would indicate that 5th defendant
has invested a sum of Rs.150 crores. That he has an
active role in the decision making of the first defendant.
He is a proper and necessary party in terms of the
aforesaid judgment. Hence, I’m of the considered view
27
that applying the parameters, necessarily the
application requires to be rejected.
For the aforesaid reasons, the petitions are
allowed. The order dated 18.9.2010 passed in OS
No.25412/2010 on IA No.II by the XXVI Addl. City Civil
Judge at Mayohall, Bangalore is set aside. IA No.II filed
by the 5th defendant is rejected.
Sd/- JUDGE
PL