IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
CASE NO.: SC12-2674
FOURTH DISTRICT CASE NO.: 4D11-4251
CIRCUIT COURT CASE NO.: 2010-681-CP
ON PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
(IN RE: ESTATE OF RAFAEL A. CASTRO-ABALLI, M.D.)
RAFAEL A. CASTRO, III
Appellant-Petitioner,
v.
ELDA HIDALGO,
Appellee-Respondent.
AMENDED JURISDICTIONAL BRIEF OF PETITIONER, RAFAEL
A. CASTRO, III, ON BEHALF OF THE NATURAL CHILDREN
Rafael A. Castro, III, Esq.
Florida Bar No. 047015
Attorney for Himself and His Siblings, the Natural Children of Decedent
Address: 5904 S.W. 64th Ave., Miami, Florida 33143
I-phone: (703) 302-0594; Facsimile: (786) 288-0782
Primary Email Address: [email protected]
Electronically Filed 02/27/2013 12:44:31 PM ET
FILED, 2/27/2013, Thomas D. Hall, Clerk, Supreme Court
Castro v. Hidalgo, Case No.: SC12-2674
Fourth DCA No.: 4D11-4251
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (ii)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
a. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
b. THE RECORD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
c. SUBSTANTIVE FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
d. PROCEDURAL HISTORY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
ISSUE OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE STATUTE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
I. THE FOURTH DISTRICT’S (REPORTED) OPINION IN CASTRO v.
HIDALGO DIRECTLY AND EXPRESSLY CONFLICTS WITH THE
SECOND DISTRICT’S DECISION IN CLEMONS v.
CLEMONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
II. THE PROBATE ORDER WAS AN APPEALABLE FINAL ORDER UNDER
FRAP 9.170(b)(13) (AND FORMER FRAP RULE 9.110(a)(2)). . . . . . . . . 9
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
APPENDIX A – Conformed Copy of Fourth DCA Orders. . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Castro v. Hidalgo, Case No.: SC12-2674
Fourth DCA No.: 4D11-4251
(ii)
TABLE OF CITATIONS
CASES PAGE
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure,
84 So. 3d 192 (Fla. 2011)……………………………………………… 1
In re Estate of Mitchell,
1957 Fla. LEXIS 3578, 96 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1957) ………..................... 6
Lowe v. Lowe,
142 Fla. 266, 194 So. 615 (Fla. 1940) ……...................................... 1, 5-6
Milam [Milan] v. Davis (“Milam”),
97 Fla. 916, 123 So. 668 (Fla. 1929) ………………………………….. 6
Milan v. Davis (opinion On Petition for Rehearing) (“Milan”),
97 Fla. 969, 1929 Fla. LEXIS 1008 (Fla. 1929) ………..…..………….. 6
Sloan v. Sloan,
73 Fla. 345, 74 So. 407 (Fla. 1917) ……………………………………. 6
Smoak v. Graham,*
1964 Fla. LEXIS 2675, 167 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1964) ………………... 9-10
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
In re Estate of Alworth,
151 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963) …………………………………. 5
Morey v. Everbank & Air Craun, Inc.,
93 So. 3d 482 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) ……………………………………. 6
* An asterisk after a case name denotes a case on which Petitioner relies in the Argument
section of this Brief.
Castro v. Hidalgo, Case No.: SC12-2674
Fourth DCA No.: 4D11-4251
(iii)
TABLE OF CITATIONS (…Continued)
CASES PAGE
SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
Clemons v. Clemons,*
197 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) …………………………... 2, passim
Dempsey v. Dempsey,
899 So. 2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ………………………….. 10
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
Crossley v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
314 So. 2d 607 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) ……………………………….. 8-9
Lutz v. Protective Life Insurance Co.,
951 So. 2d 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) …………………………………... 2
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
Pearson v. Cobb,
701 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1997) …………………………………… 9
FLORIDA STATUTES & RULES PAGE
Fla. Stat. §222.13(1) (2010) (“Statute”) ..………………………. 3, passim
Fla. Stat. § 732.101 (2010) (“Florida’s Intestacy Laws”) ..…………... 3, 7
Rule 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv), FRAP …………………………………............. 1
Rule 9.110(a)(2), FRAP ……………………………................... 1, 4, 9-10
Rule 9.210, FRAP ……………………………………………………... 12
Rule 9.170(b), FRAP ……………………………………………... 1, 9-10
Castro v. Hidalgo, Case No.: SC12-2674
Fourth DCA No.: 4D11-4251
(iv)
TABLE OF CITATIONS (…Continued)
FLORIDA STATUTES & RULES PAGE
Rule 5.025(a), Fla. Prob. R. ………………………………………… 5, 10
Rule 1.140(c), Fla. R. Civ. P. .…………………………………… 3, 7-10
OTHER AUTHORITIES PAGE
David A. Monaco,
Florida Appellate Practice Forms and Commentary ………………… 10
32 Fla. Jur. 2d Judgments and Decrees §24 (1981)…………………… 10
Castro v. Hidalgo, Case No.: SC12-2674
Fourth DCA No.: 4D11-4251
1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
The Decedent’s son, who appealed the probate order to the Fourth District,
is the Petitioner in this appeal (“Decedent’s Son”), representing pro se the
Decedent’s natural children (himself and his four siblings) (“Natural Children”).1
Their stepmother, who is the personal representative of the Decedent’s estate, was
the appellee in that appeal and is the Respondent in this appeal (“Stepmother”).
a. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT.
Pursuant to FRAP Rule 9.030(a)(2)(A)(iv), this Court has discretionary
jurisdiction to review the Fourth District’s reported opinion in Castro v. Hidalgo,
100 So.3d 1180 (4th DCA 2011) (“Reported Opinion”) and resolve the district
conflict briefed herein, which is symbiotically and inextricably interrelated with
the issue of whether the probate order was appealable as a final order under former
FRAP Rule 9.110(a)(2).2 That Reported Opinion expressly and directly conflicts
with (i) Clemons v. Clemons, 197 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) (“Clemons”), and,
in general, (ii) Lowe v. Lowe, 194 So. 615 (Fla. 1940) (“Lowe”), and its progeny.
1 The use of “we,” “our,” “their,” and “us” refers to the Natural Children, as
represented by Decedent’s Son.
2 A copy of the Reported Opinion (“Slip Op.”) is set out in Appendix “A.”
(“FRAP” means the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.) Our appeal in the
Fourth District was predicated on former FRAP Rule 9.110(a)(2). Effective as of
January 01, 2012, FRAP Rule 9.170, titled “Appeal Proceedings in Probate and
Guardianship Cases,” has subsumed that former rule. See, e.g., In re Amendments
to the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, 84 So. 3d 192 (Fla. 2011).
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b. THE RECORD.
Overruling its motions panel, which had upheld jurisdiction, the Fourth
District noted that the jurisdiction issue could not be properly “. . .
determine[d] . . . without the benefit of the full record on appeal.” (Slip Op. at 3,
n.1.) We agree with this statement.
c. SUBSTANTIVE FACTS.
The substantive facts pertaining to this probate controversy are adequately
summarized in the Reported Opinion (see id. at 1-2), which contains these
outcome-determinative facts about the Decedent’s life insurance policy
(“Provident Life Policy”):
[T]he policy at issue did not specifically designate a beneficiary.
Under the terms of that policy, if no individual is designated as its
beneficiary, then the owner of the policy – the [D]ecedent – becomes
the beneficiary.
(Id. at 1.) (emphasis added). In her amended pleadings, the Stepmother admitted
that the Decedent failed to designate a beneficiary in the Provident Life Policy (the
“Admitted Material Fact”). If she could not win on her affirmative defenses, we
were entitled to a final declaration of rights, and judgment as a matter of law, on
our claims of intestacy and exemption of the proceeds.3
3 Cf. Lutz v. Protective Life Insurance Co., 951 So. 2d 884, 888-89 (Fla. 4th DCA
2007) (the test for determining the sufficiency of a complaint for declaratory relief
is not success, but whether a plaintiff “is entitled to a declaration of rights at all.”)
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d. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.
Consideration of the antecedent procedural history of this case is paramount
to a proper review of the appellate jurisdiction issue. Our appeal in the Fourth
District involved the review of a probate order denying our Rule 1.140(c) motion
for judgment on the pleadings (“Rule 1.140(c) Motion”).4
That order directly
relates to a petition to determine beneficiaries – an adversary proceeding under
Rule 5.025(a), Fla. Prob. R. – which, as a result of the Admitted Material Fact,
sought a declaratory judgment that (i) the Natural Children’s share of the Provident
Life Policy proceeds inured to them under section 222.13(1), Florida Statutes
(2010) (“Statute”); and, since the Statute now requires a designated beneficiary, (ii)
Florida’s intestacy rules, see 42 Fla. Stat. § 732.101 et seq. (2010) (“Florida’s
Intestacy Laws”), automatically applied as the only means to distribute those
proceeds to them and their Stepmother. These claims were adverse to the
Stepmother’s competing claim that she inherited all of the proceeds.5
After an extensive non-evidentiary hearing, the probate court denied our
Rule 1.140(c) Motion, reasoning that intestacy did not apply in light of the “or 4 Rule 1.140(c), Fla. R. Civ. P., is a vehicle to test – solely on the basis of the
pleadings (as amended) – the legal sufficiency of the Stepmother’s allegations in
her answer and affirmative defense(s). If, for instance, the Admitted Material Fact
obviated trial on the merits, we should have been legally entitled to judgment.
5 The total amount of the proceeds is US$372,263.79 plus interest. During the
Rule 1.140(c) hearing, the probate court focused on clause VIII, rather than clause
VI (residuary clause), of the will as being dispositive for passing said proceeds.
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Fourth DCA No.: 4D11-4251
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otherwise” language in the Statute and clause VIII of the Decedent’s will, which
mentioned the Provident Life Policy. The Decedent’s Son appealed that definitive
probate ruling to the Fourth District pursuant to former FRAP Rule 9.110(a)(2).
After considering the full record, and without reaching the merits, that court
dismissed our appeal, concluding that it “lack[ed] jurisdiction because the order
appealed from is neither a final nor an appealable, non-final order.” (Slip Op. at 1.)
It reasoned that “[t]he trial court’s work is not at an end,” (Id. at 3), but did not
give any weight to the Admitted Material Fact, nor any real significance to the
prior procedural history of this probate proceeding.
ISSUE OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE
The Key Amendment,6 coupled with the Admitted Material Fact, presents
this Court with the following issue of first impression and great public importance:
Whether the life insurance proceeds became estate (probate) assets,
pursuant to the “or otherwise” language in the Proviso7 to the Statute,
or remained exempt (non-probate) assets pursuant to the Exemption 6 “Key Amendment” means an amendment to the Statute, occurring in either 1970
or 1971, which had the effect of deleting certain language (“… shall inure
exclusively to the benefit of the surviving child … or husband or wife in equal
portions ….”) that in the Statute’s earlier versions created a default presumption in
favor of distributing insurance proceeds equally to a decedent’s surviving children
and spouse.
7 The “Proviso” is that part of the Statute beginning with “… Notwithstanding the
foregoing, whenever the insurance, by designation or otherwise, is payable to the
insured or to the insured’s estate or to his or her executors, administrators, or
assigns . . . .
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Clause8 of the Statute, as a result of the Decedent’s failure to
designate a beneficiary in the Provident Life Policy? (And, if they are
exempt assets, whether intestacy applied as a consequence of that
failure?)
To appreciate this issue, it is necessary to thoroughly comprehend the legislative
intent of the Statute, which is currently amenable to misinterpretation by Florida’s
probate courts due to a dearth of post-Key-Amendment case law.
LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE STATUTE
Prior to the Key Amendment, if a Florida decedent failed to name a
beneficiary in his life insurance policy, the proceeds under that policy inured as a
matter of law under the Statute to the surviving spouse or child, in equal portions.9
After the Key Amendment, the Statute now requires a designated beneficiary and
no longer contains a default predilection. In any case, non-compliance with the
Proviso to the Statute precludes a testator-decedent from exercising his freedom to
contract and bereaves that person of the privilege of bequeathing the life insurance
proceeds pursuant to his or her will. See Lowe, 194 So. 2d at 617 (explaining that
proceeds were exempt because testator did not comply with the 1920 version of the
8 The “Exemption Clause” is that part of the Statute preceding the Proviso, the
intent of which is to exempt life insurance proceeds from becoming subject to
probate administration, where they can be attached by creditors.
9 See, e.g., In re Estate of Alworth, 151 So. 2d 478, 481-85 (Fla. 1
st DCA 1963)
(tracing the historical legislative development of the Statute from 1872-1959).
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Fourth DCA No.: 4D11-4251
6
Statute); but cf. Sloan v. Sloan, 74 So. 407, 408 (Fla. 1917) (proceeds payable to
“insured, his executor, administrators and assigns” and were not exempt and
passed via the will’s residuary clause). To be sure, the Proviso does not take away
the exemption afforded to life insurance proceeds under the Exemption Clause, but
only adds additional rights to deal with such proceeds “in like manner” as “other
property and effects,” notwithstanding their special, unique, and regulated nature.10
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
By dismissing our appeal on jurisdictional grounds (without reaching the
merits), the Fourth District sanctioned the Stepmother’s unwinnable argument that
a facility of payment clause in the Provident Life Policy – making the Decedent the
beneficiary – could create an issue of fact warranting further judicial labor in the
probate court as to the Natural Children’s exemption of proceeds and intestacy
claims. This created express and direct conflict with the Second District’s decision
in Clemons, which held that only the Statute, which today requires a designated
beneficiary, can fill the void in a life insurance policy resulting from the absence of
a beneficiary designation in such policy. Clemons supported our intestacy claim.
10
See Milam [Milan] v. Davis, 97 Fla. 916, 923-24, 123 So. 668, 671-72
(“Milam”) (4-2 plurality opinion) (interpreting section 222.13 in connection with a
widow’s dower rights), reh’g denied, Milan v. Davis (“Milan”), id. at 973-76; cf. In
re Estate of Mitchell, 96 So. 2d 661, 662 (no surviving child or spouse)
(explaining legislative history); Morey v. Everbank & Air Craun, Inc., 93 So. 3d
482, 485-86 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (trust named as beneficiary in life insurance
policy and its terms made the proceeds payable to the estate).
Castro v. Hidalgo, Case No.: SC12-2674
Fourth DCA No.: 4D11-4251
7
ARGUMENT
I. THE FOURTH DISTRICT’S (REPORTED) OPINION IN CASTRO v. HIDALGO
DIRECTLY AND EXPRESSLY CONFLICTS WITH THE SECOND DISTRICT’S
DECISION IN CLEMONS v. CLEMONS.
The Key Amendment opened the door to uncertainty and confusion
concerning the circumstances under which life insurance proceeds cease to be an
exempt asset.11
By dismissing our appeal, the Fourth District fostered further
unpredictability, espousing the Stepmother’s tenuous argument that the standard
terms and conditions of the Provident Life Policy prevail over the Statute (or
Florida’s Intestacy Laws) for purposes of determining beneficiaries in the absence
of a beneficiary designation in such policy. This created express and direct
conflict with the Second District’s contrary holding on the same point of law.12
The Admitted Material Fact made the Clemons decision, on which we relied
in bringing our Rule 1.140(c) Motion, directly applicable to this case, even though
11
The Key Amendment will continue to cause confusion and uncertainty for
probate courts until this Court interprets the Statute in a case, such as this one,
where a decedent dies testate with a life insurance policy that does not contain a
specific beneficiary designation (other than the facility of payment provision
provided by the express terms of the policy). Such confusion and unpredictability
will continue in spite of a modern, non-probate-revolution trend, in which testators
use will-substitutes (such as life insurance policies) as an estate planning vehicle to
avoid, as much as possible, probate administration of wills.
12
See Clemons, 197 So. 2d at 40 (noting that “the policy is complete unto itself”
because the Statute [the 1964 version of section 222.13(1)] supplies the void and
makes the widow and the children of the insured the beneficiaries, as if their names
were written in the beneficiary clause of the insurance policy).
Castro v. Hidalgo, Case No.: SC12-2674
Fourth DCA No.: 4D11-4251
8
it was only persuasive authority in the Fourth District. In Clemons, the decedent
failed to renew the beneficiary in his life insurance policy, inadvertently leaving
that policy without a specific beneficiary designation. The insurance policy in
Clemons contained the following facility of payment clause – titled “Claims
Payment” – which provided (in relevant part):
Indemnity for loss of life of the Insured Member . . . is payable to the
beneficiary if surviving the Insured Member, and otherwise to the
Estate of the Insured Member. (Emphasis supplied.)
Clemons, 197 So. 2d at 39. Applying the pre-Key-Amendment predilection of the
Statute, the Clemons court held that the insurance policy, a contract, was subject to
the Statute’s provisions, which automatically applied in the absence of a
beneficiary designation by the decedent. Id. at 40. It bolsters our intestacy claim.13
Much like the estate representative’s similar claim in Clemons, the
Stepmother’s contention is legally untenable and cannot create an issue of fact
warranting further judicial labor in the probate court as to the Natural Children’s
Rule 1.140(c) claim that the life insurance proceeds inured to them and were
13
Id. (noting that any provision of the Florida statutes applies to such contracts “as
if written into the same in haec verba.”) If the Statute cannot provide a
beneficiary, then intestacy applies since the Fourth District has held that “a facility
of payment clause . . . is in nowise determinative of beneficiaries.” Crossley v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 607, 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (italics added). In
dismissing our appeal, the Fourth District not only overlooked Crossley, which
made the Stepmother’s argument untenable, but considered affidavit testimony
(Slip Op. at 1-2), which is improper in a Rule 1.140(c) Motion analysis.
Castro v. Hidalgo, Case No.: SC12-2674
Fourth DCA No.: 4D11-4251
9
exempt assets that pass by intestacy. The Admitted Material Fact should have
caused the Fourth District, as well as the probate court, to apply the holdings in
Clemons and Crossley (its own opinion) to the substantially similar facts of this
case. Failure to do so was reversible error and created district conflict.
II. THE PROBATE ORDER WAS AN APPEALABLE FINAL ORDER UNDER
FRAP RULE 9.170(b)(13) (AND FORMER FRAP RULE 9.110(a)(2)).
The probate order, which “determine[d] exempt property,” was an
appealable final order under FRAP Rule 9.170(b)(13) (as well as under former
FRAP Rule 9.110(a)(2))14
because it definitively determined our intestacy rights.15
Whether or not it was designated a final order on its face is irrelevant, see Pearson
v. Cobb, 701 So. 2d 649, 650 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (reference to order as “non-
final” did not affect its finality for appeal), given the clear ruling in the record
regarding why our Rule 1.140(c) Motion was denied. In addition, the fact that it
was rendered in an adversary proceeding to determine beneficiaries clearly made
the order “final,” see Smoak v. Graham, 167 So. 2d 559, 561 (Fla. 1964) (“We
conclude that the judicial labor of the probate court is complete . . . at the point 14
Since the exemption of proceeds claim involves “the right to immediate
possession of property,” it could also have been brought under FRAP Rule
9.130(a)(3)(C)(ii) (appeal of non-final order).
15
Like FRAP Rule 9.110(a)(2), FRAP Rule 9.170(b) allows interim probate
orders to be appealed piecemeal as final orders, provided that they “finally
determine a right . . . of an interested person as defined in the Florida Probate
Code,” such as our intestacy and exemption of proceeds claims.
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Fourth DCA No.: 4D11-4251
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when . . . defense of such independent action is required as a condition to any
further consideration of the claim in probate.”), since from our vantage that
independent proceeding was necessary to defend our intestacy claim.16
Had the
Fourth District focused on that proceeding or on the effect,17
rather than the type,
of the probate order, it might have upheld jurisdiction (as its motions panel did).
CONCLUSION
By denying our Rule 1.140(c) Motion, the probate court finally (but
unfavorably) determined that we were not entitled, as a matter of law, to our share
of the Provident Life Policy proceeds – an exempt asset – by virtue of intestacy.
By failing to apply the Clemons holding (which supported intestacy) to these
substantially similar facts, the Fourth District created district conflict. This Court
should invoke its discretionary jurisdiction to resolve that conflict, or, alternatively,
should remand the case to the Fourth District for further proceedings on the merits
with clear guidance that the probate order was an appealable “final” order under
former FRAP Rule 9.110(a)(2) (now subsumed within FRAP Rule 9.170(b)). 16
See Dempsey v. Dempsey, 899 So. 2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (noting a
difference, in light of the meaning of final orders, between a non-adversary and an
adversary proceeding under Rule 5.025(a), Fla. Prob. R., and explaining that the
question of finality must be viewed from the perspective of the interested person
challenging the order).
17
See David A. Monaco, Florida Appellate Practice Forms and Commentary 103
(The Harrison Co. Publishers 4th ed. 1998); see also 32 Fla. Jur. 2d Judgments and
Decrees §24 (1981) (noting that it is the legal effect, rather than the language of a
judgment, that governs.).
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Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Rafael A. Castro, III
_____________________________________
Rafael A. Castro, III, Esq.
Petitioner and Attorney for Himself and His Siblings,
the other Natural Children of the Decedent
5904 SW 64th
Ave., Miami, Florida 33143
I-Phone: (+1) (703) 302-0594
Fax No. (+1) (786) 288-0782
Fla Bar No. : 047015
Primary E-mail: [email protected];
Secondary E-mail: [email protected]
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Undersigned counsel certifies that on February 14, 2013 the original of
Petitioner’s Amended Jurisdictional Brief has been sent by overnight mail for
filing to the Florida Supreme Court and that a copy has also been electronically
served upon such Court; and that, on the same date, a copy has also been served on
Cartolano & Alvero, P.A., c/o Joseph Cartolano, attorney for Respondent, by
electronic mail at [email protected] (primary e-mail address) and
[email protected] (secondary e-mail address), as well as by
priority mail to the following address: 11645 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 302 & 304,
North Miami, FL 33181.
/s/ Rafael A. Castro, III
_____________________________________
Rafael A. Castro, III, Esq.
Fla Bar No. : 047015
Castro v. Hidalgo, Case No.: SC12-2674
Fourth DCA No.: 4D11-4251
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that this Brief has been prepared using Times New
Roman 14 point font and is otherwise in compliance with the type and font
requirements of FRAP Rule 9.210(a).
/s/ Rafael A. Castro, III
_____________________________________
Rafael A. Castro, III, Esq.
Petitioner and Attorney for Himself and His Siblings,
the other Natural Children of the Decedent
5904 SW 64th
Ave., Miami, Florida 33143
I-Phone: (+1) (703) 302-0594
Fax No. (+1) (786) 288-0782
Fla Bar No. : 047015
Primary E-mail: [email protected];
Secondary E-mail: [email protected]
Castro v. Hidalgo, Case No.: SC12-2674
Fourth DCA No.: 4D11-4251
13
APPENDIX “A” TO PETITIONER’S
AMENDED JURISDICTIONAL BRIEF
Conformed Copy of the Reported Order of the Fourth District Court of
Appeal (Castro v. Hidalgo) Dismissing the Appeal of the Natural Children and
the Order Denying their Combined Motion for Clarification and for
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc or Certification