In the Supreme Court of the United States In the Supreme Court of the United States In the Supreme Court of the United States In the Supreme Court of the United States In the Supreme Court of the United States RICARDO MEDRANO-ARZATE, EVA CHAVEZ-MEDRANO, as Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF HILDA MEDRANO, Deceased, Petitioners, v. PAUL C. MAY, individually and as SHERIFF OF OKEECHOBEE COUNTY, FLORIDA, and OKEECHOBEE COUNTY, FLORIDA, Respondents. On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENT OKEECHOBEE COUNTY Becker Gallagher · Cincinnati, OH · Washington, D.C. · 800.890.5001 NO. 17-601 J. MATTHEW BELCASTRO Counsel of Record ROBERT C. SHEARMAN HENDERSON, FRANKLIN, STARNES & HOLT, P.A. 1715 Monroe Street Fort Myers, FL 33901 (239) 344-1100 [email protected]Attorneys for Respondent Okeechobee County
Transcript
In the Supreme Court of the United StatesIn the Supreme Court of the United StatesIn the Supreme Court of the United StatesIn the Supreme Court of the United StatesIn the Supreme Court of the United States
RICARDO MEDRANO-ARZATE, EVA CHAVEZ-MEDRANO,as Personal Representative of the
ESTATE OF HILDA MEDRANO, Deceased,Petitioners,
v.
PAUL C. MAY, individually and as SHERIFF OFOKEECHOBEE COUNTY, FLORIDA,
and OKEECHOBEE COUNTY, FLORIDA, Respondents.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to theUnited States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FORRESPONDENT OKEECHOBEE COUNTY
J. MATTHEW BELCASTRO Counsel of RecordROBERT C. SHEARMANHENDERSON, FRANKLIN, STARNES &HOLT, P.A.1715 Monroe StreetFort Myers, FL 33901(239) [email protected]
Attorneys for RespondentOkeechobee County
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QUESTION PRESENTED
Respondent restates the question presented asfollows:
Whether a plaintiff whose death or injury resultsfrom an automobile collision during a police officer’spursuit or response to a call for back up can state acognizable claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C.§1983 for the deprivation of a citizen’s substantive dueprocess rights without alleging that that the policeofficer involved in the collision acted with aconstitutionally culpable state of mind?
The Petition for Writ of Certiorari does not presenta question worthy of this Court’s review. Petitionersbroadly ask this Court to decide whether amunicipality can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for apolicy when the employee implementing the policy didnot act with a constitutionally culpable state of mind. In doing so, Petitioners assert a long-standing circuitsplit. In asserting this split, Petitioners do not,however, distinguish between municipal liability in thecontext of a police pursuit case, and municipal liabilityin the context of other types of cases, such as wrongfuldetention or wrongful termination. With respect topolice pursuit cases, there is not a true circuit split onmunicipal liability—the vast majority of courts whichhave addressed this issue have determined that theremust be an underlying constitutional violation beforemunicipal liability will attach.
Petitioners argue that the source of this circuit splitis uncertainty over the scope of this Court’s decision inCity of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986);however, there is no need for further clarification ofHeller. Indeed, in subsequent decisions, this Court hasmade clear the circumstances under which municipalliability will arise. As a result, Certiorari should bedenied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For purposes of the Court’s consideration of thePetition, Okeechobee County does not dispute thefactual circumstances giving rise to the accident, asthose facts are set forth in the Petition, with oneexception. Specifically, contrary to Petitioners’
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assertions, the subject policies are not policies ofOkeechobee County and there is no legal basis forimposing liability upon Okeechobee County based uponsuch policies.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 15, RespondentOkeechobee County, Florida (“Okeechobee County”)seeks to clarify this apparent misstatement of fact inthe Petition. Petitioners’ case is rooted in theircontention that certain policies created municipalliability upon Respondents for Hilda Medrano’s death. These policies, according to Petitioners, include“conflicting Sheriff’s Department policies” that(1) required a deputy to use the radio to obtainpermission from a senior officer before activating thedeputy’s emergency lights or sirens, but (2) forbadedeputies from using the radio while a fellow officer wasresponding to an ongoing code. Pet. for Cert., p. 5. Throughout their case, including in the Petition,Petitioners inaccurately commingle the interests ofRespondents, Okeechobee County, the Sheriffindividually, and the Sheriff in his official capacitytogether, calling them the “County Defendants,” ratherthan including any specific factual allegationsattributing the subject policies to Okeechobee County. Pet. for Cert., p. 5. Indeed, as described below,Petitioners cannot attribute the subject policies toOkeechobee County, because the subject policies areSheriff’s Department policies over which OkeechobeeCounty has no control.
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REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
This Court should deny the instant Petition becausethis case does not present compelling reasons to grantcertiorari, particularly as to Respondent OkeechobeeCounty.
I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISIONDOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THISCOURT’S DECISION IN HELLER INSOFARAS OTHER CASES DECIDED BY THISCOURT HAVE CLARIFIED HELLER’SSCOPE
Petitioners urge this Court to find that the EleventhCircuit’s decision was based on an overly broad readingof City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).Petitioners then suggest that this Court should clarifycertain language in Heller and determine thatmunicipal liability may attach in a police pursuit case,even if there is no underlying constitutional violationby the municipal employee.
The Petition should be denied because there is noneed for further clarification of this Court’s decision inHeller. This Court has already provided sufficientguidance as to the circumstances giving rise tomunicipal liability, even absent an underlyingconstitutional liability by the municipal employee. This Court’s decisions have made clear that municipalliability will only arise where the policy itself is foundto have been the direct moving force behind theconstitutional deprivation.
One example of this analysis is set forth in thisCourt’s decision in in Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown,520 U.S. 1283 (1997), which involved allegations of
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inadequate screening in connection with the hiring ofa Sheriff’s Deputy. The Court observed as follows:
If a program does not prevent constitutionalviolations, municipal decisionmakers mayeventually be put on notice that a new programis called for. Their continued adherence to anapproach that they know or should know hasfailed to prevent tortious conduct by employeesmay establish the conscious disregard for theconsequences of their action - - the “deliberateindifference” - - necessary to trigger municipalliability.
Brown, 520 U.S. at 407. Notably, the “deliberateindifference” described in these cases arises fromdecisionmakers ignoring a known danger resultingfrom a given policy and subsequently failing to takeappropriate measures to address the known dangers.
The Brown case further recognized that municipalliability appears to arise “only where the evidence thatthe municipality had acted and that the plaintiff hadsuffered a deprivation of federal rights also provedfault and causation.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 405. Thesecases typically involve prisoner detention or custodycases, as in Brown,1 or procedural or administrative
1 Another example is City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,390 (1989), which found that a municipality may be liable forfailure to provide medical attention based upon inadequatetraining where “the need for more or different training is soobvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation ofconstitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city canreasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to theneed.”
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matters where the municipality, acting as a body,directly violates civil rights. For example, in Owen v.Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), the municipality, acity council, was alleged to have censured anddischarged an employee without a hearing. Similarly,in Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981),the city council was alleged to have cancelled a concertlicense. As explained by the Court in Brown, “neitherdecision reflected implementation of a generallyapplicable rule.” Id. at 406. Rather, the cases involveda situation where “each decision, duly promulgated bycity lawmakers, could trigger municipal liability if thedecision itself were found to be unconstitutional.” Brown at 406. (emphasis added).
In short, the Brown court acknowledged thatmunicipal liability may exist where theunconstitutional action of a municipality directlycauses a deprivation of rights, and the plaintiffdemonstrates fault and causation. Brown, 520 U.S. at405. However, those cases must be distinguished fromcases involving “implementation of a generallyapplicable rule,” like the policies involved in the instantcase. Id. at 406.
The balance of the Court’s analysis in Brownaddressed the standard for establishing municipalliability following a deprivation of constitutional rightsby a municipal employee. Id. at 406-07. Indeed, thefollowing language demonstrates that the Court iscontemplating a scenario where there has been anunderlying constitutional violation by a municipalemployee, rather than a situation involving only theimplementation of a generally applicable rule:
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That a plaintiff has suffered a deprivation ofFederal rights at the hands of a municipalemployee will not alone permit an inference ofmunicipal culpability and causation; the plaintiffwill simply have shown that the employee actedculpably.
* * *
[A] plaintiff seeking to establish municipalliability on the theory that a facially lawfulmunicipal action has led an employee to violatea plaintiff’s rights must demonstrate that themunicipal action was taken with “deliberateindifference” as to its known or obviousconsequences.”
Id. (Emphasis in original).
This Court’s decision in Collins v. City of HarkerHeights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992) providesguidance as to circumstances in which municipalliability is alleged to arise out of municipal policymaking functions. In Collins, the decedent, a citysanitation employee, died of asphyxia while working oncity sewer lines. The plaintiff alleged municipalliability based upon theories of failure to properly trainor warn its employees. The Court first reiterated theapplicable standard for analyzing municipal liability:“(1) whether plaintiff’s harm was cause by aconstitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the cityis responsible for that violation.” Id. at 120 (citingOklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 817 (1985)). Determining that no liability existed, the Courtobserved that “[d]ecisions concerning the allocation ofresources to individual programs . . . such as training
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and compensation of employees, involve a host of policychoices that must be made by locally electedrepresentatives, rather than by federal judgesinterpreting the basic charter of Government for theentire country.” Id. at 128-29. The Court alsodistinguished claims arising out of policy-makingfunctions from those involving prisoner detention orcustody claims: “It is quite different from theconstitutional claim advanced by plaintiffs in several ofour prior cases who argued that the State owes a dutyto take care of those who have already been deprived oftheir liberty . . . the Due Process Clause of its own forcerequires that conditions of conferment satisfy certainminimal standards for pretrial detainees.” Id. at 127.
Claims arising out of police pursuit or emergencyresponse simply do not fit within the spectrum ofmunicipal liability for the simple fact that these casesare premised on the independent conduct of theresponding or pursuing officer, rather than upon themunicipality’s policy. See Collins, 503 U.S. at 123 (“amunicipality can be found liable under §1983 onlywhere the municipality itself causes the constitutionalviolation at issue.” (quoting Springfield v. Kibbe, 480U.S. 257, 267 (1987)). Simply put, if the claim againstthe municipality is premised upon action taken by amunicipal employee (even if such action is donepursuant to a municipal policy), there must first be anunderlying constitutional violation by that employeebefore municipal liability may arise.
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In light of the foregoing decisions from this Court,the circuit courts have almost uniformly2 determinedthat municipal liability will not arise in a policepursuit/emergency response case absent an underlyingconstitutional violation by the acting officer. As such,there is no need for further clarification on the rule oflaw by this Court.
II. THERE IS NOT A TRUE CIRCUIT SPLITON THIS ISSUE
There is no split of authority among the circuitcourts on this issue. As acknowledged by Petitioners,the vast majority of circuits which have addressed thisissue in the context of a police pursuit cases havedetermined that there must be an underlyingconstitutional violation before municipal liability willattach. Here, there is no dispute that the underlyingcase involved a police pursuit, as opposed to other typesof underlying cases, such as wrongful detention orwrongful termination.
The Third Circuit’s decision in Fagan v. City ofVineland, 22 F.3d 1283 (3d Cir. 1984), appears to bethe primary exception to this rule, but the decision hasbeen widely criticized and its validity has been calledinto question—even by a subsequent panel of the ThirdCircuit. See Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, Okl., 239 F.3d1150, 1155 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that amunicipality cannot be held liable for the actions of itsemployees if those actions do not constitute a violation
2 As discussed in further detail below, Fagan v. City of Vineland,22 F.3d 1283 (3d Cir. 1984), appears to be the primary exceptionto this rule, but the decision has been widely criticized and itsvalidity has repeatedly been called into question.
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of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights). Indeed, theTrigalet court specifically pointed out that the ThirdCircuit Court of Appeals “has questioned the Faganpanel’s analysis” on this issue. Id. at 1156, n. 4 (citingMark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1153 n. 13(3d Cir. 1995)).
The remaining cases relied upon by Petitioners areeasily distinguished. Barrett v. Orange Cty. HumanRights Com’n, 194 F.3d 341 (2d Cir. 1999) arises out ofthe firing of the plaintiff, Barrett, who had been theExecutive Director of the Orange County HumanRights Commission. Suit was filed against the County,the Commission, and two of the individualCommissioners, Lee and Colonna. The plaintiff allegedthat the defendants improperly terminated Barrett inretaliation for exercising his First Amendment Rights.The jury returned a verdict finding that Lee andColonna had no liability, and judgment wassubsequently entered in favor of all defendants. Atissue was whether liability of the municipality wasdependent upon a finding against Lee and Colonna. The court held that it was not, and in doing so, citedMonell for the proposition that municipal liability mayexist absent individual liability “at least so long as theinjuries complained of are not solely attributable to theactions of the named individual defendants.” Id. at350. The court further explained that municipalliability may exist under the circumstances because,although Lee and Colonna “may have been the mostprominent figures in Barrett’s termination . . . theCommission is a multi-member body that makes itsdeterminations as a group, and many of the adverseemployment actions complained of by Barrett . . . were
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taken by the Commission as a whole, not by Lee andColonna themselves.” Id.
The decision is consistent with this Court’sdecisions in Brown and Owen, because the case did notinvolve the implementation of a generally applicablerule or injuries resulting from the actions of a specificindividual, but instead involved a situation where thedecision of the Commission itself could be foundunconstitutional. Thus, the Barrett case does notcreate a basis for conflict.3
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Thomas v. CookCty. Sheriff’s Dept., 604 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2010) is awrongful death case involving allegations of a pre-trialdetainee failing to receive appropriate medical care. The court determined that the County may haveliability based upon its inadequate policies even if theindividual employees did not commit a constitutionalviolation. This determination was premised upon theconcept that the detainee’s death may have been resultof “the well-documented breakdowns in the County’spolicies for retrieving medical request forms” ratherthan the deliberate indifference of any Countyemployee. Id. at 305. Once, again, there is no conflictbecause the County’s policy in Thomas could be the“moving force” necessary to impose liability, asaddressed in this Court’s decision in Harris.
3 A 2008 case from the Northern District of New York suggeststhat the rule of law in the Second Circuit is consistent with therule followed by the Eleventh Circuit. See Krzykowski v. Town ofCoeymans, 2008 WL 5113784 (N.D. N.Y. 2008) (in case involvingpolice pursuit, no Monell liability would attach to municipaldefendants based on pursuit policy where the pursuing officer wasfound to have committed no constitutional violation).
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The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Speer v. City ofWynee, Arkansas, 276 F.3d 980 (8th Cir. 2002) does notconflict with the general rule. Speer involved thetermination of a police officer, which appeared to resultfrom statements attributed to the mayor. The potentialfor municipal liability, however, could arise if a cityofficial refused to provide the terminated officer withan opportunity to clear his name. Thus, liability wouldbe premised upon the city’s official conduct as it relatedto the terminated officer, rather than arising out of themayor’s conduct. Once again, this holding is consistentwith this Court’s decisions recognizing the potential forliability based on the conduct of the municipal entityrather than the employee. See Owen, 445 U.S. at 631(noting that “[i]t is when execution of a government’spolicy or custom, whether made by its law makers or bythose whose edicts or acts may fairly be said torepresent official policy, inflicts injury that thegovernment as an entity is responsible under §1983.”).
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Sitzes v. City ofMemphis Arkansas, 606 F.3d 461 (8th Cir. 2010) ismore closely aligned with the facts of the current caseand reveals there is no conflict. Sitzes was a wrongfuldeath case involving a motorist who was struck by apolice car responding to a call. After determining thatthe officer had committed no constitutional deprivation,the court concluded summary judgment was properlyentered in favor of the municipal defendants because“such claims could not be sustained absent anunderlying constitutional violation by the officer.” Id.at 470-71.
Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2002) is awrongful detention case where the “constitutional
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depravations were not suffered as a result of theactions of the individual officers, but as a result of thecollective inaction of the Long Beach PoliceDepartment.” Id. at 917. Thus, the basis for municipalliability was independent of the conduct of theindividual officers. Notably, the Ninth Circuitspecifically distinguished (and therefore did notperceive a conflict with) two of its prior decisions whichare more closely related to the facts of our case:Quintanilla v. City of Downey, 84 F.3d 353 (9th Cir.1996) (rejecting claim of Monell liability based uponpolicy involving police dogs where arresting officerswere found to have committed no constitutionalviolation); Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1994)(in case involving claim of excessive force by arrestingofficers, municipal defendants could not be liable wherearresting officers committed no constitutionalviolation).
As set forth above and as acknowledged byPetitioners, the overwhelming weight of authorityconfirms that municipal liability will not exist in thecontext of injuries or death arising out of police pursuitor emergency response.
III. THE POLICIES THAT FORM THE BASISOF PETITIONERS’ CLAIM WERE NOTOKEECHOBEE COUNTY’S POLICIES
As noted in the Statement of the Case, Petitionerslump Okeechobee County in with the Sheriff inpointing fingers for liability allegedly as a result of thesubject policies. Other than simply grouping therespondents together, no underlying allegation and nosupporting documentation identifies a policy, practiceor custom of Okeechobee County or an Okeechobee
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County agent, servant, or employee as a final decisionmaker having policymaking authority in connectionwith any policy, practice, or custom allegedly givingrise to a violation of constitutional rights. A countymay not be held liable under §1983 based uponrespondeat superior. Instead, it can only be liable forexecution of its own policies, practices, or customs.Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98S.Ct. 2018, 56 (1978). Similarly, liability cannot beimposed upon a county for the acts of officials overwhom it has no authority or control. Turquitt v.Jefferson County, 137 F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 1998).
In determining whether Florida law providescounties with authority or control over a Sheriff, thelabel “County Sheriff” is not determinative. SeeMcMillan v. Monroe County. Ala., 520 U.S. 781, 786,117 S.Ct. 1734 (1997). Florida Sheriffs areindependently elected officials whose powers, rights,and duties are established by statute, including § 30.15Florida Statutes. Sheriffs are charged to be“conservators of the peace in their counties,” Section30.15 (1)(d) & (d). While the county in which a Sheriffoperates may have some role in determining theSheriff’s budget it has no ability to control the specificexpenditures made by the Sheriff, nor does it have theability to discipline or suspend a Sheriff from office. SeeFlorida Statute § 30.49; Fla. Const. Art. IV § 7(a),Florida law does not identify law enforcement as astatutory function of counties. See Fla. Stat. § 125.01. Additionally, under Florida law Sheriffs are distinctgovernmental officers responsible for the actions oftheir deputies. See Fla. Stat. § 30.07. Nothing inFlorida law provides counties with rights or duties inconnection with the training or supervision of the
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Sheriff’s deputies. The mere fact that the county fundsthe operation of the Sheriff is insufficient todemonstrate authority or control over the Sheriff.McMillan, 520 U.S. at 791. This Circuit has expresslyidentified the Sheriff as the final policymaker withcontrol over the actions and discipline imposed upon adeputy. See Lucas v. O’Loughlin, 831 F.2d 232, 235(11th Cir. 1987).
At his deposition, and as reflected in the excerptattached to the Amended Complaint as Exhibit B,Anthony Gracie testified that the policies were theSheriff’s Department’s policies, not OkeechobeeCounty’s. Pet. App. 29–30. Despite the vague mannerin which the Amended Complaint attributes policies to“Defendants” generally, the specific policies describedtherein, as well as the exhibits, make it abundantlyclear that the policies at issue are those of the Sheriffof Okeechobee County, and not Okeechobee County.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for Writ ofCertiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
J. MATTHEW BELCASTRO Counsel of Record ROBERT C. SHEARMAN HENDERSON, FRANKLIN, STARNES &
HOLT, P.A.1715 Monroe Street Fort Myers, FL 33901(239) [email protected]
