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Income targeting and surge pricing

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Income Targe,ng & Surge Pricing Fish VP Analy,cs, Zenefits (thanks to Uber data science) 11/18/15
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Page 1: Income targeting and surge pricing

Income  Targe,ng  &  Surge  Pricing  

Fish  VP  Analy,cs,  Zenefits  

(thanks  to  Uber  data  science)  11/18/15  

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Tradi,onal  Economics  

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Behavioral  Economics  (Kahneman  &  Tversky,  1979)  

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Camerer  et  al.  (1997)  –  Income  Targe,ng  

•  “Daily  targe,ng  makes  exactly  the  opposite  predic,on  of  the  intertemporal  subs,tu,on  hypothesis:  When  wages  are  high,  [the  worker]  will  reach  their  target  more  quickly  and  quit  early;  on  low-­‐wage  days  they  will  [work]  longer  hours  to  reach  the  target.”  

•  Taxi  cab  driving  is  a  natural  context  for  studying  this...  –  “Schedules”  are  flexible  –  “Wages”  fluctuate  daily  –  Wages  are  correlated  within  day,  but  weakly  across  days  –  Heterogeneity  of  drivers  –  Strong  wage  proxies  –  Good  data  (for  1997)  

 

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Rejects  posi,ve  response  to  wages  

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Becer  data,  same  context,    &  important  component  of  mission  

“push  a  bucon  and  get  a  ride  in  minutes”  

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Lye  “Prime  Time”  and  Uber  “Surge”  

•  Wage  Flexibility  

–  Lye  “Prime  Time”  •  Prime  Time  adds  a  percentage  to  your  

ride  subtotal.    “When  ride  requests  greatly  outnumber  available  drivers,  our  system  will  automa,cally  turn  on  Prime  Time.”    

–  Uber  “Surge  Pricing”  •  “At  ,mes  of  high  demand,  the  number  

of  drivers  we  can  connect  you  with  becomes  limited.  As  a  result,  prices  increase  to  encourage  more  drivers  to  become  available.”  

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Hall,  Kendrick,  Nosko  (2015)  •  Inves,gates  2  events  

–  Ariana  Grande  concert  at  MSG  –  Technical  glitch  on  NYE  

 •  Strong  response  to  surge  pricing  (counter  to  Diakopoulos,  2015)  

–  Drivers  go  to  the  surge  area  –  Riders  less  inclined  to  request  a  ride  

•  Focus  on  economic  efficiency  of  Surge  –  Increased  total  surplus  (riders  +  drivers)  

•  Surge  Pricing  transfers  some  surplus  from  rider  to  driver  •  Higher  value  riders  matched  (lower  value  riders  drop  out)  •  Increased  driver  supply  allows  more  matches  

–  Matching  completed  under  15  minutes  is  high  with  aid  of  Surge  Pricing  

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Customer  response   Driver  response  

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Natural  Experiment  (Technical  Glitch)  

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Results  

Driver  (non)  response  to  (non)  surge  

Evidence  of  posi,ve  intertemporal  subs,tu,on    

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Selec,on?  Hall  &  Krueger  (2015)  

•  Sor,ng  by  most  opportunis,c  

–  Valuing  flexibility  •  “A  variety  of  ques,ons  made  it  

clear  that  Uber's  driver-­‐partners  value  the  flexibility  that  the  Uber  plaoorm  permits,  and  many  are  drawn  to  Uber  in  large  part  because  of  this  flexibility.”  

–  Outside  op,ons  •  Most  of  Uber’s  driving  partners  

con,nued  full-­‐  or  part-­‐,me  jobs.    “Uber’s  driver-­‐partners  also  oeen  cited  the  desire  to  smooth  fluctua,ons  in  their  income  as  a  reason  for  partnering  with  Uber.”  

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What  I  liked  

•  Novel,  extensive  data  

•  Simple,  Clear,  Robust  – The  result  is  in  the  visualiza,on,  not  the  model  specifica,on  

•  Making  the  most  of  a  “natural  experiment”  

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What  I  didn’t  like  

•  The  measure  of  (driver)  responsiveness  and  efficiency  •  Diakopoulos  finds  heterogeneity  of  impact  in  Washington,  D.C.  neighborhoods  

•  Sharing  limited  results  publicly  –  Focused  on  economic  efficiency  of  Surge  Pricing  –  Not  es,ma,ng  a  coefficient  of  elas,city  –  Not  exploring  the  data  for  more  results  

•  What  happens  to  the  app  openers  who  did  not  request  

•  Responsiveness  to  an  unknown  shock  is  the  more  relevant/interes,ng  es,ma,on  –  New  Years  Eve  and  Ariana  Grande  are  predictable  events  

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Next  steps  &  learnings  •  What  mo,vates  Lye/Uber  drivers?  

–  Higher  wages  –  Intertemporal  subs,tu,on  

•  Farber  (2005)  vs.  Camerer  et  al.  (1997)  –  Farber  argues  cumula,ve  hours  dominate  (increasing  disu,lity)  

•  Do  drivers  during  a  surprise  surge  drive  longer?  •  How  does  Surge  Pricing  impact  long-­‐term  driver  response?    

•  Do  we  observe  heterogeneity  in  response?    –  Camerer  et  al.  found  posi,ve  intertemporal  effects  in  high  experienced  drivers,  and  nega,ve  effects  in  low  experienced  

–  Can  we  get  increased  economic  efficiency  through  •  Experience?  •  Informa,on  /  Training  


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