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Increasing Earnings Among Families with Housing Subsidies James A Riccio NAEH Conference San Diego February 20, 2015
Increasing Earnings Among Families with Housing Subsidies
James A Riccio
NAEH Conference San Diego
February 20, 2015
MDRC
National not-for-profit social policy research organization, headquartered in NYC
Mission: Build evidence to improve the lives of low-income families
2
Experiments with recipients of housing subsidies
Jobs-Plus
• An employment intervention in public housing
NYC Work Rewards Demonstration
• For Section 8 voucher holders
UK Employment Retention and Advancement (UK ERA) Demonstration
• Sample includes social housing residents
New studies underway 3
Jobs-Plus Demonstration
Target group: Residents of public housing • Place-based employment intervention
‒ Employment services on site
‒ New rent rules to promote work
‒ Neighbor-to-neighbor support for work (social capital)
• Tested in 6 cities; full/sustained implementation in 3
Public and private sponsors: • HUD, Rockefeller and Annie E. Casey Foundations
• Other public and private funders
4
Pooled average quarterly earnings for the 1998 cohort (full implementation sites)
Figure pooled 1
Mean Quarterly Earnings for the 1998 Able-Bodied Sample:
3 sites pooled
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000Q
1 1
992
Q 1
1993
Q 1
1994
Q 1
1995
Q 1
1996
Q 1
1997
Q 1
1998
Q 1
1999
Q 1
2000
Q 1
2001
Q 1
2002
Q 1
2003
Q 1
2004
Q 1
2005
Q 1
2006
Mea
n Q
ua
rter
ly E
arn
ing
s (i
n 2
00
3 d
oll
ars
)
Time Period
Comparison Group
Roll-out
period
Full program
period
Post-program
period
Pooled average quarterly earnings for the 1998 cohort (full implementation sites)
Figure pooled 1
Mean Quarterly Earnings for the 1998 Able-Bodied Sample:
3 sites pooled
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000Q
1 1
992
Q 1
1993
Q 1
1994
Q 1
1995
Q 1
1996
Q 1
1997
Q 1
1998
Q 1
1999
Q 1
2000
Q 1
2001
Q 1
2002
Q 1
2003
Q 1
2004
Q 1
2005
Q 1
2006
Mea
n Q
ua
rter
ly E
arn
ing
s (i
n 2
00
3 d
oll
ars
)
Time Period
Jobs-Plus GroupComparison Group
Roll-out
period
Full program
period
Post-program
period
Earnings impacts through 7 years (full implementation sites)
Site Avg. per year (2000 - 2006)
Change (%)
All 3 sites $1,300 +16%
Dayton $984 +14%
Los Angeles $1,176 +15%
St. Paul $1,883 +19%
All results statistically significant
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Replication efforts based on the evidence
New York City
• Now serving 8 areas of New York City
• A key feature of NYC’s “Young Men’s Initiative”
San Antonio, Texas
• Operating in 3 public housing developments
Obama administration (HUD)
• Funding a federal expansion
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UK Employment Retention & Advancement (UK ERA) Demonstration
Large-scale randomized trial testing effects of:
• Adding 2 years of “post-placement” job coaching to Britain’s main welfare-to-work program
• Plus 2 years of financial incentives, including a full-time work bonus
Welfare recipients • Lone parents • Long-term unemployed (mostly men)
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ND25+: Long-term unemployed at baseline
Random assignment
New Deal intake
ERA
Control
ERA New Deal
Welfare-to-work + advancement focus
Regular New Deal
Welfare-to-work
In-work support + incentives
JOB
JOB
Random assignment
PRE- employment
POST-employment
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ND25+: Long-term unemployed
Impacts on cumulative 5-year earnings, by housing status at baseline
Family housing Social housing Private housing
ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control
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ND25+: Long-term unemployed
Impacts on cumulative 5-year earnings, by housing status at baseline
Family housing Social housing Private housing
ERA Control ERA Control ERA Control
£703
New York City’s Work Rewards Demonstration
Employment interventions for families with Section 8 housing vouchers
NYC Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD)
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1. FSS (Family Self-Sufficiency)
• NYC’s version of HUD’s national program
• Employment and other service referrals
• Asset-building (Escrow “savings” accounts)
• 5-year program
2. FSS + workforce incentives • Cash rewards for:
‒ Sustained full-time work: $150/month
‒ Completed education/training
• Paid every 2 months for 2 years
Work Rewards Demonstration
Test of 2 interventions vs. control group
Evaluation design: 3-way random assignment
Voucher-holders sign up
Random Assignment
FSS-only
FSS + incentives
Control group
• Recruited volunteers from housing roster • N = 1,455 households; 1,603 adults
5 years of follow-up (ongoing) 15
Ever Employed (%) Average / Quarter (%)
0.0 0.0
0.0 0.0
69.4
42.6
0
20
40
60
80
100
FSS Only
Control group employment, Years 1-4 (Preliminary – not yet published)
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FSS + Incent.
Control group
Control group
Ever Employed (%) Average / Quarter (%)
72.4
45.2
73.3
46.2
69.4
42.6
0
20
40
60
80
100
FSS Only
Impacts on employment, Years 1-4 (Preliminary - not yet published)
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Diff: 4.1 pp*
Diff: 3.6 pp*
Diff: 3.0 pp (ns)
Diff: 2.6 pp (ns)
FSS + Incent.
Control
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$0
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
$2,500
Q2 Q5 Q8 Q11 Q14 Q17
Control
group
Control group earnings, Years 1-4
(Preliminary - not yet published)
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$0
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
$2,500
Q2 Q5 Q8 Q11 Q14 Q17
FSS
Control
group
(Preliminary – not yet published)
Impacts on earnings, Years 1-4
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$0
$500
$1,000
$1,500
$2,000
$2,500
Q2 Q5 Q8 Q11 Q14 Q17
FSS +
Incentives
FSS
Incentives end
Control
group
Impacts on earnings, Years 1-4
(Preliminary – not yet published)
SUBGROUP impacts on earnings
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$0
$200
$400
$600
$800
$1,000
$1,200
$1,400
$1,600
Q2 Q5 Q8 Q11 Q14 Q17
FSS + Incentives
FSS-Only
Subgroup: Not working at baseline
Incentives end
Control group
(Preliminary – not yet published)
Impacts on cumulative earnings, Years 1-4 (Percentage change)
FSS-Only FSS + Incentives
Subgroups
Program vs. Cs Program vs. Cs
Not working at baseline
+21.4% +46.7% ***
Working at baseline
-0.6%
-4.2%
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††
(Preliminary – not yet published)
Program Control Difference Group Group (Impact)
TANF/SNA (%)
Ever received, Years 1-4 66.2 67.1 -0.9
Received in avg. quarter, Year 4 33.4 36.2 -2.8
SNAP (%)
Ever received, Years 1-4 93.6 93.0 +.6
Received in avg. quarter, Year 4 76.3 83.3 -7.0**
Section 8 Housing (%) Received voucher in Year 4 91.6 89.9 1.8
FSS + Incentives: Impacts on benefits SUBGROUP: Not working at baseline
23 (Preliminary – not yet published)
Further innovation and testing underway
1. Testing FSS in other cities
• HUD FSS evaluation underway (18 cities)
• More effective elsewhere? If operated differently?
2. Testing alternative rent rules to promote work
• HUD Rent Reform Demonstration (4 cities)
• Let tenants keep more of their earnings gains
3. Testing a bolder alternative to regular FSS
• A new demonstration in Boston (public-private funding)
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“Bridge to Family Self-Sufficiency” (Bridge FSS) in Boston
Crittenton Women’s Union Mobility Mentoring model
• 5-year model for Section 8 and public housing tenants
• Uses brain-science-informed coaching strategies
• Builds capacity in 5 domains (education, work, financial management, social networks, family well-being)
• Financial incentives to support transitions in each domain
Goal: More transformative effects, and for broader range of families
Randomized trial: Does it succeed?
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Conclusion
The good news
• Interventions can work
• There’s promise in using the housing subsidy system as a platform for employment
The less good news
• Some interventions don’t work
• Some work only for certain subgroups – positive effects are not broad-based
• Positive impacts are modest; not transformative
Build on what works, but make bolder efforts 26
