iastoss.in [email protected]1 India’s Neighborhood: Afghanistan, The Graveyard of Empires USA’s Departure The US President has argued that battlefield successes since 2009 along with killing of the Al-Qaeda top leadership have enabled this long war to come to a responsible end. But, in reality the war will not end in 2014, the state would be attacked. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) can probably sustain the present situation, but only as long as the U.S. Congress pays the multibillion-dollar annual bills needed to keep them fighting. The war will thus become a contest in stamina between US Congress or world community and the Taliban . Shrinking of ANSF would lead to Afghanistan plunging to chaos again. Two Alternatives: o Get serious about negotiations with the Taliban. The US administration has pursued such talks for over two years. o The other defensible approach is outright withdrawal. The ANSF’s best units should be capable of modest offensive actions to clear Taliban strongholds; although the Taliban will probably not march into Kabul after coalition combat troops leave, because some of the troops would stay back and regional players are keen to see peace in war torn country. The United States will contribute some $4–$6 billion annually to the ANSF, the amount required to support the ANSF will surely exceed this for a long time. And unlike Israel, which enjoys powerful political support in Washington, there is no natural constituency for Afghan military aid in American politics. A compromise with the Taliban would be a bitter pill to swallow, but at this point, it would sacrifice less than the alternatives. But, The Taliban are not serious about the negotiations. In late 2011, they assassinated Burhanuddin Rabbani, the head of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s High Peace Council and the Kabul official charged with moving the talks forward. Since the Taliban can wait out the United States and win outright, why should they make concessions? Bringing together multiple Taliban factions, their Pakistani patrons, the Karzai administration, the governments of the United States and its allies, and intermediaries such as Qatar will simply prove too complex. Thus the situation on ground in Afghanistan is going to remain CHAOTIC and perplexed. Afghans are famously nationalist, and the Afghan-Pakistani rivalry runs deep; exile across the border surely grates on the Afghan Taliban. Perhaps more important, they live under the constant threat of assassination by U.S. drones or commando raids. The Taliban would have to renounce violence, break with al Qaeda, disarm, and accept something along the lines of today’s Afghan constitution. Which seems nowhere near to plausible. Pakistan would have to give up its blue-sky ambitions for an Afghan puppet state under Taliban domination, but it would gain a stable border and enough influence via its
India’s Neighborhood: Afghanistan, The Graveyard of Empires USA’s Departure
The US President has argued that battlefield successes since 2009 along with killing of the Al-Qaeda top leadership have enabled this long war to come to a responsible end. But, in reality the war will not end in 2014, the state would be attacked.
The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) can probably sustain the present situation, but only as long as the U.S. Congress pays the multibillion-dollar annual bills needed to keep them fighting.
The war will thus become a contest in stamina between US Congress or world community and the Taliban. Shrinking of ANSF would lead to Afghanistan plunging to chaos again.
Two Alternatives: o Get serious about negotiations with the Taliban. The US administration has
pursued such talks for over two years. o The other defensible approach is outright withdrawal.
The ANSF’s best units should be capable of modest offensive actions to clear Taliban strongholds; although the Taliban will probably not march into Kabul after coalition combat troops leave, because some of the troops would stay back and regional players are keen to see peace in war torn country.
The United States will contribute some $4–$6 billion annually to the ANSF, the amount required to support the ANSF will surely exceed this for a long time. And unlike Israel, which enjoys powerful political support in Washington, there is no natural constituency for Afghan military aid in American politics.
A compromise with the Taliban would be a bitter pill to swallow, but at this point, it would sacrifice less than the alternatives.
But, The Taliban are not serious about the negotiations. In late 2011, they assassinated Burhanuddin Rabbani, the head of Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s High Peace Council and the Kabul official charged with moving the talks forward.
Since the Taliban can wait out the United States and win outright, why should they make concessions?
Bringing together multiple Taliban factions, their Pakistani patrons, the Karzai administration, the governments of the United States and its allies, and intermediaries such as Qatar will simply prove too complex. Thus the situation on ground in Afghanistan is going to remain CHAOTIC and perplexed.
Afghans are famously nationalist, and the Afghan-Pakistani rivalry runs deep; exile across the border surely grates on the Afghan Taliban. Perhaps more important, they live under the constant threat of assassination by U.S. drones or commando raids.
The Taliban would have to renounce violence, break with al Qaeda, disarm, and accept something along the lines of today’s Afghan constitution. Which seems nowhere near to plausible.
Pakistan would have to give up its blue-sky ambitions for an Afghan puppet state under Taliban domination, but it would gain a stable border and enough influence via its
Taliban proxies to prevent any Afghan-Indian axis that could threaten it. That would be dangerous for India.
And the United States, for its part, would have to accept the Taliban as a legal political actor, with an extra-democratic guarantee of positions and influence, and the probable forfeiture of any significant base structure for conducting counterterrorist operations from Afghan soil.
The Taliban are not popular in Afghanistan; that is why they will accept a deal only if it guarantees them a certain level of representation in the government.
The US paid heed to its objection to the Taliban’s Doha office flag and the Pakistani prime minister sent his envoy to Kabul to appease the Afghan president. Thus the current afghan government is not spineless.
The scenarios possible after 2014 o First, The Pakistani Taliban lay down arms and live happily ever after. This is
least likely. o Second, the recently established state and security institutions in Afghanistan,
with the support of regional and international stakeholders (Read India and other neighbors), put up fierce resistance against the Taliban onslaught. In that case, there will be a stalemate between the Taliban and the rest of Afghanistan so the terrorism will grow.
o The third scenario, reconciliation process. The challenges include the process of reconciliation, reconstruction and state building and the establishment of sustainable political institutions in Afghanistan.
The sprawling militant network in Pakistan might find it a good opportunity to unleash immense terror on the state and society if second scenario prevails. (Afghan Taliban de-linking from Al Qaeda).
Some districts of Khyber Pashtun (KP) earlier occupied by the Pakistani Taliban and later taken back by the military might see the resurgence of the militant network.
If the reconciliation process among the Afghans (internally) and among the states in the region and international stakeholders is initiated simultaneously and is in sync with the reconstruction process and the political institutionalization of Afghanistan, all stakeholders might emerge victorious.
This can only happen when all parties to the conflict make efforts at finding a shared interest in the solution. This cannot be achieved as long as all parties wish to show the other as the vanquished.
India’s Options
Apart from the US, Afghanistan is the only country where India has such a huge diplomatic presence -- four Consulates (Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Jalalabad), apart from an embassy in the capital Kabul. It is a high priority area for India.
The Taliban-ISI nexus had proven to be the biggest headache for the government of India during Taliban rule in Afghanistan, culminating in Indian Airlines IC 814 hijack on Christmas Eve in 1999. So simply, keep the Taliban away.
No other country enjoys as much popularity among the masses in Afghanistan as India does. A Gallup poll, conducted in 2010, proved this. It found that Afghans prefer India's leadership over that of the US and China, with 50 percent expressing approval, the most positive rating of India for any other surveyed Asia-Pacific country. India’s stake in Afghanistan are high.
The following scenarios appear to be in foresight:
Scenario 1: A new Afghan president is chosen in 2014 through a relatively free and fair election process. The Afghan security forces would thwart the Taliban insurgency.
Scenario 2: The presidential candidates accusing of widespread malpractice and fraud can undermine the power and legitimacy of the new president. (By the time you read this document, Afghans will have new president.
o Afghan society could fracture along ethnic and tribal lines with regional powers supporting their proxies.
o With Afghanistan divided into various spheres of influence, India would be constrained to choose sides not just among the present regime and other political groups, but also among the warlords and regional commanders.
o This would be a case of high risk involvement with diminishing returns, with little guarantee of securing India's interest in the long term.
Scenario 3: power-sharing arrangement o This would gradually lead to instability and fragmentation, with anti-Taliban
political forces, women and civil society groups opposing such deals, leading the country to a 1990s-type civil war situation.
o In case of the precipitous withdrawal of international forces, the danger of a complete Taliban takeover is also highly probable. This is possibly the worst case scenario. India will have little option but to wind-down its operations, strengthen its homeland security measures and increase vigilance along the India-Pakistan border.
Scenario 4: A political dispensation backed by Pakistan or headed by a pro-Pakistan personality like Muhammad Umar Daudzai type assumes power.
o This could also lead to a surge of influence and area domination by the Peshawar Shura or the Haqqani network.
o New Delhi will have to recalibrate its mode of engagement by extending support and building linkages among tribal networks, refugees, and nomadic groups in the bordering areas of Afghanistan-Pakistan.
The near to medium-term projects could include training of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), particularly its officer corps, the police, paramilitary, and the air force, and also helping to build the justice sector.
In the long term, security sector reform and building sound civil-military relations would remain critical in preventing the disintegration or loss of civil control of the army.
The transition in the political sector is more challenging. There is an immediate need for India to push for a national dialogue in Afghanistan which addresses the concerns of the impending election and reconciliation process.
In addition to broad based engagement with the other political groups, New Delhi needs to work on strengthening the electoral reform process.
On the economic sector, in the near and medium term, India could help establish small and medium enterprises, alternate livelihood programs and revive the Afghan indigenous economic base.
India’s aid and assistance programmes involving high-visibility infrastructure projects have created national assets for Afghanistan, shaping India’s image and generating a measure of gratitude.
However, an enduring Indian influence would remain linked to New Delhi designing and helping implement development programmes to address poverty, illiteracy and systemic administrative dysfunction.
Afghanistan would be the “test case” of New Delhi’s major power aspirations in the region.
India’s Presence in Afghanistan
Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh sealed a strategic partnership which will include help from New Delhi to train Afghan security forces as international troops prepare to head home in 2014.
India has thus far funneled developmental aid worth 3.2 billion dollars in Afghanistan. Besides, India has also invested about 11 billion dollars in Afghanistan in various projects so far.
India is involved in projects including roads, power lines and the construction of the Afghan parliament.
India is Afghanistan's sixth-largest aid donor, giving about six times more than an estimated $330 million given by Pakistan.
In mid-2014, India has agreed to pay for military equipment sourced from Russia to Afghanistan. The equipment will include artillery, helicopters, tanks, and armored vehicles. India will also pay to repair old Soviet hardware left behind after the Russian withdrawal in 1989.
India offered to rebuild the Afghan national airline Ariana, donating Airbus aircraft despite a shortage in its own fleet.
It also trained pilots, donated 600 buses, provided experts who have restored telecommunication networks in at least 11 provinces.
Construction of a road that connects Delaram in western Afghanistan with Zaranj on Afghanistan's border with Iran is done with the assistsance of India.
India is also rebuilding a road linking Kandahar with Spin Boldak, on the Pakistani border.
India is viewed favourably by most Afghans, many of whom, on the other hand, regard Pakistan with suspicion.
Pakistan alleges India’s involvement in Baloch insurgency whereas India denies it. India does not have any troops on the ground in Afghanistan. But there are more than 500
men from the Indo-Tibetan Border Police and the Border Roads Organization providing security for Indians involved in the construction of roads, as well as for consulates.
India also trains a small number of officers from the Afghan National Army at defense institutions in India.
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI) signed the operational agreement pertaining to the $7.6 billion TAPI gas pipeline project. This is also known as Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline.
The 1,735-kilometre-long pipeline, starting from the Yolotan-Osman gas field in Turkmenistan, will supply Pakistan and India with 1.327 billion cubic feet per day (BCFPD) of gas while Afghanistan will get 500 mmcfd.
Countries involved in the TAPI pipeline project have agreed to establish a company for execution of the proposed project.
Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been appointed as legal-technical consultant, and it is identifying a company which will drive the project. The company will be from in a neutral country.
France’s energy firm Total has evinced interest in steering the gas pipeline project (The Hindu).
A protocol has also been inked in which the parties fixed the decision on the need to prepare founding documents and the registration of the TAPI Ltd.
Estimated cost of the pipeline project is reported at $7.6 billion. It has the potential to be transformative for the future of the entire region. The pipeline
project is a true multinational effort and, if realised, can serve as an important example of the benefits of greater regional economic connectivity.
Afghanistan- Pakistan Hydropolitik
Afghanistan wants to build 12 dams on Kabul river system that connects with Indus system. Afghanistan is upper riparian state. The Pak concerns are that India allegedly cooperating with the Afghan government to implement those plans.
According to PAK, it will increase India’s influence over Afghanistan while at the same time decrease Pakistan’s water supply.
From 1999 to 2010, Pakistan has been in open disagreement with India over the Baglihar Dam located on the Chenab in Jammu and Kashmir (Discussed in India-PaK section somewhere else in the document).
In August 2013, two months after Nawaz Sharif took power in Pakistan, the ministers of finance from Afghanistan and Pakistan signed an agreement to build a 1,200 megawatt hydropower project on the Kunar
River at a cost of US$2.7 billion. It was a surprise. Pakistan secured funding from the World Bank for the Dasu hydropower project,The
4,320 megawatt project is located on the Indus river which was objected by the National Security Council of Afghanistan.
The World Bank approved US$588.4 million funding for the Dasu dam. The government of Afghanistan decided to follow the same resource capture strategy that
allowed it to build the Salma and Kamal Khan dams in river basins shared with Iran. But Afghanistan has only succeeded in building two minor projects on the Kabul River (Shah-wa-Aros and Machalghoo) funded by the government and with no transboundary repercussions.
Overall, the past decade may well have been a wasted opportunity for Afghanistan’s transboundary water resources development in the Kabul-Indus basin.
It is not be too late to engage in meaningful and constructive dialogue to make projects such as Kunar move forward, particularly considering the potential for benefit sharing, including flood control, sediment control and hydropower.
Quickread: Afghanistan
What will the post-2014 Afghanistan look like? Most short-term scenarios for Afghanistan predict instability and even civil war.
The foreign forces are leaving Afghanistan without having stabilised it. When they leave Afghanistan by 2014, their interest in the country will also decline.
This will open up the field for the return of the Taliban. The prospects of national reconciliation are not bright.
The US will retain some troops even after 2014, these troops will perform a geo-strategic role for the US.
India, which has contributed significantly to Afghanistan’s reconstruction, will face the question of whether to continue with these programmes if and when the instability increases.
In the 10-year scenario, India should maintain contacts with all sides in Afghanistan, deepen people-to-people contacts but remain cautious about getting bogged down in the country. The prescription is wait and watch.
An unstable Afghanistan will also have a destabilizing impact on Pakistan whose Pashtun-dominated areas will become more restive and lawless.
This will have implications for India’s Pakistan policy also. The game changing event that might occur after 2014 could be the beginning of a
civil war in Afghanistan. It is unlikely that the continued presence of the US troops in Afghanistan will be tolerated by the Taliban who would need to be accommodated in the political settlement.
The prospects of a regional solution to the Afghanistan problem are limited given the lack of capacities in the neighbouring countries as also the vastly different political agendas.
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