GUJARAT NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY
International Relations
India's Look East Policy
SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:Dr. Aruna Kumar Malik MOHIT KUMAR SINGH (13A070)ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAWGUJARAT NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY Vth SEMESTER
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sr. No. Context Page No.
1. ABSTRACT 2
2. INTRODUCTION 3
3. REASONS FOR INDIA TO LOOK EAST 5
4. WHY LOOK EAST POLICY IS SO IMPORTANT? 8
5. KEY RELATIONSHIPS IN ASIA 10
6. EVALUATING MODI’S LOOK EAST POLICY 18
7. PM ON LOOK-EAST POLICY 20
8. OBSTACLES TO REALISING THESE AMBITIONS 22
9. CONCLUSION 23
10. BIBLIOGRAPHY 24
1
ABSTRACT
The Look East policy has appeared as an important foreign policy initiative of
India in the post-Cold War period. It was propelled in 1991 by the Narasimha
Rao government with the objective of developing political contacts, growing
economic integration and creating security cooperation with countries of
Southeast Asia. The policy manifests a shift in India’s perception of the world,
with the strategic and economic significance of Southeast Asia to India’s national
interests being recognized. The second phase, which commenced in 2003,
extends the attention of the Look East policy from Australia to East Asia, with
(ASEAN) Association of Southeast Asian Nations as its core. The new phase thus
marks a shift in emphasis from trade to wider economic and security
cooperation and support, political partnerships, substantial physical connectivity
via road and rail links. In this article, the evolution of India’s Look East policy and
its recent approach are analyzed.
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INTRODUCTION
India's Look East policy denotes its efforts to cultivate widespread economic and
strategic relations with the nations of Southeast Asia in order to strengthen its
standing as a regional power and a counterbalance to the strategic influence of the
Republic of China. Introduced in 1991, it marked a strategic shift in India’s
perspective of the world. It was developed and enacted during the régime of Prime
Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao and carefully pursued by the successive administrations
of Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh.1
The downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of the Cold War and the
world order that preceded it. The subtleties post the era saw a swift global rebuilding.
United States of America became the most influential and powerful country in the
world and China arose as the face of the ‘East’, this once underdeveloped country was
on the path to become a global super power. In a world that was rapidly globalizing,
the ‘Look East Policy’ was a tweak in India’s foreign policy. It was formally hurled in
the 1990s by the Narasimha Rao-led government when India identified the change in
the a center or source of the world economic power from ‘west’ to ‘east’ as forced by
the evolving geo-politics and trends in the Asia-Pacific. The aim was to recuperate
political ties, forge regional security collaboration and develop economic links by
increasing integration with Southeast Asia.
The Look East policy is an attempt to hearth closer and deeper economic integration
with its eastern neighbors as a part of the new 'realpolitik' in evidence in India’s
foreign policy and the engagement with Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN) is the recognition on the part of India’s elite of the strategic and economic
significance of the region towards the country’s national interests.
Under Narendra Modi, India has invested certain efforts in strengthening ties with the
East and Southeast Asian partners. Under the new government in Delhi, India’s Look
1 Thongkholal Haokip, “India’s Look East Policy: Its Evolution and Approach,”South Asian Survey 18, no.2 (2011): 242.
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East policy has morphed into a proactive 'Act East' policy, which foresees accelerated
across-the-board engagement in a vibrant Asia.
India is attempting to build concrete partnerships with key states in the Asia-Pacific,
with a particular focus on Japan, Vietnam, Australia and ASEAN.
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REASONS FOR INDIA TO LOOK EAST
Need to counter China economically:
The open door policies of China, India’s neighbor, during the 1980s had seen the
spectacular rise of an emerging economic giant in Asia, in disparity with India’s own
Fabian socialist policies in India under Nehru’s rule .China vies with India in the
political, economic and military scope and most significantly, for economic influence
in the region of South East Asia. In brief, India need to adopt an economically
aggressive attitude to compete well with international arcade forces at work in the
region.
The former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that he hailed Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) into India, which rakes in only a current US$3 billion as compared
to US$53 billion in FDI to China annually. India’s FDI hardly measures up to 6% of
its main rivals. Evidently, there is a need to seek new markets in order for India to
develop economically and to seek a noteworthy way of countering China’s own
economic policies.
An emerging middle class:
America invented the idea of outsourcing, substantially the exploitation of foreign
labor with basic amount of control but nevertheless, governed by motivation for
profit. A US software engineer earns US$75,000 per year as compared to his Indian
counterpart, who earns US$20,000 per year in India. 60% of India’s one billion
population is below the age of 30, meaning that a vast number of educated and
talented people formed a huge manpower pool waiting to be tapped. Globalization
and the Western media have also brought about influences in Western tastes and a
materialistic lifestyle in a growing middle class in India2.
2 India's Look East Policy: Prospects and Challenges for Northeast India-3, accessed electronically http://haokip.bandamp.com/blog/17831.html , on February 23, 2009.
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A world wealth report in June 2004 by US brokerage firm Merill Lynch, revealed that
India has 61,000 millionaires, in US $. However, the average Indian earns just
US$1.60 per day. Materialism has led to a disturbing trend in mercenary pursuit of
wealth at the expense of traditional, conservative social values. In a local crackdown
in New Delhi, nearly 300 women from middle class background were arrested for
prostitution. Thus, India seeks new markets to export its restless workforce. An
ignoring of changing trends however, could well lead to serious social problems for
the government of India. 3
Containment from West and Central Asia:
India’s long disagreement with Pakistan over the Jammu and Kashmir region has
caused long standing aggressive bilateral ties between these two states. China, as
Pakistan’s ally and supporter and a budding economic rival, would sensibly trail
policies that either not promotes India or which hinder India’s economic progress and
interests. Although India also retains business interests and provides foreign labour to
the Middle East, geo political instability and the continuous threat of terrorism meant
that there could be no serious responsibility of worthwhile financial investment in
Middle Eastern countries.
As a consequence, India remains edged in and severed from mainstream Asian affairs
on whichever the western or northern direction. The only lingering alternative of
potential development and progress is to look eastwards towards the South East Asian
region.
Response of South East Asia and how it regards India:
In a speech made at Harvard University, Former Indian External Affairs Minister
Yashwant Sinha pointed out that previously, India’s engagement with South East Asia
was based on an uncompromising perception of Asian brotherhood, a shared colonial
history and cultural ties. However, present regional dynamics dictate that the progress
3 Mishra, N. (2007), ―The Push and Pull of Globalisation: How the Global Economy Makes Migrant Workers Vulnerable to Exploitation‖, http://www.solidaritycenter. org/files/pubs_policybrief_migration.pdf (last accessed on September 10, 2015)
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of South East Asia is also motivated just as much by trade, investment and
production. The truth is that Asia’s other large regional player, China, has much better
pre-set circumstances conducive for economic investments and developments
attractive to South East Asian investors. This includes a larger, educated and cultured
work force in measurable terms, cheaper material resources in plenty and relatively
stables authority free from any noteworthy external or internal security threat. The
simple fact of consumer behaviour settling towards a better choice in terms of cost
and quality ensures that South East Asia turns first to China for trade and investment
rather than other countries. However, one major flaw exists for China. Its long history
of socialist rule results in a firmly controlled state with little room for political
maneuvering or reform. This means that China is a state that plays by its own rules
and is not answerable to non-state players like foreign investors.
India, in contrast, having less to offer in tangible terms like manpower costs and
resource abundance, however, enjoys the reputation of being a democracy which
respects consumer rights and international law governing trade and foreign
investments. Also, India’s long standing recognition of English as the official
language breaks down language and cultural barriers in trade communications, and in
theory, accelerates business procedures. This is the advantage that India’s Look East
Policy has over China, and should be exploited to the full to gain an edge.4
4 Sushil Khanna, “Economic Opportunities or Continuing Stagnation” Gateway to the East: a symposium on Northeast India and the Look East Policy, Seminar, June 2005.
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WHY LOOK EAST POLICY IS SO IMPORTANT?
“India has two main reasons for this project, one to connect with ASEAN and one to
compete with China,” said Kim, a long-term observer of IndoBurma relations and
author of “Unfair Deal”.
India’s relationship with Burma is also largely based on a need to counter China’s
influence in theregion. China has recently become Burma’s second largest foreign
investor and has built its own port in Kyaukphyu, just 40km or so from Sittwe. This
Kaladan Project has secured India’s Northeastern province with a lifeline for opening
up trade and transport to the rest of ASEAN and the world. Once completed, bilateral
trade will manifold. Moreover, the overall development of India’s Northeast region,
and particularly land-locked states like Mizoram, will be greatly increased. Bilateral
trade meetings were held between Burmese trade and investment delegates and trade
ministers from the four Northeastern Indian states in midSeptember 2010 in an
attempt to strengthen border trade.
The Kaladan Project will likely open up the economic geography of the region,
potentially connecting to the Asia highway in the future, which will open up
international trade routes. Feeling threatened by the way in which China is
strengthening its position in both South and Southeast Asia, India has recently
decided to change the basis of its Look East policy in order to counterbalance the
Chinese rise in the region. According to today’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
“India’s Look East Policy is not merely an external economic policy; it is also a
strategic shift in India’s vision of the world and India’s place in the evolving global
economy. Most of all it is about reaching out to our civilization neighbors in
Southeast Asia and East Asia”.5
The new version of India’s Look East policy has the idea of counterbalancing China
as its implicit core, as it explicitly refers to the way in which New Delhi should
strengthen its relations with neighboring countries today reckoning China as an
5 Rajiv Sikri’s lecture ‘Northeast India and India's Look East Policy’, in CENISEAS Forum ‘Towards a New Asia: Transnationalism and Northeast India.
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important partner. With the aim of destabilizing China’s position in these countries,
India is developing a new strategy oriented at stressing geographical proximity as well
as economic development to convince nations such as Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, but also Vietnam, Myanmar and other Southeast Asian
nations that New Delhi can “offer them more” than a distant country like China. India
thinks that its functional relations with Asian countries could be reinforced by
commonality of affinity of cultures, balancing with diplomacy China’s military
superiority and economic advantage.
Today, although economic cooperation between India and China is growing, the
strategic competition and rivalry between the two is also sharpening. Feeling more
and more threatened by China, during the last few months India has drastically
changed its regional strategy with the aim of better consolidate its own regional
alliances.6
6 Dong, Zhang. 2006. ‘India Looks East: Strategies and Impact’, AUSAID Working Paper, September, accessed from http://www.ausaid.gov.au/Publications/Documents/india_east.pdf (accessed on 17 September 2015).
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KEY RELATIONSHIPS IN ASIA
It is clear that the 'Modi Government' must pursue a stable environment in its
neighborhood before it can seek to expand its influence further afield. India will
attempt to maintain positive relations with its neighbors, although not at the expense
of national security. However, the 'Modi Government’s' ambition of pursuing a larger
international role for India, and the greater long-term economic and strategic
prospective of engagement with East and Southeast Asia, will necessitate the
prioritization of India’s relations with this region over its traditional emphasis on
West Asia. How will this affect India’s key relationships in Asia?
China
India’s increased engagement with the region is driven by the impact of China’s rise
on both its bilateral relationship and the broader evolving security dynamics of the
Indo-Pacific. China’s presence in the Indian Ocean has increased significantly in
recent years, made easier by its relationships with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives,
and others. China has a legitimate interest in protecting its trading and energy
lifelines, with 70 per cent of its oil supply and almost 80 per cent of its total trade
being shipped through the Indian Ocean region7.
According to Indian Home Ministry figures, the number of alleged Chinese border
transgressions doubled from 2011 to 2012, and, in August 2014, was on track to
exceed the levels of previous years.8 India’s focus on building economic and security
relations with key partners in East and Southeast Asia can be seen to be part of an
external balancing strategy in response to these concerns.
While India and China remain strategic rivals, India's "Look East" policy has
included significant rapprochement with China. Since 1993, India began holding
high-level talks with Chinese leaders and established confidence building measures In
2006, China and India opened the Nathu La pass for cross-border trade for the first 7 Mohan Malik, “The Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain” in Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific: Perspectives from China, India and the United States, ed. Mohan Malik. (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 15, 17.8 Alyssa Ayres, “China’s Mixed Messages to India,” Forbes, 17 September 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/alyssaayres/2014/09/17/chinas-mixedmessages-to-india/.
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time since the 1962 war. On 21 November 2006 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan
Singh and the Chinese President Hu Jintao issued a 10-point joint declaration to
improve ties and resolve long-standing conflicts.9 Trade between China and India
increases by 50% each year, and it reached the $60 billion target set for 2010 by both
Indian and Chinese governments and industrial leaders. However, China's close
relations with Pakistan, skepticism about India's annexation of Sikkim and Chinese
assertion over Arunachal Pradesh have threatened the improvement in bilateral
relations. India's providing asylum to the political-cum-spiritual leader, the 14th Dalai
Lama also causes some friction in bilateral ties.
Chinese commentators have been critical of India's Look East policy. A People's
Daily editorial opined that the Look East policy was "born out of [the] failure" of
India's trying to play the Soviet Union and the United States against each other for its
own benefit during the Cold War, and that trying to do the same with China and Japan
by strengthening its ties with the latter would also fail.10
Indian public opinion on China is somewhat conflicted. While 83 per cent of Indians
believe that China will front a security threat to India in the next ten years, 63 per cent
would like to see relationships with China become sounder in this same time frame.11
This strain already informs India’s China policy, and the relationship has long
improved along two distinct economic and security tracks. Notwithstanding criticism
of the previous government’s handling of relations with China, this pattern can be
anticipated to continue under a Modi-led government.
Prime Minister Modi has argued for a stronger approach to China, and publicly
criticized China’s “expansionist attitude” at a rally in the disputed territory of
Arunachal Pradesh during his campaign.12 This sentiment was echoed during Modi’s
September 2014 visit to Japan, where he remarked obliquely upon “an 18th-century 9 http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/nov/21jintao6.htm10 http://en.people.cn/90002/96417/7179404.html11 Rory Medcalf, India Poll 2013, (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2013)12 Press Trust of India (PTI), “Can't Allow China to Dominate India, We Need to Take Ourselves Seriously: Modi,” Indian Express, 19 October 2013, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/cant-allow-china-to-dominate-india-weneed-to-take-ourselves seriously-modi/1184413/0 and Victor Mallet, “Modi Hits Out at Chinese Expansionism,” Financial Times, 24 February 2014, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/65df3de0-9d1f-11e3-83c5-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2xhy9U600.
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expansionist mind-set: encroaching on another country, intruding in others’ waters,
invading other countries and seizing territory.” This sentiment has had some of degree
policy impact; Sushma Swaraj has made it clear on multiple occasions that India’s
endorsement of the One China policy is contingent on China’s affirmation of a ‘One
India policy’ recognizing Indian sensitivities on Arunachal Pradesh.13 While the Modi
Government is likely to be more strident than the UPA Government on China,
especially in its oratory, it will remain a pragmatist on the relationship, and will be
careful to balance this sentiment with the economic benefits of India’s relationship
with China.
China does not favour a strong Indian presence and influence in Southeast Asia.
China is aware of the various cultural and spiritual ties that India shares with
Southeast Asia, which could naturally attract the two regions to come closer. China
knows that India is the only country that could possibly challenge its ascendancy and
potential hegemony in Asia, and therefore it makes sense for China to try hard to keep
India under pressure. Traditionally, China has been very dismissive of India, which it
treats as a mere South Asian player. However, over the last decade or so, the Chinese
have been somewhat puzzled and intrigued by the steady rate of India’s economic
growth and its political stability. So they have no option but to take India more
seriously.
Japan
India’s relations with Japan are likely to be the most strongly affected by Modi’s
election. As the most advanced Asian naval power, and as a potential source of
considerable investment and technological assistance, Japan offers significant
partnership opportunities as India deepens relations with East Asia. Japan and India
are still relatively minor economic partners, with a bilateral trade volume of only
$US16 billion in 2013-14, and almost $US2 billion in investment in 2013. In an
important convergence of developmental and strategic objectives, the Japan
International Cooperation Agency was, in November 2014, awarded a contract to
build approximately 2000km of strategic roads along India’s disputed border with
13 Indrani Bagchi, “India Talks Tough on One-China Policy, Says Reaffirm OneIndia Policy First,” Times of India, 9 September 2014,
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China.14 While economic ties between the two are still somewhat immature, Japan is
the source of sizable official development assistance, particularly on the
infrastructural projects such as the Delhi-Mumbai and Chennai-Bangalore Industrial
Corridor.
However, it is the strategic probability of the relationship that is most significant.
Again, China’s aggressiveness in the East China Sea and along the Ladakh border has
created a further impetus for closer India-Japan ties. The absence of historical
baggage and mutual appreciation of each other’s importance in Asia’s rapidly
changing geo-political situation has, in recent years, induced India to prioritize
relations with Japan. Under the former government, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe was the Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day Parade in January 2014.15 And Abe
has long been a advocate of closer India-Japan ties, arguing for the creation of a
Japan-and India-led ‘broader Asia’ during his last term as Prime Minister.16 However
the test of this trust will be the extent to which India and Japan commit to assisting
each other in the event of a crisis.
Under Modi, India’s relationship with Japan will gain the additional drive brought
about by his close personal relationship with Abe. Their like-mindedness has already
borne results with the inauguration of a new Special Strategic and Global Partnership
during the Prime Misnister's September visit to Japan last year, his first outside of
India’s immediate region. The partnership arises from the two countries’ “convergent
global interests, critical maritime interconnection and growing international
responsibilities” and Japan’s place “at the heart of India's Look East Policy.”17
However, the inability to conclude a civil-nuclear deal during Modi’s recent visit to
14 Rohinee Singh, “Japan Gets Contract to Build Strategeic [sic] Roads on IndoChina Border,” DNA India, 3 November 201415 Danielle Rajendram, “India-Japan Ties in the Face of a Rising China,” China India Brief #20, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, 28 January 2014, http://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publication/china-india-brief/china-india-brief-20.16 Shinzo Abe, “Confluence of the Two Seas,” (speech, Parliament of the Republic of India, 22 August 2007).17 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Tokyo Declaration for India - Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership, 1 September 2014, http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateraldocuments.htm?dtl/23965/Tokyo+Declaration+for+India++Japan+Special+Strate gic+and+Global+Partnership
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Japan demonstrated that advancement in the relationship will not be driven solely by
the political will of the two leaders.
ASEAN
While ASEAN has been at the heart of India’s Look East Policy since its inception,
Modi’s announcement of the 'Act East' Policy during the 2014 India-ASEAN Summit
reinforces the importance of the organization to India’s engagement with countries to
its East. China’s firm stance on disputed territories has given India the opportunity to
enhance its strategic presence in Southeast Asia, and ASEAN states are gradually
looking to India to play a balancing role in the region. Sushma Swaraj gave
manifestation to this sentiment at the 12th India ASEAN meeting in Nay Pyi Taw
saying: “The ASEAN-India strategic partnership owes its strength to the fact that our
‘Look East’ to ASEAN meets your ‘Look West’ towards India.”18
However, India’s recent economic drop combined with the policy paralysis that
afflicted the UPA Government in its final years, means that India will need to work
intensely hard to convince ASEAN that it is serious about becoming a reliable partner
with an expanded security profile in the region. India and ASEAN raised their
relationship to the level of a strategic partnership in 2012. The Indian Navy has thus
far played a vital role in deepening India’s security partnerships with ASEAN states,
through joint patrols, bilateral exercises, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief;
and multilateral engagement, including the two-yearly MILAN exercises at Port Blair
since 1995.19 While India’s Andaman and Nicobar Command presents a natural base
for India to project power through the Malacca Strait into the waters of East Asia, the
Indian Navy has also begun a significant rebalancing of its fleet from its Western to
Eastern Naval Command, which is now the larger fleet in terms of major warships.
On the political level, Modi’s government has continued its commitment to the
previous government’s pledge to open a new diplomatic mission to ASEAN in 2014,
as well as potentially seconding an officer to the ASEAN Secretariat.
18 Sushma Swaraj, “Opening Remarks by External Affairs Minister at 12th India ASEAN Meeting in Nay Pyi Taw,” (speech, India-ASEAN meeting, Nay Pyi Taw, 9 August 2014).19 David Brewster, “India’s Defence Strategy and the India-ASEAN Relationship,”in India-ASEAN Defence Relations, ed. Ajaya Kumar Das (Singapore: S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013), 128.
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In August 2014, Sushma Swaraj announced India’s objective to begin drafting its
next India-ASEAN action plan, with an importance on increasing connectivity in the
region to boost trade and people-to-people links. In terms of connectivity, economic
infrastructure development in India’s Northeastern states will be crucial. As the only
overland connection to mainland Southeast Asia, the strategic utility of these states
has become even more salient since Myanmar began greater global engagement.
Australia
Australia also has the potential to play a significant role in India’s eastward shift in
focus. Australia-India relations have, in recent years, suffered from inattention,
although they have been on an upward trajectory since the low point of the 2009-2010
attacks on Indian students in Australia. With new leaders in both Australia and India,
there is fresh potential to reinvigorate ties between the two Indian Ocean democracies.
Australia and India have a bilateral trading volume of almost $US10 billion, although
the relationship has declined by almost 20 per cent in the last year. A recent visit to
Australia by Prime Minister Modi showed that he and Prime Minister Abbott are well
aware of the opportunities in the relationship, and early signs point to a greater
prioritisation of Australia in Indian foreign policy calculations. The beginning of the
Modi Government’s term has witnessed an unprecedented level of engagement
between the two Indian Ocean democracies, in both bilateral and multilateral
contexts.20
Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott was the first foreign leader to visit India
since the Modi Government’s inauguration, marking the first time the two leaders had
met. The visit’s highest profile outcome was the conclusion of an Australia-India civil
nuclear cooperation agreement, pending final arrangements on safeguards. Aside from
the economic benefits of nuclear commerce between the two states, the conclusion of
the deal has removed a major source of mistrust from the relationship, signalling that
Australia considers India a responsible nuclear power. Modi reciprocated in
November with a full bilateral visit after the G20 Leaders’ Summit, the first by any
20 Danielle Rajendram, “Collaborating across the Indian Ocean,” Pragati, 14 September 2014, http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2014/09/collaborating-acrossthe-india-ocean/
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Indian Prime Minister in nearly three decades. In an address to the Australian
Parliament, Modi outlined his view of Australia “as a major partner in every area of
our national priority,” noting that “Australia will no longer be at the periphery, but at
the centre of India’s vision.21
Vietnam
Vietnam’s increasingly tense relationship with China and its geostrategic position in
Indochina and the South China Sea makes Vietnam a natural partner for India to
balance against China in its own neighborhood. The Modi government has devoted
considerable diplomatic effort to enhancing ties with Vietnam, having sent External
Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and President Pranab Mukherjee to Vietnam and
receiving Vietnamese prime minister Dung in Delhi.
China is suspicious of India’s growing partnership with Vietnam, not least because of
its potential to draw India into the South China Sea through oil-block exploration and
investment. India has also expressed its support for freedom of navigation in the
South China Sea, signaled its commitment to Vietnam’s security, extended a $100
million export line of credit and hinted that New Delhi and Hanoi were discussing a
proposal to supply BrahMos anti-ship missiles to Vietnam. Given that India and
Vietnam both use similar Russian defense platforms, there is much potential for joint
training and technology transfer between the two.
It is clear that India is investing a significant amount of effort in these partnerships,
with a view to consolidating its position in the Asia-Pacific region. Of course, India’s
ability to realize its Asia-Pacific ambitions will be dependent on a number of external
and internal conditions, including the stability of its neighborhood and its relationship
with Pakistan, the security situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of allied
forces and India’s own domestic economic and political situation.22
21 Prime Minister of Australia the Hon Tony Abbott, MP, “Joint Statement with Prime Minister Modi, New Delhi, India,” https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-09- 05/joint-statement-prime-minister-modi-new-delhi-india.22 Carl Thayer, “How India-Vietnam Strategic Ties are Mutually Beneficial,” TheDiplomat, 3 December 2012, http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/how-india-vietnamstrategic-ties-are-mutually-beneficial/
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The economic relationship between India and Vietnam is fairly minor, ranking only
29th among India’s top bilateral trading partners. That said, in the past five years,
trade between India and Vietnam has more than tripled.
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EVALUATING MODI’S LOOK EAST POLICY
India has been pursuing closer engagement with the Asia-Pacific for over two decades
now. In order to be transformative, however, the Modi Government must look beyond
what has already been pledged to pursue serious and deep strategic partnerships
throughout the region. This seriousness would be gauged through a number of
indicators. On the political level, there would need to be greater engagement with East
and Southeast Asian partners, and greater diplomatic resourcing throughout the
region. There would also need to be more active involvement in relevant multilateral
institutions, such as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, and APEC, to
which India has applied for membership. On the economic front, it can be expected
that India’s trade engagement with existing East and Southeast Asian partners will
continue. But the extent to which India is willing to liberalize its domestic restrictions
to allow greater levels of foreign investment will be a clearer indication of India’s
commitment to strengthening relations with the Asia Pacific particularly with regard
to Japan. Finally, a key indicator will be enhanced defence cooperation and
assistance, including joint exercises, defence transfers, and financial or technological
assistance. Conclusion on the sale of advanced weaponry to the region, and naval
cooperation, particularly in trilateral arrangements, will be of particular significance.
In recent years, it is clear that India’s engagement with East and Southeast Asia has
been driven primarily by the challenge of responding to China.
As such, the kind of regional relationships pursued by the Government will be
affected by the way China’s ties with India and its other neighbors continue to
develop. Should China persist with its current accelerated rate of incursions along
India’s disputed border, or should China’s presence in the Indian Ocean acquire a
significant military dimension, India is likely to pursue a deeper relationship with
critical partners such as Japan, Vietnam, Australia, ASEAN, and Indonesia. Similarly,
should China’s assertive behaviour in maritime territorial disputes in Asia continue to
be regionally destabilizing, it can be expected that states in East and Southeast Asia
will look more seriously towards India to assume an influential role in the region’s
security architecture.
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India’s evolving relationship with the United States will also influence its engagement
with East and Southeast Asia, given the continuation of America’s critical role and its
stake in the region’s security. The United States has for some time expressed a desire
for an enhanced global role for India.
Thus far, the Modi Government appears serious about developing a more substantial
partnership with the United States, as demonstrated by the breadth of Modi’s first visit
to the United States in October 2014 and the invitation for President Obama to visit
India as Chief Guest for Republic Day in January 2015. In all this, access to advanced
US military technology is likely to be a key objective for India.
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PM ON LOOK-EAST POLICY
Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Thursday told world leaders that his government
accorded high priority to turn India’s erstwhile “Look East” policy into an “Act East”
policy.
“Since entering office six months ago, my government has moved with a great sense
of priority and speed to turn our ’Look East Policy’ into ‘Act East Policy’,” Mr. Modi
said in his address to the East Asia Summit in the Myanmarese capital Nay Pyi Taw.
“The East Asia Summit is an important pillar of this policy,” he said.
“Look East” was introduced in the early 1990s when the Congress party’s PV
Narasimha Rao was prime minister. It was endorsed by former prime ministers Atal
Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh.
Mr. Modi said the initiatives taken by the East Asia Summit in disaster preparedness
and response are truly commendable.
“No other forum brings together such a large collective weight of global population,
youth, economy and military strength. Nor is any other forum so critical for peace,
stability and prosperity in Asia-Pacific and the world,” he said.
In recognition of the centrality of the institution, at this year’s India-ASEAN summit
Modi announced that India’s long-standing Look East Policy would be upgraded to
“Act East.” This is more than just a rebrand and signals India’s willingness to play a
more active role in the region.23
Under Modi, India has invested particular effort in strengthening ties with its East and
Southeast Asian partners. Under the new leadership in Delhi, India’s Look East
policy has morphed into a proactive Act East policy, which envisages accelerated
across-the-board engagement between the two growth poles of a vibrant Asia. This
has been reflected in a spate of two-way visits in the first few months of the Modi
government. President Pranab Mukherjee went on a landmark visit to Vietnam in
September, followed by the visit of Vietnam’s prime minister to New Delhi in
23http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/look-east-policy-now-turned-into-act-east-policy-modi/article6595186.ece
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October. External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj chose Myanmar as one of her first
few foreign destinations abroad in August, and met a spectrum of ministers from
ASEAN countries as well as East Asian countries. She has already visited Vietnam
and Singapore and looks set to travel to most of other ASEAN countries in the months
ahead. During her visit to Singapore, India’s foreign minister articulated the need for
an Act East policy forcefully: "Look East is no longer adequate; now we need Act
East policy.”
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OBSTACLES TO REALISING THESE AMBITIONS
India’s engagement with East and Southeast Asia will, to some extent, is contingent
on the regional situation in South Asia. Indian public opinion reveals that Pakistan is
still perceived to present the greatest threat to Indian security in the next ten years,
with Pakistani-launched terrorism the primary reason for this level of threat
perception. This is particularly salient in light of Al Qaeda’s announcement of a new
South Asia ‘branch’ in September 2014 and wider concerns about a potential South
Asia dimension to the rise of Islamic State. Should relations with Pakistan
substantially deteriorate, or a major Pakistan-backed terror attack occur on Indian soil,
it should be expected that India’s primary international focus will revert swiftly to its
own neighborhood. Destabilization in the countries to India’s west could also impact
on India’s pursuit of its interests in East Asia. As 68 per cent of India’s imported oil
and $US30 billion of remittances come from millions of Indian workers in the Persian
Gulf, the Middle East will continue to be of significance to India.24
The power vacuum and resultant instability that may follow the US withdrawal from
Afghanistan also has the potential to shift much Indian attention from east to west.
Even so, and despite ties with Israel, which Modi seems keen to enhance, West Asia
is not likely to grow as a priority for India it the same way as the Asia-Pacific. In any
case, Modi’s advocacy of a “Look East, Link West” policy suggests that his broader
foreign policy vision is connected to success in both spheres.
24 Malik, “The Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain”; Alyssa Ayres, “India’s Stakes in the Middle East,” Forbes, 26 February 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/alyssaayres/2014/02/26/indias-stakes-in-the-middleeast/.
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CONCLUSION
In its first months since assuming office, the Modi Government has signalled its
intention to pursue serious engagement with the AsiaPacific and prioritise high-level
interactions with China, ASEAN, Singapore, Vietnam, Japan, and Australia. Modi’s
overwhelming electoral victory has not only afforded his government the opportunity
to pursue a serious strategy in the Asia-Pacific, but has enhanced the perception of
India as an attractive security partner in the region. Deeper engagement with the
region will align with Modi’s intentions to Indian economic growth and carve out a
more prominent global role for India.
In addition, prioritising relations with India’s East and Southeast Asian partners will
fulfil India’s broader strategic objectives of balancing against China’s increasing
presence in the Indian Ocean. China’s assertive stance in its border dispute with India
and maritime territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific is increasing the relevance of a
stronger Indian presence in the region. If it is able to carefully manage Chinese
sensitivities, cautious Indian engagement has the potential to act as a stabilising force
in the region.
India’s Look East Policy has over the last two decades strengthened its economic,
political, security, and civilization links with the rest of Asia. To cope with the global
financial turmoil, India however should become even more persistent and proficient in
deepening its linkages with the rest of Asia, while strengthening its capacities to meet
its developmental challenges.
To accomplish this task, India will need to develop far greater expertise in geo-
economics, an area that has not received the requisite attention. India should also
consider establishing a well funded, resources, think-tank for researching, debating,
communicating, and influencing foreign policy issues and options. This will also
enable India to better communicate its intentions to rest of the world, including its
partners in Asia. Thus, the success of the policy depends on the commitment of the
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Indian government to implement the proposed plans and projects under the policy and
to give role for the Northeastern states in this policy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books Referred
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Zajaczkowski, J., Schottli, J. and Thapa, M. (n.d.). India in the contemporary
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Yu, G. (1977). Intra-Asian international relations. Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press.
Haokip, T. (n.d.). India's Look East Policy and the Northeast.
Ram, A. (2012). Two decades of India's look East policy. New Delhi: Indian
Council of World Affairs.
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Forbes.com, (2015). Forbes Welcome. [online] Available at:
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