The Industrial Development Bank is the latest in the series of specialised institutions set up to finance and develop industry — institutions which have, by and large, failed to make a significant impact. Together with the Unit Trust, much hope now seems to be pinned on the IDBI.
But misgivings arise that the already over-worked Board of the Reserve Bank and its Governor may not be able to give this institution all the care and time it will need.
Doubts have also been expressed about the need for yet another institution when there already are so many primary lending agencies and, besides, an active, though young, refinancing body.
Was the alternative of strengthening these institutions not workable?
It is true that their performance in the past has not been exactly promising. If that was the consideration which weighed with the Government, then why not face realities and end the independent existence of these institutions ?
FIRST the Industr ia l Finance Corporation of India , under a
Central Ac t of 1948; then the State Financial Corporations Act , 1951, under which fourteen State Financial Corporations were set up, the last one in 1960 in Gujarat ; in 1954 the National Industrial Development Corpora t ion whol ly state-owned; in 1955 the Nat ional Small Industries Corporation, also whol ly State-owned. The first gate-crasher from the private sector was the Industr ia l Credit and Investment Corporation of India in 1955 w i th active foreign collaboration and financial assistance. Then followed a l u l l for three years. In 1958 was set up the Refinance Corporation for Industry, part State-owned, and a beginning was made wi th the State Smal l Industries Corporations — small-sized replicas of the National Small I n dustries Corporation. State industr ia l Development Corporations, modelled after a fashion on the National Industr ial Development Corporation, began to he set up in I960. There are besides, the F i l m Finance Corporation, the State Minera l Development Corporations and the Rehabilitation Industries Corporation. A n d now, the Industr ia l Development Bank of India , to be set up under a statute - the coping stone?
According to the B i l l introduced in the Lok Sabha on February 28. the Indus t r ia l Development Bank of I n d i a is to be a fu l l subsidiary of the Reserve Bank of India which w i l l ho ld its entire equity, and the Central Board of Directors of the Reserve Bank shall constitute the Board of the l D R I. It is to start w i th an issued capital of Rs 10 crores. These resources w i l l be augmented by loans from the Central Government, including one
of Rs 10 crores, interest free, and repayable in fifteen annual instalments commencing after 15 years of the date of receipt of the loan ; sale of bonds and debentures with or without Government guarantee; borrowings from the Reserve Bank inc lud ing term borrowings from the National Industr ial Credit (Long-Term Operations) Fund to be set up under the Reserve Bank Act (this Fund was first recommended by the W o r k i n g Group on State Financial Corporations which submitted its Report to the Reserve Bank recently, to support term lending insti tut i ons ) ; and accepting deposits of not less than one year's matur i ty . It is also being authorised to borrow in foreign markets, w i th Government approval and, where necessary, guarantee. W i t h the large authorised capital of Rs 50 crores — subscriptions to which by the Reserve Bank would not be impeded by considerations of dividend as in the rase of other financial institutions, and supplemented by such other resources as detailed in the B i l l , the I D B I would not certainly be short of funds.
The provision of the Rs 10-crore 30 years interest-free loan is parti-cuiarly noteworthy. It was denied to the I F C as also the S F Cs and other Corporations. An exception was made in the case of the I C I C I, and recently, the Agr icu l tu ra l Refi-'narue Corporation. In the case of the IC1CI. it was imperative if the assistance of the I B R D was to be fo r thcoming and it ensured an adequate profit-earning capacity in the early years when business had to be developed from scratch, and no tax concession was available, unlike in many other countries. In the case of the Agr icu l tu ra l Refin
ance Corporation too this faci l i ty was 'needed to meet the guaranteed dividend on shares which were also held by non-government bodies. But in the present case when the entire equity — for which there is no provision for a pre-determined rate of guaranteed dividend — is held by the Reserve Bank, and there is complete immuni ty of the incomes, profits and gains of the I D B 1 (and of the Development Assistance Fund proposed in the B i l l ) f rom the payment of income tax, super tax, super profits tax, etc, the raison d'etre of the interest-free loan is 'not very clear. Instead of this indirect subsidy, why not guarantee a straight subsidy of work ing losses? Government might feel nervous about annual ly vot ing the subsidy. Then surely. Parliament should not be lul led by an arrangement of the k i n d proposed? It should be able to debate the workings of a body l ike this when its annual accounts are placed before i t . Al ternat ively could not government contribute the same amount to the equity of the I D B I and relieve management of the need to repay the contr ibut ion?
The functions of the I D B I include both those of a p r imary lending in-sti tution for industrial concerns and those of an apex body for other p r i mary lending institutions. To take up the latter first, the IDB1 can refinance term advances of three to 25 years" matur i ty made to industr i a l concerns by the I F C, S F Cs ( i n c l u d i n g the Madras Industr ial Investment Corporation) and other financial institutions which Government may not i fy ; it can s imi la r ly refinance term loans of three m ten years' maturi ty made by scheduled banks arid State Cooperative Banks; it can refinance export credits of up
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Industrial Development Bank
March 14, 1964 T H E E C O N O M I C W E E K L Y
to ten years' maturity granted by either o! the two previous categories of institutions; it ran subscribe to the shares and bonds of the I F C, S F Cs, etc, and can accept, discount or rediscount bills of exchange and promissory notes.
There is a second group of functions. The I D B I has been empowered to finance industrial concerns on its own and purchase or underwrite their shares and debentures; it can stand guarantee for deferred payments due from industrial concerns, as also for loans raised by them which are floated in the open market or from scheduled and State Cooperative Ranks and the group of specialised term-lending bodies. Lastly, 'it can guarantee the obligations of such banks and other lending bodies on account of their underwriting of share and debenture issues of industrial concerns.
Development Assistance Fund
This two-fold division of the functions of the I D B I has more than a mere idle classificatory interest. The authors of the Bill have dug this dichotomy into the financial structure of the 1 D B I pretty deep. Chapter V of the Bill enjoins the I D B I to set up a special fund — the Development Assistance Fund (D A F ) — w h e n required by Central Government. The second group of the 1 D B I's functions distinguished above would be financed with the resources of the D A F which would consist, primarily, of all amounts received for purposes of this fund by way of loans, gifts, grants, donations, etc. from Government and other sources. To the D A F would also be credited repayments, etc, of loans and other facilities granted from it. income from investments made from it. and income as interest, etc, on the application of the resources to the specified group of functions.
It is provided, however, that these primary assistance functions can be undertaken only with prior approval of Government, and only when the I D B I is satisfied that banks or other financial institutions are not likely to extend such assistance in the ordinary course of their busi-ness, and Government in turn are
satisfied that such assistance to industrial concerns is necessary in the interests of the industrial development of the country. But it is also additionally provided that if such assistance is sought to be given by the I D B I from its general resources and not out of the D A F, Government's prior approval is not necessary —- this is perhaps more like an emergency exit, a permissive provision which would rarely be used. Perhaps the only justification for this separate fund is to insulate —for accounting purposes — the special role of the I D B I as the primary lender in defined sectors of the economy, financed from funds earmarked for the purpose by Government on concessional terms. It has little functional significance beyond, perhaps, demarcating refinancing from primary lending and the less risky from the more risky and time-weighted investments. As the fund, is proposed in the Bil l , the profits and losses made by it would not reflect on the earnings of the I D B I out of its general fund,
The Bil l also provides that, if considered necessary, the I D B I would absorb the Refinance Corporation for industry. The K C I is subsisting on PL480 funds, and it was actually the sensitiveness of IS authorities to giving these funds to any enterprise in the State sector which compelled the Indian Government to devise the R C I which was acceptable to the U S. Its absorption into the IDBI would have to wait therefore for an appropriate change in U S attitudes, unless of course the Rs 20-odd crores of PI--180 funds in it could be repatriated.
Why a New Agency ?
In some ways the I D B I is perhaps more favourably placed to assist industry than other extant institutions. The Bill , for example, lays down no criteria regarding the security which must be obtained by it either for refinancing or for primary lending, which should enable the Board to accommodate special cases deserving support: also there does not seem in the immediate future a scarcity of resources of the I D B I. and there is no maximum statutory limit on its borrowings. But misgivings have been expressed that the already overworked Board of the
Reserve Bank and its Governor, having an array of formidable developmental and normal central banking functions to guide, may not be able to give this institution all the care and time it will need, despite assistance from expert officials.
Doubts may also arise of the need for yet another institution when already there are so many primary lending agnicies and a fairly vigorous, though new. refinancing body — the Refinance Corporation for Industry. Was the alternative of strengthening these institutions not workable ? We have not been told. May be, it was deduced from their experience in the last decade that they would have to depend largely on funds from Government if their operations had to be carried on at rates deemed reasonable. If that be so, why not then face realities and end the independent existence of these other institutions ? Thus the suggestion has been made more than once that the I F C should absorb the anaemic State Financial Corporations.
The Real Failure
There, must then be something wrong with the general economic and monetary policy of the country. The I D B I would depend heavily o/i the Government (one cannot visualise an over-enthusiastic public eager to subscribe to 25-year bonds) for its funds. Where does the private investor come in — when shares and debentures, etc. are unloaded ? What is the inflationary implication of this mode of financing ? We keep coming back to the one central issue - how to ensure that the savings that the community is making, and will increasingly make in the next few years, will be channelled, with the minimum of leakage into the unwanted byways of the economy, to productive purposes as envisaged in a total planned effort? As long as such leakages are allow-ed in the glaring light of the law, and the bulk of the resultant incomes and capital gains are outside the tax net. efforts such as the present one will masquerade as the need of the hour and yield but little.
— absit omen
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March 14, 1964 T H E E C O N O M I C W E E K L Y
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March 14, 1964 T H E E C O N O M I C W E E K L Y
to ten years' ma tu r i t y granted by ei ther of the two previous categories of ins t i tu t ions ; it can subscribe to the shares and bonds of the I F C, S F Cs, etc, and can accept, discount Or rediscount b i l l s of exchange and promissory notes.
There is a second group of func
tions. The I D B I has been em
powered to finance indust r ia l con
cerns on its own and purchase or
underwr i te their shares and deben
tures; it can stand guarantee for
deferred payments due f rom indust
r ia l concerns, as also for loans raised
by them which are floated in the
open market or f rom scheduled and
State Cooperative Banks and the
group of specialised term- lending
bodies. Last ly , it can guarantee the
obl igat ions of such batiks and other
lending bodies on account of their
underwr i t i ng of share and debenture
issues of indust r ia l concerns.
Development Assistance Fund
Th is two-fold d iv is ion of the func
t ions of the I D B I has more than
a mere idle classif icatory inter
est. The authors of the H i l l have
dug this d ichotomy into the f inan
cial structure of the I D B I pretty
deep. Chapter V of the B i l l en
joins the I D B I to set up a spe
cial fund the Development Assis
tance Fund ( D A F) when re
qu i red by Central (Government. The
second group of the I D B I's func
tions d ist inguished above would be
financed wi th the resources of the
D A F wh ich would consist, p r ima
r i l y , of al l amounts received for
purposes of this fund by way of
loans, gi f ts, grants, donat ions, etc.
f rom Government and other sources.
To the D A F would also be credited
repayments, etc. of loans and other
fac i l i t ies granted f rom it. income
f rom investments made f r o m it. and
income as interest, etc, on the app l i
cat ion of the resources to the speci
f ied group of funct ions.
It is p rov ided , however, that these
p r ima ry assistance funct ions can be
undertaken only w i th pr io r approva l
of Government, and on ly when the
I D B I is satisfied that banks or
other f inancial inst i tut ions are not
l ikely to extend such assistance in
the o rd ina ry course of their busi
ness, and (Government in tu rn are
satisf ied that such assistance to i n
dust r ia l concerns is necessary in the
interests of the indust r ia l develop
ment of the count ry . But i t is also
add i t i ona l l y prov ided that i f such
assistance is sought to be given by
the I D B I f r o m its general resour
ces and not out of the D A F, (Gov
ernment 's p r i o r approval is not ne
cessary •— this is perhaps more l ike
an emergency exi t , a permissive
provis ion wh ich wou ld rare ly be
used. Perhaps the on ly just i f icat ion
for this separate fund is to insulate
— f o r account ing purposes — the
special ro le of. the I D B I as the
p r i m a r y lender in defined sectors of
the economy, f inanced f rom funds
earmarked for the purpose by (Gov
ernment on concessional terms, It
has l i t t le funct ional signif icance -
beyond, perhaps, demarcat ing ref i
nancing f r om pr imary lending and
the less r isky f rom the more r isky
and t ime-weighted investments. As
the fund is proposed in the B i l l , the
prof i ts and losses made by it wou ld
not reflect on the earnings of the
I D B I out of its general f und .
The B i l l also provides that, i f considered necessary, the J D B I wou ld absorb the Refinance Corporat ion fo r .Industry. The R C I is subsist ing on PL-480 funds, and it was ac tua l l y the sensitiveness of US authori t ies to g iv ing these funds to any enterprise in the State sector wh ich compel led the Ind ian (Government to devise the R C I wh ich was acceptable to the US. Its absorpt ion into the 1DB1 would have to wait therefore for an appropr iate change in U S att i tudes, unless of course the Bs 20-odd crores of PL-480 funds in it cou ld be repatr iated.
Why a New Agency ?
In some ways the I D B I is per
haps more favourab ly placed to as-
sist industry than other extant insti
tut ions. The B i l l , for example, lays
down no cr i ter ia regarding the seen-
r i t y which must be obtained by it
ei ther for ref inancing or for p r imary
lending, which should enable the
Board to accommodate special cases
deserving suppor t : also there does
'not seem in the immediate future a
scarci ty of resources of the I D B I.
and there is no max imum statutory
l im i t on its borrowings. But misg i
vings have been 'expressed that the
a l ready overworked Board of the
Reserve Bank and its Governor,
having an array of f o rm idab le deve
lopmenta l and normal central bank
ing functions to guide, may riot be
able to give this inst i tut ion a l l the
care and t ime it w i l l need, despite
assistance f rom expert officials.
Doubts may also arise of the need
for yet another ins t i tu t ion when
already there are so many p r i
mary lending agencies and a fa i r ly
vigorous, though new, ref inancing
body — the Refinance Corporat ion
for Indus t ry . Was the al ternat ive of
strengthening these inst i tut ions not
workable ? We have not been to ld .
M a y be, it was deduced f r o m their
experience in the last decade that
they wou ld have to depend largely
on funds f rom (Government i f their
operations had to be carr ied on at
rates deemed reasonable, lf that be
so. why not. then face real i t ies and
end the independent existence of
these other inst i tut ions ? Thus the
suggestion has been made more than
once that the I F C should absorb
the anaemic State F inancia l Corpo
rations.
The Real Failure
There must then be something
wrong w i th the general economic
and monetary pol icy of the country .
The I D B I would depend heavi ly
on the (Government lone cannot visu
alise an over-enthusiastic pub l ic
eager to subscribe to 25-year bonds)
for its funds. Where does the p r i
vate investor come in when shares
and debentures, etc are unloaded ?
What is the in f la t ionary imp l i ca t ion
ol this mode of f inancing ? We
keep coming back to the one cen
t ra l issue how to ensure that the
savings that the communi ty is
making, and w i l l increasingly make
in the next few years, w i l l be chan
nelled, w i th the m i n i m u m of leakage
into the unwanted byways of the
economy, to product ive purposes as
envisaged in a totaI p lanned effort ?
As long as such leakages are a l low
ed in the g l a r i n g l ight of the law,
and the bulk of the resultant in
comes and capital gains are outside
the tax net. efforts such as the pre
sent one w i l l masquerade as the
need of the hour and yield but l i t t le .
— absit omen
521
March 14, 1964 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY
522