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PPROVED FORRELEASE -HISTORICALCOLLECTIONDIVISION DATE:06-18-2012
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INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Report
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The Soviet Motorized Rifle Division and Tank Division:
Organization, Size, and Logistic Capability
Secret
November 1970
ARCHIVTL RECORD
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WARNING
Comments on the facts and judgriments contained in
this report should be for warded through appropriatechannels to the Director of Strategic Research. CIAHeadquarters. Washington, D.C., 2050.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCYDirectorate of Intelligence
November 1970
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
The Soviet Motorized Rifle Division and Tank Division:
Organization, Size, and Logistic Capability
Introduction
In the early Sixties Warsaw Pact ground forceswere structured to optimize their effectiveness foroperations in conjunction with theater nuclear war.In particular, artillery was sharply reduced--in partbecause it was assumed that nuclear weapons would per-form the breakthrough role formerly assigned to thoseweapons. Logistic support was also reduced to improvemobility and reduce vulnerability.
Since the mid-Sixties, articles in the Sovietmilitary press yhave indicated thatSoviet military doctrine now accep sthe possibility of nonnuclear hostilities between NATOand the Warsaw Pact. This same evidence suggests,however, that the Soviets expect that NATO would initi-ate tactical nuclear strikes if a Pact nonnuclear offen-sive achieved initial success.
This report evaluates those changes in the organ-ization and strength of two representative first-lineSoviet divisions in the Group of Soviet Fo'rces inGermany since they were last analyzed in depth in 1967.It assesses in detail their logistic capabilities,measures to what extent Soviet divisional organizationhas been affected by the shift in tactical doctrine,and projects likely future developments.
The conclusions drawn from this analysis are sum-marized beginning on page 25. Sources and methodology,together with detailed data, are presented at Annexbeginning on page 28.
Note: This report was produced solely by CIA. It wasprepared by the Office of Strategic Research and coor-dinated with the Office of National Estimates.
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Contents
Page
Organization and Equipment .S...... .. 5
19th Motorized Rifle Division....... 5
10th Guards Tank Division ....... 11
Personnel Strengths ..... . ...... 13
Logistic Capabilities .... ........ 14
Background ...... .. ....... 14
The Evidence ...... . ....... 15
Division POL Capacities ........ 15
Assessment of POL Capabilities ...... 18
Division Ammunition Capacities ...... 19
Assessment of Ammunition Capabilities . . 21
Division Capacities for Other
Supply Categories .... . ...... 22
Future Trends ...... . ....... 23
Summary ... .. .. ... . . ...... 25
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Contents(continued)
Page
Annex: Sources and Methodology ....... 28
Table 1. Vehicle Storage and Holdingsof Major Equipment Items of the 19thMotorized Rifle Division . ...... 32
Table 2. Vehicle Storage and Holdingsof Major Equipment Items of the 10thGuards Tank Division . ........ 34
Table 3. Estimated Holdings of MajorEquipment Items of the 19th MotorizedRifle Division and the 10th Guards TankDivision, By Unit .... . ...... 36
Table 4. Estimated Holdings of MajorEquipment Items of the 19th MotorizedRifle Division and the 10th GuardsTank Division, By Type of Equipment . . . 37
Illustrations
19th Motorized Rifle Division and 10thGuards Tank Division, GSFG (map). ...... 4
Soviet Tank and Motorized Rifle Divisions(organization charts) .... ........ 6-7
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Organization and Equipment
Two divisions in the Group of Soviet Forces inGermany (GSFG.)--the 19th Motorized Rifle Division andthe 10th Guards Tank Division--are believed to berepresentative of first-line Soviet divisions and serveas a standard against which all other Soviet line divi-sions can be measured. (See the map; facing.) Thefield artillery strengths in both of the divisionshave been substantially augmented during the past sev-eral years. Aside from this change, however, andgradual improvements due to modernization, the generalorganizational structures of both remain essentiallywhat they have been since the early Sixties (see thecharts on pages 6 and 7).
The overall equipment strength of each divisionhas been increased by about 100 major items since 1967,mostly as a result of the artillery augmentation. Thecurrent equipment totals are about 2,300 for the tankdivision and 2,400 for the motorized rifle division.
The results of the analysis of the organizationand equipment of these two combat ready divisions aresummarized in this section and in the tables at Annex,beginning on page 28.
19th Motorized Rifle Division
The 19th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD), garrisonedin the Dallgow-Doeberitz area, has increased in sizesince early 1968. Some 100 vehicles and major items ofequipment have been added, increasing the total equip-ment count from about 2,300 to about 2,400 (see Table 1at Annex on page 32). This growth is largely attribut-able to increases in organic divisional and regimentalartillery and consequent increases in supporting vehicles.
The artillery regiment of the 19th MRD was increasedfrom eight to nine batteries in mid-1968 with the addi-tion of a six-gun 152mm howitzer battery. This bringsthe regiment to a total of 54 guns--18 152mm howitzersand 36 122mm howitzers.
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TANKDIVISION a- A
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RIFLEDIVISION
MANEUVER
reconnaissance battalionmotorized, rifle regimentmotorized rifle regiment
infantry infantry infantry armor motorized rifle regiment>. tank regiment
COMBAT SUPPORTcon 'entional nuclear antiaircraft artillery regimentfire support fire support defense multip e rocket launcher battalion
FROG battalionantitank artillery reconnaissance batterydefense antiaircraft artillery regiment
engineer battalionsignal battalion '
chemical chemical defense companydefense comninaions antitank battalion
SERVICE SUPPORTheadquarters companymotor transport battalion
medical transport maintenance supply maintenance battalionmedical battaliontraffic control companyfield bakery
The maneuver elements-the direct combat force-are the motorized rifle and tank regiments and areconnaissance battalion. These elements receive combat fire support from rocket and tube artillery units.
The comhat support elements-such as the engineers who provide a river and stream crossing capability,the signal units, the antiaircratt defenses, and chemical and biological defense units-are common to bothtypes of divisions. The rifle division also contains an antitank unit.
The service support elements provide the supply, maintenance, and general housekeeping activities forthe division in peacetime or war.
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Before the introduction of the additional howitzerbattery, a Soviet artillery regiment had an estimated205 vehicles and pieces of equipment. Current analysisindicates that this regiment has about 210 major equip-ment items. This total includes the six additionalhowitzers and the newer ZIL-131 cargo trucks whichreplaced older model trucks as prime movers and generaltransport vehicles for their logistic support.
This new artillery organization incorporates whatappears to be an important tactical and logisticaltrend. Formerly, the supporting elements of the regi-ment included a cargo vehicle which had a carryingcapacity of no more than 2.5 metric tons (mt). Manyof these trucks have apparently been replaced on aone-for-one basis by the newer ZIL-131 truck with acapacity of 3.5 mt, increasing the load carrying capa-bility of the regiment to provide for the additionalhowitzer battery without increasing the number oftrucks.
The division's rocket units, the FROG (free-rocket-over-ground) battalion and the multiple rocketlauncher battalion, have also been increased in size,adding to the division's nuclear and nonnuclear firesupport.
One launcher has been added to the FROG battalionand there are now four launchers organized into twofiring batteries of two launchers each. In addition,the new wheeled FROG-7 has replaced the older, trackedmodels (see lower photograph on page 9). The FROG-7system includes a new resupply vehicle,. built on thesame chassis as the launcher and carrying threerockets rather than one. The new resupply vehiclehas not yet been observed in the FROG units of the19th MRD but has been supplied to other Soviet unitsin Germany. One of these resupply units per launcherwould increase the total number of rockets availablein the division from the present 8 to 16 (four onthe launchers and three on each resupply vehicle).
A major increase in total division firepower hasbeen achieved by the introduction of a battery of 6
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122 mm Rocket Launcher (40-round) BM-21-
Weight with launcher and rockets 13 metric tonsVehicle speed 47 miles per hour
Vehicle cruising range 252 milesReload time 10 minutes
Crew Six menRocket range 16,410 yards
Free Rocket Over Ground (FROG-7)
Weight with launcher and rocket 20 metric tonsVehicle speed 41 miles per hour
Vehicle cruising range 311 miles
Rocket range 37 nautical miles
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122mm BM-21 rocket launchers (see top photograph onpage 9) in the multiple rocket launcher battalion,augmenting the 12 older 140mm BM-14 rocket launchers.The BM-21 is a 40-round launcher which rapidly expendslarge amounts of ammunition, calling for extensivemobile stocks.
The antitank battalion has undergone a greatertransformation over the past several years than anyother element of divisional artillery. Before 1968the antitank unit was a six-gun. battery probablyattached to divisional artillery headquarters for ad-ministrative and logistic support. Since that timeit has been increased to three six-gun batteries,probably organized as a separate battalion adminis-tratively subordinate to the division headquarters.This new organization was first observed in early1969 after the division returned from Czechoslovakiain late 1968. (Previous estimates of the equipmentholdings of the antitank battalion have included abattery of antitank guided missile vehicles. Thereis no current evidence to indicate that the antitankbattalion of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division doesin fact have guided missiles. There is, however, abattery of nine antitank guided missile vehicles ineach motorized rifle regiment.)
The heavy mortar support was increased to a totalof 18 tubes for each motorized rifle regiment, witha six-tube battery directly subordinate to each ofthe three rifle battalions. Formerly the mortar unitswere subordinate to the regiment, and each regimenthad 15 tubes. In addition, a six-gun 122mm howitzerbattery was added to each motorized rifle regiment,providing additional fire power.
Recently the 19th MRD has begun receiving theBTR-60 armored personnel carrier (APC), replacing theobsolescent BTR-152. Some other Soviet divisions inGermany have been equipped with the BTR-60 since about1963, but it was not until late 1969 that the 19thMRD, formerly fully equipped with the BTR-152, wasobserved with the newer BTR-60. The BTR-60 is amphib-ious and has significantly better mobility and arma-ment than the BTR-152. It is not yet known how many
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BTR-60s will be allocated to each regiment, but inany case the combat effectiveness of the division'sinfantry is being increased.
The 19th MRD evidently has not been issued any ofthe newest model Soviet APCs--the tracked amphibioussquad fighting vehicle called the infantry combatvehicle, which mounts a 76mm smoothbore cannon and anantitank missile launcher. This vehicle is being in-troduced into motorized rifle units in the USSR buthas not yet been identified with Soviet forces inGermany.
The currently estimated equipment holdings of the19th MRD are shown at Annex by number in each subor-dinate unit in Table 3 on page 36 and by type of equip-ment in Table 4 on page 37.
10th Guards Tank Division
The 10th Guards Tank Division (GTD), garrisonedat Krampnitz and Potsdam, -has also been strengthenedby the addition of about 100 vehicles and pieces ofequipment since early 1968. The total of major itemsof equipment in the tank division is now about 2,300(see Table 2 at Annex on page 3.4.)... The increases,like those in the 19th Motorized Rifle Division,consist largely of additional divisional and regimentalartillery and supporting logistics vehicles.
The artillery regiment of the 10th GTD previouslyhad 36 guns, 12 fewer than the artillery regiment ofthe rifle division. Since 1967, 18 122mm howitzershave been added to the tank division's artillery regi-ment, raising its total to 54 guns--the same number nowfound in the motorized rifle division's artillery regi-ment. This increase probably reflects a Soviet percep-tion of a greater need for conventional supporting firefor the tank division. The FROG and multiple rocketlauncher battalions of the tank division were increasedto the same levels as those now found in the motorizedrifle division. The multiple rocket launcher battalionof the tank division has been fully equipped with 18 ofthe new BM-21 rocket launchers, replacing the 12 240mmBM-24s. To meet the ammunition supply needs of the BM-21,
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the Soviets have provided the battalion with at least20 Ural-375 trucks and 20 two-axle cargo trailers, eachwith a 5-mt capacity. The Ural-375 is the largest ofthe general purpose transport vehicles now being intro-duced into either the tank or motorized rifle division.
Two of the four line regiments of the tank divisionhave been observed with the ZSU-23-4, a self-propelledAA weapon which mounts four 23mm cannons and has anintegral radar direction system (see photograph below).According to I_
the addition of the ZSU-23-4s to the existing- --battery forms a battalion. The rifle regiment of
the tank division now has its original six-gun batteryof ZPU-4s (towed quadruple 14.5mm guns) and twofour-gun batteries of ZSU-23-4s. In the three tank
ZSU-23-4 23mm Self-Propelled Antiaircraft Gun
Weight 14 metric tonsVehicle speed 25 miles per hour
Vehicle cruising range 155 milesCrew Four men
Maximum rate of fire 1,200-1,400 rounds per minuteEffective range (slant) 6,600 feet
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regiments, two four-gun batteries of ZSU-23-4s wereadded to the four-gun battery of ZSU-57-2s, self-propelled dual 57mm AA guns.
At least two of the four line regiments of thetank division have also received some Ural-375s aspart of their motor transport; probably replacingolder and lighter cargo vehicles.
The currently estimated equipment holdings of the10th GTD are shown at Annex, by number in each sub-ordinate unit in Table 3 on page 36 and by type ofequipment in Table 4 on page 37.
Personnel Strengths
Although the equipment levels of these Sovietdivisions can be determined with a high degree ofaccuracy, no comparable methodology has been developedto accurately determine the absolute levels of person-nel strengths of Soviet units. There is reliablerecent evidence, however, that the authorized wartimestrength of a Soviet motorized rifle division is about10,000 men and that of a tank division about 8,000.Small personnel increases which have resulted fromthe subsequent artillery reorganization have probablynot affected these totals significantly.
Actual peacetime manning levels of Soviet divisionsin East Germany are probably significancly less than100 percent of wartime strength at most times. Thereis good evidence that Warsaw Pact planners assumethat first-line Soviet and East European divisionsmight enter combat at effective strengths rangingbetween 80 and 95 percent, suggesting both that somepersonnel shortages are normal in peacetime and thatthese are deliberate.
In the case of Soviet divisions, these shortagesmay result in part from personnel attrition in theintervals between conscript callup periods. But at
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least som divisional units are probably regularlyundermanned. - -
rna-wasoonssent-ykept at-- rL--en--o-rts-a-tutnorized strength. If the condi-
tion r applied to other divisional supportelememr-s=-oorn c at support and service support--the division could have been as low as 80 percent of .its authorized wartime strength.
It would be more consistent with known Sovietmanning practices, however, if combat support unitssuch as artillery were closer to full strength thanservice support units such as the maintenance battalion.A more likely manning level--assuming only minor short-ages in combat elements (the tank and motorized rifleregiments) and combat support elements with the bulkof the shortages in service elements--is between 90and 95 percent.
Logistic Capabilities
Background
The service support organization at division levelappears to have been reduced substantially in theearly Sixties as part of a general streamlining de-signed to optimize the Soviet ground forces for highspeed armored combat on a nuclear battlefield. Thisaction was reflected in the debates ofthat period, with the advoca et the reduction--ledby then Minister of Defense Malinovskiy--claiming thatthe cuts enhanced the ground forces' capability tomaintain high rates of advance in nuclear war andproposing even further reductions.
Others such as Colonel General Malykhin, deputychief of the Rear Services, complained that the cutshad already dangerously reduced mobile supplies andargued for keeping the stocks at least at the thencurrent levels. These 'indicated thatthe actual mobile stock e in a ivision wassufficient for some three to five days of offensivecombat.
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Analysis confirms that the logistic capacity ofthe Soviet division has been maintained at essen-tially the same level as in the early Sixties,although the trend toward the replacement of lightcargo trucks and trailers with new medium cargocarriers on a one-for-one basis may eventually resultin increased overall logistic capacity if it continuesbeyond the point of compensating for the increasedrequirements of the artillery weapons added to thedivisions.
The Evidence
for his study enabled the identification of POL(petroleum, oil, and lubricants) and ammunition trans-port units for many of the combat regiments and bat-talions of the divisions as well as the mobile stocksin division reserve.
In four of the eight line regiments of the twodivisions studied, mobile stocks of ammunition arekept in vehicles in open sheds separately securedwithin regimental and battalion areas. The same istrue for the POL stocks in three of the lineieaiment.
All four tank regiments and the four motorizedY ri eregiments in the two divisions are about the samesize, however, and mobile stocks of ammunition and POLare probably present in the remaining regiments at thesame level as they are in those regiments for whichmobile stocks were identified and analyzed.
Division POL Capacities
The POL transport at division level and lower isprovided by tank trucks and trailers and cargo trucksand trailers carrying bulk containers. A tank truck
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can hold about 1,000 gallons of fuel and tow a tanktrailer of 1,000 gallons. The cargo trucks and trailerscan also transport about 1,000 gallons each.
As shown in the following tabulation, the tankdivision has an estimated 328 POL-carrying vehicles,with a total capacity of about 328,000 gallons. Amotorized rifle division has an estimated 297 POLcarriers, with a capacity of about 297,000 gallons.
POL vehicles in Soviet divisionsTank Motorized rifle
division division
Tank regiment 20 25Tank regiment 20 --Tank regiment 20 --Motorized rifle'regiment 25 26
Motorized rifleregiment -- 26
Motorized rifleregiment -- 26
Artillery regiment '5 5FROG battalion 2 2*Motor transportbattalion 236 187
Total vehicles 328 297
The amounts of fuel carried in the on-board fueltanks of division vehicles were calculated from Sovietdata on fuel tank capacities. These amounts plus the
* Mobile POL stocks were not identified in the FROGbattalion of the motorized rifle division and wereassumed to be at the same level as in the tank divi-sion.
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capacities of the POL supply vehicles equal the totalPOL supply which a division can carry as follows:
POL capacity in gallonsMotorized
Tank rifledivision division
Total capacity 508,000 451,000
POL carriers 328,000 297,000
On-board fuel tanks 180,000 154,000
Assessment of POL Capabilities
When the data on fuel-carrying capacities is used
in conjuction with vehicle inventories, vehicle fuelconsumption rates, and Soviet planning factors forcombat fuel consumption, the probable number of daysof sustained intensive combat of which a Soviet divi-
sion is capable without POL resupply can be calculated.
Soviet military writings of the early Sixties re-ferred to an expected rate of advance in nuclearwarfare of 80 to 100 kilometers (km) per day. RecentSoviet writings, however, suggest that this planningfactor has been reduced to a more realistic 60 to 80km per day in nuclear warfare and 40 to 60 km per dayin nonnuclear combat. The days of effective combatfor four different rates of advance are:
Days of combatTank Motorized rifle
division divisionRate of advance
per day
80-100 km 3.0 3.560-80 km 4.0 4.040-60 km 5.5 6.020-40 km 8.5 9.5
Thus the supplies of POL within a division advancingbetween 60 and 80 kilometers per day would permit
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intensive combat for only about four days. At thispoint the mobile POL stocks would have been expendedto keep the vehicle tanks full and only the fuel inthe vehicle tanks would remain. Resupply from ahigher echelon would have to start by this time orthe division would begin to lose effectiveness.
Division Ammunition Capacities
The approach to estimating mobile ammunition stocksis different from that for estimating POL.* Virtuallyall the types of vehicles used to carry POL have thesame capacity. Ammunition carriers, however, aremeasured by weight capacity rather than by volume ca-pacity so it is necessary to identify the type ofcarriers as well as enumerate them.
The major ammunition transporters in the tankdivision are currently the new 5-mt Ural-375 and the2.5-mt ZIL-157 and ZIL-164. The newer 3.5-mt ZIL-131and 4-mt ZIL-130 are replacing some of the older ZILmodels and have been observed transporting ammunition.Mobile ammunition stocks in the rifle division arealso transported in Ural and ZIL trucks, but the pro-portion of the smaller 2.5-mt vehicles is higher inthe rifle division than in the tank division.
Bytihese methods,I----a-,v-m--na- an-e3-sc-rra-- d 337 vehicles trans-
porting mobile stocks of ammunition, with a totalcapacity of about 1,315 mt. The motorized rifle
* Information on Soviet planning factors for the suppZ,distribution, and consumption of mm-unikix G-~~+=a--'
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Mobile ammunition stocks(Capacity in metric tons)Tank Motorized rifle
Unit division division
Total capacity 1,315 1,060
Tank regiment 125 125
Tank regiment 125 0
Tank regiment 125 0
Motorized rifleregiment 50 50
Motorized rifleregiment 0 50
Motorized rifleregiment 0 50
Artillery regiment 115 121
Antiaircraft artilleryregiment 75* 75*
Multiple rocketlauncher battalion 220 118
Antitank battalion 0 47
Motor transportbattalion 500 425
The AAA regiment was the only ammunition consumer forwhich no ammunition area was identified in either divi-sion. The amount of ammunition for this regiment wasassumed to be at a leveZ consistent with current Sovietplanning factors.
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division has an estimated 303 vehicles carrying atotal of about 1,060 mt. The distribution of mobileammunition stocks within these divisions is shown inthe tabulation on page 20.
The total ammunition supply is derived by addingthe amounts of ammunition estimated to be stored witheach weapon or in the direct possession of the troopsto the ammunition in mobile stocks as follows:
Ammunition capacity inmetric tons
Tank Motorized rifledivision division
Total capacity 2,107 1,685
Mobile stocks 1,315 1,060
With weapons orpersonnel 792 625
Assessment of Ammunition Capabilities
The data on ammunition carrying capacity can becombined with estimated expenditure factors to deter-mine the total probable days of intensive combatwhich a division could sustain without resupply. Theevidence on Soviet ammunition supply and consumptionplanning factors is incomplete and much of it is old.There is recent evidence, however, that plannedallowances for artillery weapons and tanks have notbeen changed for some time. The allowances for ar-tillery are still about one-third of those used byUS planners.
The division level mobile ammunition stocks aresufficient, under nonnuclear attack conditions (ex-pending ammunition at the rate of 0.4 unit of fireper day*), for about 2 to 2.5 days of effective
* The unit of fire is an arbitrary quantity of ammuni-tion established by the Soviets for each type of weaponand used as a planning factor in calculating require-ments and allowances.
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combat. At this point the mobile ammunition stockswould have been exhausted in supplying the combat ele-ments; only ammunition with the weapons or troopswould remain, and resupply from a higher echelonwould have to begin by this time. The days of effec-tive combat at various expenditure rates are:
Days of combatMotorized
Expenditures per day Tank rifle(unit of fire) division division
Attack -- 0.40 2.5 2.5Defense -- 0.44 2.0 2.0Delay -- 0.25 4.0 3.5Average -- 0.27 3.5 3.5Pursuit -- 0.09 11.0 10.0Inactive -- 0.10 10.0 9.0
Division Capacities for Other Supply Categories
Of the major military supply categories, ammunitionand POL have the largest requirement for transport.These expendables require about 90 percent of the totaltransport capacity available within the division. Re-quirements for rations and what the US Army categorizesas Class II, IV, VIII, and IX supplies amount to about10 percent of total divisional mobile stocks.* -Theactual amounts of these supplies in the 19th MRD and10th GTD are subject to considerably more uncertaintythan are ammunition and POL
These other supplyca egories, however, are less important than ammuni-
* The US categories include: replacements and partsfor weapons, vehicles, and engineer and signal equip-ment; construction materials; and quartermaster andmedical equipment and supplies. Soviet requirementsare derived from current Defense Intelligence Agencyestimates of consumption of these expendables per manp er day U. S a _T .:
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tion and POL to the short-term combat capabilities ofthe division.
Future Trends
The standard organization and equipment structureof Soviet divisions is largely a product of the pre-vailing tactical doctrine, but is also influencedstrongly by technological developments and economicconsiderations. The Soviet tactical doctrine of theearly Sixties had evolved from the German blitzkrieg,with important modifications resulting from the as-sumption that any major hostilities involving theWarsaw Pact and NATO would probably lead to theater
nuclear war.
-- These factors have resulted in a division whichis characterized by high mobility and firepower butwhich is optimized for relatively short durationcombat. These characteristics are achieved by heavyemphasis on tanks--which are expected to survive wellin nuclear war--with a relatively light infantry com-ponent and logistic tail.
The Soviets began in the mid-Sixties to modifytheir doctrine of inevitable nuclear escalation byrecognitzing that conventional war between the WarsawPact and NATO is possible. But they almost certainlybelieve they would have the advantage in any non-nuclear conflict, and 'they apparently have littleexpectation that NATO would refrain from using tacticalnuclear weapons if the Pact succeeded in an initialconventional offensive. They probably expect a theaternuclear war would develop from such a situation.
With this background, the recent artillery in-creases in Soviet divisions can be viewed as aneffort to improve their capabilities for conventional
-_ * - combat--particularly in the initial breakthroughphase in which theater nuclear weapons were formerlyrelied on to penetrate NATO's defenses. But the in-creases also enhance the divisions' capacity for effec-tive operations in the wake of theater nuclear strikesas do the concurrent increases in FROG launchers.The divisions can be said, therefore, to have beenmade more capable for either type of combat.
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The Soviets probably consider their divisions tobe appropriately structured for short-term conven-tional conflict, and they evidently do not expect aconventional conflict to be protracted. There appears,therefore, to be little incentive for them to restructuretheir divisions radically for war with NATO. More-over, the new Soviet divisions being formed on theChinese border are reportedly identical in structureto the divisions in Gdrmany. The Chinese have nocapability for tactical nuclear combat. If the Sovietsconsidered their Warsaw Pact division organizationunsuited for combat against a foe using conventionalweapons they probably would develop a different or-ganization for the new divisions on the Sino-Sovietborder.
Given the absence of any identifiable incentivefor the Soviets to radically change their divisionstructure--and the reported similar organization ofthe newly formed divisions on the Chinese border--itis not likely that the size and structure of the currentSoviet tank and motorized rifle divisions will changesignificantly within the next three to five years.
Minor changes in organization and equipment willprobably continue to occur as new equipment is in-troduced and small improvements are made. For example,
tank battalionsin the motorized rifle regimen s on the China borderhave been increased from 31 medium tanks to about 40--an overall increase from 186 to 213 in the division.
this .change would indicate a reinforcement of-Soviet predilection toward tank-heavy divisions
and further evidence that the current division structurewill persist.
Also, the Soviets may increase the logistic load-
: carrying capacity of the divisions by replacing oldmodel cargo trucks with new trucks of larger capacity.If all the cargo trucks in current divisions werereplaced on a one-for-one basis, the overall increasein ammunition logistical capability would amount toabout 28 percent in the tank division and 43 percentin the motorized rifle division. Even so, the Soviets
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have a strong interest in keeping their divisions'logistic tail as small as possible. They may seizethe opportunity to shorten the tail by keeping thesame load-carrying capacity with fewer but largertrucks. This is what appears to have happened in thedivision artillery regiment, where the increaseresulting from replacing the older trucks was onlyabout enough to make up for the increased requirementresulting from the additional guns.
Summary
Shifts in Soviet doctrine for theater warfare inEurope since the mid-Sixties suggest an acceptanceof the possibility of at least a short period of non-nuclear war between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.However, they evidently believe that NATO would resortto tactical nuclear warfare if a Warsaw Pact conventionaloffensive achieved major initial successes.
Analysis --- cw-,:omowalredy Sviet divisions
in-Germany--the 19th Motorized Rifle Division and the10th Guards Tank Division--has provided a means formeasuring the influence of the prevailing tactical doc-trine on the organization, strength, and logistic capa-bilities of divisions.
The analysis
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yields an accurate accounting of the major-co e equipment contained within each installation,
the level of mobile logistics stocks, and some mea-sure of relative manning levels.
A combat ready motorized rifle division currentlyhas about 2,400 major equipment items and a tank divi-sion about 2,300. These totals represent an increaseof about 100 items in each type of division sinceearly 1968, resulting mainly from increases in artil-lery.
Nonnuclear artillery in the divisions has in-creased by about 50 percent in the past three years.The motorized rifle division now has 90 artillerypieces--72 howitzers and 18 multiple rocket launchers.The tank division has 78 artillery pieces--60 howitzersand 18 multiple rocket launchers. Additionally, heavymortars were increased from 15 to 18 in each motorizedrifle regiment, antitank artillery in the motorizedrifle division was increased from 6 to 18 tubes, andthe regimental air defense artillery in the tank divi-sion was increased from 4 to 12 weapon batteries.
Nuclear delivery capability is being increased bythe addition of a fourth FROG launcher to each Sovietdivision in East Germany and by replacing older modelswith the newer FROG-7 transporter-erector-launcher, aneight wheeled vehicle with good mobility.
indicates that a combatrea r---I-c-cror-Lz-e-rTe division in East Germanyprobably has some 90 to 95 percent of its authorizedwartime personnel strength of about 10,000 and a tankdivision has 90 to 95 percent of an authorized 8,000.The shortfalls probably occur primarily in supportunits, although minor shortages of combat personnelare also likely. The authorized strengths have prob-ably increased slightly as a result of the artilleryaugmentation, but no other increases have been de-tected.
The overall logistic capacity of the Soviet divi-sion has remained essentially unchanged since theearly Sixties. The divisions carry mobile stocks ofammunition sufficient for about two to three days of
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intensive combat under nonnuclear conditions or threeto five days under nuclear conditions. Under nuclearconditions the ammunition stocks would probably onlypermit artillery rates of fire in fluid situations atabout one-third the level of planned US rates forsimilar situations. The mobile stocks of POL aresufficient for three to six days of intensive combat.
The logistic capacity of the divisions may in-crease moderately in the next five years as the Sovietsreplace old model light cargo vehicles with newermodel medium capacity vehicles. Such an increasewould be particularly applicable to ammunition capa-bility and might raise the overall logistic capabil-ity of the division.
It is believed that with the increases in conven-tional artillery and nuclear capable rockets, theSoviets consider their divisions to be appropriatelystructured for short-term conventional conflict andthey evidently do not expect a conventional conflict--or the conventional phase of a conflict escalating totheater nuclear war--to be protracted. There appearsto be little incentive, therefore, for them to rad-ically restructure their divisions for war with NATO.The Soviet divisions being formed on the Chineseborder are reportedly identical in structure to thedivisions in Germany. If the Soviets consideredtheir division organization unsuited for combat againsta foe with only a conventional capability, they prob-ably would develop a different organization for theSino-Soviet border.
Given the absence of any identifiable incentivefor the Soviets to change their division structure,and the reported similar organization of the newlyformed divisions on the Chinese border, it is not likelythat the size and structure of the current Soviet tankand motorized rifle divisions will change significantlywithin the next three to five years.
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Annex
Sources and Methodology
The 19th Motorized Rifle Division and the 10thGuards Tank Division of the Group of Soviet Forcesin Germany (GSFG) are both garrisoned within theBerlin Air Control Zone.
These estimates have been used as a standardagainst which all other Soviet line divisions arecompared. Analysis of the other Soviet divisionsin East Germany supports the judgment that these twodivisions exemplify the highest peacetime readinesslevel in the Soviet forces. There is good evidencethat the Soviets consider these divisions combatready.
* The methodology used in this anal - --- °- -- '
i_n_dAetai i n a-CAD1A__io n_t skudu
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This study presents the latest results of thecontinuing analysis of these two divisions to deter-mine to what extent shifts in Soviet doctrine arebeing manifested in the strength, organization, equip-ment, and logistic capabilities of first-line divisions.
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The top photograph, of the tank regiment at Dallgow Doeberitz 263 _--
I ~ ~ -- rrograpn--oeToW7 elements of the motorized rifle req ment inba ~oeberitz 263 pre aring to move Out for the invas on of Czechoslovakia.
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Table 1
Vehicle Storage and Holdings of Major EquipmentItems of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division
Maximum ProbableInstallation capacity holdings
Dallgow-Doeberitz 261-262 a 652 495
Multiple rocket launcherbattalion 150 99
Chemical defense company 30 30Reconnaissance battalion 60 50Signal battalion and
unidentified b 137 90Motor transport element 245 196Unidentified b 30 30
Dallgow-Doeberitz 263 a 679 676
Motorized rifle regiment 312 309Tank regiment 271 271Antitank artillery
battalion 70 70FROG battalion 26 26
Dallgow-Doeberitz 264-75 1,109 1,068
Motorized rifle regiment 306 300Motorized rifle regiment 345 310Artillery regiment 207 207Engineer battalion 135 135Motor transport element 24 24Unidentified b 92 92
Dallgow-Doeberitz 268 162 116
Antiaircraft artillery
regiment 162 116
Dallgow-Doeberitz 578 75 75
Motor transport element 75 75
Division total 2,677 2,430
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Notes to Table 1
The maximum capacity is derived mathematicallyand does not reflect practical vehicle storage re-straints such as working areas, access aisles, and,in certain cases, unit integrity. The estimate ofprobable holdin s i 'exrved from a combination ofactual holdings land calculations of practicalstorage capacit -n-a-z-1-ization. Major items ofequipment include all self-propelled vehicles (exceptmotorcycles) and large towed items such as artilleryand two-axle trailers.
a. Current order-of-battle holdings identify somenondivisional units in this installation. Theareas occupied by these units are excluded from.the analysis.
b. Units not identified by type but believed to besubordinate to the division. These units prob-ably include
dviszon~- eadquar ers,t e artillery ins rumen al reconnaissance battery,the maintenance battalion, the medical battalion,the traffic control company, and a 'small partof the motor transport.
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Table 2
Vehicle Storage and Holdings of Major EquipmentItems of the 10th Guards Tank Division
Maximum ProbableInstallation capacity holdings
Potsdam 287 407 365
Tank regiment 277 277Motor transport element 60 60Unidentified a 70 28
Potsdam 288 784 707
Artillery regiment 262 232Tank regiment 306 272Antiaircraft artillery
regiment 126 116Motor transport element 90 87
Krampnitz 261 1,346 1,146
Headquarters 38 26
Chemical defense companyand signal battalion 74 60
FROG battalion 39 28Tank regiment 336 269Multiple rocket launcher
battalion 153 126Artillery instrumentalreconnaissance battery andengineer battalion 147 130
Maintenance battalion 75 63Reconnaissance battalion 52 43Motorized rifle regiment 341 310Motor transport element 91 91
Krampnitz 567 100 100
Motor transport element 100 100
Division total 2,637 2,318
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Notes to Table 2
The maximum capacity is derived mathematicallyand does not reflect practical vehicle storage re-straints such as working areas, access aisles, and,in certain cases, unit integrity. The estimate ofprobable holdin s is derived from a combination ofactual holdings and calculations of practicalstorage capacit awr2tization. Major items ofequipment include all self-propelled vehicles (exceptmotorcycles) and large towed items such as artilleryand two-axle trailers.
a. Units not identified by type but believed to besubordinate to the division. These units probably
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\the medical battalion andt e traffic control company.
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Table 3
Estimated Holdings of Major Equipment Items of the19th Motorized Rifle Division and the10th Guards Tank Division, By Unit
Estimated holdings19th Motorized i0th GuardsRifle Division Tank Division
Unit
Headquarters 26 26Motorized rifle regiment 310 310Motorized rifle regiment 310 0Motorized rifle regiment 310 0
Tank regiment 275 275-- Tank regiment 0 275
Tank regiment 0 275
Reconnaissance battalion 50 - 45FROG battalion 28 28Artillery regiment 210 230Multiple rocket launcherbattalion 99 126
Antiaircraft artilleryregiment 116 a 116
Antitank artillery battalion 70 0Artillery instrumental
reconnaissance battery 15 15
Engineer battalion 135 115Signal battalion 30 30Chemical defense company 30 30Motor transport battalion 332 338Maintenance battalion 63 63Medical battalion 10 10Traffic control company 5 5Field bakery 6 6
Total major items 2,430 2,318
Note: Major items of equipment include all self-propelledvehicles (except motorcycles) and large towed items suchas artillery and two-axle trailers.
a. Information for the AAA regiment in the motorizedrifle division is not as good as that for the sameunit in the tank division, but the holdings areprobably the same.
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Table 4
Estimated Holdings of Major Equipment Items of the19th Motorized Rifle Division and the
10th Guards Tank Division, By Type of Equipment
Estimated holdings19th Motorized 10th GuardsRifle Division Tank Division
Tanks 205 329Medium 186 310Light 19 19
Antitank weapons 45 9100mm field gun 18 0ATGM vehicle 27 9
Antiaircraft weapons 46 7414.5mm AAMG (ZPU-4) T23mm quad self-propelledAA gun (ZSU-23-4) 0 3257mm AA gun (S-60) 24 2457mm twin self-propelled
AA gun (ZSU-57-2) 4 12
Artillery, rockets, and mortars 148 100FROG launcher 4 4120mm mortar 54 18122mm howitzer (M-30/D-30) 54 60152mm howitzer 18 0Multiple rocket launcher 18 18
Transport vehicles 1,986 1,806APC 198 80Armed scout car 68 41Light command vehicle (UAZ-69) 64 61General purpose vehicle a . 1,178 1,108Special purpose vehicle b 200 177Trailer (two-axle) 278 339
Total major items 2,430 2,318
Note: Major items of equipment include all self-propelledvehicles (except motorcycles) and large towed items such asartillery and two-axle trailers.a. Van trucks, POL tankers, and cargo trucks.b. Decontamination vehicles, engineer equipment, and
ambulances.
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