Infantry - Fort Benning...6 TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER: SNIPERS IN THE SBCT Major Mark S. Leslie 10...

Infantry

••••• INFANTRY (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for bimonthly publication by the U.S.Army Infantry School at Building 4, Fort Benning, Georgia. • Although it contains professional information for theinfantryman, the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any informationpresented in other official Army publications. • Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authorsand not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it. • Official distribution is to infantry andinfantry-related units and to appropriate staff agencies and service schools. • Direct communication concerningeditorial policies and subscription rates is authorized to Editor, INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA31995-2005. • Telephones: (706) 545-2350 or 545-6951, DSN 835-2350 or 835-6951; [email protected]. • Bulk rate postage paid at Columbus, Georgia, and other mailing offices. •POSTMASTER: Send address changes to INFANTRY, P.O. Box 52005, Fort Benning, GA 31995-2005. •USPS Publication No. 370630.

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2006 Volume 95, Number 5

PB 7-06-5

MG WALTER WOJDAKOWSKICommandant, The Infantry School

RUSSELL A. ENOEditor

MICHELLE J. ROWANDeputy Editor

BETTY J. BYRDEditorial Assistant

Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion,4th Infantry Regiment, 10thMountain Division, look forsuspicious activity during apatrol in Ghazni Province,Afghanistan. (Photo bySpecialist Ethan Anderson)

This medium is approved for officialdissemination of material designed to keepindividuals within the Army knowledgeable ofcurrent and emerging developments withintheir areas of expertise for the purpose ofenhancing their professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Peter J. SchoomakerGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

Distribution: Special

Official:

JOYCE E. MORROWAdministrative Assistant to the

Secretary of the Army 0626205

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FRONT COVER:

BACK COVER:A Soldier with the 4th Battalion,23rd Infantry Regiment, 172ndStryker Brigade Combat Team, provides security during ahumanitarian mission in Baghdad. (Photo by MasterSergeant Mike Buytas, USAF)

FEATURES26 SMALL CALIBER LETHALITY: 5.56MM PERFORMANCE IN CLOSE

QUARTER BATTLEMajor Glenn Dean and Major David LaFontaine

33 THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN — LESSONS FROM THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR

37 THE COMBAT SHOTGUN IN THE BCTFirst Sergeant (Retired) D. Robert Clements

DEPARTMENTS1 COMMANDANT’S NOTE2 INFANTRY NEWS6 TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER: SNIPERS IN THE SBCT

Major Mark S. Leslie10 PROFESSIONAL FORUM

10 ‘CHOSIN’ PLATOON CLIMBS TO VICTORY IN KORENGALSergeant First Class Michael Pintagro

13 WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS - A KOREA EXPERIENCEColonel Matthew T. Margotta

18 A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO COMBAT IDENTIFICATIONMajor Edward J. Ospital and Captain Adam N. Wojack

22 STREET LITERATURE ON USAMA BIN LADEN PART II: THE SOVIET-AFGHAN YEARSLieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN

42 TRAINING NOTES42 21ST CENTURY HOME STATION MODEL - SUPPORTING ARFORGEN AT

THE MOUNTAIN POSTLieutenant Colonel Karl D. Reed and Fort Carson’s Strategic Initiative Group

47 SUMMER TRAINING AT USMACaptain Ryan Morgan

49 WEAPONS CORNER: HANDGUNS OF THE GWOT51 BOOK REVIEWS53 SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

MAJOR GENERAL WALTER WOJDAKOWSKI

Commandant’s Note

The global war on terrorism is characterized to a largeextent by the harshness of the climate and the terrain inwhich we operate. We are going after the enemy from

the deserts and the maze of streets and alleys in the urban centersof Iraq to the mountains of Afghanistan. In this Commandant’sNote I want to highlight the demands placed on our Soldiersand planners by operations in mountainous terrain.

The mountain environment is unique in terms of its steepgrades, rough terrain and limited trafficability, the thin air ofhigh elevations, and extremes of weather. Cold, snow, rain,low-hanging clouds and fog often predominate, and constantly-changing winds can restrict the use and effectiveness of fixedand rotary wing aircraft. The climate itself can create non-battle injuries, something that demands constant alertness onthe part of the chain of command. Units experienced inmountain operations understand these challenges and areoperating effectively in spite of them. Mountain operationshighlight the importance of infantry skills trained at FortBenning and at home station. Among these are the employmentof mortars and the long-range precision fire of snipers,designated marksmen, and other infantrymen. We must trainand sustain these warriors as well.

Sustainability and mobility are other key components ofmountain operations. Units maneuver and operate on foot, byroad, or by air. Rotary-wing aircraft can re-supply deployedunits and evacuate casualties. Road and foot movements offerbetter cover and concealment but are in turn vulnerable toambushes with direct and indirect fire weapons and mines.Predictability means vulnerability; during the Soviets’ war inAfghanistan, Mujahideen operatives kept guerillas informed ofplanned Soviet and DRA operations and convoy movements,facilitating some catastrophic ambushes and complicatinglogistical operations. We now operate less predictably, but wemust maintain tight operations security at all costs.

Cultural awareness is is just as important in the mountainsof Afghanistan as it is in the desert of Iraq. Today’s insurgentsmove freely among the indigenous population and draw support— whether coerced or freely offered — from it. One challengein dealing with the scattered mountain populations is theirinaccessibility, both physical and social. Tribal, religious, andblood ties and the mistrust of strangers within host nationpopulations — particularly those among the mountain tribes— may go back generations, and old allegiances are not easily

MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS:THE HIGH ALTITUDE CHALLENGE

September-October 2006 INFANTRY 1

broken or new onesformed. The Sovietoccupation ofAfghanistan left deepscars and mistrust offoreign militaryforces. Gainingthe wholehearted support of the indigenous tribes and factionsis no overnight matter, but our efforts have already yieldedsuccess. Human intelligence has led us to stockpiles ofweapons, ammunition and other supplies, and enables us toneutralize ambushes, interrupt the emplacement of mines andIEDs, and disrupt the insurgents’ logistical, psychological, andpolitical operations.

Fire support in mountain operations is also important. Wehave an array of delivery means available. Mortars, artillery,attack aviation, close air support, and high altitude bombingare some of the options available. Global positioning systemsand laser designators can facilitate placement of precision fires,but low clouds and fog can also make observed fires difficult.Map reading and terrain association skills remain important,and range estimation is especially crucial in the steep,compartmented mountain terrain where a few meters’ differencecan place rounds hundreds of feet below or above the target.The logistics of moving arti l lery and ammunition isaccomplished by ground or air within weather and altitude-imposed constraints. As always, we take into account thelikelihood and effectiveness of enemy ground fire whenconducting these missions. The physical demands thatmountain operations place on our Soldiers cannot be overstated.Infantry moves across exposed ground, often on unstable talusslopes that can shift underfoot; over moss or lichen-coveredrock; and up, down, or across steep slopes and trails at dizzyingheights. Soldier’s load soon becomes critical when even theminimum combat load of weapon, ammunition, water, food, andpersonal gear takes on a whole new meaning in the thin air ofmountain ridges, saddles, and peaks.

We will win the global war on terrorism by hunting down theterrorists wherever they choose to hide, and part of that is in themountains and valleys. Our Soldiers have shown they can fightand defeat the enemy anywhere and at any time, and doing this inmountains remains a core competency of our Infantry.

Follow me!

INFANTRY, ARMOR NCOS TRAIN TOGETHERANNETTE FOURNIER

DOCTRINE AND COLLECTIVE TRAINING UPDATE: The Doctrine and Collective Training division ispleased to announce the creation of the U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) Lessons Learned andIntegration Cell. The cell is made up of three Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) analysts who willwork at Fort Benning. Their mission is collect, analyze, validate, disseminate, and respond to requestsfor Infantry lessons. You can contact the Lessons Learned Cell at [email protected].

DoctrineDoctrineDoctrineDoctrineDoctrineCornerCornerCornerCornerCorner

As part of the Army’s ongoing transformation, seniorarmor and infantry NCOs began training together in September during the first

combined Advanced NCO Course.Two of the combined classes began simultaneously, with

one class at Fort Benning and the other at the ArmorSchool at Fort Knox, Ky.

ANCOC was redesigned as combined training so seniorNCOs in combat arms would have a better understanding ofeach other’s tactics, capabilities and equipment, said FortBenning’s ANCOC First Sergeant Sherman Roberts.

In the Army’s restructured brigade combat teams, Soldiers ofmany MOSs work side by side in combat, said Michael Quirion,the Fort Benning NCO Academy’s chief operations officer. Thenew training will help NCOs make better use of the equipmentand Soldiers available, because they’ll understand their abilities,he said.

“The armor and the infantry deploy together and work togetherall the time, but they know very little about each other,” Robertssaid. “Combining the courses will enable us to train as we fight.”

The courses are also being combined in preparation for theArmor School coming to Fort Benning to form the ManeuverCenter.

The decision evolved from discussions between Major GeneralWalter Wojdakowski, Fort Benning’s commanding general, andMajor General Robert Williams, Fort Knox’s commanding general,Quirion said.

First word that the courses might be combined spread in late2005, and by January the armor and infantry NCO academieswere tasked with combining the old ANCOC and updating oldcontent to create the joint course.

Much of the course content for the armor and infantry ANCOCwere similar, but combining the two was easier said than done,Quirion said.

“It’s really a challenge because doctrine and manuals have tobe rewritten. But, infantry and armor have the same goals, justdifferent ways of accomplishing them,” Quirion said. “We’re

focusing on the common ground, then adding some MOS-specific information.”

NCOs study together during the first five weeks ofthe seven-week course. In the class, doctrine is taughtby an instructor but enhanced by student discussions.Because many of the students are combat veterans, theirexperiences are valuable teaching tools, Roberts said.Students also study the specialized skills, equipmentand terminology of scouts, tankers, mortarmen, andinfantrymen.

“I’m interested to see at the end what they learned from theirbrothers in arms,” Roberts said.

During the sixth week, students are divided to learn certainMOS-specific skills, and the final week the students rejoin for asituational training exercise (STX).

Because Fort Benning currently lacks the equipment to launchan STX complete with tanks, the practical exercise is conductedin the close combat tactical trainer.

Each week of the course, the instructors from the Fort Benningand Fort Knox classes meet via video teleconference to discussthe week’s progress.

“This is a coordinated effort all the way. Infantry doesn’t havethe lead and armor doesn’t have the lead on the new course,”Roberts said. “And it’s not just putting the two old coursestogether.”

The new course adds content relevant to today’s battlefield andfocuses on building skills that each MOS may not have had a lotof practice with.

New content includes combatives for armor and mounted landnavigation for infantry. Other new content includescounterinsurgency operations, intelligence preparation of thebattlefield, and information operations.

“Before, infantry didn’t know what armor was doing and armordidn’t know what infantry was doing,” Roberts said. “This courseis breaking ground.”

(Annette Fournier writes for The Bayonet newspaper on FortBenning, Ga.)

2 INFANTRY September-October 2006

USAMU OFFERSSDM COURSE FORDRILL SERGEANTS


The U.S. ArmyMarksmanship Unit willconduct a SquadDesignated Marksmanship(SDM) Course Jan. 29 toFeb. 2, 2007, which is opento all Army drill sergeants.

Slots must be reserved in advance. Unittraining and operations sections shouldrequest slots by e-mail to Sergeant 1stClass Edward H. Hocking [email protected]; includethe Soldier’s full name, rank, socialsecurity number, military occupationalspecialty, specific unit and unit point ofcontact name and telephone number. Formore information, call (706) 545-7174/1410.

Each student’s unit is responsible forlodging, per diem, and personaltransportation. The USAMU supplies thesquad designated marksman rifle,ammunition, and advanced combat opticalgunsight.

The U.S. Army Marksmanship Unitconducts Squad Designated MarksmanInstructor Courses to help Soldiersimprove their warfighting marksmanshipskills. Soldiers are instructed in areas ofmarksmanship, range estimation andtarget detection; there are numerouspractical exercises including instructionon known and unknown distance rifleranges.

The course is normally available toNCOs in team leader through platoonsergeant positions, with priority going toSoldiers in combat arms; the course isleader training to develop Soldier long-range shooting skills.

The award-winning shooters of theArmy Marksmanship Unit’s Service RifleTeam teach the SDM course. Theseshooters specialize in firing small armsthat are organic to units within the militaryincluding the M-14, bolt-action rifles, andall variations of the M-16 and M-4 atdistances up to 1,000 yards.

(Article provided by the U.S. ArmyMarksmanship Unit.)

To meet the need for long-range marksmen,Fort Benning cadre are training Soldiers in anew long-range marksmanship (LRM) course.

The LRM course began in June to “fill agap,” said Sergeant First Class MichaelHodge, an LRM team sergeant and instructorwith the course, which is managed by 2ndBattalion, 29th Infantry Regiment.

“We’re changing with the Army,” Hodgesaid, “and the Army is changing because ofthe (global) war on terrorism. Units need long-range marksmen.”

In basic training, Soldiers learn to shoottargets up to 300 meters away. Sniper studentslearn to fire at 800 to 1,000 meters, but theintermediate range was left void, said CaptainMark Messerschmitt, commander of CCompany, 2nd Bn., 29th Inf. Regt.

“Units deploy with sniper weapons anddon’t have anyone who knows how to usethem,” Messerschmitt said. “The long-rangemarksmen can be pulled down range to firewith the sniper weapon from a fixed position.”

The students learn to use an M-16 and M-4with attached sniper scopes and sniperweapons, like the M-24 and the .50 calibersniper rifle. They also learn to detect targets,estimate the distance to a target, collectballistics information, and correct for factorslike humidity, wind, and weather conditionswhen shooting. The course includes firing atmoving targets during the day and night.

LRM is not a replacement for SniperSchool, he said, but it’s a good way to meetthe Army’s need for long-range marksmen.The students don’t learn the stalking andreconnaissance skills of snipers, but they areable to engage targets at an intermediate rangeusing sniper weapons.

“We can train 256 snipers a year, but we’vealready trained 255 marksmen in five months.That’s more than anyone thought we would.”

They’ve taught one class at Fort Benning,but most are taught by mobile training teamsof four to six instructors who train units attheir installations. The MTTs have gone toFort Drum, N.Y.; Fort Stewart, Ga.; Fort Hood,Texas; and Korea.

The MTTs cost less and allow for more

students to train, Messerschmitt said.When a unit requests training, four tosix MTT instructors travel to the unit’sinstallation. The unit pays theinstructors’ per diem while they teachclasses of about 36 students. It’s morecost effective than sending 36 Soldiersto Fort Benning for two weeks,Messerschmitt said.

While the main goal is trainingSoldiers to be long-range marksmen, it’sgreat preparation for Sniper School,Hodge said.

The majority of LRM instructors aresnipers and all but one are combatveterans. The class is targeted forSoldiers from E-1 to E-4, Hodge said,because they will be the squad riflemenin deploying units. The class stands outbecause the subject matter experts trainstudents directly, rather than a train-the-trainer approach.

“It would be a lot for an NCO to learnin just two weeks and bring back to teachothers,” Hodge said. “Even though theSoldiers won’t be snipers, this doublestheir range and lets them use theirweapons to their maximum capability.This extends their range and makesthem more lethal on the battlefield.”

It’s a menu-based course,Messerschmitt said. “We work (with) theunit to focus on what training theirSoldiers need. Because it doesn’t havethe requirements Sniper School (has),it gives us flexibility to adjust training.”

Each day ends with a mentoringsession when the instructors meet withsmall groups and answer questions.The class is focused on teaching, notattrition, Hodge said.

“We want to teach them skills theycan use when they deploy,” Hodgesaid. “This training might save aSoldier’s life. That’s what makes thisassignment satisfying.”

(Annette Fournier writes for TheBayonet newspaper on Fort Benning,Ga.)

ANNETTE FOURNIER

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The Natick Soldier Center’s(NSC’s) Unitized Group Ration-Express (UGR-E) provides a

group dining capability anytime, anywhere.With a quick pull of a tab, the meals are

ready in 30 to 45 minutes and provide achange of pace from Meals, Ready-to-Eat(MREs). UGR-E modules serve hot mealsfor up to 18 warfighters without requiringkitchen equipment, cooks, fuel, or a powersource. UGR-Es also reduce the costs andlogistical burden associated with using afield kitchen.

“Warfighters would utilize the UGR-Ein locations where they are unable to use aMobile Kitchen Trailer (MKT), but want agroup dining capability. This could bebefore MKTs make it to the field or if theyare located too far away for the group tocongregate there. UGR-Es also eliminatethe need for trucks to bring them food ininsulated containers,” said Shari Dangel,an NSC physical scientist.

“The UGR-E borrows technology fromthe MRE’s Flameless Ration Heater (FRH)to heat the food. These magnesium-basedheaters produce a significant amount ofheat with relatively small amounts of rawmaterial. All that is required to start thereaction is mixing salt water with themagnesium. The UGR-E contains fourheaters that are 10 times the size of eachsingle FRH heater,” explained Dangel.

Dangel said that there are two types ofUGR-Es. The Type I UGR-E requireswarfighters to place the four heaters intothe heater trays before pulling the tab. WithType II UGR-Es, the heaters are sealed intothe heater trays. Warfighters need to pullone tab that will uncover the heaters andthen pull a second tab that will release theactivator solution.

According to Peter Lavigne, NSCchemical engineer, “To meet theimmediate needs of the services, anaccelerated development effort will fieldthe UGR-E initially as Type I, and laterthe Type II will be transit ioned asimprovements in the heating system arecompleted. We’re also investigating otheropportunities to improve the concept, toinclude the use of coated fiber heatingtrays that are low cost, lightweight andoffer improved disposabili ty andrecyclability.”

According to Dangel, the first offeringof the UGR-E will include three breakfastmenus and six lunch/dinner menus. Themeals can be easily transported with theunit. The four six-pound polymerictraypacks include an entrée, vegetable,starch, dessert, plus snacks as well as

dining trays, beverages, eating utensilsand serving utensils.

“While the food is heating, warfighterscan enjoy the snack items included in theUGR-E. These can include M&Ms, Reese’sPieces, Trail Mix, and powderedbeverages,” said Dangel.

According to Dangel, warfighters whohave evaluated the UGR-Es have liked thatthey do not have to rely on drivers to bringthem food in insulated containers cookedin field kitchens hours beforehand. Theycan wait until they are almost ready to eatto start heating the food, then eat it whileit’s still hot.

The technology most benefits small,remote units operating in austereenvironments. According to Dangel,prototype UGR-E’s have been sent to bothAfghanistan and Iraq.

Future improvements are already in theworks.

“An Enhancement Box, or E-Box, isalso being developed to provide asupplement for the UGR-E. It will includemilk, cereal, bread, and othercomplementary items that will increase thevariety and nutrition offered by the ration,”said Lavigne.

Sarah Underhill

Soldiers pull a tab to activate the Unitized Group Ration-Express (UGR-E). UGR-E modulesserve hot meals for up to 18 Soldiers without requiring kitchen equipment, cooks, fuel, or apower source.

U.S. ARMY SOLDIER SYSTEMSCENTER - NATICK

INFANTRY NEWS

INSTITUTE INVESTIGATES WAYS TO HELPSOLDIERS OVERCOME ALTITUDE

Scientists at the U.S. Army Research Institute ofEnvironmental Medicine (USARIEM) are investigatingways to help Soldiers adjust to high-altitude environments.

Soldiers being sent to Afghanistan are often quickly deployedto high-altitude environments via helicopter, leaving little timefor their bodies to adjust and putting them at risk for contractinghigh-altitude sickness. High-altitude conditions, which includeadjusting to less oxygen and thinner atmosphere, can impact eventhe most physically fit Soldier.

According to USARIEM’s Dr. Stephen Muza, high-altitudeconditions, at a minimum, affect stamina and cause Soldiers tofatigue much more quickly. Other problems can develop as well.

The most prevalent type of altitude sickness is acute mountainsickness (AMS), which can cause headaches, dizziness, nausea,and make it difficult to fall asleep. According to Muza, AMStypically occurs within 4-12 hours.

Although most people experience the aforementioned symptomsof AMS, 100 percent of the population experiences a decline intask performance.

“Soldiers can still make accurate decisions, but it takes themlonger to do so. Altitudes above 5,000 feet can impair vision,especially the ability to see color,” said Muza.

AMS symptoms will often dissipate once a Soldier’s bodyadjusts to the high-altitude environment, but sometimes AMS can

intensify into pulmonary edema, which is caused by a build up offluid in the lungs and can lead to shortness of breath and heavycoughing.

AMS can also transform into cerebral edema, which is causedby an increased blood flow to the brain. Cerebral edema can causeswelling, disorientation, hallucinations and can impact physicalcoordination. It can be deadly if left untreated.

USARIEM scientists are investigating the use of pre-exposureto high-altitude conditions to prevent altitude sickness to helpSoldiers who need to make sudden and prolonged ascents toaltitudes of 5,000 to 14,000 feet.

Soldiers will perform a myriad of typical tasks in USARIEM’sHypoxia Room and Hybobaric Chamber, which replicates a high-altitude environment. The Hypoxia Room is a low-cost, low-oxygenenvironment and can be replicated anywhere, even in smallnuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) shelters.

The study will document changes in Soldier performance underboth high-altitude and low-altitude conditions. The study will alsodocument changes in performance and well-being before and afterHypoxia Room treatments. USARIEM’s investigation will revealexactly how much time Soldiers need to be exposed to high-altitudeconditions to offset the effects of altitude sickness.

Based on observations so far, Muza said it appears Soldiersexposed to 10,000-14,500 feet for three or four hours a day are

ready to undertake their mission with less sickness andhigher performance.

According to Muza, if the Hypoxia Room treatmentsare done over six to seven days, it has been found thatthe treatments can increase physical stamina by 30percent and can reduce or eliminate AMS. USARIEMscientists have found that two-thirds of improvementoccurs during the first week of treatments.

One result of the study will be the creation of altitudepreparation guidelines. Muza said that USARIEM’sresearch will develop predictive models to determinerates of decline in physical and cognitive abilities incorrelation to how fast Soldiers need to ascend.

In addition to the Hypoxia Room treatments, recentlycompleted studies by Muza’s team have determined thata high-carbohydrate diet in high-altitude conditionsimproves Soldier stamina and appears to reduce AMS.However, taking anti-oxidants or creatine did not lessenthe effects of high-altitude exposure. Muza says thatfuture studies will examine several other ways to lessonthe effects of exposure to high-altitude conditions.

The study should be completed sometime prior to theend of 2006.

U.S. ARMY SOLDIER SYSTEMS CENTER - NATICK

Sarah Underhill

Private Jerrod Howard performs a task measuring marksmanship under bothhigh-altitude and low-altitude conditions.


MAJOR MARK S. LESLIE

TSM STRYKER/BRADLEYCORNER

“Where precision fire is concerned, the sniper exists as thepremiere and undisputed answer to the use of deadly force withthe least chance of collateral damage and use of excessive force.”

— U.S. Army Sniper School

In an operating environment like Iraq, with an insurgencyaimed at disrupting stability and reconstruction operations, the ability to place precision fires on the targeted enemy

and only the targeted enemy is paramount to a successfulcounterinsurgency fight. The sniper and his abilities are essentialand critical tools that every commander must address during theplanning process. The Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) isan organization that has a larger and more flexible sniper taskorganization than its counterparts in light or mechanized infantryunits.

Appendix C of FM 3-21.2, Stryker Brigade Combat TeamInfantry Battalion, puts the role of snipers in the SBCT intoperspective:

“Snipers play an important role in the SBCT infantry battalion.They give the commander accurate, discriminatory, long-rangesmall-arms fire. The best use of sniper fire is against key targetsthat other available weapon systems may be unable to destroydue to their range, size, or location; visibility; security and stealthrequirements; avoidance of collateral damage; intensity ofconflict; or rules of engagement. The techniques snipers use enablethem to gather detailed, critical information about the enemy asa secondary role. The effectiveness of a sniper is not measuredsimply by the number of casualties or destroyed targets; snipereffectiveness also includes the effect the presence of snipers hason enemy activities, morale, and decisions. The presence of snipershinders the enemy’s movement, creates confusion and personalfear, disrupts enemy operations and preparations, and compelsthe enemy to divert forces to deal with the snipers.”

Compared to the other infantry formations in our Army today,the SBCT snipers are uniquely suited for the mission we face

in our current global war on terrorism due to thesignificant, substantial increase in sheer numbers, and

task organization within the SBCT. This is not meantto imply that theindividual snipersthemselves are any

better than theircounterparts in other

battalions, only to suggest that the taskorganization of the SBCT supports the role of

the sniper element better than previousformations.

Task OrganizationThe doctrinal sniper task organization in the SBCT

is a sniper squad at the battalion level and three snipers inevery infantry company. That would bring the total to 48 snipers

per SBCT. This is a substantial increase from other organizations.Snipers are capable of inflicting the right amount of force at theexact time and location the commander wants with minimalresources and with minimal collateral damage and negative impactupon the community we are there to protect. The battalion sniper

Snipers in the SBCT


Photo by Mike Buytas

squad is at the disposal of the battalioncommander to use with as METT-TC(mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time,civilians) requires. It can and often isconsidered a separate maneuver element.This sniper squad gives the battalioncommander the capability to place precisionfires on a target with minimal collateraland/or negative effects, at multiplelocations throughout his battlespace. Thebattalion sniper squad is composed of twothree-man sniper teams with a sniper squadleader. Each team is armed with an M107sniper rifle, an M24 sniper rifle, and anM16/M203 per team. The company sniperteam gives a company commander thesame capability to place precision fires ona target with minimal collateral and/ornegative effects as the battalion commanderat a reduced scale. Company sniper teamsare composed of three Soldiers: a teamleader and two snipers. They are armedwith an M24 sniper rifle, an M107, andM16/M203 per team. This allows thecompany commander the ability to taskorganize his sniper team appropriatelybased off of the mission at hand withoutseeking additional assets from the battalionlevel for precision fires.

Compared with a light/airborne/airassault infantry battalion, the additionalcapabilities and tools at the hands of theSBCT battalion and company commandersare striking. A light/airborne/air assaultinfantry battalion has six two-man sniperteams organic to the scout platoon that areused by the battalion commander as METT-TC dictates. These six two-man teams arearmed with three M24 sniper rifles andthree M107 sniper rifles. This is a healthyasset that has and will continue to be usedeffectively in our operating environments.But, this task organization is restrictivecompared to the SBCT. The companieshave no organic precision-fire capability,other than designated marksmen, at theirdisposal. The quality of designatedmarksmen in all units is often tempered bythe equipment available, training, andcommander’s focus on precision-firetraining. A mechanized infantry battalion’sprecision capability is even more restricted.By task organization, the mechanizedinfantry battalion has two snipers per riflecompany, each armed with an M107 sniperrifle and an M24 sniper rifle. The battalions

also utilize squad designated marksmen.Recognizing the need for precision fires inour current operating environment in Iraq,some mechanized infantry battalions haveconsolidated their snipers at the battalionlevel, somewhat mirroring the SBCTdoctrinal task organization. But this comesat the expense of the company commandersin terms of boots on the ground. It is aninvestment that is usually profitable,increasing the flexibility and capability of thebattalion commanders. Compare this to theSBCT, which has the precision-fire capabilityorganic to the battalion and company levelswith the flexibility to “surge” precision-firecapabilities at the company or even platoonlevel when the need is identified for specificoperations. Of course, the ability to surgeassets to one company is not unique to theSBCT, and the need to do so may be less oftenexercised due to the multitude of precision-fire capabilities organic at the battalion andcompany levels in the SBCT. In turn, it alsodoes not deny the other units within thebattalion the precision-fire capability that isoften the best answer in a counterinsurgencyfight.

Even though sniper teams avoid contactuntil they have identified their targets andinvolvement in sustained close combat isnot the optimal employment of sniperteams, the enemy and circumstances incombat often change that equation, and thesniper teams themselves have little say soin the matter. One of the unique elementsof the SBCT sniper capability is that in lieuof the traditional two-man teams, anadditional Soldier has been added as asecurity man. This is an improvement overpast sniper team organizations in that itgives the sniper team additional organicsecurity without having to rely onadditional assets from the parent

organization. The additional security manis a part of the sniper team and is not onlyable to provide security but transition to therole of sniper if the need arises.Additionally, he can assist in thetransportation of what is often a heavyamount of equipment that the modernsniper needs to stay alive on the modernbattlefield. The battalion sniper squad is abattalion asset to be used at the battalioncommander’s discretion. The emphasisplaced on snipers at every level within theSBCT lends credence to the Army’sevolving picture on warfare in this century.In a counterinsurgency, the need forprecision fires is often greater than in thetraditional fight. The need to destroy onlythe designated target with minimalcollateral damage in a counterinsurgencyfight often makes our Army’s technologicaland heavy weapons a disadvantage.

TrainingCurrently, the U.S. Army Sniper School

has no training specific to the SBCT or anyother type of unit, and rightly so. Themission of the Sniper School focuses ondeveloping and sharpening the skills of theindividual sniper. According to Sniper


Figure 1 — Battalion Sniper Squad

Figure 2 — Company Sniper Team

TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER

School officials, SBCTs are proportionally represented in sniperclasses and have in the past performed above standard duringpre-train ups prior to mobile training teams (MTTs) conductedon-site by Sniper School cadre, resulting in a large number oftrained Snipers within the SBCTs.

While preparing this article, I conducted interviews with twoSniper School instructors from the 2nd Battalion, 29th InfantryRegiment at Fort Benning, Ga., who have served in an SBCT assnipers in Iraq. Staff Sergeants Shannon Kay and Joseph Brownboth served in Stryker units during their tours of Iraq. They bothhad very positive experiences as snipers in a SBCT and have aplethora of knowledge on how snipers in the SBCT operate andtrain. Both had very positive things to say in regards to theirtraining at Sniper School and said the training had prepared themfor what was expected from snipers in combat. Neither Soldierrecommended that any “unit-specific” (such as the SBCT) trainingbe implemented in Sniper School as it would detract from theprimary mission of training snipers on the individual skillsrequired of them. Both agreed that this would be a task better leftto the unit and felt that the unit was better suited to conduct thistraining before and after a sniper’s graduation from the school.This is based on the premise that the unit prepares the Soldier toattend Sniper School by focusing on the basics of being a sniperand what is required to complete the training. Sniper School thengives the sniper the foundation. After graduating from SniperSchool, the unit then capitalizes on the basic groundworkingrained and focuses its training depending on the type oforganization. From their combat experience, both SSGs Kay andBrown agreed that other than marksmanship skills, target detectionis probably the single most important skill learned in SniperSchool. Often, a sniper’s job is 90-percent observation andreporting and at best, 10-percent actual engagement. Otherinstruction that the two NCOs found extremely useful included:pistol training, urban operations training, and unorthodox and/oroffhand shooting exercises.

Home station training focused largely around marksmanshipskills, demolition classes and breach exercises, infiltration andexfiltration exercises as well as developing rapport with the restof the company at the company level and with the line companiesfor the battalion sniper squad. In hindsight, both agreed that roomclearing was a skill that the sniper teams needed to hone andbecome proficient at prior to deployment. As experienced NCOs,both were proficient and comfortable with room clearing drillswith a squad, but clearing a room with a sniper team, with reducedcombat power and direct fire assets, was something new. No teamwas ever committed to any openly hostile building where theyhad received direct fire and were required to clear the enemy andestablish a hide, but as all good Soldiers know, prior toestablishment of a position, in this case a hide site, the area mustbe cleared. While overtly clearing a building with a four-manstack from a platoon is one thing, clearing a building covertly,with a three-man sniper team with pistols and bolt action rifles,is quite another.

One area of particular concern in the sphere of training andtask organization is the snipers at the company level. While thecommand relationship and employment of the snipers at the

battalion and company levels was a positive atmosphere, the levelsof training varied. This is probably due to the fact that there areonly three snipers at the company level, and although they aredesperately needed and a valued asset, the commander’s focusand priority for training is to the bulk of his company. While havinga sniper team organic at the company level in combat and traininggives the company commander a degree of flexibility and optionsthat are needed in the counterinsurgency fight, the method oftraining them at home station prior to deployment becomesdifficult. It may be better to have all snipers in the battalion at thebattalion level, effectively having two sniper squads. This wouldallow the battalion commander to ensure quality control and acommon baseline for training for all sniper teams throughout thebattalion. The sniper teams in the second squad could be habituallyassigned to the same company on training exercises to developthe rapport necessary for proper support and employment. Once adeployment order is received, the operational control of the sniperscould then be given to their respective companies. This wouldallow the company commander to inherit a trained sniper teamthat he and his subordinates have developed a relationship andrapport with, without losing any capabilities organic to the SBCT,and allow him to focus on the majority of his combat power. Thiswould also allow the battalion commander to ensure that all of hissniper teams are trained to a common standard, have comparableskills, and would ease training as far as ranges, etc.

Sniper Employment OfficerThe issue of “who is the Sniper Employment Officer or SEO”

at both the battalion and company levels is often overlooked andsometimes not even addressed. This is a critical issue to ensurethat the commander gets the most out of all his assets. During themilitary decision-making process (MDMP), both at the battalionand company levels, all units are represented with what they canbring to the fight. To ensure that the snipers at all levels areemployed in accordance with the commander’s intent and properlywithin their capabilities, it is paramount that they are representedin the MDMP process. The sniper squad leader usually was presentat the battalion level and served as the S-3’s “go to” guy for allsniper-related issues as far as employment, capabilities, etc. Hewas also the person that did not let the S-3 forget about the sniperassets available to the battalion when the S-3 was focusing on thebigger moving pieces and mechanics involved in a battalion fight.

At the company level, it usually fell upon the executive officer(XO) to act as the company SEO. This was not by design, butworked out extremely well when looking at the SBCT companytask organization. No vehicle is specifically designated as the“mover” of the sniper team. A Stryker Mortar Carrier Vehicle


It may be better to have all snipers in thebattalion at the battalion level, effectively

having two sniper squads. This would allow thebattalion commander to ensure quality control

and a common baseline for training for allsniper teams throughout the battalion.

(MCV) orFire SupportVehicle (FSV) wereusually designated to carry thesniper team on administrative moves.Often attached to platoons for operations,the snipers would do as snipers in allorganizations have done in the past andmake themselves part of the platoon for theinsertion in their vehicles. Whenconducting infiltrations separate orindependent from a platoon or the rest ofthe company, the XOs used either the MCVor the FSV to insert the teams. This workedout well, gave the sniper team independentsupport without hindering or reducing thecombat power of the platoons, and allowedthe commander visibility of the sniper teamat all times through the XO.

Intelligence and EquipmentSupport

The available intelligence assets organicto the SBCT battalion are fairly robustcompared to that of their counterparts inthe heavy and light battalions. This allowsthe intelligence officer the ability to developvery good target folders and “real time”imagery and video to assist the snipers inmission planning and hide site selection.Both SSGs Kay and Brown reportedregularly receiving target folders andproducts from the S-2 that enhanced theircapabilities to plan and determine thefeasibility of a mission. Of course, extensiveplanning on a battlefield such as Iraq wasnot always a luxury snipers had, and theyoften had to operate off of verbal orders viaFM radio. They were, however, still ableto get “real-time” intelligence updates fromthe S-2 from the assets available, whichwere fed to them as situations developed.

While the snipers in an SBCT are notequipped with any more or less specialequipment than snipers in any other unit,their observations on some of the equipmentdeserve noting.

1. The Stryker vehicle itself is anexcellent insertion/extraction vehicle dueto its high speed, low or subdued noisesignature, and agility. Deception operationsare a viable insertion technique, and theStryker’s reduced noise signature can easily

Major Mark S. Leslie is currently serving asthe deputy chief of Training and Organization forthe Stryker Transformation Team at Fort Benning,Ga. He is a 1997 OCS graduate and has almost20 years of service in the Infantry. He has servedas a Long Range Surveillance Team Leader,Ranger Instructor, and commanded A Companyand HHC of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry, 1stCavalry Division. MAJ Leslie is a veteran ofOperations Just Cause, Desert Shield/DesertStorm and Iraqi Freedom.


capitalize on the observation mission of thesnipers. This allows a unit to investigatewhat the sniper observes when deadly forceis not desired or when they do not want tocompromise their position, without theobserved target receiving early warning(due to noise) of their approach.

2. The PVS 10 scope is a good piece ofequipment but rather fragile, and repairsin country were difficult.

3. The AN/PRC 148 radio is an excellentpiece of equipment that needs to be standardequipment for all sniper teams.

4. Suppressors for sniper weapons are amust. They reduce a sniper’s signature andreduce the chances of compromise once anengagement is initiated, therefore increasingsurvivability and reducing the possibility ofhaving to conduct a displacement once anengagement is initiated.

5. In an SBCT, the M107 rifle’s role islimited in its employment due to thephenomenal ability of the Remote WeaponSystem (RWS) in the Stryker. This lendsvalidity to the “arms room” concept of thesniper in the SBCT. The trained sniperknows best the weapon of choice for themission at hand.

The SBCT is a unique organization inour Army today. It has organic assetsspecially suited for the counterinsurgencyfight. The number of precision-fire assetsavailable to the maneuver commander isunprecedented. The flexibility of havingnumerous precision fire teams afford theSBCT commander the ability and flexibilityto not only kill the enemy, but ensure thatonly the enemy is killed, preserving theprecious, carefully cultivated relationshipsdeveloped with our Iraqi partners.

“Untutored courage is useless in theface of educated bullets.”

— General George Patton

Photo by Staff Sergeant Kevin L. Moses

A Soldier with the 2nd Battalion,22nd Infantry Regiment providessecurity during a mission in Iraq.

CAMP BLESSING,Afghanistan – In spring of2006, Soldiers from 2nd

Platoon, “Combat” Company, 1stBattalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, TaskForce Spartan, patrolled the Shuriak Valleyduring Operation Mountain Lion, movinginto strategic position atop the peak of AbasGhar as the highly successful missionwound toward its conclusion.

Like other infantrymen from the 10thMountain Division’s “Chosin” Battalion,the 2nd Platoon, Combat CompanySoldiers conducted operations in theShuriak and Pech Valleys of northeasternAfghanistan in the immediate aftermath ofMountain Lion.

Were their experiences typical, the warstory might have ended there — combatduty done, insurgent operations disrupted,bragging rights and a place in SpartanBrigade as well as Chosin Battalion historysafely secured.

But for the men of the 2nd Platoon, thestory was in its early chapters.

Selected to “stand up” the KorengalOutpost, the infantrymen shifted to the siteof a dilapidated lumber yard rather than therelatively comfortable confines of a forwardoperating base.

In all, the Chosin Soldiers spent 115 daysin remote outposts, camps and unmitigatedmountain wilderness along the river valleysof northeastern Afghanistan. Only a briefpause at Asadabad to resupply interruptedtheir stay “in the field.”

Many American Soldiers, and manySpartans in particular, spend substantialchunks of time in the field. Yet the Chosintroopers’ experience differs not only in thequantity of their field time but in the types

of missions they typically perform. For 2ndPlatoon troopers, “Mountain Infantry” and“Light Infantry” described present realities,not historic legacies.

“When I got off the plane in Bagram, Inoticed all the mountains around the base,”recalled Private First Class JonathanDemler, a 22-year-old 2nd Platooninfantryman from Niagara Falls, N.Y.“Now we (are) up in those mountains,climbing them every day.”

Indeed, Demler and colleaguesperformed the vast bulk of their missionson foot. While fellow Soldiers in other partsof Afghanistan — not to mention Iraq andKuwait — typically travel in vehicular

SERGEANT FIRST CLASS MICHAEL PINTAGRO

‘Chosin’ Platoon Climbs‘Chosin’ Platoon Climbs‘Chosin’ Platoon Climbs‘Chosin’ Platoon Climbs‘Chosin’ Platoon Climbsto ViCtory in Korengalto ViCtory in Korengalto ViCtory in Korengalto ViCtory in Korengalto ViCtory in Korengal


An assistant gunner with 2nd Platoon,“Combat” Company, 1st Battalion, 32ndInfantry Regiment, Task Force Spartan,

monitors his sector at a check post alongthe Pech River Road in northeastern

Afghanistan.

Photos by Sergeant First Class Michael Pintagro

convoys, the 2nd Platooninfantrymen traveled by foot over,around, and through the mostrugged terrain imaginable.

The length of the operation andsize of the participating elementvaried according to mission andcircumstance. Missions rangedfrom engagements and villageassessments to combat operationsagainst known anti-Coalitionmilitants (ACM).

Operating in an isolated, rural,mountainous region located close tothe Pakistani border and home toknown ACMs, the Chosin trooperspredictably made frequent contactwith the enemy. The Soldiers saidthey averaged an indirect fire attack,typically a rocket or mortar assault,around every other day. They alsomet the enemy frequently duringtheir daily foot patrols through themountain passes and river beds ofthe Korengal and Pech Valleys.

“Sometimes, we’d get contactevery day for a week, then go a fewdays with none at all. On patrols, itwas around a ‘50-50’ chance ofreceiving contact,” McQuade said,adding that the enemy frequently“set up ambushes on cliffs andriverbeds. They always seemed toattack from the high ground.”

The native of York, Maine, who onlyrecently celebrated his 26th birthday,recalled one memorable patrol duringwhich a Chosin team “came around a bendof a trail and came face-to-face with threeACM. Our guys opened up first, killing twoof the three. But we immediately receivedfire from another direction and withdrew.”

Many of the platoon’s young trooperstook the gunfights in stride.

“By the time you could start thinking ‘Ihope I don’t get shot,’ you’d already befiring back,” Demler said. “And then,before you knew it, it would be all over.”

The grueling physical challenges posedby the terrain and the mission impressedmany in the platoon more than any perilspresented by the enemy. Soldiers andleaders alike described the pace asrelentless. In theory, Soldiers alternatedduties, patrolling some days and providingsecurity or serving on the quick reaction

force on others. But given the velocity ofthe operation tempo, the frequency ofenemy attacks and the precarious conditionof the camp, the weary infantrymen enjoyedlittle rest.

“There would be days when we’d getback, drink some water and turn aroundand go out two hours later,” McQuade said.“If you were lucky, maybe you had a chanceto wash your clothes or sew your uniformbefore you went back out.”

“It’s the toughest physical thing I’ve everhad to do in my life,” added SergeantBradley Brinkman, a 23-year-old 2ndPlatoon team leader from Sacramento,Calif. “It pushes you to your limit — andthen you look up and you still have twomore clicks to go.”

The endurance of the Chosininfantrymen reached proportions almostcomical in their extremity.

“We had one guy who fell like 30 feetoff the side of a mountain,” recounted

Specialist Issac Jackson, a younginfantryman from Plattsburg, Mo.“He’s a .240 gunner and he brokehis butt stock. He landed in ariverbed. He got up and beganpulling security by himself with a‘9-mil.’ We asked him if he wasOK. He said, ‘yeah,’ and we justcontinued the mission.”

The versatile infantrymen notonly “humped,” climbed, foughtand shot, but built. Theestablishment of the KorengalOutpost, envisioned by ColonelJohn Nicholson, the Task ForceSpartan commander, as aninstitutional manifestation of theCoalition’s commitment to thesecurity and welfare of the region,represents an accomplishment ofstrategic magnitude.

They started from scratch.When the Chosin infantrymen

arrived at the Korengal in thespring, Americans — mainlyMarines who occupied the groundduring Operation Mountain Lion— serving in the “outpost”enjoyed the use of a singlehardstand building. A large,circular concertina-wire boundaryencompassed ruins, fightingpositions, decayed lumber stocks,

human and animal waste, and a patch ofreasonably level ground pressed into serviceas a landing zone. Aircraft landed anddeparted within a dozen or so yards of thesingle building, shaking loose makeshiftdoors and shutters and filling the haplessedifice with dust and debris.

Aided by combat engineers from the27th Engineer Group from Fort Bragg,N.C., as well as engineer assets organic tothe Spartan Brigade, the Chosininfantrymen slowly and painfullytransformed the disaster site into afunctional outpost. Soldiers serving at the“KOP” currently live in tents and enjoyaccess to functional if modest dining, washand sanitary facilities as well as limitedtelephone and recreational services.Perversely, electrical service arrived as the2nd Platoon Soldiers finally rotated out.

The men described living conditions atthe KOP during their tenure as, well,Spartan.

An infantryman with C Company, 1st Battalion, 32nd InfantryRegiment, mans a check post in northeastern Afghanistan.


“It was cool at night, (very) hot during the day,” said StaffSergeant Chris Bryant, currently the senior enlisted 2nd PlatoonSoldier. Perpetually donning “battle rattle” under the witheringnortheastern Afghan sun — daytime temperatures rarely fell below100 degrees in the summer and occasionally reached as high as130 — Soldiers struggled to keep hydrated. For three iceless weeks,the warriors consumed hot water. Some went entire days withouturinating. Chosin troopers expertly assessed times and distancesin terms of water requirements.

“You could give any of our guys a grid and he’d tell you exactlyhow much water you had to bring,” Private First Class LucasAmyx, a 19-year-old 2nd Platoon infantryman from Cincinnati,said with a smile. “The packing list would be three-fourths water.Just three camel backs, some meals and your ammo – you didn’teven think about putting anything else in your assault pack.”

Soldiers serving on major theater operating bases typically findshelter from the sweltering Afghan summer heat in their livingquarters, if not in comfortable work spaces, dining facilities, gymsor Morale, Welfare and Recreation establishments. Upon arrivalat the KOP, 2nd Platoon Soldiers, by contrast, lived in a draw,forming makeshift shelters with timber beams, pieces of tarp,ponchos or clothing.

Food consisted principally of meals, ready-to-eat, supplementedoccasionally by “pogie bait” garnered from care packages orregional bases and Afghan fare prepared by ANA colleagues orpurchased from locals.

Not surprisingly under such circumstances, the 2nd PlatoonSoldiers lost weight – sometimes significant amounts. Bryant, byno means fat to begin with, dropped 37 pounds. His “PL,” a lean,compact young man who could ill afford it, lost 23. Leadersestimated the men lost around 20 pounds on average during the“115 days.”

“Korengal,” Bryant observed one morning as he stretched hishand across his belly. “Asadabad,” the Columbia, S.C., residentadded with a gesture toward the meatier midsection of acolleague enjoying the “plush” conditions of Asadabad – intruth only a small regional base featuring modest amenities.

When in charitable moods, 2nd Platoon Soldiers characterizesanitation at the KOP as “primitive.” The Chosin infantrymentypically relied on stream water or small amounts of bottledwater for whatever washing they attempted. Uniforms, generallysoiled and not infrequently torn into rags, went weeks withoutcleaning.

Service at the KOP did provide a few unique opportunities,mainly cultural in nature. The allies, for instance, shared livingand working space at the outpost, officially an Afghan facility.

The platoon’s Soldiers forged tight bonds with the ANAtroops they served alongside. Nearly every mission launchedfrom the KOP, McQuade pointed out, involved Afghans as well asAmericans. As they labored together against a ruthless, determinedfoe amid austere conditions, the Soldiers developed mutual respectand even affection.

“They were excellent,” McQuade said of his Afghan brothersin arms. “They’d pick up on things we wouldn’t. One time anANA soldier reached down into the road and picked up an(improvised explosive device). We didn’t even notice it.”

ANA soldiers, he added, picked up on “The cultural things,especially the language. Sometimes, they’d just know an attackwas coming.”

The American warriors also grew to admire their ANAcounterparts’ ferocity in battle.

“You shoot at them, and they’ll chase you down until they getyou,” Amyx said. “They’ll scale walls to get at the enemy.”

The Americans noted the many essential similarities of the alliesand their services. Similar in age to their American allies, ANAsoldiers represent a national institution drawn from a broad cross-section of ethnic and cultural groups. Just as the U.S. militaryblends Soldiers of a variety of European, Asian, African and LatinAmerican ancestry representing numerous strands of Christianityas well as other faiths, the ANA unites Sunni and Shiite Muslimsof Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek as well as Pashtun extraction.

The Americans learned about enemies as well as friends.Amyx said events that occurred during one patrol demonstrated

the insurgents’ complete indifference to the lives of innocent Afghancivilians, including children.

“One time we were walking through a riverbed past a kid,” theinfantryman recalled. “He was shaking hands with us and everything.”

Anti-Coalition assailants, he continued, “just started firing intothe area with no regard for the kid or any of the other locals in thearea. The kid’s family was waiting for him on the other side. Theykept screaming for (the insurgents) to stop, but they just kept shootingwith no regard for human life.”

While the young men typically describe their accomplishments inearthy or ironic terms, they clearly appreciate the gravity of theirmission and the stakes riding on its successful accomplishment.

“Being part of two monumental things in Afghanistan — MountainLion and standing up the KOP — is real exciting,” Amyx said.

“There’s a permanent base on the Korengal now, and we’rethe ones who started it,” McQuade said. He added that his platoon’sinsertion into an ACM stronghold also made a significantcontribution to the allied effort.

If training rotations in the humid Louisiana woods and desertsof southern California, field problems in the frozen northern NewYork forests, deployment and shared grief hadn’t done so already,the “115 days” molded the platoon into a family.

“You’re going to scream and yell and get upset every once in awhile, but I have a lot of confidence in these guys,” Demler saidof his 2nd Platoon brothers. “I’m glad they’re on my side.”

“You just learn to trust people,” Brinkman added. “People youmight not get along with in the rear might be your best friendswhen you’re out.”

“We were a pretty well-rounded, tight-knit platoon to beginwith, but being in that kind of environment for that length of timejust brings a platoon closer together,” McQuade observed. “Theyknow the only people out there with them are the dudes on theirright and left. It helps them perform better. They know they alwayshave to give 110 percent.”


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

Sergeant First Class Michael Pintagro is currently serving as the PublicAffairs NCOIC for Task Force Spartan in Afghanistan.

WWWWWINNINGINNINGINNINGINNINGINNING THETHETHETHETHE H H H H HEAREAREAREAREARTSTSTSTSTS ANDANDANDANDAND M M M M MINDSINDSINDSINDSINDS

A KA KA KA KA KOREAOREAOREAOREAOREA E E E E EXPERIENCEXPERIENCEXPERIENCEXPERIENCEXPERIENCE

The U.S. Army has Soldiers deployed to approximately120 different locations worldwide. We are a forwarddeployed force sent to promote and ensure U.S. political,

economic, and security interests. As part of our continuingpresence in these foreign lands, it has become one of our goals to“win the hearts and minds” of the people of the host nation. Intoday’s political environment, where Americans are no longerwelcomed with open arms in many parts of the world, this goal isimperative. It is imperative not only to ensure the safety of ourSoldiers, but to assist us in accomplishing our national goals aswell as ensuring support for our continued presence, bothdomestically and abroad.

But, how do we go about “winning the hearts and minds?”What follows are ideas and observations based on experience whileserving as the commander of the United Nations CommandSecurity Battalion – Joint Security Area (UNCSB-JSA) located inPanmunjom, Republic of Korea (ROK). This unique battalionwas comprised of 600 Soldiers, 60percent of which were ROK officersand Soldiers. The UNCSB-JSA wasthe only U.S. tactical unit thatexecuted operations inside theKorean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).These included security operationsinside the DMZ and administeringthe civil affairs for the Koreanvillage of Tae Song Dong (TSD).This small farming village is theonly South Korean village locatedinside the DMZ. The villagerslived, worked, and played within a“stone’s throw” of the MilitaryDemarcation Line (MDL) and wereconstantly under the observation ofarmed North Korea combatoutposts.

The leaders and Soldiers of theUNCSB-JSA monitored andcontrolled virtually every aspect ofthe villagers’ lives. This includedmaintaining order and discipline,holding mayoral elections,determining residency eligibility,controlling access to the village,serving as a conduit to the United

COLONEL MATTHEW T. MARGOTTA

Nations Command (UNC) for approval for construction or villageimprovements, and approval for expansion of farming areas withinthe DMZ. Most importantly, the battalion provided around theclock security for the villagers and guest workers, both inside thevillage as well as in the farming areas – many of which borderedright along the MDL. In order to accomplish these missions, itwas imperative that the leaders and Soldiers of the UNCSB-JSAgain the willing cooperation of the villagers.

Additionally, since the battalion was a “combined” unit,consisting of both American and Korean officers and Soldiers, itwas imperative that we created the environment that facilitatedthe formation of a cohesive and effective team. This wascomplicated since we were dealing with components of twocompletely different military cultures and national characters.

In order to do this, it was our belief that there were five keycomponents to “winning the hearts and minds” of the Koreansthat we worked with and were responsible for:

Heike Hasenauer

Major Jose Devarona (front right), the battalion executive officer for the U.N. Command SecurityBattalion, glances toward the tall building in the background, which is the North Korean side ofPanmunjom — the site where many discussions have been held with North Korean officials in the past.



Understanding and respecting theculture;

Building a foundation of trust,confidence and mutual respect;

Developing personal relationships;Attending social and cultural

events; andWorking to improve their quality

of life.

IMPORTANCE OFUNDERSTANDING ANDRESPECTING THE CULTURE

In John Peddie’s book The Roman WarMachine, he describes how Roman generalsmade it a matter of policy to establish goodrelations with the native people of theoccupied territories that made up theRoman Empire. To the Romans, theexercise of good public relations aimed atgaining the friendship and support of localinhabitants was not only wise, but a militarynecessity. Roman armies, compared withthe populations of their conqueredterritories, were small in size, and thenumber of legionnaires requiredmaintaining security and numericalsuperiority would have been considerableand wasteful. The Romans desired to turnover responsibility for law and order to thepeople of the conquered territories as soonas possible. He writes how Augustus,during the war with the Germans, found atree laden with fruit located inside hismarching camp. The day after the withdrawalof the army, the local populace found the treeand fruit undisturbed. Although this exampleis simplistic, it may give an indication of howthe Romans managed to maintain a vastempire for almost 2,000 years. To theRomans, it was all about respect. Respectfor the culture, respect for the customs,respect for the traditions, respect for thereligion, respect for the property, andrespect for the people of the lands that thelegions were garrisoned in.

Although the United States does notmaintain an “empire” in the traditionalsense, we do have units and Soldiersdeployed all over the world, providingsecurity, stability, and ensuring U.S.interests are maintained. Just as theRomans recognized, in order to effectivelyaccomplish this we first must gain therespect of the people of the host nation. The

first step in earning this respect is for ourSoldiers to learn, understand, and thenrespect as much about the nation, itsculture, customs, and traditions as possible.

The term “ugly American” is familiarto anyone who has traveled overseas. It isvery easy for Americans, especially militarypersonnel, to think of ourselves as superiorto people of other nations — superiorintellectually, morally, culturally,professionally, physically, etc. Although wemay feel superior in any or all of theseareas, we should never convey ordemonstrate this to our hosts. We mustrecognize that people from all nations takegreat pride in their country, its history,customs and traditions. We mustacknowledge and recognize this! Treat thepeople of the host country with dignity andrespect and embrace the differences andnuances of their culture, customs, andtraditions.

Some countries, Korea for example,have an incredibly diverse and rich history,unique culture, and traditions that are overa thousand years old. But from a practicalsense, how do we go about understandingand respecting the culture of our hostnation? It first starts with education. Ourleaders and Soldiers must becomeknowledgeable about the host nation; itspeople, religion, customs, traditions,history, etc.

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

This education process was fullyintegrated into the training program at theUNCSB-JSA. Even though U.S. forces hadbeen a fixture in the ROK since the KoreanWar, we were amazed how little ROKSoldiers knew about America and itspeople. The same, even more so, could besaid for U.S. Soldiers who served in theUNCSB-JSA. For the most part, they werecompletely ignorant of the nuances ofKorean society and even why the U.S. Armywas in Korea. A technique that we used tomitigate this lack of knowledge andunderstanding was twice each year we gavea “U.S. – Korea” presentation to all Soldiersin the battalion, both Korean andAmerican. This half-day presentationcovered major aspects of life in bothcountries to include history, government,leaders, customs, sports, religion,entertainment, music, etc. In a combinedforum, we briefed the American perspectiveto the ROK Soldiers and the Koreanperspective to the U.S. Soldiers. The intentwas to give the Soldiers and leaders a broadunderstanding of our two nations and theirpeople, highlighting the similarities anddifferences of the two. With it came agreater understanding of the basis of eachside’s actions, beliefs, and why we acted inthe manner that we did.

Additionally, six days a week, seniorleaders of the battalion gathered each

Courtesy photos

U.S. and ROK Soldiers assigned to the United Nations Command Security Battalion-JointSecurity Area patrol an area of the Tae Song Dong village.

morning for an operational update. Thisupdate covered the day’s upcomingactivities, patrols, visitors, training, andintelligence summary. Before webegan, the battalion S2 (U.S. officer)and S3 Air (ROK officer) presentedsignificant news highlights and items of i n t e r e s tfrom both the U.S. and the ROK. This always generateddiscussion and served to further educate both Americans andKoreans about our two nations and gain a better understandingof each other.

Learning and understanding the culture, customs andtraditions of Korea was only a starting point. It was importantfor us to not only respect these, but we attempted to apply themin day-to-day activities as well. Some examples that were apart of our experience included taking our shoes or boots offprior to entering a person’s home, sitting on the floor and eatingmeals from a table approximately one foot high, eating with chopsticks, socializing prior to conducting business, greeting Koreansin their native language, and respecting the ROK soldiers as theysang their national anthem each morning during PT formation.These are just several examples; there were many more.

These examples may seem trivial to Americans and our serious,professional business-oriented culture, but they were veryimportant to the Koreans and assisted us in earning their trust,confidence, and respect.

TRUST, CONFIDENCE AND RESPECTThe intent of honoring and respecting the Korean culture,

traditions, and customs was to build a foundation of trust,confidence, and respect between the Soldiers and leaders of theUNCSB-JSA and the Korean people. The more trust, confidenceand respect that we developed at all levels, the easier it becamefor us to gain the cooperation, assistance, and support of theKoreans, especially the villagers of TSD and the ROK Soldiers ofthe battalion.

This garnered many practical benefits to the battalion. Theseincluded increased and more productive dialogue, betterintelligence (especially from ROK governmental organizations),willing cooperation for initiatives, support for quality of lifeimprovements and security issues, better treatment of U.S. Soldiers,improved relations between ROK and U.S. Soldiers, and increasedcooperation by members of the local populace concerning trainingactivities and operations in and along the DMZ.

Most importantly, gaining the trust, confidence, and respect ofour Korean hosts showed America, its Army, and its people in thebest light possible. The Korean soldiers that were selected toserve in the UNCSB-JSA were some of the best and brightest youngmen in the ROK. Upon completion of their military service, theyreturned to Korean society attending universities, with many goingon to become leaders in business, government, and the military.Their impression of Americans and the United States was shapedby their experience serving in the UNCSB-JSA. We did our bestto ensure that this impression was a positive one — showingAmericans as intelligent, respectful, open-minded, andcompassionate individuals.

DEVELOPING PERSONALRELATIONSHIPS

As mentioned earlier, Americans(especially military personnel) generallybelieve in and display a more business-oriented (i.e. less personal) approach to

our affairs than do many other nationalities.Establishing a personal relationship with those that wework with or do business with is often considered unimportantor unnecessary. This was not our belief and experience in theUNCSB-JSA. Establishing close, personal and professionalrelationships between individuals was a key component toeffective operations, especially when dealing with people fromtwo different nationalities.

Every effort was made to create conditions that promotedand fostered the ability to build personal and professionalrelationships between the U.S. and ROK Soldiers, and ourSoldiers and the TSD villagers. In the battalion, there was nosuch thing as a Korean-only or U.S.-only event. All functionsand activities were “combined,” designed to bring Americansand Koreans together. ROK Soldiers were encouraged (andmany did) to bring U.S. Soldiers home with them while onpass to show them their country and give them a taste of the“real Korea.” American Soldiers were likewise encouraged totake ROK Soldiers to the Yongsan U.S. Army Base in Seoul.Soldiers, leaders, and units were paired up with counterpartsfor all social and morale building activities. Teams wereintegrated for athletic competitions and all training andoperations included a mix of Koreans and Americans. Everyeffort was made to form habitual relationships betweenindividuals and units in anticipation that this would lead toenhanced personal and professional associations. Althoughmaintaining national integrity in many of these activities wouldhave been easier (especially given the language barrier), thecreation of personal and professional bonds between individualswas an integral part of building trust, confidence, and respect foreach other and successfully operating in a combined environment.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL EVENTSSocial and cultural activities are a part of every society in the

world. These were a big part of life in Korea, the village of TaeSong Dong, and with the ROK Soldiers in the UNCSB-JSA. Theseincluded national and local celebrations, dinners, weddings,funerals, parties, barbecues, school events, sporting events, andreligious events. When invited, we made every effort to attendthese events. On the rare occasion when we did not receive aninvitation, we made it known that we were interested in attendingand actively sought an invitation. Once again, this showed theKoreans that we were interested in their culture and wanted tolearn more about them personally.

Attending social and cultural events were viewed as anopportunity. They were an opportunity to get to know the Koreanson a more personal level and, more importantly, for them to get toknow us. Social events provided a venue for Americans andKoreans to interact in a relaxed atmosphere, facilitatingrelationship building and cultural understanding. Leaders and


PROFESSIONAL FORUM


Soldiers of the battalion were encouragedto participate in as many social or culturalevents as they could make time for. Whenwe attended these events, we ate what theKoreans ate and in the manner that wastheir custom, drank what they drank,participated in the games and sportingevents, met and talked with members of thecommunity — especially wives andchildren, and did our very best to respectthe customs and traditions that were a partof these events.

This allowed the Koreans to see apersonal side of American Soldiers andview us as respectful, considerate, andopen-minded. These events became soimportant to our philosophy of gaining thetrust and respect of the TSD villagers thatall village cultural and social events wereannotated on the battalion training calendarand became command-directed events formany of the leaders of the battalion.Although sometimes there was “mumblingand grumbling” prior to going to many ofthese events, I cannot think of a Soldierwho did not feel that their time in Koreawas enriched by these experiences.

Keeping this same intent, we alwaysinvited the Koreans to traditional Americanevents and functions hosted by thebattalion. These included 4th of Julycelebrations, Thanksgiving and Christmasmeals in the dining facility, unitorganizational days, athletic and sportcompetitions, unit barbecues, Oktoberfestparties, Cinco de Mayo celebrations, andcoffees and social events hosted by theAmerican wives. When possible, weassigned escorts or sponsors to the Koreanswhich facilitated getting to know ourSoldiers. We found that the Koreans werefascinated by these events, our customs andtraditions, and for the most part, thoroughlyenjoyed them.

An example of how small gestures cango a long way toward building a positiveimage occurred during my second year inthe battalion. The ROK leaders andfamilies hosted a formal dinner for thesenior American leaders and families aspart of their annual Chusok celebration.This is probably the most important Koreancelebration, on par with our Thanksgiving,where Koreans come together with theirentire extended family to honor theirancestors. The Koreans went to great

lengths and expense to make this dinnerspecial for the Americans. They preparedwonderful traditional Korean dishes andtreated the entire evening as if they werewith “family.” The battalion S3 and I,along with our wives, wore traditionalKorean dress (Hanbok) to the dinner. TheKoreans were amazed and delighted thatwe were willing to wear the traditionaldress. This gesture enhanced ourrelationship with the Koreans as word andpictures spread throughout the battalion ofthe respect we had shown this importantcultural event.

ENHANCING QUALITY OF LIFEOne of the most effective tools for

building trust between the Koreans (ROKSoldiers and TSD villagers) and thebattalion was demonstrating ourcommitment to improving their quality oflife.

Given the isolated location of thebattalion (400 meters south of the DMZ),complete absence of local, off-camprecreational activities, and extendedoperational requirements (Soldiers receivedonly one four-day pass per month), qualityof life for the Soldiers was of primeimportance to the battalion leadership.Considering that most of the ROK Soldierswere operating and living in an unfamiliar

environment (on a U.S. Army installation),special attention was given to improvingtheir quality of life. These includedproviding Korean food in the diningfacility, purchasing Korean movies andshowing them on our battalion moviechannel, improving living conditions atour operational sites in the DMZ,providing each platoon their ownbarbecue, purchasing Korean newspapersfor distribution, etc. All of these werefairly simple initiatives, but they had anenormous impact on building respect andtrust in the leadership of the battalion.

Although security of Tae Song Dongand the villagers was our number onepriority and dominated our decisionmaking, any issue concerning the villagewas always considered in the context ofhow it would impact on the villagers’quality of life. Our goal was not just tosustain the village, but do everything inour power to improve the village andenhance the villagers’ quality of life.This included all facets of village lifesuch as modernization, beautification,streamlining of many administrativerequirements, enhancing businessopportunities, implementing schoolimprovements, enhancing availablereligious services, increasing recreationalopportunities, promoting villageexposure, and tempering disruptivesecurity requirements.

As the relationship between thevillagers and the leaders of the UNCSB-JSA matured and a sense of mutual trustpermeated both, the villagers becamecomfortable enough to raise issues that theyhad previously withheld. We discoveredthat the villagers had a number of ideas toimprove life in the village. They apparentlyhad made some of these ideas and requestsknown for years but had never seen anyvisible action on the part of the UNCleadership to address them. This resultedin a corresponding loss of trust in the UNCleadership.

An example of this and how we turnedit around to our advantage occurred duringone of our quarterly town council meetings.The villagers had been seeking approvalto establish cell-phone coverage inside thevillage and adjacent DMZ farming area.This required construction of a cell-phoneantenna station within the village,

American leaders and families wore traditionalKorean dress to a 2003 Chusok celebration.

something that required UNC approval. To the villagers, thiswas a significant quality of life as well as a prestige issue, sincethe village touted itself as a model of modern South Korean lifeand was designed to be a showcase village in the eyes of NorthKorean leaders and tourists. From the villager’s perspective, eachtime they raised this issue, it appeared that nothing was ever doneto move the issue forward and gain approval, and their requestwas consistently denied.

When they made the request known, we discovered that therewas no valid reason to deny the request. It made too much sense.It enhanced the villagers’ quality of life and had the added benefitof assisting the battalion in providing security to the villagers.We now had an alternate form of effective communication, in lieuof land-line and secure radio, within the DMZ. Within two monthsof making the request, we gained UNC approval, the tower wasconstructed, and the villagers had cell phone coverage.Immediately, there was enhanced respect and trust in the leadershipof the battalion. We demonstrated, in a tangible way, that wewere willing to take action to back up our stated goal of enhancingthe quality of life of the villagers.

I can not overstate how effective being truly concerned forthe TSD villagers and ROK soldiers’ welfare and quality oflife was in building a foundation of trust between the Americansand Koreans. Once again, this dynamic provided some verytangible benefits to the battalion. Whenever we asked forsupport or concessions from the villagers on certain issues,they were more inclined to agree and support our requests. Thiswas extremely important during the high OPTEMPO plantingand harvest seasons when we had to ask their cooperation toschedule and coordinate farming efforts, ensuring that we couldprovide sufficient armed security escorts whenever a villager

Colonel Matthew T. Margotta is an Army War College Fellow at theUniversity of Texas. Previously he served as the commander of the UnitedNations Command Security Battalion-Joint Security Area in Panmunjoem,Republic of Korea, and executive officer to the Chief of Staff, United NationsCommand, Combined Forces Command, United States Forces Korea andCommander Eighth United States Army.


or worker went into the fields. This was initially met withresistance, but once we gained the trust and confidence of thevillagers, they came to support the effort wholeheartedly.

WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS IS HERE TOSTAY

No one can accurately predict what the future holds for theU.S. Army, but it seems clear that the Army will be involved instability, support, and security operations throughout the worldfor the foreseeable future. As long as the United States haspolitical, economic or security interests in a particular countryor region, and other governmental organizations continue todisplay an inability to respond or influence as they wereintended to (i.e. State Department), the U.S. Army will remainat the forefront of promoting American interests overseas. Aslong as this dynamic remains, our long-term success willundoubtedly be predicated not so much on our military prowess,but on our ability to gain and retain the willing support of thepeople of our host nations. To accomplish this, it seems clearthat commanders, leaders and Soldiers must actively seek waysin which to “win the hearts and minds” of the populace. Thiswill require deliberate planning, conscious execution, and mustbe made an integral part of any deployment operation. Isolatingourselves in our base camps and limiting our contact with thelocal populace will only breed mistrust and fail to capitalizeon our greatest strength — the American character and idealas demonstrated by our Soldiers. The people of other nationsmust see and be exposed to this. Leaders must look foropportunities to make contact with and build personalrelationships with members of the host nation. It is onlythrough the creation of interpersonal relationships that we canwe establish a foundation of mutual trust, respect, andconfidence. Once established, there is no limit to what can beaccomplished by people from two nationalities working togethertoward a common goal.

The author (at right) poses for a photo with the mayor of Tae SongDong village. Although security of Tae Song Dong and the villagerswas the UNCSB-JSA’s number one priority and dominated decisionmaking, any issue concerning the village was always considered inthe context of how it would impact on the villagers’ quality of life.

It is only through the creation ofinterpersonal relationships that we can we

establish a foundation of mutual trust, respect,and confidence. Once established, there is nolimit to what can be accomplished by people

from two nationalities working together towarda common goal.

See Identify Engage

Equals

Increased Combat Effectiveness and Fratricide Reduction


Combat Identification(CID) is the process ofattaining an accurate

characterization of detected objects(friendly, enemy or neutral)throughout the Joint battlespace to theextent that with high confidence, timelyapplication of militaryoptions and weaponsresources can occur.Combat Identification isachieved through proficient application ofa family of situational awareness and targetidentification capabilities, and adherenceto doctrine, unit tactics, techniques andprocedures (TTPs), and approved rules ofengagement (ROE) that directly support acombatant’s shoot/don’t shoot decision fordetected objects in their battlespace.

The purpose of CID is to improve unitcombat effectiveness while at the same timepreventing fratricide and minimizingcollateral damage. CID is the process thathuman shooters or sensors go through toidentify entities on the battlefield prior tomaking shoot/don’t shoot decisions. Toperform CID, the warfighter uses allavailable means at his disposal to sort theentities on the battlefield prior to applyingcombat power or fires effects. The wholepoint is to enable the warfighter tomaximize the effects of lethal fires againstthe enemy, while at the same time reducingor eliminating the effects of fires on friendlyor neutral personnel, equipment orfacilities.

While CID is a complex series of linkedsystems, procedures and doctrine — whenit is effective, it is simple and transparent.When it is ineffective, its results can betragic and disastrous. A recent example ofthe “links” in the CID chain (Family ofSystems [“See” the entity] + Training[“Identify” the entity] + Doctrine/TTP/ROE

MAJOR EDWARD J. OSPITAL AND CAPTAIN ADAM N. WOJACK

[“Engage” the entity]) being broken in theglobal war on terrorism is a highlypublicized incident involving the 2ndBattalion, 75th Ranger Regiment.

Fratricide in AfghanistanWhile on patrol in a Taliban-infested

sector of Afghanistan’s Paktia Provincein April 2004, an element of the 2ndBattalion, 75th Ranger Regiment becamebogged down because of a brokenHMMWV. A segment of the platoon,Serial 1, passed through a canyon andwas near i ts north rim. The othersegment, Serial 2, changed route plansbecause of poor road conditions thathindered the recovery of a brokenHMMWV being towed by a locallyacquired vehicle. Serial 2 entered thesame canyon from the south. Serial 2 didnot have the ability to communicate theirsituation and change of route to Serial 1due to the rugged terrain. Upon enteringthe canyon, Serial 2 came under mortarand small arms fire from Afghan Talibanfighters. Rangers in Serial 1 heard theinitial explosion that preceded the attack.Three Rangers were ordered to headtoward the attackers. The canyon’s wallsprevented them from radioing theirpositions to their colleagues, just as Serial2 had not radioed its change in plans. Onegroup moved toward the north-south ridge

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to face the canyon.The light was dimming. The

presumed Taliban guerrillas wereabout half a mile away.

Two Rangers and an Afghan allymoved down the slope into a position

where they could engage the enemy.As Serial 2 pulled

alongside the ridge, thegunners fired into thearea where members of

Serial 1 had taken position. The first todie was the Afghan, whom the Rangersin Serial 2 mistook for a Taliban fighter.Under fire, Rangers on the ridge shoutedand waved their arms. They then used asmoke grenade to mark their position andfiring ceased for a few moments. TheRangers in Serial 1 thought the engagementwas over and got up from their position.The HMMWV then moved to a position ofadvantage and resumed firing killing oneof the Rangers in the second engagement.

To use this tragic example to betterexplain CID, you must first understand itsbasic formula: Situational Awareness (SA)+ Target Identification (TI) = CombatIdentification (CID).

Situational Awareness (SA)SA consists of reported friendly (blue),

enemy (red), neutral and unknown entitiesnormally displayed on a computer screenor manually posted on a map. For thepurposes of CID, we will only describe SAas it relates to automated and reportedinformation using available command andcontrol (C2)/SA systems. There are threekey attributes of SA – accuracy/timelinessof reporting; density of blue position,location, information (PLI) generatingsystems; and interoperability of friendlyforce C2/SA systems in the affectedbattlespace. SA is sent to and displayed in

Family ofSystems Training Doctrine, TTPS

and ROE

two places — to the common operationalpicture (COP) located in command postsfor C2 purposes; and to individual vehicle/aircraft/Soldier platform C2/SA displaydevices for both C2 and Combat IDpurposes. The latter directly supports shoot/don’t shoot decision making by humanshooters and sensors in close proximity toenemy forces on the battlefield.

When the Ranger unit lost SA of whereits subordinate elements were in relationto each other, the situation deteriorated:two friendly forces converged on oneanother without communications. Severalsystems could have prevented this loss ofSA in the Ranger element. A FBCB2/BlueForce Tracker (GPS-fed, vehicle-mountedor hand held C2/SA system) capabilitywould have given all elements involved avisual depiction of where mounted anddismounted friendly forces were located —assuming, of course, that all vehicles anddismounted elements involved were soequipped. Knowing where blue entitieswere in the battlespace in combination withthe proper mix of target identification

systems would have enabled vehiclecommanders to properly guide theirelement’s crew-served weapon gunnersonto enemy targets — as well as to preventthem from engaging friendly forces.

Target Identification (TI)TI is the process of determining the

affiliation (blue, red, neutral) of detectedobjects at the point of engagement in one’simmediate battlespace. This is normallyconducted within line of sight visual rangeand is for the purpose of applying combatpower or fires effects against enemy entitiesor targets, while preventing fratricide andminimizing collateral damage. There aretwo categories of TI — cooperative targetidentification (CTI) and non-cooperativetarget identification (NCTI).

CTI includes any method or materielsolution that allows a human shooter/sensorto “interrogate or question” a potentialtarget, and allows the same potential targetto “respond or answer” the interrogator ina timely manner. Air-to-air and ground-to-air systems use of IFF (identification


Situational Awareness Target Identification

PLUS

Equals Combat Identification: The process of attaining an accurate characterization

of detected objects (friendly, enemy, neutral) in the joint battlespace to the extentthat with high confidence, timely application of military options and weaponsresources can occur (CID MA ICD). Combat ID is achieved through proficientapplication of a family of situational awareness and target identification capabilities,and adherence to doctrine, unit TTP, and approved ROE that directly supports acombatant’s “shoot/don’t shoot” decision for detected objects in his/her battlespace.

And Increased Combat Effectiveness: (as related to Combat ID) The ability of a friendly unit

to rapidly and accurately sort and characterize detected objects within thebattlespace in order to allow for the timely application of combat power and fireseffects against an enemy force or target (to destroy, neutralize, suppress or disrupt),with the least risk of death, injury or damage to friendly and neutral forces, entities,facilities and equipment (prevention of fratricide and collateral damage) definitionby the TRADOC Capability Manager Platform Battle Command/CombatIdentification (TCM PBC/CID).

friend or foe) Mode 4, and ground-to-ground systems, in the near future, may useBattlefield Target Identification Device(BTID) and Radio-Based CombatIdentification (RBCI) CTI systems. IFF isa misnomer as none of the CTI technologiesidentify foe, they only identify friend orunknown (IFU) entities.

NCTI involves methods or systems thatexploit the physical characteristics ofentities in the battlespace to help identifyand determine affiliation, and does notrequire a cooperative response or answerfrom the target. NCTI systems includeoptics (forward-looking infrared [FLIR],night vision goggles [NVGs] andbinoculars), vehicle and personnelmarkings (Joint Combat IdentificationMarking Systems [JCIMS], which includeCombat ID Panels [CIPs], Thermal IDPanels [TIPs], Phoenix Beacons [infraredlights lights] and Dismounted CombatIdentification Marking System [DCIMS] -a TIP panel that is form fitted to a Kevlarhelmet, giving a reverse polarity imagethrough a FLIR device), and AutomatedTarget Recognition (ATR) devices. JCIMSmarking systems are used in conjunctionwith FLIR optics and night vision gogglesand assist in friendly identification at thepoint of engagement.

In this example, Serial 2 (or the platoonfor that matter) did not have adequateoptics. Thermal sights for HMMWV-mounted crew-served weapons (AN/PAS-13s or Enhanced Night Vision Goggles[ENVG], for example) combined withreverse-polarity markings and/or thermalballistic helmet covers on all Soldiers wouldhave enabled turret gunners to identify thedismounted Rangers in Serial 1 as friendlyentities. Technology combined with arehearsed TTP to avoid fratricide andadherence to ROE could have preventedthis occurrence. Each “link” of the CIDchain was broken.

The unit fired on would have benefitedfrom other NCTI devices such as infrared(IR) beacons for limited visibilityoperations (seen through AN/PVS-7B/D orPVS-14 night vision goggles that Soldiersare currently issued) or a day-visible strobelight.

A CTI technology that services Ground-to-Ground domains (“platform toplatform,” “platform to soldier,” “soldier

to soldier,” “soldier to platform”) wouldhave been an additional tool at the pointof engagement that would have enabledboth serials to identify unknowns asfriendly. Unfortunately, the direct fire CTItechnology (Battlefield TargetIdentification Device [BTID]) currentlybeing recommended for an acquisitionstrategy for the U.S. Army and U.S.Marine Corps services only one domain— “platform to platform” — andinterrogates only targets from M1, M2/M3, and Stryker vehicles.

In the earlier example, even if theHMMWVs are replaced by armoredvehicles equipped with BTID, the fratricide still could haveoccurred — since BTID does not work within the platform-to-soldier domain. This weakness in the CID “link” does not enablethe firer to gain positive identification (PID) of the unknowndismounted entity. In the example, Serial 2 in turn broke both thesecond (“Identify”) and third links (“Shoot/Don’t Shoot”): ROEwas not satisfied by the gunners manning the crew-served weaponson the HMMWVs; and PID was not gained by the firing element.In addition, a TTP (i.e. smoke grenade signal), was not establishedor trained prior to the engagement (or not comprehended duringthe engagement) as a signal to cease fire in case of friendly firesituations.

The Serial 2 firing platform could have used additionalprocedures to prevent the fratricide: transmitting the location ofthe unknown entity to another element (e.g. higher headquarters)to gain PID; by maneuvering to a position of advantage until PIDcould be acquired; or by using the proposed DIDEA (Detect,Identify, Decide, Engage, and Assess) Target Engagement Process.

In this highly publicized incident, well-trained Rangers wereplaced in a situation where they did not have the proper CID familyof capabilities and in the heat of battle failed to correctly implementtheir training and ROE procedures. The end result was a costlydecision that led to a fatal fratricide incident.

Better CID CapabilitiesThe ability of a CTI technology to service multiple domains

has gained importance since Operation Desert Storm (ODS).Fratricide studies have illustrated a 25-percent increase inplatform-to-soldier incidents and an increase in soldier-to-soldierincidents by 10 percent during recent major combat operations insupport of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The two CTItechnologies recently approved for acquisition strategy do notaddress or fill this CID gap. BTID services only the platform-to-platform domain (M1, M2/M3, Stryker, and LRAS3) where asRadio-Based Combat Identification (RBCI) addresses the Ground-to-Ground and Air-to-Ground domains from an indirect and closeair support perspective.

None of these technologies directly address the “platform-to-soldier” and “soldier-to-soldier” domains. Regardless of what CTItechnology is used, the combatant must still make the finaldetermination whether to engage the unknown entity based on

blue, red or neutral status. Oncedetermined, the combatant mustincorporate the ROE criteria andrestrictions into his “shoot/don’t shoot”decision.

Positive visual identification (PID) ofthe entity to determine if it is a legitimatemilitary target must also be ascertained.There does not exist a technology thatidentifies friend or foe (IFF). CTItechnologies only identify friend orunknown (IFU). A CTI technologyshould not be used as the sole criteriafor engagement due to its mechanical/electronic nature or due to enemy action

(electronic countermeasures [ECM]) that might render the CTItechnology inoperative. In addition, partial fielding (either throughdesign or system failure) of CTI technology has been proven toincrease fratricide, not decrease it, as crews rely on the technologyas the sole criteria to engage or not engage an unknown entity.

A Holistic CID SolutionProgress has been made since the incident in Paktia. Per the

recommendation of the AMCB G-G CID Study, the Training,Doctrine and Combat Development Division at Fort Knox, Ky.,assisted by the TRADOC Capability Manager Platform BattleCommand/Combat Identification (TCM PBC/CID) and theTRADOC Centers, selected a vendor in March 2006 to addressissues associated with the incorporation of CID into Army doctrine.Comprehensive CID doctrine will be developed for inclusion intoFM 3.90, Tactics (publication date: 4 July 2001), that explainshow to increase combat effectiveness in relation to combatidentification requirements, including but not limited to SA, TI,TTP and ROE. The CID input will address the Ground-to-Ground(“platform to platform,” “platform to soldier,” “soldier to soldier,”“soldier to platform”), Air-to-Ground (rotary-wing aircraft-platform to soldier and UAV-platform to soldier), and Ground-to-Air mission areas.

Gunnery doctrine will be updated to incorporate combatidentification requirements, to include but not limited to, insertionof friendly, allied/coalition and neutral targets, and refinement ofdirect fire target engagement processes. Existing gunnery manualsfor Armor/Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery, Air Defense, and Aviationwill be reviewed to identify deficiencies in addressing CID-relatedtasks. This doctrine shall be for the entire Heavy Brigade CombatTeam (HBCT), including Armor, Infantry, mortar gunnery,Engineers, and Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM)and should be used as a template for the Infantry Brigade CombatTeam (IBCT) and Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) manuals.The doctrinal effort will take approximately 12 months to completefollowing initiation in March 2006. This effort will strengthenthe Doctrine/TTP/ROE (“Engage or Do Not Engage”) “link” ofthe SA + TI chain.

Improvements in the current family of systems (FBCB2/JBC-P, Optics, 2/3 GENFLIR, JCIMS) enabling the “sensor-to-shooterkill-chain” to better see the targeted entity can be enhanced through


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

Regardless of what CTItechnology is used, the

combatant must still make thefinal determination whether to

engage the unknown entitybased on blue, red or neutralstatus. Once determined, thecombatant must incorporate

the ROE criteria andrestrictions into his “shoot/

don’t shoot” decision.

the acquisition of a CTI that services all ofthe Ground to Ground domains and onethat addresses the Air to Ground MissionArea, such as RBCI. Future CTI systemsthat enter into an acquisition strategyshould service as many domains as possibleto fully address our CID gaps.

Fratricide incidents are still occurringduring stability operations in Iraq and arebeing committed by platforms other thanarmored. A system like BTID would haveno positive impact on these incidents.Acquisition of a CTI technology thatservices all domains will strengthen thefamily of systems (“See the entity”) link inthe CID equation. Until that occurs and thedoctrinal/facility gap mitigation measuresare in place (identified and funded by theAMCB G-G study), fratricides in fullspectrum operations will likely continue tooccur.

The fog of war and the human factormakes total elimination of fratricidedifficult. Marksmanship and “musclememory” (the ability to conduct crew drills/battle drills under stressful conditions, i.e.fire commands, fire control systems switchmanipulation) training remains a “must”


in order to maintain lethal crews andsoldiers, and is necessary to simultaneouslyprotect the force from fratricide. Thecontemporary operating environmentdrives the need for target discriminationskill-set for all soldiers. This standard oftraining grounded in solid doctrinalprinciples will hone the warfighter’sjudgment at the point of engagement.Family of system and doctrinalimprovements coupled with improvedtraining devices (Recognition of CombatVehicles (ROC-V), simulations, andrealistic ranges with blue, red and neutraltargetry incorporating shoot/don’t shootdecision making) will enable the soldier tomake better decisions on whether or not toengage an unknown entity. The combatantmust be able to ask themselves the questionif unsure whether to shoot or not:

(1) Am I or my friends in mortal danger?(2) What is the worse thing that can

happen if I pull the trigger?(3) Am I positive that my target is

hostile?There is no “silver bullet” solution to

end all fratricide incidents. The emphasisshould be placed upon improving densityof SA and TI systems in the Army inventory,preparing the combatant for full spectrumoperations and acquiring a CTI technology

Major Edward J. Ospital is the CombatIdentification Branch Chief for the TRADOCCapability Manager Platform Battle Command /Combat Identification (TCM PBC/CID) at FortKnox, Ky. He is a 1989 Distinguished MilitaryGraduate from the California State UniversitySacramento ROTC program. During a five-yearbreak in service, he earned numerous Police OfficerStandardized Training (POST) Certifications fromthe State of California as a law enforcement officer.Major Ospital has served in various civilian lawenforcement and Armor/Cavalry command andstaff positions in the continental United States,Korea, and Germany.

Captain Adam N. Wojack is the S3 PlansOfficer for the 2nd “Dagger” Brigade Combat Teamof the 1st Infantry Division at Camp Liberty, Iraq.He was a Distinguished Military Graduate from U.S.Army Officer Candidate School in 1997, andcommanded Alpha Company, 1st Battalion, 26thInfantry in Schweinfurt, Germany. He has alsoserved in various leadership and staff positions inIraq, Kosovo, Germany, Hawaii, Fort Campbell,Panama, and Korea.

to service all domains in the Ground-to-Ground mission area. This can only beaccomplished by looking at CID through aholistic lens and by strengthening everylink of the CID (SA+TI [Family of Systems+ Training + Doctrine/TTP/ROE]) chain.It is imperative that we do everythingpossible to prevent unfortunate incidentsof fratricide from occurring in the future.

Photo by Specialist Christa Martin


Usama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaedamovement represent majorchallenges to American military

planners, and as such, any material writtenabout him and his organization should beanalyzed and studied with great care. TheMay-June 2006 edition of Infantry featuredan analysis of street literature highlightingthe strategic evolution of Bin Laden and hisorganization (See “Street Literature onUsama Bin Laden: A Review of Cheaper ArabBiographies found in Arab Alleyways,” pages22-24). The response from readers desiringmore analysis of pro-Bin Laden streetliterature has been overwhelming. Requestshave come in from the Pentagon to warcolleges and even colleagues from NavalStation Rota in Spain. As a result, part two will focus on a 1991booklet that mythologizes his Soviet-Afghan war years (1980-1989).

In major Middle East capital cities, one can find a host of streetliterature about Bin Laden, but between the wild claims of hisabilities to fight Soviet forces and other Afghan jihadist groupsare kernels of knowledge that offer a realistic assessment of theAl-Qaeda leader, his health, his psychology, his world view, andthe evolution of his military tactical prowess. Such street literatureis one of the least known means by which Islamist militantsinfluence public opinion, by offering those wanting to go beyondsatellite television a means of reading in detail the mythology, themanipulation of Islamic history and texts as well as what a youngimpoverished man on the street can do to join the jihadist cause.U.S. war colleges should assign translated excerpts of these streetbiographies of Bin Laden. These books can range from less than100 pages to more than 400 pages and have permeated Arab streetssince the early ’90s; war colleges and Special Forces schools canextract excerpts of this material as a basis for a robust discussionand assessment of one of America’s major adversaries.

These books can be obtained from street vendors in pricesranging from 50 cents to $3. This review will look at an earlierpiece of Bin Laden street literature that details his Soviet-AfghanWar years. Usama Bin Laden Yarwi Maarek Massadah Al-AnsarAl-Arab bee Afghanistan (Usama Bin Laden Narrates the Battlesof the Arabs of Massadah Al-Ansar in Afghanistan) was publishedin 1991, by Manar Al-Jadid Press in Cairo. The author, Essam

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER YOUSSEF ABOUL-ENEIN, USN

Daraaz, was among those Arab jihadists wholeft Egypt to report on Usama Bin Laden’s jihadagainst the Soviets in Afghanistan. His talentlay not in combat but in propaganda, journalism,and chronicling the Arab-Afghan movement inAfghanistan. He is perhaps one of the earliestindividuals to convince Usama Bin Laden of theneed to publicize his movement to globalize hisnetwork and reach among the Arab street. The93-pages detail the early phases of Usama BinLaden’s vision to bring Arabs to the fight againstthe Soviets, and the network he developed thatwould evolve into Al-Qaeda today. This was atime when it was acceptable for Arab jihadiststo be associated with Bin Laden and when Arabregimes all too gladly got rid of violent radicalsby exporting them to the Soviet-Afghan war. It

was hoped they would never come back alive. Like many streetpublications, the dates are unclear and the tactics discussed arenot crisp; there are also no maps that would aid the reader infollowing the engagements of Bin Laden’s group. The datescovered are Bin Laden’s phase where he jetted between SaudiArabia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan from 1980 to 1984, and theyears he settled in Afghanistan more permanently during theSoviet-Afghan War from 1985 to 1989.

Bin Laden’s Gradual Involvement in the Soviet-AfghanWar

According to the book, Bin Laden arrived in the region 17days (January 1980) into the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan butnever made it to Afghanistan. His first foray into the jihadistmovement was to arrive in Lahore, Pakistan, connect with JamiatAl-Islamiyah and through them provide money to the most radicalof the Mujahideen factions led by Gulbudin Hekmetyar andBurhannudin Rabbani. Between 1980 and 1984, he returned toPakistan from Saudi Arabia numerous times and solicitedinformation on whereabouts of Afghan Mujahideen factions tocontribute directly to them. He also formulated his vision between1980 and 1984 of creating his own Arab organization that wouldenable Arabs to directly contribute their services, funds, andthemselves to the Afghan cause. Usama Bin Laden would latchonto a mentor and professor from King Abdul-Aziz University inJeddah, who had established the beginnings of an organizationthat greeted Arabs arriving in Pakistan and enabled them to

PROFESSIONAL FORUM

STREET LITERATURE ON USAMA BIN LADEN PART II:

The Soviet-Afghan Years

experience the jihad in Afghanistan againstthe Soviets. It would offer a counter-cultureexperience for those Arabs wanting toparticipate full-time or part-time in thejihad against the Soviets. Azzam’sguesthouse was also an effectivefundraising tool as it enabled donors tospend vacations at the front. The cleric andprofessor was the Palestinian AbdullahAzzam, who first saw a need to organizeArabs arriving in Pakistan and began byestablishing guesthouses for them inPeshawar that would be called the MaktabAl-Khidmat lil Mujahiddeen (The ServicesOffice for Arab Jihadists). This is theprecursor to Al-Qaeda, the coreorganization from which Bin Laden wouldimprove upon and globalize. Bin Ladenwas brought into this organization by hisprofessor, and his skills proved invaluablein financing and organizing the group.

Bin Laden Reorganizes Azzam’sOrganization

Bin Laden heard many complaints ofinefficiency in Azzam’s organization, andhe began to organize what was essentiallyAzzam’s guesthouse into a structuredorganization, which included a: military committee; administrative committee; travel committee; and training committee.

The travel committee specialized incross-border infiltration of Arab jihadiststhrough the Pakistan-Afghan border. Thebook highlights how Bin Laden spent$25,000 alone on jihadist literature,propaganda, books, and papers. Why thebook highlights only this particular expenseis unclear, but it demonstrates theimportance the organization places onpropaganda. By 1985, Usama Bin Ladenhad become a permanent resident ofMaktab Al-Khidmat in Peshawar, and from1985 to 1986 he began importingearthmoving equipment and engineers fromthe family construction firm intoAfghanistan. He selected the mountainstronghold of Jaji to be an area from wherehe would lead Arabs in a separate brigadeto attack the Soviets and Afghan communistforces or to supplement the two of theMujahideen factions under Rabbani orHekmetyar. The book discusses that Bin

Laden not only constructed trenches,tunnels and defensive fortifications, butmore importantly he taught his followershow to operate and construct thesefortifications.

Interview Between the Author andBin Laden on Forming Massadah Al-Ansar

The author interviewed Bin Laden inJeddah, and he articulates how when he wasin his final years of studies he felt remissas an Arab and Muslim about his dutytowards the Afghans, noting how theRussians helped the Afghan communistsand Muslims around the world were doingnothing. He tells the author that when hevisited Afghanstan, he noted that theMujahideen felt bolstered and empoweredby the presence of Arabs in their midst. Inthe early months of the Soviet invasion,they treated Arabs as guests and preventedArabs from fighting alongside them. In1984, he asked permission from IttihadIslami Mujahideen to bring more Arabs intoAfghanistan and create additional safehouses for them, as well as training camps.

According to the book, the formation ofBin Laden’s Massadah Al-Ansar (The LionDen of the Companions) was a gradualprocess and represents a historic momentin the Arab jihadist movement. It unifieda global network of like-minded violentIslamist radicals who shared the sameworld views; these views included that Arabregimes:

Were to be violently opposed;Oppressed their people;Wrecked and stifled Islamic

scholarship; andImported alien ideologies.

The arrival of Arab jihadists inAfghanistan was the first step andmigration from these Arab nations whorode the wave of Marxism, Baathism, ArabNationalism and capitalism and havefailed. It would be a physical declarationof independence, and the majority ofMassadah Al-Ansar members were initiallySaudia, according to the book and theauthor who interviewed Bin Laden .

One hundred Arab jihadists joined in thesummer of 1984, but by the winter thenumber dropped to a dozen. Bin Ladentells the author that these young Arabs did


not appreciate the importance of this frontand the necessity of killing infidels so thatGod’s word reigned supreme. The dozenwho remained were mostly from the Saudicity of Medina. Bin Laden seeks legitimacythrough symbols and Medina is the citywhere the Prophet Muhammad is buriedand home to the first Islamic societyestablished in the early seventh century AD.According to the book, Bin Laden spent1985 to 1987 tunneling, building, trainingand recruiting those committed to fightingthe Soviets. He built Massadah Al-Ansarin the mountains of Jaji and acquired thename from a poem written by ProphetMuhammad’s companion. An interestingtactical note is that an Afghan commander(named Abdul-Sameeah) ignored BinLaden’s advice to winter over at Jaji,considering it folly and a waste ofmanpower. The Afghan tribes wouldtypically winter over in villages and not inthe mountains. It seems Bin Laden andhis dozen insisted they winter over in Jaji,and this may explain why only a dozenArabs remained with him at that location.

Tactical Trial and Error, Accordingto Bin Laden and His Associates

Abdul-Rassul Sayyaf ordered a first trialof the Massadah Al-Ansar-trained Arabunit in Ramadan 1986, granting the unitpermission to fight in the Battle of Khost.It is important to pause and understand thatKhost, which is located on the Afghan-Pakistan border in Afghanistan’ssoutheastern end, would be assaulted byMujahideen forces numerous times. It wasan easy target as supply lines from Pakistanwere virtually guaranteed. The bookdiscusses an assault conducted in 1986when the Arabs probed around a staticcommunist troop defense. One hundredand twenty Arab fighters were divided intotwo groups:

(1) Advanced fighters and(2) Support or reserve forces.At 1800 the Arabs assaulted objective

Umm Khanadaq (mother of ditches); 40meters from entrenched communistdefenses around the city of Khost. Theirassault would be a complete failureaccording to the book, as the Arabs beganwith an ineffective mortar and artillerybarrage that only heightened Soviet militaryawareness. Then the barrage ceased and the

Arabs assaulted, providing a pre-warning of when and from whichdirection the attack would come. The Afghan communist forceson watch let loose with the World War II Goruynov 7.62mmmachine guns and suppressed the Arab assault. Bin Laden orderedwithdrawal, and Afghan commanders felt their performance onlyreaffirmed their belief that Arabs could not fight. From the Battleof Khost, Bin Laden learned many lessons on training andpreparation, exploitation of artillery by assault forces,reconnaissance, that assaulting a larger force directly was folly,and the value of larger firepower to suppress an assault.

One year after the Battle of Khost, a system was set up whereyoung Arab volunteers would arrive in Peshawar and be taken toJalalabad for two months training. Bin Laden hoped his MassadahAl-Ansar would offer additional training opportunities, but he hadno experience in setting up training schedules. Coupled with thepressure of young Arabs wanting to immediately face Soviet forces,Bin Laden stressed that training and patience to maximize damageto the adversary was what they most needed. The book talks aboutthe difficulty in reigning in young, inexperienced Arabs whowanted their first taste of battle. Seven months in 1987 werespent fortifying Jaji. Shelters were constructed, tunneling occurred,and to appease the eager young Arabs, he authorized small raidingoperations that only garnered the attention of the Soviets. Bythen, Massadah Al-Ansar has been composed of a command andcontrol room they called the Badr Center (after Islam’s first Battlein the plains of Badr), a room for anti-air weapons was constructed,storage room for food, an armory, a guestroom and a kitchen. BinLaden made another tactical blunder by ordering an assault onSoviet forces operating in Jaji without completing the tunnels anddefenses at Massadah. Aside from incomplete construction, healso did not have enough weapons and ammunition for every Arabfighter in Jaji, as everything had to be brought up the mountainby pack mule.

The first real trial occurred during Ramadan 1987, when theSoviets and Arab jihadists in Jaji each planned different campaignson one another. The Soviets and Afghan government forcesplanned a three-week campaign to annihilate the Jaji camp with ascorched earth policy of villages surrounding the camp and closureof the Jaji passes to Mujahideen forces. Ten thousand Soviet andAfghan communist troops were amassed with three Soviet brigadesand one Soviet Spetnaz (Special Forces) brigade. The Sovietsstruck first with aerial bombardments of Massadah Al-Ansarlasting nine days. Like during the Battle of Khost, Bin Laden’sleaders divided his force into advanced fighters and support forces.The advanced fighters were then divided into two groups: oneprotected Massadah Al-Ansar and fired surface-to-surface missiles,and the second was an assault force under the command of AbuKhalid Al-Masri. Bin Laden ordered the support force(those with the least training) to guard therear of the tunnels, and he sentan experiencedjihadist fighterwith them.

After theSoviet aerialbombardment ,

the Soviet offensive began with communist tanks on the lowerside of the mountain approaching on an incline. Bin Laden andthe jihadists used communications to concentrate fire on individualtanks, the signal of three bursts of fire (from which weapon isunclear) meant the Arab unit was surrounded and needed aid.The book highlights Arab jihadist and Mujahideen use of wirelessphones to let Bin Laden’s group know of the approach of Spetnazforces. According to the book, Bin Laden used a concentratedfire of 35 rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to repel the Sovietspecial forces assault.

The Arab jihadists, who now numbered under 100, beganacquiring real tactical field experience such as distinguishingbetween the Kalakov assault rifles carried by Soviet special forcesand the Kalashnikovs given to Afghan communist regulars. TheBattle of Jaji also provided a lesson in Soviet field tactics; theydid not advance while calling in artillery on Arab positions andwere typically no more than 200 meters entrenched from wherethe artillery landed. Once the Soviet artillery stopped, they wouldthen advance. Bin Laden also noted that transmitting a Spetnazbody count seemed to stiffen Arab resistance and boost morale.The book criticizes Soviet tactical performance saying they: Did not practice good field discipline and stealth maneuver; Constantly broke radio silence; and Rustled through scrub and brush giving away their positions

and allowing Arabs to regroup for an ambush.The Arabs who trained at Massadah noted that in a defensive

war the Soviets were at a severe disadvantage because their groundforces were not as aware of the contours of the terrain. This wasan era before extensive use of GPS mapping, and it seems theSoviets did not conduct much aerial reconnaissance before a majorassault. One thing is clear about the Battle of Jaji (which wasalso called the Battle for Massadah Al-Ansar by the jihadists) isthat the Arabs began taking note of the tactical capabilities oftheir adversary.

The Battle for JalalabadIn many ways this battle would be prophetic in the way 21st

century conflicts would evolve. This was the first urban warinvolving the Arab-Afghans. By then the book boasts that BinLaden has established 18 Massadah Al-Ansar training centers.(This could be an exaggeration, as pre-9/11 showed no more thanfive training camps.) What is clear is that Bin Laden’s groupdeveloped and acquired: Increased training centers, More rifles, rockets and RPGs,

Medical evacuation system fromAfghanistan to hospitals in Saudi Arabia,

More trained artillerymenand mortarmen, Skill in

using maps toland artillery and mortars on target

and develop kill zones, A potent infusion of comms and trucks


PROFESSIONAL FORUM

to maneuver irregular troops around thebattle zone, and Captured weapons up to tanks were

used to train jihadists on new systems.The Soviets conducted a July 1987

assault on Jalalabad focusing on theneutralization of not only a Mujahideenstronghold, but a home for Arab jihadistslike Bin Laden. Weapons caches pepperedthe city itself and outlying villages, and theSoviets encountered stiff resistance. Thefirst indication of trouble for the Sovietswas that the Arab and Afghan Mujahideenforces maintained a 72-hour constantbarrage of mortar and artillery exchanges.Soviet tactical aircraft encountered anti-airguns and there was a saturation of rocketsfrom multiple rocket launchers. The onlytank under Arab control was a single T-62tank used to guard one of the main roadsto Jalalabad leading to the airport. Bythe admission of this mythologizedversion of Bin Laden’s battles inAfghanistan, the tank deployment wasuseless in stemming the approach of theSoviets and Afghan communist regulars.Bin Laden and his forces withdrew intostructures and ambushed Soviet armorwith 75mm and 82mm anti-tank guns,RPGs at a range of 300 meters, and Milananti-tank missiles. They destroyed twocommunist tanks, and 42 tanks werecaptured. The Arabs were provided six ofthose tanks, and former Egyptian armysoldiers (Egypt has a mandatory draft ofall male citizens) who had trained in armorwere able to operate and then train othersin the operation and repair of the T-62 tank.In the end, the Mujahideen forces werepushed out of the center of Jalalabad but ata tremendous cost. Yet in Al-Qaeda lore,this is a major psychological victory.

What Bin Laden ConsidersLessons of the Massadah Al-AnsarCampaigns?

(I) The concept of Arab fighters inAfghanistan evolved from guesthouses tomilitary training camps to militaryformations. One can expect this to be themodel of how Islamist militant groups whotake control of a neighborhood or stateoperate. Convert military training campsinto military formations to exert dominanceover society and bring a constant state ofconflict with adversaries.


(II) Arab jihadist youths must bespiritually, mentally, and physicallytrained and oriented for j ihadistoperations. This clearly indicates BinLaden as a patient and calculatingtactician, who believes in acquiring aqualitative edge in operatives and fightersto achieve his objectives.

(III) Training and lessons learnedshould be derived from each contact withthe enemy. From the Soviet-Afghan War,Al-Qaeda learned lessons on ever-changing tactics and the need to learnfrom failed operations. U.S. forces andlaw enforcement must remain vigilant fornew techniques and attempts to improveupon failed operations.

(IV) There should be adequate timeallocated for a qualitative trainingprogram. Keeping Bin Laden fromestablishing a base of control as well asAl-Qaeda-like organizations fromestablishing a geographical permanencemeans a drop in the quality of fightersand suicide operatives. An objective forthe United States is to deprive theseIslamist militant organizations anyopportunity to establish a presence fromwhere to develop quality trainingregimens.

(V) Soviet airborne and special forcesmust be dealt with using the tactic ofharassment, withdrawal, and ambush.

(VI) The Battle of Jalalabad (urbandefensive battle) taught the need foractive reconnaissance of approachingSoviet forces, marking known resupplyand escape routes in and out of the city,and to utilize the fluid and flexible tacticslearned in mountain fighting in the urbansetting.

(VII) The profile of the jihadist AliAl-Hazlan shows a Saudi who went from

Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein is a Navy Medical Service Corps officer whohas been on special detail in the Washington, D.C.,area. From 2002 to 2006 he was Middle East PolicyAdvisor at the Office of the Secretary of Defensefor International Security Affairs. He currentlyserves as a Counter-Terrorism Analyst. He hashighlighted many Arabic books of military interestin the pages of U.S. Army professional journals.Aboul-Enein delivers a popular three-hour lectureon the evolution of Islamist Militant Ideology fromthe 7th century to the present to military audiencesaround the country. He wishes to thank the JohnT. Hughes and Georgetown University librariansfor making this street literature available for studyand the readers of Infantry Magazine who contactedhim asking for more assessments of Bin Ladenbiographies written in Arabic.

discos and the luxuries of the PersianGulf lifestyle to guilt over sin and thento jihad to expunge those sins.Operatives can go from discos to jihadand back again if tactically necessary.

ConclusionThere is much mythology surrounding

Bin Laden both in Arabic and English.This adversary and the legacy he leavesbehind once he is neutralized are muchtoo important to ignore. While preparingthis review essay, questions surroundingBin Laden’s death or illness once againpermeated the national media. Thebooklet contained a collection of photos,one of which shows Bin Laden receivingwhat the book calls glucose treatments.The book goes on to describe only twophysical ailments he suffers from: one islow blood pressure, and the second issevere lower back pain that necessitatesthat he lie down for extended periods torelieve back pressure. There is noindication of any other physical ailments.

Studying this street biography andothers of Bin Laden’s early days in theSoviet-Afghan War provide a baseline bywhich one can begin to detect advancesin strategy, tactics, and war fightingtechniques of the Arab-Afghanmovement. It is vital that such Arabicworks written by Bin Laden sympathizersbe translated, analyzed, and rationalized forfuture American military leaders who willbe combating the Al-Qaeda movement fordecades to come.

Studying this streetbiography and others of Bin

Laden’s early days in theSoviet-Afghan War provide abaseline by which one canbegin to detect advances in

strategy, tactics, and warfighting techniques of theArab-Afghan movement.


Not long after the U.S. Army’s entry into Afghanistan,reports from the field began to surface that in closequarters engagements, some Soldiers were experiencing

multiple “through-and-through” hits on an enemy combatantwhere the target continued to fight. Similar reports arose followingthe invasion of Iraq in 2003. Those reports were not alwaysconsistent – some units would report a “through-and-through”problem, while others expressed nothing but confidence in theperformance of their M4 carbines or M16 rifles. The M249 SquadAutomatic Weapon, which fires identical bullets as the M4 andM16, did not receive the same criticism. Often, mixed reports ofperformance would come from the same unit. While many of thereports could be dismissed due to inexperience or hazy recollectionsunder the stress of combat, there were enough of them fromexperienced warfighters that the U.S. Army Infantry Center askedthe Army’s engineering community to examine the issue.Specifically, the Infantry Center asked it to examine the reports of“through-and-through” wounds, determine if there was anexplanation, and assess commercially available ammunition todetermine if there was a “drop in” replacement for the standardissue 5.56mm M855 Ball rounds that might provide improvedperformance in close quarters battle (CQB).

What resulted grew into a lengthy, highly technical, and highlydetailed study of rifle and ammunition performance at closequarters ranges that involved technical agencies from within theArmy, Navy, and Department of Homeland Security; medicaldoctors, wound ballisticians, physicists, engineers from both thegovernment and private sector; and user representatives from theArmy, U.S. Marines Corps, and U.S. Special OperationsCommand.

After having made some significant contributions to the science

MAJOR GLENN DEANMAJOR DAVID LAFONTAINE

of woundsballistics effects and

ammunition performanceassessment, this Joint Services

Wound Ballistics (JSWB) IntegratedProduct Team (IPT) was eventually able to conclude that: (1) therewere no commercially available 5.56mm solutions that provideda measurable increase in CQB performance over fielded militaryammunition, (2) the reports from the field could be explained andsupported with sound scientific evidence, and (3) there are stepsthat can be taken to immediately impact performance of smallarms at close quarters ranges.

BackgroundDevelopment of small caliber ammunition is an area which in

recent years has largely been left to the manufacturers of the civilianfirearms industry. Although there have been efforts by the military

S S S S SMALLMALLMALLMALLMALL C C C C CALIBERALIBERALIBERALIBERALIBER L L L L LETHALITYETHALITYETHALITYETHALITYETHALITY:::::5.56MM PERFORMANCE INCLOSE QUARTERS BATTLE

services to assessthe performance of

its small arms, thelevels of effort and resources

involved have been extremelylow compared to those spent on

other weapons systems: burstingartillery rounds, anti-tank munitions, etc.The general assumption within the services,despite evidence to the contrary from thelarger wound ballistics community, hasbeen that small arms performance was arelatively simple, well-defined subject.What has developed in the interim in the

ammunition industryis a number of

assessment techniquesand measurements

that are at bestunreliable and inthe end are able toprovide onlyrough correlation

to actual battlefieldperformance.

The majorproblem occurs at the

very beginning: What iseffectiveness? As it turns out,

that simple question requires a verycomplex answer. For the Soldier in combat,effectiveness equals death: the desire tohave every round fired result in the deathof the opposing combatant, the so-called“one-shot drop.” However, death — orlethality — is not always necessary toachieve a military objective; an enemycombatant who is no longer willing or able


to perform ameaningful military taskmay be as good as dead under mostcircumstances. Some equate effectivenesswith “stopping power,” a nebulous termthat can mean anything from physicallyknocking the target down to causing thetarget to immediately stop any threateningaction. Others may measure effectivenessas foot-pounds of energy delivered to thetarget — by calculating the mass andimpact velocity of the round — withoutconsidering what amount of energy isexpended in the target or what specificdamage occurs to the target. In the end,“foot-pounds of energy” is misleading,“stopping power” is a myth, and the “one-shot drop” is a rare possibility dependentmore on the statistics of hit placement thanweapon and ammunition selection.Effectiveness ultimately equates to thepotential of the weapons system toeliminate its target as a militarily relevantthreat.

The human body is a very complex target, one that has a numberof built-in mechanisms that allow it to absorb damage and continueto function. Compared to a tank, it is far more difficult to predicta human target’s composition and what bullet design will be mostadvantageous. The combinations of muscle, bone, organs, skin,fat, and clothing create a staggering number of target types whichoften require different lethal mechanisms. Physical conditioning,psychological state, size, weight, and body form all play a factorin the body’s ability to resist damage, and all add to the complexityof the problem. The same bullet fired against a large, thick, well-conditioned person has a very different reaction than that firedagainst a thin, malnourished opponent.

The physical mechanisms for incapacitation — causing thebody to no longer be able to perform a task — ultimately boildown to only two: destruction of central nervous system tissue sothat the body can no longer control function, or reduction in abilityto function over time through blood loss. The closest things thehuman body has to an “off switch” are the brain, brain stem, andupper spinal cord, which are small and well-protected targets.Even a heart shot allows a person to function for a period of timebefore finally succumbing to blood loss. What the wound ballisticscommunity at large has long known is that the effectiveness of a

round of ammunition is directly related to the location, volume,and severity of tissue damage. In other words, a well-placed .22caliber round can be far more lethal than a poorly placed .50 calibermachine gun round. Setting shot placement aside for the moment,though, the challenge becomes assessing the potential of a givenround of ammunition to cause the needed volume and severity oftissue damage, and then relating this back to performance againsta human target.

Terminal Ballistic TestingA common way of measuring this “damage potential,” or

“terminal ballistic effectiveness,” is through what are known as“static” testing methods. Typically, these involve firing a weaponat a tissue simulant which is dissected after the shot to allowassessment of the damage caused by the bullet. Tissue simulantscan be anything from beef roasts to blocks of clay to wet phonebooks, but the typical stimulant is ballistic gelatin. Gelatin hasthe advantage of being uniform in property, relatively cheap tomake, and simple to process, which means that this form of statictesting can be done almost anywhere without the need for specialfacilities. Unlike other simulants, gelatin is transparent. Therefore,assessment can take the form of video footage of a given shot,


Figure 1 — Original study ammunition configurations (Source: ARDEC)

measurement of the cavity formedin the gelatin (“gel”) block, andrecovery of the bullet or itsfragments for analysis. Staticmethods measure real damage ingel, but have difficulty translatingthat damage to results in humantissue.

When the Infantry Centerinitially asked its questions about5.56mm performance, two agenciesmoved quickly to provide an answerthrough static testing, firing a smallnumber of shots against gel blocksto compare several bullet types.Unfortunately, tests at the NavalSurface Warfare Center at Crane,Ind., (NSWC-Crane) and theArmy’s Armaments Research,Development, and Engineering Center(ARDEC) at Picatinny Arsenal, N.J.,produced significantly different results.Further analysis revealed that the twoagencies had different test protocols thatmade the results virtually impossible tocompare — and as it turns out, these testmethods were not standardized across theentire ballistics community. The JSWB IPTbegan work to standardize test protocolsamong the participating agencies to allowresults to be compared. Unfortunately, afterthat work had been completed and staticfirings of a wide range of calibers andconfigurations of ammunition were underway (see Figure 1), the IPT discovered thatresults were still not consistent. Despiteusing the same gel formulation, procedures,the same lots of ammunition, and in somecases the same weapons, the static testingresults still had differences that could notinitially be explained.

The IPT was ultimately able todetermine a reason for the differences. TheArmy Research Laboratory (ARL) atAberdeen Proving Ground, Md., has longused a type of testing know as “dynamic”methods to evaluate ammunitionperformance, which estimate probablelevels of incapacitation in human targets.Dynamic methods are resource intensive —the ARL measures the performance of theprojectile in flight prior to impacting thetarget as well as performance of theprojectile in the target. ARL was able toidentify inconsistencies in bullet flight thatexplained the differences in the statictesting results. Ultimately, the best featuresof both static and dynamic testing methods


were combined into a new “Static/Dynamic” method that is able to muchbetter assess weapon and ammunitionperformance. This method takes intoaccount a range of parameters from the timethe bullet leaves the muzzle, to its impacton the gel block target, its actions once inthe target, and then uses a dynamic analysistool to correlate the gel block damage todamage in a virtual human target. Itprovides a complete “shooter-to-target”solution that combines both live fire andsimulated testing, but is very time andresource-intensive to perform. As a result,the study effort narrowed, focusing onproviding complete analysis of the mostpromising 5.56mm systems, and onereference 7.62mm system, needed to answerthe original question (see Figure 2).

Terminal MechanicsBefore providing an explanation of the

JSWB IPT’s results, a brief discussion ofsmall caliber, high velocity terminalballistics is in order. The small caliber, highvelocity bullets fired by military assaultrifles and machine guns have distinctlethality mechanisms; conclusions providedhere do not necessarily apply to low velocitypistol rounds, for example, which havedifferent damage mechanisms. Theperformance of the bullet once it strikes thetarget is also very much dependent uponthe bullet’s material and construction aswell as the target: a bullet passing throughthick clothing or body armor will performdifferently than a bullet striking exposedflesh. This study focused on frontal exposedtargets.

Take an average M855 round, thestandard round of “green-tip” rifleammunition used by U.S. forces inboth the M4 and M16 seriesweapons and in the M249 SAW. The62-grain projectile has an exteriorcopper jacket, a lead core, and acenter steel penetrator designed topunch through steel or body armor.An M16 launches the M855 atroughly 3,050 feet per second, andthe M855 follows a ballistictrajectory to its target, rotating aboutits axis the entire way, and graduallyslowing down. Eventually, the bulletslows enough that it becomesunstable and wanders from its flightpath, though this does not typicallyhappen within the primary ranges of

rifle engagements (0-600m). (For moredetailed ballistic discussion, see FM 3-22.9).

Upon impacting the target, the bulletpenetrates tissue and begins to slow. Somedistance into the target, the tissue actingon the bullet also causes the bullet to rotateerratically or yaw; the location and amountof yaw depend upon speed of the bullet atimpact, angle of impact, and density of thetissue. If the bullet is moving fast enough,it may also begin to break up, with piecesspreading away from the main path of thebullet to damage other tissue. If the targetis thick enough, all of these fragments maycome to rest in the target, or they may exitthe target. Meanwhile, the impacted tissuerebounds away from the path of the bullet,creating what is known as a “temporarycavity.” Some of the tissue is smashed ortorn by the bullet itself, or its fragments;some expands too far and tears. Thetemporary cavity eventually rebounds,leaving behind the torn tissue in the woundtrack — the “permanent cavity.” It is thispermanent cavity that is most significant,as it represents the damaged tissue that canimpair and eventually kill the target,provided, of course, that the damaged tissueis actually some place on the body that iscritical.

This is where the balance of factors inbullet design becomes important. Volumeof tissue damage is important — whichmight suggest high velocities to enable thebullet to tumble and fragment sooner,materials that cause the bullet to break upsooner, etc. — but it must also occur incritical tissue. If the bullet immediately

Ammunition GivenFull Static/Dynamic

CQB Analysis

M855 “Green Tip”(62-gr.) M995 AP (52-gr.) M193 (55-gr.) Mk 262 (77-gr.) COTS (62-gr.) COTS (69-gr.) COTS (86-gr.) COTS (100-gr.) M80 7.62 (150-gr.)

Weapons Tested toAnswer the Problem

Statement:

M16A1 M4 M16A2/A4 Mk 18 CQBR (10”

M4) M14

Figure 2 — Final analysis systems(Source: PM-Maneuver Ammunition Systems)

breaks up, it may not penetrate through outer garments to reachtissue, or it may break up in muscle without reaching vital organsunderneath. The projectile must have enough penetration to beable to reach vital organs to cause them damage. At the sametime, it must not have so much penetrating capability that it passescompletely through the target without significant damage —resulting in a so-called “through-and-through.” Energy expendedoutside the target is useless (incidentally, this is why “impactenergy” is a poor measure of bullet comparison, as it does notseparate energy expended in damaging the target from energy lostbeyond the target). The ideal bullet would have enough energy topenetrate through any intervening barrier to reach vital organswithout significantly slowing, then dump all of its energy intodamaging vital organs without exiting the body. Unfortunately,design of such a bullet is nearly impossible in a military round,even if all human bodies were uniform enough to allow for such athing. A round that reaches the vital organs of a 5-foot 6-inch140-pound target without over-penetration is likely to reactdifferently against a 6-foot 2-inch 220-pounder, even withoutconsidering target posture. To complicate matters, when hitting aprone firing target the bullet might have to pass through a forearm,exit, enter the shoulder, then proceed down the trunk beforestriking heart or spinal cord. A flanking hit would engage thesame target through or between the ribs to strike the same vitalregions. All these possibilities are encountered with the sameammunition. Ultimately, bullet design is a series of tradeoffscomplicated by the need to survive launch, arrive at the targetaccurately, possibly penetrate armor, glass, or other barriers, andbe producible in large quantities (1+ billion per year) at costs themilitary can afford.

FindingsThe significant findings of the JSWB IPT’s efforts include:

1. No commercially available alternativesperform measurably better than existingammunition at close quarters battle rangesfor exposed frontal targets. Based oncurrent analysis through the static/dynamicframework, all of the rounds assessedperformed similarly at the ranges of 0-50meters. Though there might be differencesfor a single given shot, the tradeoffs ofdelivery accuracy, penetration,fragmentation and wound damage behavior,and speed and efficiency of energy depositall serve to render differences betweenrounds minimal. The following chart(Figure 3) shows the rounds of interestplotted together. The specific values of thechart are not meaningful; what ismeaningful is the fact that all of the roundsact in the same band of performance.Interestingly, the one 7.62mm round thatreceived the full evaluation, the M80 firedfrom the M14 rifle, performed in the sameband of performance, which would indicatethat for M80 ammunition at least thereappears to be no benefit to the larger caliber

at close quarters range.2. Shot placement trumps all other variables; expectation

management is key. Though this should produce a “well, duh!”response from the experienced warfighter, it cannot be emphasizedenough. We try hard to inculcate a “one-shot, one-kill” mentalityinto Soldiers.

When they go to the qualification range, if they hit the targetanywhere on the E-type silhouette, the target drops. The reality isthat all hits are not created equal — there is a very narrow areawhere the human body is vulnerable to a single shot if immediateincapacitation is expected. Hits to the center mass of the torsomay eventually cause incapacitation as the target bleeds out, butthis process takes time, during which a motivated target willcontinue to fight. While projectile design can make a good hitmore effective, a hit to a critical area is still required; this fact isborne out by the Medal of Honor citations of numerous American

Figure 3 — System effectiveness for studied rounds(Source: PM MAS)

Figure 4 — Bullet Yaw vs. Path of Flight


Soldiers who continued to fight despitebeing hit by German 7.92mm, Japanese6.5mm and 7.7mm, or Chinese orVietnamese 7.62mm rounds. A morerealistic mantra might be “One well-placedshot, one-kill.”

3. Field reports are accurate and can beexplained by the phenomenon of bullet yaw.Shot placement aside, why is it that someSoldiers report “through-and-through” hitswhile others report no such problems,despite using the same weapons andammunition? The phenomenon of bulletyaw can explain such differences inperformance.

Yaw is the angle the centerline of thebullet makes to its flight path as theprojectile travels down range (Figure 4).Although the bullet spins on its axis as aresult of the barrel’s rifling, that axis is alsowobbling slightly about the bullet’s flightpath.

Yaw is not instabili ty; i t occursnaturally in all spin-stabilized projectiles.However, bullet yaw is not constant andrifle bullets display three regions ofsignificantly different yaw (see Figure 5).Close to the muzzle, the bullet’s yawcycles rapidly, with large changes ofangle in very short distances (severaldegrees within 1-2 meters range).Eventually, the yaw dampens out and thebullet travels at a more-or-less constantyaw angle for the majority of its effectiverange. Then, as the bullet slows, it beginsto yaw at greater and greater angles, untilit ultimately destabilizes. A spinning topwhich wobbles slightly when started, thenstabilizes for a time, then ultimately

wobbles wide and falls over demonstratesthe same phenomenon.

Unfortunately, projectiles impacting atdifferent yaw angles can havesignificantly different performance,

particularly as the projectile slows down.Consider the two photos on page ??. In thefirst (Figure 6), the bullet impacted atalmost zero yaw. It penetrated deeply intothe gel block before becoming unstable. Ina human target, it is very likely that thisround would go straight through withoutdisruption — just as our troops havewitnessed in the field. In the second photo(Figure 7), the bullet impacted the gel blockat a relatively high yaw angle. It almostimmediately destabilized and began tobreak, resulting in large temporary andpermanent wound cavities. Our troops havewitnessed this in action too; they are morelikely to report that their weapons wereeffective.

So all we have to do is fire high-yawammunition, right? Unfortunately, it’s notthat easy. High yaw may be good againstsoft tissue but low yaw is needed forpenetration — through clothing, bodyarmor, car doors, etc. — and we needammunition that works against it all.

Figure 5 — Overview of Bullet Yaw (Source: ARL)


Figure 7 — High yaw impact (Source: ARDEC)

Figure 6 — Low yaw impact (Source: ARDEC)


Further, we currently cannot control yawwithin a single type of ammunition, andall ammunition displays this tendency tosome degree. Both of the shots were twoback-to-back rounds fired from the samerifle, the same lot of ammunition, at thesame range, under the same conditions.Yaw requires more study, but the Armysolved a similar problem years ago in tankammunition.

4. There are doctrinal and trainingtechniques that can increase Soldiereffectiveness. The analysis tools used inthis study were used to evaluate somealternative engagement techniques. Thetechnique of engaging CQB targets withcontrolled pairs — two aimed, rapid shotsas described in Chapter 7 of FM 3-22.9— was shown to be significantly betterthan single aimed shots (see Figure 8).While that should certainly not besurprising to those who have been using

this technique for some time, we nowknow why. Not only are two hits

better than one, but controlledpairs help to average outstriking yaw; on average, theSoldier is more likely to see ahit where the bullet’s yawbehavior works in his favor.

CaveatsThis study was an

extremely detailed, in-depth analysis of a

specific engagement(5.56mm at CQB

range); we must becareful not to

apply thel e s s o n slearned out

of context.The study did

not look at theeffectiveness ofammunition at

longer ranges,where differences

in projectile mass,velocity, and

composition may havegreater effect. The target

set for this analysis was anunarmored, frontal

standing target; againsttargets in body armor, or

crouching/prone targets, the

Figure 8 — Improvement in performance due to controlled pairs(Source: ARL)

Major Glenn Dean served as the chief of the Small Arms Division in theDirectorate of Combat Developments at the U.S. Army Infantry Center atFort Benning, Georgia. He was the Infantry Center’s representative to theJoint Services Wound Ballistics Integrated Product Team.

Major David LaFontaine is the Assistant Product Manager for SmallCaliber Ammunition and served as the PM-Maneuver Ammunition Systemslead for the Joint Services Wound Ballistics IPT.

results may be different. Of course, most targets on the modernbattlefield can be expected to be engaged in some form of complexposture (moving, crouching, or behind cover) and future analysiswill have to look at such targets, too. The study evaluated readilyavailable commercial ammunition; this does not rule out the possibilitythat ammunition could be designed to perform significantly betterin a CQB environment. Human damage models need furtherrefinement to move beyond gelatin and more closely replicate thecomplex human anatomy. While these caveats should not detractfrom the importance of the study’s findings, they should beconsidered as a starting point for continued analysis.

ConclusionSoldiers and leaders everywhere should take heart from the

fact that despite all the myth and superstition surrounding theirrifles and ammunition, they are still being provided the bestperforming weapons and ammunition available while thearmaments community works to develop something even better.

More work remains to be done in this area, and the work iscontinuing with the participation of the major organizations fromthe original study. That effort is planned to look at longer ranges,intermediate barriers, and different target postures, and will furtherrefine the tools and methods developed in the original study. Thelessons learned are being put to immediate use as part of anongoing program to develop a lead-free replacement for the M855cartridge; the information obtained from this study will be usedto develop a round that is expected to be more precise and consistentin its performance while still being affordable.

Editor’s Note: Given the unique nature of mountainoperations and the Mujahideen actions against Soviet andDemocratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) ground forces, wehave selected three operations from The Other Side of theMountain, by Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, that illustratean ambush, a shelling attack and its consequences, and a miningattack using improvised explosive devices. These three actionsare noteworthy because they discuss tactics commonly used bythe insurgents, and because they all include mistakes that eithercaused the operation to fail or resulted in higher casualties oneither side.

AMBUSH AT QAFUS TANGAYBy Major Sher Aqa KochayOn August 13, 1985, my 40-man Mujahideen force moved from

its base at Sewak (20 kilometers southeast of Kabul) to establishan ambush at the Qafus Tangay (some 25 kilometers east of Kabul).The area was protected by a Sarandoy (Internal Ministry Forces)regiment. This area was previously protected by tribal militia, butexactly one year prior, the local tribal militia of Hasan KhanKarokhel defected to the Mujahideen. Hence, the regimentdeployed east of Kabul between Gazak and Sarobi to protect thepower lines supplying electricity from Naghlu and Sarobihydroelectric dams to Kabul. The regiment’s headquarters was atSur Kandow and its forces were deployed along the Butkhak-Sarobiroad (the southern east-west road on the map) in security posts.(Map 16a — Qafus 1).

Each day, the regiment sent truck convoys with supplies from


THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN

Lessons from the Soviet-Afghan Warheadquarters to the battalions. In turn, battalions sent trucks tomake deliveries to all their highway outposts. About two kilometersfrom the DRA Mulla Omar base, the road cuts across the mouth of anarrow valley called Qafus Tangay. Qafus Tangay begins at the Khak-e Jabar pass in the south and stretches north to the Gazak-Sarobiroad. The valley offered a concealed approach from the Mujahideenbases in Khord Kabul in the south. The road at the mouth of thevalley passes through difficult terrain forcing the traffic to move veryslowly. This was a favorable point for an ambush.

I moved my detachment at night reaching the ambush site earlyin the morning of August 13. My group was armed with four RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launchers, several light machine guns andKalishnikov automatic rifles. I grouped my men into three teams.I positioned a 10-man party with the four RPG-7s at the bottom ofthe valley near the road. I positioned two 15-man teams on eachof the ridges on the two sides of the valley that dominated theroad to the north. Both of the flank groups had PK machine guns.(Map 16b — Qafus 2)

The plan was to wait until the enemy’s supply vehicles arrivedat the difficult stretch of road directly facing the Qafus TangayValley. I planned to assign targets to the RPGs as the trucks movedinto the kill zone (for example number one, fire at the lead truck).I hoped to engage four trucks simultaneously, maximizing surpriseand fire power. The teams on the ridges were to cover the valleywith interlocking fields of fire and to support the withdrawal ofthe RPG teams while repelling any enemy infantry. They wouldalso seize prisoners and carry off captured weapons and suppliesonce they had destroyed the enemy convoy.

Finally, the group heard a vehicleapproaching from the east. Soon an enemyjeep appeared around a bend in the road.As the jeep slowly moved over the rockyroad to the ambush site, a machine gunneron the ridge suddenly opened fire at thevehicle.

I was extremely upset because theambush had been compromised and orderedone RPG-7 gunner to kill the jeep before itescaped. A few seconds later, the vehicle wasin flames and the wounded driver was out ofthe jeep. He was the sole occupant of thevehicle. He was returning from the battalionheadquarters at Lataband where he haddriven the regimental political officer. Wegave him first aid and released him. He wasa conscript soldier from the Panjshir Valleywho had recently been press-ganged intothe military.

The Sarandoy sent out patrols from thenearby Spina Tana and Nu’manak outposts.Because it was too risky to remain at the


ambush site we withdrew through the QafusTangay Valley to our base.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideenambush failed for lack of fire discipline. Theunauthorized initiation of fire compromiseda carefully planned and deftly preparedambush. It was always a challenge forMujahideen commanders to train and controla volunteer force fighting an organizedmilitary power. Further, some Mujahideencommanders ignored certain basic controlmeasures. It is not clear what arrangementsMajor Aqa made to control the fire of theMujahideen deployed on the ridges. Had thecommander assigned sub-group leaders oneach ridge with clear instructions to controlthe fire of the teams the outcome of theambush could have been different.

The ambush also lacked sufficient earlywarning which could communicate thesize, composition and activity ofapproaching convoys. If the commanderhad early warning and a chain of command,he could have anticipated the arrival ofvehicles using something other than sound,determined whether or not to attack thevehicles and gotten his new orders to hismen in a timely manner.

Major Sher Aqa Kochay is a graduateof Afghan Military Academy, Kabul, andreceived training in commando tactics inthe Soviet Union. He served in the 37thCommando Brigade and participated inDRA actions against the Mujahideen inPanjsher Valley. He defected, with a largeamount of weapons, to the Mujahideen in1982 and became a NIFA commander inKabul. He organized a new Mujahideen

base in the Khord Kabul area some 20kilometers southeast of the Afghan capital.

A SHELLING ATTACK TURNS BADBy Mawlawi Shukur YasiniIn the spring of 1981, the Soviets and

DRA were very active in our area. As aresult, we dismantled our permanent basesand changed them to mobile bases scatteredthroughout the area. I intended to launch amajor show of force against the Sovietsusing my mobile bases. I had two mortars— a 60mm and an 82mm. The problemwith the 60mm mortar is that it only has arange of 1,400 meters, so the gunner hasto get close to the target to use it. I also hadtwo DShK machine guns, and five RPG-7s. I kept these heavy weapons at my base

at Gerdab. My men had small arms whichthey kept with them.

On 17 April 1981, I launched a shellingattack against the Soviet 66th SeparateMotorized Rifle Brigade in Samarkhel. Ionly took 42 men with me since we werenot very well equipped and we were notready for a major encounter with superiorforces. Further, Kama District is rightacross the river from the 66th Brigadegarrison and they kept the area underconstant surveillance. I did not want tomove a large group of men through the areaand alert them. To avoid observation, wewent north from Gerdab into the mountainsand then west across the mountains and intoMamakhel Village in the Kama area (Map3-1 — Dargo). We stayed for three nightsin Mamakhel and spent the days in themountains at Dargo China spring — somethree kilometers away. From Mamakhel, wewent to Kama Village where some peoplewere still living — although many peoplehad already emigrated to Pakistan

At Kama, I put my nephew Shahpur incharge and told him to my two mortars and38 men and to go shell the 66th’s camp. Ikept four men with me. The shelling groupleft Kama at dusk. They positioned the82mm mortar on the north side of the riverat the house of Khan-e Mulla at JamaliVillage — since it had the range. Then theycrossed the river at Bela and approachedthe camp through the village of Samarkhel.They occupied positions close to theentrance of the enemy camp. They had theguerrilla mortar (60mm) and the RPGs withthem. They opened fire with the RPGs and


the 60mm mortar from close range at 2200 hours. The 82mmmortar joined in long-range fires onto the sleeping camp. Theshelling attack created chaos. The shelling group fired at intervalsover a two-hour period and then broke contact and withdrew. Iwas in Kama throughout the attack. My men had orders to joinme in the mountains at the Dargo China spring the next day. Iwent to the rendezvous point. I arrived at dawn and they werealready there. Two of my men were missing, since they hadforgotten the 60mm mortar and a video camera and had goneback to retrieve them.

While I was in Kama, informers told me that the enemy wouldlaunch a search and destroy mission in Kama District in five days. Idecided that they would now come sooner since we had shelled them.

I decided that we had to leave the area. At sunrise, I instructedmy men to go deeper into the mountains. I was tired and had acold, so I decided to go back home to Gerdab. However, as I setout, I saw helicopters lifting off from the airport and flying lowover Kama District. I hit the ground and hid. I was alone exceptfor Hail Shahbaz. Other helicopters followed the first two. At firstI thought that the helicopters were enroute to Kunar Province, butthen they started landing troops from two helicopters at Mirji Gholipoint on Derghi Ghar mountain — about a kilometer away. Theyalso landed troops north of Mamakhel on the plain and on GedaroGhunday hill. My men saw the helicopters landing and realizedthat they would be seen if they continued to climb into themountains. So they turned around in the wide canyon and startedback toward me. I was in a ditch between Mirji Gholi and DargoChina and was hidden by the early morning shadow from themountain. As I raised my head, I could make out some 25 Sovietsoldiers along with several people wearing tsadar moving to thesoutheast from the high ground of Mirji Gholi toward GedaroGhunday. I could also see Soviets setting up mortars on top ofGedaro Ghunday. I crawled about 50 meters in the ditch. TheSoviets were facing the sun and I was in the shadow, so theycouldn’t see me. As I crawled, I got rid of heavy things that I had inmy pockets — such as pliers and wads of money. I headed northtoward the mountain ridge. At that point, Zafar and Noor, carryingthe missing 60mm mortar and video camera, walked into the Sovietgroup setting up at Gedaro Ghunday. They were immediately captured.Noor was my cousin. I climbed Derghi Ghar Mountain to try and seewhat was happening. I saw that my men had split. Thirteen werenow back in Dargo China. These 13 men were commanded by Tajahuland the rest, commanded by Shahpur, were going back into themountains. I saw that part of the Soviets were heading toward my 13men. The Soviets began firing flares at the group of 13 to mark theirposition. Helicopter gunships then attacked my men with machine-gun fire. Other Soviets headed down from Derghi Ghar toward them.After the air attack, the Soviets began attacking my 13-man group. Iwas midway between the attacking Soviets and my men — about500 meters away. I looked in my binoculars and saw that anothergroup of Soviets were down in the valley picking up the pliers, firstaid packets and money I had discarded. The group examining mythings looked different than the others and I thought that they wereofficers. I decided that when the helicopters made their nextstrafing run, I would use the noise of their gunfire to hide my fire.When the helicopters made their next gun run, I fired on the groupin the valley and hit one. I then took cover, raised my head, firedand got another one. This drew the Soviets attention and they

opened up on me. Artillery started to fall all around. I ran fromthis position to another position about 100 meters away. I had a“20-shooter” [Czechoslovak M26 light machine gun] and someof my men had “20-shooters.” As I ran to change positions, Iheard firing from “20-shooters” in my group. They were involvedin a heavy fire fight.

I then heard noise from the north and I thought that the Sovietswere coming from that direction as well. But then I saw Shapurand one of men. They were coming for me. Shapur reported thattanks were moving through Kama and had sealed the exits. Theenemy were arresting people throughout Kama. We decided toleave to the north. Earlier, Shapur had sent a messenger to mygroup of 13 telling them to move north. However, they were pinneddown by heavy artillery fire and direct fire. They could not breakcontact and fought to the last man. As we left the area, one of myMujahideen fired an RPG at a helicopter. The helicopter caughtfire and flew off and fell to the ground near Kama where itexploded. I don’t know whether the RPG hit the helicopter orwhether other ground fire got it.

We moved to the village of Ghara Mamakhel, some four hoursinto the mountains, where I met two more of my men. By morning,12 of my people arrived there. I learned the fate of my group of13. The Soviets remained in Kama for two days. Then we returnedto retrieve the bodies of my men. I found the bodies of my 13 menin a group, plus those of Zafar and Noor and five more of mymen. The Soviets had booby-trapped some of the bodies and hadsprinkled chemicals on other bodies which caused them todisintegrate. We couldn’t evacuate these bodies. So we built gravesover them. Their bodies are still there under stones. I do not knowwhat the Soviet casualties were, but I do know I shot two, wedowned a helicopter and the Soviets lost three vehicles to ourmines during this action.

Throughout the war, I faced the Soviets like this during sevensweeps. I moved the families of the martyrs to refugee camps inPeshwar, Pakistan, since we couldn’t support them in the Kamaarea. I later learned that the Soviets were looking for me personally.They arrested someone who looked like me (the narrator has aprominent nose) while he was harvesting clover. At that time, mybeard was shorter. They took him to Jalalabad and paraded himaround — “We’ve caught the son of a b—” they said. Someonefinally recognized him, and said that he wasn’t me and so he wasreleased. Around that same time, the DRA governor of Kama Districtwas in the Merzakhel Village. The Soviets arrested him and put himinto forced labor since they didn’t recognize him. They had himcarrying water to their soldiers on the high ground. The Soviets werevery careless of Afghan lives. They killed several villagersindiscriminately. They also killed one of my men who was unarmed.I am glad we drove the Soviets out, but the subsequent actions of theMujahideen tarnish their record of victory. I have written manypoems of protest against their current activities.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen were able to fire on thegarrison over a two-hour period since they periodically shiftedfiring positions to avoid return fire. The Soviets did not push outany night patrols to find the firing positions but only replied withartillery fire. The artillery fire did no good. Apparently, thegarrison commander had not surveyed potential and actualMujahideen firing positions to counter them.

The Mujahideen rendezvous point was located in one of three


escape routes into the mountains fromKama District. Further, it is adjacent to alikely blocking position which the Sovietsused during their periodic block and sweepoperations. The Mujahideen were caughtdownhill from the Soviet blocking force andcould not escape. As usual, the Mujahideenwere severely hampered by the lack ofportable, short-range radios which wouldhave allowed them to coordinate theiractions.

Mawlawi Shukur Yasini is a prominentreligious leader in Nangrahar Province. Heis from the village of Gerdab in Kama Districtnortheast of Jalalabad. During the war, hewas a major commander of the Khalis group(HIK). Later, he joined NIFA. During the war,he took television journalist Dan Rather tohis base in Afghanistan.

MINING ATTACKS NEAR MEHTARLAM

By Commander Sher Padshah andSheragha

After the battle for Alishang DistrictCenter, Commander Padshah gathered 30Mujahideen and moved further south to thevillage of Mendrawur. Mendrawur is about11 kilometers south of the provincial capitalof Mehtar Lam and about five kilometersnorth of the Kabul Jalalabad highway. Wereceived information that an armoredcolumn would be moving from Jalalabadto Mehtar Lam toward the end of August1981 (Map 5-1 — Mehtar). We decided toattack the column with bombs and anambush. We liked powerful mines, so weusually took the explosives from twoEgyptian plastic mines and put these intoa single large cooking oil tin container. Wealso used the explosives from unexplodedSoviet ordnance to make our own bombs.We put one bomb under a small bridge andhooked a remote-control device onto it. Westrung the detonating wire about 100 metersfurther south where we established ourambush in an orchard on the east side ofthe highway. We had two RPG-7s, one PKmachine gun and one Bernau light machinegun. There were three Mujahideen in thebomb-firing party.

We saw the Soviet column approachslowly. Dismounted Soviet engineers werewalking in front of the column with theirmine detectors. They were carefullychecking the route. When they came to thesmall bridge, they discovered the bomb.Several Soviets gathered around the bomb,

but instead ofdisconnecting the wires,they stood around talkingabout the bomb. The three-man firing party, Sheragha,Matin and anotherSheragha, were watchingthem through binoculars.We saw several Sovietschecking the bomb andknew that the ambush wasspoiled, so we detonatedthe bomb killing severalSoviets. The Soviet columnbegan firing in everydirection. We left theorchard and withdrewthrough the Bazaar ofMendrawur going north.Some of the villagers werewounded by the Soviet fire.

Three or four dayslater, we had 40Mujahideen in our groupand were ready to tryanother ambush. We wentto the village of Masha-khel. We buried two of ourbombs in the road. We didnot have any more remote-control firingdevices, so we rigged these bombs withpressure fuses. We put cow manure on themines to hide them. God bless Matin’s soul,he used to always put the manure on themines. We set up our ambush covering themines.

We saw the column approach slowly.Soldiers with mine detecting dogs werewalking in front of the column. The dogswere running loose and they promptlyfound and pointed out our bombs. Sheraghaand Shawali moved forward when they sawthe dogs. They watched as the dogs stoodby the mine. Two soldiers got out of an APCwith a long probe. The soldiers startedprobing the manure piles and they foundthe mine in the third pile. Four Soviets,including an officer, crowded togetherlooking at the mine. So, Sheragha andShawali opened fire killing the four Soviets.The remaining Soviets pulled back out ofthe ambush kill zone.

The Soviets began to return fire.Commander Padshah ordered fourMujahideen to move north onto Tarakhelhill to provide covering fire for the group’swithdrawal. To confuse the enemy, hegrabbed his megaphone and yelled “Keep

your positions. The reinforcements justarrived.” A DRA column came from MehtarLam and took up defensive positions andstarted firing at us. Tanks also maneuveredagainst us on the Mehtar Lam plain westof the road. We withdrew under the coverof night. We know we killed four Sovietsand may have killed or wounded up to 18DRA and Soviets. We destroyed one of theirtanks and two trucks.

COMMENTARY: The Mujahideenpreference for homemade mines in metalcans made it easier for Soviet minedetectors to find them. The tendency forcurious troops to cluster around a newly-discovered mine is not uniquely Soviet, andthe Soviets eventually trained theirengineers to quit clustering around mines.

The Mujahideen usually combineddemolitions and mining with other forms ofoffensive and defensive action. They usuallycovered their mines with direct fire weapons.The Mujahideen seldom left their minesunattended if they were located a distancefrom the border and a ready supply of mines.After an ambush or fight, they would oftendig up their unexpended mines and take themwith them to the next mission.

Commander Sher Padshah andSheragha are from Laghman Province.

THECOMBAT

SHOTGUN INTHE BCT

The shotgun is the most misunderstoodweapon in the Brigade Combat Team. Thecombat shotgun has found new life in the Infantry

during the war on terror and through “Modularity” withthe BCT being equipped with 178 M-500 shotguns.However, at issue is that no single doctrinal resource existssupporting the current combination of roles the shotgun is beingemployed in. Units are forced to either search through multiplefield manuals, depend on unit subject matter experts, or simplymake it up. The result is often that shotguns are being used inimproper roles such as a primary weapon without a stock orsupporting pistol, or as a secondary weapon with the full stockslung across the Soldier’s back. In this article, I will attempt toimpart the lessons learned over the last five years of employingshotguns in the 10th Mountain Division.

Methods of EmploymentThe shotgun should be employed in one of two methods. In the

first method, the shotgun is employed as a primary weapon with afull stock. Considerations for the commander when employed inthis manner are the limited range and reduced ammo capacity ofthe shotgun. A Soldier conducting house-to-house fighting at closeranges may be well served by the standard shotgun. However,skills that must be ingrained are: reloading constantly or the “loadwhat you shoot” rule and transitioning to a handgun. With only sixrounds at their disposal, a shotgunner may find himself out of ammoquickly in a fire fight. Reloads must occur at every lull in the fight.Transitioning to a hand gun is one method of staying in the fight ifyou run out of ammo. Simply put, the shotgun is lowered and theM-9 is drawn, and a controlled pair fired when the shotgun is out ofammo. The shotgunner maintains the M-9 until the situation allowshim to reload the shotgun. The same process is used for a stoppagethat cannot be cleared by immediate action.

In the second method, the shotgun is employed as a secondaryweapon. In this case the primary weapon for the Soldier is the M-4or M-16. The shotgun is then typically employed with a pistol

FIRST SERGEANT (RETIRED)D. ROBERT CLEMENTS

grip and some sort of retention system. The 10th Mountain’sInfantry Mountain Leaders Advanced Marksmanship Course(IMLARM) teaches the shotgun being slung on the firer’s side andto transition from the M-4 to the shotgun, then back again.

In the role of a secondary weapon to the M-4, the shotgun is carrieduncocked on an empty chamber or with an expended cartridge in thechamber. When employed, the gunner pulls the M-4 across his bodyaway from the shotgun, then brings up the shotgun, racks the slideand fires. Once the engagement is complete, the gunner leaves theshotgun action closed on the expended round and transitions backto the M-4. This process is repeated as required. The gunner will

then reload the shotgun when thetactical situation permits.

Units should look at usingNSN: 8465-01-491-4509 incombination with a sling forretaining their shotguns used as asecondary weapon.

The fundamental operation ofthe shotgun in either role is thesame. Vigorous racking of the slideback then forward assures positive

extraction, ejection, and chambering of the rounds. Weakmanipulation of the slide will result in the shotgun suffering amalfunction. Immediate action for any malfunction is to cycle theaction again. If you are still unable to fire, transition to the M-9 orM-4 and continue the fight. Once the tactical situation allows, gointo remedial actions to clear the malfunction or reload as required.

Operational Roles of the ShotgunThe greatest strength of the shotgun and its greatest weakness is

NSN: 8465-01-491-4509


Master Sergeant Mike Buytas, USAF

An Iraqi Army soldier shoots off a lock during a cordon and search mission.

the versatility of its ammo. Everything frombird hunting loads, slugs, and flares to 12-gauge high explosive rounds are availabletoday. Currently, the Army only authorizes afew loads: #9 shot, 00 buckshot, M-1030breaching rounds, M-1012 and 1013 less-lethal rounds. Other rounds such as the ActionFRAG-12 (USMC), Joint Non-LethalWarning Munition (JNLWM), XM-104 Non-Lethal Bursting Hand Grenade and theExtended Range Point Less-Lethal Munitionsare in various stages of development andshould be expected to lead to new trainingrequirements. This leaves a bewildering arrayof possible roles (anti-personnel, breaching,less-lethal, etc.) depending on the type ofrounds at the commander’s disposal. Further,many rounds can be used in multiple roles.For example, 00 buckshot can be used toconduct breaches but presents an increasedrisk of collateral damage to civilians or fellow

DESCRIPTION DODIC

Figure 2 — 12-Gauge Munitions

12-Gauge 00 Buckshot AO11

Army:

12-Gauge Breaching Round M-1030 AA54

12-Gauge #9 Shot Shell

12-Gauge Non-Lethal Point Control (M1012) AA51

12-Gauge Non-Lethal Crowd Dispersal (M1013) AA52

New Army / Soldier Enhancement Programs:

Extended 12-Gauge Non-Lethal Round, XM1068 TBD

FY 07 SEP XM-104 Non-Lethal Bursting Hand Grenade TBD

Grenade, Practice Body Non-LethalFY 07 SEP XM-104 Non-Lethal Bursting Hand Grenade TBD

12-Gauge Launching CupFY 07 SEP XM-104 Non-Lethal Bursting Hand Grenade TBD

FY 07 SEP 12-Gauge Stand Off Breaching Round TBD

The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program:

12-Gauge Joint Non-Lethal Warning Munitions TBD

USMC:Grenade, Rubber Ball Non-Lethal 9590 GG04Grenade, Practice Body Non-Lethal GG05

12-Gauge Launching Cup AA30

12-Gauge Bean Bag AA29

12-Gauge Fin Stabilized AA31

Soldiers. Also, lack of a STRAC (Standardsin Training Commission) that sufficientlysupports training with the shotgun hasextremely hampered commandersunderstanding the shotgun.

Currently, the shotguns roles can bedivided into three general roles:

1. Offensive Weapon,2. Breacher,3. Less-Lethal Munitions delivery

system.As an offensive weapon, the shotgun

should be employed as a full-stockedweapon employing 00 buckshot rounds,supported by a M-9 pistol. In this rolecommanders must account for the limitedeffective range of the shotgun. Employingthe current 00 buckshot loads, the shotgun’srealistic effective range would be 25-35meters. If the shotgun is employed withouta stock, this range is reduced to 10 meters.

Future munitions such as the Action FRAG-12 or a type-classified slug round combinedwith an improved sighting system shouldbe expected to increase this range to 100meters.

In the breaching role, the shotgunprovides the commander with increasedmomentum when conducting urbanoperations. The breaching shotgun isextremely effective in quickly defeatinglocked doors with reduced risk to theSoldier compared to manual breachingmethods. The M-1030 round is the primarybreaching round; however, it has only beenprocured in small numbers. The M-1030round presents the most effective breachinground and presents the lowest risk forcollateral damage. Typically units shouldexpect to employ #9 shot loads for trainingand can also effectively employ them incombat with only slightly increased risk ofcollateral damage and slightly reducedeffectiveness. Commanders should also beaware that both M-1030 rounds and #9 shotloads are not effective anti-personal roundsmuch farther than arm’s reach.

In the role of a less-lethal munitionsdelivery system, the 12-gauge shotgunoffers exceptional versatility. Utilizing theshotgun instead of systems such as the FN-303 Individual Serviceman Non-LethalSystem (ISNLS) reduces the training andsustainment burden on the commanderalso, since he already has shotgunsorganic to the unit. Here, more then anyarea though, the lack of training ammoor qualification standards has defeatedthe commander. The current M-1012round provides the commander with a lowto medium point pain compliancemunition effective to about 30 meters.The M-1012 round is most effective in alow threat environment against anindividual target. The M-1013 is amedium pain compliance round designedfor use against multiple targets; however,it is also effective against a point target.Munitions such as the USMC Stingballgrenade or Army XM-104 Non-lethalBursting Hand Grenade, which areemployed from the shotgun’s grenadelaunching cup, can extend the less-lethalrange out to 100 meters and givecommanders an extremely effective methodof dispersing rioting mobs. Developmentalrounds such as the Flarebang also providethe commander with the ability to delivermore effective warning shots by providing



Shotgun Ammunition/Training Strategy

Event DODIC Rounds Frequency

PMI N/A EST 2

Instructional Fire A011 3 2

Qualification Fire A011 10 2

Total Per Soldier A011 26

M1200 Shotgun Door Breaching Training Strategy

Event DODIC Rounds Frequency

Ballistic Breaching AA54 8 2

Total Per Soldier AA54 16

Table 2 — STRAC Table 5-79

a visual and audio cue. This round should prove to be exceptionallyeffective at check points.

SOPsUnits must consider how they configure their combat loads of

shotgun ammo if they are using multiple types of ammo on aoperation. Units must determine the method of employment, thenthe role the shotguns will be used in. For example, the commanderdetermines that they will employ the shotgun as a secondaryweapon. He further sees the role as being primarily to conductbreaching with a secondary mission of delivering less-lethalmunitions. The commander elects in this case to designate shotgunsas primary breachers and determines they will be loaded withbreaching rounds in the mag tube, breaching rounds in the shotgunammo pouch (fighting load) and less-lethal ammo carried in theright canteen pouch (sustainment load). In each case, the chamberis empty or after initial contact is closed with the pump unlocked.

Commanders may also segregate the types of munitions intospecial teams. The commander thus reduces the requirement toclear weapons in order to switch munitions. Instead, the squadleaders are able to call forward a special team to meet the need asrequired. He has further reduced the likelihood of firing a lethalbreaching round into a situation requiring less-lethal rounds.Further segregating the load carried by the Soldier reduces thelikelihood of introducing the “wrong” round while reloading.

The same principles apply when the shotgun is employed as aprimary weapon. The primary difference is based on METT-T(mission, enemy, terrain troops, time), but one of the two loadscarried should be 00 buckshot. This provides the shot gunnerslethal force and specialty munitions as required. Mixing more

then two types (lethal, less lethal andbreaching) of ammo per Soldier

should be carefully considered andhave sufficient measures in place

to prevent employing thewrong munitions forthe target.

Training PlansCommanders frequently are unable to locate qualification

standards due to the lack of a supporting field manual. The soldiertraining publication (STP) for shotgun qualification is no longerin print and is difficult to locate online also. Short rangemarksmanship (SRM) standards are ironically listed in the M-16manual. Listed after the M-16 SRM standards shotgun andautomatic firing standards are described as being the same as rifleSRM. Less-lethal munitions also do not have a published standard.FM 3-19, Civil Disturbance Operations, and FM 3-22.40, TacticalEmployment of Non-Lethal Weapons, outline a recommendedrange standard; however, they note that the Army does not have aqualification standard. Furthermore, no standards for breachingqualifications are published Army wide.

STRAC also does little to help commanders. Different types ofInfantry organizations have different STRAC authorizations, with

the Stryker brigade’s being the best resourced (Table5-79). Some of those authorizationsinclude breaching munitions, some do

not. None of the STRAC shotgun tablessupport SRM or live-fire exercises.

Commanders must develop and resourcea realistic training plan that will allow

them to integrate the shotgun into the fullspectrum of operations. They must then push

for the training system to provide them withenough ammunition to support their plan.

When developing their breaching trainingplan, the question of procuring doors is a

frequent issue. A command or installationfaces purchasing enough doors for 178

shotguns per BCT to conduct shotgunbreaching semiannually. Commanders

should consider using such trainingaids as the Breaching Technology’s

Shotgun Breaching Door or RoyalArms Breach Door Trainer. Eitherdoor provides for a reusable trainingdoor that can be emplaced in aMOUT Site or MOUT LFX facility


First Sergeant (Retired) D. Robert Clementsis currently employed by Quantum Research as aDA G-8 Force Development and TransformationCoordinator for Fort Drum, N.Y. He previouslyperformed duties with 10th Mountain DivisionModularity Coordination Center responsible forfielding and New Equipment Training of SoldierSystems, RFI, and Small Arms.

Shotgun Qualification Standards

in support of all phases of training. Both doorssupport M-1030 rounds and the morecommon #9 shot. Prior to procuring anybreaching doors, the command must do a riskassessment and is advised to coordinate theiractions with the Installation Safety Office andtheir Range Division.

Commanders must also be aware thatunits and individuals are also modifyingthe issue shotguns to better meet theirrequirements with untested commercialparts. Such modifications are violating thetechnical manual and Army Regulation750-10, Army Modification Program .While there are improvements that couldbe made to the issue shotgun, they areoutside the scope of this article. Currentlythe only approved method for requesting

modifications is through an OperationalNeeds Statement for “Special MissionsModifications.”

Once properly understood and resourced,the shotgun presents the commander withmany additional capabilities that he is ableto tailor to his mission. From lethal force toless-lethal or breaching, the combat shotgunis on hand and ready to support theInfantry.

Task: Engage targets with a 12-gauge shotgun (Qualification). Modified from STP 19-95c1 SM.Conditions: You are given a requirement to engage targets using a 12-gauge shotgun. You are given a shotgun,

10 rounds of #00 buckshot, Type E silhouette targets, a 25-meter range and a firing barricade. The barricade shouldmeasure about 72 inches x 26 inches with an opening (window) cut 36 inches to 42 inches from the bottom of thebarricade. The opening should be 18 inches wide and approximately 36 inches high.

Standards: Engaged targets with the 12-gauge shotgun, scoring a minimum of two pellets per round in thetargets.

SHOTGUN QUALIFICATION

POSITION ROUNDS DISTANCE METHOD TIME STANDARD NOTES FIREDStanding 2 25 Off Hand 4 Seconds Load 4 Rounds

Kneeling 2 25 Off Hand 4 Seconds

Crouched 2 25 Underarm Assault 4 Seconds Load 4 Rounds

Standing 2 25 Strong Side 4 Seconds

Standing 2 25 Barricade Supported 4 Seconds Load 2 Rounds

Barricade Supported

SHOTGUN FIRING, SHORT-RANGE MARKSMANSHIP QUALIFICATION (Modified from FM 3-22.9, RifleMarksmanship, Chapter 7, 7.27 Phase III)

Soldiers should conduct SRM qualification semiannually, using the shotgun in the full stock configuration. Inaddition to qualification, commanders should conduct familiarization using the same qualification standards whilealtering the conditions. Firing the qualification tables with out stock, in protective masks and during periods oflimited visibility with night vision devices should be included.

Task: Conduct short range marksmanship with a 12-gauge shotgun . Modified from FM 3-22.3Conditions: You are given a requirement to engage targets using a 12-gauge shotgun. You are given a

shotgun, 16 rounds of #00 buckshot, Type E silhouette targets, and a 25-meter range.Standards: Engaged targets with the 12-gauge shotgun, scores 16 hits day and night. A hit is a minimum of two

pellets per round in the targets. Continued on next page ...

TURN IN M1200 SHOTGUNSThe M1200 shotgun is obsolete

and has been replaced by the M500Mossberg shotgun, NSN 1005-01-295-1832. Units authorizedshotguns that still have M1200sshould get them replaced withM500s since the M1200 is no longersupported by the Army.

Units that need assistance cancontact TACOM-Rock Island’s FloraTaylor at DSN 793-1943, (309) 782-1943 or e-mail [email protected]

TM 9-1005-338-13&P covers theM500. (Information provided by PSMagazine.)

LESS-LETHAL QUALIFICATION MODIFIED FROM FM 3-19, CHAPTER 5, 8-9

Shotgun qualification standards con’t ...

SHORT RANGE MARKSMANSHIP (SRM) RECORD AND PRACTICE FIRE

POSITION ROUNDS DISTANCE METHOD TIME STANDARD NOTES FIREDStraight Ahead 2 25m Controlled pair 4 Seconds Load 4 Rounds

Left Turn 2 25m Controlled pair 4 Seconds

Right Turn 2 25m Controlled pair 4 Seconds Load 4 Rounds

Straight Ahead 2 5m begin Controlled pair 4 SecondsWalking

Walk laterally 2 10m Controlled pair 4 Seconds

at 15m

Straight Ahead 4 10m begin Controlled pair 8 Seconds Load 4 RoundsWalking at 20m

Straight Ahead 2 25m Controlled pair 4 Seconds Load 4 Rounds

to the left

LESS-LETHAL RECORD AND PRACTICE FIRE

POSITION ROUNDS DISTANCE TARGET TYPE ROUND TYPE NOTES FIREDStanding 1 75m Area Sting Ball/ Load 1 Round

Standing 1 50m Area Sting Ball/ Load 1 round

Standing 4 25m 3 Area, 2 Point 3 M-1013/ 2 M1012 Load 4 rounds

Launching Round USMC only

Launching Round USMC only

Standing 3 20m 3 Area 3 M-1013 Load 3 rounds

Standing 2 20m 2 Point 2 M-1012 Load 2 rounds



Soldiers should conduct less-lethal qualification annually, using the shotgun in the full stock configuration.In most cases, kinetic energy will only carry these NL munitions projectiles 75 meters or less. This givestrainers flexibility as to the locations where a live-fire exercise can be conducted, especially in a field-expedient situation.

Task: Conduct less-lethal marksmanship with a 12-gauge shotgun. Modified from FM 3-19.Conditions: You are given a requirement to engage targets using a 12-gauge shotgun. You are given a

shotgun, a grenade launching cup, 2 rubber ball grenade (Sting ball), 2 launching rounds, 7 M-1012 rounds,6 M-1013 rounds, Type E silhouette targets, and a 25-meter range.

Standards: Engaged targets with the 12-gauge shotgun, scores 15 hits USMC, 13 hits Army.Note: The Sting ball grenade and grenade launching cup is a USMC only program. Stingball grenades

should not be fired directly at individuals. The XM-104 Non-Lethal Bursting Hand Grenade SEP programshould be expected to provide this capability to the Army in the future.



21st Century Home Station Model

The Army Challenge“After one year, 68 deaths, and 498 Purple

Hearts awarded with “several hundred more”pending, the 3,900 soldiers of the 2ndBrigade, 2nd Infantry Division have left Iraq.They were an experiment of sorts for the Army,deploying from bases along the DemilitarizedZone in South Korea, the first time units theremeant to preserve a Cold War peace were sentdirectly to a shooting war. They will head toan entirely new home in Fort Carson, Colo.,taking over the barracks of yet another unitdeploying to Iraq.”

— Stars and Stripes, Pacific edition,July 31, 2005

The Army is simultaneously fightinga prolonged war while conductinga substantial transformation process

which increasingly limits the pool of availableunits to deploy, and decreases the dwell timebetween deployments. The 2nd BrigadeCombat Team, 2nd Infantry Division, is amodel example of our incredible flexibility.Our young Americans are “Our GreatestGeneration.” We owe them the best inequipment and training. This article will outline a way to meetthe demands of freedom by supporting the readiness of her mostimportant resource, our Soldiers.

Coupled with Transformation, the Army approved the ArmyForce Generation (ARFORGEN) model as a synergistic approachto building combat power during compressed re-fit periods for alldeploying units. This structured progression of increased unitreadiness over time, results in recurring periods of availability oftrained and cohesive units prepared for operational deployment.

Installations must transform themselves to provide a flexiblebase operations surge capability in order to support all units bothassigned and mobilized with a live/virtual/constructive collective

LIEUTENANT COLONEL KARL D. REED AND FORT CARSON’S STRATEGIC INITIATIVE GROUP

training framework. These base operations become the hallmarkof a flagship installation capable of supporting all units throughouttheir transformation and “go-to-war” readiness cycle.

The Integrated Training StrategyUnits preparing to deploy to Afghanistan or Iraq will rely more

and more on home station training exercises. Recently, the FortCarson, Colo., developed a major, installation-wide trainingexercise designed around the 2nd BCT, 2nd ID that incorporatedand tested this integrated training strategy.

Developing an installation-wide exercise around a deployingbrigade combat team makes sense from the point of leveraging all

SUPPORTING ARFORGEN ATTHE MOUNTAIN POST

Photos courtesy of Fort Carson’s Directorate of Information Management

Exercises like Bayonet Strike allow Soldiers to train the way they fight. Developing aninstallation-wide exercise around a deploying brigade combat team makes sense from thepoint of leveraging all possible enablers to create the appropriate task organizatin and relevanttheater environment.

possible enablers to create the appropriate player task-organizationto replicate the relevant theater environment.

This particular exercise, called Bayonet Strike, included unitsvalidating for deployment, preparing for a Combat Training Center(CTC) rotation, and sustaining training readiness. (See Figure 1.)

Every unit on the installation as well as Reserve componentunits from several states participated in the training. For example,the New Mexico National Guard flew 39 close air support sortiesin support of live fires and force-on-force engagements throughoutthe Pinon Canyon and Fort Carson areas. Civil Affairs teams fromthe Arkansas National Guard supported the BCT in civil-militaryoperations. Veteran units recently returning from combatoperations in theater supported the opposing force (OPFOR) andobserver/controller (O/C) tasks. After leveraging all availabletrainers and enablers, more than 5,200 Soldiers were involved increating a realistic training venue for 18 separate units rangingfrom a military police working dog detachment to SpecialOperations teams.

The next challenge was identifying and completing the trainingenvironment by rounding out all the left and right coalition andU.S. forces in the constructive and virtual simulationsenvironment. These “simulated digital player units” were role-played by the external control staff and spiraled into one commonoperational picture that replicated the current contemporaryoperating environment.

Building around a deploying BCT is an excellent way of“teaming” all available assets and cutting costs. The MountainPost used the 2nd BCT, 2nd ID as the catalyst to bring aninstallation’s worth of units together and to meet deployment andsustainment training objectives.

The 2nd BCT, 2nd ID “Strike Force” provides an excellentexample of the challenges installations have today in supportinga modular brigade combat team in its mission as a globalexpeditionary force. This brigade deployed to OIF from Korea inSeptember 2004 and received a Department of the Army orderwhile in theater directing in stride re-stationing to Fort Carson atthe conclusion of a yearlong combat tour.

As the brigade wrapped up its yearlong tour in Ramadi, ColonelGary Patton, the brigade’s commander, said “We’ve got a lot ofblood, sweat and tears invested here. We will be following theprogress of Ramadi. We want to see this thing finished.”

The Strike Force BCT uncased their colors at Fort Carson inSeptember 2005, reorganizing into a modular combat formation.The unit is now combat ready following its recent home stationtraining event and mission readiness exercise at the NationalTraining Center. In only 10 short months, the Strike Force hastransformed into a new modular force ready to deploy and fight.(See Figure 2.)

The Relevant Training FrameworkFort Carson, with its superb satellite training facility, the Pinon

Canyon Maneuver Site (PCMS), offered some insights on how aflagship installation tackles the challenges of supporting the ArmyForce Generation model.

Transformation is all about changing the way the installationdoes business and supports modularity. Since the Army is


DEVELOPING A HOME STATIONTRAINING EXERCISE

Determine where each unit on the installation isin their glide path for deployment IAW the gates ofARFORGEN. Have the commanders of those unitsuse their METL [mission essential task list] todetermine what tasks they need to train. Determine who you want to train and for what

theater deployment mission. Determine the training objectives. When the

exercise is finished, what do you want to haveaccomplished? Determine the level of proficiency of the unit you

are training when performing the tasks you haveselected. Determine the level of complexity/difficulty of the

exercise based on proficiency and what enablers areneeded to enhance the task organization of these unitsor increase the realism for them on a dirty battlefield.Include joint enablers. Determine what combination of live/virtual/

constructive capabilities you want to use, then spiralthese together in one contemporary operatingenvironment against a realistic theater thread ofevents to build the enemy and friendly battlefieldconditions.

Individual / Section training FOB operations Logistical Support Force on Force Command Post Exercise (SIMEX) Live Fire Exercise Environmental Training (COE)

Determine what resources you will need toconduct the training and how you will rheostat to re-enforce success and failure of units actions andinactions throughout the exercise Assign duties and responsibilities across the

installation and to those volunteering enablers (RC/DLI/etc) Issue a plan for the training of observer/

controllers, opposing forces (insurgency), Iraqi roleplayers and security forces. Rehearse and validate the plan.

Figure 1

reconfiguring from a division-basedstructure to a more flexible and agilebrigade combat team-based structure, theinstallation is changing its business modelas well.

Fort Carson replicates a docking stationthat can accept and accommodate thetraining, sustainment, and life supportneeds of both active and reserve componentBCTs that are not necessarilygeographically assigned to the MountainPost. Combine this with the remote full-spectrum, high-altitude Afghanistan-liketraining area of Pinon Canyon and theanswer is realistic training in real time overreal distances.

“Bayonet Strike” — Developingthe Exercise

Preparing the Strike Force BCT forsuccess at the National Training Center(NTC) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)serves as an example for home stationtraining now and in the future. A criticalpart of that success was the contributionmade by 3rd Armor Cavalry Regiment inorganizing, preparing, and executing O/Csupport, but most importantly by sharinglessons learned from a very recentdeployment to Iraq. The planning andinvestment of veterans who have recentlyreturned from war into the next unit’spreparation for combat provides a sourceof continuity in home station training thatcannot be replicated at the CTCs. Coupled

with training and organization, this willensure our units are as prepared as they canbe for combat. Every unit follows the samefundamental gate training strategy asoutlined in Figure 3.

One hundred and fifty road miles awayat Fort Carson, members of the EXCON(exercise control) are carefullychoreographing Bayonet Strike, a missionrehearsal exercise for the 2nd BCT, 2nd IDjust one of Fort Carson’s BCTs preparingfor deployment to Iraq. Months before

TRAINING NOTES


Bayonet Strike began, thobes, affectionatelyreferred to by those ordering the traditionalMiddle-Eastern apparel as “man dresses,”had been ordered. Street signs in Arabicwere printed. Mock villages to includemosques and schools were erected, andmany task orders were sent out to supportthis mammoth undertaking, which wasdesigned to replicate the command andcontrol and geographic conditions Soldiersface in theater.

Because the 2nd BCT, 2nd ID wouldoperate under the command of the 1stCavalry Division in Iraq, Fort Carson builtthe training scenario to replicate a 1stCavalry Division higher headquarters.Completing the scenario, the plannersincluded Special Operations forces, U.S.Air Force elements, coalition units andIraqi Army and police units. The 2nd BCT,2nd ID occupied a forward operating basedownrange while units rotated throughdemanding live-fire exercises.

The battalions then rotated to PCMS,traveling the 150 miles between the twofacilities in a tactical configurationreplicating the kinds of distances and linesof communication found in Iraq. At PCMS,they were immersed in a MILES and O/C-supported training environment closelymodeled on current operational missionsin Iraq. Fort Carson provided the locationfor the sustainment operating base and a

LD

AV

AILAB

LE

ReintegrationBlock Leave

InventoriesNational Training Center06-08

Individual & Crew Small

Arms Training

Personnel & UnitRealignment

After operations m

aintenance

Rail Operations

Holiday

Leave

Block

Leave (T)

Iraq Leader’s Recon

FieldingTowed Howitzer

FieldingMortars

FieldingDigital Systems

Reset Train Ready Available

Small Unit Training

National Training Center

Leader’s Recon

Digital Systems Training

New Soldier & Leader Integration

Theater Specific Training (Cultural, Arabic, IED, ROE, Pattern A nalysis, Logistics)

AUG OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEPSEP OCT

16 Day Brigade/Post Exercise -PrepBayonet Strike

Company Training

Specialized Battlefield Operating Systems Training

Command Exercise

PlatoonRe-Train

Fielding: Long Range

Surveillance System

Fielding: Armored HMMWV

Fielding: Towed Howitzer Fielding: Advanced

Sights

Iraq Leader’s

Recon

E-Date16 NOV 05

Platoon Training

LD

AV

AILAB

LE

ReintegrationBlock Leave

InventoriesNational Training Center06-08

Individual & Crew Small

Arms Training

Personnel & UnitRealignment

After operations m

aintenance

Rail Operations

Holiday

Leave

Block

Leave (T)

Iraq Leader’s Recon

FieldingTowed Howitzer

FieldingMortars

FieldingDigital Systems

Reset Train Ready Available

Small Unit Training

National Training Center

Leader’s Recon

Digital Systems Training

New Soldier & Leader Integration





16 Day Brigade/Post Exercise -PrepBayonet Strike

Company Training

Specialized Battlefield Operating Systems Training

Command Exercise

PlatoonRe-Train

Fielding: Long Range

Surveillance System

Fielding: Armored HMMWV

Fielding: Towed Howitzer Fielding: Advanced

Sights

Iraq Leader’s

Recon

E-Date16 NOV 05

Platoon Training

Figure 2 — 2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry DivisionARFORGEN Glide-Path to Combat Readiness

1. HST Training: CORE⇒Stay Relevant (Reach Back)⇒Leader Training⇒Individual through Squad⇒Battle staff training⇒Platoon to Battalion situational training⇒Modularity⇒Build the Team

2. HS Training: MISSION⇒Cultural Training⇒Recon theater/ IED Defeat⇒Combined Arms/ Joint⇒Theater focused STX⇒Gunnery⇒Maneuver/ Urban Ops⇒BN/ BCT/ CPX⇒Deployment Training

3. Deploy: FULL SPECTRUM⇒Rear Detachment⇒TOA (RS/LS Ride)⇒MNI-I COIN Academy⇒Theatre Lane Training⇒Pass Back Lessons Learned⇒Resource the fight

4. Re-deploy / Re-set⇒Reception / Integration⇒Lessons Learned⇒Reset the team⇒Begin Modularity⇒Schools⇒Participate in Training COC and LDR Development

Mountain Post Training StrategySupporting ARFORGEN, the key tasks associated with the ARFORGEN Training Cycle

1. HST Training: CORE⇒Stay Relevant (Reach Back)⇒Leader Training⇒Individual through Squad⇒Battle staff training⇒Platoon to Battalion situational training⇒Modularity⇒Build the Team

2. HS Training: MISSION⇒Cultural Training⇒Recon theater/ IED Defeat⇒Combined Arms/ Joint⇒Theater focused STX⇒Gunnery⇒Maneuver/ Urban Ops⇒BN/ BCT/ CPX⇒Deployment Training

3. Deploy: FULL SPECTRUM⇒Rear Detachment⇒TOA (RS/LS Ride)⇒MNI-I COIN Academy⇒Theatre Lane Training⇒Pass Back Lessons Learned⇒Resource the fight

4. Re-deploy / Re-set⇒Reception / Integration⇒Lessons Learned⇒Reset the team⇒Begin Modularity⇒Schools⇒Participate in Training COC and LDR Development

Mountain Post Training StrategySupporting ARFORGEN, the key tasks associated with the ARFORGEN Training Cycle

Figure 3

host of live-fire training while the PinonCanyon Maneuver Site provided the force-on-force venue at a realistic distance from theBCT. This separation replicated the time anddistance factors in theater as well as addedthe fog and friction of war through theextensive use of a broad range of role players.

Partnerships at PCMS with the localmedia, academia, resident subject matterexperts, joint and special forces units provideda demanding and highly realistic operational,cultural, linguistic, digital and politicalenvironment set within a climatic andgeographic training area that mimics theatervery well. Constructive simulation wasartfully integrated to support live training atboth Fort Carson and PCMS. Interfaced withthe newly received digital command andcontrol systems of the 2nd BCT, 2nd IDconstructive simulations and higher commandheadquarters replicate not only coalitionforces (including 1st Cavalry Division as thecontrolling headquarters) but various Iraqi security elements aswell.

The unique synergy obtained by using both Fort Carson andPCMS, the live and constructive integration, the sophisticated useof OPFOR, role players, subject matter experts, joint enablers andthe injection of real world events (such as the elimination of theterrorist leader al-Zarquawi) all combined to provide a tremendousmission rehearsal for the Soldiers and leaders of the brigade.

This capability is a particularly useful tool that permitscommanders to tackle the home station training/CTC proficiency“delta” that has always existed but now has become more of achallenge due to the variances in readiness, equipment, andmanning generated by the different force pools in the ARFORGENmodel.

The Fort Carson and Pinon Canyon complex offers a mitigationtool in support of the CTC throughput shortfalls that exist inCONUS. Pinon Canyon’s demonstrated ability to support a majormission readiness exercise (MRE) at very reasonable costs,combined with the emergent concept of an exportable trainingcapability offer some exciting options to the Army for trainingmore BCTs than can currently be supported between our combinedarms training centers.

Home station training in support of the ARFORGEN modelrequires a far broader and sophisticated approach than has beenthe case in the past. ARFORGEN provides a trained and readybrigade combat team prepared for continuous operations in supportof the Global War on Terrorism. Rather than trying to have all theunits ready for the “Big One” all the time, the Army can repetitivelygenerate BCTs focused on actual or contingency missions in amore predictable process, while still maintaining the ability tosurge for major combat operations. Based on this methodology,Fort Carson realized the new mission of receiving, equipping,training, deploying, supporting and recovering brigade combatteams required a steady-state training and logistical process far


more sophisticated than any previous systems. This combinationof training and logistical support for ARFORGEN has generateda surge requirement in base operations that is unprecedented.

Military Police Security PatrolThe four-vehicle convoy of up-armored high-mobility

multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) labored up the slopeahead and began negotiating the unpaved road’s bends and curves.The young military police lieutenant in the lead vehicle wasgrateful the dust coating her face wasn’t as thick today as it hadbeen. While contemplating the dust, she also thought about howfortunate her small patrol had been making it through the lastvillage without incident and was now on the way through opencountry.

Out of the corner of her eye she saw muzzle flashes in thescrub brush about 40 meters off the road. “Contact right,” sheshouted into the radio. “Everyone put suppressive fire down now.”Without releasing the mike button, she called her platoon sergeant,“One-Four watch our left. I’m going after the threat on our right.”Without waiting for a response, she ordered her driver to turn offthe road and stop.

She instructed Johnson to, “Keep fire on this area” and quicklyfired her rifle at the spot she’d seen the muzzle flashes originate.Using the vehicle for cover, she jumped out and ran around to thefollowing HMMWV, gesturing for the MPs inside to dismount andform a skirmish line. The rest of the patrol was now staggeredalong the road, some firing at the ambush site to the right, somenervously scanning to the left, looking for more insurgents.

Taking stock of the situation, the young MP lieutenant wipedthe perspiration from her eyes, took a deep breath, and told thedriver of the second HMMWV to call in a contact report justbeyond checkpoint four. “Tell’em I’m developing the situation,”she said. While looking at the corporal and two MPs next to her,she pointed toward the scrub, “Let’s go in and get those guys.”

The 150 miles separating the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site from Fort Carson, Colo., is idealfor training Soldiers in convoy ambush tactics and provides a training scenario in not onlyreal time but also real distance.

Together they began moving forward at alow crouch. Standing behind a pinion pineabout 25 meters away, the 3rd ACR O/Capprovingly made some quick notes on hismap. This was the second ambush todayalong this mock main supply route and,although surprised, the patrol had reactedpretty well. Looking over his shoulder, hecould see another team of MPs from therear vehicle quickly moving to flank theinsurgent position.

The cavalryman nodded to himselfthinking, “If they move fast and don’t walkinto their own crossfire, they just might getthe insurgents before they can breakcontact.” In a few minutes anotherBayonet Strike after action report led byveteran mounted riflemen of the 3rd ACRwould take place, and the MPs would havea chance to learn some valuable lessons.

Integrating our Combat VeteransThe 3rd ACR returned in February-

March 2006 from successfulcounterinsurgency operations in both TalAfar and southern Baghdad. The regiment,still inside of its 90-day redeploymentwindow, was preparing both personnel andproperty to re-station to Fort Hood as partof the Army’s Base Realignment andClosure Program (BRAC) andtransformation campaign. The regimentunderstood the challenges of supportingthis rigorous exercise while re-stationingbut was committed to sharing theregiment’s lessons learned in combat.

Two of three ground cavalry squadrons


had already initiated movement to FortHood and most of the regimental staff hadbegun to clear post. Therefore, theregimental commander, Colonel McMaster,directed his 3rd Squadron (Thunder) toorganize, equip, and deploy a regimentalO/C package from units across the regimentand provide the regiment’s hard earnedlessons learned to the Strike Brigade. Theregimental headquarters in turn focused ontraining the 2nd BCT, 2nd ID staff duringa simulation exercise at Fort Carson while3/3 ACR deployed O/Cs to PCMS to trainand assist 2BCT, 2ID battalions rotatingthrough MILES based force-on-forcecompany lanes.

The 3rd ACR O/C team also provideddaily feedback to unit commanders at thebattalion, company, and platoon levels. Atbattalion level, sustain and improves fromevery company were consolidated daily toprovide overall battalion sustains andimproves to the battalion commanders.These observations were used to providedaily status to the senior trainer and postcommander, Major General Robert W.Mixon, Jr. After providing dailyobservations to the battalion commanders,the O/Cs requested the battalioncommander’s O/C priorities for the nextday’s training. The O/Cs acted as “directedtelescopes” to provide feedback thecommander needed to better understandwhere his unit was in preparation. Uponcompletion of each battalion’s four-daytraining exercise, the 3rd ACR O/Csconsolidated the unit’s battalion and

The 3/3 ACR O/Cs also provided each battalion with useful toolsemployed in Iraq which included:

company training observations andprovided it to the unit as part of the takehome package.

In ConclusionTo fully realize the potential of the

ARFORGEN model requires that a newarray of installation functions be providedto BCTs that may not be assigned in thetraditional fashion to either the seniormission commander or the supportinginstallation. In reality, the installation mustact as a docking station that allows allmodular units of different type to literallyplug into the infrastructure and haveimmediate access to collaborativecommand and control systems both inCONUS and the operational theater. Themethods of training must be far moreadaptive to the rapidly changing demandsof combat than our traditional missiontraining plans and mission essentialtraining list methodology. They mustquickly incorporate the latest tactics,techniques and procedures fresh from thebattlefield in a well-knit live, virtual, andconstructive package.

Understanding the implications of theARFORGEN process, planners at FortCarson built a new home station trainingmodel and validated it during Bayonet Strike.This model had to simultaneously trainmultiple units and staffs at differingproficiency levels within a single integratedscenario. Ultimately, the installation mustenable all units to bring together all theirSoldiers, equipment, and tactics, techniques,and procedures through theater-likeimmersion site training culminating in amission readiness exercise comparable to aCTC-hosted exercise. We must not just focuson brigade formations, but give every Soldierno matter how small the unit every advantageof being trained and ready. While thisdaunting task is being accomplished, theinstallation must also continue to supportand sustain resident families and deployedSoldiers while continuing to project andrecover combat power.

Effects Working GroupTemplate Squadron Daily INTSUM

Example Squadron OIF 04-06 Battle

Rhythm Guidelines on Individual

Detention Detainee Packet Checklist Skull Session Examples Squadron SOP on Clearance

Ops Talking Points for Patrols

Sensitive Site ExploitationExample PCC/PCI Checklist Example 15-6 Investigation Battalion Targeting Meeting

Agenda 3/3 ACR Squadron TOC Layout Tactical Risk Management

Example Squadron Rehearsal Checklist Linguist User Handbook

3/3 ACR Squadron AMB

Lieutenant Colonel Karl D. Reed is currentlyserving as the III Corps G3 (FWD) at Fort Carson,Colo. He commanded the 5th Battalion, 20thInfantry, 3rd Brigade (SBCT), 2nd Infantry Division.in support of OIF 2003-2004. Reed also previouslyserved as G3 for the 7th Infantry Division in 2005-2006.

TRAINING NOTES

The mission of the Department ofMilitary Instruction at the UnitedStates Military Academy states

that it will “…train, educate, and inspirecadets in the essence of Warfighting andthe Profession of Arms ... in order todevelop competent future Army officers.”For as far back as most can remember, thatmission has been fulfilled by using a ColdWar model for training. That has nowchanged.

Cadets, in their first two years, go frombeing civilians to small unit leaders. CadetField Training (CFT), the trainingconducted at West Point for the second-yearcadets, follows the crawl, walk, run methodspread over two four-week details. The firstdetail, crawl and walk, focused onindividual training. Land navigation, basicand advanced rifle marksmanship,patrolling, combatives, and first aid are justa sample of the training conducted duringthe first detail. Up until the summer of2006, the second detail training wasfocused on offense, defense, raid, recon andambush operations. These were separateevents that took on a focus of operating inthe woods and away from built-up areas.The training was good and useful but inlight of the global war on terrorism, not asrelevant as it needed to be. The academyrealized this and made a radical change.

The change came not as a slow, multiple-year process, but in the course of about twomonths the new plan was instituted, andthe planning and resourcing started. Thenew training for CFT still followed thecrawl, walk, run model; however, now therun phase looks more like a sprint. All ofthe training during the first detail nowdirectly supports Operation Highland


Warrior (OHW), which is the second detail.Camp Buckner was transformed into aforward operating base (FOB) completewith access control points. Cadets alsoimplemented a complete weaponsimmersion program, and training turnedinto a continuous operation where all of thecommittees interacted with each other. Thenew committees for OHW are Cordon andSearch, Search and Attack, Access ControlPoint, Quick Reaction Force, Squad Live-Fire Ambush, and Convoy Reaction. Theacademy also hired Arabic linguists toprovide Cadets with experience in dealingwith a language barrier and to also learnmore about the Muslim religion andculture.

When asked to put into context thechanges for the 2006 training, Major BillConde, the regimental executive officer,explained that “the training at CFT hasevolved since my first experience back in1992 ... This past CFT we took the trainingto a new level by using current scenarioswe are experiencing in the GWOT. Thedeliberate defense, for example, haschanged to defend a forward operating baseand establish access control points. Othermissions the cadets experienced this

Summer Training at USMA

CAPTAIN RYAN MORGAN

summer were search and attack, convoyoperations and cordon and search. All ofwhich our force is executing daily whileforward deployed.”

The access control point mission was anopportunity for cadets to not only beexposed to the difficulties in defending afixed site but the necessity of all Soldiershaving to deal with difficult tactical,ethical, and cultural decisions at a highvisibility location — the front gate of anAmerican compound. Cadets were trainedand evaluated in the actual setup andexecution of an ACP by conducting vehicleand personnel searches. However, theywere further challenged when the enemytried to infiltrate the ACP using a varietyof methods which included vehicle-borneand personnel-borne improvised explosivedevices (VBIEDs, PBIEDs), peaceful andaggressive protests, and full-out attacks.Each of the situations required cadets inall positions to make tough decisions onthe spot.

Search and attack operations focused ontraditional patrolling techniques. Thenecessity for all cadets, and futurelieutenants, to understand the principals ofa combat patrol is critical to current

AcademyUpdates CadetField Training

Courtesy photos

During the training exercise, a cadet company commander speaks with a village sheik througha translator.

operations in many theaters of operations. This mission centeredon the security of the FOB by conducting combat patrols in thesurrounding hills looking for enemy mortars and caches.

Convoy operations occur on a daily basis in OIF/OEF, and thisled to the development of a convoy reaction mission. This missionnot only focused on the ability of executing a convoy andconducting react-to-contact drills, it also trained the cadets onroute clearance missions, resupply missions, and reacting to IEDs.Cadets were able to focus on eight of the 9 Warrior Drills whileconducting this mission.

“The cadets are pushed a little harder, hold more responsibilityas cadet leaders and actually learn techniques and procedures theycan take directly to the Army as platoon leaders,” MAJ Condesaid.

Cordon and search is the only company-sized mission ofOHW. This mission consisted of an extensive planning period,an air assault, establishment of a patrol base, then the actualcordon and search that has the propensity to escalate into anurban attack. This mission allows cadets the opportunity toconduct deliberate troop leading procedures and missionrehearsals. When the cadets are entering the village, they mustestablish contact with the village leader (who was played by anArabic linguist from Iraq).

TRAINING NOTES


Captain Ryan Morgan is the Cadet Summer Training S3 at the UnitedStates Military Academy. His previous assignments include serving ascommander of C Company and Headquarters and Headquarters Company,2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) duringOperation Iraqi Freedom I. He has also served as an Infantry RequirementsAnalyst at the Futures Center, Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and DoctrineCommand.

The cadet company commander, through an interpreter,discusses the operation with the sheik, tries to gain his trust andcooperation, and execute a safe, controlled search of the village.The enemy has also infiltrated the village, and the cadets mustthen search and clear the buildings with the enemy in them. Afterthe battle, the cadet commander must return to the sheik and repairthe relationship damaged by the enemy attack. This is an eye-opening experience for most cadets, from having to talk throughan interpreter and deal with the obvious, and not so obvious,cultural differences, to conducting building and room clearancein a company operation.

The quick reaction force (QRF) interacted with all of the othermissions in addition to conducting its own separate missions.The QRF had priorities of planning given to it by the regimentalcommander, and it conducted TLPs in support of this guidance.In addition to supporting each of the other missions, the OPRconducted searches for mortar teams, downed aircrew rescue,and medical evacuations (MEDEVACs). This mission gavecadets the opportunity to conduct planning along multipletimelines, and to coordinate with multiple units to support theirmission.

One huge difference that stands out with the summer trainingof 2006 from previous summers was that the operations, acrossthe entire summer, were continuous. The regimentalcommander and staff had the challenge of managing all aspectsof the cadet’s summer. They organized training, events, andactivities for down time (what little of it there was). The staffconducted mission planning for all missions and trainingevents, and coordinated with the eight company commandersin daily battle update briefs. The result was a summer trainingprogram that was run by cadets for cadets from the first day to thelast.

“Compared to past years, CFT was a truer reflection of trainingin the real Army,” said Cadet Command Sergeant Major AmeliaWiershem.

The field training conducted by cadets during the summer of2006, more so than in recent years and especially during OperationHighland Warrior, exposed cadets to what they can expect to seewhen they graduate. The objective is not to make all cadets expertsin all of the missions, but to place cadets in situations that takethem out of their comfort zone and force them to make difficultdecisions. The overall purpose of Cadet Summer Training is totrain, instruct, test, and validate cadets and new cadets on specificBasic Officer Leader Course I (BOLC I) tasks, Military ProgramRequired Tasks (MPRT), and the Chief of Staff of the Army’sWarrior Tasks and Drills focused by the global war on terrorismwithin the contemporary operational environment, and this lastsummer was a resounding success.

A cadet interacts with a villager during the training exercise.

— just as the .455 Webley — can also be loaded using full-moonclips.

The M1933Tokarev (Figure4) is a modifiedColt and Browningdesign, and was thestandard issue Sovietsidearm from 1933until the 1950’s. The7.62x25mm is a

high-velocity round and generates more muzzleenergy than the .455 Webley, but less than the 9mm

Parabellum and the .45 ACP. The Tokarev is to be found inservice in many of the former Soviet surrogate and client

states around the world. A cautionary note when handlingthis pistol: it has no manual safety, but only a half cock featurethat locks the slide.

The Browning Hi-Power (Figure 5) is the sidearm of Britishand Australianc o a l i t i o nforces in Iraq.

Prior to thedefeat of

Iraq, it was also thefavored sidearmof high-ranking

Iraqi officers,including SaddamHussein himself.Chambered for the NATO standard9x19mm round, the Browning is widely distributeddue to its accuracy, reliability, and the ready availability

of 9mm Parabellum ammunition. The pistol’s basic design wasthe work of American John M. Browning, who patented it in 1922.The pistol was first manufactured in Belgium, where it was refinedand manufactured as the M1935. When Belgium was overrun byGerman forces in World War II, the M1935 continued to bemanufacturedand used by theAxis, whileother factoriesin Canada madethe pistol for Allied use.

The Beretta Model 92(Figure 6) pistol firstappeared in 1975 andthe United StatesArmy adopted it as a

Not all of the handguns carried by today’s combatantsare of recent manufacture or are any longer standardissue. The pistols and revolvers found in Afghanistan

and Iraq, for example, include the venerable British .455 Webleythat was in service from 1915-1947. The big Webley (Figure 1)was the standard British service pistol during most of World War I,and was latersuperseded by a .38/200 (.38 caliber, 200grain bullet) revolverin 1936 because it wasfelt the .455 was toopowerful for generalmilitary use. The .455 revolvers were resurrectedfrom storage during the massive buildup for World War IIand reissued, either in their original .455 caliber or in aversion converted to fire the powerful .45 Automatic Colt Pistol(ACP) round, and which could be loaded by means of 3-roundmoon clips (Figure 9).

The United States adopted the Colt automatic pistol as itssidearm in 1911. Based upon WWI experience, changes were latermade to the trigger, tang, sights, grip and other features, and in1926 the improvedweapon was designatedthe Pistol U.S. Caliber.45 Model 1911A1(Figure 2). More than2,400,000 M1911A1’swere issued to U.S.forces, and the pistolserved us through the Cold War. The number of thesepistols made under separate contract for foreigngovernments and commercial markets is in the hundreds ofthousands and, due to their reliability and the impressiveknockdown power of the .45 ACP round, they are still to be foundwherever shooters need a reliable, powerful pistol.

When the United States entered World War I, fewer than 56,000of the M1911 service pistol were available for the Army and MarineCorps, so both Colt and Smith & Wesson received contracts toproduce the UnitedStates Revolver,Caliber .45, M1917,based on earlier Coltand Smith & Wessondesigns. The M1917(Figure 3) used thesame ammunition as the .45 service pistol,with ammunition held in 3-round half-moon clips for easeof loading and of ejecting the fired cases. Today, the M1917

WWWWWEAPONSEAPONSEAPONSEAPONSEAPONS C C C C CORNERORNERORNERORNERORNER

HANDGUNS OF THE GWOT


Figure 1 —Webley Mark VI.455 Webley &

Scott

Figure 2 —Colt Model 1911A1

.45 ACP

Figure 3 —Model 1917 Colt

.45 ACP

Figure 4 —M1933 Tokarev7.62x25mm (.30

Tokarev)

Figure 5 —Browning Hi-Power9mm Parabellum

(9x19)

Figure 6 —Model 92 Beretta9mm Parabellum

(9x19)

TRAINING NOTES


BULLET BULLET MUZZLE MUZZLE CARTRIDGE WEIGHT (grains) TYPE VELOCITY (ft/sec) ENERGY (ft. lbs.)

.45 ACP 230 gr. FMJ 880 401

.455 Webley 262 gr. Lead 700 2859mm Parabellum 112 gr. FMJ 1262 423 (9X19mm) (U.S. Army M882)9mm Makarov 95 gr. FMJ 1000 211 (9X18mm).380 Browning 90 gr. FMJ 910 165(9X17mm Short)7.62 Browning 71 gr. FMJ 905 129 (.32 ACP)7.62X25mm 71 gr. FMJ 425 305 Tokarev

NOTE: Ballistic figures are approximate and may vary according to bullet weight, powder charge, barrel length,and other factors. However, the data shown represent the characteristics of most handguns carried bycoalition, host nation, and enemy forces in the COE.

replacement for ourM1911A1 in 1985.Chambered for theNATO 9x19mm round, itfacilitates resupply of ammunitionbetween NATO partners.While made in anumber of variationssuch as the compactversion, the Model92’s carried by theU.S. and Italy areessentially the samepistol, and could beinterchanged without creatinginteroperability issues. The 9mmParabellum is generally adequate for mostapplications, and that is the overridingconsideration.

In 1951 the Soviet Union replaced theM1933 Tokarev with the 9x18mmMakarov (Figure 7) as its servicesidearm, which meant that thepistol would soon be adoptedthroughout the Soviet Union’ssubsidiary states. While theMakarov is more powerful that itsclosest relative, the .380 Browning(9x17mm or 9mm Short), it generatessignificantly less muzzle energy than

either the 9mm Parabellum or the .45 ACP(Figure 10). While the lion’s share ofMakarovs were made in Russia, they werealso produced in China, Bulgaria, and EastGermany. According to Wikipedia — anexcellent source of firearms data, by the way

— handguns chambered for the9x18mm cartridge were also made

Figure 7 —Makarov

9mmMakarov

(9x18)

Figure 8 —7.62 mm Tarik

(.32 ACP)

in Poland and Hungary, butare not true Makarovs.

During SaddamHussein’s reign, theIraqis manufactured a7.65mm pistol underBeretta license. Namedthe Tarik (Figure 8), itis chambered for the .32ACP cartridge and was

initially intended for issue tomembers of the Republican Guard.Externally, it closely resembles the BerettaM1935, another small and easily concealedpocket pistol.

This is but a glimpse of the variety ofhandguns that can turn up wherever ourSoldiers are deployed. Some of the moreesoteric calibers such as 7.62 Nagant, 9mmUltra, 7.63 Mauser, 9mm Bergmann-Bayard, and others appear in the marketsand bazaars and in private hands, but such

ammunition is no longer readilyavailable. If you come across aweapon or cartridge you cannotidentify, send us a digital image andwe’ll try to help.

(Weapons photographed courtesyof the National Infantry Museum,Fort Benning, Ga.)

Figure 10 — Comparative Handgun Cartridge Ballistics

Figure 9 — .45 ACP full-moonand half-moon clips

Fighting The Breakout: The GermanArmy In Normandy From ‘Cobra’ To TheFalaise Gap. Edited by David C. Isby.London: Greenhill Books, 2004, 255pages. Reviewed by Lieutenant ColonelMichael A. Boden.

The events of Fighting the Breakout:The German Army in Normandy From“Cobra” to the Falaise Gap are familiarto most students of World War II. As partof its series on World War II Germanmilitary debriefs, Greenhill Books herepublishes a collection of personal accountsfrom five German generals, all of whomwere instrumental in the activities of theSeventh Army during the campaign. Thesefirsthand accounts are presented in oneconsolidated collection for students of theera to study.

For the most part, the selections are fromthe after action reviews and post-wardebriefs of Generalmajor Freiherr vonGersdorff (chief of staff, German SeventhArmy) although chapters from GermanGenerals Hausser, Fahrmacher, Eberbachand von Luettwitz are included. These menall figured prominently in the Germandefense against the expanding alliedarmies, and their accounts representoperational perspectives on the fightingduring the critical period betweenOperation Cobra and the closing of theFalaise pocket — three weeks that sealedthe fate of German hopes for a positivedecision in Normandy. Most readers willbe acquainted with these men, their units,and their stories from the hundreds ofsecondary sources covering this period ofthe war; all of these contributions have beencited regularly by scholars in the past half-century. Here, the accounts stand on theirown and can be read without lookingthrough the prism of another writer.

As with many primary sourcecollections, however, there are drawbacksfor the casual reader. These accounts allcontain a great deal of detail and specificitywhich can prove difficult, presented in therespective authors’ formal verbiage. Theaudience for such accounts is admittedlylimited, but those who are studying any

aspect of the examined operations will reapgreat rewards working through theseimportant and substantial accounts.Besides commentary on the positioning andmovement of forces, these officers’ storiesaddress other aspects of the Normandyfighting, such as the impact of Allied airsuperiority and French partisan actions.These discussions are particularlyinteresting in light of six decades ofhindsight, research, and historicalknowledge.

Fighting the Breakout is a useful andinformative collection, despite thesometimes thick reading. Thesereminiscences of German general officersserves as a valuable parallel to the trialsand tribulations of the common soldiers ofthe war, and the perspectives here shouldnot be forgotten.

Lee & Grant: Profiles in Leadershipfrom the Battlefields of Virginia. ByMajor Charles R. Bowery Jr, U. S. Army.American Management Association,2005. 262 pages, $24 (Hardcover).Reviewed by Command Sergeant Major(Retired) James Clifford.

The recent ascendancy of the militaryas an institution in the minds of the publichas given rise to a spate of books designedto teach the rest of the world, especiallythe business world, the leadership lessonsof our most revered leaders andorganizations. A search of a popularbookselling website using the words‘leadership lessons of…’ brings upthousands such books, most based onmilitary examples. Virtual bookstoreshelves are full of titles about the leadershiplessons of Navy Seals, Army Rangers, LordNelson, Alexander the Great, Lewis &Clark, Patton and a host of others; and, ofcourse, several on Grant and Lee. Add thisbook to the growing list.

Lee & Grant is published by theAmerican Management Association andtargets the business world. This, and allbooks of this type, is based on the widely


held belief that the military is the premierleadership laboratory in existence today.Such an idea ebbs and flows in the publicmind, but currently the military is riding along wave of admiration with no end insight. Among the countless icons of stellarleadership, Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E.Lee are some of the most popular. Theauthor, an active duty aviator, formerhistory professor at West Point, and veteranof Operation Iraqi Freedom, focuses on theOverland Campaign of 1864, in whichGrant fought Lee to the gates of Richmond,to illustrate his leadership examples.

He juxtaposes his points against currentArmy leadership doctrine as articulated inField Manual 22-100, skillfully explainingthe different categories of direct,organizational, and strategic leadership.Bowery points out that in the OverlandCampaign Lee and Grant applied theinterpersonal, conceptual, technical, andtactical leadership skills that are the basisof the organizational level of leadership.

While businessmen with little or noknowledge of military leadership may findLee & Grant useful, it will also providesome service to Soldiers as the author usesexamples to illustrate his points. In onesuch case, the author does a good job ofusing Grant’s assumption of overallcommand of the Union armies as ademonstration of how one can take overbusiness responsibilities, especially in achallenging situation. In anothercircumstance, he explains how leadershipby example can redeem a bad decision suchas in the well-known ‘Lee to the rear’incident in the May 1864 Wilderness battle.The book is full of such well-illustratedexamples that correspond with the tenetsof FM 22-100. Bowery harvests these andtranslates them into business lessons thatcan be used with equal success by civilianmanagers and Soldier leaders alike. He alsocloses the book with a useful template foroff-site visits to battlefields suitable forbusiness leaders.

Students of the Civil War, however, mayfind some reason to take issue with theauthor’s interpretation of events depending

BOOK REVIEWS


on their view vis-à-vis the “Lost CauseTheory.” This is the theory that attributesthe Southern defeat to several causes butplaces no blame on the Southernersthemselves. The foundation of this theoryis idolatry of Lee. Bowery does bowsomewhat at Lee’s altar himself. Hischaracterization of Lee’s betrayal of theUnion as a show of Lee’s “inner strengthof character that made him the great leaderhe was” (p. 20) made this student of theCivil War cringe. Additionally, the authormakes a few other curious assertions aboutthe war such as when he mentions thatUnion General George McClellan was a“very competent” leader whose petulanceprevented him from “earning the credibilityand freedom of action that he [McClellan]thought he deserved” (p. 27-28).

Other than those minor concerns, Lee& Grant: Profiles in Leadership from theBattlefields in Virginia is stronglyrecommended.

The German Way of War: From theThirty Years’ War to the Third Reich. ByRobert M. Citino. Lawrence, KS:University Press of Kansas, 2005, 428pages, $34.95 (cloth). Reviewed byLieutenant Colonel (Retired) RickBaillergeon.

We have all heard the old adage, “Don’tfix it if it ain’t broke!” However, in today’ssociety it seems these words are rarelyheeded as people continually try to reinventthe wheel. Fortunately, author RobertCitino is from the old school of thought.His most recent effort, The German Way ofWar, follows the same formula of the othersuperb books I have read by him. It ishighly researched, superbly written, trulyinformative, and a book that is simplyoutstanding!

For years, we in the military circles havethrown out constant references to a“German way of war.” In developingcourses of action or drawing parallels totactics or doctrine, it was always vogue tothrow out German historical references.Regrettably, for many, there was no clearunderstanding of what was truly this“German way of war.” Citino clears upthese misconceptions and greatly broadensa reader’s understanding of the concepts

they used so freely in the past.Citino answers three key questions for

readers. First, “What characterizes theGerman way of war?” Second, “Why didthey develop this style of warfare?” Finally,“What events and people shaped andinfluenced this style of war?” In answeringthese questions, he provides exhaustiveresearch to his readers and a rare ability toput his keen insight into words that readerscan comprehend.

Based on his research, Citino focuses hisstudy from the Prussian First Northern Warof 1655 to the collapse of the Third Reichattack into Russia during World War II.Readers will find detailed discussion on thewars, campaigns, and battles fought by thePrussian, Bismarckian, Weimer, and Naziregimes during this nearly 300-year period.Additionally, Citino keys on the men whofought and led these conflicts and those whoshaped doctrine and thought. Theseinclude Frederick the Great, Moltke (theElder), Clausewitz, Schlieffen, von Seeckt,and Manstein. Of the men highlightedabove, the author is especially effective inhis treatment of Frederick, Clausewitz, andSchlieffen.

After reading previous volumes byCitino, I find there is always anticipationas to what intriguing insight or freshcomment may come up on the nextparagraph or page. Certainly, within thepages of The German Way of War there isno shortage of excellent material that willmake you think or question yourself as towhy you never thought of that. One suchexample follows next. When surmising theoverall career of Frederick the Great, Citinostates, “He was perhaps, Frederick theGreat, but he was certainly Frederick theLucky. To which one is tempted to add:anyone who is lucky eventually receives aninvitation to leave the casino.”

As in his past works, it is the addedextras that truly set a Citino book from mostvolumes. In The German Way of War, heinserts dozens of pen and ink drawings ofthe men he analyzes and adds over a dozenmaps to depict key battles and campaigns.Even more impressive, is the author’s notesection at the end of the book. Citinoprovides more than 60 pages of notesdiscussing his sources and providingreaders additional information if they seekfurther material on a specific subject. I

believe there is no better writer today inproviding this valuable service to hisreaders.

I found Citino’s last effort, Blitzkrieg toDesert Storm: The Evolution ofOperational Warfare to be, perhaps, thebest book I read in 2004. Certainly, othersagreed as it was awarded several prestigiousawards and was highly acclaimed innumerous publications. However, I believeThe German Way of War may be even betterbecause of its specific focus and his uttercommand of the subject area. It is one ofthose rare books that allows Citino to notonly teach his readers, but also facilitatesfuture learning. It is truly highlyrecommended reading and I again lookforward to his next project. What was thatadage again? “If it ain’t broke…”

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED —Given Up for Dead: America’s Heroic

Stand at Wake Island. By Bill Sloan.Bantam Books, 2003.

Fighting for American Black Soldiers:The Unsung Heroes of World War II. ByChristopher Paul Moore. BallantineBooks, 2005.

Gunner’s Glory. By Johnnie M. Clark.Ballantine Books - Presidio, 2004.

A Life in a Year: The AmericanInfantryman in Vietnam. By James R.Ebert. Ballantine Books - Presidio, 2003.

Hill 488. By Ray Hildreth and CharlesW. Sasser. Pocket Books, 2003.

Soul Patrol. By Ed Emanuel.Ballantine Books - Presidio, 2003.

Recondo: LRRPs in the 101st. ByLarry Chamber. Ballantine Books -Presidio, 2003.

To the Far Side of Hell: The Battle forPeleliu, 1944. By Derrick Wright. FireAnt Books, 2005.

Visions from a Foxhole: A Rifleman inPatton’s Ghost Corps. By William A.Foley, Jr. Ballantine Books - Presidio,2003.

Down South: One Tour in Vietnam. ByWilliam H. Hardwick. Ballantine Books- Presidio, 2004.

The Do-or-Die Men: The 1st MarineRaider Battalion at Guadalcanal. ByGeorge W. Smith. Pocket Books, 2003.

Stalin’s War: Tragedy and Triumph,1941-1945. By Edwin P. Hoyt. CooperSquare Press, 2003.


Above, Soldiers with the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, come acrossa mortar tube during a mission in Mosul, Iraq. At right, a 10th MountainDivision Soldier patrols near Aranas, Afghanistan.

Specialist Christa Martin

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Infantry - Fort Benning...6 TSM STRYKER/BRADLEY CORNER: SNIPERS IN THE SBCT Major Mark S. Leslie 10...

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