INfORMATION ShARING MODELS AND...

June 2008

IN NATIONAL, CROSS-BORDER ANDINTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT

INfORMATIONShARING MODELSAND INTEROPERABILITY

Crisis Management InitiativeTilburg UniversityCrisis Management Centre FinlandElisa Ltd.June 2008

Authors: Willem Muhren (Tilburg University), Meeri-Maria Jaarva (CMI), Kristiina Rintakoski (CMI), Jari Sundqvist (CMC)

Additional research team members: Gerd Van Den Eede(Tilburg University), Damir Durbic (Tilburg University),Juha-Matti Seppänen (CMI), Ilkka Demander (Elisa)

Project management board members: Risto Ojanperä (Elisa),Bartel Van De Walle (Tilburg University), Jari Sundqvist (CMC),Kirsi Henriksson (CMC), Kristiina Rintakoski (CMI),Mika Hyytiäinen (National Defence University)

IN NATIONAL, CROSS-BORDER ANDINTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT

INfORMATIONShARING MODELSAND INTEROPERABILITY

Due to the anonymity promised our interviewees we cannot thank them publicly, but we

would like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation by mentioning the organi-

sations they work for.

For the case study in the Democratic Republic of Congo we would like to thank the peo-

ple from the following organisations: Association pour la Santé Familiale (ASF), Swedish

International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)

Belgium, Save the Children, Oxfam GB, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),

UN Population Fund (UNFPA), UN Development Programme (UNDP), Office for the Coordi-

nation of Humanitarian Affairs (UN/OCHA), World Food Programme (WFP), UN Children’s

Fund (UNICEF), Belgian Government Consulate, Mission of the UN in the DRC (MONUC),

European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), Catholic Relief Services (CRS),

World Health Organization (WHO), and UK Department For International Development

(DFID).

For the Barents Rescue Exercise we would like to thank the people who were part of

the following teams in the exercise: On Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC), On-

Site Command Center (OSC), Medical team, and Local Emergency Management Authority

(LEMA).

For the case study on Portuguese forest fires we would like to thank the people from

the following organisations, both in Lisbon and Brussels: Portuguese Forest Services, Por-

tuguese National Authority for Civil Protection, European Commission DG Environment,

and Civil Protection Unit of the Council of the European Union.

For the Bosnian case study we would like to thank the people from the following or-

ganisations: European Union Police Mission (EUPM), European Commission (EC), Europe-

an Union Force (EUFOR), European Union Special Representative’s office (EUSR), Canton

Sarajevo Police Department, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

and Populari.

ACkNOwLEDGEMENTS

6 INFORMaTION SHaRING MODELS aND INTEROpERaBILITy 7INFORMaTION SHaRING MODELS aND INTEROpERaBILITy

This study aims to improve the understanding of information sharing models and interop-

erability in national, cross-border and international crisis management. The project’s four

case studies have been chosen to reflect four different types of crisis: natural disaster (Por-

tuguese forest fires), accident (Barents Rescue Exercise), complex emergency (humanitar-

ian assistance in DR Congo) and post-conflict state-building (EU Police Mission in Bosnia

and Herzegovina). In order to investigate the essential information needs and information-

sharing models in crisis situations, it is valuable to gain a good understanding of how actors

process information. This study uses the Sensemaking theory as a theoretical lens to better

understand how this is done.

The main findings of the case studies are grouped into three themes: two-way commu-

nication, interoperability of crisis response and decision-making in crisis situations. The

study concludes that communicating and explaining the objectives and activities to the local

population is vital in a crisis management operation. Often there is room for improvement

in the public information area in international assistance missions. While national crisis

management missions regularly operate in settings where they are close to the local popu-

lation, there is often a lack of understanding of the needs for citizens to be informed of what

is going on. Timely and clear information is a crucial component in managing consequences

and of recovery. The study showed that information sharing when it happens is mostly one

directional: from the authorities to the citizens.

The study confirmed the findings of previous research that the exchange of information

with people from other organisations during crisis situations is often done informally. These

contacts are not institutionalised, but are established on a personal basis. Information is

shared more easily with people that one knows and trusts. However, it is clear that technol-

ogy cannot help in information exchange if it is based completely on personal contacts. On

the other hand trust can be built through, for example, common trainings in the mission

area. It creates a sense of community and trust can be built which increases information

sharing during crisis situations. In post-conflict crisis management operations where the

situation is relatively calm, information sharing settles into more institutionalised ways and

is not as ad hoc as during an acute crisis.

The study revealed that there are a number of shared requirements in terms of essential

information and tools in national, cross-border and international crisis management. There

are widely shared information needs such as situational picture, incidents, and other actors,

but otherwise the essential information needs are mostly mandate-related. The different

levels also share many of the same obstacles in achieving interoperability. Obtaining and

maintaining shared situational awareness and picture is seen often a key challenge in cri-

sis response where several organisations are working in parallel. Organisations continue to

plan and procure their information and communications technology for their own organisa-

tional mission partly ignoring the multi-actor reality of crisis response. At the national level

there are more efforts and investments into interagency interoperability. A positive develop-

ment that the study noted is that interoperability is not any more seen as mainly a technol-

ogy issue but organisational and human aspects of interoperability are better recognised.

The study concludes that within crisis response organisations there is a need for leader-

ship and initiative to determine how communications systems best support the delivery of

the organisational mission in a complex interagency environment. Political, organisational

and other substance related factors should determine the development of systems, not the

availability and push of technology solutions. Senior management would need to take an

increased interest in what kind of tools and systems should be used in crisis management

operations, so as to develop the tools from a needs based perspective. The report makes a

number of recommendations on how to increase interoperability and information sharing:

International organisationsThe UN needs to develop communications solutions that work in poor infrastructure •

conditions. These tools could be especially based on mobile phones.

The UN would be well placed to identify the shared information needs among different •

actors and to facilitate trust building.

The EU should do a mapping study on the concepts and systems in use in both ESDP and •

in civil protection in order to make the existing gaps and synergies between systems

visible and to highlight their functions and possibilities.

ESDP operations should have a clear communication strategy in place prior to the •

launch of an operation in order to clearly explain the mandate and manage expectations

of the local population. Effective two-way communication should be implemented and

resources allocated to press departments including sufficient numbers of highly quali-

fied staff and adequate financial means.

The development of the CIS concept for ESDP civilian operations should be finalised and •

its implementation in future operations assured.

Civilian CIS capacity should be enhanced and user requirements for civilian actors es-•

tablished to increase civil-military cooperation in planning ESDP operations.

ESDP crisis management missions should be equipped with a web-based information •

management tool from the outset. At the very least this should include a central report

repository with a search tool, a situational picture and discussion fora. This information

management tool should be easy to link to Brussels, and building similar systems for

different missions would bring economy of scale benefits as well as familiarity to those

staff members who have been in earlier missions.

Timely deployment of communication and information systems for ESDP civilian mis-•

sions needs to be improved.

The European Group of Training should include two-way communication in EU civilian •

crisis management training modules.

EXECuTIvE SuMMARY


GovernmentsAll governments should do a mapping exercise of existing civil protection agreements •

and mechanisms where they are involved and study the uniformity and interoperability

between different mechanisms.

Governments should work out the procedures for requesting and receiving aid and •

should clarify the uniformity of definitions and language.

Governments should develop comprehensive crisis communication strategies that ef-•

fectively address the need for two way communication.

Governments should promote public-private partnerships in addressing crisis manage-•

ment challenges and create opportunities and incentives for the private sector’s engage-

ment in projects where profit is not gained immediately by sharing the financial risk

through public support for projects.

Private sectorPrivate sector companies should become more involved in development projects seek-•

ing to improve crisis communications and seek new partnerships and new ways to en-

gage with governments and international organisations.

NGOsNGOs need to develop methods and mechanisms to share information with other ac-•

tors without losing their perceived neutrality. An example of a possible mechanism can

be found in Afghanistan where NGOs have created a third-party NGO to function as a

middle man in information sharing between them and other actors.

NGOs should develop information management practises and analysis capacity in order •

to overcome the information over-flow and processing of “raw data” into meaningful

knowledge for decision making. Focused and timely analysis of events, incidents, proj-

ects and actors would be needed.

There should be humanitarian NGO sector wide institutional learning process from •

implemented systems capturing lessons learned and best practice in order to replicate

successful systems.

Research communityFor appropriate information systems design, the research community should take into •

account human issues that facilitate or hinder information sharing.

Research should address the added value of social networking and information sharing •

in crisis management operations.

The research community should address how Sensemaking can bring new insights into •

how people process information and make decisions in crisis situations and how that

affects and should affect technology development.

1 INTRODuCTION: ThE SCOPE Of ThE STuDY 10

2 STATE Of ThE ART IN INTEROPERABILITY

AND INfORMATION ShARING 12

2.1 National and cross-border crisis management 12

2.2 International crisis management 15

2.3 Initiatives for new tools and partnerships 19

3 RESEARCh METhODOLOGY:

SENSE-MAkING AS A fRAMEwORk 22

4 CASE STuDIES 24

4.1 Forest fires in portugal 24

4.1.1 Background 24

4.1.2 Main findings 25

4.2 Barents Rescue Exercise 28

4.2.1 Background 28


4.3 Humanitarian crisis in DR Congo 31

4.3.1 Background 31


4.4 ESDp police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 35

4.4.1 Background 35


5 CONCLuSIONS 40

5.1 Two-way communication 40

5.2 Interoperability of crisis response 40

5.3 Decision-making in crisis situations 42

6 RECOMMENDATIONS 44

References 46

CONTENT


1 INTRODuCTION: ThE SCOPE Of ThE STuDY

The management of a crisis is often a big, complex and drawn-out operation, which in-

volves many public and private organisations. It relies on the ability of all levels of govern-

ment and the private sector to communicate and cooperate effectively with one another.

In many cases, organisational relations and responsibilities are not necessarily clearly

delineated – such as in the relations between military and civilian operators in both na-

tional and international emergencies. The nature of threats and emergencies makes cross-

border coordination more important than ever. The number of crisis management opera-

tions outside the European Union is growing and they are faced with similar cooperation

challenges with other actors – local and international – present in the area.

Information is key to successful cooperation. This includes the mutual exchange of infor-

mation within public administration, communication with the media and the communica-

tion of risks and safety information to and from the public. A key challenge in the future is

how essential information can be identified and communicated in real time safely to those

who need it.

Communications interoperability and shared situational awareness are now widely rec-

ognised as vital to effective day-to-day public safety services as well as emergency response.

They ensure that personnel can communicate and coordinate response actions with one an-

other regardless of agency or department affiliation. However, even if the technical capabili-

ties are available the organisational, institutional and political factors are seen as powerful

barriers to cooperation and information sharing. Crisis cooperation relies often on ad hoc

models and improvisation instead of tested models and concepts.

Technology is only one component of more complex socio-technical systems. The intro-

duction of technology is dependent on other factors such as organisational commitment,

training, and policies that affect how a new technology is managed in an organisational

context; roles that various stakeholders play in designing, developing, and implementing

a technology; and the role of user groups in determining how technologies come to be sys-

tems embedded in complex institutional and cultural contexts. As Kristiina Rintakoski and

Simo Alho note in their study commissioned by the European Parliament, though the devel-

opment of communication technology has greatly changed the model of communication in

the last 50 years, it has not changed the crisis intervention management model as much.

The proper management of information and the resulting analysis of crisis situations

are crucial for informed decision-making and the effective use of resources. In any crisis

management situation, the critical factor in making timely, appropriate decisions is to have

the benefit of the optimum amount of quality information. This may come from a variety

of sources that need to be integrated in an information system that is appropriate for the

environment in which it is being used. The situations on the ground are often extremely

complex and volatile and can change rapidly without warning. A coherent and co-ordinated

reaction can only be based on accurate information that must be produced and transmitted

with speed and precision.

This study is the final report of a project aiming to improve the understanding of in-

formation-sharing models and interoperability in national, cross-border and international

crisis management. The project was carried out in 2007-2008 by the Crisis Management

Initiative, Tilburg University, the Crisis Management Centre Finland and Elisa Ltd. The proj-

ect’s general method was case study research. The project analysed information exchange

and interoperability in four case study contexts at the national, cross-border and interna-

tional level: forest fires in Portugal, Barents Rescue Exercise in October 2007, international

involvement in the humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Euro-

pean Union’s police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The four case studies have been chosen to reflect four different types of crisis: natural

disaster (Portuguese forest fires), accident (Barents Rescue Exercise), complex emergency

(humanitarian assistance in DRC) and post-conflict state-building (EU Police Mission in BiH).

The project also wished to study different crises phases: prevention (Portugal), ad-hoc or

short term crisis (Barents Rescue), ongoing or long term crisis (DRC) and post-crisis (BiH).

The four case studies have been studied at different levels of activity: the Portuguese forest

fires and the humanitarian crisis in DRC were studied at the strategic level while the other

two case studies mainly dealt with the operational level. By studying different kinds of crisis

management operations, from a natural disaster to a post-conflict state-building project, the

project aims to show a continuum in national, cross-border and international crisis manage-

ment and their interoperability challenges.

1. Kristiina Rintakoski and Simo alho (2008), “Improving the Coherence of Crisis Management: New Technologies for Command

and Control Systems”, Study for the European parliament policy Department External policies, February 2008, p. 1


2 STATE Of ThE ART IN INTEROPERABILITY AND INfORMATION ShARING

The number and diversity of actors and networks involved in crisis management creates

many coordination challenges. Information sharing and coordination requires interoper-

ability. By that this study does not only mean technological interoperability, but political,

organisational, operational and technical as well. Numerous initiatives to increase the in-

teroperability of crisis management actors on different levels do exist, but they are scat-

tered around the international community. The following chapters aim to map the scene

of national, cross-border and international crisis management actors’ activities and initia-

tives in the field of interoperability and information sharing.

2.1 National and cross-border crisis managementRequirements for public safety and security mobile communications systems are rapidly

evolving as a direct result of recent world events. Responses to many major disasters are

adversely affected by the lack of interoperability between the responding emergency ser-

vices. The need for secure and fully meshed communication between agencies is evolving

as a key strategic requirement for all public safety organisations. Standardised and in-

teroperable communication systems are of vital importance to first responders. These sys-

tems should be able to seamlessly and dynamically interconnect multiple users, who have

many functions, and numerous information and communications technology systems.

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and hurricane Katrina, the United States Department of

Homeland Security has paid an increasing amount of attention to interoperability in domes-

tic crisis response. The Department of Homeland Security’s communications programme,

SAFECOM, is the main vehicle for improving interoperability for first responders within the

US. SAFECOM works within existing federal communications initiatives and emergency re-

sponse stakeholders to address the need to develop better technologies and processes for

the multi-jurisdictional and cross-disciplinary coordination of existing systems and future

networks. SAFECOM has launched and concluded the RapidCom initiative2, for example, a

programme that was designed to ensure that a minimum level of emergency response in-

teroperability would be in place in ten high-threat urban areas in the US.

The results of the programme have been feeding into the “Interoperability Continuum”,

which describes the core facets of interoperability according to the stated needs and chal-

lenges of the emergency response community and aids emergency responders and policy

makers in their interoperability efforts. The Continuum addresses five critical elements for

success in interoperable crisis response: governance, standard operating procedures, tech-

nology, training and exercises, and usage of interoperable communications.3 While these

five elements are all addressed in the Continuum, it seems that most attention is given to

communications interoperability and technology development. However, issues such as

planning and coordination, standards and lack of awareness of the importance of interoper-

ability are also studied.

In the European Union the responsibility and mechanisms in civil protection are divided

between the Council and the Commission with some overlapping elements. Rapid and coher-

ent coordination and decision-making is at the core of an effective response. Steps have been

taken to improve the effectiveness of the political coordination process in Brussels and the

mechanisms for calling on available assets.

The EU established the Community Civil Protection Mechanism in 2001. The mechanism

links national authorities of 30 countries4 to the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC),

which can forward a request for assistance from one state through the network to all na-

tional points of contact.

The MIC mechanism is to be improved in two major ways in the near future. First, a se-

cure general rapid alert system (ARGUS) will be created that will link the MIC to the six other

rapid response systems within the community, ranging from the ECURIE system (radiologi-

cal emergency) and BICHAT (biological and chemical threats), to EWRS (communicable dis-

eases) and ADNS (animal health)5. The Commission will enhance its ability to coordinate

efforts and lead the assistance in case of an emergency. To this end, a communication and

information system (CESIS) has been created for the MIC. A new Central Crisis Centre is also

being established, that will bring representatives from all relevant Commission services to-

gether during an emergency. The Commission’s role has thereby expanded from mere con-

tingency planning to the running of operational centres in the event of an emergency. How-

ever, it is too early to evaluate whether these new measures have helped to bring coherence

to the Community response.

The Council had on several occasions requested the setting up of integrated EU arrange-

ments for crisis management with cross-border effects. The manual on EU emergency and

Crisis Coordination Arrangements (CCA)6 was submitted to the Council in June 2006. The

CCA sets out how EU Institutions and affected Member States interact in Brussels during a

crisis mode. Not all emergencies require a coordinated EU response at the political level and

therefore CCA is only applied to a few of the most severe emergencies. The manual is built

on the key principle of subsidiarity. Member States are still primarily responsible for the

management of crises within their territory, and the manual does not impose any obliga-

tions, nor does it change existing competencies. Nevertheless, the manual is cross pillar and

relevant to external crises and as well as those within the EU, and aims to assist Member

States during emergencies.

Within civil protection in the EU Member States the diversity of technologies used by

different countries and user groups creates serious interoperability problems at different

levels, from the level of equipment to the level of applications and user/system requirements.

The interoperability problem reduces the efficiency of emergency response, especially in

complex situations and/or those requiring coordinated international efforts.

2 http://www.safecomprogram.gov/SaFECOM/interoperability

3 US Department of Homeland Security, SaFECOM Interoperability Continuum Brochure

4 EU-27, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway

5 European Commission (2004) “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European parliament on

preparedness and consequence management in the fight against terrorism”, p.10

6 Council of the European Union (2005) “The manual on EU emergency and Crisis Coordination arrangements”


Many countries have already deployed or are currently deploying nationwide coverage

with Professional Mobile Radio (PMR) narrowband systems. They are based on TETRA7 or

TETRAPOL digital radio network. For example Belgium8, Finland9, Sweden10, France11, Spain12

and the Czech Republic13 have deployed public authority network that provides the local and

national authorities and agencies with a safe and reliable management and communica-

tions system.

Using one network enables the relevant authorities and agencies to respond more flex-

ibly and in a more coordinated way when dealing with major accidents. These networks

have made it possible to introduce new forms of cooperation between different services and

agencies, and have added a new dimension to national security. Despite being a common

system, the network, such as VIRVE in Finland provides its users, such as the police, fire bri-

gades and rescue personnel, with all the services of dedicated networks. Particular emphasis

has been given to guaranteeing data protection and ensuring high-speed data and speech

throughput. The network in Belgium, called ASTRID is based on two technological advances:

a digital radio network and computer-aided control rooms. Numerous new applications en-

hance operational efficiency, including data and image transmission, message encryption,

GPS and high-volume remote use of databases.

The European Commission has recently invested a lot in research on crisis management

IT systems and interoperability through its framework programmes. The Security Research

Programme was launched as part of the FP7. The overall budget for Security Research in

2007-2013 is around €1.4Bn. The Work Programme for the next two years is around €170m

(comprising about €150m for Security Research Call 1 and €20m for Coordinated Call for

Security and ICT).

One of the seven mission areas identified under the Security Research agenda is “re-

storing security and safety in case of crisis”. This covers command and control (C2), as well

as public safety communication issues. Its priorities are at the level of integration projects:

network enabled command and control systems; and integrated specialist search and res-

cue system; a post-incident basic service restoration system; and wireless communication

for EU crisis management. Within capability projects the priorities are: situation awareness

(developing a common operational picture between regional and national authorities, first

responders, etc.); C2 (intelligent decision support); and incident response (personal equip-

ment, neutralisation of devices/effects).

Examples of research projects funded by the EC recently include for example the High-

way to Security: Interoperability for Situation Awareness and Crisis Management (HiTS-

ISAC) project14, which aimed to enable information analysis and fusion from different sourc-

es through secure cross-border on-line group cooperation between authorities through a

problem solving environment and a virtual operations room; the Interoperability and Auto-

mated Mapping (INTAMAP) project15, which developed an interoperable framework for real

time automatic mapping of critical environmental variables by extending spatial statistical

methods and employing open, web-based data exchange and visualisation tools; and the

Mobile Autonomous Reactive Information System for Urgency Situations (MARIUS) proj-

ect16, which developed a pre-operational autonomous Command Post that can be deployed

quickly to monitor different types of crisis management operations.

In addition, the EC has funded projects that include the Management Decision Support

for Critical Infrastructures (MEDSI)17, which resulted in the creation of a prototype crisis

management system, which uses web services to automatically obtain and exchange infor-

mation from different sources to support decision-making in crisis management centres;

Integrating Communications for Enhanced Environmental Risk Management and Citizens

Safety (CHORIST)18, which creates solutions to increase rapidity and effectiveness of inter-

ventions following a major natural and/or industrial disaster in order to enhance citizens’

safety and communications between rescue actors; and ORCHESTRA19, which is designing

and implementing the specifications for a service-oriented spatial data infrastructure for

improved interoperability among risk management authorities in Europe, which will enable

the handling of more effective disaster risk reduction strategies and emergency manage-

ment operations.

Although these (and other) research projects have created new information and devel-

oped new systems to increase interoperability in crisis management, not a lot has been put

to actual use by organisations involved in national, cross-border and international crisis

management. The European Union has an advantage in its extensive research programmes.

The EU is already spending a lot of money on the research, development and testing of

IT tools and systems for example in the 6th and 7th Framework programmes. Linking this

research to both ESDP missions and the EU civil protection mechanism would bring added

value to both the research and the practice.

2.2 International crisis managementThe ICT4Peace process, led by the ICT4Peace Foundation and officially launched in No-

vember 2007 in New York, is becoming the main international vehicle for facilitating

a cohesive approach to using ICTs in crisis management. ICT4Peace raises awareness

about the contribution and potential of ICTs in crisis management, and fosters the ex-

change of best practices in that field. It also enhances the competency of the interna-

tional community in crisis management through improved interagency interoperabil-

ity supported by practical collaborative frameworks and ICT tools20.The launch of the

ICT4Peace process is an important milestone in the efforts to coordinate the different

7 Terrestrial Trunked Radio, open standard by ETSI which defines a digital system for land mobile radio communication, private

Mobile Radio (pMR). This has created a basis for a multi-vendor market and TETRa products from several manufacturers are being

introduced. Interoperability aims to guarantee that TETRa products can be used in any vendor’s network.

8 aSTRID (all-round Semi-cellular Trunked Radio communication network with Integrated Dispatching)

9 VIRVE official network

10 The public authority network is Sweden is called RaKEL, which is an acronym for ”Radiokommunikation för Effektiv Ledning”, an

attempt to integrate all the different radio systems in the different blue-light organisations so they have the possibility to exchange

data between the different organisations via radio.

11 In France aCROpOL and aNTaRES networks for French national police and fire brigades are recent initiatives aimed at improving

public safety communications.

12 SIRDEE network (Sistema de Radiocomunicaciones Digitales de Emergencia del Estado)

13 pEGaS is a full digital cellular system, with integrated voice and data services.

14 http://www.hits-isac.eu

15 http://www.intamap.org

16 http://www.ec.europa.eu/enterprise/security/doc/project_flyers_2006/766-06_marius.pdf

17 http://www.introsolutions.com/medsiEN.html

18 http://www.chorist.eu

19 http://www.eu-orchestra.org

20 http://www.ict4peace.org; see also Sanjana Hattotuwa (2007) “ICT4peace: an International process for Crisis Management”,

peace IT! Online Journal 2/2007


strands of the international community working towards enhancing the use of ICTs in

crisis management.

An important step within the UN family has been the appointment of the first Chief

Information Technology Officer at the level of Assistant Secretary-General of the United Na-

tions, Choi Soon-hong, in 2007. The ICT4Peace Foundation and the office of the Chief Infor-

mation Technology Officer are carrying out a stock-taking exercise on UN crisis information

management capabilities. The ICT4Peace Foundation’s preliminary studies show that the

UN System has a number of solutions that have emerged in response to particular events or

needs, usually within individual organisations. While many of these solutions have produced

excellent results and could be leveraged across the UN system in times of crisis, at present

many tools, solutions and processes remain unknown and isolated from one another21. It is

hoped that with the stock-taking exercise the UN system as a whole can address issues of

crisis information management and technology best practice at a strategic level.

New information sharing mechanisms have been developed within the humanitar-

ian community with the UN in the lead. For example the UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has developed several initiatives in the field of information

sharing, such as ReliefWeb22 which is an on-line information repository on humanitarian

emergencies and disasters. ReliefWeb is specifically designed to assist the international hu-

manitarian community in effective delivery of emergency assistance.

UN OCHA also manages Humanitarian Information Centers (HICs) that support the coor-

dination of humanitarian assistance through the provision of information products and ser-

vices, and the decision-making process at headquarters and the field level by contributing

to the creation of a common framework for information management within the humani-

tarian community. The HICs aim to ensure that individuals and organisations at the field

and strategic levels have access to the benefits of information management tools to assess,

plan, implement and monitor humanitarian assistance. UN OCHA also runs other regional

information sharing web sites, such as the Sudan Information Gateway23.

The OCHA-run Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (Virtual OSOCC)24 is a tool

for disaster coordination, providing registered users with coordination, mobilisation, alert-

ing and discussion tools. In addition UN OCHA coordinates the Working Group on Emergen-

cy Telecommunications (WGET), a multi-stakeholder forum to facilitate the use of telecom-

munications in humanitarian assistance.

The EU Civil Protection Mechanism applies to disaster relief both inside and outside the

EU, providing humanitarian assistance in conflicts and disasters around the world. Past

operations outside the EU include those mounted after the major earthquakes in Algeria

and in Bam, Iran in 2003, the South-East Asian tsunami in 2005, hurricane Katrina, and the

earthquake in northern Pakistan in 2005, the Java earthquake and the Lebanon crisis in

2006. These efforts are usually conducted in close cooperation with the UN or other interna-

tional actors present on the ground25.

On the ESDP side of the EU, the “Comprehensive Approach”, bringing together both mili-

tary and civilian instruments, is the aim within the European Union’s crisis management

operations. General Bentegégeat, Chairman of the EU Military Committee, has stated that

the approach of military and civilian personnel working in intelligent synergy must be the

focus of the EU’s efforts and that it will involve adapting the EU’s structures but also chang-

ing the cultures.26 This approach can only be implemented in an effective way with the sup-

port of interoperable, secure communication and information systems between different

command levels and also horizontally between the military and civilian actors. Technology

alone, however, cannot solve all the challenges but procedures and arrangements have to be

in place to ensure that sensitive information can be distributed to all the actors regardless

what nation or organisation they represent.

The EUMS CIS division has identified27 a number of possible actions that if taken would

improve the current state of affairs of communications and information systems (CIS) in ci-

vilian missions. For example setting up a basic stock of critical equipment for rapid mission

start-up could be considered utilising the experience in the United Nations. The stock should

include crypto devices for secure voice and data transfer, radios, GSM, satellite phones and

dishes, equipment to connect to satellite systems, and equipment to establish local area net-

works. Another solution suggested by the EUMS CIS division to ensure interoperable CIS 21 ICT4peace Foundation (2008) “Questionnaire: Stocktaking of UN Crisis Information Management Capabilities and Best prac-

tices

22 http://www.reliefweb.int

23 http://www.unsudanig.org

24 http://ocha.unog.ch/virtualosocc

25 pia Bucella (2007) “Enhancing the civil protection capacity of the EU” in Faster and More United? The debate about Europe’s

crisis response capacity, European Commission, Brussels, May 2007, pp. 104-108

26 Chairman of the EU Military Committee, General Henri Bentégeat’s statement in the Bulletin of the EU Military Staff IMpETUS

Spring/Summer 2007, p. 8

27 Interview with Ralf persicke, EUMS CIS Division on 11 October 2007, quoted in European parliament (2008), “Improving the

Coherence of Crisis Management: New Technologies for Command and Control Systems” p. 13


for a mission is that one member state would provide the equipment. The draw-back of this

latter approach is that it does not build the EU’s long-term capacity.

Its comprehensive approach to crises is one of the factors that make the EU unique.

The early involvement of all EU bodies and other international participants in the decision-

making and planning process is vital. The nations that support the mission should not be

absent from this joint action. Information exchange at all levels needs improvement, taking

into account the security of information, arrangements for sharing information between

the actors involved, technical interoperability requirements for the CIS and acceptance pro-

cedures for interconnections of the systems.

Common military understanding of the term interoperability has two parts: functional

and technical. In the ESDP Headline Goal 2010 interoperability is defined as the ability of

armed forces to work together and to interact with other civilian tools. It is an instrument

to enhance the effective use of military capabilities as a key enabler in achieving the EU’s

ambitions in Crisis Management Operations28. Equipment is only one element of capability,

the interoperability requirement relates to all aspects of capability, from language to proce-

dure to training.

The United States Department of Defence (DoD) definition for interoperability covers

both aspects in the following way: 1) the ability of systems, units or forces to provide ser-

vices to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so

exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together; 2) the condition achieved among

communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment

when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them

and/or their users29.

NATO defines interoperability as the effective sharing of information and work processes

across system and organisational boundaries. A more formal definition of interoperability

by NATO is: “The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services

from other systems, units, or forces, and to use the services so exchanged to enable them

to operate effectively together.” The NATO Interoperability Directive specifies the manda-

tory aspects of the NATO Consultation, Command and Control (C3) system interoperability

process as defining the sources of interoperability requirements; analysis of those require-

ments, such as assessing the required degree of interoperability; and the categorisation and

resolution of the interoperability requirements, which may involve the use of standards and

common products. The main forum for the elaboration of interoperability policy is the NATO

Standardization Organisation (NSO).

A RAND Corporation study on NATO interoperability concluded from several coalition op-

erations that interoperability problems might occur at all levels – strategic, operational, tacti-

cal and technical – and that problems at one may affect interoperability at other levels. An im-

portant lesson according to RAND is the fundamental source of interoperability problems can

be political disagreement on the purpose of the mission. In such cases no amount of technical

interoperability can mitigate the problem. Consensus at the strategic and operational levels

will make tactical and technical problems less likely and easier to resolve when they arise.30

Under the Berlin Plus agreement, the EU has been given assured access to NATO assets,

including planning capabilities, for EU-led military missions. This includes the availability

of NATO assets such as communication units and headquarters. Exchange of classified infor-

mation is governed by the NATO-EU security agreement. Leo Michel has in his study31 listed

some of the challenges for cooperation between the two organisations. First, NATO and the

EU have to ensure that their procedures are very much in tune, if not identical, and their

training is coherent. When it comes to doctrine, training and equipment interoperability,

European military commanders understand that inconsistent practices could increase the

inherent risk of military operations.

Michel’s findings about the recognised need to improve interoperability in the missions

are supported by Professor Adrian Pop in his study of the evolving relationship between the

EU and NATO. One of the lessons from the Balkans for NATO and the EU is to focus on increas-

ing interoperability and coordinating doctrine, planning, technology, equipment and train-

ing. Professor Pop states that current acquisition and investment programmes do not meet

the needs of today’s multinational forces. He also draws attention to the fact that today’s

terrorist groups and criminal networks operate internationally, benefiting from real-time

communications, information sharing and relative freedom of travel. The degree to which

nations and organisations such as NATO and the EU share information, cooperate in inter-

dicting such groups and engage in counter-terrorism and combating organised crime is

crucial.32

The operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have particularly demonstrated the need for in-

teroperability between national forces. Most nations, particularly those in NATO, recognise

the value and the necessity of deploying multinational contingents, to mitigate the decreas-

ing sizes of land forces and to leverage the many niche capabilities being developed by cer-

tain smaller nations. As many national systems are now designed to be interoperable with

NATO systems, NATO is setting a de facto common standard of military CIS. To avoid duplica-

tion, the EU has also generally accepted this principle. However, this has created difficulties

for the non-NATO EU Member States, and for those who are members of the Partnership for

Peace (PfP).

A number of European countries already possess or are seriously exploring elements of

modern Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Re-

connaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. However, the approach is not uniform across Europe and

there continues to be major interoperability gaps both within and between the European

countries. Interestingly, countries tend to place higher emphasis on achieving interoperabil-

ity with NATO and the US rather than European level.

2.3 Initiatives for new tools and partnershipsThe mushrooming of new information and communications tools, such as blogs, wikis,

social networking sites, instant messaging and web based collaboration tools are also

creating new opportunities in the field of crisis management. Blogs are increasingly be-

coming the model for sharing information in crisis situations. For example in the Central

African Republic the humanitarian and development actors have come together to share 28 Council of the European Union (2006) “Headline Goal 2010” 6309/6/04/REV 6

29 US Department of Defence Joint pub 1-02 Dictionary of Military and associated Terms, June 1998, p. 231

30 RaND Corporation (2004) “Research Brief: Interoperability of Coalition air Forces: Lessons Learned from U.S. Operations with

NaTO allies”, RaND project aIR FORCE31 Leo Michel “NaTO – EU Cooperation in Operations and Implications for Italy”

32 adrian pop (2007) “NaTO and the European Union: Cooperation and Security”


information in a public internet blog33 and an intranet. Blogs have the advantage of being

relatively cheap to set up, and are easy to update and create a participatory community

with low barriers of entry.

Blogs thus fulfil the recommendation made in the report “Wikis, Webs and Networks.

Creating Connections for Conflict-Prone Settings” by the Center for Strategic and Interna-

tional Studies (CSIS) that participatory structures that encourage contributions based on

expertise, not status or rank, are beneficial for conflict environments and should be encour-

aged. The report also maintains that communication is a social, not technical problem and

that incentives to encourage people to join information sharing networks should be created.

Regarding communications tools, CSIS recommends using all available means of commu-

nication and creating advanced technologies that interface with common, low-tech tools to

increase utility and decrease exclusivity.34

Another CSIS report recommendation is the creation of a consortium of organisations

to take the issue of interoperability and information sharing forward.35 The Crisis Manage-

ment Initiative (CMI) organised the first seminar on interoperability in crisis management

in 2002 with the aim of creating just that kind of a consortium. The seminar aimed to find

practical means to improve coordination and information sharing between different or-

ganisations, including the interoperability of communication and IT-systems. CMI has been

guided by the belief that meeting user requirements in a globalising and highly complex

crisis management environment can be facilitated through an effective liaison between the

crisis management community and the business community. With this in mind, CMI has

organised three more conferences since the first gathering.

CMI’s partners in building the community of experts in interoperability in crisis man-

agement have included the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and the Object Manage-

ment Group (OMG), as well as several governmental and private sector partners. The OMG’s

role in the interoperability expert community is standardisation. OMG produces and main-

tains computer industry specifications for interoperable enterprise applications and the

tools to develop them. The OMG C4I (Consultation, Command, Control, Communications, and

Intelligence) Domain Task Force works for the enhancement of collaboration and critical

information sharing among multi-national and non-government organisations operating

in response to crisis situations through the adoption of consensus-based interoperability

standards.

Within the think-tank and NGO community, USIP has been one of the leaders in the field

of information technology and crisis management with its Virtual Diplomacy Initiative. The

Initiative’s mission is to explore the role of information and communications technologies

in the conduct of diplomacy, particularly the effect upon international conflict management

and resolution. Through the Virtual Diplomacy Initiative, USIP has been analysing how new

ICTs are impacting the institutional structures and operational effectiveness of groups en-

gaged in crisis management; identifying ways that ICTs can aid in preventing, managing,

and resolving international conflict; and fostering cooperation among crisis management

groups using ICTs.

During the annual information technology and crisis management conferences or-

ganised by CMI, security and safety were identified as an issue in which diverse organisa-

tions working in the field have a shared interest and that can help to increase connectivity.

For this reason CMI has started to develop the Safety Information Reporting Service (SIRS)

that seeks to improve the sharing of safety and security related information with staff and

beneficiaries in the field. The goal of SIRS is to become an information management service

that provides safety and security information services for local NGO security collaborations.

By integrating a variety of systems and organisational structures, it is building a global ca-

pacity to produce improved safety and security analysis and lessons learned to improve the

safety of aid workers in the field.36

At the moment, CMI is with working the Finnish Defence Forces to develop Shared In-

formation Framework and Technology (SHIFT) as part of the Multinational Experimenta-

tion 5 (MNE5). SHIFT aims to replace the current practice of building bilateral or ad hoc

information exchange relationships between actors in the conflict regions. SHIFT is both an

information source and a platform to disseminate and share information. The SHIFT tech-

nical solution includes a collection of web-based, integrated communication tools that en-

able information sharing. It features incident mapping and Geographic Information System

(GIS) tools, organisational directories, a wikipedia-like knowledge base, discussion boards,

instant messaging and internet telephony services, user defined filters and a robust search

function.37

Common projects between the governmental and civil society organisations, such as

SHIFT, can help create systems for information sharing that will come into wider use. The

SHIFT framework is especially worthwhile in that the end-users are meant to include actors

from the military and civilian governmental actors and NGOs, and the development process

has been participatory, bringing different stakeholders to the testing and experimentation

events.

Within the European Commission’s newly established funding instrument, the Instru-

ment for Stability, more room exists in linking the capacity building efforts of civil society

organisations. One part of the Instrument for Stability is the Peace-building Partnership,

which provides for strengthening the knowledge base and know-how of civil society organi-

sations in order to develop their operational capacity, and specifically mention “the develop-

ment and testing of security-enhancing technology”38. Possibilities should be explored for

linking these efforts into the private sector and research institute oriented support in the

Framework programmes. In the absence of these links there is a danger of the EU’s various

efforts becoming isolated from each other, thus not reaching the full potential that exists.

Communities of experts, such as ISCRAM (Information Systems for Crisis Response and

Management) Community39 for example, can also be used to help bridge the gap between

research and practice.

33 http://hdptcar.net

34 Rebecca Linder (2006) “Wikis, Webs, and Networks. Creating Connections for Conflict-prone Settings”, Center for Strategic and

International Studies, Washington D.C., pp. 19-20

35 Ibid. pp. 22-23

36 For more information on the SIRS initiative, see for example Crisis Management Initiative (2006) “Launching SIRS: The Safety

Information Reporting Service, Conference on Crisis Management and Information Technology, 11-14 December 2005. Conference

report”, June 2006

37 http://www.shift.fi

38 European Commission (2008) “Instrument for Stability Crisis preparedness component. annual action programmes 2007-2008

peace-building partnership Support. Guidelines for grant applicants responding to the call for proposals“, p. 11

39 http://www.iscram.org; see also Bartel Van de Walle (2007) “ISCRaM2007 – the 4th International Conference on Information

Systems for Crisis Response and Management”, peace IT! Online Journal 1/2007


3 RESEARCh METhODOLOGY: SENSE-MAkING AS A fRAMEwORk

In order to investigate the essential information needs and information-sharing models

in crisis situations, it is valuable to gain a good understanding of how actors process this

information. The Sensemaking theory40, brought to maturity by Karl Weick, offers a theo-

retical lens to better understand how this is done. Sensemaking literally means ‘to make

sense of things’, and its central activities consist of seeking, processing, creating, and us-

ing information. This means that Sensemaking is not a noun, but a verb; it is a process,

with sense as its end product.

In traditional research, decisions are said to be made by identifying the problem, list-

ing all possible alternative actions, evaluating the outcome of these actions and selecting

the best alternative according to the specified goal. In a crisis situation however, people do

not have time to make decisions like this. They engage in a continuous process of seeking,

processing, creating, and using information. There are numerous attempts to make sense

of what is happening. Sensemaking encompasses intuitions, opinions, hunches, effective re-

sponses, evaluations and questions. Sensemaking is an intuitive approach to information

processing and serves as a complement to the traditional and more rational decision-mak-

ing framework earlier described. Another important feature of Sensemaking is that it deals

with omnipresent discontinuity in constantly changing situations. Sensemaking addresses

questions like: ‘What is happening out there?’, ‘Why is it taking place?’, and ‘What does it

mean?’. Crisis situations, in which discontinuity is the rule and continuity the exception, are

settings in which Sensemaking is particularly relevant.

Sensemaking can be described accordingto its seven underlying properties:

Identity construction:• The actor seeks to discover what it thinks and knows about itself

and its environment;

Retrospective:• The actor examines past practices in order to learn (and unlearn) things

about the current context;

Enactment:• The actor creates or enacts parts of its environment through selective atten-

tion and interpretation;

Social:• The actor’s activities are contingent on what others say, think and do;

Ongoing:• The actor processes information in a continuing and dynamic fashion as

events unfold;

Cue extracting:• The actor decides what to pay attention to;

Plausibility:• Looking for what is plausible is often of more practical help than finding

accuracy.

Weick and his colleagues formulate a gripping conclusion as to what the seven Sensemak-

ing properties are all about: “Taken together these properties suggest that increased skill

at Sensemaking should occur when people are socialized to make do, be resilient, treat

constraints as self-imposed, strive for plausibility, keep showing up, use retrospect to get a

sense of direction, and articulate descriptions that energize. These are micro-level actions.

They are small actions. But they are small actions with large consequences.”

Sensemaking provided the research with a lens to observe and understand how infor-

mation is processed and shared within and among organisations. The Sensemaking theory

has helped in the gathering of the data presented in this report, data that would not have

been obtained without the Sensemaking lens. In the interviews the respondents were asked

indirectly about the seven Sensemaking properties, in order to get a better understanding

of how they manage information in their specific situations. By using Sensemaking theory,

we were able to understand and analyse these information processes which otherwise are

hidden in a “black box” and as such difficult to notice and capture. This has resulted in useful

insights into how actors manage and process information in their specific crisis situations,

and consequently resulted in a better understanding of the information sharing models and

interoperability issues in crisis situations.40 a more detailed description of the Sensemaking approach has been reported in Muhren et al. (2008a; 2008b), and of which

this section is an excerpt.


4 CASE STuDIES

Information sharing and interoperability in four different types of crises was studied for

this research:

Prevention and Readiness: Portuguese forest fires (natural disaster, strategic level);•

Ad-hoc crisis: Barents Rescue Exercise (accident, operational level);•

Ongoing crisis: DRC’s humanitarian assistance (complex emergency, strategic level);•

Post-crisis: Bosnia-Herzegovina EU Police mission (post-conflict state-building, opera-•

tional level).

The main findings of the case studies are grouped into three categories: two-way commu-

nication, interoperability of crisis response, and decision-making in crisis situations. ‘Two-

way communication’ relates to the project’s hypothesis that in today’s crisis management

operations it is not enough to simply focus on information exchange between authorities

but information sharing with the general public is vital for efficient crisis management

and recovery. The research has looked into the ways in which crisis managers communi-

cate with citizens and whether any good practices could be identified.

The findings in the interoperability of crisis response relate both to organisational and

technological issues, although one of the project’s hypotheses was that information ex-

change and interoperability in the field is not lacking because technology is not available

but because of human issues and organisational cultures. In ‘decision-making in crisis situ-

ations’ the research has tried to identify what are the vital information needs in a crisis situ-

ation and how people handle and process information.

4.1 forest fires in PortugalThe case study on forest fires in Portugal represents a national crisis management oper-

ation with cross-border elements. The research team interviewed personnel at the National

Authority for Civil Protection and the Portuguese Forest Services in Lisbon in December

2007, as well as the European Commission, Environment DG and the Civil Protection Unit of

the EU Council Secretariat in Brussels in February 2008.

4.1.1 Background

About 27% of Portugal is covered by forests, around 48% by agricultural areas. Between

1990 and 2005, about 2.3 million hectares burned, representing about 25% of the coun-

try area. In 2003 and 2005 the burnt area reached the highest values since 1980 (about

750,000 ha). The fire situation in Portugal has been aggravated by the changes in land

use practices. The rural exodus has left a large area of land uncultivated, increasing the

amount of combustible materials that can trigger big fires when droughts occur.

The Civil Protection structure in Portugal is organised at the municipal, regional and

national levels. The National Authority of Civil Protection (Portuguese acronym ANPC) has

the primary role in planning, coordination and implementation of the Civil Protection pol-

icy. The ANPC integrates three national spheres, for the areas of Civil Protection resources,

emergency planning and fire-fighters, as well as the command structure of the SIOPS. The

ANPC is thus a central operational service, under the direct administration of the Govern-

ment, endowed with administrative and financial autonomy and its own patrimony, under

the dependency of a responsible Government member within the Ministry of Interior.

The National Authority of Civil Protection maintains its own operational structure, the

National Command for Relief Operations (CNOS) that ensures the operational command in

terms of relief operations and the integrated operational command of all the fire brigades

in accordance with the legal system. The CNOS is composed of the National Operational

Commander, the Deputy National Operational Commander and three National Operations’

Assistants and encompasses the planning, operations, information and logistic cells.

The Integrated System for Relief and Protection Operations (SIOPS) is a set of structures,

norms and procedures that ensure all Civil Protection agents act under a sole command.

SIOPS aims at responding to imminent situations and serious accidents or disasters. The

principle of a unique command is based on a two-dimensional system, institutional coordi-

nation the operational command.41

Portugal requested outside assistance to fight the fires in 2003, 2004 and 2005, mainly

through the EU, whose Community Civil Protection Mechanism, established in October 2001,

is an operational instrument designed to enhance preparedness and to mobilise immediate

civil protection assistance in the event of disasters. It can be activated in case of natural and

man-made disasters, including nuclear incidents. 30 states (the EU Member States as well as

Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland) participate in the Mechanism.

4.1.2 Main findings

Two-way communication

Forest fires in Portugal do not only happen during the summer, they also occur in win-

tertime. Winter fires are often good if controlled, since what burns then cannot burn in

summer, when the fires are mostly not controllable. However, the concept of “good fires” is

new and generally unknown by the population. According to the interviewees it is impor-

tant inform the local populations that fires during winter are not as damaging, if they are

managed appropriately. The Portuguese Forest Services promotes this idea on their web-

site and they have launched a campaign on television, radio and in newspapers. It is also

important that people realize that they cannot light fires near the forest during summer.

This was also part of a campaign. Besides these national wide campaigns, the Portuguese

Forest Services has engaged in direct contact local shepherds, farmers and forest owners

to try to change their behaviour and spread the word that not all fires are bad.

The National Authority for Civil Protection (NACP)’s main target currently is also to edu-

cate people. They do this together with big companies for example, such as supermarket

chains. One initiative included printing the phrases “Portugal without fires depends on ev-

41 For more information on the civil protection system in portugal, see http://www.proteccaocivil.pt


eryone” and “You should not use fire on a hot day” on their plastic bags. NACP has also

been advertising in football stadiums and on football shirts, and has had advertisements on

television and in newspapers. “You have to give good and correct information to your popu-

lation, otherwise you can have situations as in 2003, 2004 and 2005”, one interviewee said.

The number of ignitions has been reduced since these campaigns were started.

There have been instances where the forest fire situation was under control, but the local

populations started to panic when images of the fire were aired on television. It is felt that

the best way to prevent this kind of situations is to work with the media. The NACP gave the

media some courses on civil protection and the media outlets have been educating the first

responders on how to present information on camera.

External communication is now mainly done through the media. NACP handles the me-

dia in an organised way. If a threatening situation arises, NACP sends out an alert and the

key players from the media come to the office where they are briefed. The media outlets then

disseminate the message to the citizens, including any measures that should be taken. NACP

also organises a press conference every week on what is happening and the expectations for

the following week. In crisis situations there is a daily press conference.

The NACP displays information for the citizens on their website including where current

fires are and how many fire fighters are working in the area. There is also a risk indication

and a plan on what to do for each level of risk. They feel that it is important to provide accu-

rate information: “We cannot always tell people that tomorrow will be the worst day.”

Interoperability of crisis response

The Portuguese Forest Services are mainly focused on preventing forest fires. They produce

two kinds of fire hazard maps each with different statistics, to share with the district level

and national level authorities for civil protection:

A map with a large pixel size. This is a structural map and is used on the national level, •

but is not very detailed.

A map with a smaller pixel size. This is better suited for teams on the ground and indi-•

cates the hazards. In winter it is used to find areas where the authorities can conduct

“prescribed firing”, which are techniques to manage fuel.

In summer the Portuguese Forest Services have technicians in the field who help the com-

mander to make decisions. This is the only organisation in Portugal with the authorization

to fight fires using fire.

Detection and first response are extremely important, especially in terms of the resourc-

es needed. Forest fires can be detected in three ways: by the population calling 117 (the

dedicated forest fire emergency line) or 112, by a surveillance post, or by a surveillance bri-

gade. The NACP is responsible for informing the population, the people who work for civil

protection, the media, and the national and district level command structure. The district

command for relief operations is responsible for the deployment of means, terrestrial and

aerial, and providing the first intervention. If they do not succeed, or if the fire crosses the

district level, a team goes out and there is an enlarged combat situation for that the NACP

is responsible for. They are then responsible for sending more means to the field, which

can requested from other districts. If there is a situation that is overwhelming, and national

resources are insufficient, the minister – advised by the national commander – can activate

the Community Civil Protection Mechanism by sending a message to the Monitoring and

Information Center (MIC) in Brussels.

The NACP is permanently connected to the Common Emergency Communication and

Information System (CECIS) of the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection. Each time

a European Union member state has an emergency for which it wants to request interna-

tional assistance this is triggered. If a country is not a member state but wants to request

assistance, it should send a request to the MIC. The MIC manages emergencies all over the

world as well as inside the EU. The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection was created

to facilitate cooperation among member states in terms of civil protection. It is a “one-stop

shop” for civil protection as it is easy to trigger 29 other countries by just one phone call or

message.

CECIS allows current information on the situation to be shared as well as identifying

what is needed. Countries can also indicate whether they can provide assistance or not. In

Portugal the State Secretary for Civil Protection decides what to do since there is always

a political dimension to such a decision. Notably the use of language in CECIS is not stan-

dardised. This sometimes causes problems in interpreting what is meant by a request or an

offer.

At NACP there are daily briefings on the general situation of the country with represen-

tatives from the major players. The national guard and the armed forces have permanent

liaison officers at the NACP. If the situation demands, there are liaison officers at the NACP

from other civil protection agencies (such as the forest department, maritime authority, po-

lice, medical services and meteorological institute): “In the daily briefings we bring informa-

tion from all the agents who share responsibility in terms of civil protection.” At the end

of the briefing everything is available in writing. The national commander takes decisions

according to the information shared in the meeting and the analysis that is done in the

meeting, for example, whether to increase the readiness level or to pre-mobilise resources.

Once a week there is an enlarged meeting with all the representatives from civil protection.

During the summer this meeting is followed by a press conference.

After each big emergency in Portugal, the NACP invites all the people who were involved

to discuss how it went, what was done and what worked (or did not). These lessons learned

are then incorporated into their procedures.

Decision making in crisis situations

Historical information on where the forests fires took place is vital information for produc-

ing the maps of the Portuguese Forest Services. Depending on the tree species it takes an

average of five years for a forest to become a potential “problem situation” where a forest is

again at risk. However it takes many more years to get to pre-fire levels of forest maturity.

The civil protection actors in Portugal face could use more up-to-date information. However,

land-use data for example is very expensive to obtain.

The NACP gets data from the district level on the major incidents that are occurring in

the country. This data is visualised on a Geographical Information System (GIS). They also

have a map that is solely concerned with forest fires to aid their decision making.

There is a lot of redundancy in sharing of information. When people send a message,

they want to make sure it arrives by using as many means as possible. At the NACP, people

are updated on the situation by text message, and they then immediately called to check

28 INFORMaTION SHaRING MODELS aND INTEROpERaBILITy

whether they have read the message. Besides using CECIS, fax messages are simultaneously

sent to other countries and phone calls are made: “In a crisis situation this is quite normal as

you want to make sure the message gets to the person.”

The MIC has the overall European perspective on civil protection. The mechanism can fa-

cilitate and give an “educated hint” as to which country to help, but in the end the countries

themselves decide where they want to provide or accept assistance. Countries do not always

accept assistance, because the help that is offered may not be exactly what they wanted, or

it comes with a price tag they are not willing to pay.

“Nothing helps more in emergency situations than people knowing each other”, many

interviewees mentioned. The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection and the MIC bring

together people from all 30 countries, for events like training sessions, workshops, common

exercises, and meetings. These interactions help people in knowing each other, and becom-

ing more familiar the realities of the other countries: “The more you exchange information,

the more you know where and how to target your request for assistance. And the better you

make your request, the better you get answered.”

4.2 Barents Rescue ExerciseThe research for this case study was accomplished with observations of ongoing activities,

questionnaires completed by participants, interviews with key personnel and workshops

and feedback sessions during the exercise. Even though this case was an exercise, not a

real crisis management operation, it presented a good opportunity to observe the cross-

border crisis management operation on the operational level, which in a very short-term

crisis management operation, such as the one exercised for this accident, would be dif-

ficult to carry out in a real life situation.

4.2.1 Background

The Barents Rescue 2007 Exercise was held 18-21 October in the Saariselkä region of Fin-

land. The exercise aimed to facilitate communication, coordination and cooperation be-

tween countries and civil-military services that may be involved in emergencies relevant

to the Barents Region. The project consisted of a series of planning conferences, training

events and exercises.

The exercise scenario was an aviation accident. An aircraft executed an emergency land-

ing in the uninhabited areas of the Inari municipality. More than 200 passengers were in-

jured or deceased. The passengers were mainly tourists from the UK, but there were also

many other nationalities represented among the passengers. The reason for the crash was

not immediately obvious. The Finnish authorities requested rescue assistance from the Bar-

ents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) countries.

The scenario aimed to challenge the services and agencies to enhance trans-boundary

cooperation. The great distances and limited resources in the Barents Region pose a real

challenge to rescue operations and it is important that the BEAC member countries together

plan how to use the resources available.42

The exercise included three phases with different approaches to emergency manage-

ment:

Phase One – ALARMEX. Alarming and gathering of possible resources in the Barents •

Euro-Arctic Region in case of a major emergency.

Phase Two - Table Top Exercise, TTX. Practical response in the emergency area. This •

phase consisted of a command post exercise, larger than usual table top exercise and

utilising virtual tools.

Phase Three – Field Training Exercise, FTX. This phase demonstrated the capabilities •

of respective organisations and agencies involved in the major emergency situation

planned for this exercise.

4.2.2 Main findings


Unfortunately the citizens did not play a role in this exercise. In future exercises more

should be done to study the dynamics that communicating with the public brings to a cri-

sis management operation and to explore good practices for use in real crisis situations.


The first phase of the exercise, ALARMEX, was based on the agreements and existing pro-

cedures for emergency cooperation between countries in the Barents sea region, and the

objectives were met relatively well. Starting with the accident, the agreement expert in the

evaluation team performed an inventory of all the relevant agreements, both bi- and mul-

tilateral, between the Barents countries and then compared the real action in the TTX and

the FTX exercises with the procedures stipulated in the different agreements. The expert

did not find any serious divergences and the overall impression is that there is no urgent

need for any reviews of the agreements. It is worth noting that none of the international

42 petteri Taitto (2007) “Barents Rescue 2007 project Culminates in a Major Emergency Exercise” in Crisis Management Centre

(2007) “Barents Rescue 2007, Seminar publication”, CMC Finland Working papers, Vol. 1: No. 1/2007, p. 5

29INFORMaTION SHaRING MODELS aND INTEROpERaBILITy


response teams, both military and civilian, met any obstacles when bringing personnel

and equipment into Finland in order to join the exercise.

There were, however, a number of differences recorded in the procedures during the

alarm exercise. Some of these were caused by streamlining procedures or using modified

forms for exercise purposes, which should not have been done for the aim of the exercise

was to imitate reality as closely as possible. Others were caused by different views of the

actual procedure to follow, for example Finland expected a very fast response from other

countries, while Norway worked for some time to find the exact resources available. In ad-

dition the use of Emergency Rescue Centre (ERC) Tromsø as a contact point was not made

known to the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) and there was a question whether

this procedure is in accordance with the agreements.

It seems that the concept of LEMA/OSOCC (Local Emergency Management Authority/

On-Site Operations Coordination Centre) was unfamiliar to most of the participants. OSOCC

should work closer with LEMA. It seemed that during TTX OSOCC and LEMA worked more

or less independently. This hampered information sharing.

It took 90 minutes to get the first information about patients to the medical leading

points after the initial alarm. The medical organisation was able to determine the exact de-

tails about the need of assistance only after this information had arrived. This response time

is much too long. The airport and the rescue service located the accident site in two different

places. The map coordinating systems were not similar. There was also the matter of getting

the go-ahead command and who is responsible for giving. If this is not clear between the

requesting and assisting organisation there could be an unnecessary delay.

The effectiveness of the major emergency warning systems and information-sharing

methods between the countries in the Barents was also tested. The communication lines

between the contact points worked without any problems. The alarm system worked quite

fast and is a good system for alerting others. All the Rovaniemi ERC alarms and requests for

assistance were sent efficiently to Norway, Sweden and Russia.

The alarm procedures were introduced when fax technology was the most common tool.

It would be useful to look at the possibilities of the more advanced information technology

as an option. Messages are double-checked to make sure that the ones sent from one or-

ganisation to another organisation arrive. In radio communications (Tetra) during the crisis

when something was transmitted the recipient would repeat the main words in order to

make sure that they were understood correctly.

On an individual level, participants had different ways for making sure they were com-

municating as effectively as possible. For example, one actor started handling the crisis by

listing his key contact persons and phone numbers in order to prepare himself for informa-

tion exchanges in the upcoming hectic circumstances.

Language can be a difficulty in international crisis response. Since responders do not

use their native language, they may find it difficult to choose the right words to use. Culture

is also important, as an interviewee emphasised: “We [the Finns], together with the Swedes

and Norwegians, think in the same way and have the same kind of picture in mind all the

time. We have the same kind of systems [in the meaning of structures] in place, and we un-

derstand each other. But with the Russians it’s a bit harder.”

Interviewees felt that “you are forced to trust the people with whom you are exchanging

information, no matter who is on the other side” when responding to a crisis. There is not

have time to think about whether the information received from others is right or wrong. It

is therefore not important to know the people, as one needs to trust them anyway, although

a personal relationship of course increases trust.


It was vital information for OSOCC to have a good situational awareness and to continu-

ously know what was happening: “We need to get the key cards, to keep being informed”.

OSOCC was physically separated from LEMA (they were working in separate rooms). Be-

cause LEMA was very busy, OCOCC did not know all the time what was going on. A des-

ignated liaison officer was appointed who gave briefings to OSOCC on a regular basis.

In the future having LEMA and OSOCC in the same location (in Rovaniemi) could be an

improvement.

Some people identified experience as helpful for crisis response while others felt it nec-

essary: “From your experience you cannot remember everything, but many things stay in

the back of your head and become a routine.”

People have preferences concerning towards the level of detail of information that is

useful to have. Although most people clearly stated that more detail was better for them,

there were also cases in which actors argued that anything more than essential information

was not needed and in fact distracted them from their job.

For one key decision maker it was important to create time to think about the situation:

“I read the documents and think about what’s next. And if there is too much noise, I go per-

haps out, take a cup of coffee, and smoke a cigarette. Because when it’s so hectic, you have to

clear your mind and think about what’s going on.”

Most of the interviewees indicated that they value effectiveness more than efficiency in

their decision making. For example, they would request extra resources than deemed abso-

lutely necessary, just to be sure there where enough.

4.3 humanitarian crisis in DR CongoThe third case study looked at the humanitarian crisis in the Democratic Republic of

Congo. This case represented an international crisis response to a complex emergency.

During a mission to Kinshasa in August 2007 the research team conducted 17 interviews

altogether. The organisations where the interviews were conducted were: UN Population

Fund, UNDP, UN OCHA, WFP, UNICEF, Mission of the UN in the DRC (MONUC), WHO, Asso-

ciation pour la Santé Familiale, Médicins Sans Frontière – Belgium, Save the Children, Ox-

fam GB, Catholic Relief Services, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency,

European Community Humanitarian Aid department, UK Department for International

Development, International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Belgian Government.

4.3.1 Background

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is slowly emerging from crisis and moving to-

wards certain stability. Joseph Kabila’s election as president in autumn 2006 was the re-

sult of the first free elections in the country, and the establishment of a parliament and

implementation of the constitution adopted by referendum on 18 December 2005 have

brought an end to the transition born out of the 2002 peace deal. These provide the funda-


mental elements of the political solution agreed upon during the peace talks and open a

new era for the country. However, there are several issues still to be addressed in the peace

process. The situation in the eastern part of the country is volatile and the state’s authority

is still weak in the opposition-dominated west.

The peace process has ended major fighting in much of the country, but the security

situation remains unstable, especially in the eastern provinces. In March 2007, fighting

broke out in Kinshasa between government soldiers and the guard of former vice president

Jean-Pierre Bemba. It is estimated that at least 400 people were killed during two days of

fighting43. In June 2007, some NGOs suspended their operations in some areas of North and

South Kivu because of attacks against NGOs’ storehouses and vehicles.44

The political advancement and the process of the unification of the army facilitated an

improvement in the security situation which has prompted the return of refugees and dis-

placed populations. This stability has also permitted access to certain populations that the

humanitarian community could not previously reach due to insecurity. Despite the progress

towards recovery, humanitarian needs have remained high.

There are many actors working in the DRC. UNDP, UN OCHA, UNICEF, UNHCR, UNHCHR,

FAO, WFP, ILO, WHO, UNAIDS, IMF, and IOM are all found in the country. UN has also estab-

lished a peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo, with its current authorisation in place until the end of 2007. The Eu-

ropean Union’s ESDP missions concentrate on security sector reform. More than 50 interna-

tional NGOs are working in the DRC, and at least twice that number of local NGOs, primarily

in the humanitarian, development and human-rights sectors.

The main coordination mechanisms within the humanitarian sectors are the clusters and

the sectoral commissions. A cluster is a group of organisations that work in the same domain

of activity, whether in more traditional sectors such as sanitation or health, or in multi-sectoral

activities such as protection or early recovery. The cluster lead is responsible for supporting

the work of the group by facilitating the updating of the “who does what where” matrix, identi-

fying urgent gaps to fill, and formulating common humanitarian strategies. The sectoral com-

missions were the earlier coordination mechanism and have mostly been replaced since early

2006 by the clusters. Sectoral commissions still exist in parts of the country. 45

4.3.2 Main findings


Information from the local people is very important for the different actors in the DRC. “All

of what we do is meant to be not for us, not for the international community, but for the

people who most need it, among the Congolese. So we need to find out what people need,

what people think.” Contact with local populations is primarily through the organisations’

field offices. The contact takes place because they are the beneficiaries of humanitarian

assistance. As was identified in the interviews, this information exchange benefits both

parties: local people need some information from the humanitarian organisations and the

humanitarian organisations need to give a message to the population.

In Kinshasa contact with the local population is very direct, since all the organisations

have employed many local staff members. The local population can provide the organisa-

tions with information, which they otherwise would not have access to. This one-way com-

munication is especially important for security assessments: “These people have much more

of a feeling for the security situation and can notice when a threatening situation is about to

occur”. The international organisations can better understand the culture and habits of the

citizens through the local staff: “Their [local staff’s] assessment is in many instances more

important than what international staff would say. If you want to be close to recipients, if you

want to be really in the field, you need to know their culture.”

Not all organisations communicate directly with the local population. For example donor

organisations operate in the background and just communicate with the agencies they are

funding.


The research identified several challenges of interoperability and information sharing in

the DRC. It was for example felt that “information sharing and communication is always

at the bottom of an organisation’s list because they have many other things to do”. Inter-

viewees indicated that people and organisations do not realise that information sharing

benefits them in the long run.

There is a challenge to getting the necessary information. It is very hard for organisa-

tions to get the information they need due to the size of the country, the poor infrastructure,

and the security situation. Some feel that the government could play a role in helping the

organisations with this, but their capacity to collect data is weak.

43 International Crisis Group (2007) “Congo: Consolidating the peace”, Crisis Group africa Report No. 128, July 2007, p. 11

44 IRIN (2007), “DRC: NGO suspends operations amid increased displacement in the east”, 28 June 2007

45 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian affairs (2006), “Democratic Republic of the Congo. Humanitarian

action plan 2007”, November 2006, pp. 75-76


Another challenge is getting the right information. Sometimes the information that is

provided is not accurate, due to several reasons. One example is that information providers

sometimes have their own agendas. One organisation interviewed had frequently reported

an increased number of casualties than was actually the case in order to get more medi-

cal resources to the affected area. As is so the case in crisis situations, many interviewees

seemed to have problems in processing all the incoming information primarily because of

time constraints.

To obtain the information they need, interviewees indicated that they try to get informa-

tion from all sources within their reach. Overall, MONUC and OCHA – mainly through the

cluster approach – seem to be very important in providing information on the humanitarian

and security situation. “The starting point is to share assessments of humanitarian needs

and the security environment. Being with many actors, it is very important to exchange

the different views and analyse them.” It was indicated that organisations are sometimes

reluctant to share information they have in the clusters since they do not always know what

happens to those thoughts they give during meetings. They feel a need for a feedback loop

of the information shared in meetings. Also a bottleneck has been identified in the informa-

tion exchange between the different clusters. On several occasions clusters did not know

what each other were doing while working in a same area.

Besides relying on these umbrella organisations, the different organisations all seem to

have their own platforms, meetings, and discussions in order to exchange information with

each other. There are frequent meetings with all of the organisations working in the same

cluster, mostly under the umbrella of OCHA. Organisations that directly support the govern-

ment can get valuable information there. There is a platform for the donor community that

meets regularly, and embassies have their own meetings. One organisation mentioned that

they even have well-established contacts with the Congolese Secret Service for their infor-

mation provision.

OCHA determines security levels for the UN organisations, but generally the NGOs do

not commit themselves to those and set their own security levels. The NGOs have their own

organisation to assess the security situation: the NGO security tree. A security assessment

might be shared, but the interpretation is different for each organisation. The same security

assessment could, for example, pose a problem for one actor to operate somewhere, but not

for another actor, perhaps because of its identity, its network, or the kind of activities it does:

“We can have the same reading of the situation, and not the same decisions.” The UN’s secu-

rity levels are generally more conservative than the NGOs’ security levels. Above that, every

organisation has its own security plan.

One of the most frequent observations in the interviews was that information exchange

with other organisations is mostly done informally with the people from the international

community working for those organisations. These contacts are not institutionalised, but

are established on a personal basis. These informal contacts were very important for the

actors.

There also seem to be organisational barriers to information sharing, hindering the

information exchange. For example, for some organisations it was difficult to share infor-

mation bilaterally with certain other organisations as they felt the need to maintain their

neutrality.


The organisations needed to get different kinds of information vital for their work in this

ongoing crisis context. The first type that is important to the actors is situational informa-

tion on what is happening in the sector in which the organisation is operating. A widely

shared need is information on the actual humanitarian situation. There is a lot of help

needed, but organisations have limited resources so it is important to know where they

would be most effective. One organisation indicated that information collection on the

humanitarian situation is vital to their work, since they must show funders why they are

investing in the crisis in the DRC.

Security concerns are a big problem for, especially in the east of the country. That is why

they want to have the most up-to-date information on the security situation. And in case of

an acute crisis situation, the security information becomes even more important.

It is also important for organisations to know what other organisations are doing so as

not to duplicate efforts and to learn where they can cooperate together. This information,

however, was sometimes abused with political intentions.

Several people indicated that in the humanitarian crisis of the DRC there is no time for

an organisation to realize a long-term vision. Instead, decisions are made on a day-to-day

basis. Decisions were often said to be made based on intuition and officious information.

This officious information was often termed “radio trottoir”, which is the French term for

‘news from the street’. Although this information is officious, it is a much faster vehicle for

important information than information through official sources. Time was identified as an

important factor for relying on more uncertain information for decision making.

The people interviewed relied heavily on their personal experience when making im-

portant decisions. The collective knowledge of the humanitarian community in the DRC

was also regarded as important for the actors. However, mainly due to the high rate of staff

turnover, it is difficult to maintain this collective knowledge. Different types of information

coming in from a variety of sources can lead to information overload. People tend to rely on

their own rules of thumb for dealing with this problem.

4.4 ESDP police mission in Bosnia and herzegovinaThe research team conducted interviews in Sarajevo in April 2008. The team interviewed

staff in the following organisations: EUPM, EUFOR, Office of the EUSR, European Commis-

sion, OSCE, Sarajevo Canton Police, and the Populari think-tank. Altogether 13 people were

interviewed. The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) represents an international crisis

management mission in a post-conflict reconstruction phase.

4.4.1 Background

The Dayton Agreement of 1995 ended the war in BiH. According to the terms of the agree-

ment, a sovereign state known as the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will consist of

two entities: the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia. The agreement also

called for democratic elections and stipulated that war criminals would be handed over

for prosecution. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) that was deployed to preserve

the cease-fire included 60,000 troops. The post-war international presence also included

as many aid workers, NGO personnel and civilian administrators.


Since 1991, the EC has set aside more than EUR 2.5 billion to support Bosnia and Herzegov-

ina. Key target areas have been public administration reform, justice and home affairs-related

issues and improvement of the investment climate. The negotiations on a Stabilisation and

Association Agreement were launched in November 2005. Technical talks have been complet-

ed and the SAA was initialled on December 4th 2007. However, the SAA has not been signed

because of lack of progress in addressing key priorities, notably police reform, ICTY coopera-

tion, media reform and public administration reform. Police reform has been one of the main

obstacles to BiH’s EU integration. On July 1st 2005 the European Commission concluded that

police reform was the single remaining obstacle to beginning negotiations on the Stabilisa-

tion and Association Agreement. In April 2008 the police reform law package was adopted in

the BiH parliament, which means that the SAA can be signed in the near future.

International efforts to reform the Bosnian police force started already immediately af-

ter the signing of the Dayton Agreement when the UN-led International Police Task Force

(IPTF) was deployed. The International Police Task Force (IPTF) was comprised of more than

2,000 international police officers from 43 countries.

On January 1st 2003, the EU launched an EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Her-

zegovina. It was the first mission initiated under the European Security and Defence Policy

(ESDP), was initially envisaged to cover a three-year period (from January 2003 to December

2006). Some 500 police officers from more than thirty countries made up the mission in the

initial phase (2003-2005). Following an invitation by the Bosnian authorities, the EU decided

to establish a refocused EUPM comprising of some 200 international staff and a mandate of

two years (from January 1st 2006 until the end of 2008) with an extension expected. It sup-

ports the police reform process and continues to develop and consolidate local capacity and

regional cooperation in the fight against major and organised crime.

In addition to the EU Police Mission, the EU has an EU Special Representative (EUSR) and

a military crisis management mission (EUFOR Althea) in BiH. The European Commission

also has extensive programmes in the country. The decision to launch Operation ALTHEA

followed the decision by NATO to conclude its SFOR-operation and the adoption by the UN

Security Council authorising the deployment of an EU force in BiH. Following the improved

security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU Defence Ministers decided in Decem-

ber 2006 on a force reduction of EUFOR Althea from 6,000 to 2,500 troops.

The EUSR, who is also the High Representative, is in charge of assuring the coherence

of the ESDP activities. The EUSR is in the chain of command of EUPM and can offer politi-

cal advice to the EUFOR regarding organised crime, indictees of the International Criminal

Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or the six-month review of the EUFOR. The EUSR should

also facilitate coordination between Brussels and Sarajevo. According to a CEPS evaluation46,

there are some grey areas between the mandates of EUPM and EUFOR, especially regarding

the fight against organised crime. The EUFOR also has a paramilitary police force under its

command which exacerbates the tensions. These grey areas have mostly been clarified in

the new mandate of EUPM, which tasks it to lead in the coordination of policing aspects of

the ESDP efforts in the fight against organised crime. 47

4.4.2 Main findings


The EUPM has found it very difficult to distribute its message to the citizens: “With nor-

mal press work you fail to communicate with the public”. The local media in the country

is rather biased and citizens tend to watch and read their own particular news and media.

Whenever EUPM issues a press release it is reported in three different ways: from Serb,

Croat and Bosnian angles. This means that they cannot properly reach out to the public.

Bosnia-Herzegovina’s television networks are still underdeveloped and underfunded but

it is the most unbiased media in the country. However, the ratings are not very high. EUPM

also finds it difficult to trust local journalists.

This is why EUPM has set up its own relatively large media department that it uses to

distribute its message to the citizens. EUPM launches their own television programmes,

does public information campaigns, organises round-table discussions, produces radio

programmes, or sometimes just simply airtime. An example of a newly set-up television

programme is the Bosnian version of “America’s most wanted”. This is a tool for EUPM to

distribute police-related or EUPM-related topics. In addition, EUPM is producing a print sup-

plement, called “Kronika 112” (112 is the Bosnian emergency phone number).

A few years ago the international community in Bosnia was focused on communicating

to local media and population by means of press conferences. This was, however, just one-

way communication. EUPM’s point of view is that when they organize any kind of public

gathering, usually together with the local police, it is important to have a two-way communi-

cation with the citizens and ask them what they think. EUPM has found this to be successful.

Since it is not an official happening but an informal communication, people tend to be very

open. “It is always successful to do these public relation events with the citizens”, was a view

expressed by an interviewee. EUPM gathers local police and NGOs for these sessions. Many

citizens come just to see what is happening. Ever since EUPM started organising such events

they noticed it was much more successful than the traditional press conferences.

EUPM has introduced public complaint bureaus throughout the country, where citizens

can report bribe demands or any other suspicious police activity. Once a year EUPM con-

ducts comprehensive public opinion surveys in which they test the messages that have been

sent out. EUPM also focused efforts to train the press officers of local police forces and the

police chiefs in media management and aim to stay in the background in public communi-

cation about joint projects with the local police.


Intelligence gathering and analysis systems in the country traditionally worked by mak-

ing lots of reports. Effective tools for analysis were missing. After the war the nationwide

data systems disappeared and were cut into small elements. The equipment and the facili-

ties were very poor. Now the police have informants from different political parties and

criminal groups inside their units, which they are aware of. That is why the police now

gather most important information in the heads of some trusted members of the police

agency. They then process, negotiate and make plans from there, and many things are not

documented.46 ana E. Juncos (2007) “police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina” in Michael Emerson and Eva Gross (eds.) Evaluating the EU’s

Crisis Missions in the Balkans, Centre for European policy Studies, pp. 58-59

47 Jari Mustonen (2008) “Coordination and Cooperation on Tactical and Operational Levels: Studying EU-ESDp Crisis Management

Instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Civilian Crisis Management Studies, Vol. 1: No. 1/2008, p. 15


Local police is an important source of information for EUPM. But EUPM often needs to

“press out” information from them. This goes back to the former Yugoslavian time when

information was power and information would not be shared unless ordered. This culture, of

not sharing information with internationals, was partially enforced during the IPTF time.

An organised crime overview and analysis was made in Bosnia and Herzegovina by the

authorities. However, this did not provide an accurate picture. There are many reliability

problems regarding the information that is gathered and put together by the public admin-

istration because of different legislations, different practices and an often general unwill-

ingness to give out information. This is not necessarily because of corruption, but mostly

because of political preferences. The kind of information the political decision-makers are

willing to give out depends on which view of the security situation they want to show. Every

now and then there are some situations that are politically fuelled and people are manipu-

lated.

EUPM tries to get local information on the overall security situation together with EU-

FOR through the EUFOR’s LOT (Liaison Observation Team) house concept. Because those in

the LOTs are military peacekeepers, they are sometimes not very good at collecting criminal

intelligence for EUPM.

As in so many other international crisis management operations, there is a problem

within EUPM concerning their institutional memory because of the high turnover of staff.

EUPM does not have an internet-based information sharing tool within the mission and

internal information management is based on daily, weekly, monthly and incident reports.

EUPM’s institutional memory gathers in the heads of “veterans”. Details are easily lost and

there is no longitudinal approach to information.

There is no central database to retrieve important information from. All information is

stored on local hard drives. This is a problem because there is a need for some kind of web-

based application, but nobody thought of this when EUPM was deployed and now it is too

late. EUPM has an archive of aggregated reports that are sent weekly to the headquarters in

Brussels. But these relate to trends, and are intended for member states and other people in

Brussels, who “are not interested in details, but that is exactly what we need here.” So a real

added value would be an internal reporting and storage system, with the ability to search

for names, locations and incidents.

Some interviewees complained that very few people understand that information shar-

ing and coordination takes a lot of time: “Sometimes you have some things which cannot

be e-mailed, or which have to be encrypted. All these kind of things take time and have to

be organised.”

An interviewee responsible for coordinating with Brussels felt that inside EUPM the in-

formation flow is far more difficult to manage than between EUPM and the headquarters in

Brussels. This is felt to be not uncommon in other field operations as well. Because there is a

lot of information coming from a lot of individuals, you do not have only one set of informa-

tion within the mission.

Within the European community in BiH there is a system of liaison officers to communi-

cate and share information between the different EU organisations. There is a liaison officer

dedicated to EUPM in each EU organisation. There are bi-weekly meetings to share security

information between all the international organisations, the so called “security awareness

working group”. That is one of the most relevant tools or systems to share pertinent infor-

mation regarding the security and safety situation.


To support the local police in fighting organised crime, it is important for EUPM to collect

criminal intelligence information from all around Bosnia and Herzegovina and analyse

it to create a good situational overview. The main sources of information for EUPM head-

quarters are the local police, the daily reports from EUPM’s field offices, and the security

awareness working group. EUPM follows the general statistics of everyday crime in the

country in order to notice crime trends that could be part of the bigger picture. Other im-

portant information relates to police crime and police corruption. This information does

not only come from the local police, but also from the local community. EUPM has infor-

mants who have high positions in society.

In a complex country such as BiH, EUPM needs context information to be able to put

the police information and crime security information in the right context, interpret it in

the right way, and identify the ways to proceed based on those interpretations. This helps in

making decisions. That is why EUPM collects a lot of political information. And not only is

the local, and national Bosnian, political information important, but so too is international

political information such as that related to the situation in Kosovo.

Doubts were raised as to whether the international community is basing its analysis on

the right information. A think-tank leader interviewed was very critical of the international

community, arguing that they do not do enough field-based research. According to her, it is

important to go to the smallest villages and ask people questions. Information presented as

narratives can be very telling of the situation and one should not necessarily trust statistics.

The failure of the international community to get information from local people in multi-

ethnic areas has led to “a gap between the Bosnian reality and the way it is presented by the

media and policy makers.”


5 CONCLuSIONS

5.1 Two-way communicationCommunicating and explaining the objectives and activities to the local population is vi-

tal in a crisis management operation. Often there is room for improvement in the public

information area in international assistance missions. While national crisis management

missions regularly operate in settings where they are close to the local population, there

is often a lack of understanding of the needs for citizens to be informed of what is going

on. Timely and clear information is a crucial component in managing consequences and

of recovery.

Information sharing with citizens is mostly one-way, from authorities to citizens, as was

the case in the fire prevention campaign through the media in Portugal for example. Infor-

mation going in the other direction, from the local population, was especially valued in the

DRC. Organisations there tried to get information from the people to get a better ‘feel’ of

what was happening. However, this information exchange was not formalised.

Innovative ways of communicating with citizens have been used by EUPM in Bosnia and

Herzegovina. The Press and Information department of that mission is relatively large and

well resourced. As discussed in chapter 4.4.2, EUPM is reaching out to the public by round

table discussions, and television and radio programmes with interactive features. Using

communications tools and mechanisms that go beyond the traditional “press conference

communication” is a good practice that could be more widely used.

How to communicate with citizens in situations where information is scarce is a ques-

tion that authorities have to ponder, especially during acute crises (such as the South-East

Asian Tsunami, where communication from authorities to the citizens was heavily criticized

in many countries). It has become clear that authorities can no longer wait to get the full

information before communicating with citizens in crisis situations.

More emphasis should be put on communication with local populations, both in acute

crisis situations where authorities often get criticised for too little information sharing and

where there are generally no well developed methods for using information coming to au-

thorities from citizens, and in post-crisis situations were communication mostly is based on

press releases and press conferences. Communication with citizens could also be part of cri-

sis management exercises so that good practices for two-way communication can be found

and crisis managers can be trained to face the public.

5.2 Interoperability of crisis responseThere are a number of shared requirements in terms of essential information and tools

in national, cross-border and international crisis management. The different levels also

share many of the same obstacles in achieving interoperability. Obtaining and maintain-

ing shared situational awareness and picture is seen often a key challenge in crisis re-

sponse where several organisations are working in parallel. Organisations continue to

plan and procure their information and communications technology for their own organi-

sational mission partly ignoring the multi-actor reality of crisis response. At the national

level there are more efforts and investments into interagency interoperability. At the na-

tional level there are more efforts and investments into interagency interoperability. A

positive development is that interoperability is not any more seen as mainly a technology

issue but organisational and human aspects of interoperability are better recognised.

The humanitarian sector has been innovative in creating new solutions for information

sharing but the problem is that they are often ad hoc and fragmented. There is a lack of

analysis of lessons learned and institutionalisation of success stories, thus the development

of information sharing methods is continuously started from scratch. Replication of existing

successful systems is needed.

A complex emergency with a multi-organisational approach calls for an overall under-

standing of the relevant matters. The use of uniform language should be increased. Interop-

erability would be enhanced if technical measurements and other terminology would be

standardised between all actors. Clearing houses for information, such as the Monitoring

and Information Centre (MIC) of the EU Community Civil Protection Mechanism or the UN

ReliefWeb, provide a useful service but there are also calls to make them more proactive in

processing the information and developing a common situational picture.

Uniform procedures for crisis management would be helpful in cross-border situations,

such as the one that was practiced in the Barents Rescue Exercise. Procedures for receiving

large scale international assistance should be planned and trained for at the national level.

In the Barents region, the new Barents Euro-Arctic Council agreement on emergency preven-

tion, preparedness and response which will hopefully be signed in the near future will help

providing a permanent joint committee to watch over these matters.

Information exchange with people from other organisations is often done informally

during crisis situations. These contacts are not institutionalised, but are established on a

personal basis. Information is shared much more easily with people that one knows and


trusts: “Bonding is important for chaotic situations”. It is clear that technology cannot help

in much information exchange if it is based completely on personal contacts.

Trust can be built through, for example, common trainings in the mission area. It creates

a sense of community and trust can be built which increases information sharing during

crisis situations. In post-conflict crisis management operations where the situation is rela-

tively calm, information sharing settles into more institutionalised ways and is not as ad hoc

as during an acute crisis. Thus for example information sharing between the EU and other

international organisations, at the headquarters level in Sarajevo, for example, was quite

institutionalised.

How organisations are built has an impact on information sharing. If there is no hori-

zontal information sharing and everyone reports upwards, there is a need to determine the

“interoperability threshold”, i.e. at what level is information shared horizontally (with other

departments and with other organisations) to get a full picture of the situation. There is a

danger that the threshold may be set to too high, which impedes working level contacts

between departments and organisations.

5.3 Decision-making in crisis situationsIt is difficult to make conclusions about what the essential information needs are for dif-

ferent actors. There are information clusters of widely shared needs such as situational

picture, incidents, and other actors, but other needs are mostly mandate-related.

Information on the crisis itself is important for actors in all of the different types of crises

studied. Actors need to have a good situational picture, which requires them to get accurate

and timely information from the field. However, in many situations the problem is not that

there is not enough information to make decisions but that there are problems in process-

ing the incoming information and knowing what information is accurate.

Different actors’ vital information needs differ from situation to situation and from actor to

actor. Some common needs can be identified, including information on the security situation.

This appeared to be vital to decision making for everyone, whether related to danger of fires

(Portugal) or armed groups (DRC). Other common needs mentioned included information on

what other actors in the mission area are doing and other kind of context information.

Some NGOs interviewed mentioned that information on what impact their activities are

having on the ground is important to them, especially as they need to show their donors

that their investments are having the desired effect. Other than this, no interviewees men-

tioned the need to know how their actions are affecting the crisis reality. The reason for this

might be that evaluation of impact is often done after the mission at the headquarters level,

if at all. Information to support the monitoring and evaluation of the achieving of the man-

date could be useful for crisis management operations, especially those that are longer-term

and can then make adjustments to their activities during the operation.

The need for information analyses was also mentioned. Too much “raw data” is received,

and the over-flow of information coupled with time constraints renders most of it inappli-

cable. Instead, focused and timely analysis of events, incidents, projects and actors is needed.

This finding is corroborated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ “Wikis,

Webs and Networks. Creating Connections for Conflict-Prone Settings” report48, which asked

practitioners, military personnel, civil society organisations, diplomats, and academics

about their information needs in the field.

Interviewees differed on the need for detail. While some wanted to receive all detailed

information that they could, others felt that they only wanted those details necessary for

forming a complete situational picture. Still others felt that with the aggregated reports

that headquarters receive, for example, details are lost. A practice where the most important

details are received, with analysis if time permits, but all the existing detailed information is

available (and stored) for use when needed, would be ideal.

48 Linder, op. cit. p. 41


6 RECOMMENDATIONS

The study concludes that senior management would need to take an increased interest in

what kind of tools and systems should be used in crisis management operations, so as to

develop the tools from a needs based perspective. Political, organisational and other sub-

stance related factors should determine the development of systems, not the availability

and push of technology solutions. The following recommendations for different actors are

based on the case studies of this project as well as previous projects and experience.

International organisations

The UN needs to develop communications solutions that work in poor infrastructure •

conditions. These tools could be especially based on mobile phones.

The UN would be well placed to identify the shared information needs among different •

actors and to facilitate trust building.

The EU should do a mapping study on the concepts and systems in use in both ESDP and •

in civil protection in order to make the existing gaps and synergies between systems

visible and to highlight their functions and possibilities.

ESDP operations should have a clear communication strategy in place prior to the •

launch of an operation in order to clearly explain the mandate and manage expectations

of the local population. Effective two-way communication should be implemented and

resources allocated to press departments including sufficient numbers of highly quali-

fied staff and adequate financial means.

The development of the CIS concept for ESDP civilian operations should be finalised and •

its implementation in future operations assured.

Civilian CIS capacity should be enhanced and user requirements for civilian actors es-•

tablished to increase civil-military cooperation in planning ESDP operations.

ESDP crisis management missions should be equipped with a web-based information •

management tool from the outset. At the very least this should include a central report

repository with a search tool, a situational picture and discussion fora. This information

management tool should be easy to link to Brussels, and building similar systems for

different missions would bring economy of scale benefits as well as familiarity to those

staff members who have been in earlier missions.

Timely deployment of communication and information systems for ESDP civilian mis-•

sions needs to be improved.

The European Group of Training should include two-way communication in EU civilian •

crisis management training modules.

Governments

All governments should do a mapping exercise of existing civil protection agreements •

and mechanisms where they are involved and study the uniformity and interoperability

between different mechanisms.

Governments should work out the procedures for requesting and receiving aid and •

should clarify the uniformity of definitions and language.

Governments should develop comprehensive crisis communication strategies that effec-•

tively address the need for two way communication.

Governments should promote public-private partnerships in addressing crisis manage-•

ment challenges and create opportunities and incentives for the private sector’s engage-

ment in projects where profit is not gained immediately by sharing the financial risk

through public support for projects.

private sector

Private sector companies should become more involved in development projects seek-•

ing to improve crisis communications and seek new partnerships and new ways to

engage with governments and international organisations.

NGOs

NGOs need to develop methods and mechanisms to share information with other ac-•

tors without losing their perceived neutrality. An example of a possible mechanism can

be found in Afghanistan where NGOs have created a third-party NGO to function as a

middle man in information sharing between them and other actors.

NGOs should develop information management practises and analysis capacity in or-•

der to overcome the information over-flow and processing of “raw data” into meaningful

knowledge for decision making. Focused and timely analysis of events, incidents, proj-

ects and actors would be needed.

There should be humanitarian NGO sector wide institutional learning process from •

implemented systems capturing lessons learned and best practice in order to replicate

successful systems.

Research community

For appropriate information systems design, the research community should take into •

account human issues that facilitate or hinder information sharing.

Research should address the added value of social networking and information sharing •

in crisis management operations.

The research community should address how Sensemaking can bring new insights into •

how people process information and make decisions in crisis situations and how that af-

fects and should affect technology development.


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InterviewsAugust 8 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with a representative of the Association pour la 1. Santé Familiale (ASF)August 8 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with a representative of the Swedish International 2. Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)August 8 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with a representative of Médecins Sans Frontières 3. (MSF) BelgiumAugust 9 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with a representative of Save the Children4. August 9 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with a representative of Oxfam GB5. August 9 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with two representatives of the International Com-6. mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC)August 10 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with a representative of the UN Population Fund 7. (UNFPA)August 10 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with a representative of the UN Development Pro-8. gramme (UNDP)August 10 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with a representative of the Office for the Coordi-9. nation of Humanitarian Affairs (UN/OCHA)August 10 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with a representative of the World Food Pro-10. gramme (WFP)August 10 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with three representative of the UN Children’s 11. Fund (UNICEF)August 13 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with a representative of the Consulate of the Bel-12. gian GovernmentAugust 13 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with a representative of the Mission of the UN in 13. the DRC (MONUC)August 13 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with a representative of the European Commission 14. Humanitarian aid Office (ECHO)August 13 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with two representatives of the Catholic Relief Ser-15. vices (CRS)August 14 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with a representative of the World Health Organi-16. zation (WHO)August 14 2007, Kinshasa, recorded interview with two representatives of the UK Department For 17. International Development (DFID)October 19 2007, Saariselkä, recorded interview with a participant from the On Site Operations 18. Coordination Center (OSOCC)October 20 2007, Ivalo, recorded interview with a participant from the On-Site Command center 19. (OSC)October 20 2007, Ivalo, recorded interview with a participant from the Medical team20. October 21 2007, Saariselkä, recorded interview with a participant from the Local Emergency 21. Management Authority (LEMA)December 12 2008, Lisbon, recorded interview with two representatives of the Portuguese Forest 22. ServicesDecember 13 2008, Lisbon recorded interview with two representatives of the Portuguese Na-23. tional Authority for Civil ProtectionFebruary 29 2008, Brussels, recorded interview with a representative of the European Commis-24. sion Environment DGFebruary 29 2008, Brussels, recorded interview with a representative of the Civil Protection Unit 25. of the Council of the European UnionApril 8 2008, Sarajevo, recorded interview with a representative of the European Union Police 26. Mission (EUPM)April 8 2008, Sarajevo, recorded interview with a representative of the EU Coordination Office of 27. the European Union Police Mission (EUPM)April 8 2008, Sarajevo, recorded interview with a representative of the Security Department of the 28.

European Union Police Mission (EUPM)April 8 2008, Sarajevo, recorded interview with a representative of the Press and Public Informa-29. tion Department of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM)April 8 2008, Sarajevo, recorded interview with a representative of the Press and Public Informa-30. tion Department of the European Union Police Mission (EUPM)April 9 2008, Sarajevo, notes taken at an interview with a representative of the European Commis-31. sion (EC) Department Police ProjectsApril 9 2008, Sarajevo, recorded interview with a representative of the European Union Force 32. (EUFOR)April 9 2008, Sarajevo, recorded interview with a representative of the European Union Special 33. Representative (EUSR)April 10 2008, Sarajevo, recorded interview with three representatives of the Canton Sarajevo 34. Police DepartmentApril 10 2008, Sarajevo, recorded interview with a representative of the Organization for Security 35. and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)April 10 2008, Sarajevo, recorded interview with two representatives of the Department for Secu-36. rity Cooperation of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)April 11 2008, Sarajevo, recorded interview with a representative of Populari37.

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