Innovation and War:Innovation and War:Military Operations in Afghanistan Military Operations in Afghanistan

and Iraqand Iraq

James RussellJames RussellDepartment of National Security AffairsDepartment of National Security Affairs

Naval Postgraduate SchoolNaval Postgraduate SchoolJune 2010June 2010

OutlineOutline

Project Project BackgroundBackground• Iraq, AfghanistanIraq, Afghanistan

Focus on Focus on empirically built empirically built cases of units as cases of units as they conduct they conduct operations. operations.

Up Front Punch lineUp Front Punch line

Analysis of US military operations in Iraq Analysis of US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan show organizations that and Afghanistan show organizations that can quickly adapt, change, and innovate can quickly adapt, change, and innovate while closed with the enemy.while closed with the enemy.

Nonsense to suggest that insurgents are Nonsense to suggest that insurgents are somehow more creative, flexible, and somehow more creative, flexible, and adaptive.adaptive.

I’m not arguing that this wins the war!I’m not arguing that this wins the war!

Basis for This Statement?Basis for This Statement?

3rd Battalion, 6th

Marine Regiment; 1st

Marine Battalion, 7th

Marine Regiiment, Al Qaim, 2005-2006

4-14 Cavalry Group, Rawah, Western Anbar, 2005-2006

172nd SBCT, NinewaProvince /Mosul, 2005-2006

Unit Locations2/28 Brigade Combat Team; 1/1 Brigade Combat Team, Ramadi, Anbar, 2005-2007; 1st

Battalion, 37th

Armored Regiment; 2nd

Battalion, 7th

Marine Regiment (both attached to 1/1 in Ramadi, 2006-2007)

3rd Battalion, 6th

Marine Regiment; 1st

Marine Battalion, 7th

Marine Regiiment, Al Qaim, 2005-2006

4-14 Cavalry Group, Rawah, Western Anbar, 2005-2006

172nd SBCT, NinewaProvince /Mosul, 2005-2006

Unit Locations2/28 Brigade Combat Team; 1/1 Brigade Combat Team, Ramadi, Anbar, 2005-2007; 1st

Battalion, 37th

Armored Regiment; 2nd

Battalion, 7th

Marine Regiment (both attached to 1/1 in Ramadi, 2006-2007)

Iraq cases of Iraq cases of empirically built empirically built cases of 9 Army cases of 9 Army and Marine Corps and Marine Corps battalions in 05-07.battalions in 05-07.

Chronicle field-Chronicle field-level adaptive and level adaptive and innovative innovative processes.processes.

Findings from Iraq ResearchFindings from Iraq Research

Organizations developed new, indigenous organizational Organizations developed new, indigenous organizational capacities.capacities.• Dialectical process that cannot be described solely as top-Dialectical process that cannot be described solely as top-

down, or bottom up – though execution process is generated down, or bottom up – though execution process is generated organically.organically.

• Innovation is the end product of a series of linked processes Innovation is the end product of a series of linked processes that builds organizational capacities that deliver outputs that that builds organizational capacities that deliver outputs that didn’t exist before the unit arrived.didn’t exist before the unit arrived.

New capacities required modification to organizational New capacities required modification to organizational structures.structures.• S-2 shops, non-kinetic effects working groups, JIATFs.S-2 shops, non-kinetic effects working groups, JIATFs.• New small unit tactics to disrupt insurgent ops.New small unit tactics to disrupt insurgent ops.

Units gradually built new SOPs to operationalize new Units gradually built new SOPs to operationalize new capacities.capacities.• Census Operations.Census Operations.• COP construction.COP construction.• CMO and IO integration into lethal/non-lethal targeting.CMO and IO integration into lethal/non-lethal targeting.

Other Iraq InferencesOther Iraq Inferences Role of doctrine miscast by security Role of doctrine miscast by security

studies theorists:studies theorists:• Capstone operational doctrine is foundation Capstone operational doctrine is foundation

to innovation; lack of specific COIN doctrine to innovation; lack of specific COIN doctrine not important in these cases.not important in these cases.

Informal doctrine important tool.Informal doctrine important tool. Organizational hierarchy operates Organizational hierarchy operates

differently in war than in peace – no differently in war than in peace – no surprise, but…surprise, but…• Ad-hoc org structures; flattened Ad-hoc org structures; flattened

organizational hierarchy; authority driven organizational hierarchy; authority driven down the chain of command; informal down the chain of command; informal relationships a great source of organizational relationships a great source of organizational productivity; embrace of systems-based productivity; embrace of systems-based based perspectives to understand second based perspectives to understand second and third order effects of actions as a guide and third order effects of actions as a guide to decision-making. to decision-making.

Innovation and Adaptation in Innovation and Adaptation in War: The Case of 4/25 in P2KWar: The Case of 4/25 in P2K

Gorbuz

#

Tere Zayi

Matun

4

Jaji Maidan

Bak

SabariMusa Khel

Mandozayi

Nadir Shah Khot

Qalandar

Dowmandah

Tani

Spera

FOB Orgun-EFOB Orgun-E

FOB CurryFOB Curry

FOB BorisFOB Boris

FOB TillmanFOB Tillman

Zerok COPZerok COP

FOB MunozFOB Munoz

FB LilleyFB Lilley

4/25 Adaptation – the Good4/25 Adaptation – the Good 4/25 Board of Directors – A Campaign Plan!4/25 Board of Directors – A Campaign Plan!

• AID, Agriculture, State, BDE CommanderAID, Agriculture, State, BDE Commander• Attempt to involve other USG elements in the Attempt to involve other USG elements in the

stabilization/COIN effortstabilization/COIN effort Immense array of additional organizational/TF Immense array of additional organizational/TF

support – the alphabet soup approachsupport – the alphabet soup approach• Human Terrain, PRT, Law Enforcement Program, ADTs, Human Terrain, PRT, Law Enforcement Program, ADTs,

JIEDDO, SOF, Intell orgs of every stripe to help in JIEDDO, SOF, Intell orgs of every stripe to help in targeting, detainee ops., all built through ad-hoc, JIATF-targeting, detainee ops., all built through ad-hoc, JIATF-type organizations.type organizations.

This is one model for how to organize diverse This is one model for how to organize diverse organizational components conduct stability organizational components conduct stability operations in modern era.operations in modern era.

Military remains provider and enabler….Military remains provider and enabler….

TF Yukon Leadership

Yukon Board of DirectorsDoS USAID USDA DoD

Louis CoronadoJames Story Gary Domian COL Howard

Team Khowst Team PaktikaTeam Paktya• DoSSarah Groen

• USAIDTeresa Miller

• USDAFeridoon Mehdizadegan

• BSOLTC Stephen Smith

• PRTCDR John Pestovic

• ADTCOL Brian Copes

• DoSGenevieve Libonati

• USAIDJohn Koogler

• USDAVacant

• BSOLTC Rob Campbell

• PRTLtCol Carlos Halcomb

• ADTCOL Jim Moore

• DoSTrevor Boyd

• USAIDDaniel Weggeland

• USDACarolin Clarin

• BSOLTC Clint BakerLTC Pete Minalga

• PRTCDR Tim Cauthen

The Case of 3-509 in The Case of 3-509 in EPaktikaEPaktika

Significant initiative at BN Significant initiative at BN levels to structure their levels to structure their own operations.own operations.

Organizing for the fight.Organizing for the fight. Driving responsibility Driving responsibility

down the chain of down the chain of command – IO, survey command – IO, survey data collection.data collection.

Tactical organizational Tactical organizational complexity that mirrors complexity that mirrors command level.command level.

FOB Orgun-EFOB Orgun-E

FOB CurryFOB Curry

FOB BorisFOB Boris

FOB TillmanFOB Tillman

Zerok COPZerok COP

FOB MunozFOB Munoz

FB LilleyFB Lilley

Districts 9

Sq KM 6204-About the size of the big island of Hawaii

Population ~300,000

125 KM of Border with Pakistan

PAKMIL Checkpoints 51

Initiative Spotlight:Initiative Spotlight: 1-501 1-501 Sub-Governor Budget Pilot ProgramSub-Governor Budget Pilot Program

1. Targets the legitimacy gap at the District

2. Provides Government with a simple means to improve the community

3. Record keeping, dispute resolution, and consultative processes codified in documents

4. Employs the local community and fosters a sense of ownership

Preliminary Conclusions from Preliminary Conclusions from Iraq and Afghanistan Iraq and Afghanistan

Research Research Process of battlefield innovation is complex mix of Process of battlefield innovation is complex mix of

top-down, bottom up process: dialectic in nature.top-down, bottom up process: dialectic in nature. Afghan: top down guidance and doctrine shape Afghan: top down guidance and doctrine shape

approach, but significant variation on unit basis, approach, but significant variation on unit basis, just like Iraq.just like Iraq.

Iraq parallels: units get it, upper- mid- and lower Iraq parallels: units get it, upper- mid- and lower levels all get it. Educated, experienced work levels all get it. Educated, experienced work force.force.• Organizations extremely flexible to build new output Organizations extremely flexible to build new output

capacity.capacity. Organizational learning happens but is Organizational learning happens but is

idiosyncratic; doctrine does not smooth this idiosyncratic; doctrine does not smooth this process.process.