BAR BULLETIN - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28 www.nmbar.org July 9, 2007 • Volume 46, No. 28 Inside This Issue Table of Contents .............................................. 5 Appellate Rules Committee Vacancy ................. 6 Settlement Week Deadlines ............................... 6 Board of Bar Commissioners Meeting Agenda .. 6 Keys to Law Office Management Marketing Isn’t a Four-Letter Word .............. 8 Web Corner ....................................................... 8 Business and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts, a Book Review by John R. Cooney and Megan T. Muirhead................................ 9 Rules/Orders .................................................... 18 From the New Mexico Supreme Court............ 19 2007-NMSC-030, State v. Romero 2007-NMSC-031, Moriarty Municipal School District v. under MountainWater Company 2007-NMSC-032, State v. Frazier From the New Mexico Court of Appeals ......... 35 2007-NMCA-075, State v. Rowell 2007-NMCA-076, Albin v. Bakas 2007-NMCA-077, State v. Soto 2007-NMCA-078, Hamberg v. Sandia Corp 2007-NMCA-079, Computer One, Inc. v. Grisham & Lawless PA Michael Dickson Rule of Law State Bar of New Mexico 2007 Annual Meeting • July 12–15 • Mescalero, NM
Transcript
Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28 �
www.nmbar.org
July 9, 2007 • Volume 46, No. 28
Inside This IssueTable of Contents .............................................. 5
From the New Mexico Supreme Court ............ 19 2007-NMSC-030, State v. Romero 2007-NMSC-031, Moriarty Municipal School District v. Thunder MountainWater Company 2007-NMSC-032, State v. Frazier
From the New Mexico Court of Appeals ......... 35 2007-NMCA-075, State v. Rowell 2007-NMCA-076, Albin v. Bakas 2007-NMCA-077, State v. Soto 2007-NMCA-078, Hamberg v. Sandia Corp 2007-NMCA-079, Computer One, Inc. v. Grisham & Lawless PA
Michael Dickson Rule of Law
State Bar of New Mexico2007 Annual Meeting • July 12–15 • Mescalero, NM
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MeetingsJuly9 Taxation Section Board of Directors, noon, via teleconference
11 Children’s Law Section Board of Directors, noon, Juvenile Justice Center
11 Criminal Law Section Board of Directors, noon, State Bar Center
12—15 SBNM Annual Meeting Inn of the Mountain Gods, Mescalero
Contributions and announcements to the Bar Bulletin are welcome but the right is reserved to select material to be published. Unless otherwise specified, publication of any an-nouncement or statement is not deemed to be an endorsement by the State Bar of New Mexico of the views expressed therein, nor shall publication of any advertisement be considered an endorsement by the State Bar of the product or service involved. Editorial policy is available upon request.
Board of Commissioners–OfficersDennis E. Jontz, PresidentCraig A. Orraj, President-ElectHenry A. Alaniz, Vice PresidentStephen S. Shanor, Secretary-TreasurerVirginia R. Dugan, Immediate-Past President
Board of EditorsDavid M. Berlin, Esq.Janet BlairPaul A. Bleicher, Esq.Joel Carson, Esq.Martin R. Esquivel, Esq.Mark Glenn, Esq.Kathryn Morrow, Esq.Steve Sanders, Esq.Stacey E. Scherer, Esq.Elizabeth Staley, Esq.
Executive Director – Joe ConteEditor – Dorma Seago(505) 797-6030 • E-mail: [email protected] – Julie SchwartzE-mail: [email protected] Executive – Marcia C. Ulibarri, (505) 797-6058 • E-mail: [email protected] – Brian SanchezPrint Shop Assistant – Richard MontoyaMail Handler – Chris Knowles
Cite officially as Bar Bulletin (ISSN 1062-6611).July 9, 2007, Vol. 46, No. 28.Subscription price $80 per year. Subscriptions are nonrefundable once purchased.Published weekly by the State Bar, 5121 Masthead NE, Albuq., NM 87109(505) 797-6000 • (800) 876-6227Fax: (505) 828-3765 E-mail: [email protected] • www.nmbar.org
State Bar WorkshopsJuly25 Consumer Debt/Bankruptcy Workshop 6 p.m., State Bar Center, Albuquerque
26 Consumer Debt/Bankruptcy Workshop 5:30 p.m., Branigan Library, Las Cruces
August22 Consumer Debt/Bankruptcy Workshop 6 p.m., State Bar Center, Albuquerque
Notices ...........................................................................................................................................................6–7Keys to Law Office Management: Marketing Isn’t a Four-Letter Word ..........................................8Web Corner .........................................................................................................................................................8Business and Commercial Litigation in Federal Courts, a Book Review by John R. Cooney and Megan T. Muirhead ...................................................................................... 9Legal Education Calendar ......................................................................................................................... 10Writs of Certiorari ......................................................................................................................................... 12List of Court of Appeals’ Opinions ........................................................................................................... 14Clerk Certificates ............................................................................................................................................ 15Rules/Orders .................................................................................................................................................... 18
No. 07-8300-17: In the Matter of the Approval of Local Rule LR6-207 for the Sixth Judicial District .......................................................................................................................... 18
Opinions ...................................................................................................................................................19–59 From the New Mexico Supreme Court
2007-NMSC-030, No. 30,000: State v. Romero ...................................................................... 19
2007-NMSC-031, No. 30,020: Board of Education, Moriarty Municipal School District v. Thunder Mountain Water Company ........................................................... 20
2007-NMSC-032, No. 29,138: State v. Frazier ......................................................................... 24
From the New Mexico Court of Appeals
2007-NMCA-075, No. 26,429: State v. Rowell ........................................................................ 35
2007-NMCA-076, No. 26,134: Albin v. Bakas .......................................................................... 40
2007-NMCA-077, No. 25,473: State v. Soto ............................................................................ 45
2007-NMCA-078, No. 26,559: Hamberg v. Sandia Corporation ...................................... 51
2007-NMCA-079, No. 25,732: Computer One, Inc. v. Grisham & Lawless PA. ............. 56Advertising ..................................................................................................................................................... 60
With respect to opposing parties and their counsel:
I will clearly identify, for other counsel or parties, all changes that I have made in all documents.
Professionalism Tip
Cover Artist: Michael Dickson is this year’s official artist of the poster for the 2007 SBNM Annual Meeting and for the cover of the 2007–2008 Bench & Bar Directory. Dickson is senior principal and director of design at SMPC Architects in Albuquerque. As an artist, he has exhibited his paintings in numerous galleries in both Texas and New Mexico. His work is currently showing at Weems Galleries in Albuquerque. To see the cover art in its original color, visit www.nmbar.org and click on Bar Bulletin.
Destruction of Exhibits and Tapes Pursuant to the Judicial Records Retention and Disposition Schedules, exhibits or tapes filed with the court in criminal, civil, children’s court, domestic, incompetency/mental health, adoption and probate cases for the years and courts shown below, including but not limited to cases that have been consolidated, are to be destroyed. Cases on appeal are excluded. Counsel for parties are advised that exhibits and tapes can be retrieved by the dates shown below. Attorneys who have cases with exhibits, or who have cases with tapes and wish to have duplicates made, may verify exhibit or tape information with the Special Services Division at the numbers shown below. Plaintiff(s) exhibits will be released to counsel of record for the plaintiff(s), and defendant(s) exhibits will be released to counsel of record for defendant(s) by Order of the Court. All exhibits will be released in their entirety. Exhibits and tapes not claimed by the allotted time will be considered abandoned and will be destroyed by Order of the Court.
1st Judicial District Court (505) 827-4687 Exhibits in criminal, civil, children’s May be retrieved through July 29 courts, domestic, incompetency/mental health, adoption and probate cases, 1976–1990 Exhibits in criminal, civil, children’s May be retrieved through August 29 courts, domestic, incompetency/mental health, adoption and probate cases, 1973–1991
N.M. Supreme ourtAppellate Rules CommitteeVacancy A vacancy exists on the Appellate Rules Committee due to the resignation of one member. Attorneys interested in volunteer-ing time on this committee may send a letter of interest and/or resume to Kathleen Jo Gibson, Chief Clerk, PO Box 848, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87504-0848. Deadline for letters/resumes is July 30.
Law LibraryOpen Monday–Friday, 8 a.m.–6 p.m.Closed Saturdays and SundaysPhone: (505) 827-4850; fax: (505) 827-4852; e-mail: [email protected]; Web site: www.supremecourtlawlibrary.com.
Second Judicial District CourtSettlement Week Deadlines The 2nd Judicial District Court’s Nine-teenth Annual Settlement Week will be Oct. 15–Oct. 22. The deadline for requesting a referral of a civil or domestic relations case to Settlement Week 2007 is Aug. 3. For complete details regarding referral requests, refer to LR2-602, Section C, of the Second Judicial District Court’s Local Rules Governing the Settlement Facilitation Program. Blank referral forms are available in the civil clerk’s office, domestic relations clerk’s office and Court Alternatives. Forms are also available at www.seconddistrictcourt.com. Note: All referrals should be filled out completely and sent directly to the assigned judge in the case. Include names, addresses and contact numbers of all parties/attorneys
(especially pro se parties) involved and any other individuals requiring notice of the settlement facilitation. Invited facilitators should submit a completed form to Court Alternatives by July 13. For more informa-tion about Settlement Week, call Court Alternatives, (505) 841-7412.
sTaTe bar newsAnnual Meeting According to its bylaws, the State Bar is required to hold an annual meeting of its members. As part of this year’s annual meeting, which will be held at the Inn of the Mountain Gods in Mescalero, the State Bar will conduct a CLE session on discussion topics from 3 to 4:45 p.m., July 12. Possible discussion topics include non-partisan judicial elections, reciprocity, tort reform and electronic filing. Members who have suggestions on other possible topics or who are interested in speaking to a specific topic or moderating a discussion, should contact Joe Conte, (505) 797-6099 or [email protected].
Attorney Support Group The next Attorney Support Group meet-ing will be held at 5:30 p.m., Aug. 6, at the First United Methodist Church at Fourth and Lead SW, Albuquerque. The group meets regularly on the first Monday of the month. For more information, contact Bill Stratvert, (505) 242-6845.
Board of Bar CommissionersMeeting Agenda The Board of Bar Commissioners will meet at 10 a.m., July 12, during the Annual
Meeting at the Inn of the Mountain Gods in Mescalero. 1. Approval of Apri l 27 meeting
port 13. Popejoy Report 14. Issues Facing the Profession Committee
Report 15. Judic ia l Reform/Advancement
Committee Report 16. Su p r e m e C o u r t B o a rd s a n d
Committees Liaison Reports 17. Bar Commissioner District Reports 18. New business
Paralegal DivisionMonthly Brown-Bag CLE for Attorneys and Paralegals The Paralegal Division invites members of the legal community to bring a lunch and attend Workers’ Comp: What a Para-legal Needs to Know, presented by Linda Linthicum, CP, and Sarah Barnes, Esq., both of Butt Thornton & Baehr PC. The program will be held from noon to 1 p.m., July 11, at the State Bar Center and offers 1.0 general CLE credit. Registration begins at the door at 11:30 a.m. The cost is $16 for attorneys and $15 for paralegals and support staff. For more information, contact Cheryl
Passalaqua, (505) 872-7469 or Evonne Sanchez, (505) 222-9356.
Senior Lawyers DivisionAnnual Meeting The Senior Lawyers Division will hold its annual meeting at 5 p.m., July 13, during the State Bar’s annual meeting at the Inn of the Mountain Gods, Mescalero. Any suggested agenda items should be sent to Chair Terrence Revo, [email protected] or (505) 293-8888. A reception with the Young Lawyers Division will follow at 5:30 p.m. All senior lawyers who will be at the convention are encouraged to join the SLD and YLD for the reception.
Solo and Small Firm Practitioners SectionMeeting and CLE The Solo and Small Firm Practitioners Section will hold a meeting at 11:30 a.m. during the luncheon at the State Bar’s annual meeting, July 13, at the Inn of the Mountain Gods, Mescalero. Agenda items should be sent to Chair George Weeth, [email protected], (505) 828-1122. The section will co-sponsor When and How to Get Out of Client Relationships at 3:15 p.m. that afternoon. Visit www.nmbar.org to obtain a registration form for the State Bar’s annual meeting.
Young Lawyers DivisionAnnual Meeting and Reception The Young Lawyers Division will hold its annual meeting from 10 a.m. to noon, July 14, during the State Bar’s annual meeting at the Inn of the Mountain Gods, Mescalero. Agenda items should be sent to Chair Erika Anderson, [email protected], or (505) 982-8405. YLD members are also invited to attend a reception from 5:30 to 7 p.m., July 13, co-hosted by YLD and the Senior Lawyers Division.
oTher barsAlbuquerque Bar Association Luncheon and CLE The Albuquerque Bar Association’s mem-bership luncheon will be held at noon, July
10, at the Doubletree Hotel, 201 Marquette, NW, Albuquerque. Rick Homans, execu-tive director of the New Mexico Spaceport Authority, will be the speaker. The CLE (1.0 general CLE credit) will immediately follow the luncheon from 1:30 to 2:20 p.m. George Bach of the ACLU will present Garcetti & Meatballs: Leftovers from a Half-Baked Opinion. Lunch only: $20 members/$25 non-members with reservations, $5 additional at door; lunch and CLE: $40 members/$55 non-members with reservation, $5 additional at the door; CLE only: $20 members/$30 non-members with reservation, $5 addi-tional at the door. Register for lunch by noon, July 6. Regis-ter online at www.abqbar.com; by e-mail at [email protected]; by mail to ABA, 400 Gold SW, Suite 620, Albuquerque, NM 87102; by fax to (505) 842-0287; or call (505) 842-1151 or (505) 243-2615.
National Association of Women LawyersLaw Student Mentor Program The National Association of Women Lawyers has begun a new law student mentor program geared toward the social and professional advancement of female attorneys. The program matches attorney mentors and students from a variety of legal fields and geographic locations on a nationwide basis. Mentors may be any level of seniority and will be given guidance from NAWL on how to best help student pro-tégées. NAWL anticipates completing the formal pairings in September 2007. Lawyers who join NAWL for the first time and sign up to become mentors will receive $20 off their first year dues. Law student membership in NAWL is free and is open to both women and men. For more information, contact Dr. Stacie Strong, (312) 988-6186 or [email protected].
N.M. Defense Lawyers AssociationYoung Lawyer of the Year Award Nominations are being accepted for the 2007 NMDLA Young Lawyer of the Year Award. The award will be presented at the 2007 DLA Annual Meeting on Oct. 18 in Albuquerque. The award is given to one
or more attorneys who have not practiced more than five years or are under the age of 36; have, by their ethical, personal and professional conduct, shown exemplary achievement in the legal profession; and/or have contributed time and expertise to the NMDLA. Letters of nomination should be sent to NMDLA, PO Box 94116, Albuquerque, NM 87199; fax to (505) 858-2597; or e-mail [email protected]. The deadline for nominations is Aug. 31. This is the first year of this award.
N.M. Women’s Bar AssociationNetworking Luncheon The N.M. Women’s Bar Association’s networking luncheon will be from noon to 1:15 p.m., July 10, at NYPD, located on Central Avenue between 2nd and 3rd in Albuquerque. Hilary Tompkins and Yolanda Archuletta, N.M. Women’s Foundation, will discuss projects funded by NMWF that encourage a positive social change among women. Members and visitors are welcome. R.S.V.P. by 5 p.m., July 9, to [email protected].
UnM School of LawSummer Library HoursMonday–Thursday 8 a.m. to 9 p.m.Friday 8 a.m. to 6 p.m.Saturday 9 a.m. to 6 p.m.Sunday Noon to 9 p.m.ReferenceMonday–Friday 9 a.m. to 6 p.m.Saturday ClosedSunday Noon to 4 p.m.
by Donald Becker, Co-Chair, Law Office Management Committee
In the past, there has frequently been an attitude that marketing is the same as advertising, and both are obscene ideas for a professional. One will occasionally hear the view that using business methods have destroyed professionalism.
As with many things, an orientation toward money and the “bottom line” can result in violations of professional and/or ethical rules and regulations, with one losing sight of professional values and choosing short term gains. Unfortunately, there will always be some people who will violate the trust of their clients and breach their fiduciary duty.
However, common sense should dictate that conducting affairs in an ethical and professional manner IS GOOD BUSINESS. Most established businesses recognize that happy satisfied customers/clients are the best marketing tool. Most professionals realize that professional and ethical conduct is a form of marketing that draws desirable clients. Referrals may come from current or former clients or from other professionals who understand and appreciate one’s professionalism; or they may come from one’s reputation in the community as an ethical professional.
Over the years, the American Bar Association has conducted various studies about cli-ent satisfaction. Winning was NOT the most important factor for the vast majority of clients. How the client and the case were treated was the most critical factor. Handling the case in a professional and competent manner determined the ultimate opinion on the merits of the legal services. Most clients realize that attorneys deal with the given facts (i.e., attorneys don’t create the facts). Also, in a legal dispute, someone is going to lose and it might be them.
How to advertise? How to develop a “business” plan? There is no one formula. It is necessary, however, for attorneys and law offices to make their own objective assessment as to their particular situations as well as to their own particular goals or objectives. This information will generally become a business plan and may be reflected in a mission statement.
Marketing Isn’t a Four-Letter Word
www.nmbar.org
By Veronica Cordova, Assistant Director of Administration
This month users are directed to the utility link of the site entitled Contact Us at www.nmbar.org.
Contact Us, a convenient feature on many Web sites, makes State Bar contact information readily available. This area provides links to the Board of Bar Com-missioners, the Bar Center, advertising opportunities, volunteer opportunities, Casemaker, staff listings and change of address information.
Both the mailing and street addresses of the State Bar are listed, along with phone, fax and e-mail contacts. Even a map to the State Bar is provided. Every-thing that helps members and the public find the State Bar or the resources they need is available through this handy shortcut called Contact Us.
As always, members are encouraged to visit the site. Ideas and suggestions to continually improve the site are always welcome. Send comments to [email protected], or call (505) 797-6039. Look for this column next month.
The Litigation Sec-tion of the Ameri-can Bar Association recently published Business and Com-mercial Litigation in Federal Courts, Sec-ond Edition. Despite its title, this treatise is an excellent and useful reference for general federal court practice as well as more specia l ized business and com-
mercial litigation. Comprised of eight volumes and ninety-six chapters, it explores jurisdiction, removal, venue, discovery, pretrial preparation, trials and appeals. It also includes chapters dealing with the many types of commercial disputes which find themselves in federal court, including mergers and acquisitions, copyright and e-commerce. A particularly useful feature is the accompanying compact disc which contains all but a few of the chapters.
One hundred and ninety-two authors contributed to the treatise, including fourteen U.S. district court judges and three federal Court of Appeals judges. The large number of contributing judges aids in the insight and usefulness of the material.
The chapters, each beginning with a comprehensive and easy-to-use index, contain thoughtful strategic or practical tips. For example, the chapter on removal gives a lengthy checklist of items that a client and counsel should consider in deciding whether to seek removal, such as the likelihood that a federal court judge will have law clerks and support staff to assist in a complex or lengthy business litigation or the availability and extent to which voir dire is allowed by the different courts. The chapter on expert witnesses contains a multi-page practice aid with a checklist of considerations for retaining, communicating with and disclosing an expert as well as a draft engagement letter. In fact, the majority of the chapters include “practice aid” checklists detailing things like essential al-legations and defenses for various claims, relevant jury instructions and sample pleadings. These items are helpful whether the reader is a young associate addressing these issues for the first time or an experienced litigator benefiting from the assistance of a complete and detailed checklist.
The initial “fundamental” chapters (i.e., those which pertain to general federal court practice rather than those which focus on matters related to business and commercial litigation) offer thorough discussions of the intricacies of the subject matter. The chapter on personal jurisdiction walks the reader through the traditional bases for personal jurisdiction, its constitutional due process requirements and the considerations for service of process. As appropriate, these “fundamental” chapters also include discussions pertaining to busi-ness and commercial concerns. For example, the chapter on personal jurisdiction contains subsections analyzing whether a subsidiary’s activities could provide minimum contacts for personal jurisdic-tion over a parent corporation, whether advertising a product in a jurisdiction fulfills the minimum contact requirements and whether interactive internet Web sites may satisfy due process concerns.
The chapter on arbitration contains an excellent analysis of the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act, including challenges to enforceability of arbitration agreements (noting the federal courts’ distinction between challenges to enforceability of the entire contract and chal-lenges to the enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate) and claims of unconscionability and waiver. This chapter also discusses access to federal courts for orders in furtherance of arbitration, including a discussion of the split of authority concerning the power of federal courts to issue an injunction to preserve the status quo pending arbitration and the extremely limited circumstances in which a federal court will order discovery. There is also a good discussion of the extremely limited circumstances in which an arbitration award may be vacated, modified or corrected, including an interesting discussion of whether there exists a “non-statutory” ground for vacating an arbitration award based on “manifest disregard” of applicable law.
The treatise also contains a good chapter on “litigation management by law firms.” This chapter has several helpful tips for developing a strategic plan and a budget for a complex case, including a checklist and sample budget. This chapter also contains a general discussion of document management and control, including the suggestion that “imaging” of large numbers of documents be considered.
The treatise deals with virtually every type of commercial dispute litigated in federal courts, including commercial real estate litigation, commercial defamation and disparagement, franchising, litigation with government entities and many other subjects. The discus-sions are in depth, contain many citations to federal cases and deal with modern trends. For example, the chapter on commercial real estate litigation discusses constitutional claims regarding zoning decisions, or statutory civil rights claims such as racial steering or “blockbusting.” It also discusses disputes which have arisen under relatively modern real estate arrangements such as “PSAs” (pooling and service agreements) in which an investment bank purchases numerous mortgages from a lender or mortgage company and then “pools” the mortgages together as an investment product for sale in shares to investors. This chapter also contains a good discussion of the application of the federal “local action doctrine” and provisional remedies applicable in federal court in commercial real estate disputes, including injunction, receivership and the use of special masters.
While this treatise would be an asset to any law library, it is an invaluable resource to any commercial or business attorney. The strategy analyses, practical aids, historical contexts and straightfor-ward information provides a strong foundation for understanding a particular matter. Additionally, each chapter is replete with footnotes and research references (including key cases, statutes, articles and rules) which will give the user a jump start on additional research avenues. This treatise may be ordered from Thomson-West (800) 328-4880 or online at www.west.thomson.com ($907).
John R. Cooney is a member of the Modrall Sperling Law Firm. His practice is concentrated in complex litigation and arbitration primarily in the areas of oil and gas, other natural resources, eminent domain and antitrust law. Megan T. Muirhead has been a member of the litigation department of the Modrall Sperling Law Firm in 1997. Her practice focuses on products liability, employment and personal injury matters.
A Book Review by John R. Cooney and Megan T. Muirhead
bUsiness and CoMMerCial liTigaTion in federal CoUrTs
Daniel P. ButtramGuebert, Bruckner & Bootes, P.C.PO Box 938806723 Academy Rd., NE (87109)Albuquerque, NM 87199-3880(505) 823-2300(505) 823-9600 (telecopier)[email protected]
Bruce E. CastleCampbell Management Consulting Group, L.L.C.6501 Americas Parkway, NE, Ste. 1020Albuquerque, NM 87110(505) 797-4500(505) 797-8466 (telecopier)[email protected]
Christopher B. ChaneyU.S. Bureau of Indian AffairsOffice of Justice Services1849 C Street, NW, MS-4551Washington, DC 20240(202) 208-2874(202) 208-6170 (telecopier)[email protected]
J. Douglas ComptonJohn S. Stiff & Associates400 Gold Ave., NW, Ste. 1300WAlbuquerque, NM 87102(505) 243-5755(505) 243-5855 (telecopier)[email protected]
Daniel T. DoughertyOffice of the State’s AttorneyPO Box 1006Salisbury, MD 21803-1006(410) 548-4880(410) 860-2425 (telecopier)[email protected]
Jennifer J. FooteHarvey Law Firm708 Marquette Ave., NWAlbuquerque, NM 87102(505) [email protected]
Russel A. FrostVal R. Jolley, P.C.PO Box 2364Farmington, NM 87499-2364(505) 327-6116(505) 325-8232 (telecopier)[email protected] Sandra E. GallagherOffice of the District Attorney109 W. First St., Ste. B-1Portales, NM 88130(505) 356-4434(505) 359-3083 (telecopier)[email protected]
Albert J. Granger11503 Jones Maltsberger, Ste. 277San Antonio, TX 78216(210) 491-9338(210) 491-9368 (telecopier)[email protected]
David M. HoulistonLaw Office of David M. Houliston426 Pueblo Solano Rd., NWAlbuquerque, NM 87107-6644(505) 242-2041(505) 341-9389 (telecopier)[email protected]
Elizabeth Ann JaenickeOffice of the District AttorneyPO Box 17501500 Idalia Rd., Bldg. ABernalillo, NM 87004-1750(505) 896-3952(505) 896-3954 (telecopier)
Christopher A. JohnsonSingle Oak Law Offices28780 Single Oak Dr., Ste. 220Temecula, CA 92590(951) [email protected]
Jeremy R. JonesSommer, Udall, Hardwick, Ahern & Hyatt, L.L.P.PO Box 1984200 West Marcy St., Ste. 129Santa Fe, NM 87504-1984(505) 982-4676(505) 988-7029 (telecopier)[email protected]
Hon. J. Michael Kavanaughformerly known asJoseph Michael KavanaughSecond Judicial District CourtPO Box 488Albuquerque, NM 87103-0488(505) 841-7499(505) 841-5457 (telecopier)[email protected]
�6 Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28
clerk certificates
Gina R. ManfrediOffice of the City Attorney3900 Southern Blvd.Rio Rancho, NM 87124(505) 891-5980(505) 891-5200 (telecopier)[email protected]
Vincent E. Martinezformerly known asVincent Eliseo Martinez913 Second St., NWAlbuquerque, NM 87102(505) 242-8187(505) 224-2880 (telecopier)[email protected]
Michael Gernon McLeanGordon & Mott, P.C.4695 N. Mesa St., Ste. 100El Paso, TX 79912(915) 545-1133(915) 545-4433 (telecopier)[email protected]
Mekko Mangas MillerPueblo of Tesuque Development Corp.17486A Highway 84/285Santa Fe, NM 87506(505) 955-0102(505) 989-9234 (telecopier)[email protected]
Elliott Alan Mohler277 E. Amador, Ste. 201Las Cruces, NM 88001(505) 541-6110(505) 541-6111 (telecopier)[email protected] Marcos A. MontemayorBauman, Dow & León, P.C.PO Box 306847309 Indian School Rd., NE (87110)Albuquerque, NM 87190-0684(505) 883-3191(505) 883-3194 (telecopier)[email protected]
Karla Mariana Niemanformerly known asKarla Mariana HernandezOffice of the City Attorney2 Civic Center Plaza, 9th FloorEl Paso, TX 79901-1196(915) 541-4706(915) 541-4710 (telecopier)[email protected]
Sharon M. NoelPO Box 825Pablo, MT 59855-0825(505) 463-5720
Charles A. PurdyPurdy Law OfficesPO Box 8002233 Johnson St. (87501-1854)Santa Fe, NM 87504-8002(505) 984-2999(505) 983-6965 (telecopier)[email protected]
Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28 �9
advance opinions www.supremecourt.nm.orgfroM the neW Mexico supreMe court and court of appeals
opinion
richard c. Bosson, Justice
{1}Inthisappeal,wearecalledupontoresolveaconflictbetweenabailbondformpromulgated by thisCourt and a statutegoverningforfeitureofbailbonds.Weholdthatthestatutecontrols.SeeNMSA1978,§31-3-2(asamendedthrough1993).WeexpresslyadoptthereasoningoftheCourtofAppealsbelow,State v. Romero,2006-NMCA-126,140N.M.524,143P.3d763,aswell as that court’s previous opinioninState v. Valles, 2004-NMCA-118, 140N.M. 458, 143P.3d 496. In reliance onthoseopinions,weneedonlyaddresstheconflictsummarily.BACKGROUND{2}Thisappealinvolvestwoconsolidatedcases.Inbothcases,Defendantsviolatedtheconditionsoftheirreleaseonbail,suchashavingcontactwithanallegedvictimandviolatingstatecriminal lawbycom-mittingresidentialburglary,but“eachap-pearedatalltimesbeforethedistrictcourt
From the New Mexico Supreme Court
Opinion Number: 2007-NMSC-030
Topic Index:Criminal Procedure: Bail Bond Forfeiture; and Bail and Bondsmen
Statutes: Interpretation
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,Plaintiff-Petitioner,
versusANTHONY ROMERO, TOMMY MARTINEZ,
AND GERALD MADRID BAIL BONDS,Defendants-Respondents.
No. 30,000 (filed: June 1, 2007)
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI STEPHEN PFEFFER, District Judge
GARY K. KINGAttorney GeneralMAX SHEPHERD
Assistant Attorney GeneralSanta Fe, New Mexico
for Petitioner
JOSEPH NEWTON RIGGS, IIIAlbuquerque, New Mexico
for Respondents
asordered.”Romero,2006-NMCA-126,¶2.Thedistrictcourtineachcaseorderedforfeitureofthebondforfailuretocomplywithconditionsofreleaseotherthanfailuretoappear.See id.¶3.Thebailbondcom-panytimelyappealedfrombothforfeitures,andtheCourtofAppealsreversed.Id.¶¶3,13.Weacceptedcertioraritodecidewheth-erabondmaybeforfeitedforviolationsofconditionsofreleaseotherthanfailuretoappear,andalsotoresolvesomelingeringconfusionpertainingtoValles.DISCUSSION{3}Ineachcase,thereleaseorderandbondformusedbythedistrictcourtwassimilartoForm9-303ANMRA,promulgatedbythisCourtinourRulesofCriminalProce-dure.See Romero,2006-NMCA-126,¶3.Thatformcontainslanguageindicatingthata bondwill be forfeited if thedefendantfailstoappearorviolatesaconditionofhisrelease.Thestatutegoverningforfeitureofbonds,ontheotherhand,isentitled“Fail-ure to appear; forfeiture of bail bonds,”and provides that “[w]henever a personfailstoappearatthetimeandplacefixed
bythetermsofhisbailbond,thecourt...maydeclareaforfeitureofthebail.”Sec-tion 31-3-2(B)(2).No statute authorizesforfeitureofbail for anythingother thanfailuretoappear.Thus,thestatuteandtheform appear to be in direct conflict, thestatuteonlyindicatingthatabondmaybeforfeitedwhenthedefendantfailstoappear,andtheformindicatingthatviolationsofother conditions of releasewill result inforfeiture.{4}Vallesaddressedasimilarconflict.Inthat case, Form9-304NMRA indicatedthatthesurety’sobligationwouldremainin effect until the bond was expressly“exoneratedanddischargedbythecourt.”Therelevantstatute,however,providedthatthe bond automatically terminatedwhenthe defendant pled guilty and the courtacceptedtheplea.See NMSA1978,§31-3-10(1987).TheCourtofAppealsheldthatthe statutewascontrollingand, thus, thesurety’sobligationendeduponthecourt’sacceptanceofthedefendant’sguiltyplea.Valles,2004-NMCA-118,¶16.Theopin-ionreasonedthat“thebond[was] issuedpursuant tostatutoryauthority,”andthus“thestatutoryrequirements[were]deemedtobeincorporatedintothebond.”Id.¶11.Further,becausetheobligationofasuretyisdefinedby law, thecourtheld that thestatutedescribeda substantive right, andtherefore,whenaSupremeCourtformisinconflictwiththestatute,thestatutewilltrump.Id.¶14.{5}There have been some doubts sur-roundingtheVallesopinionstemmingfromthisCourt’sorderrescindingthatopinionshortlyafteritwaspublished.See Valles,2004-NMCA-118, *Editor’s Note.Thatorderwaslaterwithdrawnandtheopinionwasrepublished.Id.Wetakethisopportuni-tytodispelanydoubtsandexpresslyadoptJudgeVigil’scarefulanalysis,andthatofJudgeFry in thiscase,of the interactionbetweenthisCourt’sbailbondformandthestatutesgoverningforfeitureofbailbonds.Valleswascorrectthatastatutedescribinga substantive rightwill prevail over anyconflictingtermsinthisCourt’sforms,andits holdinggives appropriate recognitiontoNewMexicopublicpolicyencouragingbondsmentoenterintobailcontracts.2004-NMCA-118,¶12.Viewedinlightofthispolicy,Section31-3-2properlylimitsthegroundsforforfeituretofailuretoappear.Ifthestatutewereinterpretedotherwise,a
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suretywouldberequiredtoinsureagainsta wide range of behaviors, including adefendant’sconsumptionofalcohol,pos-sessionofweapons,contactwithvictims,and disobedience of the law in general.Thisisclearlyanunacceptableriskthatnosuretywouldbeexpectedtotake.{6}Forthesereasons,weaffirmtheCourtofAppeals,whichreliesonVallesinhold-ing thatSection31-3-2 allows forfeitureonly for failure to appear. See Romero,2006-NMCA-126,¶¶10-12.Inaccordancewith theCourtofAppeals,wenowhold
thatthetermsofabondthatbroadentheliability of a party beyond the liabilitycontemplated by statute are ineffective.Thebondsinthiscaseshouldnothavebeenforfeitedbecause,pursuanttoSection31-3-2,violationsofDefendants’conditionsofreleaseotherthanfailuretoappearwerenotgroundsforforfeiture.WeurgetheRulesofCriminalProcedureCommitteetomakethenecessarymodificationstoForms9-304and9-303A, aswell as other forms thatmaybeinconflictwithSection31-3-2,inaccordancewithVallesandthiscase.Cf.
{1}PetitionerBoard ofEducation,Mo-riartyMunicipalSchoolDistrict (SchoolDistrict) appeals froman opinion of theCourtofAppeals,whichaffirmedthedis-trictcourt’sdecisionthattheSchoolDistrictmustpayRespondentThunderMountainWaterCompany(ThunderMountain) thefairmarketvalueofitspropertyinacon-
From the New Mexico Supreme Court
Opinion Number: 2007-NMSC-031
Topic Index:Constitutional Law: Taking Without Compensation
Government: Eminent DomainProperty: Condemnation
Public Utilities and Communications: Public Utilities, Rate Making
BOARD OF EDUCATION, MORIARTY MUNICIPAL SCHOOL DISTRICT,Plaintiff-Petitioner,
versusTHUNDER MOUNTAIN WATER COMPANY, a public water utility,
Defendant-Respondent.No. 30,020 (filed: June 1, 2007)
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI JAMES A. HALL, District Judge
FRANK J. ALBETTAMELISSA WURTZEL O’SHEACUDDY, KENNEDY, ALBETTA
& IVES, L.L.P.Santa Fe, New Mexico
for Petitioner
RICHARD B. COLEKELEHER & MCLEOD, P.A.
Albuquerque, New Mexicofor Respondent
demnation action and that deducting theamountof a “contribution inaidof con-struction”(CIAC)fromthecondemnationawardwouldresultinanunconstitutionaltakingofpropertywithoutjustcompensa-tion.Moriarty Mun. Sch. Dist. v. Thunder Mountain Water Co., 2006-NMCA-135,¶1,140N.M.612,145P.3d92.WeholdthattheSchoolDistrictmustpayThunderMountain the fair market value of theproperty.WealsoholdthatNMSA1978,Section 42A-1-24(D) (2001) does notauthorizeadeductionoftheamountofa
CIAC previously paid by a condemnorfromtheamountowedthecondemneeasjustcompensationforthetaking.Wethere-foreaffirmtheCourtofAppeals.I.Background{2}The School District entered into aConstructionContractandWaterServiceAgreement (Agreement) withThunderMountaininOctober1999,whichprovidedforconstructionofawaterlineextensionandconsumptive-usewaterandfireprotec-tionservicetothenewEdgewoodMiddleSchool.TheSchoolDistrict,apublicutil-ity customer ofThunderMountain,wasrequired to contribute to the installationof the water line extension pursuant toNew Mexico Public Regulation Com-missionRule19.CustomerServiceRulesandRegulationsforWaterUtilities,NewMexicoPublicRegulationCommission,17.12.760NMAC(6/30/1988).ItappearstheSchoolDistrict paid a total of about$69,185toThunderMountainforconstruc-tionofthewaterline,themeter,valves,andapproximatelytenfeetofafireprotectionwaterline,andtherelatedequipment,labor,andcosts.Severalyearslater,inNovember2002,theSchoolDistrictfiledacondemna-tionactionandasserteditwasentitledtodeducttheamountoftheCIACfromthecompensationdue toThunderMountain.ThepartiesapparentlyagreedforpurposesofthemotionforsummaryjudgmentthattheamountrequiredoftheSchoolDistrictin1999was the fairmarketvalueof thepropertyin2002.Thunder Mountain,2006-NMCA-135,¶¶6-7,14.{3}TheSchoolDistrict filed a petitionforeminentdomaintocondemnthewaterline extension and associated propertyin accordancewith theEminentDomainCode,NMSA1978,Sections42A-1-1 to-33(1981,asamendedthrough2001)andthe SpecialAlternative CondemnationProcedureAct, NMSA 1978, Sections
Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28 2�
42-2-1to-16(1959,asamendedthrough1981).Although theAgreement is silenton the issue, thedistrictcourtconcludedthatthecontributedpropertyisthelawfulpropertyofThunderMountain.Thepartiesagreethedisputedpropertyhasanactualvalueof$60,715andincludes2,700linearfeetofeight-inchwatertransmissionline,awatermeterandrelatedvalves,andap-proximately ten feetof stub-outofafireprotection line. The district court alsoconcludedThunderMountainwasentitledto damages for the actual value of thepropertyandthattheSchoolDistrictwasnotentitledtoacreditpursuanttoSection42A-1-24(D) for thevalueof theCIAC.Thedistrictcourtenteredsummaryjudg-ment in favor ofThunder Mountain onThunderMountain’smotionintheamountof $60,715, plus statutory interest.ThejudgmentorderedthattitletothepropertywouldvestintheSchoolDistrictuponpay-mentofthejudgment.{4}TheSchoolDistrictappealed.Affirm-ingthedistrictcourt,theCourtofAppealsheld that deducting the amount of theCIACpaid by the SchoolDistrict fromthe condemnation awardwould result inan unconstitutional taking of propertywithoutjustcompensationandthatSection42A-1-24(D) is not applicable. Thunder Mountain,2006-NMCA-135,¶¶1,18.TheSchoolDistrictpetitionedforcertioraritothisCourt, andwe granted the petition.2006-NMCERT-10, 140 N.M. 675, 146P.3d810.{5}Onappeal,theSchoolDistrictarguesitisbeingforcedtopayThunderMountaintwice for thedisputedproperty, resultingin unjust enrichment, that this result iscontrary to the state ConstitutionAnti-DonationClause,seeN.M.Const.art.IX,Section14,andthatSection42A-1-24(D)authorizesadeductionoftheamountoftheCIACfromthejustcompensationrequiredbythetakingofthedisputedproperty.Weconclude that eminent domainprinciplesrequiretheSchoolDistricttopayThunderMountain the fair market value of thedisputed property and thatSection 42A-1-24(D)isnotapplicable.Wearenotper-suadedthatprinciplesofunjustenrichmentsupporttheSchoolDistrict’sargument.Wedonotaddress theAnti-DonationClauseargument.II.Discussion{6} Because the material facts are un-disputed, we review the district court’sgrantofsummaryjudgmentdenovo.See Ulibarri v. State of N.M. Corr. Acad.,2006-NMSC-009,¶7,139N.M.193,131P.3d
43.Thetwoissuesweareaskedtoaddressare:whetheracondemnorwhopreviouslypaidacondemneeutilityaCIACmustpaythecondemneeforthesamepropertyinacondemnationaction,whenthefairmarketvalueofthepropertyisessentiallythesameamountastheCIAC,andwhetherSection42A-1-24(D) authorizes a deduction oftheamountofaCIACpreviouslypaidbythecondemnorfromtheamountowedthecondemneeascompensationforthetaking.Forthefollowingreasons,weholdthattheSchoolDistrictmustpayThunderMoun-tainthefairmarketvalueofthepropertyandthattheSchoolDistrictisnotentitledunderSection42A-1-24(D)todeducttheamountoftheCIAC.A.JustCompensationisNotDoubleRecovery{7}ThunderMountainisapublicutilityregulatedbytheNewMexicoPublicRegu-lationCommission(PRC).Asaregulatedmonopoly,ThunderMountain agrees tocedecontrolofthefreedomtodeterminewhoitwillserve,whatitwillchargeforitsservice,andhowitwillfinanceorinvestitsresourcesinexchangeforthefreedomfromcompetitionitenjoys.Doña Ana Mut. Do-mestic Water Consumers Ass’n v. N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n,2006-NMSC-032,¶16,140N.M.6,139P.3d166.ThePRCis chargedwith setting rates, regulatingpublicutilities,andlimitingcompetitiontopreventduplicationandwaste.Id.;NMSA1978,§§62-6-4to-26.1(1941,asamendedthrough2003);§62-9-1(2005).ThunderMountainmaychargeratesforitsservicesthataredeterminedtobe“justandreason-able”bythePRC.NMSA1978,§62-8-1(1953); §§62-6-4 to -26.1.See Thunder Mountain,2006-NMCA-135,¶8.{8}ThunderMountainhasafundamentalright,guaranteed to itby the federalandstateConstitutions,thatitspropertyshallnot be takenwithout just compensation.U.S.Const.amend.V.TheFifthAmend-mentdoesnotforbidtheSchoolDistrict’stakingoftheproperty;itdoesforbidtak-ingwithout just compensation.Our stateConstitution provides similar protection.N.M.Const. art. II, § 20.TheCourt ofAppeals correctly held that deducting aCIACfromthecondemnationawardwouldresultinanunconstitutionaldeprivationofThunderMountain’spropertywithoutjustcompensation.Thunder Mountain, 2006-NMCA-135,¶16;accordDade County v. Gen. Waterworks Corp., 267So.2d 633,639-40(Fla.1972)(recognizingthathowtheutilitycametoownthepropertydoesnot effectively exclude it from constitu-
tionalprotections);Rangeley Water Co. v. Rangeley Water Dist.,1997ME32,¶18,691A.2d171(holdingutilitywasentitledtocompensationforcontributedpropertybecause rate-making concepts cannot belikenedtoeminentdomainasabasisfordeterminingfairmarketvalue); Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Util., Inc. of Md.,775A.2d1178,1194(Md.2001)(holdingstatuterequiringthevalueofallproperty contributed to the utility as aCIACbedeductedinaneminentdomainproceedingviolatedtheconstitutionalpro-hibitionagainstatakingwithoutjustcom-pensation);Dedeaux Util. Co., Inc. v. City of Gulfport,938So.2d838,¶¶7-11(Miss.2006)(notingthatexclusionofCIACsincompensationcaseswasnotproper).{9}TheCourtofAppealsfoundRangeleyhelpfultoitsdeterminationthattheSchoolDistrictmust payThunderMountain thefairmarketvalueofthedisputedproperty.Thunder Mountain, 2006-NMCA-135, ¶13.LiketheSchoolDistrict,thecondem-norinRangeleyallegeditshouldnothaveto pay for condemnedproperty thatwascontributedtothewaterutility.Rangeley,1997ME32, ¶ 17.TheMaineSupremeCourtdisagreedandheldthewatercom-panywasentitledtojust compensationforthe contributed property because of the“complete dissimilarity” between rate-making standards and just compensationstandards.Id.¶18.Itisthis“completedis-similarity,”notedbytheCourtofAppeals,thatiscompelling.ThereisafundamentaldifferencebetweenpaymentoftheCIACasacontractualobligationandjustcompensa-tion ineminentdomainactions.Thunder Mountain, 2006-NMCA-135, ¶¶ 13-15.Justcompensationisnotdoublerecovery.{10} Dade County also supports ourconclusion. In Dade County, the countyinitiatedcondemnationproceedingsagainsta number of privately-operated watercompaniesandclaimeditshouldnothavetocompensatethecompaniesforcontrib-utedproperty. 267So.2d at 634-35.TheFloridaSupremeCourtrejectedthisargu-ment, holding the contributed propertyconstituted “property” under theFloridaConstitutionandthatassuch,contributedpropertywas required to be included inthemethodofvaluationwhendeterminingfairmarketvalueforthepurposesofjustcompensation.Id.at639-41.{11} In Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission,775A.2dat1194,theMary-landCourtofAppealsheld thatastatuterequiringadeductionofaCIACfromthefairmarketvalueofcondemnedproperty
22 Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28
effectedatakingofpropertywithoutjustcompensation.The court concluded thatvaluation of condemned property mustensurethat“astheendresultoftheexerciseofthepowerofeminentdomain,theownerwillbereceivingtheequivalentmonetaryworthforthevalueofthepropertytakenfromthetimeoftaking.”Id.at1196(quot-ing Orono-Veazie Water Dist. v. Penobscot County Water Co.,348A.2d249,255(Me.1975)).{12}TheSchoolDistrictinsistsourcon-clusionresultsinanunfairdisposition.TheSchoolDistrict argues the crux of thesecondemnation cases is that fair marketvaluebepaidtotheutility,whichitargueswaspaidwhenitpaidtheCIAC.However,thepaymentsitwishestoequaterepresenttwodistinctrecoveriesbyThunderMoun-tain,separatedbythreeyears.Thefirstwasmandated by thePRC,when theSchoolDistrict elected to requestwater servicefromThunderMountain; thesecondwasmandated as a matter of constitutionallawwhen theSchoolDistrict elected toinitiate a condemnation action.Wehaveneitherfound,norbeenreferredto,acaseinvolvingacondemnationactionsuchasthisinwhichacourtheldthatCIACswereunprotectedbytheconstitutionalrequire-mentthatjustcompensationbepaidforataking.{13}Duringthethreeyearsthatseparatethe two recoveries, the School Districthad the benefit of the facilitiesThunderMountainconstructed.ThewatersuppliedprovedunsatisfactorytotheSchoolDistrictanditterminatedthecontract.TheSchoolDistrict’s claim of unjust enrichmentoverlooksthefactThunderMountainwasrequiredtosupplywaterbythePRCandthat the SchoolDistrictwas required tocontributetotheconstructionofappropri-ate facilitiesby thePRC.The termusedwas “contribution.”The contract and itstermswere controlled by thePRC.ThatfactmakesitdifficulttoconcludethatanybenefittoThunderMountainwasunjustorthattherewasaburdenontheSchoolDis-trictthatjustifiesapplicationofequitableprinciples.Both theSchoolDistrict andThunderMountainarethebeneficiariesofpublicpolicy.TheSchoolDistrictobtainedwater;ThunderMountain,whichwasre-quiredtosupplywater,receivedfinancialassistanceinfulfillingtherequirement.{14}Whenappliedtootherscenarios,theSchoolDistrict’spositionisuntenable.Forexample,imagineathirdpartyoriginallyrequestedthewaterlineextensionandpaidtheCIAC,andthattheSchoolDistrictthen
tookoverthepropertyreceivingwaterser-vicefromThunderMountainandlateriniti-atedacondemnationaction.Surely,underthesefacts,theSchoolDistrictwouldnotarguethatbecauseaCIAChadbeenpaidbyathirdparty,theSchoolDistrictshouldnot have to provideThunder Mountainjust compensation.The School DistrictcontendstheCourtofAppealsappliedanoverly formalistic approach in reachingitsdecision.Wearenotpersuadedthattheapproach is either overly formalistic orotherwisewrong.Thedisputedpropertybe-longstoThunderMountain,andtheSchoolDistrictmust provideThunderMountainjustcompensationforitstaking.{15}TheCourtofAppealscorrectlyrec-ognized that aCIACcannotbe includedinautility’sratebase.Thunder Mountain,2006-NMCA-135,¶9;see also Behles v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm’n(In re Application of Timberon Water Co.), 114N.M. 154,157, 836P.2d73, 76 (1992) (explainingthatitwouldbeunfairtorequirecustomerswhopaidaCIACtothenpayratesbasedonthevalueoffacilitiestheythemselvesfinanced); Rangeley,1997ME32,¶17(“Inarateproceeding,contributedpropertyisnotincludedinautility’sratebasebecauseitwould be unfair to allow the utility’sinvestorstorecoupfromratepayersmoneythat the utility did not expend.”).As theCourt ofAppealsnoted, the “‘traditionalelements’ of the rate base/rate of returnrate-makingprocess to establish the rev-enue requirements of a regulated utilityare‘(1)determinationof thecostsof theoperation,(2)determinationoftheratebasewhichis thevalueof thepropertyminusaccrueddepreciation,and(3)determinationoftherateofreturn.’”Thunder Mountain,2006-NMCA-135,¶9(quotingHobbs Gas Co. v. N.M. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,94N.M.731, 733, 616 P.2d 1116, 1118 (1980)).Afterdecidingthatrate-makingcasesareinapplicable to the issues presented bythis case, theCourt ofAppeals properlydeterminedthatcondemnationcasesdictatethataCIACcannotbeexcludedfromthecomputationofjustcompensation.Thunder Mountain, 2006-NMCA-135, ¶¶ 11-12.ThereisnoindicationtheCourtofAppealsthought the rate-making cases controlledthe disposition of the School District’sclaim.That is, there is no indication theCourt ofAppeals thought that becausethevalueofaCIACisexcludedfromthecalculation of value in determining ratebase and depreciation allowed, that thevalueoftheCIACtheSchoolDistrictwasrequiredtocontributeshouldbeexcluded
fromconsiderationofvalueintheeminentdomainproceedings.{16}TheSchoolDistrictarguesit isnotsuggestingtherate-makingcasessupportanargumentthatbecausethevalueoftheCIAC is not permitted to be included inThunderMountain’sratebaseitshouldnotbeconsideredanassetoftheutility.Instead,theSchoolDistrictinsists,relyingonCity of Hagerstown v. Public Service Commis-sion,therate-makingcasesareapplicablebecause they indicate that property towhichtheDistrictmadeaCIACisThunderMountain’spropertyonlyinthesensethatitholdsbarelegaltitleandanycompensa-tionprovidedatthispointwouldresultina“windfall”totheutility.141A.2d699,705 (Md.1958).TheMarylandCourtofAppealsnotedthattherationaleforexclud-ingCIACsfromtheratebaseis“thatitisinequitabletorequireconsumerstopaytotheutilityareturnonpropertywhichthey,nottheutility,havepaidfor.”Id.at704.{17}Thecourtreasonedthat
the utility holds legal title tothe contributed property, on thegroundthatthecontributedprop-ertyissubjecttocontractualrightsin favor of thosewho furnishedit (treating a developer as if heweretheagentofthosewhobuylotsservedbythecontributedfa-cilities),whichplacethebeneficialuseofthepropertyinthosewho,from time to time,own the lots,houses, factories or landswhichthewatercompany(inthiscasetheCity)hasagreedtoserve,sothatthevalueofthewatercompany’sbarelegal title tothepropertyisnothing.Inotherwords,thewatercompany(heretheCity)issimplyinthepositionofatrustee,hold-ing legal title to the contributedproperty for thebenefitof thosewithwhom it has contracted, ortheirsuccessorsininterest.
Id.at705.{18}WethinkthereasoningoftheMary-landcourtmayidentifyarationaleforex-cludingcontributedpropertyfromtheratebase.InHagerstown,theMarylandcourtwasdiscussingtherelevanceofcontributedpropertyindeterminingvalueforpurposesofrate-making,nottherelevanceofcon-tributedpropertyfordeterminingvalueforpurposes of condemnation proceedings.Washington Suburban Sanitary Commis-sion,a2001opinionfromthesamecourt,in fact, noted thatHagerstownwas onlyapplicable in the context of rate-making
Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28 2�
cases.Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n,775A.2d at 1194-95.The distinction isimportant because “[a] utility valuation,bywhateverapproach,thatispremisedonaregulatoryratebasethatexcludessignifi-cantutilityassets[suchasCIACs]usuallyresultsinless-than-justcompensationforallpropertytaken.”8PatrickJ.Rohan&MelvinA.Reskin,Nichols on Eminent Do-main,§14A.06(1)(b)(3ded.rev.2007).{19}TheSchoolDistrictmaintainsthattheCourtofAppeals’decisionthatitmustpayThunderMountainthefairmarketvalueofthepropertybasedonadistinctionbetweencondemnationcasesandrate-makingcasesiserroneous.TheSchoolDistrictasksthisCourt to hold that fairmarket value hasalreadybeenpaid,makingtheneedforjustcompensation unnecessary because anyotherresultwouldenrichThunderMoun-tain unjustly.However, the district courtdeterminedthatThunderMountainistheownerofthedisputedproperty.TheSchoolDistricthasidentifiednobasisforrecogniz-ingequitabletitlewhenitwasrequiredtopaytheCIAC,andweconcludethedistrictcourt’sdeterminationthatThunderMoun-tainownedthepropertybeingcondemnedwasappropriate.{20}TheSchoolDistrict’sargumentdoesnotdistinguishbetweentherequiredCIACunderthePRCregulationsandtheconsti-tutionalimplicationsofaneminentdomainaction.Thesearetwoseparateproceedings.ThunderMountain remains powerless inbothoftheseactions;theSchoolDistrictwasrequiredtopaytheCIACaccordingtoPRCrules,notThunderMountainpolicies.PRCRule19requirestheSchoolDistricttopayaCIACandmandatesthatwhenanextensionofautility’slinesisrequiredtoserveanewcustomer,
[i]nvestmentinthelineextensionrequired to serve the applicantmayberequiredtobepaidintotalbytheapplicantrequestingtheex-tensionintheformofanAdvanceforConstructionoraContributioninAidofConstruction.TheCompanyshallnotunderanyconditionmakeanextensionthatwouldbeunprofitableandtherebycause unduefinancial burden to
existingcustomers,whichmeansthatthereshallresultnoincreasein rates for service to existingcustomers....
Paragraphs 2-3 of 17.12.760.10NMAC.Ordinarily,pursuanttoPRCRule19,thecontributor becomes entitled to refundsfor itsCIACwhenothercustomersneedservice from that line. On these facts,however, the configuration of the linemayhave precluded any other customerfromutilizingtheline.Thunder Mountain,2006-NMCA-135,¶10.Nevertheless,Rule19provides that“the [t]otalconstructioncostforthelineextensionmaybepaidasanadvance inaidof constructionby theapplicant,buttheadvancemaybesubjectto future refunds to that applicantwhenwaterserviceisconnectedtoeachabuttingorbenefited[sic]propertyup to ten (10) years.”Paragraph5(B)(II)of17.12.760.10NMAC (emphasis added).The ten-yearlimit indicates to us thatwhile thePRCallowscustomerstorecoupatleastapor-tion of their expenses, these customershave no equitable title in property paidfor byCIACs.Additionally, the contractbetweenThunderMountainandtheSchoolDistrictstatesthatThunderMountainwasresponsibleforallmaintenanceandupkeepoftheextension.ThisisafurtherindicationthatbothpartiesconsideredthepropertytobelongtoThunderMountainandthatthereisnobasisforanapplicationofequitableprinciplesonthefactsofthiscase.B.ApplicationofSection42A-1-24(D){21}TheNewMexicoEminentDomainCoderequiresthat
[j]udgmentshallcreditagainstthetotalamountawardedtothecon-demneeanypaymentsordepositspaidovertohimmadebeforethedateofentryofjudgmentbythecondemnor as compensation forthepropertytaken,includinganyfundswhichthecondemneewith-drewfromtheamountdepositedbythecondemnorpursuanttotheprovisionsofSection42A-1-19or42A-1-22NMSA1978.
Mountain should be credited.However,this argument ignores the fact that theCIACpaidtoThunderMountainwaspartof a contractual obligationmandated bythePRC.Thisisnot thesortofpaymenttheLegislatureenvisionedwhendraftingSection42A-1-24(D).Rather, the statutecontemplates prepayments or deposits,neitherofwhichisatissuehere.III.Conclusion{22}The School District andThunderMountainenteredintoacontractualagree-mentregardingwaterservice.TheCIACtheSchoolDistrictpaidtoThunderMoun-tainwasrequiredbythePRCandwaspartofthecontract.ThereisnonexusbetweentheSchoolDistrict’scontractualobligationand just compensation for the taking ofthe disputed property in this condemna-tion action.Thedistrict court found thatSection42A-1-24(D)isnotapplicabletocontributedproperty.TheCourtofAppealsalsoheldthestatutedoesnotapplyinthemannertheSchoolDistrictproposes.“The$60,715paidbytheSchoolDistrictin1999,wasacontractualobligation[incurredbytheSchoolDistrictsothatit]couldobtainwaterservice,notsothattheSchoolDistrictcouldtakethepropertybycondemnationasitsubsequentlydidin2002.”Thunder Mountain,2006-NMCA-135,¶18.{23}TheCIACtheSchoolDistrictpaidThunderMountainwasasumrequiredoftheSchoolDistrictatthetimeofconstruc-tion to support construction. In the con-demnationactionbeforethedistrictcourt,theawardmadebythedistrictcourtwasasumrequiredbyconstitutionallawasjustcompensation for a taking.We concludeSection 42A-1-24(D) does not requirea different result. For these reasons,weaffirm thedistrictcourtand theCourtofAppeals.{24} ITISSOORDERED. PAMELAB.MINZNER, Justice
24 Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28
From the New Mexico Supreme Court
Opinion Number: 2007-NMSC-032
Topic Index:Appeal and Error: Preservation of Issues for Appeal
Constitutional Law: Double JeopardyCriminal Procedure: Double Jeopardy; Lesser Included Offense;
and Separate OffenseStatutes: Legislative Intent
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,Plaintiff-Appellee,
versusJARRELL FRAZIER,
Defendant-Appellant.No. 29,138 (filed: May 11, 20007)
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTYMARK A. MACARON, District Judge
LIANE E. KERRLIANE E. KERR, L.L.C.
Albuquerque, New Mexicofor Appellant
GARY K. KINGAttorney GeneralANITA CARLSON
Assistant Attorney GeneralSanta Fe, New Mexico
for Appellee
opinion
richard c. Bosson, Justice
{1}ThisappealcontinuesourhistoricallyclosescrutinyoftheNewMexicofelonymurder statute. See State v. Contreras,120N.M.486,903P.2d228(1995); State v. Ortega, 112N.M.554,817P.2d1196(1991); State v. Harrison, 90N.M. 439,564P.2d1321(1977). InContreras,weheld thatdouble jeopardyprinciplespro-hibitconvictingadefendantofbothfelonymurderandthepredicatefelonyonwhichthe felonymurder is based, at least notwhen the underlying conduct is unitary.120N.M.at491,903P.2dat233.Todayweinquire,forthefirsttime,whetherthemurderandthepredicatefelonyareactu-ally greater and lesser includedoffensesin every case, one subsumedwithin theother,which therebyprecludesmultiple,separateconvictionsaccordingtohowthelegislature has defined the particular of-fenseoffelonymurder.Concludingthatthelegislaturehasthusspoken,weholdthatthepredicatefelonyisalwayssubsumedintoafelonymurderconviction,andnodefendantcanbeconvictedofboth.Accordingly,we
reversetheconvictionforthepredicateof-fenseofkidnapping.Weaffirmallotherconvictions.BACKGROUND{2}IntheearlymorninghoursofApril14,2002,DefendantJarrellFrazier(“Fra-zier”),alongwithhisco-defendantDavisWilson (“Wilson”), brutally beat KellyKnoll (“Knoll”) in front of a truck on aresidentialstreetintheKirtlandAdditionneighborhoodofAlbuquerque.Afterbeat-ingKnoll,FrazierandWilsonwipeddownthe truckwith rags, placedKnoll in thebackofthetruck,andkickedhimyetagain.KnollwasthendrivenaboutamileawayandshotfivetimesinthebackofthetruckbyeitherFrazierorWilson.ThecauseofKnoll’sdeathwasgunshotwoundstohisheadandchest.{3}OfficerVigilrespondedtoacallfromaneighbor.Arrivingatthesceneshortlyafterthetruckhadleft,OfficerVigilheardseveral gunshots coming from the southofhis location. ThenextdayKnollwasfounddeadinthebackofthetruckaboutamile southeast fromwhere the beatingoccurred.{4} AjuryconvictedFrazierofkidnap-ping, felony murder predicated on that
same kidnapping, conspiracy to commitkidnapping,aggravatedbatterywithgreatbodily harm, conspiracy to commit ag-gravatedbatterywith great bodily harm,two counts of tamperingwith evidence,andconspiracytocommittamperingwithevidence. Frazierwasacquittedoffirst-degreewillfulanddeliberatemurderandconspiracytocommitfelonymurder.ThetrialcourtsentencedFrazierconsecutivelyto life imprisonment for felony murderand twelve years imprisonment for kid-napping.{5} Fraziernowappealsdirectly to thisCourt,raisingtwoissues.SeeN.M.Const.artVI, § 2; Rule 12-102(A)(1) NMRA(direct appeal to Supreme Court fromconvictionoffirst-degreemurder).First,Frazierarguesthathisrighttobefreefromdouble jeopardy was violated when hewasconvictedofbothfelonymurderandkidnapping, theverypredicate felonyonwhich themurder convictionwasbased.Second,FrazierclaimsthatthetrialcourterredwhenitallowedtheStatetointroducecertainfingerprint evidence.BecauseweconcludethatFrazier’sseparateconvictionofkidnappingviolatestheDoubleJeopardyClauseof theUnitedStatesConstitution,we vacate that conviction. We affirmFrazier’s remaining convictions becausehis argument regarding the admissionofthefingerprintevidencewasnotproperlypreserved.NEWMEXICOCASELAWONFELONYMURDER{6}Beforeweembarkonaconstructionofourfelonymurderstatuteasitpertainstothedoublejeopardyissue,wefirstbrieflysurveyNewMexico’sfelonymurdercaselaw.{7}NewMexicocourtshaveoftencom-mentedonthegeneraldisfavorwithwhichthe felony murder rule is viewed. AsthisCourt noted inOrtega, “[f]ew legaldoctrineshavebeenasmalignedandyethave shown as great a resiliency as thefelony-murderrule.”112N.M.at559,817P.2dat1201(quotedauthorityomitted);see alsoModelPenalCode§210.1cmt.1,at5-6(OfficialDraftandRevisedComments1962) (explaining that theModel PenalCodeabandonsthefelonymurderdoctrineasanindependentbasisforestablishingli-abilityforcriminalhomicide).Proceedingfromthispremise,ourcaseshavereadintothe felonymurder statute several limita-tionsonitsuse.{8}InHarrison,weheldthatonlyafirst-degreefelonyoraninherentlydangerousfelonycommittedunderinherentlydanger-
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ouscircumstancescouldsupportafelonymurdercharge.90N.M.at442,564P.2dat1324.Subsequently,inOrtega,weheldthatfelonymurderhasamens reaelement,“whichcannotbepresumedsimplyfromthecommissionorattemptedcommissionofafelony.” 112N.M.at561,817P.2dat1203.Therefore,inordertoconvictadefendantoffelonymurder,theStatemustprove that the defendant had a culpablestateofmindsufficienttosupportaconvic-tionforsecond-degreemurder;thementalstaterequiredfortheunderlyingfelonyisnotsufficient.Id.at563,817P.2dat1205.Ortegaevenwentsofarastosuggestthat,absentaconstructionofthefelonymurderstatutetoincludethisenhancedintent,thestatutemightbe subject to constitutionalattack by establishing a presumption of mens reainviolationofdueprocess.Id.at562-63,817P.2dat1204-05.{9} After construing the felonymurderstatutetoincludeanintentrequirement,weobservedinOrtega thatthelegislaturehadlegitimately“determinedthatakilling inthecommissionorattemptedcommissionof a felony is deservingofmore seriouspunishment than other killings inwhichthekiller’smental statemightbesimilarbut the circumstances of the killing arenotasgrave.”Id.at565,817P.2dat1207.Our felonymurder statute thus serves toelevatetofirst-degreemurderwhatwouldotherwisebeasecond-degreemurderbasedon the rationale that a killing in whichthekiller’smentalstateisconsistentwithsecond-degreemurder,butwhichisdoneinthecommissionofadangerousfelony,deservespunishmentequaltothatoffirst-degree premeditated or depraved-mindmurder.See id.{10}Weobserveaparadox.Adefendantwhoisconvictedofandsentencedforboththefelonymurderandtheunderlyingfelo-nydoesnotreceiveapunishmentequaltothatforfirst-degreepremeditatedmurder;heactuallyreceivesagreaterpunishment.Heisconvictedofboth first-degreemurderand the underlying predicate felony andcanbe sentencedconsecutively forboth.Thus,iftheStateprovesthatadefendantkilledwith amental state sufficientonlyforsecond-degreemurder,butinthecourseofadangerousfelony,thatdefendantwillreceive agreater punishment than a de-fendantwhoisshowntohavekilledwithamoreculpablementalstatesuchasdelib-erateintentmurder.Intheabsenceofanymorespecificelaborationbythelegislature,suchanoutcomeappearsarbitrary.{11}Wequestionwhetherthelegislature
intended such a resultwhen, aswewilldiscuss shortly, (1) the legislature neverexpresses an intent thatbothconvictionsshouldstandandbesentencedconsecutive-ly,and(2)theindiciaoflegislativeintentwediscussbelowdemonstratesthecontraryconclusion: that the predicate felony issubsumedwithintheconvictionforfelonymurder.Thisproblematicresult,alongwiththenarrowconstructionwehavepreviouslygiventoourfelonymurderstatute,informsouranalysisofdoublejeopardyissuesinthecontextoffelonymurder.DOUBLEJEOPARDY{12}TheDoubleJeopardyClauseoftheFifthAmendment to the United StatesConstitution provides: “[N]or shall anypersonbesubjectforthesameoffensetobetwiceputinjeopardyoflifeorlimb.”U.S.Const.amend.V;see also N.M.Const.art.II,§15(providingfordouble-jeopardyprotection). The clause is applicable tothestatesthroughtheDueProcessClauseof the FourteenthAmendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395U.S. 784, 794 (1969),overrulingPalko v. Connecticut,302U.S.319(1937).{13} Among other things, the DoubleJeopardyClauseprotectsadefendantfromtwicebeingpunished at one trial for the“same offense” (multiple punishments).See Whalen v. United States,445U.S.684,688(1980);State v. Lynch,2003-NMSC-020,¶9,134N.M.139,74P.3d73.Mul-tiplepunishmenthastwoprongs.Firstarethe“unit-of-prosecution”caseswherethedefendantis“chargedwithmultipleviola-tionsofasinglestatutebasedonasinglecourseofconduct.”Swafford v. State,112N.M. 3, 8, 810P.2d 1223, 1228 (1991).Secondarethe“double-description”caseswhere“thedefendantischargedwithviola-tionsofmultiplestatutesthatmayormaynotbedeemedthesameoffensefordoublejeopardypurposes.”Id.Frazierarguesthathewas improperly convicted under twoseparatestatutesforthesameoffense,thefelonymurderstatuteandthekidnappingstatute,andthereforeweanalyzethisasadouble-descriptioncase.TheSwafford Test{14}Swafford istheleadingNewMexicocaseonthedouble-descriptionanalysis.Inthatopinion,thisCourtaddressedwhetherSwafford’s convictions and sentence forbothincestandcriminalsexualpenetrationarising out of the same conduct consti-tuteddoublejeopardy.Id.at6,801P.2dat1226.Inholdingtherewasnodoublejeopardyviolation,thisCourtsynthesizedthemanyvariedtheoriessetforthinboth
NewMexico and federal decisional lawtocomeupwithasingletestformultiplepunishmentcases.Infashioningthistest,werecognized“thepolestarguidingcourtsisthelegislature’sintenttoauthorizemul-tiple punishments for the sameoffense,”the central question being whether thelegislaturehas,infact,authorizedmultiplepunishmentsoronlyasinglepunishmentforthesameoffense.Id.at8,810P.2dat1228.Wethusstateda“two-parttestfordetermining legislative intent topunish.”Id.at13,810P.2dat1233.{15} Thefirstpartof the test fordeter-mining legislative intent asks “whetherthe conduct underlying the offenses isunitary, i.e., whether the same conductviolatesbothstatutes,”whichinmostcasesleadstoajudicialinquiryintothefactsandcircumstances of the case to determinewhetheractsassociatedwitheachstatuteare sufficiently separated by time andspacetoallowforseparateprosecutionandconvictionundereachstatute. Id.at13-14,810P.2dat1233-34.Thesecondpartofthetestthen“focusesonthestatutesatissuetodeterminewhetherthelegislatureintended to create separately punishableoffenses.”Id.Ifthereisnoclearexpres-sion of legislative intent, a court mustapply the rule of statutory interpretationannouncedbytheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt in Blockburger v. United States,284U.S.299(1932). See Swafford,112N.M.at14,810P.2dat1234.Accordingto Blockburger, “where the same act ortransactionconstitutesaviolationof twodistinct statutory provisions, the test tobeappliedtodeterminewhethertherearetwooffensesoronlyone,iswhethereachprovisionrequiresproofofafactwhichtheotherdoesnot.”284U.S.at304.Contreras andApplicationoftheBlockburgerTesttoFelonyMurderCases{16}ThisCourthasalreadydeterminedtheoutcomeofthesecondpartoftheSwaf-fordtestasappliedtofelonymurdercasesbasedonunitaryconduct. InContreras,weheldthatwhentheconductisunitary,thedefendantcannotbeconvictedofbothfelonymurderandtheunderlyingpredicatefelony.120N.M.at491,903P.2dat233.WereachedthisconclusionbyrelyingontheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt’sanalysisinWhalen. Id. InWhalen, theSupremeCourtappliedtheBlockburger testtofindthatCongressdidnotauthorizeconsecu-tive sentences for felonymurderand theunderlying felony. 445U.S. at 684. Inso holding, theSupremeCourt reasoned
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that,underthefederalstatute,adefendantcouldnotbeconvictedforakillinginthecourseof a rapewithout theprosecutionprovingall theelementsof thepredicateoffenseof rape, and therefore“Congressintended rape to be considered a lesseroffense includedwithin the offense of akillinginthecourseofrape.”Id.at694n.8.ThisCourtobservedinContreras thattherewasnosignificantdifferencebetweenourfelonymurderstatuteandthefederalfelonymurderstatuteinWhalen,andthere-fore“[a]pplicationofadifferentrationale[was]unwarrantedbyanythinguniquetoourstatutes.”Contreras,120N.M.at491,903P.2dat233.{17} Because Contreras controls theoutcomeofthesecondpartofSwafford’slegislative intent inquiry as applied tofelonymurdercases,thepresentcaseturnsentirely on the unitary conduct prongofSwafford. Specifically,we askwhetherourfelonymurderstatuteexpressesaclearlegislativeintentthatakillingduringthecommissionofafelonyconstitutesunitaryconductineverycase,therebyprecludingaunitaryconductinquirybythisCourtintothespecificfactsofthecase.UnitaryConductunderSwafford{18}Legislativeintentisthetouchstoneofthedouble-descriptionanalysis.Casesfollowing Swafford, and even Swafforditself in its application of the test, haveconstrued the two parts of theSwaffordtest as separate, one part inquiring intothefactsofthecaseandtheotherpartintolegislativeintent.See Swafford,112N.M.at13-14,810P.2dat1233-34(statingthatiftheconductisfoundtobenon-unitary,“inquiry is at an end”); Contreras, 120N.M.at489,903P.2dat231(statingthat“itisonly‘ifitreasonablycanbesaidthattheconductisunitary...[that]onemustmove to thesecondpartof the inquiry’”(quotingSwafford, 112N.M. at 14, 810P.2dat1234)).However,Swafford’sinitialarticulationofthetestspeaksintermsofbothprongsbeingusedtodetermineleg-islativeintent.112N.M.at13,810P.2dat1233(statingthatthetwo-parttestisusedforthepurposeof“determininglegislativeintenttopunish”).Wethinkthisarticula-tionistelling.{19}Regardlessofwhichpartweanalyze,the Swafford test never veersmateriallyfromtheunderlying“polestar”oflegisla-tiveintent.Viewedasatoolfordiscerninglegislativeintenttopunish,theunitarycon-ductprongofSwaffordfunctionsasaproxyforlegislativeintentwhenthelegislatureissilent.Inotherwords,ifcriminalactsare
sufficientlyseparateintimeandspace,wehaveassumedthatthelegislatureintendedto authorize separate punishments underdifferentstatutesforeachdistinctact,un-lessthestatutesindicatethattheconductshould be construed as part of a singletransaction.See, e.g., id. (unitaryconductpartofSwaffordtest“arisesfromtheprag-maticobservationthatthedoublejeopardyclause clearly cannot operate to prohibitprosecution, conviction, and punishmentinasingletrialfordiscreteactsviolativeof thesamestatute (whetheractually thesameorthesameunder[theBlockburger test])”); see also Vick v. State,991S.W.2d830,833(Tex.Crim.App.1999)(holdingthatdoublejeopardywasnotviolatedbymultiple convictions for separate acts ofsexual assault because “theLegislature,throughthelanguageofthestatute,hasre-jectedgroupingaggravatedsexualassaultsby‘transaction’”).{20}Thecorollaryofthisprincipledic-tatesthatwhenthelegislatureisnotsilentandspeaksoftheconductaselementsofasinglecriminalepisode,eveniftemporallyseparate,thenourjobistoenablelegisla-tive intent. When the relevant statutesdefine the offenses as greater and lesserincluded,andthejuryinstructionsrequirethe jury to make the factual finding ofunitary conduct, then legislative intentwithregardtothefirstprongoftheSwaf-fordtestisclear.Inthatcase,itwouldbepresumptuousforthisCourttoconductourowninquiryintothefactualparticularitiesofeachcase.See Brown v. Ohio,432U.S.161,169-70(1977)(becauseOhiostatutesonautotheftandjoyridingdefinedthetheftandoperationofasinglecarasasingleof-fense,defendantcouldnotbeconvictedofbothcrimeseventhoughtheconductsup-portingeachtookplaceatdifferenttimesandindifferentplaces).UnitaryConductUnderNewMexico’sFelonyMurderStatute{21} Keeping in mind that legislativeintentisourprimaryconcernindecidingmultiple punishment cases,we lookfirstto the language of the statutes at issue.See Missouri v. Hunter,459U.S.359,366(1983)(statingthatinthemultiplepunish-mentcontext,“theDoubleJeopardyClausedoesnomorethanpreventthesentencingcourtfromprescribinggreaterpunishmentthanthelegislatureintended”).Tonosur-prise,thekidnappingstatuteissilentonthequestionofwhetherthelegislatureintendedthe conduct supporting kidnapping to beconstruedasunitarywiththeconductsup-portingafelonymurderoffense.Wewould
not expect any reference tomurder in akidnappingstatute. However, the felonymurderstatuterevealsaclearanswer.{22}NewMexico’sfelonymurderstatuteprovidesthat“[m]urderinthefirstdegreeisthekillingofonehumanbeingbyanotherwithoutlawfuljustificationorexcuse...in the commission of or attempt to commitanyfelony.”NMSA1978§30-2-1(A)(1994)(emphasis added).Our jury instructionsbasedonthisstatuterequirethat,tofindadefendantguiltyoffelonymurder,thejurymustfindthatthedefendantcommittedorattemptedtocommittheunderlyingfelonyandthatthedefendantcausedthedeathofthevictim“during the commissionof”or“the attempt to commit” the underlyingfelony. Rule 14-202NMRA (emphasisadded)(bracketsomitted).Indeed,inthiscase,thejurywasinstructedthat,inordertofindFrazierguiltyoffelonymurder,ithadtofindthathe“committedthecrimeof kidnappingunder circumstancesor inamanner dangerous to human life,” andthathe“causedthedeathof[Knoll]during the commission of kidnapping.”(Emphasisadded.){23}Thelanguageofboththestatuteandour jury instruction renders the conductsupportingthefelonymurderandtheun-derlyingpredicatefelonyunitarybydefini-tion; itexpresslyrequires that thekillinghappen“inthecommissionof”theunderly-ingfelony.Thejuryinstructionsbasedonthestatuterequirethat,forajurytoconvictadefendantoffelonymurder,theconductuponwhichboththeunderlyingfelonyandthefelonymurderisbasedmustnecessar-ilybeunitary.Thus,whenajuryfindsadefendantguiltyof felonymurder, ithasalreadydeterminedthefact-basedunitaryconductquestion—ithasfoundthatthekill-inghappenedduringthecommissionoftheunderlyingfelony.WearesimplyunabletodiscernanyprincipleddistinctionbetweenSwafford’snotionof“unitaryconduct”andtherequirementthatthekillinghappen“inthecommissionof”or“duringthecommis-sionof”theunderlyingfelony.112N.M.at13,810P.2dat1233;see Brown,432U.S.at169(“TheDoubleJeopardyClauseisnotsuchafragileguaranteethatprosecu-torscanavoiditslimitationsbythesimpleexpedientofdividingasinglecrimeintoaseriesoftemporalorspatialunits.”).See generallyGeorgeC.ThomasIII,A Unified Theory of Multiple Punishment,47U.Pitt.L.Rev. 1, 12-25 (1985) (discussing themultiplepunishmentanalysisandstatingthat “the unitary conduct issue dependsentirely onwhat the legislature intended
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tobetheunitofconviction,ratherthanona space-time analysis of the defendant’sphysicalactions”).{24}OurholdingisnotinconsistentwithSwafford, which refers to both parts ofitsmultiple punishment test in terms oflegislativeintent. TheparticularfactsofSwaffordalsolendsupport.Swafford itselfdidnotundertakeaunitaryconductanalysiswithregardtothedefendant’sconvictionsofincestandcriminalsexualpenetration,findingsimplythatthefirstpartofthetestwassatisfiedbecausetherewasnodisputethatthesameconductprecipitatedbothof-fenses.112N.M.at15,810P.2dat1235.However,inSwafford,justasinthiscase,becauseofthewaythestatutesdefinedtheoffensesofcriminalsexualpenetrationandincest, therewasnowayfor theconductnot tobeunitary;theconductrequiredtocommitcriminalsexualpenetrationwhencommittedunderthefamilialcircumstanc-espresentinSwaffordwillalwayssupportaparallelchargeofincest.Similarly,theconductrequiredtocommitfelonymurderwillalwayssupportaparallelchargewithrespecttotheunderlyingfelony.ThoughSwafford reached its conclusion that theconductwasunitarybyfindingnodisputeontheissue,thesameconclusionnecessar-ilyfollowsbylookingatthestatutesthem-selves.SeeNMSA1978,§30-9-11(2003)(criminalsexualpenetration);NMSA1978,§30-10-3(1963)(incest).{25}OuropinioninContreras,butforitscursory analysis of unitary conduct, alsoprefiguresourdecisionhere.Implicitinourholding,thattheelementsoftheunderlyingfelonyweresubsumedbytheelementsoffelonymurder,wasthenotionthatafactualinquiryintounitaryconductwasnotnec-essary to thedeterminationof legislativeintent.Whenthefelonymurderstatuteisinterpretedsuchthattheunderlyingfelonyisalesser-includedoffenseoffelonymur-der,itfollowsthatthelegislatureintendedtheconductsupportingbothoffensestobeconsidered “unitary”for double jeopardypurposes. See Whalen, 445U.S. at 692(stating that, absent a clear indicationoflegislativeintenttothecontrary,twostatu-tory provisions that proscribe the “sameoffense” are construed not to authorizecumulativepunishments).{26} The requirement under the felonymurderstatute,thattheconductbeunitarytoconvictadefendantoffelonymurder,isalsoconsistentwithourearlierdiscussionof the legislative purpose behind felonymurder. When theState is permitted toelevatewhatwould otherwise be a sec-
ond-degreemurdertofirst-degreemurder,withtheattendantincreaseinpunishment,basedonthefactthatthekillinghappenedduring the commission of a felony, thefelony should be subsumedby thefirst-degree murder. The underlying felonyhasalreadyservedtoenhancethemurdertofirstdegreewithoutrequiringproofofpremeditation or a depravedmind. See Ortega,112N.M.at563,817P.2dat1205(explainingthat“[s]econddegreemurder...maybeelevatedtofirstdegreemurderwhen it occurs in circumstances that thelegislaturehasdeterminedaresoseriousastomeritincreasedpunishment”(emphasisadded)). To allowa separate convictionfor thepredicatefelonywouldcreate theparadoxical resultwe noted above—thedefendantwouldreceiveagreaterpunish-mentthanifhehadkilledwithamorecul-pablementalstate.Nothinginthestatuteindicatesthatthelegislatureintendedthisarbitraryresult. See Swafford,112N.M.at15,810P.2dat1235(statingthat“[t]hequantumofpunishment . . . is probativeof legislative intent;” thus, “[w]here onestatutoryprovision incorporatesmanyoftheelementsofabasestatute,andextractsagreaterpenalty than thebasestatute, itmaybeinferredthatthelegislaturedidnotintendpunishmentunderbothstatutes”).{27}Ofcourse,ifthefactssupportmul-tiplechargesofaparticularfelonywhichcanbesustainedunderaunit-of-prosecu-tionanalysis,thentheStateisfreetouseoneofthosechargesasthepredicatefelonyand obtain separate convictions for theothercharges.OurrecentopinioninState v. Bernal,2006-NMSC-050,140N.M.644,146P.3d289,isillustrative.BernalbrokeintoGiron’shome,intendingtorobhimofsomedrugmoney.Id.¶2.UponenteringGiron’sbedroom,BernalimmediatelyshotGironandthenturnedhisgunonGiron’sgirlfriend, Romero, demanding that shefindthemoney.Id.¶¶2-3.RomerocouldnotfindthemoneyandBernalthenleftthehouse.Id.¶3.AjuryfoundBernalguiltyof felony murder, two counts of armedrobbery,andotheroffenses.Id.¶5.ThetrialcourtdismissedBernal’sconvictionfortheattemptedarmedrobberyofGironbe-causethatcountrepresentedthepredicatefelony for the felonymurder conviction,but thecourtdidallowtheseparatecon-victionforattemptedrobberyofRomerotostand.Id.{28}ThisCourtupheldBernal’sconvic-tion for the attempted armed robbery ofRomero,findingthattheconductsupport-ing that chargewas not unitarywith the
felonymurderofGiron.Id.¶11.However,the true point on which our holding inBernalturns is theoutcomeofaunit-of-prosecutionanalysiswithregardtotheat-temptedrobberycharges.See id.¶¶12-13.Weheldthattheconvictionsfortwocountsof armed robberydid not violate doublejeopardy,despitethefactthatBernalonlyhadtheintenttostealonevictim’sproperty.Id.¶31.WereachedthisdeterminationbyapplyingthetestarticulatedbythisCourtinHerron v. State,111N.M.357,361,805P.2d624,628 (1991). See Bernal, 2006-NMSC-050,¶15.{29} Herronwas a unit-of-prosecutioncaseinwhichwesetforthatesttodiscernwhenadefendant’sactsweresufficientlydistincttopermitmultiplepunishmentsun-derthesamestatute.AcourtapplyingtheHerrontestevaluatesthefollowing“indiciaofdistinctness”:(1)temporalproximityoftheacts;(2)locationofthevictimduringeach act; (3) existenceof an interveningevent;(4)sequencingoftheacts;(5)defen-dant’sintentasevidencedbyhisconductandutterances;and(6)thenumberofvic-tims.111N.M.at361,805P.2dat628.WeappliedtheHerroncriteriainBernaltofindthatBernal’sactsweresufficientlydistincttojustifymultiplepunishmentsunderthesamestatute.Bernal,2006-NMSC-050,¶¶20-21.Thus,theattemptedarmedrobberyofRomerodidnotserveasthepredicatefelony for the felony murder of Giron,andBernalcouldbeconvictedofboththefelonymurder and the attempted armedrobberyofRomero,butnottheattemptedarmedrobberyofGiron.{30} BernaldemonstratesthatiftheStatecharges a defendantwithmultiple first-degreefeloniesunderasinglestatute,andmultipleconvictionsunderthatstatutecanbesustainedbasedonaunit-of-prosecutionanalysis, then only one such convictionneedstoserveasthepredicatefelonyforafelonymurderconvictionandtheotherconvictionsmaystand. However,wherethereisonlyonefirst-degreefelonycon-victionwhichalsoservesasthepredicatefelonyforafelonymurderconviction,weholdthatthelegislaturedidnotintendtoallowaseparateconvictionforthatsamefelony.ClarificationofDoubleJeopardyIssueinFelonyMurderPrecedent{31} We recognize that our holdingrepresentsadeparturefromcertaincasesincludedwithourfelonymurderjurispru-denceinwhichwehaveexaminedwhetherconductisfactuallyunitary,insomecasesfinding that it is not and allowing both
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convictions to stand. See, e.g., State v. Foster,1999-NMSC-007,¶35,126N.M.646,974P.2d140(convictionsforaggra-vatedkidnappingandfelonymurderwerebasedonnon-unitaryconductanddoublejeopardywasnotviolated);State v. Mora,1997-NMSC-060,¶69,124N.M.346,950P.2d789(convictionsforcriminalsexualcontactandfelonymurderwerebasedonnon-unitaryconductanddoublejeopardywasnotviolated);Contreras,120N.M.at490-91, 903P.2d at 232-33 (convictionsfor armed robbery and felony murderwerebasedonunitaryconductandarmedrobberyconvictionwasvacated);State v. Kersey,120N.M.517,523,903P.2d828,834(1995) (convictionsforkidnappingandfelonymurderwerebasedonnon-unitaryconductandthusdoublejeopardywasnotviolatedbyseparateconvictions);Ortega,112N.M.at571,817P.2dat1213(same).However, none of these cases addressesthespecificissuebeforeushere:whetherthefelonymurderstatuteexpressesaclearlegislative intentbyrequiring the jury tomakethefindingofunitaryconductbeforeconvictingadefendantoffelonymurder.{32} Our previous cases applied theunitaryconductprongoftheSwaffordtesttofelonymurdersituationsandwerenotaskedtoinquireintowhethertheparticularlanguageofthefelonymurderstatutemightbe indicative of legislative intent on theissueofunitaryconduct. Someof thosecases analyzed the statutes defining thepredicatefelony,askingwhetherthefelonywasdefinedinsuchawaythatitsupportedajuryfindingofnon-unitaryconduct. See, e.g., Foster, 1999-NMSC-007,¶¶29-40;Kersey,120N.M.at517,903P.2dat828.{33}InFoster,welookedtothestatuteand jury instructions on armed robberyto determinewhether they provided thejurywith alternative bases for a convic-tion, some supporting unitary conductandsomesupportingnon-unitaryconduct.1997-NMSC-007,¶¶36-37.Inthatcase,weheldthatbasedonthestatuteandtheinstructionsonarmedrobberyasappliedtothefacts,thejurycouldhavebaseditscon-victiononconductthatwaseitherunitaryornon-unitary.Id.¶¶36-40.Wereasonedthat if the jury had based its finding onunitary conduct,Contreraswould applyandtheelementsofarmedrobberywouldbesubsumedwithintheelementsoffelonymurder,thusviolatingdoublejeopardyifthedefendantwereconvictedofboth.Id.¶¶39-40.Becausetheverdictdidnotin-dicatewhichalternativethejuryreliedonandifoneofthealternativeswouldhave
violateddoublejeopardy,weheldthatthedefendant’s convictionof armed robberycouldnotstand.Id.¶40.{34} However, we also analyzed thekidnapping statute inFoster tofind thatthe conduct supporting the defendant’sconvictionofaggravatedkidnappingcouldnothavebeenbasedonconductthatwasunitarywiththefelonymurder,andthus,theaggravatedkidnappingconvictiondidnot violate double jeopardy. Id.¶¶ 29-35.WeconductedasimilarreviewofthekidnappingstatuteinKersey,reachingthesame factual conclusion as that reachedin Foster with regard to the kidnappingconviction.See Kersey,120N.M.at523,903P.2d at 834 (analyzing “hold to ser-vice” requirement in kidnapping statuteandholdingthatdoublejeopardywasnotviolatedbecauseconductrequiredtoestab-lishkidnappingwascompletedtwohoursbefore the conduct required to establishfelonymurder).{35}FosterandKerseywerecorrectintheiranalysesofthepredicatefelonystat-uteswithrespecttolegislativeintentontheissueofunitaryconduct.However,thosecasesdidnotaskthequestionweaskhere,whichshiftsthefocusfromthepredicatefelonystatutestothefelonymurderstatuteitself.Thatstatuterequiresthekillingtohappenin the commission ofafelonyandtheaccompanyingjuryinstructionsrequirethe jury tofind that thekillinghappened during the commission of the predicatefelony. Therefore, the questionwenowaskiswhetherthejury,whensoinstructed,couldhavefoundthatthekillingwassepa-rate from the underlying felony. Wedonotbelievethejurycouldsofindandthelanguageof the statutedoesnot indicatethat the legislature intended otherwise.See Whalen, 445 U.S. at 691-92 (whenonestatuteissubsumedwithintheother,we presume that the legislature did notintendmultiplepunishmentsunless thereis“aclearindicationofcontrarylegislativeintent”).Wenowclarifyourprecedentac-cordingtothelegislativeintentexpressedinthefelonymurderstatute.FINGERPRINTEVIDENCE{36}Attrial,Frazier’sgirlfriendtestifiedtowhatFrazierhadtoldher:thathehadborrowedatruckfromKnoll,thathestillhadtimeleftonitwhenKnollreturnedtopickitup,thathehadbeatenKnoll,andthatheknewthepolicewerelookingforhim.AdetectiveinthecriminalisticsunitoftheAlbuquerquePoliceDepartment(“APD”)testifiedthatlatentfingerprintswereliftedoffofthedoorframesofthetruck.Another
APDdetective,DetectiveHerrera,testifiedthatshematchedfiveoftheselatentprintstoa“ten-print”fingerprintcardofFrazier’sthatwaskeptbyAPDintheordinarycourseofbusiness.{37}Fraziernowassertsthatthefinger-printevidenceandtheten-printcardwereinadmissible hearsay. Theoverall thrustofFrazier’s argument appears to be thatDetectiveHerrerashouldnothavebeenal-lowedtoidentifytheprintsontheten-printfingerprintcardasFrazier’sbecause thatcouldnotfallwithinthebusinessrecordsexception to the hearsay rule. See Rule11-803(F)NMRA.Frazierclaimsthathiscounselproperlyobjectedtotheevidencebut that the trial court overruled the ob-jection.TheStatepointsoutthatFrazieris relying upon objections made by hisco-defendant’scounselandthatFrazier’scounseldidnotobjecttotheadmissionoftheevidence.Infact,afterDetectiveHer-reratestifiedthatshecomparedthelatentprintstoaten-printcardbearingFrazier’snameandbirthdate,thattheten-printcardwaskeptinthenormalcourseofbusiness,andthatshereliedonsuchrecordstomakeprofessionaljudgments,Frazier’scounselaffirmativelystatedthattherewasnoobjec-tiontotheadmissionofFrazier’sten-printcard. Inhisreply,Frazierarguesthatheshould be able to rely on the objectionsmadebyhisco-defendant’scounselsincehehadpreviouslyobjectedtoajointtrialbutwasdeniedaseverance.Frazierthencitestotherecordwhereheclaimstohaveobjected,althoughallofthecitationsaretoobjectionsmadebyhisco-defendant’scounsel.{38}“Acquiescenceintheadmissionofevidence...constituteswaiveroftheissueonappeal.”State v. Campos,1996-NMSC-043,¶47,122N.M.148,921P.2d1266.Frazierdidnotpreserveanyobjectiontotheadmissionofthefingerprintevidenceashedidnotobjectorjoininhisco-defendant’sobjections. See State v. Pettigrew, 116N.M.135,143,860P.2d777,785(Ct.App.1993)(concludingthatthedefendant“wassatisfiedwiththetrialcourt’shandlingofthematter”whenhedidnotobjectorjoininhisco-defendants’objections);State v. Pacheco, 110 N.M. 599, 604, 798 P.2d200, 205 (Ct.App. 1990) (rejecting thedefendant’s failure to sever claimwherethedefendantdidnotobjectbut, instead,relied on his co-defendant’s objection).Moreover,notonlydidFrazieracquiesceintheadmissionoftheevidence,Frazier’scounselaffirmativelystatedthattherewasnoobjectiontotheadmissionofFrazier’s
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ten-printcard.EvenifFrazierdidatsomepoint raiseanobjectionbeforeDetectiveHerreratestified,“[a]partycannotrelyonawithdrawnobjectiontopreserveerror.”State v. Duncan,117N.M.407,413,872P.2d380,386(Ct.App.1994),abrogated on other grounds byState v. Brule,1999-NMSC-026, ¶¶ 3-6, 127N.M. 368, 981P.2d782.{39}Finally,Frazierarguesthatheshouldbeabletorelyonco-defendant’sobjectionsbecausetheState“electedtojointhetwodefendants” and because his motion toseverwasdenied. Thisargumenthasnomerit.Frazierpointstonoauthority,andweseenobeneficialpolicyadvancedbyadoptinghislogic.Therefore,anyobjec-tiontotheadmissibilityofthefingerprintevidencewasnotproperlypreservedandwewillnotconsideritonappeal.CONCLUSION{40} We vacate Frazier’s kidnappingconviction as violative of double jeop-ardy.Frazier’sremainingconvictionsareaffirmed.Weremandtothedistrictcourtfor further proceedings consistent withthisopinion.{41} ITISSOORDERED. RICHARDC.BOSSON, Justice
CHÁVEZ,ChiefJustice(speciallyconcurring){42}Ifullyconcurinthediscussionper-tainingtothefingerprintevidence.IalsoconcurinvacatingFrazier’sconvictionofkidnappingongroundsofdoublejeopardy.Iwriteseparately,however,because,whileIbelievethiscaseisastepintherightdirec-tion,Iamconvincedthatmoreisrequiredtobringourdouble-jeopardyjurisprudenceinlinewiththeUnitedStatesConstitution.After taking a fresh look at the issue, Iampersuaded thatour“unitary-conduct”analysis is in conflictwithUnitedStatesSupremeCourtprecedentand,thus,begin-ningwithSwafford v. State,112N.M.3,810P.2d1223(1991),mustbemodified.IwriteseparatelytoexplainwhyandhowI
believeourdouble-jeopardyjurisprudencemustbemodified.{43}TheDoubleJeopardyClauseoftheFifthAmendment to the United StatesConstitution provides: “[N]or shall anypersonbesubjectforthesameoffensetobetwiceputinjeopardyoflifeorlimb.”U.S.Const.amend.V;see also N.M.Const.art.II,§15(providingfordouble-jeopardyprotection). The clause is applicable tothestatesthroughtheDueProcessClauseoftheFourteenthAmendment.Benton v. Maryland,395U.S.784,794(1969),over-rulingPalko v. Connecticut,302U.S.319(1937).TheDoubleJeopardyClausehastwomaincomponents.First,itprotectsadefendantfrombeingretriedforthe“sameoffense” either after acquittal or convic-tion (subsequent prosecutions). Second,it protects a defendant from twice beingpunishedatonetrialforthe“sameoffense”(multiple punishments). See Whalen v. United States,445U.S.684,688(1980);State v. Lynch,2003-NMSC-020,¶9,134N.M.139,74P.3d73.Thiscaseconcernsthemultiplepunishmentcomponent,whichitselfhastwoprongs.Firstarethe“unit-of-prosecution”caseswherethedefendantis “chargedwithmultipleviolationsof asinglestatute.”Swafford,112N.M.at8,810P.2dat1228.Secondarethe“double-description”caseswhere“thedefendantischargedwithviolationsofmultiplestatutesthatmayormaynotbedeemedthesameoffensefordoublejeopardypurposes.”Id. SinceFrazierarguesthatdoublejeopardywasviolatedwhenhewas sentencedac-cordingto theseparatestatutesoffelonymurderandtheunderlyingfelonyonwhichthefelonymurderwaspredicated,thisisadouble-descriptioncase.A. UnitedStatesSupremeCourtPrecedent{44}Becausetheissueisoneofadefen-dant’sfederalconstitutionalrights,IwouldbegintheanalysisbylookingatprecedentfromtheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtsincetheSupremacyClauseoftheUnitedStatesConstitutionrequiresustodoso.See U.S.Const.artVI,cl.2;N.M.Const.art.II,§1.Whendealingwithamultiple-punish-mentissue,theSupremeCourthasmadeitclearthattheDoubleJeopardyClause“islimitedtoassuringthatthecourtdoesnotexceeditslegislativeauthorizationbyim-posingmultiplepunishmentsforthesame
offense.” Brown v. Ohio, 432U.S. 161,165 (1977);see alsoMissouri v. Hunter,459U.S.359,366(1983)(“Withrespecttocumulativesentencesimposedinasingletrial,theDoubleJeopardyClausedoesnomore than prevent the sentencing courtfromprescribinggreaterpunishmentthanthe legislature intended.”). Thus, underSupremeCourtprecedent,thefirststepinacourt’sanalysisistodeterminewhethertwoconvictionsatasingletrialwereforthe“sameoffense.”Ifso,thesecondstepistodeterminewhethermultiple punishmentsfor those sameoffenseswere authorizedbytheLegislature.1
Offense{45}Indeterminingwhethertwochargedoffensesarethesame“forpurposesoftheDoubleJeopardyClause,[acourt]lookstowhethertheoffensesarethesame,nottheintereststhattheoffensesviolate.”United States v. Dixon,509U.S.688,699(1993),overruling Grady v. Corbin,495U.S.508(1990).Inmakingthisdetermination,theSupremeCourthasconsistentlyused thetestformulatedbyBlockburger v. United States, 284U.S. 299 (1932). See, e.g.,Brown,432U.S.at166(statingthat“[t]heestablished test for determiningwhethertwooffenses are sufficiently distinguish-abletopermittheimpositionofcumulativepunishmentwasstatedinBlockburger”).Infact,theBlockburgertest,otherwiseknownasthe“same-elements”test,see Dixon,509U.S.at696,istheonly testusedtodeter-minewhethertwooffensesarethesameforpurposesofdoublejeopardy.See id.at704(overrulingGrady’s “same-conduct” testandnotingthattheBlockburgertest“hasdeephistoricalrootsandhasbeenacceptedinnumerousprecedentsof[theSupreme]Court”);see also United States v. Hatchett,245F.3d625,631(7thCir.2001)(“Dixonre-established the ‘same-elements’ testarticulatedbyBlockburgerastheoneandonlytestthatcourtsaretoapply....”).{46}AccordingtoBlockburger,“wherethe same act or transaction constitutes aviolation of twodistinct statutory provi-sions, the test tobeapplied todeterminewhethertherearetwooffensesoronlyone,iswhether eachprovision requires proofofafactwhichtheotherdoesnot.”284U.S.at304.Thus,therearetwoprongsto
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Blockburger.UnderBlockburger,acourtmustdetermine:(1)whethereachchargedoffense “requires proof of a fact whichtheotherdoesnot”;and(2)whethereachchargedoffensewaspartofthe“sameactortransaction.”{47}Brownisinstructiveonbothofthesepoints.2 InBrown, thedefendant stole acar inEastCleveland,Ohio. Nine dayslater,thedefendantwascaughtdrivingthecar inWickliffe,Ohio. InWickliffe, thedefendantwas chargedwith the offenseofjoyriding—“takingoroperatingthecarwithout the owner’s consent.” 432U.S.at162. Thedefendantpledguilty to thecharge,paida$100fine,andspentthirtydaysinjail.Aboutamonthafterbeingre-leasedfromjail,thedefendantwaschargedinEastClevelandwithauto theft. Id.at162-63.Contingentonhisargumentthathecouldnotbeprosecutedforautotheftongroundsofdoublejeopardy,thedefendantpled guilty. Id. at 163. On appeal, theOhioCourtofAppealsheldthatjoyridingwasalesser-includedoffenseofautotheftbecausetheonlyelementneededtoproveauto theft not needed to prove joyridingwasanintenttopermanentlydeprivetheownerof the automobile. Id. at 163-64.Nonetheless, the defendant’s convictionofautotheftwasupheldonappealbecausethecourtdeterminedthattheconductun-derlyingeachconvictionwasnotpartofthe“sameactortransaction.”AccordingtotheOhiocourt:
The two prosecutions [were]basedontwoseparateactsoftheappellant,onewhichoccurredonNovember 29th and one whichoccurredonDecember8th.Sinceappellant ha[d] not shown thatboth prosecutions [were] basedon the same act or transaction,thesecondprosecution[was]notbarred by the double jeopardyclause.
Id.at164(quotationmarksomitted).{48} Applying thefirstprongofBlock-burger,theSupremeCourtinBrownagreedwiththeOhioCourtofAppealsandheldthatagreateroffenseandalesser-includedoffensearegenerallythesameforpurposesofdoublejeopardy:“Asisinvariablytrueofagreaterandlesserincludedoffense,thelesseroffense...requiresnoproofbeyondthatwhichisrequiredforconvictionofthegreater....Thegreateroffenseisthere-forebydefinitionthe‘same’forpurposesofdouble jeopardy as any lesser offenseincludedinit.”Id.at168.{49}Regardingthe“sameactortransac-tion”prongofBlockburger,however,theSupremeCourt disagreedwith theOhiocourt. Notwithstanding the nine daysseparatingtheconductunderlyingthetwocharges,theSupremeCourtheldthatthetwooffenseswere part of the “same actor transaction.” Id. at169-70. Itdidsobecause “[t]he applicableOhio statutes,aswrittenandasconstruedinth[e]case,ma[de]thetheftandoperationofasinglecarasingleoffense.”Id.at169.Critically,theSupremeCourt stated: “TheDoubleJeopardyClauseisnotsuchafragileguar-anteethatprosecutorscanavoiditslimita-tionsbythesimpleexpedientofdividingasinglecrimeinto a series of temporal or spatial units.” Id.(emphasisadded);see also id.at169n.8(notingthat it“wouldhave [been] a different case if theOhioLegislature had provided that joyriding[was] a separate offense for eachday inwhichamotorvehicleisoperatedwithoutthe owner’s consent”). Soon afterwardsinanothercase,theSupremeCourtquotedBrownandfurtherclarifiedthisprinciple.
“TheDoubleJeopardyClauseisnotsuchafragileguaranteethat...itslimitations[canbeavoided]bythesimpleexpedientofdivid-ingasinglecrimeintoaseriesoftemporalorspatialunits,”or, as we
hold today, into “discrete bases of liability” not defined as such by the legislature.”
Sanabria v. United States437U.S.54,72(1978) (alteration in original) (emphasisadded)(citationomitted).{50}UndertheanalysisinBrown,alesser-includedoffenseisthe“sameoffense”asthegreateroffensesolongasbothoccurredas part of the “same act or transaction.”Importantly,Brown andSanabriamandatethatindeterminingwhethertwochargesarepartofthe“sameactortransaction,”courtsare to look solely atwhat the governingstatutesprovide—notsimplytothetempo-ralorspatialdistancebetweentheeventsorconductunderlyingthecharges.3
2. DeterminingLegislativeIntentto Punish{51}Eveniftwochargesarethe“sameoffense” under the Double JeopardyClause,adefendantisnotprotectedagainstmultiplepunishmentsforthosechargesifthelegislaturehasspecificallyauthorizedsuchpunishment.Indetermininglegisla-tiveintentinthiscontext,theBlockburgertest—the same test used for determiningwhethertwooffensesarethe“same”—isthestartingpoint.SeeAlbernaz,450U.S.at 344 n.3 (1981). The outcome of theBlockburger test provides a presumptivelensthroughwhichtoviewanystatutorylanguage.{52} Supreme Court precedent makesclearthatifoneofthetwochargesisde-terminedtobealesser-includedoffenseoftheotherandifbothwerepartofthe“sameactortransaction,”multiplepunishmentsareunconstitutionalunlessthelegislaturehasclearlyprovidedforthem.See Whalen,445U.S.at692 (“[W]here twostatutoryprovisions proscribe the ‘same offense,’theyareconstruednottoauthorizecumula-tivepunishmentsintheabsenceofaclearindicationofcontrarylegislativeintent.”).Iftheoffensesarethesameforpurposesof
Wehaveoftennoted that theClause serves the functionofpreventingboth successivepunishmentand successiveprosecution,butthereisno authority...forthepropositionthatithasdifferentmeaningsinthetwocontexts.Thatisperhapsbecauseitisembarrassingtoassertthatthesingleterm“sameoffence”...hastwodifferentmeanings....
509U.S.at704(citationomitted). See also Brown,432U.S.at166(“Iftwooffensesarethesame...forpurposesofbarringcon-secutivesentencesatasingletrial,theynecessarilywillbethesameforpurposesofbarringsuccessiveprosecutions.”).Moreover,Blockburgeritselfwasamultiple-punishmentcase.See Blockburger,284U.S.at300-01.3Ofcourseifthedefendantwaschargedwithmultipleviolationsofthesame statute,aunit-of-prosecutioncase,thentheonlyquestiontobeansweredindeterminingwhethertwochargesarethe“sameoffense”iswhetherthedefendant’sconductunderlyingeachchargewaspartofthe“sameactortransaction”asdefinedbythelegislature.
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doublejeopardyandthelegislativeintentregardingmultiplepunishmentsisambigu-ousinsuchsituations,theruleoflenityistobeused.See id.at695n.10.{53}Ontheotherhand,whentwochargesarenotthe“sameoffense,”multiplepun-ishmentsarepresumedpermissibleunlesscontrarytolegislativeintent.Hunter,459U.S. at 367; see Albernaz, 450 U.S. at340.Likewise,whentheBlockburgertestreveals that thechargesarenot thesameforpurposesofdoublejeopardy, theruleoflenityinconstruingambiguousstatutesserves nopurpose. This is because it ispresumedthatthelegislaturewasattempt-ing to eradicate separate evils with thedifferentstatutes.See Albernaz,450U.S.at342-43.{54} Most instructive are Whalen andHunter. In Whalen, the defendant wasconvictedofrapeandfelonymurderpredi-catedonrape.Similartotheinstantcase,the defendant argued that imposition ofmultiplepunishmentsviolatedtheUnitedStatesConstitution. 445U.S.at685-86.TheSupremeCourtfirstdetermined thatrapewasalesser-includedoffenseoffelonymurder because “rape [was] a necessaryelementofproofofthefelonymurder.”Id.at694.Next,theSupremeCourtreversedthe defendant’s rape conviction becauseCongresswas, at best, ambiguous as towhetheritintendedmultiplepunishmentsforfelonymurderanditspredicates.See id.at695.{55}IncontrastisHunter.Inthatcase,thedefendantcomplainedofhismultipleconvictionsofarmedcriminalactionandthe lesser-includedoffenseof robbery inthefirstdegree.SeeHunter,459U.S.at361-62. The statute proscribing armedcriminal action, however, provided thatanypunishmentforthatcrimewasto“beinadditiontoanypunishmentprovidedbylawforthe[lesser-includedoffense].”Id.at362. TheSupremeCourtupheldbothconvictionsbecausethelegislature’sintentinprovidingformultiplepunishmentswas“crystalclear.”Id.at368.B. ApplicationofUnitedStates SupremeCourtPrecedent{56} Applying the Supreme Court’sprecedenttotheinstantcase,Ibelieveaninquirymust first bemade intowhetherFrazier’schargeofkidnappingisthe“sameoffense” as his chargeof felonymurder.Thisrequirestheansweringoftwoques-tions:(1)whetherkidnappingisalesser-includedoffenseoffelonymurderinthiscase;andifso,(2)whetherthekidnappingchargeandthefelony-murderchargestem
fromthe“sameactortransaction?”Iftheanswertoeitherofthesequestionsis“no,”thechargesofkidnappingandfelonymur-derarenotthesameforpurposesofdoublejeopardyand thepresumption is that theLegislatureintendedmultiplepunishments.Conversely,iftheanswertobothquestionsis“yes,”thenthetwochargesarethe“sameoffense” and an additional inquiry intowhethertheLegislatureintendedmultiplepunishmentsisrequired.{57} Frazier’s kidnapping charge is alesser-includedoffenseofhisfelony-mur-der charge. InWhalen, the governmentarguedthatrapewasnotalesser-includedoffenseof thedefendant’s felony-murderchargebecausethefelony-murderstatute“proscribe[d]thekillingofanotherpersoninthecourseofcommittingrapeorrobberyor kidnapingorarson,etc.” 445U.S.at694.TheSupremeCourtrejectedthisargu-ment,stating:“Aconvictionforkillinginthecourseofarapecannotbehadwithoutprovingalltheelementsoftheoffenseofrape.” Id. at 693-94. We recognized inState v. Contrerasthat,afterWhalen,thereisnodoubtthatthepredicatefelonyofafelony-murderchargeisalesser-includedoffenseoffelonymurder.120N.M.486,491,903P.2d228,233(1995),overruling State v. Stephens,93N.M.458,463,601P.2d428,433(1979).Intheinstantcase,aspointedoutbyJusticeBosson,inordertobeconvictedoffelonymurderthejuryhadtofindthatFrazier“causedthedeathofKellyKnollduringthecommissionofkidnapping.” Maj.Op.¶22. Similar toWhalen,Fraziercouldnothavebeencon-victedoffelonymurderwithoutalloftheelementsofkidnappinghavingfirstbeenproved. Since kidnapping is subsumedbythefelony-murderchargeinthiscase,Frazier’s kidnapping charge is a lesser-included offense of his felony-murdercharge.{58}Thenextinquiryiswhetherthekid-nappingandthesubsequentkillingofKnollwerepartofthe“sameactortransaction.”The answer to this inquiry depends onwhether“[t]heapplicable.. .statutes,aswrittenandasconstruedinthiscase,make[kidnapping and felonymurder] a singleoffense.”See Brown,432U.S.at169.MyreadingofUnitedStatesSupremeCourtprecedentisthatwemustlookonly tothestatutes;wemustnotuse“thesimpleexpe-dientofdividing[the]crimeintoaseriesoftemporalorspatialunits.”See id.Irecog-nizethat,whenitcomestofelonymurder,themajorityandIagree.See Maj.Op.¶17(“[W]easkwhetherourfelony-murder
statuteexpressesaclearlegislativeintentthatakillingduringthecommissionofafelonyconstitutesunitaryconductineverycase,therebyprecludingaunitaryconductinquirybythisCourtintothespecificfactsofthecase.”).Iapplaudthisdeparturefromour previous cases, which have mostlyconductedaspatialandtemporalanalysisofthedefendant’sunderlyingconduct.See, e.g.,State v. Mora, 1997-NMSC-060, ¶¶68-71,124N.M.346,950P.2d789;State v. Livernois,1997-NMSC-019,¶¶20-22,123N.M.128, 934P.2d1057. Where Idifferwith themajority, however, is itsconclusionthataunitary-conductanalysisbasedonSwaffordistobeusedasaproxywhenthestatutesdonotclearlyprovidethattheyaretobeconstruedaspartofthesametransaction.See Maj.Op.¶19.AsIdiscussfurtherbelow,IbelievethatwemustalwaysconsiderthestatutesathandandtheintentbehindthemwhendeterminingwhethertheLegislatureintendedtwochargedoffensestobepartofthe“sameactortransaction.”Doingotherwisewouldberesortingtothe“simpleexpedient”thattheSupremeCourtinBrownwarnedagainst.{59} Applying Brown, I conclude thatFrazier’s kidnapping charge stems fromthe“sameactortransaction”ashisfelony-murdercharge.OurLegislaturehaspro-vided that tobeguiltyof felonymurder,themurdermust occur “in the commis-sionoforattempttocommitanyfelony.”NMSA1978,§30-2-1(A)(2) (1994). Infashioningthiscrime,itisclearfromtheplainlanguagethattheLegislaturedidnotintendtotemporallyorspatiallydividetheunderlyingfelonyfromthekilling.Thatis,thestatuterequiresthatthekillingoccur“in thecommissionof”thefelony.SincetheLegislature fashioned the felonymurderstatutesuchthatthemurdermustoccurdur-ingthecommissionofthepredicatefelony,thepredicatefelonyispartofthe“sameactortransaction”asthemurder.{60} Similar toBrown, adifferent casewould be presented had theLegislatureprovided that felonymurderwasa sepa-rateoffensefromitspredicatewhentherewasatemporalorspatialgapbetweenthecompletion of the underlying felony andthe subsequent murder. Because it didnot,andbecauseweareboundtofollowSupremeCourtprecedent,IconcludethatKnolls’skidnappingandmurderoccurredas part of the “same act or transaction.”Thus,becausetheanswertobothprongsof the “sameoffense” question is “yes,”I conclude thatFrazier’skidnappingandfelony-murder charges are the “sameof-
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fense”withinthemeaningoftheDoubleJeopardyClauseoftheFifthAmendment.{61}Havingconcludedthatkidnappingandfelonymurderinthiscasearethe“sameoffense,”Ibelievethenextcourseofactionis todeterminewhethermultiplepunish-mentsarelegislativelyauthorized.Sincekidnappingisalesser-includedoffenseoffelonymurderpredicatedonkidnapping,thereisapresumptionthatourLegislaturedidnotintendmultiplepunishments.See Whalen,445U.S.at691-92.Inlookingatthestatutorylanguage,Fraziershouldnotreceivemultiplepunishmentsunlessthereis “aclear indicationofcontrary legisla-tive intent.” Id. Any ambiguity shouldbeconstrued infavorofFrazier. See id.at695n.10.{62}ThelegislationatissueissilentonwhethertheLegislatureintendedmultiplepunishments.UnderNewMexicolaw,fel-onymurderismurderinthefirstdegree—acapitalfelony.NMSA1978,§30-2-1(A).Adefendantguiltyofacapitalfelony“shallbepunishedbylifeimprisonmentordeath.”Id.§31-18-14(A)(1993).Whoevercom-mitskidnappingwhodoesnotvoluntarilyfreethevictiminasafeplaceisguiltyofafirst-degreefelony.Id.§30-4-1(2003).Thebasicsentenceforafirst-degreefelonyis eighteen years of imprisonment. Id.§ 31-18-15(A)(2) (2005). Nowhere inthe statutory provisions defining thesecrimesorprovidingfor theirpunishmentdoestheLegislaturespecificallyauthorizemultiplepunishments. Haditwantedto,theLegislaturecouldhavespokenclearlyonthispoint.See Hunter,459U.S.at362(discussingastatutethatprovidedforthepunishment of armed criminal action to“beinadditiontoanypunishmentprovidedbylawforthe[lesser-includedoffense]”);Jackson v. State,1996-NMSC-054,¶2n.1,122N.M.433,925P.2d1195(discussinglegislationprovidingformultiplepunish-mentsforfelonymurderandtheunderlyingfelony,but thatnever reached the senatefloor).GiventheLegislature’ssilenceonthismatterandapplyingtheruleoflenity,I conclude that the Legislature has not
clearly authorizedmultiple punishmentsforfelonymurderanditspredicatefelony.Becauseithasnot,Frazier’sdualconvic-tionofbothkidnappingandfelonymurderpredicatedonkidnappingrunsafouloftheFifthAmendmenttotheU.S.Constitution.Accordingly,IagreethatwemustvacateFrazier’sconvictionofkidnapping.C. UnitaryConductDependsupon theHarmProscribedbythe StatuteatIssue{63}Iagreeentirelywiththemajority’srecognitionthatdoublejeopardyprecludesadefendantfrombeingconvictedofbothfelonymurderanditspredicate.See Maj.Op.¶¶20,23.Interestingly,inJackson,ahabeascasedecidedsoonafterContreras,weimplicitlyunderstoodContrerastoholdexactlywhatthemajoritydoesnow. See 1996-NMSC-054.ItappearsthatJacksonhasneverbeencitedforthisproposition.Despite my admiration of the majorityopinion,IfinditnecessarytodiscusswhyIbelieveSwafford,oratleastourinterpreta-tionofthatcase,isinconsistentwithUnitedStatesSupremeCourtprecedent.{64} ThedeterminationunderSwafford ofwhetheradefendant’sconductunderly-ingeachchargeisunitaryhasservedasasubstitutionforananalysisofwhetherthatconductispartofthe“sameactortrans-action” pursuant to Brown. See Brown,432U.S.at169-70.Thatis,weimplicitlydeterminedthatwhetheradefendant’scon-ductunderlyingtwochargesisthe“sameact or transaction” depends on whetherthatsameconductis“unitary.”Allthingsbeingequal,thiswouldbeamerequestionofsemantics.However,theframeworkweerectedinSwaffordontheunitary-conductquestionfocusedouranalyticalscopetoonarrowly.{65}InSwafford,wepartlyrelieduponalawreviewarticletofashionourtwo-parttest.Swafford,112N.M.at13,810P.2dat1233 (citingGeorgeC.Thomas III,A Unified Theory of Multiple Punishment,47U.Pitt.L.Rev.1,12-25(1985)).Pro-fessorThomasarguedthatthequestionofwhetherdoublejeopardyisviolatedunder
themultiplepunishmentpronghingesonthreecomponents:(1)whethertheconductisunitary;(2)whetherthestatutesproscribethesameconduct;and(3)whethertheleg-islatureauthorizedmultiplepunishments.See Thomas, supra, at 5-8. ProfessorThomas further acknowledged, however,that“[t]hesameoffensedefinitionalissuecontainsthefirsttwo‘componentissues’:(1)whether the underlying conductwasunitary,and(2)whetherthestatutorydefi-nitionsarethesame.”Id.at11.Thisob-servationtracksSupremeCourtprecedent.Thatis,ProfessorThomassimplyreiteratedwhat I have already discussed—that todeterminewhether two offenses are thesame for purposes of double jeopardy,courts must determine: (1) whether theconduct underlying eachwaspart of the“same act or transaction” (i.e., whetherthe conduct is unitary); and (2)whether theelementsofonechargearesubsumedwithintheother.{66}Swafford,adouble-descriptioncase,readtheunitary-conductquestiontomeanthat“ifthedefendantcommitstwodiscreteactsviolativeofthesamestatutoryoffense,butseparatedbysufficientindiciaofdis-tinctness,thenacourtmayimposeseparate,consecutivepunishmentsforeachoffense.”112N.M.at13,810P.2dat1233(emphasisadded). Besidesnot recognizingBrown,one errormade inSwaffordwas that theCourtconflatedtheunit-of-prosecutionis-suewiththedouble-descriptionissue.Thatis,assumingittruethatdoublejeopardyisnotviolatedifadefendantispunishedformultipleviolationsofthe“samestatutory offense” (i.e., the exact same statute) solongasthedefendant’sactionsare“sepa-ratedbysufficientindiciaofdistinctness,”thisdoesnotmeanthatthereisnodoublejeopardy violation when a defendant ispunished twice for a greater- and lesser-includedoffenseunder thesamecircum-stances.4Inotherwords,Swaffordincor-rectlyassumedthatifoneofthechargesisalesser-includedoffenseoftheother,thisisthesamethingassayingthattheyarethe“samestatutoryoffense.”Bydoingso,the
4 Importantly, though, according toSupremeCourt precedentwhether the conduct underlying each chargedoffense—even if thesamestatute,andthusaunit-of-prosecutioncase—ispartofthe“sameactortransaction”dependsuponwhatconducttheLegislatureintendedtoproscribe—notsimplyuponthetemporalorspatialseparationbetweenthedefendant’sdiscreteactions.See Sanabria,437U.S.at70(“Whetheraparticularcourseofconductinvolvesoneormoredistinctive‘offenses’underthestatutedependson...congressionalchoice.”);United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp.,344U.S.218,224(1952)(holdingthatthedefendantcouldonlybechargedonceformultipleviolationsofoneprovisionoftheFairLaborStandardsActbecauseCongressonlyintendedtopun-ish“acourseofconduct”);see also, e.g., State v. Hutchinson,99N.M.616,624,661P.2d1315,1323(1983)(describingkidnappingasacontinuousoffenseandstatingthat“[a]ctsanddeedsthatemanatefromthekidnappingbecomeapartoftheactaslongasthekidnappingcontinues”).
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courtwasabletotemporallyandspatiallydividethedefendant’sactionsintodiscreteunits.See alsoid.(observinginadouble-descriptioncasethat“thedoublejeopardyclause clearly cannot operate to prohibitprosecution,conviction,andpunishmentinasingletrialfordiscreteactsviolativeofthesame statute”(emphasisadded)).{67} In his article, however, ProfessorThomas recognized that, in accordancewithBrown,whetheradefendant’sconductunderlyingeachchargeisunitarywithan-otheriswhollydependentontheconductthelegislatureintendedtoproscribe:
[T]heunitaryconductquestionisnotwhether thephysicalactionsoftheaccusedarediscrete—theyclearly were in Brown—but is,instead,whethertheactionscon-stituteasinglecourseofconductprohibitedby the statute. If thedefendant’sseparatephysicalactsarecommittedwithinthescopeofthatlegislativelydefinedcourseofconduct,theconductisunitaryforpurposesof thedouble jeopardyclause.
Thomas,supra,at18(footnoteomitted);see also id.at19n.95(statingthatwhetherconductisunitary“ultimatelydepend[s]ondeterminingthepreciseharmproscribedbythestatutesatissueratherthananalyzingthe defendant’s physical actions”); id. at20(“[T]heunitaryconductissuedependsentirely onwhat the legislature intendedtobetheunitofconviction,ratherthanona space-time analysis of the defendant’sphysical actions.” (footnote omitted)).Thus,bymisreadingProfessorThomas’slawreviewandinadvertentlyconflatingthedouble-descriptionandunit-of-prosecutionissues,Swaffordreadtheunitary-conductquestiontoonarrowly.{68}Ialsonotethatbecausewemistak-enlybelieved inSwafford thatwhetheradefendant’schargedconductisunitaryislargelycontingentuponaspatialandtem-poralanalysisofthedefendant’sconduct,westatedthattheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt“assumed”thattherapeandmurderinWhalenwerepartofasinglecriminalepisode.See Swafford,112N.M.at13,810P.2dat1233.Infact,theSupremeCourtdidnotmakethisassumption.Rather,itsimplyrecognizedthattheconductunderlyingthepredicatefelonyofafelony-murderchargeisnecessarilyunitarywiththemurder.Thisisbecauseafelony-murderstatute,byitsverynature,requiresthatthemurderoccurduring the commission of the predicatefelony. This, in turn, necessarilymeans
thatthetwoeventsarepartofthe“sameactortransaction”sincethefelony-murderstatuteproscribesacourseofconductthatnecessarilyincludestheconductunderly-ingthepredicatefelony.Thus,becauseitcomportswithSupremeCourtprecedent,Iwouldadopttheviewthatadeterminationofwhetheradefendant’sconductunderly-ingeachchargeisunitaryalways dependssolely uponwhat course of conduct ourLegislatureproscribed—notsimplyuponthediscretephysicalactsorobjectivesofthedefendant.See Thomas,supra,at23-25(“Theunitaryconductdeterminationismadebycomparingthedefendant’scon-ducttothebasicunitofconvictiondefinedby thestatuteor statutes inquestionandtemperingtheresultwiththeruleoflenity.”(footnoteomitted)).{69}WhileIagreethatSwaffordreferredtolegislativeintentindiscussingboththe“sameoffense”andintenttopunishques-tions,see Maj.Op.¶24,ourlonglineofsubsequent precedent has undoubtedlyconstrued Swafford tomean thatwe donotconsiderlegislativeintentatallunlesswefirstdeterminethatadefendant’scon-ductwasunitaryintimeandspace.Inthefelony-murdercontextalone,wehavedonesoinatleasteightpublishedopinions. See State v. Bernal,2006-NMSC-050,¶11,140N.M.644,146P.3d289;State v. DeGraff,2006-NMSC-011,¶31,139N.M.211,131P.3d61;State v. Barrera,2001-NMSC-014,¶36,130N.M.227,22P.3d1177;State v. Foster,1999-NMSC-007,¶35,126N.M.646, 974P.2d140;State v. Mora, 1997-NMSC-060,¶71,124N.M.346,950P.2d789;State v. Livernois,1997-NMSC-019,¶22,123N.M.128,934P.2d1057;State v. Kersey,120N.M.517,523,903P.2d828,834(1995);State v. Ortega,112N.M.554,571,817P.2d1196,1213(1991).{70} This is how I would summarizeamodification ofSwafford to bring ourdouble-jeopardyjurisprudenceinlinewithUnitedStatesSupremeCourt precedent.Thegeneral rule is thatmultiplepunish-ments for the“sameoffense”violate theDoubleJeopardyClauseunlessourLeg-islaturehasclearlyauthorizedotherwise.Toascertainwhethertwochargesarethe“sameoffense,”acourtmustfirstdetermineif,pursuanttotheBlockburger same-ele-ments test, one charge is subsumed bytheelementsoftheother.Ifso,thecourtmustthendetermineiftheconductunder-lyingeachchargeispartofthe“sameactor transaction,” that is, if the conduct isunitary.Ofcourse,ifthetwochargesarestatutorilythesame(aunit-of-prosecution
case) one need only answer the unitary-conductquestiontodeterminewhetherthechargesarethe“sameoffense.”Whetherthedefendant’sconductisunitarydependsentirely onwhat conduct theLegislatureintended to proscribe—not on a simpleanalysisofthespatialandtemporaldivi-sion between the defendant’s actions orthetypeofforceusedtocommiteachact.Ifachargeisalesser-includedoffenseofthe other and if the defendant’s conductunderlyingeachchargeispartofthe“sameactortransaction,”thenthetwooffensesare the “sameoffense”anda courtmustthen determine whether our Legislatureclearly authorizedmultiple punishmentsforthat“sameoffense.”Undertheruleoflenity,statutorysilenceandambiguityonthisquestion isconstrued infavorof thedefendant.IfourLegislaturedidnotclearlyauthorizemultiplepunishments, then thelesserofthedefendant’sconvictionsmustbereversed.{71}AlthoughinthefinalanalysisIamsuggesting a further deviation fromourexistingprecedentthanthemajoritycon-templates, “we are boundby theUnitedStatesSupremeCourt’sinterpretationoftheUnitedStatesConstitution,andwemusten-deavortorefrainfromundulyencroachingonthefunctionsofthelegislativebranchofthisState.”Cockrell v. Bd. of Regents of N.M. State Univ.,2002-NMSC-009,¶27,132N.M.156,45P.3d876.See also State ex rel. Serna v. Hodges,89N.M.351,354,552P.2d787,790(1976)(recognizingthatSupremeCourtprecedentinterpretingtheU.S.Constitution is “bindinguponus”),overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Rondeau, 89N.M.408,412,553P.2d688, 692 (1976); see also State v. Mar-tinez, 2002-NMSC-008, ¶ 64, 132N.M.32,43P.3d1042(Serna,C.J.,dissenting)(“ThisCourtcannotreinterpretthefederalconstitution contrary to Supreme Courtprecedent.”);cf. Dixon, 509U.S. at 712(“Althoughstare decisis isthe‘preferredcourse’ in constitutional adjudication,‘whengoverningdecisionsareunworkableorarebadlyreasoned,thisCourthasneverfelt constrained to follow precedent.’”(quotingPayne v. Tennessee,501U.S.808,827(1991))).Furthermore,itisimportanttopointoutthatprosecutorswilltypicallynothavetheirhandstied.Forinstance,ashappenedinthiscase,aprosecutormaystillchargeadefendantwithfelonymurderandseveralotherfelonies,onlyoneofwhichis thepredicate to thefelonymurder. Insuchascenario,thedefendantcouldstillbeconvictedoffelonymurderandallofthe
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non-predicatefelonies—withsentencesonallorsomeofthosenon-predicatefeloniesrunning consecutively to his or her lifesentenceforfirst-degreemurder.See, e.g.,Meeks v. State,604So.2d748,753(Miss.1992)(“Itmaywellbethattheprosecutioncould have achieved the practical end itheredefendsthroughothermeans.Haditselectedburglaryastheunderlyingfelonyincidenttothecapitalmurderchargeandleftthekidnapping...whollyasidefromthatcharge,likelyseparateprosecutionanddoubleconvictionwouldstand.”(citationomitted)).{72}Frazierwasunconstitutionallytwicepunished for the “same offense” when
he was convicted of both kidnappingandfelonymurderpredicatedonkidnap-ping. The elements of kidnappingweresubsumedwithin the elements of felonymurder predicated on kidnapping. Be-causethefelony-murderstatuteproscribeskillings that occur during the course ofanyfelony,andbecauseFrazier’sfelony-murder chargewas contingent upon thekidnapping,Frazier’sconductunderlyingthekidnappingandmurderofKnollswasunitary. That is, the conduct underlyingbothchargeswaspartofthe“sameactortransaction.” Thus,Frazier’skidnappingandfelony-murderchargeswerethe“sameoffense.”Doublejeopardywasviolatedby
hisdualconvictionsofthesechargessinceourLegislaturehasnotclearlyauthorizedmultiple punishments in such situations.Accordingly,IwouldalsovacateFrazier’sconviction of kidnapping. However,because Iwould go further and actuallymodifySwaffordtobringitintoconformitywith theUnitedStates SupremeCourt’sprecedentondoublejeopardy,IspeciallyconcurwithJusticeBosson’swell-writtenopinion. EDWARDL.CHÁVEZ, ChiefJustice
Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28 ��
Certiorari Granted, No. 30,380, June 4, 2007
From the New Mexico Court of Appeals
Opinion Number: 2007-NMCA-075
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,Plaintiff-Appellant,
versusRICHARD ROWELL,
Defendant-Appellee.No. 26,429 (filed: April 12, 2007)
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TAOS COUNTYPEGGY J. NELSON, District Judge
GARY K. KINGAttorney General
JAMES W. GRAYSONAssistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, New Mexicofor Appellant
DAVID HENDERSONDOWNING & HENDERSON, P.C.
Santa Fe, New Mexicofor Appellee
opinion
Jonathan B. sutin, chief Judge
{1}TheStateofNewMexicoappealsthesuppressionofevidenceintheprosecutionofDefendantRichardRowell,whowasstoppedforspeedinginaschoolzone.Thesuppressedevidenceconsistedofmarijuanain plain view seized from Defendant’spocketwhile he sat in his vehicle, drugparaphernaliafoundinDefendant’spocketafterDefendantwasoutofthevehicle,andweaponslaterseizedfromDefendant’sve-hicle.Thedistrictcourtheldthattheseizureofthemarijuanawasunlawfulandthattheseizuresoftheparaphernaliaandweaponswerealsounlawfulasfruitsofanunlawfulseizureandarrestrelatedtothepossessionofmarijuana.TheStatecontendsthattheseizure of themarijuanawas lawful andthattheseizuresoftheparaphernaliaandweaponswerejustifiedundervarioustheo-ries.WeagreewiththeStatethattheseizureofthemarijuanawaslawful,andthatthemarijuanaanddrugparaphernaliashouldnot have been suppressed.We thereforereverse the suppressionof themarijuanaanddrugparaphernalia.Wedisagreethatthe seizure of the weapons was lawful.Wethereforeaffirmthesuppressionoftheweapons.BACKGROUND{2}Defendant’smotion to suppresswasheardonstipulated facts.The factswerecontainedinanarrativepreparedbyOfficer
E.ThomasoftheTaosPoliceDepartment,inTaos,NewMexico.{3}OfficerThomaswas“runningstation-aryradarduringthelunchhourschoolzonewhilestudents[were]enteringandexitingcampus.”HecaughtDefendant speedingand “conducted a traffic stop . . . in thevisitor’s parking lot of the high school.”TheofficerrequestedDefendant’sdriver’slicense,insurance,andregistration.WhenDefendantleanedacrosstotheglovebox,theofficer“couldseeaplasticbaggypro-trudingfromhisfrontleftpocket,”and“[i]tappearedthebaggycontainedagreenleafysubstancebelievedtobemarijuanainplainview.”Theofficerreachedin,tookthebag-gyfromDefendant’spocket,andconfirmedthatitwasmarijuana.HethenaskedDefen-danttoexitthevehicle,atwhichtimetheofficerhandcuffedhimand,whilecheckinghis pockets, askedDefendant “if he hadanythingelseIshouldbeawareofsuchasguns,knifes[sic],bombsorbazookas.”Tothat questionDefendant answered “No.”Theofficer found a glass-likemarijuanapipeandalighterinDefendant’spockets.TheofficerplacedDefendantunderarrestforpossessionofmarijuanaanddrugpara-phernalia.AstheofficertookDefendanttohis patrol car,Defendant “spontaneouslystatedtherewasashotguninthebackseatofthevehicle.”{4}Theofficer placedDefendant in theunit for safety purposes and made thedecisiontoimpoundDefendant’svehicle.Atsomepointaftertheofficerhadadvised
Defendant of his rights,Defendant vol-unteeredthathewascomingontoschoolgrounds todropoff lunch tohismother,andadmittedtopossessionofafirearmonschoolgrounds.Theofficerrequestedasec-ondpoliceunittoassistwiththetransportofDefendant.{5}“Whileconductinganinventorypend-ing impoundof the vehicle,” the officertookphotographsofanumberofitemsinthe vehicle, namely, a shotgun, a loadedrevolver,atwo-footlongwoodenbat/club,awoodenhandlestraightbladeknife,nine-teenroundsofshotgunshells,twoboxcut-tertypeblades,apackageofzig-zagrollingpapers, a baseball capwith a particularsymbolonit,aswellasabandana,bothofwhichwereknowntotheofficertobewornbygangmembers,andaLeatherman-typeknife/multi-tool.Atalatertime,theofficernoticed“NSL”written in thedustof thevehicleandknewthoseinitialstobethatofthe“northside”gang.{6}TheofficermovedDefendantfromhisunittotheunitthatarrivedtoassistandre-questedatowtrucktoremoveDefendant’svehicle.Uponbeingadvisedthatthetowtruckwasunavailable,theofficerdecidedtolocateDefendant’smother.WhenDefen-dant’smotherwas located, she informedtheofficer that thevehiclewasherson’svehicle.TheofficertoldherthatDefendantwasunderarrestandthat theofficerwasnotabletoimpoundthevehicleduetotheunavailabilityofatowtruck,andaskedher“if she could take custody/controlof thevehicle.”Defendant’smothersaidthatshewouldtakeresponsibilityforthevehicle.Theofficerthenseizedtheevidencehehadfoundduringhisinventoryofthevehicle.{7} Defendant was ultimately chargedwithfourcountsofpossessionofadeadlyweapon on school premises, contrary toNMSA1978, § 30-7-2.1 (1994), but hewasnotchargedwithanycountsbasedonpossessionofmarijuanaorparaphernalia.Defendantmovedtosuppresstheevidence,andstatedinhismotionthathewaschargedwith possession of marijuana and pos-sessionofdrugparaphernalia.Defendantsought suppression of “all the evidencestemmingdirectly or indirectly from theunlawful entry into his car, the seizureofabaggyfromhispocketand /or fromtheunlawfulsearchofhiscar.”TheStatearguedthat theseizuresof themarijuanaandtheweaponswerejustifiedonvariousgrounds,butconcededthatthepre-towinginventorysearchwasnotjustified.{8} The district court suppressed themarijuana,relyingonState v. Garcia,2005-
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NMSC-017, ¶ 29, 138N.M.1, 116P.3d72,inwhichourSupremeCourtheldthatunderNewMexico’sConstitution,“evenwith an object in plain view, an officermaynotenterthecarandseizetheobject,withouteitherconsent,awarrant,orexigentcircumstances.”Thecourtsuppressedtheparaphernaliaandweaponsasfruitsoftheillegalseizureofthemarijuana.TheStateappealsfromtheordersuppressingtheevi-dence,asserting(1)thattheNewMexicoConstitution does not require a warrantinordertoseizecontrabandinplainviewfrom an occupied vehicle, and that caselawcitedasholdingtothecontrarydoesnotapplytocontrabandinplainviewonadefendant’spersoninsideavehicle;(2)thatthecontrabandwasproperlyseizedpursu-anttoasearchincidenttoarrest;(3)thatthe inevitablediscoveryand independentsource doctrines apply in this casewithrespecttothemarijuanaandtheweapons;and (4) that theweaponswere properlyseizedaspartofasearchincidenttoarrestandbasedonexigentcircumstances.DISCUSSIONI. StandardofReview{9}The facts are not in dispute.ThisCourt’sreviewofthedistrictcourt’ssup-pressionoftheevidenceisdenovo.State v. Gutierrez, 2004-NMCA-081, ¶ 4, 136N.M.18,94P.3d18.II. SeizureoftheMarijuanaWas
Lawful{10} The officer seized marijuana onDefendant’spersonwhileDefendantwasbehindthewheelofthevehicle.Themari-juanawasinplainviewandtheofficerknewthat itwasmarijuana. Itwas objectivelyclearthatDefendantcoulddriveawaywiththemarijuana.ThecircumstancesinState v. Weidner, 2007-NMCA-___, ___N.M.___,___P.3d___(No.26,351)(filedApril12,2007),whichwearefilingconcurrentlywith the present case, are indistinguish-able.InWeidner,weholdthattheseizureofdrugsinplainviewfromapersonwhoisbehindthewheelandincontrolofthevehicle,andacontemporaneousarrestforpossessionof thedrugsare lawfulbasedon the exigent circumstances and searchincidenttoarrestexceptionstothewarrantrequirement.Id.¶¶1,17,24.OurholdinginWeidnercontrolshere.{11}Weholdthattheseizureofthemari-juanafromDefendantinthepresentcasewaslawful.Despitethefactthattherecordinthiscasereflectednodrug-relatedcharg-esagainstDefendant, thepartiesand thedistrictcourtappeartohavebeenoperatingundertheassumptionthatDefendantwas
chargedwith drug-related crimeswhen,in fact,hehadnotbeensocharged.Thedistrict court suppressed thedrug-relatedevidenceandtheStateappealedthatruling.Weholdthatthecourterredinsuppressingthemarijuanaandtheparaphernalia.{12}Becauseweholdtheseizureofthemarijuanatobelawful,weneednot,andthereforedonotaddresstheapplicationoftheindependentsourcedoctrinerelatedtothemarijuana.SeeState v. Wagoner,2001-NMCA-014,¶21,130N.M.274,24P.3d306(“Theindependentsourcedoctrineisanexceptiontotheexclusionaryrulewhereevidenceis legallyseizedafteranillegalsearch.”).As we discuss next, notwith-standing the lawfulnessof the seizureofthemarijuana,weholdthatthelaterseizureof theweaponswas not constitutionallypermissible.III.SeizureoftheWeaponsWasNot
LawfulA. PreliminaryMatters{13}TheState conceded in the districtcourtthattheproperprocedureswerenotfollowedtojustifythesearchasaninven-torysearchandtheStatedoesnotargueonappealthatthesearchwasjustifiedasaninventorysearch.Thus,wedonotaddresswhetherthesearchwasconstitutionalasaninventorysearch.{14}Onappeal,theStatearguesthatthedistrictcourtdidnotaddresstheissueofsuppression of the weapons separatelyfrom suppression of themarijuana eventhoughthepartiespresentedthequestionsseparately.Thus, theState argues that ifwe reverse suppressionof themarijuanawe should remand for the district courttodecide the issueof suppressionof theweapons.Wedisagree.Thepartiesmadevariousargumentsforandagainstallowingtheweaponsintoevidence.Thecourt,initsmemorandumletterstated:“Ifthiswasaseizurefromavehicle,thenGarciawoulddictatesuppressionofthebaggy,thearrest,and all that flows from that sequence of events....IthinkGarciacontrols,andtheevidencemustbesuppressed.”(Emphasisadded.)Wetakethistomeanthatthedis-trict court concluded that the seizure ofthemarijuanaandthearrestwereillegal.Further,becausethecourtbelievedthear-restwasillegal,Defendant’sstatementoncehewasunderarrestthathehadaguninthebackofhiscarwasthefruitoftheunlawfularrestandmustbesuppressed,aswellastheweaponsseized.Thedistrictcourtsuf-ficientlyaddressedtheissueofsuppressionoftheweaponsanditisnotnecessaryforustoremandforfurtherfactualdevelop-
menttoaddressthelegalityofthesearchand seizure of theweapons.See State v. Gonzales,1999-NMCA-027,¶¶11-15,126N.M. 742, 975P.2d 355 (indicating thatthedistrictcourt isnot required tomakefindingsoffactwhenrulingonmotionstosuppressevidence,andratherthanremand-ingforfactualdevelopmentwe“indulgeinallreasonablepresumptionsinsupportofthedistrictcourt’sruling”).Wemayaffirmsuppressionofevidenceifthedistrictcourtwascorrectbutforthewrongreason.State v. Snyder,1998-NMCA-166,¶8,126N.M.168,967P.2d843(statingthatwemayaf-firmthedistrictcourtondifferentgroundsunlesstheparties“didnothaveafairop-portunity to present admissible evidenceinthedistrictcourtconcerningthefactsonwhichthosegroundsdepend”).{15}TheState also argues that the evi-denceregardingtheweaponsisadmissibleundertheindependentsourcedoctrineandthesearchincidenttoarrestdoctrine.Wedeterminethatananalysisoftheapplica-tionoftheindependentsourcedoctrinetotheseizureoftheweaponsisunnecessarybecausewehaveheld that theseizureofthemarijuanawaslawfulinthiscase.See Wagoner, 2001-NMCA-014, ¶ 21 (“Theindependentsourcedoctrineisanexceptionto the exclusionary rulewhere evidenceislegallyseizedafteranillegalsearch.”).Wenowturntotheonlyremainingissue,whethertheStatemetitsburdenofjustify-ingthewarrantlessseizureoftheweaponsandwehold theState did notmeet thatburden.B. TheStateFailedtoJustifythe
WarrantlessSearchandSeizureRelatedtotheWeapons
{16}TheStateargues that“theofficer’ssearch of Defendant’s car for weapons,basedonactualknowledgeofaweaponin-sidethevehicle,wasproperbothasasearchincident to arrest and because the closeproximityofthestudentspresentedexigentcircumstances.”TheStateassertsthattheofficeractedtoprotecthimselfandforthesafety of students.We reject the State’sargument, holding that theState’s proofwas insufficient to establish the exigentcircumstancesandsearchincidenttoarrestexceptionstothewarrantrequirement.SeeState v. Martinez,1997-NMCA-048,¶¶9,12,123N.M.405,940P.2d1200(holdingtheevidenceatthesuppressionhearingwasinadequate to justify a searchof a papersackinaresidenceforweaponsasincidenttothedefendant’sarrest).{17}Warrantless seizures are presumedunreasonableandtheStatebearstheburden
Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28 �7
ofprovingreasonableness.State v. Jones,2002-NMCA-019, ¶¶ 11, 16, 131 N.M.586,40P.3d1030.Inordertoprovethatawarrantlesssearchorseizureisreason-able,theStatemustprovethatthesearchorseizurefitsintoanexceptiontothewarrantrequirement.Seeid.Recognizedexceptionstothewarrantrequirementincludeexigentcircumstances,searchesincidenttoarrest,inventory searches, consent, hot pursuit,openfield,andplainview.State v. Duffy,1998-NMSC-014, ¶ 61, 126 N.M. 132,967P.2d807.1.TheTestforExigentCircumstances{18}To prove that a search is justifiedunder the exigent circumstances excep-tiontothewarrantrequirement,theremustexist “an emergency situation requiringswift action to prevent imminent dangertolifeorseriousdamagetoproperty,ortoforestalltheimminentescapeofasuspectordestructionofevidence.”State v. Gomez,1997-NMSC-006,¶39,122N.M.777,932P.2d1(internalquotationmarksandcita-tionomitted). “[A]warrantless searchofanautomobileanditscontentsrequiresaparticularizedshowingofexigentcircum-stances.” Id. “We believe that a limitedvehiclesearchforweaponswhenanofficerreasonablybelieveshemaybeindangercomportswithArticleII,Section10oftheNewMexicoConstitutionprovidedthatitisbaseduponaparticularizedshowingofexigentcircumstances,ratherthanpurelyon the theoretical basis that harm couldoccur.”State v. Arredondo,1997-NMCA-081, ¶ 17, 123N.M. 628, 944P.2d 276(internal quotation marks and citationsomitted),overruled on other grounds byState v. Steinzig, 1999-NMCA-107, 127N.M.752,987P.2d409.Inordertojustifytheentryintoavehicletoseizeaweaponfromavehiclewhenasuspectisalreadyunderarrest,there“mustbeareasonablesuspicion the suspect is both armedanddangerous.”Garcia, 2005-NMSC-017, ¶31.UnderNewMexico law,we do notassumethatanindividualisdangerousor“inclinedtoharmanofficerinthecourseofaroutinetrafficstop”simplybecausealoadedweapon is present in the vehicle.Id. (internalquotationmarksandcitationomitted).2.TheTestforSearchIncidenttoArrest{19}To prove that a search is justifiedunderthesearchincidenttoarrestexcep-tiontothewarrantrequirement,theStatemust prove “that the search occurs as acontemporaneous incident to the lawfularrestofthedefendantandisconfinedto
theareawithinthedefendant’simmediatecontrol.”Arredondo,1997-NMCA-081,¶ 27;accord Gutierrez, 2004-NMCA-081,¶11.ThisexceptionderivesfromChimel v. California,395U.S.752,762-63(1969).SeeState v. Pittman,2006-NMCA-006,¶7,139N.M. 29, 127P.3d 1116;Gutierrez,2004-NMCA-081, ¶11;Martinez, 1997-NMCA-048, ¶¶6-7.The search incidenttoarrestdoctrineasestablishedinChimelwasthat,followingalawfularrest,anof-ficercansearch thesuspect’spersonandtheareawithinhisimmediatecontrolforweaponsorevidentiaryitems.395U.S.at762-63.Theareawithinthesuspect’sim-mediatecontrolwasdescribedastheareafrom“withinwhichhemightgainposses-sionofaweaponordestructibleevidence.”Id.at763.UnderArticleII,Section10oftheNewMexicoConstitution, once it isshownthatthesearchorseizureoccursasa contemporaneous incident to a lawfularrest,all thatmustbeprovedis that thesearch is of the suspect’s person or theareafromwithinwhichthesuspectmightgainpossessionofaweaponorconceal-ableordestructibleevidence.Arredondo,1997-NMCA-081,¶27;accordGutierrez,2004-NMCA-081,¶¶11-12.{20}Thejustificationsforthesearchinci-denttoarrestdoctrineareofficersafetyandpreventionofconcealmentordestructionofevidence.SeePittman,2006-NMCA-006,¶¶7, 10; Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081,¶27.Itisnotthejustificationswhichmustbeproved.Rather,theStatemustprovetheabilityofthesuspecttogainpossessionofaweapontouseagainsttheofficer,ortogain possessionof evidence and concealordestroyit.3. InstructiveNewMexicoCases{21}PertinentNewMexico cases pres-ent related issuesas to the lawfulnessofa general searchof a vehicle, aswell asseizureofaknownweaponinavehiclebe-foreandafterthedetentionofanoccupantwhohasbeenremovedfromthevehicle,andareusefulinouranalysis.InGarcia,officerspulledoveravehiclebecauseofasuspiciousdealerdemonstrationtag.2005-NMSC-017,¶2.Evenbeforethevehiclecame to a complete stop, the defendant,whowasthepassenger,steppedoutofthevehicle and slouched against the vehiclewith part of his bodyhidden fromview,stared at the officerswith an aggressivelookdescribedasa“‘thousandyardstare,’”anddidnotimmediatelyfollowtheofficer’sdirectionstoreturntothevehicle.Id. Thisbehaviorcausedoneoftheofficerstodraw
hisweapon.Id.Astheofficersapproachedthevehicletogivethedriverhistrafficcita-tions,oneofficersawaguninplainview“protrudingfromunderneaththerearofthepassengerseat.”Id.¶4.Asthedefendantgotoutofthevehicleashewasorderedtodobytheofficers,thesameofficersawaloadedammunitioncliponthepassengerseat.Id.Theofficersdetainedthedefendantandthedriver“[o]utofconcernforofficersafety,”searchedthevehicle,andremovedthe gun. Id.The officer did not testifythat he believed that the defendantwasdangerous.Seeid.¶¶2,33.However,ourSupremeCourtheldthatthefactsknowntotheofficer,viewedobjectively,establishedevidencethatthedefendantwasarmedanddangerous, and although the officer didnotarticulatethathebelievedtherewereexigentcircumstances,theSupremeCourtupheldthedistrictcourt’sdeterminationofexigentcircumstances.Id.¶¶6,31-33.{22} In Arredondo, the defendant wassuspected of committing an “inherentlydangerouscrime,”assaultwithahandgun.1997-NMCA-081,¶¶2,16(internalquota-tionmarksandcitationomitted).ThisCourtheldthattheofficerhadareasonablebeliefthe defendantwas armed anddangerousbasedonhissuspectedinvolvementinthereportedcrime,and thusexigentcircum-stancesjustifiedasearchofthedefendant’svehicleforweaponsasalawfulextensionofthescopeofaprotectivesearchduringtheinvestigatorystop.Id.¶¶15-16,18.{23} In Gutierrez, an officer stopped avehicle because the defendant was notwearingaseatbelt.2004-NMCA-081,¶2.Whileissuingacitation,theofficerdiscov-eredthatthedefendanthadanoutstandingwarrant,andhandcuffedandarrestedthedefendant.Id.Thedefendantthentoldtheofficerthattherewasaguninthecar.Id.¶3.Theofficerhadplannedtoturnthecarovertothedefendant’spassenger,whowasoutside the vehicle and closer to it thaneitherofficeratthescene.Id.¶8.Theof-ficertestifiedthathewasconcernedaboutthesafetyofthepublic,heknewnothingaboutthepassenger,and“hedidnotbelievehecouldsimplyhandtheweaponovertothepassenger.”Id.Theofficerseizedthegunfromthevehicle.Id.¶3.Acomputercheckrevealedthattheweaponwasstolen.Id.Analyzing the issueunder the searchincidenttoarrestexceptiontothewarrantrequirement,weheldthattheseizureofthegunwasreasonablebecausetheofficerhadtestified about his safety concerns giventhatthepassengerwasincloseproximitytothegun.Id.¶¶7,11.Ourultimateholding
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wasthat“basedonanofficer’sreasonablesafety concern, awarrantless seizure ofaweaponwithin the area of immediatecontrolofapersonwhoispresentduringacustodialarrestdoesnotviolatetherightsofthearresteeundertheNewMexicoCon-stitution.”Id.¶12.{24}Finally, inPittman,apoliceofficersawthedefendantcommitatrafficinfrac-tion.2006-NMCA-006,¶2.Thedefendantpulledintotheparkinglotofanapartmentbuildingandbefore theofficercouldap-proach the defendant, the defendant gotoutofhiscarandlockedit.Id. ¶2.Whilecheckingthedefendant’slicenseandreg-istration, the officer discovered that thedefendant had an outstanding warrant,andthenarrested,handcuffed,andplacedhimintherearseatofthepatrolcar.Id.¶3.Thedefendantgavetheofficerhiskeysandaskedhimtogivethekeystohisgrand-mother,wholivedinoneoftheapartments.Id.¶4.Theofficer,whotestifiedthathedidnotfeelthathewasinanydangerandhadnoreasontosuspectanyevidencewasinthevehiclerelatedtothearrest,searchedthevehicleandfoundaweapon.Id.Noth-ingintherecordinPittmanindicatedthattheofficerhadanyintentionofsearchingthevehicleuntilthedefendantgavetheof-ficerthekeys.Id.¶17.Becausethedefen-dantwasafelon,hewaschargedwithbeingafeloninpossessionofafirearm.Id.¶5.Thedistrict court denied the defendant’smotiontosuppresstheweapon.Id.{25}TheStatearguedinPittmanthatthesearchbytheofficerwasproperunderthesearchincidenttoarrestdoctrine.Id.¶7.ThisCourtnotedthat“[a]tthetimeofthesearch,thesituationhadbeenneutralizedbyhandcuffing[thed]efendantandplacinghiminthepatrolcar.”Id.¶23.Itwasclearfromthecircumstancesthatthedefendanthadnorealisticopportunitytoescapeandobtain theweapon inhisvehicle. Id.Wealso noted that the officer had no inten-tionofsearchingthevehicleuntilhewaspresentedwith the defendant’s keys andthattheofficerdidnotbelievethedefen-dantpresentedanydanger. Id.¶¶17,22.Further, the officer could not reasonablyhavebelieved that therewasevidence inthevehiclerelatedtothebasisonwhichthedefendantwasarrested.Id.¶24.Theofficertestifiedthathedidnotfeelthathewasinanydangeranddidnotknowofanyevi-denceinthevehiclerelatedtothearrestthatwouldbedestroyedabsentaseizureoftheevidence;rather,theofficerwas“engagedinexploratoryrummaging.”Id.¶25.Pitt-manheldthat,underthecircumstances,the
officer’ssearchcouldnotbecharacterizedasreasonableunderArticleII,Section10oftheNewMexicoConstitution.Id.{26} Unquestionably, the present casehasaspectsthatbringtheforegoingcasesinto play. Lawfulness is first guided bythe general principles that warrants arefavoredandawarrantisrequiredtoenterthevehicleunlessarecognizedexceptiontothewarrantrequirementcanbeproven.ThoseprinciplesarefirmlyestablishedbyGarcia, Gomez, Arredondo, andJones. See Weidner,2007-NMCA-___,¶6.InGarciaandArredondo,thequestionwaswhetherexigentcircumstancesexistedallowinganofficertosearchavehicleforweaponsoutof a concern forofficer safety.Gutierrezanalyzedunderthesearchincidenttoarrestdoctrinethatitwasclearthatthepersonar-restedcouldnotreachtheknownweapon.However, this Court addressed whethersafetyconcernsrequiredofficeractioninorder to assure that another vehicle oc-cupant, a passengerwhowasoutsideof,butcloseto,thevehicleandwhomightbegiven the vehicle to drive off, could nothave immediate access to theweapon touseagainsttheofficer.SeeGutierrez,2004-NMCA-081,¶11(notingtheobservationmadeinMartinez,1997-NMCA-048,¶7,a residence search case considering thesearch incident to arrest exception, that“thepresenceatthesceneofpersonsotherthanthearresteemayjustifysearchingforweaponsintheirimmediatevicinity”(inter-nalquotationmarksandcitationomitted)).Pittman also analyzed under the searchincidenttoarrestdoctrinethatitwasclearthearresteddefendantcouldnotreachthevehicle.2006-NMCA-006,¶23.{27}Thesecaseslaythefollowingfoun-dations.First,wheretheStatearguesthata search forweaponsor the seizureof aknownweapon in a vehicle is justifiedbased on exigent circumstances, the cir-cumstancesmustbecloselytailoredtotherequirementssetoutinGarcia,Gomez,andArredondoasthosecasesanalyzeandarebasedontheexigentcircumstancesexcep-tion.Theremustbe“anemergencysituationrequiringswiftactiontopreventimminentdangertolifeorseriousdamagetoprop-erty, or to forestall the imminent escapeof a suspectordestructionof evidence.”Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶39 (internalquotationmarksandcitationomitted).Theproofmustconsistofaparticularizedshow-ingoftheexigentcircumstances.Id.Theshowingcannotbetheoretical.Arredondo,1997-NMCA-081,¶17.Itmustbeshownthatanoccupantisarmedanddangerousor
inclinedtoharmanofficer.Garcia,2005-NMSC-017,¶31.Second,wheretheStateargues that a search forweapons or theseizureofaknownweaponinavehicleisacontemporaneousincidenttoalawfular-restofanoccupantofthatvehicle,theStatemustprove,throughanarticulated,particu-larizedfactualshowing,thatthesearchorseizureoccurredcontemporaneously toalawfularrestandwasconfinedtoanareawithintheimmediatecontrolofthearrestedoccupantorotheroccupantsofthevehicle.Arredondo,1997-NMCA-081,¶27;accordGutierrez,2004-NMCA-081,¶11.4. TheState’sFailureofProof{28}TheStatefailedtopresentsufficientevidence to support application of eithertheexigentcircumstancesexceptionorthesearch incident toarrestexception in thepresent case.NoonebutDefendantwasinthevehicle.AfterarrestingDefendant,theofficeraskedhimwhethertherewereanyweaponsofwhichtheofficershouldbemadeaware.Defendantinitiallystated“No,” but shortly thereafter stated thattherewas a shotgun in the back seat ofhisvehicle.TheofficerplacedDefendantinhispatrolvehiclefor“safetypurposes”andthen“conduct[ed]aninventorypend-ing impoundof thevehicle,”pursuant towhichtheofficerfoundseveralweapons.Apparently, the officer’s only reason forenteringthevehiclewasthathehaddeter-minedtohavethevehicleimpoundedandhewantedtoperformaninventorysearchbeforeitwastowed.Theofficerdidnotsaythathebelievedtherewasanythreattohissafety, nor did he state any concern thatobjectsinthevehiclewouldbeconcealedordestroyed.{29} Further, the weapons were notwithinDefendant’s immediate control atthe time they were seized. None of thefacts actually relied upon by the officerconstitutefactsthatamounttoanyexigentcircumstancejustifyingapplicationoftheexigentcircumstancesexceptiontothewar-rantrequirement.Noristhereevidenceoffactsknowntotheofficeratthetimethathe searched the vehicle which, viewedobjectively,providedavalidconstitutionalgroundfortheofficer’sactions.SeeGarcia,2005-NMSC-017,¶33.Inparticular,therewasnoevidenceofexigentcircumstanceswith respect to schoolchildren.Norwasthereanyevidenceshowingthatalternativeactionswereunreasonableorunavailable.{30}TheState nevertheless attempts todefine the exceptions to include circum-stances inwhich someunknownperson,might, theoretically, have access to an
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unguarded vehicle.TheState offers twoarguments,eachofwhichwereject.{31}The State argues that the seizuremust be considered lawful because theLegislaturerecognizedtheinherentdangerofweaponsonschoolgroundsinenactingSection 30-7-2.1, prohibiting carrying adeadlyweapononschoolgrounds.Section30-7-2.1(A)(5)statesthat:
[u]nlawful carrying of a deadlyweapononschoolpremisescon-sistsofcarryingadeadlyweapononschoolpremisesexceptby...apersonolderthannineteenyearsofageonschoolpremisesinaprivateautomobileorotherprivatemeansofconveyance,forlawfulprotec-tionof theperson’sor another’spersonorproperty.
Section30-7-2.1alsoincludesotherexcep-tionsforofficers,schoolsecurityperson-nel,andstudentsandinstructorsinvolvedin military training corps programs orother school-authorized activities. §30-7-2.1(A)(1)-(4).Plainly,theLegislature’sconcern regarding weapons on schoolgroundsdoesnotreachthelevelattributedtoitbytheState,whichisthatitisaperseexigentcircumstancetohaveaweaponin a vehicle on school grounds duringschoolhours.TheLegislature’sdetermina-tionsthatweaponsinavehicleonschoolgroundsorbeingusedbystudentsaspartofschool-sponsoredactivitiesarepermis-sibleundercertaincircumstancesbolstersourconclusionthataweaponinavehiclesituatedanywhereonschoolgroundsdoesnotalonecreateanexigentcircumstanceorconstituteaperseexigentcircumstance,
butthatamoreparticularizedshowingofexigentcircumstancesisrequired.Further,whileitmighthavebeenprovedattrialthatDefendant violated the statute, the issuebeforeus today isexigency,notwhetherDefendantviolatedthestatute.{32}TheStatealsoarguesthattheofficerknewthevehiclewasonschoolgroundsandknewtherewasaweapon in theve-hicle,anditwouldthereforebereasonabletobelievethatastudentmaygetintothevehicle, access one of theweapons, andbecome a danger.Whilewe cannot saythat it is beyond the realmofpossibilitythatastudentcouldgetintothevehicleandretrieveaweapon,asstatedinArredondoourdeterminationofreasonablenessinem-ployingexceptionstothewarrantrequire-mentdependsontheknown facts,notona“theoreticalbasisthatharmcouldoccur.”1997-NMCA-081,¶17.TheStateofferednotestimonyandthereexistsnoevidenceas to whether any student was actuallyanywhereinthevicinityofthevehicleorwaslikelytobearoundthevehiclewhileitwasunguarded.Thereexistsnoevidencethat the vehicle was even in a locationlikely to be accessed by school childrenwhilethevehiclewasinthevisitor’spark-ingarea.Moreover,theStatepresentednoevidenceshowingwhyitwasunreasonabletoobtainawarrantorwhythereexistednoreasonablealternativecourseofactionfortheofficerother thantosearchandseizetheweaponsashedid.See State v. Valdez,111N.M.438,441,806P.2d578,581(Ct.App.1990).{33}TheStatearguesthataccordingtotheofficer’snarrativetheofficerwasrunning
hisradarduringthelunchhourschoolzonewhen studentswere exiting and enteringtheschool,andthatafairinferencefromthatisthatstudentswereintheareaofthevehicle.However,webelievethatmakingthatinferencewouldrequireustorelyonatheoreticaljustificationratherthanaknownfact.We decline to do so. Furthermore,wedecline to create a broad, bright-linerule that themereexistenceofaweaponinavehiclebelongingtosomeoneatleastnineteen years old anywhere on schoolgroundsduringschoolhoursautomaticallycreates an inherent exigency justifyinga warrantless search of a vehicle undertheexigentcircumstancesexceptionorapresumptionof immediate control underthe search incident to arrest exception.See §30-7-2.1(A)(5); Arredondo, 1997-NMCA-081, ¶28 (eschewingbright-linerulesandrequiringafact-specificinquiryintothereasonablenessofasearchunderArticleII,Section10).{34}WeholdthattheStatefailedtojustifythewarrantlesssearchandseizurerelatedtotheweapons,andthatsuppressionoftheweapons,therefore,isaffirmed.CONCLUSION{35} We reverse the district court’ssuppression of the marijuana and drugparaphernalia.Weaffirmthedistrictcourt’ssuppressionoftheweapons.{36} ITISSOORDERED. JONATHANB.SUTIN, ChiefJudge
WECONCUR:CYNTHIAA.FRY,JudgeCELIAFOYCASTILLO,Judge
40 Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28
Certiorari Denied, No. 30,417, June 14, 2007
From the New Mexico Court of Appeals
Opinion Number: 2007-NMCA-076
GEORGE ALBIN, as personal representative of the Estate of JOHN ALBIN, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,versus
NICHOLAS S. BAKAS, FRANK R. TAYLOR, JOHN DENKO, CARLOS R. MALDANADO, and C.S. HOOPER and DENNIS O’LEARY,
on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated defendants,Defendants-Appellees.
No. 26,134 (filed: April 26, 2007)
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTYJAMES A. HALL, District Judge
JOSEPH P. KENNEDYKENNEDY & OLIVER, P.C.
Albuquerque, New Mexicofor Appellant
STEPHEN G. FRENCHVALERIE A. CHANG
FRENCH & ASSOCIATES, P.C.Albuquerque, New Mexico
for Appellees
opinion
Michael e. vigil, Judge
{1}The issue presented in this case iswhether state police officerswho seizecashundertheauthorityoftheControlledSubstancesAct,NMSA1978,§§30-31-1to-41(1972,asamendedthrough2006),arerequiredtocomplywiththerequirementsoftheForfeitureAct,NMSA1978,§§31-27-1to-8(2002),orwhethertheymayinsteadtransferthecashtothefederalgovernmenttobringa forfeitureactionunder federallaw,thenreceivefromthefederalgovern-mentaportionoftheproceeds.Wecon-cludethatcompliancewiththeForfeitureActismandatoryandreversethesummaryjudgmentgrantedtoDefendants.HISTORY{2}OnOctober 20, 2002,NewMexicoState Police Officer Hooper stopped avehiclethatwasspeedingonHighway54betweenLogan,NewMexicoandTucum-cari, New Mexico. As Officer HooperapproachedthevehicleandDriverrolleddownhiswindow,OfficerHoopersmelledwhatherecognizedtobeburntmarijuanacoming from inside thevehicle. OfficerHooperlearnedthatbothDriverandPas-sengerhadMissouridriver’slicenses,andthatthevehiclewasrentedtoPassengerinKansasCity,Missouri.{3}OfficerHooperaskedDrivertoexitthe
vehiclesohecouldissuehimaspeedingcitation,andwhenhedid,OfficerHoopersmelledtheodorofburntmarijuanacomingfromhisperson.Driversaidhewantedtopleadguiltytothespeedingcitationandpaythefinebymail.WhileOfficerHooperwaswritingthecitation,heaskedDriverabouthis travel plans, andDriver said hewasgoingtoPhoenix,ArizonatovisithissonandwouldreturntoMissouriinacoupleofdays,andthatPassengerwasgoingtoPhoenixtovisitagrandchild.{4}OfficerHooperthenwentbacktothevehicle toverify theVINnumberon thewindshieldandtheNADARstickeronthesideofthedriver’sdoor,andwhilehewasdoingso,askedPassengerabouthistravelplans. Passenger said he was going toPhoenix,ArizonatovisitafemalenamedMaewhoselastnamehedidnotknow,whohad justgottenmarried. OfficerHooperagainsmelledtheodorofburntmarijuanacomingfrominsidethevehicle.{5}Hissuspicionaroused,OfficerHoopercontinuedtodetainDriverandPassenger.InresponsetoOfficerHooper’squestions,Driver denied carrying over $10,000 incash, or having anyweapons or narcot-icsinthevehicle. WhenOfficerHooperaskedDriverforpermissiontosearchthevehicle,Driversaidhecouldnot,butdidgivepermissiontosearchhisownpersonalbelongings. OfficerHooper then turnedhisattentiontoPassengerwhoalsodenied
havinglargeamountsofcashover$10,000,weapons, narcotics,marijuana, cocaine,heroin, or methamphetamine. OfficerHooperthenaskedPassengerforpermis-siontosearchthevehicle,andPassengerconsented.{6}Afterfindingasmallblackbagunderthe passenger seat with rolling papersandaroachclipburnedontheendwhichsmelled likemarijuana,OfficerHooperasked Passenger where the rest of themarijuana was, and Passenger removedaplasticbagofmarijuanafromhisshoe.Continuinghissearchintothetrunk,Of-ficerHooper found a nine-inch huntingknife and a backpack which containedhallucinogenicmushrooms (psilocybin),marijuana paraphernalia, 18Xanax pillsinapillbottlewiththelabelremoved,and$23,100 incash,whichwasdivided intofivebundleswrappedwithrubberbands.OfficerHooperarrestedDriverandPassen-gerandtransportedthemandtheevidencetotheNewMexicoStatePoliceofficeinTucumcari,NewMexico,where hemetwithAgentCarr,whoisanarcoticsagentwiththeNewMexicoStatepolice.{7}AttheTucumcariStatePoliceoffice,AgentCarr spokewithOfficerHooper,counted the cash, and completed aNewMexicoStatePoliceseizure form,whichstatedthatthecashwasseizedfromPas-senger, itsowner,byOfficerHooperandAgentCarr.AgentCarrthencontactedtheUnitedStatesDrugEnforcementAdminis-tration(DEA)“topursueseizureofthecur-rency,”andplacedthecash“inevidenceforsafekeepinguntiladecisiononprocedurecouldbemade.”Thecash“waslatertrans-portedtotheAlbuquerqueNarcoticsofficeforstorageuntil[the]NarcoticsEvidenceCustodian[]couldretrieveit.”{8}The next day, October 21, 2002, acriminalcomplaintwasfiledintheQuayCountyMagistrateCourt,allegingthatPas-senger committedmisdemeanor offensesrelatedtohispossessionofthedrugs,drugparaphernalia, and knife. The chargesweredisposedofinapleaanddispositionagreementapprovedbythemagistratecourtonJuly15,2003. Passengerpleadednocontesttoonemisdemeanorcountofpos-sessionofacontrolledsubstance,andtherestofthechargesweredismissed.Here-ceivedadeferredsentenceof364days.See NMSA1978,§31-20-3(1985)(providingthatuponentryofajudgmentofconviction,thecourtmayenteranorderdeferringtheimposition of sentence);NMSA1978, §31-20-9 (1977) (providing thatwhen theperiodofdefermentexpires,thedefendant
Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28 4�
has satisfiedhiscriminal liability for thecrime,andthecourtshallenteradismissalofthecriminalcharges).{9}Therecorddoesnotshowwhathap-penedwiththecashfromthetimeitwasseizedonOctober20,2002,andtransportedtotheStatePoliceAlbuquerquenarcoticsofficeforstorageuntilNovember12,2002.Atthattime,acashier’scheckwasissuedto theUnitedStatesMarshal Service intheamountof$23,100,showing that theremitterwastheNewMexicoStatePolice.WhilethecheckwasissuedonNovember12,2002,theDEAdidnotapproveadop-tionoftheforfeitureofthe$23,100untilNovember27,2002,andtheNewMexicoStatePolice “receipt record” shows thattheUnitedStatesMarshalServicedidnottake actualpossessionof the checkuntilDecember3,2002.OnMay7,2003,whilethe criminal charges against Passengerwerestillpending,theUnitedStatesfileda complaint in theUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheDistrictofNewMexico,nam-ingthecashasthedefendantandPassengerasaclaimant,seekingforfeitureofthecashto theUnited States pursuant to federallaw. Passenger subsequently died, andtheforfeitureactioncontinuedagainstthecurrencyasthedefendantandPassenger’spersonalrepresentativeastheclaimantofthe currency. TheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtultimatelyenteredajudgmentforfeit-ingtheinterestofPassenger’sestateinthe$23,100totheUnitedStates.{10}Passenger’spersonal representative(Plaintiff)thensuedOfficerHooper,AgentCarr,andtheirsuperiors,theChiefoftheNewMexicoStatePolice,andtheSecretaryoftheDepartmentofPublicSafety(Defen-dants)undertheNewMexicoTortClaimsAct,NMSA1978,§§41-4-1to-27(1976,asamendedthrough2006),assertingthattheNewMexicoStatePoliceviolatedtheForfeitureActwhen they transferred thecashtothefederalgovernment.ThedistrictcourtgrantedsummaryjudgmentinfavorofDefendants, and this appeal followed.Wereverse.STANDARDOFREVIEW{11}Defendantsareentitledtosummaryjudgmentif“thereisnogenuineissueastoanymaterialfact”andiftheyare“entitledtoajudgmentasamatteroflaw.”Rule1-056(C)NMRA.Thepartiesdonotdisputethematerialfacts.Rather,theydisputetheapplicabilityoftheForfeitureAct.Becausethis case also requires us to determinewhetherprovisionsoftheForfeitureActareapplicableandwhethertheywereviolated,ourreviewisdenovo.Ramirez v. IBP Pre-
pared Foods,2001-NMCA-036,¶10,130N.M.559,28P.3d1100(“InterpretationofstatutorylanguageisaquestionoflawthatthisCourtreviewsdenovo.”).DISCUSSION{12}TheissuesinthiscasearisebecauseitisallegedthatstatepoliceofficersseizedPassenger’s cash under the authority ofstate law,and insteadofcomplyingwithproceduresmandatedbystatelawrelatedtothecare,custody,control,anddispositionofthecash,deliveredthecashtofederalof-ficersforforfeitureunderfederallaw.Wethereforebeginouranalysiswithwhetherthesummaryjudgmentrecordestablishesanyviolationsofstatelaw.{13}Propertyissubjecttoforfeiturewhenitisassociatedinvariouswayswithviola-tions of the Controlled SubstancesAct,Section 30-31-34, including specifically“moneywhich isa fruitor instrumental-ity of the crime.” Section 30-31-34(F).Further, the Controlled SubstancesActstates that the ForfeitureAct applies tothe “seizure, forfeiture and disposal” ofpropertythatissubjecttoforfeitureundertheprovisionsoftheControlledSubstancesAct. Section30-31-35. Inthiscase, therecord before us establishes that whenOfficerHooperdiscoveredthedrugs,drugparaphernalia,andcash,hearrestedDriverandPassengerandchargedthemwithvio-latingdrugoffensesundertheControlledSubstancesAct. ThecashwasseizedbyOfficerHooperandthendetainedbyAgentCarrunder,andpursuantto,theControlledSubstancesAct,makingits“seizure,forfei-tureanddisposal”subjecttotheprovisionsoftheForfeitureAct.ViolationsoftheForfeitureAct{14}Thepartiesdonot contestwhethertheinitialseizureofthecashviolatedtheForfeitureAct.Section31-27-4(B)(1)oftheActstatesthatpropertymaybeseizedbyalawenforcementofficerwithoutapriorcourtorderifthepropertysubjecttofor-feitureisnotaresidenceorbusinesswhen,“theseizure is incident toanarrest foracrime...andthelawenforcementofficermakingthearrest...hasprobablecausetobelievethepropertytobepropertysubjecttoforfeitureandthatthesubjectofthear-rest...isanowneroftheproperty.”WethereforeassumethatOfficerHooperandAgentCarrconformedwiththeActwhenthey initially seized the cash. However,compliancewiththeActendedthere.{15}TheForfeitureActdirects:“Seizedcurrency alleged to be subject to forfei-ture shall be depositedwith the clerk ofthe district court in an interest-bearing
account.”Section31-27-8(A). Thestat-ute does not require a forfeiture actiontobefiled tomake itoperative. In fact,the statute is entitled, “Safekeeping ofseized property pending disposition[,]”whichplainlyindicatesthatcomplianceisrequiredregardlessofwhetheraforfeiturecomplaintisultimatelyfiled.Depositingthe cashwith the district court clerk asdirectedbythestatutebringsitunderthedirect jurisdictionand supervisionof thedistrictcourt.Theclerkdepositsthemoneyintoatrustfundcheckingaccount,whichholds allmoney that belongs to litigantsormightberefundedtolitigants.NMSA1978,§34-6-36(1968).Theclerkisonlyauthorizedtopaymoneyoutofthisaccountinaccordancewithawrittenorderofthedistrictcourtfiledwiththeclerk. Id.{16}Forfeitures are in remproceedingsunderNewMexicolaw.See State v. Nunez,2000-NMSC-013,¶¶77-84,129N.M.63,2 P.3d 264 (stating that forfeiture relieson in rem jurisdiction over the propertyitself,whichallowsthecourttodealwiththepropertyeveniftheownerisnotinthejurisdiction,andwithpropertythathasnoowneroranunidentifiedowner);Devlin v. State ex rel. N.M. State Police Dep’t,108N.M.72,73,766P.2d916,917(1988)(stat-ingthataforfeitureactionistraditionallyclassifiedasaninremproceeding,andinrem jurisdiction has been assertedwhenthecourt isable toexercisecontroloverthedefendantres);In re Forfeiture of One 1980 Honda Accord,108N.M.274,275,771P.2d982,983(Ct.App.1988)(statingthat forfeiture cases against property forviolationofdrugslawsarepurelyinremproceedings). The effect of the legisla-tivedirective todepositcurrencyallegedtobesubjecttoforfeitureintoanaccountsubject to the direct jurisdiction and su-pervision of the district court is that thedistrict court acquires jurisdiction overthecurrencyandmaintainsittotheexclu-sionofanyothercourt,beitastatecourtor federal court. Since 1935,when theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtdecidedPenn General Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania, ex rel. Schnader,294U.S.189(1935),ithasbeenwellsettledthatthecourtthatfirstac-quirescontroloftheressubjecttoforfeitureretainsexclusivejurisdictionoverittotheexclusionofanyothercourt.Id.at195.Inkeepingwiththisprecedent,werejectthesuggestionmadebyDefendantsthatfederalforfeiture statutes preempt theForfeitureAct.Therefore,thefederalcourtcouldnotobtainjurisdictionoverthecashunless,anduntil,thestatedistrictcourtrelinquishedits
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own jurisdictionandcontrolof thecash.See, e.g.,United States v. One 1987 Mer-cedes Benz,2F.3d241,244(7thCir.1993)(findingthateventhoughnostateforfeitureproceeding had commenced, the federalgovernmenthadtocomplywithstatelawrequiringaturnoverorderfromthedistrictcourtbeforethefederalgovernmentcouldobtain jurisdiction over seized propertysubjecttoadoptiveforfeiture);Scarabin v. Drug Enforcement Admin.,966F.2d989,995(5thCir.1992)(requiringtheDEAto“firstseekaturnoverorderfromthestatecourt,orwaituntilthatcourtrelinquishescontrol over the res” before proceedingwithafederalforfeiturecomplaint);United States v. One 1979 Chevrolet C-20 Van,924F.2d120,122-23(7thCir.1991)(requiringthatthefederalgovernmentseekaturnoverorder from the state court before seizingtheproperty inquestionbecause“[a] lo-calpolicedepartmentmaynottakeseizedproperty and justpass it onas it pleasesto the FBI in flagrant disregard of statelawsmandatingjudicialauthorityforsuchturnovers”),superseded by statute as stated inUnited States v. Sixty-Two Thousand Six Hundred Dollars,899F.Supp.378(N.D.Ill.1995).Insteadofcomplyingwithhisdutytodepositthecashwiththeclerkofthedistrictcourt,AgentCarrimmediatelymadethedecisiontocontacttheDEA“topursueseizureofthecurrency,”andplacedthecash“inevidenceforsafekeeping”untila decisionwasmadeonwhat proceduretofollow.{17}AsecondmaterialrequirementoftheForfeitureActwassubsequentlyviolated.TheAct directs: “Within thirty days ofmakingaseizure,thestateshallfileacom-plaintofforfeitureorreturnthepropertytothepersonfromwhomitwasseized.”Section 31-27-5(A). Instead of filing aforfeiturecomplaintagainstthecashwithinthirtydays,theStatePolicekeptitinitsper-sonalcustodyfromthetimeitwasseizedonOctober20,2002,untilDecember3,2002,whenthecashier’scheckwasdeliveredtotheUnitedStatesMarshalService. TheState Police officers circumvented thisadditional requirement of the ForfeitureAct.Ifthecashhadbeendepositedwiththe clerk of the district court, it wouldhavebeenundertheexclusivejurisdictionofthedistrictcourt,withtheconsequencethatwithnostateforfeiturecomplaintbe-ingfiledwiththirtydays,Passengercouldhavepetitionedthedistrictcourttoorderthecashreturnedtohim.TheForfeitureActclearlycontemplatesthattheauthorityandjurisdictiontodeterminethestatusof
thecashlieswiththedistrictcourtandnottheStatePolice acting independently ofstatutoryrequirements.{18}Finally,wenotethatbyitsconduct,the State Police circumventedwhat ourSupremeCourt requires in Nunez: if theStatewantedtoseekforfeitureofthecash,it was required to do so in Passenger’scriminalcase.“[H]enceforth,allforfeiturecomplaintsandcriminalchargesforviola-tionsoftheControlledSubstancesActmaybothbebroughtonlyinasingle,bifurcatedproceeding.”2000-NMSC-013,¶104.{19}Weconcludethatthesummaryjudg-mentrecordestablishesthattheForfeitureActwasviolated.Defendantscontend,andthe district court apparently agreed, thattheywerenotrequiredtocomplywiththeForfeitureAct.WenowturntoDefendants’arguments.Defendants’Arguments{20}Thecashwasturnedovertothefed-eral government to pursue an “adoptiveseizure.” Johnson v. Johnson, 849 P.2d1361, 1363 (Alaska1993) describes thisprocessasfollows:
Through informal arrangements,localpolicedepartmentsagreetonotify theDEAwhen they seizepropertywhichmaybesubjecttoforfeiturepursuanttofederalnar-coticslaws.UponaDEArequest,the local police departmentwilltransferthepropertytotheDEA,whichwill treat the property asif it had been seized by federalauthorities.Thatis,theDEAwill“adopt”theseizure.TheDEAwillthen institute federal forfeitureproceedingsagainsttheproperty.Once the forfeiture is complete,theDEA is authorized to “splitthepot”withthecooperatinglocalpolicedepartment.
Similardescriptionsof an“adoptive sei-zure” fromvarious sources are collectedinCavaliere v. Town of North Beach,646A.2d 1058, 1060 (Md. Ct. Spec.App.1994)(notingthatalthoughnotexpresslyauthorizedinthefederalstatutesorregula-tions,theUnitedStatesAttorneyGeneralhaspermittedtheDEAto“adopt”seizuresmadebylocalofficialsandtousefederalforfeitureprocedureswithrespect to thatpropertyaspartofacooperativeeffortwithstateandlocalofficialstofightdrugs).See21U.S.C.§873(a)(2)(2000)(authorizingtheAttorneyGeneraloftheUnitedStatestocooperatewithlocalandstateagenciesconcerningtrafficofcontrolledsubstances
“intheinstitutionandprosecutionofcasesin the courts of theUnited States”); 21U.S.C.§881(e)(1)(A)(2000)(authorizingtheAttorneyGeneraloftheUnitedStatesto“transfer”propertyforfeitedinafederalaction“toanyStateorlocallawenforce-mentagencywhichparticipateddirectlyintheseizureorforfeitureoftheproperty”);InternalRevenueServiceManual,9.7.2.7.3(07-15-2002),available athttp://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/ch07s02.html (stating thatthestatepoliceoftenopttoturnoverthecurrencytothefederalgovernmentwhenstateforfeiturelawprohibitsforfeitureorwhen itwouldbemore advantageous toproceedunderfederallaw).{21}Defendantsfirstarguethattheywereallowedtotransferthecashtothefederalgovernmenttoinitiateafederalforfeitureaction because, although it was seizedpursuanttoNewMexicolaw,basedonaviolationoftheControlledSubstancesAct,theywere not required to initiate forfei-tureproceedingsunderstatelawbecausethere is no language in the statutes thatrenders the ForfeitureAct the exclusive lawunderwhich a forfeiture actionmaybecommenced.Thisargumentoverlookstheplain,unambiguousrequirementoftheForfeitureActwehavealreadydiscussedthat seizedcurrency that isalleged tobesubject to forfeiture “shall be depositedwith the clerk of the district court in aninterest-bearing account.” Section 31-27-8(A).Clearlyandunambiguously,thestatuterequiresdepositofthecashwiththeclerkofthedistrictcourttoprovideforitssafekeepingunder theexclusive jurisdic-tionofthedistrictcourt.{22}OfficerHooperstoppedthevehicleunderhisauthorityasaNewMexicoStatePoliceofficerforaviolationofNewMexi-colaw.HisauthoritytodetainandquestionDriverandPassenger,andthensearchthevehicle theyoccupied and their personalbelongings,wasderivedexclusivelyfromNewMexicolaw.OfficerHooperarrestedDriverandPassengerforviolationsofstatedruglawsundertheControlledSubstancesAct,andtheywereheldincustodyundertheauthorityofNewMexicolaw.Therewas no federal involvement in stoppingthevehicle,indetaining,questioningandarrestingDriverandPassenger,insearch-ingthevehicle,orinseizinganddetainingthecash.ThecashwasseizedbyOfficerHooperandthendetainedbyAgentCarrunderandpursuanttotheControlledSub-stancesAct,makingitsseizure,forfeiture,anddisposalsubjecttotheForfeitureAct.Just because the officers subsequently
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decidedtotransferthecashtothefederalgovernmentforthepurposeofbringingafederalforfeitureactiondidnotentitlethemtoignoreNewMexicolaw.See DeSantis v. State,866A.2d143,147-48(Md.2005)(concluding under substantially similarfacts that theMarylandState Police “isnotfreetocircumventStatelawaltogetherwhen it decides to forgoState forfeitureproceedingsinfavoroffederalforfeitureproceedings”). In arriving at its conclu-sion,theMarylandCourtofAppealsalsonoted that almost all the cases that haveconsidered the issue have assumed thatstate authorities cannot avoid their ownstatelawswhentheytransferpropertytothefederalgovernment.Id.at148(collect-ingcases).WearealsoinagreementwiththispropositionandholdthatDefendantswerenotentitledtoavoidallrequirementsoftheForfeitureActmerelybecausetheyintended to transfer the property to thefederalgovernment.{23}Secondly,DefendantsassertthattheForfeitureActitselfallowedthemtotrans-ferthecashtothefederalgovernmentwith-outcomplyingwithitsrequirements.TheycontendthattheForfeitureActitselfstatesthatitappliestofederalforfeitureproceed-ingsonlytotheextentthattheproceduressetforthintheForfeitureActandfederalforfeitureproceedingsareconsistentwithoneanother.Therefore,Defendantscon-tend, the ForfeitureAct does not applyto federal forfeitureproceedingsbecausetheirproceduresarenottotallyconsistentwitheachother.Thisargumentreliesonthephrase“otherlaws”inSection31-27-2(B)(2).Wealsorejectthisargument.{24}InconstruingtheForfeitureAct,ourultimategoalistoascertainandgiveeffecttotheintentoftheLegislature,andwebe-ginbylookingatthelanguageofthestatuteitself.State v. Smith,2004-NMSC-032,¶¶8-9,136N.M.372,98P.3d1022.However,wealsokeepinmindthat“[f]orfeituresarenot favoredat lawandstatutesare tobeconstruedstrictlyagainstforfeiture.”State v. Ozarek,91N.M.275,275-76,573P.2d209,209-10(1978).Initsentirety,Section31-27-2provides:
A. ThepurposesoftheForfeitureActare:
(1)tomakeuniformthestan-dardsandproceduresfor theseizureand forfeitureofproperty subject to forfeiture;and
(2)toprotecttheconstitutionalrightsofpersonsaccusedofacrimeandofinnocentpersonsholdinginter-estsinproperty subject to forfeiture.
B. TheForfeitureActappliesto: (1) seizures, forfeitures and
dispositions of property subject to forfeiturepursuanttolawsthatspecifi-callyapplytheForfeitureAct;and
(2) seizures, forfeitures anddispositionsofproperty subject to for-feiturepursuantto other laws;butonlytotheextentthattheproceduresintheForfeitureActforseizing,forfeitingordisposing of property are consistentwithanyproceduresspecifiedinthoselaws.
(Emphasisadded.){25}One of the stated purposes of theForfeitureAct is to make uniform thestandards andprocedures for the seizureand forfeiture of property, specifically,“property subject to forfeiture.” Section31-27-2(A)(1).AsusedintheForfeitureAct,“propertysubjecttoforfeiture”means,“property described and declared to besubjecttoforfeitureby a state lawoutsideoftheForfeitureAct.”Section31-27-3(G)(emphasisadded).AnexampleofpropertythatsatisfiesthisdefinitionisfoundintheControlledSubstancesActatSection30-31-34,whereitdescribespropertythat itdeclaresissubjecttoforfeiture.Toachieveitsstatedobjectiveofmakingthestandardsandproceduresfortheseizureandforfei-ture of property uniform, the ForfeitureActthendescribeswhatforfeitureactionsitappliesto.{26}First, itappliesto“seizures,forfei-tures and dispositions,” Section 31-27-2(B)(1), of “property described and de-claredtobesubjecttoforfeitureby a state law,”Section31-27-3(G),(whichistosay,“propertysubjecttoforfeiture”)underlawsthat“specificallyapplytheForfeitureAct.”Section31-27-2(B)(1).Aspecificexample,once again, is theControlledSubstancesAct,whichstates,“TheprovisionsoftheForfeitureAct...applytotheseizure,for-feitureanddisposalofpropertysubjecttoforfeitureanddisposalundertheControlledSubstancesAct.”Section30-31-35.Otherexamples areNMSA1978, § 17-2-20.1(2002) (providing that theForfeitureActappliestotheseizure,forfeiture,anddis-posalofmotorvehicles,firearms,andbowsandarrowsusedasinstrumentalitiesinthecommissionofvariouscrimesrelatingtohunting);NMSA1978,§18-6-9.3(2002)(providingthattheForfeitureActappliesto theseizure, forfeiture,anddisposalofanyinstrument,vehicle,tool,orequipmentusedtoviolatetheCulturalPropertiesAct);NMSA1978,§30-3-8.1 (2002) (provid-ing that theForfeitureAct applies to the
seizure,forfeiture,anddisposalofamotorvehiclethatisusedtocommittheoffenseof shooting at or fromamotor vehicle);NMSA1978,§30-16B-9(2002)(provid-ing that theForfeitureAct applies to theseizure,forfeiture,anddisposalofpropertysubjecttoforfeitureundertheUnauthorizedRecordingAct);NMSA1978,§30-19-10(2002) (providing that theForfeitureActappliestotheseizure,forfeiture,anddis-posalofagamblingdeviceorotherequip-ment that is used in gambling); NMSA1978,§30-45-7(B)(2002)(providingthattheForfeitureAct applies to the seizure,forfeiture,anddisposalofpropertyusedtoviolatetheComputerCrimesAct).{27}Second, theForfeitureAct states itappliesto“seizures,forfeituresanddisposi-tions”of“propertydescribedanddeclaredtobesubjecttoforfeitureby a state law”(which is to say, “property subject toforfeiture”) under “other laws.” Section31-27-2(B)(2). Incontext, it is apparentthat by its reference to “other laws” theAct is referring to statuteswhichdonot“specifically apply the ForfeitureAct.”AnexampleisNMSA1978,§66-3-507(1978),whichprovides that amotor ve-hiclewithanalteredvehicleidentificationnumbermaybedeclaredcontrabandandsubject to forfeiture by the law enforce-mentagencyconfiscatingit,butitdoesnotspecifythattheproceduresoftheForfeitureActapply.See State ex rel. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. One 1986 Peterbilt Tractor,1997-NMCA-050,¶¶4-12,123N.M.387,940P.2d1182(construingandapplyingSection66-3-507).OtherexamplescanbefoundatNMSA1978,§25-2-6(1982)(providingfortheseizureandforfeitureofadulteratedormisbrandedfood,butnotspecifyingthattheproceduresoftheForfeitureActapply);NMSA1978,§26-1-6(1972)(providingfor theseizureand forfeitureofanadul-terated,misbranded or counterfeit drug,device, or cosmetic, but not specifyingthat theproceduresof theForfeitureActapply);andNMSA1978,§77-18-2(1999)(providingfortheseizureandforfeitureordestructionofcruellytreatedlivestock,butnot specifying that theproceduresof theForfeitureActapply).Sincethose“otherlaws”donot specify that theproceduresoftheForfeitureActapply,itonlymakessense for the statute to continue stating,asitdoes, that theForfeitureActapplies“onlytotheextentthattheproceduresintheForfeitureActforseizing,forfeitingordisposingofpropertyareconsistentwithanyprocedures specified in those laws.”Section31-27-2(B)(2).
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{28}Thisbringsustothefinalquestion:Does thephrase“other laws”in theFor-feitureActatSection31-27-2(B)(2),alsorefer to federal forfeiture proceedings asDefendantscontend?Weconcludeitdoesnot.TheForfeitureActonlyhasapplica-tion to “property subject to forfeiture,”whichisbydefinitionpropertythatastate lawdescribesanddeclarestobesubjecttoforfeiture.Section31-27-3(B).TheFor-feitureActthenstatesitappliesfirsttosuchpropertythatissodescribedanddeclaredbyastate lawwhenthatlawspecificallystatesthattheForfeitureActapplies.Fur-ther,declarestheForfeitureAct,itapplieswhen“otherlaws”donotspecificallystatethattheForfeitureActappliestopropertydescribedanddeclaredbyastate lawtobesubjecttoforfeiture,butonlytotheextentthattheproceduresspecifiedintheForfei-tureActareconsistentwiththosesetforthinthe“thoseotherlaws.”Weconstruethestatutestrictlyagainstforfeiture.Ozarek,91 N.M. at 275, 573 P.2d at 209. Thedefinitionof“propertysubjecttoforfeiture”withitsspecificreferencetostate law,thestructure of the statute, and its purposesleadustoconcludethattheLegislaturedidnotintendtoincludeanadoptiveseizurebytheUnitedStatesunderfederalforfeiture
statutesinthephrase“otherlaws”inSec-tion31-27-2(B)(2).{29}We acknowledge that the use of“adoptive seizures” is apparently wide-spread and follows a long history offorfeiture collaboration between stateandfederalagencies.Wedonotaddresswhether,towhatextent,orhowan“adop-tiveseizure”toallowafederalforfeituretoproceedmaybeaccomplishedundertheForfeitureAct.Ourholdinginthiscaseislimited:whenproperty isseizedbystatepolice officers for forfeiture, compliancewiththeForfeitureActisrequiredevenifthestateintendstotransferthepropertytothefederalgovernmenttopursueafederalforfeitureactionpursuanttoan“adoptiveseizure.”Inthiscase,DefendantsviolatedtheForfeitureAct.OtherIssues{30}Inlightofourdisposition,thereareissues of fact aboutwhetherDefendantsconvertedthe$23,100.SeeJohnson,849P.2d at 1365 (“By unilaterally transfer-ringthepropertywithoutauthorityandincontraventionof state statutes, the [c]itycommittedaconversion.”);Sec. Pac. Fin. Servs. v. Signfilled Corp., 1998-NMCA-046, ¶ 15, 125 N.M. 38, 956 P.2d 837(“Conversion is theunlawful exerciseof
dominionandcontroloverpropertybelong-ingtoanotherindefianceoftheowner’srights,oractsconstitutinganunauthorizedand injurious use of another’s property,orawrongfuldetentionafterdemandhasbeenmade.”). Further, thedistrict courtgranted Defendants summary judgmentwithoutaddressingwhethertheTortClaimsActwaivesimmunityforPlaintiff’sclaimsandotherproceduralissues.Wethereforedeclinetoaddressthisissue,andweleaveit for the district court to examine theseissuesonremand.CONCLUSION{31}For theforegoingreasons,weholdthatNewMexicoStatePoliceofficersseiz-ingcurrencyunderStatelawaresubjecttotheproceduressetforthintheNewMexicoForfeitureAct. In this case, the officersviolated thatAct. Therefore,we reversethesummaryjudgmentgrantedtoDefen-dantsandremandforfurtherproceedingsconsistentwiththisopinion.{32} ITISSOORDERED. MICHAELE.VIGIL,Judge
Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28 4�
Certiorari Denied, No. 30,407, June 12, 2007
From the New Mexico Court of Appeals
Opinion Number: 2007-NMCA-077
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,Plaintiff-Appellee,
versusROGER SOTO,
Defendant-Appellant.No. 25,473 (filed: April 27, 2007)
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTYROSS C. SANCHEZ, District Judge
GARY K. KINGAttorney General
Santa Fe, New MexicoJACqUELINE R. MEDINA
Assistant Attorney GeneralAlbuquerque, New Mexico
for Appellee
JOHN BIGELOWChief Public DefenderLAUREL A. KNOWLES
Assistant Appellate DefenderSanta Fe, New Mexico
for Appellant
opinion
celia foy castillo, Judge
{1}Defendant’smotion for rehearing isdenied.Theopinionfiled in this caseonApril3,2007,iswithdrawn,andthisopin-ion is substituted.Defendant appeals hisconvictions fordrivingwhile intoxicated(DWI) and drivingwith a suspended orrevoked license. Defendant raises threeissues.Hecontends(1)thatthetrialcourtcommittedreversibleerrorinpermittingtheStatetoquestionDefendantaboutthetruthofOfficerAlbertLongobardi’stestimony,(2)thatthetrialcourtabuseditsdiscretionwhenitadmittedthecomputerprintoutofDefendant’sdrivingrecordintoevidence,and(3)thattheevidencewasinsufficienttoconvictDefendantofaggravatedDWI.Weconclude that the improperquestion-ing resulted in reversible error, that thetrial court didnot abuse its discretion inadmittingDefendant’sdrivingrecordforalimitedpurpose,andthattheevidencewassufficient to convictDefendant ofDWI.Accordingly,wereverseinpartandaffirminpart.WeremandforfurtherproceedingsonthechargeofDWI.I.BACKGROUND{2}Uponmotionbydefensecounsel,theDWIchargeand the licensechargewereseveredfortrial.Thereafter,DefendantwasconvictedofaggravatedDWIinajurytrialand convictedof drivingwith a revoked
orsuspendedlicenseinabenchtrial.Werecountthefactspertinenttoeachcharge.A. DWI{3}ThefollowingfactsderivefromOfficerLongobardi’s testimony.Atabout5a.m.,Officer Longobardi andOfficerDonaldPiatt were dispatched to a conveniencestore to investigate a report of domesticviolence.Defendantdrovebyinapickuptruck as the officers were interviewingDefendant’sbrother,whowastheallegedvictimofthereportedincident,inthepark-inglotofthestore.TheofficersleftintheirmarkedvehiclestopursueDefendant,theninitiatedatrafficstoptoquestionhimaboutthedomesticviolencereport.Priortothestop,OfficerLongobardinoticednothingunusualaboutDefendant’sdrivingorthelengthoftimeittookforDefendanttopulloverwhentheofficersengagedtheirflash-inglights.UponcontactwithDefendant,OfficerLongobardi askedDefendant forhisdriver’slicense,whichhewasunabletoproduce.OfficerLongobardithenaskedDefendant to stepoutof thevehicle andplacedhimunderarrest,basedonreason-ablesuspicionofdomesticviolence.WhileOfficer Longobardi was speaking withDefendant, the officer detected “averystrongodor of an alcoholic beverage onhisbreath.”Theofficer alsonoticed thatDefendant had slurred speech and red,bloodshot,wateryeyes.{4}OfficerLongobardifurthertestifiedtothe following.Basedonhisobservations
andtheinformationhereceivedregardingtheincidentofdomesticviolence,OfficerLongobardiwasoftheopinionthatDefen-dantwas under the influenceof alcohol.OfficerLongobardididnotaskDefendantifhehadbeendrinking,butDefendantvol-untarilyadmittedhehadbeendrinkingathismother’sapartment.OfficerLongobarditherefore saw the potential for a DWIcharge,inadditiontothedomesticviolencecharge.Hedidnotconductanyfieldsobri-etytests,however,becauseDefendantwasalready handcuffed and becauseOfficerLongobardiwasconcernedthatDefendantwouldrunorbecomeviolentifhewereun-cuffed.Departmentpolicydirectsofficersto refrain from uncuffing an individualwhohasalreadybeenplacedintocustody.OfficerLongobardi then transportedDe-fendanttothedetentioncenterand,whiledoing so, advised him that hewould bechargedwithdomesticviolenceandDWI.OfficerLongobardialsoadvisedDefendantoftheNewMexicoImpliedConsentAct,NMSA1978,§§66-8-105to-112(1978,as amended through 2005), and askedDefendanttotakeabreathtest.Defendantrefused.As a result of the investigationregarding thedomestic violence incidentandofDefendant’srefusaltosubmittothebreathtest,OfficerLongobardiconcludedthatDefendantwas“definitely”impairedbyalcohol.OfficerLongobardialsostatedthatDefendantwascooperativethroughouttheofficer’sencounterwithDefendant.{5} Officer Piatt also testified briefly.Whenaskedby theState ifbasedonhisobservations ofDefendant,Officer PiatthadcometoanyconclusionastowhetherornotDefendantwasintoxicated,OfficerPiattrepliedthathecouldconcludeDefen-danthadbeendrinking.OfficerPiattalsotestifiedthathehadbeentotheapartmentwheretheallegeddomesticviolenceinci-denthadoccurredandthathehadseen“alotofemptybeercans”there.Further,hestated thatDefendant’s brother hadbeendrinking.{6}Inaddition,Defendanttestifiedtothefollowing.Defendant refused to take thebreath test after hewas arrestedbecausehewasupsetandbelievedthatheshouldn’thavebeen arrested for either charge.Hefurther stated that he should have takenthetestandthathedidnotthinkhewouldhavetestedoverthelegallimit.Defendantthoughtatthetimeofarrest,however,thattakingthebreathtestwaspointlessbecausehehadalreadybeenarrestedandwasgoingto jail.Defendant also contestedOfficerLongobardi’s statement that Defendantadmittedhehadbeendrinking.Defendant
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deniedanyadmissionofdrinking.Rather,he specifically recalled that he told theofficershisbrotherhadbeendrinking.Atthis point, the State began its allegedlyimproper questioning ofDefendant.Wereproducethetranscriptofthisquestioninglaterintheopinion.B. DrivingWithaRevokedorSus-
pendedLicense{7}At trial,OfficerLongobardi testifiedthat when he asked Defendant for hisdriver’slicense,Defendanttoldhimthatthelicensewas revoked.OfficerLongobardialsotestifiedthatheranacomputercheckonDefendant’slicenseatthetimeofarrestandthatthischeckindicatedDefendant’slicensewasrevoked.Inaddition,theStatemovedforadmissionintoevidenceaMo-torVehicleDivision(MVD)packet,whichincluded a two-page computer printoutidentifiedastheMotorVehicleDriverRe-cordofDefendant.TheStateusedtheprint-out, datedMarch25,1997, to show thatDefendant’slicensewasindeedsuspendedatthetimeofhisarrest.Priortotrial,de-fensecounselhadobjectedtoadmissionoftheMVDpacketondiscoveryandhearsaygrounds.Attrial,defensecounselrenewedher hearsay objection and also objectedonfoundationalgrounds.ShearguedthatthemeaningofthecodesonthecomputerprintoutwasnotclearandthatfoundationaltestimonywasthereforerequiredtoshowthatDefendant’s licensewas revoked orsuspendedatthetimeofhisarrest.{8}Attherequestofthecourt,thepros-ecutorhighlighted inyellow the relevantportionof theprintout.TheStatearguedthattheprintoutclearlyshowsaten-yearsuspensionwasimposedonSeptember3,1996. Defense counsel pointed out thatthe printout does not clearly state that aten-yearsuspensionwasimposedbecausetheprintoutindicatesthatahundred-yearsuspensionhadbeenimposed,sincetheenddatewasidentifiedasSeptember3,2096.Shearguedthattheprintoutwasthereforenotself-explanatoryandthatshewasun-abletocross-examineanyoneregardingtheinconsistencieswithintheprintoutandthemeaningofthecodes.Thecourtadmittedtheprintoutsolelyforthepurposeofshow-ingthattherevocationorsuspensionbeganonSeptember3,1996.{9}On cross-examination,OfficerLon-gobarditestifiedthathewasfamiliarwiththecodesontheprintout,andheexplainedthatthecode“X3C”indicatedasuspensionbased on a traffic citation, rather than aDWI.OfficerLongobardiagreedthatonceanindividualhadresolvedanyticketsandfines,hewaseligible tohavehis license
reinstated.Onredirect,OfficerLongobardifurthertestifiedthatbasedonthecomputerprintoutadmittedintoevidence,Defendantwouldnothavehadavaliddriver’slicenseatthetimeofhisarrest.OfficerLongobardialsoreiteratedhisearlierassertionsthatthecomputercheckheranatthetimeofthearrestindicatedthatDefendantdidnothaveavalidlicenseandthatDefendanttoldhimthathedidnothaveavalidlicense.II.STANDARDOFREVIEW{10}Atrialcourt’sevidentiaryrulingsarereviewedforabuseofdiscretion.State v. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 41, 126N.M.438, 971P.2d 829;State v. Worley, 100N.M.720,723,676P.2d247,250(1984).Atrialcourtabusesitsdiscretionwhenarulingis“clearlyagainstthelogicandef-fectofthefactsandcircumstances,”State v. Lasner,2000-NMSC-038,¶16,129N.M.806,14P.3d1282(internalquotationmarksandcitationomitted),orwhen therulingis contrary to the reasonable, probable,andactualdeductionsthatmaybedrawnfromthefactsandcircumstances.State v. Flanagan,111N.M.93,95,801P.2d675,677(Ct.App.1990).{11}Whenwe are determiningwhethersufficient evidence exists, our review isconductedintwosteps.State v. Apodaca,118 N.M. 762, 766, 887 P.2d 756, 760(1994).Wefirst review the evidence byresolvingallconflicts,makingallpermis-sibleinferencesinfavoroftheverdict,anddisregarding all evidence and inferencesto thecontrary.State v. Treadway,2006-NMSC-008,¶7,139N.M.167,130P.3d746.Wethen“makealegaldeterminationof whether the evidence viewed in thismannercouldjustifyafindingbyanyra-tionaltrieroffactthateachelementofthecrimechargedhasbeenestablishedbeyondareasonabledoubt.”Apodaca,118N.M.at766,887P.2dat760(internalquotationmarksandcitationomitted).Evidenceofadirectorcircumstantialnatureissufficientif “a reasonablemindmight accept [theevidence]asadequatetosupportaconclu-sion.”State v. Caudillo,2003-NMCA-042,¶7,133N.M.468,64P.3d495(internalquotationmarksandcitationsomitted).Inconductingourinquiry,wedonotreweightheevidenceorsubstituteourjudgmentforthat of the fact-finder.State v. Montoya,2005-NMCA-078,¶3,137N.M.713,114P.3d393.III.DISCUSSION{12}Defendantmakes three arguments:(1)the prosecutor engaged in improperquestioning,andthetrialcourterredwhenit failed to sustain defense counsel’s ob-jection; (2)the trial court erredwhen it
admitted theMVDcomputer printout ofDefendant’sdrivingrecord;and(3)Defen-dant’sDWIconvictionwasnotsupportedby sufficient evidence.We address eachargumentinturn.A. ImproperQuestioning{13}TheStateconcedes inpart that thetrialcourterredinpermittingtheprosecutortoquestionDefendantabout theveracityofOfficerLongobardi’stestimony.WearenotboundbytheState’sconcession;tothecontrary,wehaveadutytoconsidertheis-sue.See State v. Muñiz,2003-NMSC-021,¶5,134N.M.152,74P.3d86.Defendantpointstothreequestions,whichheallegeswereimproper.TheStateconcedestheis-sueonlyastothefirstquestion.TheStatearguesthatDefendantfailedtopreservetheimproperquestioningissueinregardtothelasttwoquestionsposedbytheprosecutor.Webeginouranalysiswithadiscussionofthispreliminaryissue.1. Preservation{14}TheStatearguesthatdefensecounselfailedtoobjectafterthesecondandthirdquestionsatissueandthattheissueofim-properquestioningwasthusnotpreservedinregardtothesetwoquestions.Wecannotagree.The purposes of the preservationrules were served by defense counsel’sobjectionafterthefirstquestion.Defensecounselmadeaspecificobjection—thattheprosecutorwas improperly attempting tohaveDefendantcommentontheofficer’stestimony—and the trial court overruledherobjection.SeeRule12-216(A)NMRA(“Topreserve a question for review[,] itmust appear that a rulingor decisionbythedistrict courtwas fairly invoked, butformal exceptions are not required[.]”);State v. Montoya,2005-NMCA-005,¶7,136N.M.674,104P.3d540(“Theprimarypurposesof thepreservationrequirementare(1)toalertthetrialcourttoaclaimoferrorsothatithasanopportunitytocorrectanymistake,and(2)togivetheopposingparty a fair opportunity to respond andshowwhythecourtshouldruleagainsttheobjector.” (internal quotationmarks andcitation omitted)), cert. quashed, 2005-NMCERT-011, 138N.M. 587, 124P.3d565.Moreover,theobjectionwastimely.The last two questions continued in thesamelineofquestioningasthefirstques-tion,towhichdefensecounselobjected.See Flanagan,111N.M.at96,801P.2dat678(“Whentheprosecutorstartedthislineofquestioning,thepublicdefenderobjected....Thecourtallowedallthreequestionsandoverruleddefendant’sobjectiontothelineofquestioning.”); cf. State v. Lucero,104N.M.587,590,725P.2d266,269(Ct.
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App.1986)(concludingthattheobjectionsmadewerenotspecificortimelywhentheywenttotheadequacyofthefoundationandwerenotinregardtothespecifictestimonyregarding the subject at hand).Thus,weconclude that Defendant preserved hisargumentsregardingtheimproprietyofthesecondandthirdquestions.2. GeneralRule{15} In Flanagan, 111N.M. at 97, 801P.2dat679,thisCourtestablisheda“strictprohibitionupon asking the defendant ifanotherwitnessis‘mistaken’or‘lying.’”Suchimproperquestioningisparticularlyprejudicialwhen thewitness is asked tocommentonthetruthfulnessofalawen-forcementofficer’stestimony.See State v. Duran,2006-NMSC-035,¶¶19,21,140N.M.94,140P.3d515.Thereasonsbehindtheruleareseveral.First,thedefendant’sopinion regarding the truthfulness ofanother witness is irrelevant. Id. ¶19.In addition, this type of questioning canbecomeamisleadingargumenttothejurythateitherthedefendantorthewitnessesarelying.Flanagan,111N.M.at97,801P.2dat679.Moreover,askingawitnesstocommentontheveracityofanotherwitnessencroachesonthejury’sroletodeterminethecredibilityofwitnesses.Id.Further,ourSupremeCourt has expressed particularconcernthatthesetypesofquestionsdistorttheburdenofproofbyleavingthejurywiththeunfairimpressionthatinordertoacquit,theymustdeterminethatlawenforcementofficers are lying if their testimony iscontrary to thatof thedefendant.Duran,2006-NMSC-035, ¶¶19, 21. Finally, theCourt recognized in Duran that “‘weretheylying’questions”arenotcompatiblewithaprosecutor’sdutiesbecauseunfairlyquestioningadefendanttomakehimlookbadinfrontofthejuryisinconsistentwiththeprosecutor’sdutiestoseekjusticeandensureafairtrial.Id.¶¶19-21.{16} In imposing this restriction on aprosecutor’squestioninginFlanagan,wediscussed the scope.Generally, the ruledoesnotprecludeagood-faithattempttoclarifyadefendant’stestimonybyaskingaboutapparentinconsistenciesinregardtotestimonyof otherwitnesses.Flanagan,111N.M.at97,801P.2dat679.Nordoesthe ruleprohibitquestioningdesigned toelicit anexplanation foranysuch incon-sistencies.Id.3. ApplicationtoOurCase{17}Webegin our application of theseprinciples to our case by reviewing theallegedlyimproperquestioning:
Q. ([PROSECUTOR])You’re
awarethataftertheofficerscon-ductedtheirinvestigation,theyar-restedyouonadomesticviolencecharge,correct?A.Yes.Q.Andthat,inyouropinion,wasunfounded?A.Yes.Q.Andthenwhentheybegantotalkwithyouand theyobservedthat[youhad]bloodshot,wateryeyes, and they thought you hadslurred speech and they couldsmellalcoholcomingoffofyou,you think itwas still unfoundedthatpossiblyyouhadbeendrink-inganddriving?A.Yes.Q.Andwhentheyaskedyou—I’msorry,whenyouvolunteeredtotheofficersthatyouhadinfactbeendrinking that night, you think itwas still unfounded for the of-ficers to continuewith theDWIinvestigation? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]:Thisgoes beyond the scopeof directexamination.THECOURT:Overruled.A.Canyourepeatthatquestion,please?Q.([PROSECUTOR])Evenafteryou volunteered to the officersthatyouhadinfactbeendrinkingalcoholicbeveragesthatevening,youstillthinkthat,coupledwiththat and the fact that you hadbloodshot, watery eyes and thefact that youhad slurred speechand the fact thatyou smelledofalcohol, the officers were stillincorrect in conducting a DWIinvestigation?A.Actually, I didn’t tell them Ihadanythingtodrink,Itoldthemthatmybrotherwas drunk, andI couldn’t believe that he wasbelievingthem,that’swhatItoldhim.Q.SoOfficerLongobardiatleastmisledthejury,ifnotliedtothemwhen he said this morning[—]whenhesaidyouvolunteered—[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He’saskedhimtocommentonanotherperson’stestimony.Thetestimonyshouldstandalonewithoutcharac-terizationfrommyclient.THECOURT:Overruled.Q.([PROSECUTOR])Mr.Soto?A.Maybe it’s been such a longtime, maybe he wrote it down
wrong.I’mnotcallinghimaliar.Q.Soyoudon’trecallspecificallywhatyousaid?A.Idorecall,yes,Ido.Q.Yourecall?A.Yes,Ido.Q.IfOfficerLongobarditakesthestandlikehedidthismorning,andtellsusthatyoudidtellhimyouhad been drinking, thenOfficerLongobardiiswrong;isthatwhatyourtestimonyisthisafternoon?A.IknowthatIdidn’ttellhimthatIwasdrinking.Q.Iunderstandthat,sir,butthat’snotmyquestion.Myquestionis,was Officer Longobardi wrongwhenhe testifiedwhat hedid—saidwhathesaidthismorningtothisjury?A.Yes.
{18}Ourreviewofthetestimonyleadsustoconcludethattheprosecutorengagedinquestioningthatwasprohibited.Inthefirstquestionatissue,theprosecutorspecificallyusedtheword“lied”whenheaskedDefen-danttocommentonOfficerLongobardi’stestimony:“SoOfficerLongobardiatleastmisledthe jury, ifnot lied to themwhenhe said this morning[—]when he saidyouvolunteered[?]”Atthispoint,defensecounselobjected,andthecourtoverruledherobjection.Defendantattemptedtomiti-gatethesituationbystatingthatmaybetheofficer“wroteitdownwrong.”Defendantfurtherstated,“I’mnotcallinghimaliar.”Momentarily, theprosecutor again askedDefendant to characterize the officer’stestimony:“[T]henOfficerLongobardiiswrong;isthatwhatyourtestimonyisthisafternoon?”When Defendant again at-temptedtoavoidstatingthattheofficerwaswrongbyreplying,“Iknowthat Ididn’ttellhimthatIwasdrinking,”theprosecu-torrepeatedhisquestion:“[W]asOfficerLongobardiwrongwhenhetestifiedwhathedid—saidwhathesaidthismorningtothisjury?”WeequatecharacterizingOfficerLongobardi’s testimonyas“wrong”withcharacterizinghistestimonyas“mistaken.”SeeMerriam-Webster’s Collegiate Diction-ary1275(11thed.2005)(defining“wrong”as“notaccordingtotruthorfacts:INCOR-RECT”anddefining“mistake”as“awrongjudgment:MISUNDERSTANDING”);see also Flanagan, 111N.M. at 96-97, 801P.2dat678-79(concludingthataskingthecriminal defendant if three eyewitnesseswere “all mistaken” was improper andthat theobjection shouldhave thusbeensustained).Therefore, we conclude thattheprosecutor’squestioningwasimproper
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andthatthetrialcourtabuseditsdiscretionwhenfailingtosustaindefensecounsel’sobjection.See Duran, 2006-NMSC-035,¶24; Flanagan,111N.M.at97,801P.2dat679(observingthat“theimpressioncom-municatedtothejurymaybethateitherthewitnessorthedefendantislying”whenacriminaldefendant“isforcedtocharacter-izenumerouswitnesses, includingpoliceofficers,as‘incorrect’or‘mistaken’”).4. HarmlessError{19}BecauseDefendantcorrectlyobjectedtotheprosecutor’slineofquestioning,theStatecarriestheburdentoshowthatanyerrorwas harmless beyond a reasonabledoubt. See Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶22;State v. Pettigrew,116N.M.135,142,860P.2d777,784(Ct.App.1993)(“Evenwhen error is of a constitutional dimen-sion,itdoesnotrequirereversalifitwasharmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).Errorintheadmissionofevidenceisnotharmless“ifthereisareasonablepossibil-itythattheevidencecomplainedofmighthavecontributedtotheconviction.”State v. Torres,1999-NMSC-010,¶¶51-53,127N.M.20,976P.2d20(internalquotationmarks and citation omitted).The Stateasserts that even if the questioningwasimproper, any resulting errorwas harm-less because “[D]efendant’s responsetempered any prejudice thatmight haveresultedfromtheimproperquestion”andbecauseoverwhelmingevidenceexiststoproveDefendant’sguilt.Weaddresseachargumentbelow.a. Defendant’sResponse{20}According to theState,Defendantwasnotprejudicedbecause“thequestiondidnotcoax[D]efendantintoaccusingOf-ficerLongobardioflying”;rather,Defen-dant“offeredanotherexplanationforthediscrepancybetweenhistestimonyandthatofOfficerLongobardi.”See Flanagan,111N.M.at97-98,801P.2dat679-80(conclud-ingthattheerrorwasnotreversiblebecausethe dangers inherent in suchquestioningwerenotevident;rather,inresponsetothequestioning,thedefendantprovidedanex-planationforthepertinentinconsistenciesinthetestimony).Wearenotpersuaded.WeobservefirstthattheState’sanalysisrestsentirelyonDefendant’sresponsetothefirstquestion.Ourresolutionofthepreservationissue,however,requiresthatweexamineallthreequestionsatissue.TheStatewaspersistent inmakingDefendant responddirectlytothequestionastowhetherOf-ficerLongobardiwas “wrong”when hetestified in front of the jury. In responsetotheState’ssecondquestion,Defendanttriedtoavoidstatingthat theofficerwas
wrongbystating,“IknowthatIdidn’ttellhimthatIwasdrinking.”Theprosecutorrespondedasfollows:“Iunderstandthat,sir,butthat’snotmyquestion.Myquestionis,wasOfficerLongobardiwrongwhenhetestifiedwhathedid—saidwhathesaidthismorningtothisjury?”Finally,Defendantacquiescedandresponded,“Yes.”Defen-dant was not merely coaxed but forcedto answer in the affirmative the State’simproperquestioning.{21}OurreviewofthetestimonyrevealsthatwhileDefendant’sresponsetothefirstquestionmightbeperceivedasanalterna-tiveexplanationfortheinconsistencythatarguablycouldprovehelpfultoajury,theprosecutor’s continued questioning wassolelyforthepurposeofforcingDefendanttocharacterize theofficerasmistakenorlying.Thecontinuedquestioningdoesnotappeartobeagood-faithattempttoclarifyDefendant’s testimony,see id.at97,801P.2dat679,butratheramountedtoapar-ticularlyprejudicialjuryargumentbecauseDefendantwascoerced intocommentingonthetruthfulnessofOfficerLongobardi’stestimony.Duran,2006-NMSC-035,¶24(“[I]t is particularly improper to ask thedefendant tocommentontheveracityorcredibility of law enforcement officers,asitmayleadthejurytobelievethattheycannotacquitthedefendantunlesstheybe-lievetheofficerislying.”).Consequently,werejecttheState’sargumentthatinthiscase, any improper questioning resultedin harmless error.The responses did notcuretheerror; theprosecutor’squestionsresulted inDefendant’s looking “bad infront of the jury.” See id.¶19 (internalquotation marks and citation omitted).Finally,becauseourresolutionofthisissueisclearlysupportedbyNewMexicolaw,wearenotpersuadedotherwisebytheout-of-statecasesreliedonbytheState.See, e.g.,Knowles v. State,632So.2d62,66(Fla.1993)(concludingthattheimproperquestioningwasharmlesserrorbecausethejurycouldhavebelievedboththedefendantand the witnesses, since the defendanttestifiedthathedidnotremembermakingthestatements); State v. Manning,19P.3d84,100,103(Kan.2001)(concludingthatwhenthedefendantfailedtoobjectinthecourtbelow,theimproperquestioningdidnotrisetothelevelofprejudicenecessaryunderaplainerroranalysis).b. OverwhelmingEvidence{22}TheStatealsoarguesthaterrorwasharmlessbecauseoverwhelmingevidenceexistedtoproveDefendant’sguilt.Harm-lesserrorrequiresthefollowing:(1)sub-stantialevidencemustexisttosupportthe
convictionwithoutincludingtheimprop-erlyadmittedevidence,(2)adisproportion-atevolumeofpermissibleevidencemustexistsuchthatthe“improperevidencewillappearsominusculethatitcouldnothavecontributedtotheconviction,”and(3)nosubstantialconflictingevidencecanexisttodiscredittheState’spermissibletestimony.See State v. Barragan,2001-NMCA-086,¶19,131N.M.281,34P.3d1157.{23}Here, the first prong of the harm-lesserroranalysisissatisfiedbecause,asdiscussed later in this opinion, sufficientevidence exists to support Defendant’sconviction. The State fails to meet itsburden,however,inregardtothesecondandthirdprongsoftheanalysis.Underthefactsofthiscase,wecannotconcludethatthepermissibleevidencewassogreatthatthe improper questioningwasminusculeincomparison.TheStatereliesonthefol-lowingfactstoarguethatitsevidencewasoverwhelming.OfficersLongobardi andPiatt observedDefendant driving.AfterOfficerLongobardiarrestedDefendantfordomesticviolence,theofficerobservedthatDefendanthadslurredspeech;red,blood-shot,andwateryeyes;andaverystrongodorofalcoholonhisbreath.OfficerLon-gobardi testified thatDefendantadmittedhehadbeendrinkingathismother’sapart-ment.OfficerPiattobservedseveralopencansofbeerattheapartmentofDefendant’smother.AlthoughOfficerPiattspentverylittletimewithDefendant,theofficercon-cludedthatDefendanthadbeendrinking.Defendant refused toconsent toabreathtest.ThebulkoftheState’sevidencerestsonOfficerLongobardi’stestimony,andtheimproperquestioningdirectlyreflectedonthecredibilityofthattestimony.Thus,theimproperquestioningwasnot“sominus-culethatitcouldnothavecontributedtotheconviction.”See id.;see also State v. Fairweather,116N.M.456,461,863P.2d1077, 1082 (1993) (concluding that theerrorwasnot harmless because the onlyotherevidenceconsistedoftestimonybythe defendant and the complainants andthatcredibilitywasthusa“pivotalissueattrial”); Clark v. State,112N.M.485,487,816P.2d1107, 1109 (1991) (stating thatthe admission of evidence in a criminaltrial is not harmless if there is a reason-ablepossibilitythattheevidencemayhavecontributedtotheconviction).{24}Moreover,substantialevidenceexiststo discredit theState’s evidence.Defen-dant’stestimonydirectlycontradictedOf-ficerLongobardi’sassertionthatDefendantadmitted to drinking.Defendant testifiedthathedidnotadmittodrinkingbut,rather,
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toldOfficerLongobardi thatDefendant’sbrotherwasdrunk.Inaddition,OfficerPiatttestifiedthatotherpeoplehadbeendrinkingattheapartmentwhereheobservedthebeercans, includingDefendant’s brother andtwomenwhoweresleepingwhenOfficerPiattenteredtheapartment.Further,Defen-dantexplainedwhyherefusedtotakethebreathtest,andheassertedthathedidn’tthinkhewouldhavetestedoverthelegallimit ifhehad taken thebreath test.TheStatehasfailedtomeetitsburdenunderthethird prongbecause substantial evidenceexistedtodiscredit theState’s testimony.See State v. Tave,1996-NMCA-056,¶17,122 N.M. 29, 919P.2d 1094 (conclud-ing that substantial conflicting testimonyexisted such that the outcomedependedsolelyonwhichwitnessesthejuryfoundtobemorecredible);State v. Pacheco,110N.M.599,603-04,798P.2d200,204-05(Ct.App.1990)(“Therecordreflectsbothexculpatorytestimonyandanumberofdis-crepanciesinthestate’sevidencethatcouldhaveledtoanacquittal.”).“TheState’sbur-denistoprovebeyondareasonabledoubtthat the errorwasharmless, and the factthattheerrormighthavebeenharmlessisnotsufficienttosatisfythatburden.”Tave,1996-NMCA-056,¶17(emphasis,internalquotationmarks,andcitationomitted).Wetherefore cannot conclude that errorwasharmless.Underthefactsofthiscase,theStatehasfailedtocarryitsburdentoshowthat the prosecutor’s line of questioninginregardtotheveracityandcredibilityofOfficerLongobardi’stestimonywasharm-lessbeyondareasonabledoubt.See Duran,2006-NMSC-035,¶22.B. AdmissionofDefendant’sMVD
DrivingRecord{25}Defendantalsochallengeshisconvic-tionfordrivingwitharevokedorsuspend-edlicense.DefendantarguesthattheMVDrecords should not have been admittedunderthepublicrecordsexceptionbecausethecomputerprintoutofDefendant’sdriv-ing recordwasuntrustworthyon its faceandbecauseOfficerLongobardi testifiedthattheprintoutappearedtobeincompletewhen compared to the computer checkhe ran at the timeofDefendant’s arrest.Defendant further argues that admissionof theprintoutwas“notharmless,as theprosecutorhimselfrecognizedinhisstate-mentthattherewasnootherwaytoprovethat [Defendant’s] license ‘was in factsuspendedatthetimeoftheoffense.’”Wearenotconvinced.{26}TheStatemovedtoadmittheMVDpacketintoevidencetoshowthatDefen-dant’slicensehadbeensuspendedforten
years,asofSeptember3,1996,andthathislicensewasthusinvalidonthedateofhisarrest.AswediscussedintheBackgroundsectionofthisopinion,thecomputerprint-out contained in theMVDpacket statedthatDefendant’s licensewas suspendedonSeptember3,1996,whichisidentifiedasthe“BeginDate.”The“EndDate”forthisparticularsuspensionisnotedasSep-tember3,2096.Overobjectionofdefensecounsel,thecourtadmittedtherecordsforthelimitedpurposeofestablishingthestartdateofDefendant’ssuspension.Defendantappearstoarguethatthetrialcourtcannotadmitapublicrecordforalimitedpurposebecause“[a]publicrecordcannotbejusthalf-trustworthy.”{27}The rationalebehind thepublic re-cordsexceptionisthatthistypeofrecord,liketheexceptionforrecordsmadeintheregular course of business, “should beadmissibledespitethehearsayrulewherethesourcesofinformationandthemethodof preparation indicate trustworthiness.”State v. Ramirez,89N.M.635,644-45,556P.2d43,52-53(Ct.App.1976)(emphasisomitted),overruled on other grounds,Sells v. State,98N.M.786,788,653P.2d162,164 (1982);see also State v. Blakley,90N.M.744,748,568P.2d270,274(Ct.App.1977)(rulingthatcertifiedpublicrecordsconcerning the revocation of the defen-dant’sdriver’slicensewereadmissible).Afoundationisordinarilyunnecessarywhenintroducingapublicrecordintoevidencebecause a public official is presumed toproperlyperformhisdutyandbecauseitisthusmorelikelythatthepublicrecordwillbeaccurate.Ramirez,89N.M.at645,556P.2dat53.However,whenquestionsare“raisedaboutthemannerinwhichtherecordwasmadeorkept”orwhenother“sufficientnegativefactorsarepresent,”adeterminationof trustworthinessmustbemadeby the trial court before admittingtherecord.Id.(emphasis,internalquotationmarks,andcitationomitted);see alsoRule11-803(H)NMRA(describing thepublicrecords exception).When a question israisedaboutthetrustworthinessofapublicrecord,thecourtmayconsidersurroundingfactors to determine trustworthiness.See Ramirez,89N.M.at645,556P.2dat53.Thetrialcourtdoesnotabuseitsdiscretionbyadmittingtherecordif“surroundingfac-torsindicatesufficientreliability.”Id.{28} Defendant relies on State ex rel. Reynolds v. Holguin,95N.M.15,618P.2d359(1980),insupportofhisargument.OurSupremeCourtdiscussedthepublicrecordsexceptioninthecivilcontextinReynolds.TheappellantinReynoldsappealedthetrial
court’sexclusionofanaerialphotographintroduced for the purpose of establish-ingthedateonwhichthephotographwastaken. Id. at 16-17, 618P.2d at 360-61.Thephotographwasadmittedforcertainpurposesbutexcludedforthepurposeofprovingtheflightdatebecausetherewasnostatementonthefaceofthephotographregardingthedateandbecausetheappel-lant failed to produce sufficient verifica-tionofthedate.Id.at17-19,618P.2dat361-63.TheSupremeCourtaffirmedthetrial court’s decision barring admissionforestablishingthedatebutpermittingthesameexhibitforotherpurposes.Id.at19,618P.2dat363.{29}WearenotpersuadedthatReynoldssupportsDefendant’sargument.Rather,weconcludethatlikethecourtinReynolds,thetrialcourtheredidnotabuseitsdiscretionby admitting the computer printout fora limitedpurpose.See id. at 17,19,618P.2dat361,363.Inourcase,surroundingfactors supported the court’s determina-tionthat theprintoutwasreliablefor thelimitedpurpose.Seeid.at19,618P.2dat363.Defendantadmittedthathisdriver’slicensewasrevokedatthetimeofhisar-rest,andOfficerLongobarditestifiedthatthecomputercheckheranatthetimeofarrest indicated thatDefendant’s licensewasrevoked.Thus,weconcludethatthetrialcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionbyadmittingthecomputerprintoutforthelim-itedpurposeofestablishingthestartdateofDefendant’slicensesuspension.See State v. Stampley,1999-NMSC-027,¶37,127N.M.426,982P.2d477(“Admissionorex-clusionofevidenceisamatterwithinthediscretionofthetrialcourtandthecourt’sdeterminationwillnotbedisturbedonap-pealintheabsenceofaclearabuseofthatdiscretion.”(internalquotationmarksandcitationomitted));see alsoState v. Roybal,107N.M.309,310,756P.2d1204,1205(Ct.App.1988)(“Inabenchtrial,thetrialcourtispresumedtohavedisregardedim-properevidence,anderroneousadmissionofevidenceisnotreversibleerrorunlessitappearsthetrialcourtmusthavereliedonitinreachingitsdecision.”).{30}Defendant also relies on Beane v. Commonwealth, No. 85-CA-2161-DG,1986Ky.Ct.App.LEXIS1191(Aug.1,1986),insupportofhisargument.See id.,at**1,5-7(reversingthedefendant’sjuryconviction for drivingwith a suspendedlicense because the driver’s record wasthe only evidence offered to show thatthe license was suspended and becausethedefendantofferedevidencecreatingaquestionastothereliabilityofthatrecord).
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In our case,Defendant’s admission thathisdriver’slicensewasrevokedprovidedevidence,apartfromthechallengedrecord,sufficienttoprovethiselementofthecrimecharged.BecausethefactsinourcasearedifferentfromthoseinBeane,itsholdingdoesnotapply.Thus,Beaneisnothelpfulinourconsiderationoftheinstantcase.C. SufficientEvidencetoSupport
Defendant’sConviction{31}Defendantalsoargues that theevi-dencewasinsufficienttosupporthiscon-victionforaggravatedDWI.Thejurywasinstructed that itmustfind the followingelementstruebeyondareasonabledoubtinordertoconvictDefendantofaggravatedDWI:
1. [D]efendant drove a motorvehicle;2.Atthetime,[D]efendantwasundertheinfluenceofintoxicatingliquor;thatis,asaresultofdrink-ing liquor[,D]efendantwas lessabletotheslightestdegree,eithermentally or physically, or both,to exercise the clear judgmentandthesteadyhandnecessarytohandleavehiclewithsafetytothepersonandthepublic;3.[D]efendantrefusedtosubmittoachemicaltest;4.ThishappenedinNewMexicoonoraboutthe16thdayofJuly,2003.
SeeNMSA1978,§66-8-102(D)(3)(2005);UJI14-4508NMRA.{32}Defendant argues that the officersobserved inDefendant’sdrivingorotherpersonal behaviors no irregularities thatmight indicate intoxication.He contendsthatOfficerLongobardi’s allegations areunsupportedbecausehefailedtoconductanyfieldsobriety tests,even thoughDe-fendantwas cooperative.Defendant alsoasserts that heoffered a plausible expla-nation for declining the breath test, thatOfficer Longobardi admitted that otherexplanationsmay exist for the conditionofDefendant’seyesandspeech,andthatOfficerLongobardiadmittedthattheodorofalcoholdidnotindicatetheamountofalcoholconsumed.Insummary,Defendantarguesthatinmostcases,thecourtshaverequiredmuchmoreevidencethanexistsheretoproveeachelementbeyondarea-sonabledoubt.{33}Defendant relies on the followingcases: Caudillo, 2003-NMCA-042, ¶8(stating that the evidencewas sufficienttosupportaconclusionthatthedefendantwas impaired when the defendant wasinvolvedinanaccident,admittedtohav-
ingdrunkafewbeers,andrefusedtotakeabloodalcoholtestandwhentheofficersnoticedslurredspeechandastrongodorofalcohol);State v. Sanchez,2001-NMCA-109,¶¶15-16,131N.M.355,36P.3d446(concludingthattheevidencewassufficientwhen the defendant admitted to havingbeen drinking, refused to performfieldsobriety tests,was “‘babbling’”while atthescene,demandedtobetakentojail,andkickedthepatrolcarwhenhewasplacedinsideandwhentheofficernoticedblood-shot,wateryeyesandasmellofalcohol);State v. Jones,1998-NMCA-076,¶10,125N.M.556,964P.2d117(concludingthattheofficerhadprobablecausetoarrestthedefendantforDWIwhenhehitanothercarfrombehind,admittedtohavingdrunktwobeers,swayedwhenhewastalkingtotheofficer,andfailedthefieldsobrietytestsandwhentheofficernoticedbloodshot,wateryeyes, slurred speech, and a strong odorofalcohol);State v. Ruiz,120N.M.534,535,540,903P.2d845,846,851(Ct.App.1995) (concluding that the evidencewassufficientwhenthedefendantwasspeed-ingandweaving,refusedtostopforfourblocks,admittedtohavingbeendrinking,andgaveafalsenameatthescene;whentheofficernoticedbloodshot,wateryeyes,slurredspeech,andasmellofalcohol;andwhentheresultsofthefieldsobrietytestsweremixed);andState v. Hernandez,95N.M.125,126,619P.2d570,571(Ct.App.1980)(concludingthatprobablecauseforarrestexistedwhentheofficerrespondedtoacallreportingthatthedefendanthadbeen drinking,was causing trouble at aresidence, andwas leavingwith a smallchildinthecarandwhentheofficernoticedslurredspeechandasmellofalcohol).{34}WeagreethattheevidenceinmanyofthecasesreliedonbyDefendantisgreaterthanthatpresentunderthefactsofthiscase.Wecannotagree,however,thatthejury’sverdictwas not supported by sufficientevidence.Basedonthefactsinthiscase,thejurywasentitledtofindthatDefendant,asaresultofdrinkingliquor,wasdrivingwhile “less able to the slightest degree,eithermentallyor physically, or both, toexercisetheclearjudgmentandsteadyhandnecessarytohandleavehiclewithsafetytothepersonandthepublic.”SeeUJI14-4508.AsdiscussedinsectionsI.AandIII.A.4.bofthisopinion,therecordrevealsthefollowingfacts.OfficersLongobardiandPiatt observedDefendant driving.AfterOfficer Longobardi arrested Defendantfordomesticviolence,theofficerobservedthat Defendant had red, bloodshot, andwatery eyes, as well as slurred speech
andaverystrongodorofalcoholonhisbreath.OfficerLongobardi testified thatDefendantadmittedhehadbeendrinkingat hismother’s apartment.Officer PiattobservedseveralopencansofbeerattheapartmentofDefendant’smother.OfficerPiatt concluded thatDefendanthadbeendrinking, andOfficerLongobardiopinedthatDefendantwasundertheinfluenceofalcohol. In addition,Defendant does notdisputethatherefusedtoconsenttoabloodalcoholtest.AjurymayinferDefendant’sconsciousnessofguiltandfearofthetestresultsfromDefendant’srefusaltotakeabreathtest.See McKay v. Davis,99N.M.29,32,653P.2d860,863(1982);Caudillo,2003-NMCA-042,¶8.Moreover,thejuryisfreetodisregardDefendant’stestimonydenying his admission of drinking andexplaining his refusal to take the breathtest. See Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶19(“Contrary evidence supporting acquittaldoesnotprovideabasis for reversalbe-causethejuryisfreetorejectDefendant’sversionofthefacts.”).Fromthesefacts,arationaljurycouldinferthatDefendantwasdrivingundertheinfluenceofintoxicatingliquor.Viewingthefactsandindulginginallpermissible inferences in favorof theverdict,we conclude that sufficient evi-denceexistedtoprovebeyondareasonabledoubteachelementofthecrimecharged.See§66-8-102(D)(3).IV.CONCLUSION{35}We hold that the prosecutor im-properly questionedDefendant in regardto theveracityof theofficer’s testimonyandthatthetrialcourt’sfailuretosustainDefendant’sobjectionwasreversibleerror.Wefurtherrulethatthetrialcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretionbyadmittingthecom-puterprintoutfromtheMVDpacketintoevidenceforalimitedpurpose.Finally,weconclude that sufficient evidence existedfromwhicharationaljurycouldinferthatDefendantwasdrivingwhileunderthein-fluenceofintoxicatingliquor.Accordingly,wereverseDefendant’sconvictionforDWIandremandforanewtrial,andweaffirmDefendant’sconvictionfordrivingwitharevokedorsuspendedlicense.{36} ITISSOORDERED. CELIAFOYCASTILLO, Judge
Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28 ��
Certiorari Denied, No. 30,391, June 25, 2007
From the New Mexico Court of Appeals
Opinion Number: 2007-NMCA-078
CARL HAMBERG,Plaintiff-Appellant,
versusSANDIA CORPORATION, d/b/a SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES,
Defendant-Appellee.No. 26,559 (filed: April 18, 2007)
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTYGERALDINE E. RIVERA, District Judge
DUANE LINDAlbuquerque, New Mexico
WILLIAM H. LAZARTesuque, New Mexico
for Appellant
DEBORAH D. WELLSKENNEDY, MOULTON & WELLS, P.C.
Albuquerque, New Mexico
EDWARD RICCOJOCELYN DRENNAN
RODEY, DICKASON, SLOAN, AKIN & ROBB, P.A.
Albuquerque, New Mexico
CHARLES PECHEWLYSSANDIA CORPORATION
Albuquerque, New Mexicofor Appellee
opinion
lynn pickard, Judge
{1} Plaintiff appeals from the districtcourt’s award of summary judgment infavor ofDefendant, SandiaCorporation,doingbusinessasSandiaNationalLabo-ratories.On appeal, Plaintiff argues thatthedistrictcourterredasamatteroflawindeterminingthatDefendantwasPlaintiff’sspecial employer and therefore immunefrom tort liability under the exclusivityprovisionsoftheWorkers’CompensationAct(WCA),NMSA1978,§§52-1-6(D),(E), -8, -9 (1937, as amended through1990).Weaffirm.BACKGROUND{2}Plaintiffwas an employee ofOrionInternationalTechnologies, Inc. (Orion).Orion is a government services contrac-tor that provides “contract employees”to governmental agencies. DefendantcontractedwithOrion in 1996 for “staffaugmentationpersonnel”tobeprovidedbyOrionasneededbyDefendant.Underthecontract,whenDefendantidentifiesaneedforpersonnel,itsubmitsajobdescription
andrequirementsforthepositiontoOrion.OrionthenprovidesDefendantwithalistofqualifiedcandidatesandDefendantselectswhichcandidateitwants.{3}PursuanttoDefendant’scontractwithOrion,Defendantprovidesday-to-daytech-nicaldirectiontothecontractemployees.Thisincludesassigningwork,monitoringtechnical performance and compliancewith safety standards, authorizing travelandtraining,assigningovertime,approvingtimerecords,andinspectingworkinprog-ressorcompletedbythecontractemployee.DefendantmayalsodirectOriontoremoveanycontract employee from thecontractwithDefendant.Orion,ontheotherhand,isresponsibleforalldecisionsrelatingtohiring,firing,promotions,demotions,com-pensation,employeebenefits,employmentduration,careerdevelopment,andpositionreclassifications and reassignments. Forthe purposes of the contract, all contractemployees are considered employees ofOrionandarenotconsideredDefendant’semployees.{4}PlaintiffwashiredbyOrionin2001.Hewasassignedtoworkasagraphicstech-
nologistforDefendantpursuanttothestaffaugmentationcontractbetweenOrionandDefendant.Plaintiff’semploymentagree-mentwithOrionstatedthatOrion,andnotDefendant,wasPlaintiff’semployer.OrionpaidPlaintiffanhourlywage,offeredhimemployment benefits, and provided himwith vacation and sick leave. Plaintiff’sjobdescriptionasacontractemployeeforDefendantwastoprovidegraphicdesignservicesinsupportofDefendant’smarket-ingefforts.{5}Plaintiffwas injured in2002after asupervisoremployedbyDefendantalleg-edlyorderedPlaintiff todisassembleandmovealargemetalstorageunit.Plaintiffreceivedworkers’ compensation benefitspaid byOrion and then suedDefendantfor personal injuries resulting fromDe-fendant’s alleged negligence.Defendantmovedforsummaryjudgment,arguingthatPlaintiff’ssuitwasbarredbytheexclusivityprovisionsoftheWCA.ThedistrictcourtgrantedDefendant’smotionforsummaryjudgment.Thisappealfollows.STANDARDOFREVIEW{6}Wereviewthedistrictcourt’sgrantofsummaryjudgmentinfavorofDefendantdenovo.Self v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,1998-NMSC-046,¶6,126N.M.396,970P.2d582.Summaryjudgmentisappropri-ate“wheretherearenogenuineissuesofmaterialfactandthemovantisentitledtojudgmentasamatteroflaw.”Id.;see alsoRule1-056(C)NMRA.Onreview,wewill“viewthefactsinthelightmostfavorabletothepartyopposingsummaryjudgment,drawing all inferences in favor of thatparty.”Stieber v. Journal Publ’g Co.,120N.M.270,271-72,901P.2d201,202-03(Ct.App.1995).DISCUSSION{7} In general, employerswho complywiththerequirementsoftheWCAenjoyimmunityfromtortactionsbroughtbyaninjuredemployee.See§§52-1-6(D),(E),-8,-9;Vigil v. Digital Equip. Corp.,1996-NMCA-100,¶7,122N.M.417,925P.2d883;Rivera v. Sagebrush Sales, Inc.,118N.M.676,677-78,884P.2d832,833-34(Ct.App.1994).But see Delgado v. Phelps Dodge Chino, Inc.,2001-NMSC-034,¶1,131N.M.272,34P.3d1148(holding“thatwhenanemployerwillfullyor intention-allyinjuresaworker,thatemployer,likeaworkerwhocommitsthesamemisconduct,loses the rights afforded by theAct”).“Thisstatutoryschemeensuresthatinjuredworkersareadequatelycompensatedandthat employersmay avoid excessive tortliability.” Vigil, 1996-NMCA-100, ¶ 7.
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Beforeanemployermayseektheprotec-tionoftheWCA’sexclusivityprovisions,however,theremustexist“someformofanemployer-employeerelationship,eitherstatutoryoractual.”Quintana v. Univ. of Cal., 111N.M. 679, 681, 808P.2d 964,966 (Ct.App. 1991),overruled on other grounds by Harger v. Structural Servs., Inc.,1996-NMSC-018,121N.M.657,666n.3,916P.2d1324,1333n.3.TheemployermustalsocomplywiththeWCA’sinsur-anceprovisions.See Harger,121N.M.at666,916P.2dat1333.{8}Atissueinthepresentcaseiswhetheranemployer-employeerelationshipexistsbetweenPlaintiffandDefendantsuchthatPlaintiff’snegligenceclaimagainstDefen-dantisbarredbytheexclusivityprovisionsoftheWCA.Below,thedistrictcourtcon-cludedthatDefendantwasPlaintiff’sspe-cialemployerandthereforeentitledtoseekrefugeundertheexclusivityprovisionsoftheWCA.Onappeal,PlaintiffarguesthatthedistrictcourterredindeterminingthatDefendantwasaspecialemployerentitledto immunity under theWCA. Plaintiffasserts that the special employer test, asdescribedinRivera,118N.M.at678-79,884P.2dat834-35,isnotapplicabletothefactsofthiscaseandthatthedistrictcourtshouldhaveappliedthestatutoryemployertestdescribedinHarger,121N.M.at664-66,916P.2dat1331-33.Plaintiffcontendsthatunderthattest,Defendantwouldnotbeprotectedbytheexclusivityprovisionsof theWCA, and Plaintiff’s suit wouldthereforenotbebarred.{9}Wetaketheopportunitytoonceagainattempttodescribethedifferencesbetweenstatutoryemployersandspecialemployers.See Rivera,118N.M.at678,884P.2dat834(observingthatthedifferencebetweenthetwotests“isamatterofsomeconfu-sionwithinthepracticingbar,withsomepeopletakingthepositionthatthereisnodistinction and that borrowed employeesarejustonesortofstatutoryemployee”).As part of that discussion, we examinePlaintiff’s contention that the totality ofthecircumstancestestdescribedinHarger,121N.M.at664,916P.2dat1331,shouldbeappliedtothefactsofthiscase.Finally,afterdeterminingthatthespecialemployertestisthecorrecttestunderthefactsofthiscase,wewillthendecidewhethersummaryjudgmentwasproperlygrantedinfavorofDefendant.A. SpecialEmployer&Statutory
EmployerTests{10} The special employer test is a“creatureofthecommonlaw.”Bendure v.
Great Lakes Pipe Line Co.,433P.2d558,563(Kan.1967).Thetestarisesoutoftheborrowedor lent employee doctrine andappliestosituations“whereanemployeeof one employer, the general employer,works temporarily for another employer,thespecialemployer.” Rodriguez v. Martin Landscaping,882S.W.2d602,604(Tex.Ct.App.1994); see Rivera, 118N.M.at678-79, 884P.2d at 834-35.The typicalfactualscenarioinwhichthistestarisesisincaseswherealaborcontractororalaborservice provides temporary workers tootheremployers.See Vigil,1996-NMCA-100,¶¶16-18;Rivera, 118N.M.at681,884P.2d at 837;Word v. Motorola, Inc.,662P.2d1024,1027n.5(Ariz.1983)(enbanc);Ghersi v. Salazar, 883P.2d1352,1356-57(Utah1994).“Oncetherelation-shipoflentemployeeorspecialemployeeandemployerisestablished,thespecialem-ployeebecomestheservantofthespecialemployerandassumesthepositionundertheWorkmen’s CompensationAct as aregularemployee....”Bendure,433P.2dat564;see also Ghersi,883P.2dat1356(“Almostwithout exception, courts havereliedontheloanedemployeedoctrinetoholdthatthespecialemployerofatempo-raryemployeeisanemployerforworkers’compensationpurposes.”).Specialemploy-erswhocomplywiththeWCA’sinsuranceprovisionsareentitled to immunity fromtortsuits.See Rivera,118N.M.at677-78,884P.2dat833-34.{11}Althoughthestatutoryemployertestserves a similar purpose to that servedbythespecialemployertest,itisappliedunderdifferentfactualcircumstances.Id.at680,884P.2dat836;see alsoLindsey v. Bucyrus-Erie,778P.2d1353,1355(Ariz.Ct.App. 1989) (“The statutorily createdemployer-employee relationship isa leg-islative schemebywhichconcedednon-employeesaredeliberatelybroughtwithincoverage of theWorkers’CompensationActandisinapplicabletotheclassiclentemployee relationship involved here.”);Bendure, 433 P.2d at 563 (“Where theappropriatefactsarepresenttheemploy-mentmaybring the employeeunder theWorkmen’sCompensationActasastatu-toryemployeeorthefactsmayeliminatetherelationshipofstatutoryemployerandemployeeandbringtheworkmanunderthe[A]ctasaspecialemployee.”);McGinnis v. Waste Mgmt. of La., L.L.C.,914So.2d612,616(La.Ct.App.2005)(“Specialemployerstatusisdistinguishedfromthatofastatu-toryemployer.”);Ghersi,883P.2dat1356(“Therelationshipsbetweenalaborservice,
a ‘loaned’or temporaryemployee,andatemporary employer are different fromstatutoryemployer-employeerelationshipsanddifferent legalprinciplesgovern thatrelationship.”).Thestatutoryemployertestaroseoutofstatutesenactedinresponsetothe common law rule that “an employeeof a contractor or subcontractorwas notconsidered an employee of the principalandsuchanemployee...wasnotentitledtocompensationfromtheprincipalorem-ployerof the contractoror subcontractorundertheoriginalWorkmen’sCompensa-tionAct.”Bendure,433P.2dat563;cf.4ArthurLarson&LexK.Larson,Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law§73.03[2],at73-8(2006)(“[O]nepurposeofthestatu-tory-employerstatuteistopreventevasionoftheactbyparcelingouttheemployer’sownworkintheformofsubcontracts.”).{12} InNewMexico, the statute givingrisetothestatutoryemployertestisNMSA1978, § 52-1-22 (1989),which providesthat:
where any employer procuresanyworktobedonewhollyorinpartforhimbyacontractorotherthan an independent contractorand thework so procured to bedone is a part or process in thetradeorbusinessorundertakingofsuchemployer,thensuchem-ployer shall be liable to pay allcompensationundertheWorkers’CompensationAct to the sameextent as if theworkwere donewithout the interventionof suchcontractor.
Underthisstatutoryprovision,aemployeris considered a statutory employerwhentwoconditionsaremet:“(1)theemployermustprocureworktobedonebyacontrac-tor other than an independent contractorand(2)theworkmustbeapartofthetradeorbusinessoftheemployer.”Rivera,118N.M. at 680, 884 P.2d at 836; see also Chavez v. Sundt Corp.,1996-NMSC-046,¶8,122N.M.78,920P.2d1032;Harger,121N.M.at662,916P.2dat1329;Quintana,111N.M.at681,808P.2dat966.Unlikethe special employer test that addressessituations dealingwith lent or borrowedemployees, the statutory employer testtypically “address[es] theprime contrac-tor-subcontractor situation.”Rivera, 118N.M. at 680, 884 P.2d at 836; see also Bendure,433P.2dat563(“Differentfactsare necessary to create the twodifferentrelationships.”).{13}Beforeaddressingwhichtestisap-propriateinthepresentcase,weinitially
Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28 ��
observethatPlaintiffmisstatesthestatutoryemployertest.PlaintiffclaimsthatHarger established a “totality of [the] circum-stances”testforwhetheranemployercanbe considered a statutory employer. See Harger,121N.M.at664,916P.2dat1331.PlaintiffappearstoassertthattheadoptionofatotalityofthecircumstancesapproachinthestatutoryemployercontextsuggeststhatweshouldapplythetestdescribedinHargertothefactsofthiscase,evenifitisdeemedaspecialemployercase.Webe-lievethatPlaintiffmisconstruesHarger.{14}ThetestthatPlaintiffurgesthisCourttoapplytothefactsofthiscaseisnotthetestfordeterminingwhetheranemployercanbeconsideredastatutoryemployer,butratheristhetesttobeusedindeterminingwhether a contractor is an independentcontractor,which is expressly exemptedfromSection52-1-22.See Celaya v. Hall,2004-NMSC-005,¶11,135N.M.115,85P.3d239(statingthatinHarger,theCourt“adopted the Restatement (Second) ofAgency§220(1958)toidentifyaninde-pendentcontractorforpurposesofworkers’compensation”); Chavez, 1996-NMSC-046,¶¶8-12(applyingthetotalityofthecircumstancestestdescribedinHargertodeterminewhetherasubcontractorwasanindependentcontractorunderSection52-1-22);Benavidez v. Sierra Blanca Motors,1998-NMCA-070,¶8,125N.M.235,959P.2d 569 (recognizing that the SupremeCourt’sopinioninHargerfocusedonthemeaningoftheterm“independentcontrac-tor”asusedinSection52-1-22).ContrarytoPlaintiff’sassertions,theCourtinHargerdidnotrejectanypreviouslyusedspecialor statutory employer tests, but insteadrejectedourCourt’sformulationofatesttodeterminewhetherapartyisanindepen-dentcontractor.Harger,121N.M.at664,916P.2d at 1331 (rejecting thisCourt’sdefinition of “independent contractor”and adopting the definition found in theRestatement (Second)ofAgency§220).Indeed,theCourtinHargerobservedthatthesametwo-parttestdescribedabovewasthepropertestfordeterminingwhetheranemployercanbeconsideredastatutoryem-ployerunderSection52-1-22.Harger,121N.M.at662,916P.2dat1329(statingthatan employer is a statutory employer andthereforeimmuneundertheWCAwhen:“(1) . . . thework isdoneby‘acontrac-torotherthananindependentcontractor,’and(2)...theworkis‘apartorprocessinthetradeorbusinessorundertaking’ofthe employer of the contractor” (citationomitted)).
{15}Moreover,therewasnoquestioninHargerthatthestatutoryemployertestwasthecorrecttestunderthefactsofthetwoconsolidatedcasesonappeal.Inonecase,ageneralcontractorrenovatingtheCityofAlbuquerque’swastewatertreatmentplanthiredasubcontractortosandblastandapplyprotectivecoatingstoclarifierunitsattheplant.Romero v. Shumate Constructors, Inc.,119N.M.58,62,888P.2d940,944(Ct.App. 1994), rev’d in part on other grounds by Harger,121N.M.at661,670,916P.2dat1328,1337.Theinjuredworkerwas an employee of the subcontractor.Romero,119N.M.at62,888P.2dat944.Inthesecondconsolidatedcase,ageneralcontractorwashiredtoconstructaschoolinZuni,NewMexico,andcontractedwitha subcontractor to do mechanical workontheproject.Id.Asinthefirstcase,theinjuredemployeewasanemployeeofthesubcontractor.Id.{16}Applying the two-part statutoryemployer test to the consolidated cases,thisCourt determined that both generalcontractorswerestatutoryemployersunderSection52-1-22.Romero,119N.M.at63-70,888P.2dat945-52.TheSupremeCourtreversed, holding that the subcontractorswere in fact independentcontractorsandthereforethetwo-partstatutoryemployertest was not met. Harger, 121 N.M. at669-70,916P.2dat1336-37.Insoholding,Hargerdidnotrejectthetwo-partstatutoryemployertestinfavorofatotalityofthecircumstancesapproach,nordiditother-wisesuggestthatthespecialemployertestshouldberejected.See Vigil,1996-NMCA-100,¶24(“Harger,however,didnotques-tion thisCourt’s decision or analysis inRivera,inwhichweclearlyseparatedtheconceptsofspecialorborrowedemployersfromtheconceptofstatutoryemployees.”).WethereforeconcludethatPlaintiff’sreli-anceonHargerismisplaced.{17}Additionally,weconcludethatPlain-tiff’sclaimthatheisanindependentcon-tractorandthereforethestatutoryemployertestisnotmetisincorrectasamatteroflaw.WenotethatitisnotclearfromPlaintiff’sbriefwhetherPlaintiffbelievesthatheisanindependentcontractororwhetherhisemployerOrionis.However,totheextentthatPlaintiffarguesthatDefendantcannotbeastatutoryemployerbecausePlaintiffisanindependentcontractor,webelievethatPlaintiffconfusestheissue:
Both parties discuss at greatlength the various tests thatwehaveusedinthepasttodeterminewhether a person was an em-
ployeeforworkers’compensationpurposes.Those tests, however,were designed to differentiateemployees from independentcontractors,andhavenotprovedusefulhere,wherethequestioniswhose employee [Plaintiff]was,ratherthanwhetherornothewasanemployeeatall.
Ruble v. Arctic Gen., Inc., 598P.2d 95,96-97 (Alaska 1979) (footnote omitted).Moreover, if Plaintiffwas truly an inde-pendentcontractor,hewouldnothavebeenentitledtothenearly$200,000inworkers’compensationbenefitsthathehasalreadyreceivedfromOrion.See Headley v. Mor-gan Mgmt. Corp.,2005-NMCA-045,¶13,137N.M.339,110P.3d1076.{18}Additionally,totheextentthatPlain-tiffappearstoarguethatOrionisaninde-pendentcontractor(andthusthestatutoryemployertestisnotmet),weobservethata conclusion that the statutory employertestisnotmetdoesnotforeclosethisCourtfromconsideringwhetherthespecialem-ployertest isapplicable.See Rivera,118N.M.at680,884P.2dat836.Where,ashere,thefactssuggestthattheemployer-employeerelationshipismorelikethatofaborrowedor lentemployeeasopposedtoacontractor-subcontractorsituation,thefact that the statutoryemployer testmayormaynotbemetissimplyimmaterialtoouranalysis.{19}Asageneralmatter,“thestatutory-employerdoctrinegovernsonlysituationsinwhichanemployerprocuresworktobedoneforhimbyacontractor.”Id.at681,884P.2d at 837. In this case,DefendantdidnotprocureworktobedonebyOrion,but instead sought temporary employeestoaugmentitsowndepartmentsandstaff.Plaintiff’s assertion thatDefendant pro-curedworktobedonebyoneofOrion’semployees, as opposed to Orion itself,supports our conclusion that the facts ofthiscasemoreappropriatelypresentalentorborrowedemployeesituationratherthanaprimecontractor-subcontractorsituation.See id. (“Sagebrush undertook to do itsownworkthroughitsownemployeesandtemporaryworkers suppliedbyMadden.ItdidnotcontractwithMaddentorunthelumberyard,but simply tosupply itwithtemporarylaborerswhomSagebrushwoulddirectinperformingtheworkofthelum-beryard.”);Word,662P.2dat1026(“Here,MotoroladidnotprocureworktobedonebyParamount.Itundertooktoperformthework itself, through its employees, andprocuredplaintiffandadditionaltemporary
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employeesfromParamountandotherlaborcontractors.”).{20}A comparison of twoof our caseslends particular support to our conclu-sion. InRivera, a lumberyard contractedwithatemporaryemploymentagencyforworkerstoworkatthelumberyardonanas-neededbasis.118N.M.at677,884P.2dat833.Oneofthetemporaryworkerswassubsequentlyinjuredwhileworkingatthelumberyard. Id. In concluding that bothparties’relianceoncasesinvolvingstatu-toryemployerswasmisplaced,thisCourtobserved that the lumberyard contractedwith the temporary employment agencyforworkers to perform the lumberyard’swork—itdidnotcontractwiththeagencyfortheagencytorunthelumberyard.Id.at681,884P.2dat837.Assuch,thestatutoryemploymenttestwasnotapplicabletothefactsofthecase,asthefactsdidnotpres-ent a contractor-subcontractor situation.See, e.g., Ghersi, 883 P.2d at 1356 (“Atemporarylaborserviceisnotlikeasub-contractor.Suchaservicedoesnotperformanyworkforcustomers;itmerelysuppliesor‘loans’workerswhoareundercontracttotheservicetoworkasanemployeeforaclient.”(citationsomitted)).{21}Conversely, the facts in Quintanadopresentsuchasituation.InQuintana,a national laboratory contracted with acompany toprovidesupport functions tothelaboratory.111N.M.at680,808P.2dat965.UnlikethetemporaryemploymentagencyinRivera,thecompanyinQuintanawasnotsimplyprovidingtemporarywork-ers toassist thenational laboratoryin itsoperations,butinsteadwasitselfactuallyperformingworkforthelaboratorybypro-vidingessentialservices.See id.Thus,thestatutoryemployertestwastheappropriatetestgiventhefactsofthecase.Compare Vigil,1996-NMCA-100,¶¶16-22(apply-ingthespecialemployertestwhereworkerwasemployedbyapersonnelagencyandassignedtoworkatanothercompany),with Romero, 119N.M. at 63-64, 888P.2d at945-46(engaginginastatutoryemployeranalysiswhereworkerswereemployedbysubcontractorswho had contractedwithgeneralcontractorstoperformwork).{22}Inthepresentcase,Plaintiffhasnotpresented any evidence to suggest thatOrionwasitselfprovidinggraphicdesignservices forDefendant. Such a scenariowouldpresent a contractor-subcontractorsituation where the statutory employertest would have relevance. Rather, theundisputed facts indicate thatOrionpro-videdDefendantwithcontractemployees
intendedtoaugmentDefendant’salreadyexistingoperations.Thissituationismuchmoreakintothatofaborrowedorloanedemployee.{23}Despitethesefacts,Plaintiffassertshecannotbeconsideredaborrowedemployeebecause (1) he is a skilled artisan whoworkedwithoutDefendant’ssupervision;(2)hisemploymentcontractstatedthathewasOrion’semployee;(3)hewasreferredto as a “contractor” or a “consultant” atwork; and (4) his employment was notshortterm,butwasexpectedtolastmorethan three years.According to Plaintiff,thesefactsindicatethathewasaprocuredcontractorandnotaborrowedemployee,andthereforethespecialemploymenttestisnotapplicable.{24}Plaintiffcitesnoauthorityinsupportofthesepropositions.See ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 1998-NMCA-078,¶10,125N.M.244,959P.2d969(“ITTcitesnoauthorityforthispropo-sitionandthereforeitwillnotbeconsideredinthisappeal.”).Further,totheextentthatPlaintiffattemptstousethesefactsinsup-portofhisclaimthatheisanindependentcontractor,wefindsuchassertionswithoutmeritasPlaintiffcannotbeconsideredanindependentcontractorunderthefactsofthiscase.Aspreviouslydiscussed,theis-sueisnotwhetherPlaintiffisanemployeeoranindependentcontractor,butwhetherPlaintiff,asanemployeeofOrion,mayalsobeconsideredanemployeeofDefendantforworkers’compensationpurposes.See Ruble,598P.2dat96-97.{25}Because thefactsof thiscase indi-cate thatOrion lent or suppliedPlaintifftoDefendantasacontractemployee,weconclude that the district court correctlydeterminedthatthespecialemployeetestwasapplicabletothecaseatbar.Wenowturntothequestionofwhetherthedistrictcourtcorrectlyfoundthattheelementsofthespecialemployertestweremet.B. ApplicationoftheSpecialEmploy-
erTesttotheFactsofthisCase{26}Inthepresentcase,thereisnoques-tion thatPlaintiffwasdirectly employedby Orion. However, under the specialemployer doctrine, Defendant may beconsideredPlaintiff’sspecialemployerifthefollowingfactorsaremet:
(1)theemployeehasmadeacon-tractofhire,expressor implied,withthespecialemployer;(2)theworkbeingdoneisessen-tiallythatofthespecialemployer;and(3) the special employerhas the
righttocontrolthedetailsofthework.
Rivera,118N.M.at678-79,884P.2dat834-35 (quoting 1BArthurLarson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation§48.00,at8-434(1993)); see also Johnson v. Aztec Well Servicing Co., 117N.M. 697, 699,875P.2d1128, 1130 (Ct.App. 1994). Iftheabovetestismet,DefendantisaspecialemployerandisentitledtoimmunityfromtortliabilityundertheAct,providingthatDefendantcompliedwiththeAct’sinsur-anceprovisions.See Rivera,118N.M.at679-80, 884P.2d at 835-36.On appeal,Plaintiffconcedesthatthefirstfactorismet,butarguesthatgenuineissuesofmaterialfactexistastotheremainingfactors.Wedisagree.{27}As to the second factor, Plaintiffargues thatDefendant’s primarywork is“focusedonscientificendeavorsdirectedatnationalsecurity.”Plaintiffcontends,there-fore,thathisworkasagraphicdesignerinsupportofDefendant’smarketingeffortswaspurelyincidentaltoDefendant’smis-sionandcannotbeconsideredtheworkoftheDefendant.However,asrecognizedbyDefendant,Plaintiff’sdistinctionbetweenprimary and incidental work has beenpreviouslyrejectedbythisCourtinVigil,1996-NMCA-100,¶20.{28}InVigil,apersonnelagencyassignedtheplaintifftoworkasacontractemployeeforDigitalEquipmentCorporation(Digi-tal).Id.¶4.Theplaintiffwasassignedtodismantleconveyorbeltsandwassubse-quentlyinjuredonthejob.Id.¶¶3-4.TheplaintifflaterarguedthatbecauseDigitalwas not in the business of dismantlingconveyorbelts,hewasnotdoingtheworkofDigital. Id. ¶ 20.ThisCourt rejectedthisargument,notingthatDigitalrequiredconveyorbeltsforitsbusinessoperations.Id.Additionally,thisCourtobservedthatthe plaintiff’swork could not be that ofthe personnel agency, as it was “in thebusinessofrecruitingandmanagingtem-porary workers.” Id.This Court furthernoted that the plaintiffwas onDigital’spremises when he was injured and thathewasbeingsupervisedbyemployeesofDigital.Id.Thus,thisCourtconcludedthattheplaintiffwasdoingtheworkofDigitalwhenhewasinjured.Id.{29}Similarly,althoughDefendantisnotin thebusinessofmarketing, itsmarket-ingeffortsarepartofitsoverallbusinessoperations.Orion,ontheotherhand,isinthebusinessofprovidingstaffaugmenta-tionservicestogovernmentalentities.See Rivera,118N.M.at679,884P.2dat835
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(“TheworkthatRiverawasdoing,tagginglumber,wasclearlytheworkofSagebrush,whichwasinthelumberyardbusiness,asopposedtotheworkofMadden,whichwasinthebusinessofrecruitingandsupplyingtemporarylaborers.”).Plaintiffperformedhiswork atDefendant’s facilities and insupportofDefendant’smarketingefforts.Additionally, Plaintiff was injured onDefendant’spremiseswhileallegedlyfol-lowing the orders of oneofDefendant’semployees.WethereforerejectPlaintiff’sargumentthathewasnotdoingtheworkofDefendant.{30}Plaintiffnextarguesthatthethirdfac-torisnotmetbecausethereisnoindicationthatDefendanthadtherighttocontrolthedetailsofPlaintiff’swork.Insupportofhisassertion,Plaintiffpointstocontractprovi-sionsbetweenOrionandDefendantstatingthatOrionwasresponsibleforalldecisionsrelatingtohiring,firing,promotions,demo-tions, compensation, employee benefits,employmentduration,careerdevelopment,andpositionreclassificationsandreassign-ments.Additionally,Plaintiff asserts thatheworkedindependentlyfromDefendantwithout supervision. Lastly, PlaintiffclaimsthatDefendant’sinsistencethatnoemployer-employee relationship existedbetweenOrion’semployeesandDefendantfurtherdemonstratesthatDefendanthadnocontroloverPlaintiff.Wearenotpersuadedthatthisevidencecreatesanissueofmate-rialfactastothethirdfactor.{31}The third factorof the special em-ployer test contemplates “that both thegeneralemployerandthespecialemployermayhaveconcurrentrightstocontroltheemployeeofboth employers.” Rhodes v. Ala. Power Co.,599So.2d27,29(Ala.1992).The dispositive issue under thisfactor iswhether “‘the special employerhas the right tocontrol thedetailsof thework’of theemployee,notwhichof theemployershassucharight.”Id.(quotingTerry v. Read Steel Prods.,430So.2d862,865(Ala.1983));see also Teska v. Potlatch Corp.,184F.Supp.2d913,928(D.Minn.2002)(“Thelending,orgeneralemployer,does not have to completely surrenderall control over the employee, and theborrowing,orspecialemployer,doesnothavetoexercisecompletecontrolovertheemployee,suchastheabilitytodisciplineortofire.”).Significantly,thefocusofouranalysisisnotonwhetherDefendantactu-allycontrolledPlaintiff’swork,butinsteadon whether Defendant merely had therighttocontrolthework.SeeBenavidez,1998-NMCA-070, ¶12; 99C.J.S.Work-
ers’ Compensation§123,at189-90(2000)(“[T]heactualexerciseofcontrolovertheworkerisnotdeterminative.Instead,itisonlytherightofcontrolthatisrelevant.”(footnotesomitted)).{32}The fact thatOrionmay have ex-ercisedcontroloveranumberofaspectsofPlaintiff’semploymentdoesnotmeanthatDefendant did not have the right tocontrolthedetailsofPlaintiff’swork.Aspreviously observed, Defendant selectswhichOrion employeeswillwork at itsfacilities.Moreover,thecontractbetweenOrionandDefendantstatesthatDefendantwillprovideday-to-daytechnicaldirectiontotheemployeessuppliedbyOrion.Suchtechnical direction includes assigningwork,monitoring technical performanceand compliance with safety standards,authorizingtravelandtraining,assigningovertime, approving time records, andinspectingworkinprogressorcompletedby the contract employee.Additionally,Defendantisalsocontractuallypermittedto request thatOrion remove a contractemployeefromhisorherassignmentwithDefendant.Suchevidenceissufficienttoestablish thatDefendant had the right tocontrolthedetailsofPlaintiff’swork.Cf.Danek v. Meldrum Mfg. & Eng’g Co.,252N.W.2d255,258(Minn.1977)(“ThefactthatLaborPoolhiredandhadtherighttofireplaintiff,compensatedherdirectly,andpaid the expenses of her social securitytaxes andworkers’ compensation insur-ancedidnotgiveLaborPooltherighttocontrol thedetailsof theperformanceofherwork.”).{33} Plaintiff does not meaningfullydispute these contractual provisions, butinstead argues that because he workedindependently,Defendantdidnotexercisecontrol over his employment.We note,however, that thisCourthas rejected theargumentthatlackofconstantsupervisionordirectionsomehowindicatesa lackofcontrol by apurported special employer.See Vigil,1996-NMCA-100,¶21;Rivera,118N.M.at679-80,884P.2dat835-36.Moreover,sucharulewouldmeanthatthespecialemployertestisinapplicabletositu-ationsinwhichthelentemployeeisskilledorotherwiserequireslittlesupervisiondueto thenatureof thework.As recognizedbyLarson,
the “control” which the specialemployermust assumeneednotextend todirecting the technicaldetails of a skilled employee’sactivity.This would mean thatskilled employeeswould hardly
3ArthurLarson&LexK.Larson,Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 67.06,at 67-17 (2006) (footnotes omitted); see also Ghersi,883P.2dat1357(concludingthatanemployerhadtheright tocontrolthedetailsofacontractemployee’sworkwheretheemployerexercisedcontrolover“[w]hen, where, and how” the contractemployeewas towork);99C.J.S.Work-ers’ Compensation§123,at190(“[T]hemere fact that the employee is skilleddoes not, in and of itself, establish thatthe original employer, or the lending orgeneralemployer,hasretainedtherighttocontrolthemannerofperformanceofthework assigned, for purposes of liabilityforworkers’compensationandexclusiveremedyprotection.”).WethereforedonotconsiderthefactthatPlaintiffrequiredlittlesupervisiontoraiseaquestionoffactonthequestionofwhetherDefendantexercisedcontroloverPlaintiff.{34}Lastly, Plaintiff argues that provi-sions in the contract betweenDefendantandOrioninwhichDefendantmaintainsthatitisnottobeconsideredtheemployerofcontractemployeessuppliedbyOrionestablishes thatDefendant did not exer-cisecontroloverPlaintiff.Onceagain,wedisagree.“Whileemployerscertainlymaycontractasbetweenthemselves todefinetheirbusinessrelationshipsandaccomplishtheir business objectives, an agreementbetweentheemployersmaynotbedetermi-nativeoftheissueofspecialemployment.”Thompson v. Grumman Aerospace Corp.,585N.E.2d355,358(N.Y.1991).Further,aswepreviouslyobserved,DefendantandOriondidincludeprovisionswithintheircontractthatdidpermitDefendanttoex-erciseday-to-daytechnicaldirectionovertheworkofemployeessuppliedbyOrion.Assuch,weconcludethatDefendanthadtherighttocontrolthedetailsofPlaintiff’swork.Cf. Rivera,118N.M.at679,884P.2dat835(“ThefactthatRivera’saffidavitas-sertedthathehadnoemploymentcontractwithSagebrushandthathehadnotbeentoldhewouldbeconsideredSagebrush’semployeeforpurposesoftheActdoesnotchangethisresult.”).{35} Defendant, as Plaintiff’s specialemployer,isthusimmuneundertheexclu-sivity provisions of theWCA,providingthatDefendant compliedwith the insur-
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anceprovisionsoftheWCA.See Rivera,118N.M.at678-80,884P.2dat834-36.Weobserve thatPlaintiff does not arguethatDefendanthasfailedtocomplywiththeWCA’s insurance provisions, insteadarguingthatthisCourtneednotreachthatquestionsinceDefendantisneitherastatu-torynoraspecialemployer.Theundisputedmaterial facts establish that Defendantindirectlypaidforworkers’compensationinsurancethroughpaymentsmadetoOrion
underthestaffaugmentationcontract.Wetherefore conclude that Defendant hascompliedwiththeinsurancerequirementsundertheWCAsuchthatPlaintiffisbarredfromsuingDefendantfornegligence.See Harger,121N.M.at666,916P.2dat1333;Vigil,1996-NMCA-100,¶15;Rivera,118N.M.at678-80,884P.2dat834-36;Garcia v. Smith Pipe & Steel Co.,107N.M.808,809-10,765P.2d1176,1177-78(Ct.App.1988).
CONCLUSION{36}Thedistrictcourt’sgrantofsummaryjudgment in favorofDefendantanddis-missalofPlaintiff’sclaimisaffirmed.{37} ITISSOORDERED. LYNNPICKARD,Judge
theattorneycharginglienbecauseitwasnotanopposingpartytoDefendantsunderRule1-013(A)NMRAandthattheclaimswerenot thesame.Weconcludethat thedistrictcourtdidnoterringrantingsum-maryjudgment,andweaffirm.BACKGROUND{2} Defendants represented ComputerOneinabreachofcontractactionagainstSandiaCorporation.Defendants enteredinto settlement negotiationswithSandiaCorporationandeventuallyagreedtosettleComputerOne’sclaimsfor$750,000.Af-terDefendantsnegotiated thesettlement,Computer One alleged that Defendantsdidnothaveauthoritytosettleitsclaims.Defendantswithdrew from representingComputerOneandfiledanattorneycharg-inglien.
{3} Sandia Corporation filed a motiontoenforce thesettlement.ComputerOneobjected, again stating that Defendantshad no authority to enter the settlementagreementonitsbehalf.Followinganevi-dentiaryhearing, thedistrict court foundthatComputerOnehadgivenDefendantsauthoritytosettleitsclaimsfor$750,000,and the court entered anorder enforcingthesettlement.{4}Thedistrict court held a hearingontheattorneycharginglien.Atthishearing,thepartiesdiscussedthepriorityofclaimsbetweenDefendantsandanothercreditorofthesettlement.ComputerOnethenstatedthat it intended to dispute the enforce-ability ofDefendants’ claim for attorneyfees.ComputerOne requested a hearingon that issue and stated that itwouldbefilingobjectionstothecharginglien.ThedistrictcourtgaveComputerOnetendaysinwhichtofileitsobjections.{5}Initsobjectionstothecharginglien,ComputerOne alleged that the attorneyfeesclaimedbyDefendantswereexcessiveandunreasonablebecauseDefendants:(1)negotiatedthesettlementwithoutconsent;(2)releasedpotentialclaimsofbothCom-puterOneandRobertswithout authorityand to theireconomicdetriment;and(3)failedtopursueamalpracticeclaimvaluedat1.5milliondollarsagainstpredecessorcounselandfailedtonegotiateanattorneycharginglienfiledbypredecessorcounsel.ComputerOne also claimed that (4) theamended charging lien included fees forservices not related to representation ofComputerOne in theaction; and (5) thecontingency fee agreementonwhich thecharginglienwasbaseddidnotconformtoRule16-105(C)NMRA,andwasthereforeunenforceable. Computer One repeatedtheseobjectionsinitsresponsetoSandiaCorporation’smotiontodisbursethesettle-mentproceeds.ThecourtheldahearingonSandiaCorporation’smotion to disbursefeesandonDefendants’attorneycharginglienonFebruary11,2002.Itissuedanorder
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allowingdisbursementofsettlementfundsbySandiaCorporation.{6}Overayearafterentryoftheorderonthecharginglien,ComputerOnesuedDe-fendantsfor legalmalpractice.ComputerOneclaimedthatDefendants’recommen-dation to accept settlement for $750,000constitutedprofessionalnegligence.Com-puterOneallegedthatDefendantsfailedtoproperlyassesstheavailabledamagesforbreachofcontractintheSandiacase,failedtoproperlyadvise theirclients regardingevaluationofthesettlement,andcoercedtheirclientsintosettlementbythreateningwithdrawal.{7}Defendantsmovedforsummaryjudg-ment,arguingthatComputerOne’s legalmalpracticeclaimswerebarredbyclaimpreclusion. In granting the motion, thedistrict court stated that Computer Onehadraisedlegalmalpracticeclaimsinthelitigationconcerningtheattorneycharginglienandhadbeenunsuccessful.ThedistrictcourtalsofoundthatComputerOnehadtheopportunitytolitigatetheissueofwhethertherehadbeenanimproperhandlingofthelitigationbyDefendantsandwasattempt-ingtorelitigatetheissuebyraisingdifferentlegaltheories.ComputerOneappeals.STANDARDOFREVIEW{8}Weaffirmthegrantofsummaryjudg-mentwhentherearenogenuineissuesofmaterial fact and themovant is entitledto judgment as amatter of law.Krieger v. Wilson Corp.,2006-NMCA-034,¶30,139N.M.274,131P.3d661,cert. quashed,2006-NMCERT-012,141N.M.105,151P.3d 66. Because the material facts areundisputed,we review the district courtordergrantingsummaryjudgmentdenovo.See id. Whetherclaimpreclusionappliesisalsoamatteroflaw,whichwereviewdenovo.Moffat v. Branch,2005-NMCA-103,¶ 10, 138N.M.224, 118P.3d732,cert. quashed, 2006-NMCERT-003, 139N.M.353,132P.3d1039.Theburdenofshow-ingtheelementsofclaimpreclusionisonDefendants.Id.CLAIMPRECLUSION{9}“The formof res judicataknownasclaimpreclusionpreventspartiesfromrelit-igatingclaimsafterthoseclaimshavebeenlitigated once.”Hope Cmty. Ditch Ass’n v. N.M. State Eng’r, 2005-NMCA-002,¶8,136N.M.761,105P.3d314.Claimpreclusionrestsontheneedtobalancetheinterestsofdefendantsandthecourts,ontheonehand,tobringaclosetolitigation,andofplaintiffs,ontheotherhand,toseekreliefoftheirclaims.See Anaya v. City of Albuquerque,1996-NMCA-092,¶8,122
N.M.326,924P.2d735.Itbarsnotonlyclaimsthatwereactuallyraisedinapriorlitigation,butalsoclaimsthatcouldhavebeen raised in aprior litigation.State ex rel. Martinez v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 120N.M.118,121,898P.2d1256,1259(Ct.App.1995).Itsbarembracescompulsorycounterclaims.See Bentz v. Peterson,107N.M. 597, 601, 762 P.2d 259, 263 (Ct.App.1988)(“Failuretopleadacompulsorycounterclaim bars a later action on thatclaim[.]”).Forclaimpreclusiontoapply,four requirementsmust exist. “The twoactions(1)mustinvolvethesamepartiesortheirprivies,(2)whoareactinginthesamecapacityorcharacter,(3)regardingthe same subject matter, and (4) mustinvolve the same claim.” Moffat, 2005-NMCA-103,¶11.{10}ComputerOneraisestwoobjectionstothedistrictcourt’sapplicationofclaimpreclusion. First, Computer One arguesthat it was not an “opposing party” toDefendantswithin themeaning ofRule1-013(A),governingcompulsorycounter-claims.Second,ComputerOnearguesthatits legalmalpracticeclaimswerenot thesameclaimsastheobjectionsassertedinresponsetotheattorneycharginglien.Weaddresseachargumentinturn.OPPOSINGPARTIES{11}ComputerOneargues that its legalmalpractice claimswere not compulsorycounterclaims,barredbyclaimpreclusion,becauseitwasnotan“opposingparty”toDefendantsunderRule1-013(A).Rule1-013(A)providesthefollowing:
Apleadingshallstateasacounter-claimanyclaimwhichatthetimeofservingthepleadingthepleaderhas against any opposing party,if it arisesoutof the transactionor occurrence that is the subjectmatter of the opposing party’sclaimanddoesnotrequireforitsadjudicationthepresenceofthirdpartiesofwhomthecourtcannotacquirejurisdiction.
ComputerOnebasesitsargumentonBen-nett v. Kisluk,112N.M.221,814P.2d89(1991),inwhichourSupremeCourtheldthatamotionforlegalfeeswasinsufficientto invoke the compulsory counterclaimrule.Id. at224,814P.2dat92.AccordingtoComputerOne,anattorneycharginglienisnodifferentfromamotionforattorneyfeesbecause“bothareputtingtheissueofentitlementtofeesbeforethecourt.”De-fendantscounterthatanattorneycharginglienismorelikealawsuitforattorneyfees,andthatBrunacini v. Kavanagh,117N.M.
122,869P.2d821(Ct.App.1993),istheapplicableprecedent.InBrunacini,weheldthatalawsuitforattorneyfeestriggeredthecompulsorycounterclaimrulewithrespecttolegalmalpracticeclaims.Id.at123,869P.2dat822.{12}InBennett,anattorneyfiledamotionfor attorney fees just before his formerclient reached a settlement agreement.Bennett,112N.M.at222,814P.2dat90.The attorney and the former client thenreachedanagreementwhereby theattor-neywouldexecuteareleaseofanyclaimsagainsttheclientandsuccessorcounselinconsideration for receipt of his attorneyfees. Id.Fivemonths later, the client in-stitutedanactionforlegalmalpractice.Id.Theattorneyarguedinpartthattheclient’slegalmalpractice claimswere barred byresjudicatabecausetheclientshouldhaveassertedthemascompulsorycounterclaimstotheattorney’smotionforattorneyfees.Id.at224,814P.2dat92.Inreversingthegrantofsummaryjudgmentinfavoroftheattorney,ourSupremeCourtsaidthat
[w]hilethenatureoftheclaimtoattorney fees is related substan-tially enough to [the attorney’s]effortstoeffectthesettlementandtohisdischargewithoutcausesoastohavegivenrisetoacompul-sorycounterclaimformalpracticeto a complaint for collection of professional fees,wearehesitanttoaccordresjudicataeffecttoallissuesandclaimsthatmighthavebeenraisedinresponsetoamo-tionforfees.
Id. Itnoted that “[w]hether [theclient’s]claim formalpracticewas a compulsorycounterclaimto[the]motionforfeesde-pendsonwhether[theclient]wasan‘op-posingparty’withinthemeaningof[Rule]1-013(A).An‘opposingparty’mustbeonewhoasserts a claimagainst theprospec-tivecounterclaimantinthefirstinstance.”Bennett,112N.M.at224,814P.2dat92.TheCourtdetermined that theattorney’smotionforfeesdidnotplacehim“intheadversarial relationshipwith [the client]thatwould trigger the compulsory coun-terclaimruleanditsattendantresjudicataeffect.”Id.{13} In Brunacini, we determined thatthefilingof a lawsuit to collect attorneyfees placed the parties in an adversarialposition for purposes of the compulsorycounterclaim rule, precluding a secondlawsuit on legalmalpractice. Brunacini,117N.M.at125-26,869P.2dat824-25.Weheldthattheplaintiffswererequiredto
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assertalllegalmalpracticeclaimsintheirpleadingbecausetheyfiledaresponsetothedefendants’earlierlawsuitforattorneyfees.Id.; cf. Lowe v. Bloom,112N.M.203,205,813P.2d480,482(1991)(decliningtofindthatresjudicatanecessarilybarredtheplaintiff’sactionforlegalmalpracticewhentheplaintiffdidnotactuallyfilearesponsetoanearlierlawsuitforattorneyfeesandtheactionforfeeswasdisposedofbyvol-untarydismissalwithoutprejudice).{14}Althoughwe agreewithComputerOnethatanattorneycharginglienissimi-lartoamotionforfees,wedisagreewithComputerOne thatBennett governs ouranalysis. Bennett does not stand for thebroad proposition that claim preclusionwillneverbeapplicableinacaseinwhichaclaimforattorneyfeesismadebymotion.Rather,aswestatedinMoffat,“implicitinBennettisthenotionoffairnotice:thatanon-movantwouldnot necessarily knowthat he or she would have to assert alldefensesorclaimsagainstapartywhohasfiledamotion.”Moffat,2005-NMCA-103, ¶16.WethereforefocusontheinquiryinMoffat.Thatis,wemustdeterminewhetherComputerOnewas actively engaged inlitigatingtheattorneyfeesandthatithadthereforebeenputonnoticethatitneededtopursueallofitstheories.See id.;see alsoMyers v. Olson,100N.M.745,747,676P.2d822,824 (1984) (“Res judicatawillordinarilyprecludeaclaimwheretherehasbeenafullandfairopportunitytolitigateallissuesarisingoutofthatclaim.”).{15}Underthefactsofthiscase,ComputerOne was in an adversarial relationshipwith Defendants, and it was thereforerequired to assert any claims arisingoutofthesametransactioninresponsetotheattorney charging lien.Unlike the situa-tioninBennett,ComputerOnerespondedto the charging lien, alleging that itwasnotenforceable.ComputerOnerequesteda hearing and represented to the districtcourtthatitwouldbedisputingDefendants’claimforattorneyfees.Itthendiddisputetheclaimforfeesonanumberofgroundsand lost.Under these circumstances,webelieveitisreasonabletoprecludeCom-puterOnefromrelitigatingthesameclaiminasecondsuit.SAMECLAIM{16}ComputerOnefurtherarguesthatitslegalmalpracticeclaimswerenotthesameclaimsasitsobjectionstoDefendants’at-torneycharginglienforpurposesofclaimpreclusion.Initsobjectionstotheattorneycharginglien,ComputerOneclaimedthatDefendantssettleditsclaimsagainstSandia
Corporation without authority; releasedclaimsofRoberts,asanindividual,withoutauthority;failedtoprovideservicesitcon-tractedtoprovide;andchargedComputerOneforservicesithadnotrendered.Initslegalmalpractice claims,ComputerOneallegedthatDefendantswerenegligentintheirevaluationandpreparationoftheset-tlementintheSandiaCorporationcase.{17}Indeterminingwhethertwoactionsraise the “same claim” for claimpreclu-sion purposes, we use the transactionalapproach. Moffat, 2005-NMCA-103, ¶17. Underthisapproach,weviewaclaimin factual terms, regardless of the legaltheories thatwere actually raised in theprior action. Id. We “engage in a prag-maticassessmentofthetransaction,witha‘transaction’beingdescribedasanaturalgrouping or common nucleus of opera-tive facts.” Id. (internal quotationmarksandcitationomitted).Weuseathree-stepanalysistodeterminewhetheraprioractioninvolvesthesametransaction.Id. ¶18.Weconsider“(1)...therelatednessofthefactsintime,space,origin,ormotivation;(2)...whetherthefacts,takentogether,forma convenient unit for trial purposes; and(3)...whetherthetreatmentofthefactsas a single unit conforms to the parties’expectationsorbusinessunderstandingorusage.”Id. (internalquotationmarksandcitationomitted).{18}InMoffat,wediscussedanattorneycharginglien.Id.¶¶17-21.Wedefinedthetransactionas “the representationof [theclient]inhermedicalmalpracticecase,thesettlement,andassociatedattorneyfees.”Id.¶19.Weusethesamestandardtoviewthetransactioninthiscase:therepresen-tation ofComputerOne in its breach ofcontractcaseagainstSandiaCorporation,thesettlement,andtheassociatedattorneyfees.Theobjections to the charging lienand the legalmalpractice claims involvethe same underlying facts: Defendants’representation of Computer One in theSandiaCorporationcaseandtheirclaimforattorneyfeesbasedonthatrepresentation.See Brunacini, 117N.M.at129, 869P.2dat828(notingthatamalpracticecaseanda feedisputecaseboth turnon thecom-petenceofcounsel);see alsoBennett,112N.M.at224,814P.2dat92(notingthattheplaintiff’sclaimforlegalmalpracticewasrelatedtotheattorney’sclaimforfees).{19}Inaddition,thefactsthatformtheba-sisofbothclaimswouldformaconvenientunitfortrial.Itwouldhavebeenconvenientto address all ofComputerOne’s claimsagainstDefendantsrelatedtoDefendants’
representationinthecasewhenthedistrictcourt consideredComputerOne’sclaimsregarding enforceability of the charginglien.Itislikelythattheevidenceandwit-nessesrelevanttoComputerOne’sobjec-tions to thecharginglienandto its legalmalpractice claims would overlap. See Moffat, 2005-NMCA-103, ¶ 20 (notingthat“[w]heretherewouldbeasubstantialoverlap between the evidence relevanttobothactions, thesecondactionshouldordinarily be held precluded”) (internalquotationmarksandcitationomitted).{20}ComputerOnearguestothecontrary,stating that itsobjections to thecharginglienaddressedDefendants’entitlementtofees,whileitsclaimsforlegalmalpracticeaddressedtheappropriatenessofthesettle-mentintheSandiaCorporationcase.Com-puterOnefurtherarguesthattheobjectionstothelieninvolvedDefendants’authorityto settle and the services coveredby thecharginglien,whereasthelegalmalpracticeclaimsinvolvedthequalityofDefendants’representation in theSandiaCorporationcase.Bythesearguments,ComputerOneseekstomakeadistinctionbetweenitscon-tractuallybasedclaimsanditstortclaimsagainstDefendants.{21}Weseenobasisfordistinguishingbe-tweencontractclaimsandtortmalpracticeclaimsforclaimpreclusionpurposes.Theattorney-clientrelationshipisgovernedbyablendofbothcontractandtortlaw.Theattorney-client relationship is generallycreatedbycontract.Holland v. Lawless,95N.M.490,494,623P.2d1004,1008(Ct.App.1981)(notingthatunlessappointedbythecourt,theattorney-clientrelationshipiscreatedbycontract).Oncethatrelation-shipiscreated,thelawimposesadutyofreasonable care on the attorney, whichforms thebasis for amalpractice action.See Rancho del Villacito Condos., Inc. v. Weisfeld, 121N.M. 52, 55-56, 908P.2d745,748-49(1995)(notingthattorecoveronalegalmalpracticeaction,theplaintiffmust show the neglect of a reasonableduty).Bothanattorneycharginglienandanactionforlegalmalpracticearefoundedontheexistenceofthecontract. See Sowder v. Sowder,1999-NMCA-058,¶10,127N.M.114,977P.2d1034(notingthatanattorneycharging lien requires the existence of avalidcontractbetweenattorneyandclient);see also Leyba v. Whitley,120N.M.768,772,907P.2d172,176(1995)(notingthatthecontractthatgivesrisetothelawyer-cli-entrelationshipisthefoundationofalegalmalpractice claim).We are therefore notpersuadedbyComputerOne’s argument
Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28 �9
that itscontractclaimisdistinctfromitstortclaim.{22} Under the transactional approach,therelevantinquiryisnotwhatsubstantivelawgovernsaclaim,butratherwhethertheclaimsariseoutofthesametransactionorseries of transactions. See Three Rivers Land Co. v. Maddoux,98N.M.690,695,652P.2d 240, 245 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Universal Life Church v. Coxon,105N.M.57,58,728P.2d467,469 (1986).Toholdotherwisewouldbetoallowpartiestosplitacauseofactionbasedondifferentlegaltheoriesandwouldbe contrary to the policy behind claimpreclusion,which is to promote judicialefficiencyandanendtolitigation.SeeMy-ers,100N.M.at747,676P.2dat824(“Therationalefortheapplicationofresjudicatagenerally is to protect individuals fromtheburdenoflitigatingmultiplelawsuits,topromotejudicialeconomy,andtopro-motethepolicyfavoringrelianceonfinaljudgmentsbyminimizingthepossibilityofinconsistentdecisions.”);see also Deflon v. Sawyers,2006-NMSC-025,¶2,139N.M.
637,137P.3d577(“Resjudicatapreventsapartyoritspriviesfromrepeatedlysuinganotherforthesamecauseofaction.”).{23}WhenComputerOnefileditsobjec-tionstotheattorneyfees,itassertedclaimsarisingoutofDefendants’representationintheSandiaCorporationcase.Claimpreclu-sionrequiredthatComputerOnebringallitsclaimsarisingoutofthistransactionatthattime.Wethusconcludethatthedistrictcourt did not err in grantingDefendantssummary judgment in Computer One’slegalmalpracticesuit.JUDICIALNOTICE{24}ComputerOnealsoargues that thedistrict court, in considering themotionfor summary judgment, improperly tookjudicialnoticeoftherecordintheSandiaCorporationcase.ComputerOneconcedesthat “this point of error is ancillary andnotcriticaltoresolutionoftheresjudicataissue.”ComputerOnedoesnotarguethatitwas prejudiced by the district court’sexerciseofjudicialnotice,nordoesitre-questanyrelieffromthisCourt.Becauseresolutionofthisissuewouldnotprovide
relieftoComputerOne,wewillnotaddressit. See In re Pernell, 92N.M. 490, 493,590P.2d638,641(Ct.App.1979)(notingthatNewMexicoappellatecourtsdonotdecidequestionsifnoactualreliefcanbeafforded).Wealsodeclinetheparties’re-questthatweneverthelessaddressthisissueforfutureguidanceofpractitionersandthecourts. See Insure N.M., LLC v. McGonigle,2000-NMCA-018,¶27,128N.M.611,995P.2d1053(notingthattheCourtofAppealswillnot issueanadvisoryopinion in theabsenceofajusticiableissue).CONCLUSION{25}The district court correctly deter-minedthatclaimpreclusionbarredCom-puterOne’sclaimsfor legalmalpractice.We affirm the district court’s grant ofsummaryjudgment.{26} ITISSOORDERED. JAMESJ.WECHSLER, Judge
WECONCUR:LYNNPICKARD,JudgeCELIAFOYCASTILLO,Judge
60 Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28
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Positions
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Criminal Appeals, Motions, MemosA Writer for the Defense
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Toll Free 1-877-247-8558
Visit the State Bar of New Mexico’s web site
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Deputy District AttorneyThe Eighth Judicial District Attorney’s Of-fice is accepting applications for the position of Deputy District Attorney in the Clayton Office. This position will be responsible for a felony and misdemeanor caseload plus administrative duties. Salary will be based upon experience and the District Attorney Personnel and Compensation Plan. Please send resumes to Daniel L. Romero, Chief Deputy District Attorney, 920 Salazar Road, Suite A, Taos, New Mexico 87571. Position open until filled.
Contract Attorney The Schuchardt Law Firm is seeking a contract attorney for court appearances on a case-by-case basis. Fax resume to (505) 296-4822 or e-mail [email protected]
General Practice AttorneyLaw Firm with clients who need help with business matters, contract disputes, personal injury, looking for energetic and competent general practice attorney to develop his/her case own case load for a fair percentage of the fees collected. Attorney would be employee of the Firm and would be provided with all office benefits. Send resumes to: PO Box 92860, Albuquerque, NM 87199, Attn: Box G
Experienced Trial Attorney The NM Federal Public Defender is seeking a full time temporary, experienced trial attorney for it’s branch office in Las Cruces. Employ-ment would begin October 1, 2007, for a duration of six months to one year. Federal salary applies, but no benefits are included with this temporary assignment. This is not an entry level position. Experienced applicant must have sufficient knowledge to assume an immediate case load. Applicants must have one year minimum criminal law trial experi-ence, be team-oriented, exhibit strong writing skills as well as a commitment to criminal defense for all individuals, including those who may be facing the death penalty. Span-ish fluency preferred. Writing ability, federal court and immigration law experience will be given preference. Applicants must be licensed to practice law in at least one state, and in federal court. The private practice of law is prohibited. Selected applicant will be subject to a background investigation. The Federal Public Defender operates under authority of the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, and provides legal representation in federal criminal cases and related matters in the fed-eral courts. The Federal Public Defender is an equal opportunity employer. Direct deposit of pay is mandatory. Please submit a statement of interest and detailed resume of experience, including trial and appellate work, with three references to: Stephen P. McCue, Federal Pub-lic Defender, 111 Lomas Blvd. NW, Suite 501, Albuquerque, NM 87102. Writing samples will be required only from those selected for interview. Applications must be post marked by July 31, 2007. Position subject to availability of funding.
Assistant Trial Attorney and Senior Trial Attorney - Third Judicial District Attorney’s OfficeThe Third Judicial District Attorney’s Office has vacancies for Assistant Trial Attorney and Senior Trial Attorney. Qualifications and sal-ary are pursuant to the New Mexico District Attorney’s Personnel & Compensation Plan. Resumès may be faxed to Kelly Kuenstler at (505) 524-6379, or mailed to the Third Judi-cial District Attorney’s Office, ATTN: Kelly Kuenstler, District Office Manager, 845 N. Motel Blvd., 2nd Floor, Ste D, Las Cruces, NM 88007.
New Mexico Legal Aid Regional Managing AttorneyAlbuquerque, NMNew Mexico Legal Aid (NMLA) has an open-ing for a Regional Managing Attorney in its Albuquerque, NM office. NMLA provides free civil legal services for low-income individuals and families in areas which include domestic relations and domestic violence, housing, public benefits, and consumer issues, among others. Duties include the daily management of the Albuquerque Law Office that serves the counties of Bernalillo, Sandoval and Valencia. Requirements: Looking for a highly motivated individual who is passionate and strongly com-mitted to helping the disadvantaged in the community. Three (3) years of legal experience including supervisory responsibilities. Must possess strong written and oral communication skills, law office management experience, will oversee litigation and manage an individual caseload and build collaborative relationships within the community. Licensed to practice law in New Mexico. Competitive salary based on experience. Excellent fringe benefits (health, dental, life and long-term disability), paid holidays, generous personal and sick leave. NMLA is an EEO/AA Employer. Send Re-sume to: Gloria A. Molinar, NMLA, PO Box 25486, Albuquerque, NM 87125-5486 and or email to: [email protected]; Deadline: July 13, 2007.
Attorney SANTA FE small established firm seeks NM Attorney (ca. 2-7± yr.) specializing in business, corporate, commercial law, real estate, finance, labor, and related litigation. No DR, Criminal, or PI work! Must be mature, bright, aggressive, hard working with excellent writing and brief-ing skills. One who will be a “natural” with our clients. Very competitive salary + benefits, Non-smoking office. EOE. Please send CV and cover letter to: Managing Attorney, PO Box 4817, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87502-4817. All responses will be kept confidential.
Assistant Attorney GeneralThe Prosecutions Division of the Attorney General’s Office (EEO employer) has an open-ing for an “exempt” (not classified) attorney in the Santa Fe office. Applicants must demon-strate the ability to work independently and the ability to remain highly organized while working on multiple assignments. Duties in jurisdictions throughout the state will include prosecuting high profile violent offenses, gang-related offenses, and white-collar crimes as well as providing assistance to district attorney’s offices in the preparation and trial of capital offenses. Duties will also include providing expert testimony for legislative initiatives. NM bar admission is required and 3 to 5 years prosecution experience is preferred. Resume, writing sample and minimum of three profes-sional references must be received at the At-torney General’s Office. Send all information to: Attn: Dennis Martinez, HR Manager, P.O. Drawer 1508, Attorney General’s Office, Santa Fe, NM 87504-1508. Resumes must be received by 5:00 p.m. July 13, 2007.
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NM Center on Law and Poverty -Staff AttorneyPublic interest, non-profit law firm seeks at-torney to engage in advocacy and litigation on poverty law issues. Candidates should have extraordinary drive, research, writing and verbal skills. Spanish proficiency a major plus. Excellent benefits, sane hours and good work environment. Apply in confidence by sending letter of interest, resume, and writing sample to [email protected]. We are an equal employment opportunity employer.
Supreme Court Staff AttorneyThe Supreme Court is recruiting for an associ-ate staff attorney. The position is classified with an annual salary range of $56,160 - $57,200. Start date - negotiable. Qualifications & Application -Visit Judiciary website <www.nmcourts.com>, click on Human Resources, click on Job Opportunities for details. Sub-mit completed Judicial Branch Application, resume, and short writing sample to Joey D. Moya, Senior Staff Attorney, P.O. Box 848, Santa Fe, NM 87504, Deadline is July 18, 2007, at 5:00 p.m.
ParalegalThe Santa Fe office of Hinkle, Hensley, Shanor & Martin, L.L.P. is seeking a paralegal. Expe-rience in general civil practice, including em-ployment, environmental, insurance defense, professional malpractice defense, regulatory and commercial law is preferred. Candidates should have excellent writing and research skills, and the ability to work with little supervision. A paralegal certificate or degree is necessary. All inquiries kept confidential. Resume can be faxed to Office Manager, 505-982-8623 or mailed to P.O. Box 2068, Santa Fe, NM 87504-2068.
ParalegalKeleher & McLeod, P.A. seeks a full-time litigation paralegal with substantial relevant experience. The position will have a heavy em-phasis on health care law. Nursing or medical background a plus. Candidates need to possess excellent skills in complex litigation, document discovery and control, and in trial prepara-tion. Must be detail oriented, self-motivated, team player with strong work ethic as well as organizational and communication skills. Excellent benefits. Send resume and references to Administrator, Keleher & McLeod, P.A., P. O. Box AA, Albuquerque, NM 87103; or fax to (505) 346-1370.
ParalegalA unique opportunity to work with a top NM non-profit children’s rights legal services agency. Full time position, substantive legal work & heavy client contact. Requires experi-ence with Microsoft Office, self motivation & a strong work ethic; excellent writing, research, communication & organizational skills. Must have a sense of humor, be flexible and able to multitask. Bilingual Spanish/English preferred. Fax resume & cover letter to 505-244-0060.
Staff Attorney Western Environmental Law Center, a non-profit public interest environmental law firm seeks an attorney with two or more years experience for its Southwest office in Taos, New Mexico starting fall 2007. Send cover letter, resume, references, and writing sample to: Western Environmental Law Center, Attn: Attorney Position, P.O. Box 1507, Taos, NM 87571; or [email protected]. For detailed information, visit www.westernlaw.org/about/job-opportunities. (No phone calls please).
Notice of VacancyThe Director of the New Mexico Workers’ Compensation Administration hereby an-nounces a vacancy as a Workers’ Compensation Judge effective June 27, 2007. The primary location of the position is in Albuquerque, New Mexico, with travel throughout the state. This position is statutorily exempt with a one-year term. Interested individuals may request a Judicial Application by calling (505) 841-6013. The Judicial Application is also available at the WCA at 2410 Centre Avenue SE or logging on to www.workerscomp.state.nm.us. The completed Judicial Application and supporting documentation must be received by the WCA no later than close of business on July 13, 2007. The Workers’ Compensation Administration is an Equal Opportunity Employer
Administrative AssistantFT. Benefits. CLIENT ATTORNEY ASSIS-TANCE PROGRAM (CAAP) Previous law office experience preferred. Phone intakes, and screening for the various CAAP programs. Word-processing, database and telephone skills. Salary range $11 to $12 an hour. Send letter and resume to HR-,CAAP P.O. Box 92860, Albuquerque, NM 87199, Fax (505) 797-6019, or [email protected]. Position open until filled. EOE
Respondent’s Attorney The Second Judicial District Court in Albu-querque, New Mexico, is accepting applica-tions for the position of Respondent’s Attorney. Attorney will represent respondents in child abuse and neglect cases in the Second District Children’s Court Division. Caseload would be approximately four cases a month, with a one year contract. Compensation is on a per case, $40 per hour basis not to exceed established limits. Applicants must be licensed to practice law in New Mexico. Please submit your resume by Monday, July 30, 2007 by 5:00 p.m., to: Ms. Juanita M. Duran, Court Administrator, 400 Lomas NW, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 87102. Envelopes are to be clearly marked on the outside “ Respondent Attorney”.
Santa Fe CountyAssistant County AttorneySalary: DOE- Full–time ExemptRepresent the Board of County Commission-ers, the County Manager, certain County Elected Officials and certain intergovernmen-tal entities. Provide legal advice and assistance. Prepare or review various legal instruments and documents; draft or reviews proposed legisla-tion, ordinances and contracts; independently investigate facts, search out precedents and define legal and factual issues; prepare cases for trial; represent the County in various legal transactions such as joint powers agreements and contracts; review and draft proposed county ordinances, resolutions and contracts; attend meetings of the Board of County Commissioners, Local Development Review Committees, and other meetings. Minimum Qualifications:Applicants must be licensed to practice law in the State of New Mexico and in the federal courts within the State of New Mexico. Applicants must possess experience in the general practice of law or as an attorney for practicing law for a public or private employer at least three (3) years. Applicants must possess extensive knowledge of New Mexico law and relevant federal law. Experience or knowledge of local government law is preferable. Required Attachments:Each Applicant must attach to the Application proof of education, a copy of the law degree, proof of licensure in the courts of the State of New Mexico, and any relevant certificates. Each Applicant must provide a writing sample, and three references. Please send resume to Santa Fe County Human Re-sources, 205 Montezuma Ave., Santa Fe, NM 87504-0276. Santa Fe County is an EEO/AA Employer. www.santafecounty.org For more information
66 Bar Bulletin - July 9, 2007 - Volume 46, No. 28
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Far NE Hgts OfficesLocated at Paseo/Holbrook in Albuquerque, Quattro Center features virtual offices, ex-ecutive offices and professional conference rooms for legal professionals throughout the state. At Quattro Center, you can enjoy the presence and amenities of office space while working from the comfort of your home office. Full office amenities including receptionist, voice mail, mail delivery, Internet/fax/copier access, kitchen and comfortable conference rooms which seat up to 20 people for training and/or depositions. For more information or to schedule a tour, contact us at (505) 944-1070 or [email protected].
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BooksCorpus Juris Secundum, 161 Volumes, Supple-ments to 1985, $800. 1953 N.M. Statutes, 21 vols. to 1975, $1200. Powell on Real Property, 16 vols. to 1990, $300. Am. Jur Trials, 31 vols. (1 missing) to 1985, $300. Am. Jur Pleading & Practice Forms, 25 vols. to 1971, $90. The Law of Distressed Real Estate by Dunaway, 3 vols, to 1991, $60. Moors Federal Practice, 15 vols. to 1979, $50. Moores Manual, 4 vols. to 1971, $20. Pick up in Bernalillo, N.M. (505) 867-1668.
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Executive Suite Rent executive suite atop the New Mexico Bank and Trust Building, 320 Gold Ave. SW. 1 block from bankruptcy court and a short walk to other courts. Congenial office include T-1 internet connection, long distance, receptionist, conference room, coffee and full kitchen. Perfect for new solo looking for referrals in real estate, commercial litigation or established solo or small firm with support staff space needs. Covered parking available. Call for details. Krista at 842-6626.
ReceptionistDixon, Scholl & Bailey is seeking an energetic, highly motivated person with great people skills. We offer great benefits and an excel-lent work environment. If you are seriously interested in this full time position email your resume to Michaela at [email protected] or fax to 244-3889.
Attractive Lawyers’ OfficeAttractive lawyers’ office space at 1014 Lomas NW; 1200 sq feet, 3 offices, reception, work area, hardwood floors, outdoor deck, down-stairs storage and library. $1395/mo. Tony Jeffries 242-4040.
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All advertising must be submitted by e-mail or fax by 5 p.m. Wednesday, two weeks prior to publication. The Bar Bulletin publishes every Monday. Advertising will be accepted for publication in accordance with standards and ad rates set by the publisher and subject to the availability of space. No guarantees can be given as to advertising publication dates or placement although every effort will be made to comply with publication requests. The publisher reserves the right to review and edit ads, to request that an ad be revised prior to publication or to reject any ad. Cancellations must be received by 10 a.m. on Thursday, two weeks prior to publication.For more advertising information, contact Marcia C. Ulibarri at (505)797-6058, e-mail [email protected] or fax (505) 797-6075.
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