Insights on the emergency plan for LNG in port Webinar 18 ...

Insights on the emergency plan for LNG in port

Webinar – 18/11/2020

Prof. Ernesto SalzanoUniversità di Bologna

[email protected]

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SUPER-LNG - SUstainability PERformance of LNG-based maritime mobility

mailto:[email protected]

Introduction

An emergency plan or an emergency response plan (ERP) is a written set of

instructions that describes what workers and others at the workplace should do in

an emergency.

IntroductionThe ERP includes protocols to ensure close coordination withemergency response organizations and agencies operating in thearea of the analysed asset.

Must be based on a realistic assessment of hazards associatedwith the work activity or workplace, and the possibleconsequences of an incident occurring as a result of thosehazards.

External hazards (natural hazard, security) should also beexamined in preparing an emergency plan

IntroductionThe analysis of the current international standards currently adopted in

Europe for LNG has shown that:

• European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA)

• International Association of Classification Societies (IACS)

• Society of International Gas Tanker e Terminal Operators (SIGTTO)

• Society for Gas as a Marine Fuel (SGMF)

have also produced significant guidelines for contingency plans e

technical reports for “safe” bunkering operations, for the specific case of

LNG.

IntroductionAccording to the Seveso Directive, an “external emergency response plan”

(EERP), i.e. the emergency response addressed to the population and assets

located in the surrounding of the LNG installation, is also necessary

Few (no) indications can be found either in the open literature or in public

repository and normative on LNG (emergent risk).

However, all LNG terminals in Europe has produced an EERP according to the

requirements of the Directive.

IntroductionProvided all technical measures have been followed, according to the

general concepts of the risk management and ERP, the operators

(internal, external) must operate:

❑ to contain the release of hazardous substances

❑ to minimize the effects of the accidents, i.e. the consequences of

the accidental scenarios

❑ to communicate the information to the authorities

European Maritime Safety AgencyInternal emergency plan

The following situations should be covered where appropriate:

o LNG leakage and spill on the receiving ship, on the bunkering facility orfrom the LNG transfer system;

o fire in the bunkering area;o gas detection;o unexpected movement of the vessel (due to failure or loosening of

mooring lines) or of the truck tanker;o …

External emergency plans /Seveso

o names or positions of persons authorised to set emergency procedures

in motion and of persons authorised to take charge of and coordinate

off-site action;

o arrangements for receiving early warning of incidents, and alert and call-

out procedures;

o arrangements for coordinating resources necessary to implement the

external emergency plan;

o arrangements for providing assistance with on-site mitigation action;

o arrangements for off-site mitigation action, including responses to

major-accident scenarios as set out in the safety report and considering

possible domino effects, including those having an impact on the

environment;

o …

European Maritime Safety Agency

Int.l Ass. of Classification Societies

Emergency Response Plan

An Emergency Response Plan should be prepared to address cryogenic hazards,

potential cold burn injuries to personnel and firefighting techniques for

controlling, mitigating and elimination of a gas cloud fire, jet fire and/or a LNG

pool fire.

From the public authorities, a guideline can be found as that of the ItalianDepartment of Firefighters, whereas no guidelines are given by other Adriaticcountries.

According to their experience, in case of a possible impact on residential area –the partial or total evacuation should be considered only if the time requiredfor the operations are comparable with the characteristic time for theaccidental scenario.

A system of automatic traffic light/ship light must be installed in order to closeroads, maritime lines, and railway.

A table-top exercise must be performed once a year; a full-scale exerciseevery three years. After any exercise, a review of EERP should be normallyperformed.

Italian Fire Brigades - Min of Interior

Venice, the first LNG bunkering to a ship

Italian Fire Brigades - Min of Interior

BP PROCESS SAFETYLNG FIRE PROTECTION AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE

The Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) are intended to provide guidance for

the first 20 to 30 minutes of the incident and indicate the actions and

resources required to deal with the incident during this time. The ERPs

should be:

• based on potential credible serious or major scenarios for that facility;

• relevant to the facility systems and equipment (site specific);

• fit-for-purpose, easy to use, helpful to the end users.

BP PROCESS SAFETYGas cloud response strategy

• avoid water in the liquid pool as this only increases cloud size;

• check for gas drift to semi or fully-confined areas where an explosion may

be possible;

• use of high expansion foam for vapour reduction;

• water curtains can dilute and divert gas;

• water monitors may offer limited dilution;

• wear full bunker gear and SCBA in case of flash fire.

LNG pool fire response strategy

• cool any heat or flame affected steelwork or plant;

• avoid water in the burning pool as this only increases fire size and radiant

heat distance;

• foam can reduce fire size (radiant heat reduction);

• dry powder can be used, but the gas cloud will remain;

• combine foaming and dry power for extinguishment, or dry powder to

knock down and foaming thereafter to reduce vaporization;

• wear full bunker gear, and move upwind on any extinguishment.

BP PROCESS SAFETY

Jet fire response strategy

• isolate pressure source (pumps/operations);

• …;

• foam cannot extinguish pressure fire;

• dry powder may extinguish jet fires, but pressure gas clouds will remain;

• full bunker gear is required due to high levels of radiant heat.

BP PROCESS SAFETY

Road tanker liquid spill response strategy

• deal with this in the same way as an LPG road tanker:

• Give priority to evacuation to a distance of one mile (1.6 km).

• Use water curtains if a gas cloud is present to dilute/contain/divert.

• Avoid water on LNG liquid as this will increase gas cloud.

• Evacuate all responders once water curtains are in place.

• Wear full bunker gear and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) in

case of a flash fire.

BP PROCESS SAFETY

Ship actions

• Halt cargo operations and actuate water spray system for gas cloudcontrol/dilution

• Ensure ship fire pump is running• Monitor gas detection for gas migration on ship• Leaking LNG loading line isolated and drained down• Prepare ship dry powder system in case of ignition• Prepare ship-cooling monitors ready in case of ignition…

BP PROCESS SAFETY

BP PROCESS SAFETYScenario n° Description of applicable accident scenarios

Scenario 1

− Inland LNG propelled cargo vessel,

− LNG fuel tank on deck,

− Collision with bridge,

− failure of pipe work,

− Continuous release of LNG,

− Vapour cloud dispersion (no ignition),

− Escalation with prolonged gas/vapour concentration.

Scenario 2

− Tank truck to ship bunkering,

− LNG fuel tank below deck,

− Severed hose line,

− Limited release of LNG,

− Unconfined spill on water,

− RPT,

− Cryogenic damage to ship

− No ignition of LNG vapour cloud.

Scenario 3

− Inland LNG tanker/bunker ship,

− LNG cargo tanks,

− Container falls from bunkered ship onto bunkering ship,

− Short continuous release of LNG,

− Unconfined spill on water,

− RPT,

− Delayed ignition of LNG vapour cloud.

Scenario 4

− Inland LNG propelled cargo vessel,

− LNG fuel tank on deck,

− Collision with another vessel,

− Direct ignition of cargo (e.g. gasoline),

− LNG fuel tanks exposed to heat radiation,

− Escalation with prolonged exposure, cooling required within 15 minutes.

BP PROCESS SAFETYScenario 1 specific actions

First responders (ship’s crew)

• Confirm LNG release

• Notify emergency services

• Try to isolate leakage (activate ESD)

• Eliminate any ignition sources on board.

• Activation of water curtains (if fitted) to mitigate gas dispersion over a navigational bridge.

• Shut down ventilation to ship to prevent gas being drawn into ship

• Start-up fire pump and water protection systems (if fitted)

• Consider putting ship into shore at a safe location (if possible)

• Evacuate all unessential persons (passengers and crew)

• Prepare to receive emergency services

Second responders (emergency services and river/port authorities)

• Approach upwind of incident

• Make contact with master of vessel/port authorities

• Assess extent of gas cloud

• Eliminate ignition sources in path of gas migration

• Set up water spray to disperse gas cloud

• Fire boat to set up water spray to mitigate / disperse gas cloud

• Monitor extent of gas cloud with gas detection equipment. Track gas cloud visually with

thermal imaging camera.

• Continually assess incident conditions for ongoing safety and provide water spray control

support. Advise if any further evacuation requirements are necessary.

• Prepare for fire

• Aftercare: control for ‘gas pocketing’ in all buildings and enclosed spaces in vicinity of

vapour cloud area

• Cordon off incident area and evacuate surrounding area lying in path of gas cloud

• Restrict or control navigation traffic around incident area

LNG Terminal Adriatico, ItalyThe following incidents may potentially occur while the LNG Carrier is

alongside the facility (non exhaustive list):

• Fire/Explosion

• Pollution

• Uncontrolled release of LNG or NG Vapours

• Man Overboard

• LNG Carrier out of position

• LNG Carrier-related incidents, including, mechanical failure affecting

cargo operations,

• Accident/medical emergency, power failure and failure of ship’s

mooring lines.

LNG CARRIER COLLISION WITHIN SAFETY ZONE

LNG

Car

rier

Term

inal

Op

erat

or

Tugs

&

pilo

t

Identify other vessel and render assistance as required XInitiate call out of Terminal Man-overboard response team. XPlace medical services on standby. XStand-by tugs to respond as directed by Terminal or LNG Carrier Master. X

LNG Terminal Adriatico, Italy

Others EMERGENCY PLANNING EXPERIENCE FROM EXISTING LNG SITES

IN EUROPE (similar procedures, Seveso-like):

DUNKERQUE LNG TERMINAL – FRANCEPORT OF HELSINKI – FINLANDŚWINOUJŚCIE LNG TERMINAL – POLAND

OUTSIDE EUROPE

FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC) DRAFT GUIDANCE FOR LNG TERMINAL OPERATOR’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN – USA

DARWIN LNG – AUSTRALIA

LNG accidental scenarios and emergency procedures

The STAND-OFF distance

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The evaluation of stand-off distance for ignited or un-ignited LNG release is related to the evaporation and dispersion of the vapours from a pool

Simplified (Phast, Effects, …) or more complex tools (CFD) can be adopted but several questions arise in both methodologies:

1. is LNG vapour as pure methane?2. is the LNG vapour lighter or heavier than air?3. is the LNG cloud visible (evacuation, flammability)?4. can the evaporation rate ideally calculated, including the effect of substrate?5. what if ignition (flash fire, pool fire, explosion)?6. how the codes calculate a two-phase flow?7. how big is the pool?

LNG release: open questions

Component Typical (% Mole) Range (% Mole)

Hydrocarbons Methane (C1) 92.77 83.74 – 98.22

Ethane (C2) 3.36 0.52 – 7.64

Propane (C3) 1.51 0.18 – 4.74

Iso-Butane (i-C4) 0.41 0.05 – 1.10

Normal Butane (n-C4) 0.47 0.06 – 1.63

Iso-Pentane (i-C5) 0.19 0.03 – 0.50

Normal Pentane (n-C5) 0.13 0.00 – 0.42

Hexane (C6) 0.27 0.09 – 0.78

Inerts Nitrogen (N2) 0.30 0.12 – 0.91

Helium (He) Trace 0.00 - 0.02

Impurities Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 0.59 0.13 - 1.86

Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) Trace 0.00 - 0.10

Oxygen (O2) Trace 0.00– 3.00

Water (H2O) Trace 0.00 - 0.01

1. LNG: is it methane?

❑ Boiling point: -163°C to -160°C

❑ Liquid density: 458 to 463 kg/m3

❑ MLNG ≈ 20.00 < MAIR = 28.47

❑ Vapour density @ambient temperature 0.656 kg/m³e

❑ Vapour density @boiling temperature: 1.79 kg/m3

HEAVIER THAN AIR AT BOILING TEMPERATURE

LIGHTER THAN AIR AT AMBIENT TEMPERATURE

2. LNG: is vapour lighter than air?

3. LNG cloud: is it visible?

When released in the atmosphere, a visible cloud is formed if humidity approx. > 50% because of condensation

The cloud can be not completely visible even if it is flammable

3. LNG cloud: is it visible?

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4. LNG release substrate: ground or water?

30

LNG on water

No ignition• Dispersion (asphyxia)• Rapid Phase Transition

LNG on ground

No ignition: • Dispersion (asphyxia)



Evaporation rate is commonly over-estimated because condensation isneglected, either on water or on soil/tar/ concrete:

𝑚𝑒𝑣′′ = 4.786 ∙ 10−3 ∙ 𝑢𝑤

0.78 ∙ 2𝑟 −0.11 ∙ 𝑆𝑐−0.67 ∙𝑃𝑠 ∙ 𝑀𝑤

𝑅 ∙ 𝑇𝑙

𝑅𝑒 =2𝑟 ∙ 𝑢𝑤

𝜈𝑆𝑐 =

𝜈

𝐷𝑙

The conservative option fits for fires but produces much larger vapourcloud, hence larger safety distances for the dispersion output

Tools: Integral model but CFD could be used with relative effort

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33


34


35


Typical size of LNG pool and cloud are larger on water.

LNG composition (%) Methane 87.4 ethane, 10.3 propanespill temperature (K) 111.7 water pond diameter (m) 58.0 spill rate (m3 /s) 16.0 spill duration (s) 107 spill volume (m3 ) 28.4wind speed (m/s) 1.8 (−9.8°relative humidity (%) 4.6 ambient temperature (K) 306.25

Rapid Phase Transition


Rapid Phase Transition (RPT) is the fast (explosive) evaporation of any cryogenic liquid (here intended as related to accidental release)

When vapour generation is very fast, RPT can generate pressure (shock) waves

RPT does not involve fire or chemical reactions and can be considered a physical explosion (no combustion)


RPT may result in two effects:

❑ overpressure resulting from the rapid phase change❑modified dispersion of LNG into the atmosphere, with direct effects on flash fire, vapour cloud explosion, and pool fire

The physical (and chemical) conditions for explosive evaporation are still un-clear

RPT blast waves are not easily predictable as the total energy involved in the explosion depends on many factor


For LNG release on sea-water, for an RPT to occur, it is needed that:

• A CH4 content > 80% is required for LNG to RPT (the actual composition of LNG is essential for reliable and credible evaluation)

• Water temperature > 12/17 °C (depending on degree of mixing with LNG)

• RPT strength depends on spill rate (> 0.3 m3/s)

• Maximum safety distances for negligible structural damage to other ships or structures from the release point (7 kPa) is 250 m (according to Sandia Lab and other studies)


❑ The effect of the formation of ice on water surface, and related consequences on dispersion, and combustion-related phenomena (flash fire and VCE) is still unpredicted

❑ Rapid Phase Transition is credible for the release of LNG on water whereas it is unlikely on ground (concrete, earth)


If the LNG is released on ground or seawater, a liquid pool is formed.

If the pool is ignited, a fire occurs convectively (pool fire), which is limited by theevaporation rate and heat exchange

DELAYED IGNITION

If a large vapour cloud is formed before ignition, a flame propagates throughout thecloud from the point of ignition to the entire gas volume. Two scenarios can berecognized (pool fire is typically always present):

Vapour Cloud Fire (Flash Fire): no pressure waves

Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE): with pressure (shock) waves

5. What if LNG is ignited?

42

LNG on water


Early or Delayed ignition • Pool fire• Jet fire

LNG on ground


Early or Delayed ignition • Pool fire• Jet fire

5. What if LNG is ignited? The pool fire

Fire of LNG released on ground/water

Early ignition

• Pool fire

Pool fire: Heat radiation, No pressure waves


• Fire scale (Pool Geometry)• Evaporation rate (heat, mass transfer)• Burning Rate• Radiation Intensity• Lift-off Height• Soot formation

Output: Stand-Off related to the heat radiation


ሶ𝒎𝒃 = ሶ𝑚𝑏,∞ ∙ (1 − 𝑒−𝑘β∙𝐷𝑝)

Mass Burning Rate

Small scale Large scale

Hottel’s plot for the burning rate with respect to the pool diameter


𝑝∗

𝑝°=

2

𝛾 + 1

𝛾𝛾+1

Chocked flow

Standard models can be used. Chocked flow to be

calculated by typically reached if any failure/rupture or

hole on the vapour phase.

LNG jet fire

5. What if LNG is ignited? Jet fire

LNG

Pool fire

High Expansion

Foam

Gas inertization

Water

Sprinkler

Water Mist

Water Curtain

Powders

Water-based

5. What if LNG is ignited? Fire mitigation

• Water sprinkler affects the vaporization rate (boil-off effect): Large water particles(dp > 1 mm) increases the evaporation of LNG

• High expansion foam mitigates LNG vapor hazard through warming effect (raisingvapor buoyancy), but with boil-off effect due to the heat from water drainage offoam. Foaming has however a blanketing effect on source term (vaporizationrate)

• Gaseous inertization requires large amount of gases, and is unsustainable technologically and economically for large and medium scale application


❑ Temperature in the middle of the flame is significantly reduced by water mist system❑ Right outside the water spray zone the mitigation effect is insignificant (T > 200°C)

0

1

2

3

4

0 200 400 600

he

igh

t. z

[m

]

Temperature [°C]

water mist

sprinkler


LNG

Pool fire

Water Mist

Water Curtain


❑ The heat flux is significantly reduced (-40%)

❑ The temperatures field after the onset of water curtain is tolerable by human (T ≈ 25 − 35°C)

❑ The risk of gas dispersion is minimized

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

0 10 20 30 40

Ra

dia

tiv

e h

ea

tflu

x

[kW

/m2

]

Time [s]

no mitigation system. water curtain



53

LNG on water


Early ignition: • Pool fire

Delayed Ignition• Pool fire

• Vapour Cloud fire (Flash Fire)• Vapour Cloud Explosion

LNG on ground



Delayed Ignition• Pool fire

• Vapour Cloud fire (Flash Fire)• Vapour Cloud Explosion

5. What if LNG is ignited? Delayed ignition

Ultra-low temperature (100 K – 273 K) for cryogenic fuels in air

120 160 200 240 280 320

4

6

12

14

16

Me

tha

ne

mo

le fra

ctio

n [%

v/v

]

Initial Temperature [K]

Model

Zabetakis' correlation

Siu et al. (1998)

Li et al. (2011)

Cui et al. (2016)

The dependence of flammability limits (LFL, UFL) of LNG vapour with temperature

Few experiments, few correlations

Pio, G., Salzano, E., The effect of ultra-low temperature on the flammability limits of a methane/air/diluent mixtures, Journal of Hazardous Materials, 362, 224-229 (2019).

Pio, G., Salzano, E., Laminar Burning Velocity of Methane, Hydrogen, and Their Mixtures at Extremely Low Temperature Conditions, Energy & Fuels 32, 8830–8836 (2018).

5. What if LNG is ignited? Flash fire

Inerting methane at low temperature with nitrogen

DECREASING TEMPERATURE

150 K

300 K



Flash fire of LNG: why the cloud has not exploded?

CAN LNG EXPLODE?


For most common gases at ambient temperature, given a mass of fuel/air, it is:

∆𝑃 ∝𝑑𝑆𝑓

𝑑𝑡

which means that the flame must accelerate in order to produce an intense pressure wave

5. What if LNG is ignited? Vapour Cloud Explosion

The acceleration of flame is due to the turbulence induced by obstacles, which in turns increasesthe turbulence …..

flammable mixture

ignition

combustion expansion

pressurerise

flow field

turbulence

instabilities

Schelkin effect: Positive feedback of combustion


THE MULTI-ENERGY METHOD (MEM)

❑The Multi-Energy method gives the decay of the blast wave generated by VCEs, with respect to a combustion energy-scaled distance ത𝑅 and a “strength factor” F, which depends on obstacle density, i.e.:

MEM recognizes that pressure wave (i.e. flame velocity) dependson congestion grade and on the total energy of fuel (or totalamount of fuel within flammability limits)


The MEM blast chart

Scaled overpressure: ∆𝑃

Combustion energy-scaled distance ത𝑅

ത𝑅 =𝑅

3 𝐸𝑃𝑎

E is the total combustion energy of the cloud with mass m and heat of combustion ∆𝑯𝒄

𝐸 = 𝑚𝐿𝑁𝐺 ∙ ∆𝐻𝑐 = 𝜌𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑 ∙ 𝑉𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑 ∙ 𝑐𝐿𝑁𝐺 ∆𝐻𝑐

∆𝑃


F “unconfined”

F “congested”


Is it possible to have a VCE on water?

❑ The congestion level is generally very low at seahence low F (<3): the pressure wave ischaracterised by very low intensity (< 0.03 bar) at a relatively small distance from the source point

❑ On the contrary, VCE is possible on ground provided large amount of methane, delayedignition and high level of congestion

∆𝑃


F “unconfined”

F “congested”


Increasing the complexity…

❑ Small variation of geometry: large variation of pressure (geometry dependence)

❑ALL physic has to be reproduced for the correct prediction of fire and gas explosion (i.e. turbulence effect on flame, chemical reactivity and coupling with fluid-dynamic, thermodynamic, …)


The use of Computation Fluid Dynamic is the next future for all industrial application for LNG VCE is a major request


Boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion

Trucks or storage tank under fire conditions can in

principle develop a secondary dramatic

phenomenon which is related to the rapid expansion

of vapour (which is pressurised due to external heat)

and the following vapour fire (the fireball) after the

shell failure due to wall temperature increase and

internal pressurisation.

Cold liquid at atmospheric temperature can

evaporate on ground but the evaporation rate is

limited by the low heat exchange with the

environment (as for RPT, the produced shock wave

is rather weak).

Standard models can be used.

5 – added: BLEVE

66

LNG on water



Delayed Ignition• Pool fire• Vapour Cloud fire (Flash Fire)• Vapour Cloud Explosion

LNG on ground



Delayed Ignition• Pool fire• Vapour Cloud fire (Flash Fire)• Vapour Cloud Explosion

LNG release: ground or water?

Safety distances

❑ Flash fire (delayed ignition): over-predicted scenarios because of evaporation rate

❑ Pool fire: standard models are effective if low temperature effects are considered. Non-methane substances affects the safety distance dramatically

❑ Vapour Cloud Explosion: unlikely because buoyancy, low-reactivity and low-congestion ofLNG plants

❑ Rapid Phase Transition explosion: only possible on water, strongly dependent on LNGcomposition and wave intensity (max 250 m)

❑ Jet fire on the vapour phase only

Safety barriers: effective for heat radiation (water curtain for pool fire, powder). Othertechnology under development or ineffective.

Domino effects for heat radiation from pool fire rather than overpressure for VCE or RPT

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Thanks for your attention

Ernesto [email protected]

68

mailto:[email protected]

69

List of useful guidelines on ERP and EERP for LNG operations

EMSA (2018). Guidance on LNG Bunkering to Port Authorities and Administrations. European Maritime Safety Agency.

IACS (2016), LNG Bunkering Guidelines, Report 142. International Association of Classification Societies.

SIGTTO (2001) A Guide to Contingency Planning for Marine Terminals Handling Liquefied Gases in Bulk, 2nd Ed., WitherbyPublishing Group, UK.

SIGTTO (2004) Liquefied Gas Fire Hazard Management, 1st Ed., Witherby Publishing Group, UK.

SGMF (2017) Bunkering of Ships with LNG - Competency and Assessment Guidelines version 2.0. The Society for Gas as aMarine Fuel.

VV.F (2015) Circolare 18 maggio 2015, prot. n. 5870 Ministero dell'Interno, Dip. VV.F- Guida tecnica ed atti di indirizzo per laredazione dei progetti di prevenzione incendi relativi ad impianti di distribuzione di tipo L-GNL, L-GNC e L-GNC/GNL perautotrazione.

70

List of useful, recent paper on LNG and other cryogenic liquid

Pio, G., Carboni, M., Iannaccone, T., Cozzani, V., Salzano, E., Numerical simulation of small-scale pool fires of LNG (2019) 61, pp.82-88.

Pio, G., Salzano, E., The effect of ultra-low temperature on the flammability limits of a methane/air/diluent mixtures (2019) Journalof Hazardous Materials, 362, 224-229.

Pio, G., Salzano, E., Laminar burning velocity of methane, hydrogen, and their mixtures at extremely low-temperature conditions(2018) Energy and Fuels, 32 (8), 8830-8836.

Pio, G., Salzano, E., Flammability limits of methane (LNG) and hydrogen (LH2) at extreme conditions (2019) ChemicalEngineering Transactions, 77, 601-606.

Carboni, M., Pio, G., Vianello, C., Maschio, G., Salzano, E., Large eddy simulation for the rapid phase transition of LNG (2021)Safety Science, 133, 105001- in press

Iannaccone, T., Landucci, G., Tugnoli, A., Salzano, E., Cozzani, V., Sustainability of cruise ship fuel systems: Comparison amongLNG and diesel technologies (2020) 260, in press.

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