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Program for Upgrading Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting at all Facilities Within the All-Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF)

V. Yuferev, S. Zhikharev, Y. Yakimov, V. Maltsev, N. Obolochkov, V.Vatulin, G. Komarov, A. Mesheriakov, N. Mikijchuk, V. Punin, G. Skripka, A. Shapovalova (VNIIEF)

R. Augustson, (LANL), D. Cokinos, (BNL), A. Eras, L.Wright, (SNL), D. Wentz, E. Chapman, (LLNL), P . Singh, J. Randolph (OWL), M. Curtis (PNNL), M. Pikula, M. Windham (Pantex)

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Program for Upgrading Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting at all Facilities Within the All-Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF)

Authors: V. Yuferev, S. Zhikharev, Y. Yakimov, V. Maltsev, N. Obolochkov, V. Vatulin, G. Komarov, A. Mesheriakov, N. Mikijchuk, V. Punin, G. Skripka, I. Smirnov, M. Kuvshinov, I. Zhukov, A. Shapovalova, S. Khlystov, G. Lomtev, and A. Kopeikin (VNIIEF)

R. Augustson, E. Kutyreff, and B. Scott, (LANL), D. Cokinos, (BNL), T. Malone, L. Wright and A. Eras, (SNL), D. Wentz, E. Chapman, and Z. Koenig, (LLNL), P. Singh, J. Randolph, and J. Lewis (ORNL), M. Curtis (PNNL), M. Pikula and M. Windham (Pantex), and D. Curtis (DOE)

Abstract As part of the Department of Energy-Russian program for strengthening nuclear material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A), plans have now been formulated to install an integrated MPC&A system at all facilities containing large quantities of weapons-usable nuclear material within the All-Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF, Arzamas-16) complex. In addition to storage facilities, the complex houses a number of critical facilities used to conduct nuclear physics research and facilities for developing procedures for disassembly of nuclear weapons.

INTRODUCTION The All-Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF), Russian Nuclear Center, has been actively involved in the Department of Energy @OE)/Russian Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) enhancement program since its beginning in 1994, and even before that, VNIIEF has been a participant in Nunn-Lugar-sponsored activities like the Department of Defense (DOD)/Minatom program for constructing a long-term Russian Fissile Material Storage Facility. Today, VNIIEF’s collaboration with the DOE and its US national laboratories is stronger than ever.

As reported in earlier Institute of Nuclear Materials Management ONMM) papers [ 1,2], the evolution of the joint MPC&A program progressed fiom assembling a model system in 1994-95, to evaluation of key MPC&A instrumentation, both Russian and US made, during 1995-96, leading to the design and implementation of systems at two operating sites starting in 1996 and continuing through 1999. Each step provided the technical foundation and operating experience for each succeeding expansion. In the fall of 1997, the VNIIEF management, with Minatom approval, agreed to open all buildings, facilities, and sites processing or storing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium to installation and implementation of enhanced protection, control and accounting measures. This represents a major expansion of the work at VNIIEF, which will result in better safeguards on the large quantity of nuclear material within the institute boundaries.

VNIIEF is a compIex site, performing the functions of research, design, engineering, fabrication, and assembly of nuclear weapons. Comparing with DOE national laboratories, VNIIEF is a combination of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory (LLNL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and parts of Pantex Plant and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Y-12. In total, there are 16 fenced sites (designated guarded areas [GA]) which are further subdivided into more than 30 material balance areas W A S ) . There will be a multi-layered design for the MPC&A systems to be implemented at these GAS. Each GA will have a local control and accounting organization, which will communicate with each MBA within the GA via a local area computer network. Groups of GAS will report to one of two administrative organizations, one, an engineering/fabrication unit (designated the Industrial Zone) and the second, a unit which performs physicaVscientific measurements (designated the Scientific Zone). All the GAS and the administrative organizations will be connected together by a Central Information System network (CIS). A site-wide MPC&A oversight organization will operate the CIS.

INDUSTRIAL, ZONE The Industrial Zone at VNIIEF encompasses ten GAS containing 22 MBAs, including all of the central storage facilities for VNIIEF (three sites) and five technological process areas where various aspects of the weapons production cycle take place.

Work began in fiscal year 1997 (FY97) on a conceptual design of a zone-wide, integrated MPC&A system. This effort has continued into FY98 with additional tasking to include detailed designs for the full installation and testing of the computerized MC&A system, installation of video surveillance and access control systems, introduction of measurements, the installation of a communications network, and upgrades to physical protection.

In FY99, the following upgrade activities are planned for all ten GAS: install rapid upgrades to physical protection measures inside buildings, complete installation of communication network cabling, and design site-wide computerized material accounting system.

Extra emphasis will be put into installing a full complement of MPC&A instrumentation at GA-3, - 5, -6, and -7, which include the major central storage facilities.

Production Site (part of GA-1) At the present time, there is an integrated MPC&A system in trial operation at the Production Site, providing modem and improved safeguards for large quantities of special nuclear material (SNM). This system includes tighter perimeter and facility access control, measured physical inventories, and timely accounting and tracking of nuclear material.

Trial operations will be continued in FY99 in order to gain more experience in the implementation of rapid inventory procedures and continued access control upgrades. In addition, operation and equipment maintenance tasking will continue. Tasks will be put in place to provide in-depth training for personnel at the site using the system.

Nine Additional Guarded Areas in the Industrial Zone MPC&A upgrade efforts started in FY98 at the nine additional GAS in the Industrial Zone and will continue through FY2003. FY98 tasks include detailed designs for the full installation and testing of

the computerized MC&A system, installation of video surveillance and access control systems, introduction of nuclear material verification measurements, the installation of a communications network, and upgrades to the physical protection system.

Planned activities for FY99 include implementing physical protection upgrades at all GAS, developing requirements for accounting software, and installing MPC&A equipment at four GAS (-3, -5, -6, and -7); + PENAL + portal and portable metal detectors + accounting computer equipment and installation + installation of networking equipment + terminate fiber optic cables at GAS + portal radiation monitors, KPRM and BIRK adapting accounting software to all Jhdustrial Zone GAS installing access control systems for four GAS (-3, -5 -6, and -7), installing TV surveillance for four GAS (-3, -5, -6, and -7), and beginning trial operations at four GAS (-3, -5, -6, and -7).

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In later fiscal years, all the GAS will be outfitted with complete systems.

SCIENTIFIC ZONE The Scientific Zone within the VNIIEF complex includes the Reactor Site (GA-12), Testing Site (GA-13), and four additional GAS. The Reactor Site was the first area to upgrade the existing MPC&A system, beginning trial operations in 1997.

In FY99, the detailed design for all GAS within the zone will be completed, the communications cabling will be laid, and the design of a computerized item-control system will be adapted to each GA. Trial operations at GA-12, the reactor site, will continue.

Reactor Site (GA-12) The Reactor Site has both classified and unclassified areas contained within its boundaries. It includes critical assemblies, a pulsed reactor, and several storage sites. The Reactor Site contains large quantities of SNM (HEU and plutonium) for research programs and reliability testing. It is surrounded by a security fence and is guarded by a security force. There is an integrated MPC&A system in trial operation providing modem, improved safeguards for large quantities of attractive nuclear material. This enhanced MPC&A includes tighter perimeter and facility access control, measured physical inventories, and timely accounting and tracking of nuclear material. The site has a central alarm station and an upgraded TV surveillance and computerized item-control system.

Trial operations will be continued in FY99 in order to gain more experience in the implementation of rapid inventory procedures and continued access control upgrades. In addition, operation and equipment maintenance tasking will continue. Tasks will be put in place to provide in-depth training of personnel at the site using the system.

Five Additional Guarded Areas in the Scientific Zone FY99 activities for all the GAS include

finishing conceptual and detailed design; installing fiber-optic cable and networking equipment; adapting, implementing, and integrating item-control software; developing requirements and adapting accounting software to Scientific Zone; and producing and installing VNIIEF equipment including KPRM, BIRK, PENAL, and Passportizer; and installing TV surveillance systems at Research Site and Test Site.

RUSSIAN-DESIGNED EQUIPMENT Examples of VNIIEF instrumentation that will be installed at the GAS include a radiation-based pedestrian monitor (KPRM), a handheld radiation monitor (BIRK-3), the PENAL room access unit, and a gamma-ray-based Passport system.

The KPRM portal monitor (Fig. 1) is a two-pillar, floor-standing unit designed by VNIIEF. The pillar cabinets include four detector blocks of plastic scintillators, a microprocessor controller unit driving the module operation, an infrared sensor to detect whether a person is occupying the space under control, an alarm system of flashing lights and sounds, and a board indicating the status of the module. The module performs the following functions: self-diagnostics, continuous background monitoring, fissile material entry and exit control, and control of unauthorized access to the equipment. It can operate in unattended mode as part of an automated MPC&A system. The KPRM pedestrian monitor has been certified in Russia and meets the Category III nuclear material mass detection sensitivity standard set forth in Russian OCT 95 10539-97 (equivalent to the Category I1 mass detection sensitivity standard set forth in ASTM C 1169-92).

The BIRK-3 is an advanced, handheld gamma-ray monitor (Fig. 1) designed by VNIIEF, which can be used by a security inspector to manually search personnel, packages, or other items for concealed nuclear materials. It has a high sensitivity of detection and high accuracy of localization. The BIRK- 3 meets the Category 11 mass detection sensitivity standard set forth in Russian OCT 95 10539-97 (equivalent to ASTM C 1237-93).

Figure I . The BIRK-3 handheld gamma-ray monitor and the KPRMportal monitor,

PENAL is a room access authorization system (Fig. 2) designed to insure that only authorized personnel are given keys to a specific room and to enforce the "two- or three-person" rule as a criterion for entering the room.

The Passport system measures the gamma-ray spectral signature f?om containers (Fig. 2) and confirms that nuclear material is consistent with the accounting database.

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Figure 2. The PENAL room access authorization system and the Passport system.

IMPLEMENTATION OF SITE-WIDE CENTRAL INFORMATION SYSTEM The VNIIEF site-wide CIS development effort began in FY97. Its development has been expanded for FY98 and includes the installation of the backbone communications network and development of software specific to the CIS. The CIS will integrate with the proposed Industrial and Scientific Zone-wide computerized MPC&A systems, the access authorization system, and the existing security services network.

FY99 activities include finishing the detailed design, installing fiber-optic cable and networking equipment, writing CIS operating software, writing access authorization software, and conducting initial testing and trail operation of the network.

SUMMARY A strong foundation in MPC&A technology gained through four years of collaboration with the DOE MPC&A program is enabling W I E F to significantly enhanced their existing nuclear material safeguards measures at all 16 GAS of the institute. The enhancements presently planned will be implemented over the next several years.

REFERENCES 1. G. Skripka, et al., “Implementation of MPC&A Systems at the VNIIEF Research (Reactor) Site,”

Nucl. Mater. Manage. XXV (Proc. Issue) (1996).

2. G. Skripka, et al., “Trial Operation of W C & A Systems at Two Active Nuclear Material Handling Sites Within the All-Russian Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF),” Nucl. Mater. Manage. XXVI (Proc. Issue) (1997).