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Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) “Beyond Numbers: Understanding the Institutions for Monitoring Poverty Reduction Strategies”
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Page 1: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring

Markus GoldsteinWorld Bank

From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006)

“Beyond Numbers: Understanding the Institutions for Monitoring Poverty Reduction Strategies” World

Bank

Page 2: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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Content

1. Expectations and realities2. Organizing monitoring activities3. Making use of PRS monitoring 4. Organizing participation

Page 3: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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1. Expectations (and realities) Objectives of a PRS-MS or any MS

Supports decision-making Supports accountability to the public Promotes evidence-based dialogue Supports reporting to donors for their

own accountability Functions of the PRS-MS

Poverty monitoring PRS implementation monitoring Expenditure tracking

Focus on entire results-chain, linking the various elements

Page 4: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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1. Expectations (and realities)

PRS-MS mainly has institutional functions: Coordinating actors (not duplicating) Developing set of indicators and targets Building capacity where deficient Organizing information flows Compiling data Linking elements of results-chain Organizing analysis and evaluation Generating reports Disseminating findings Organizing participation of civil society

Page 5: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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1. (Expectations and) realities

Modest achievements: Few have established functioning links between monitoring and decision-making

Common obstacles: Practical issues with data collection, especially

administrative routine data Difficulties in coordination, duplication,

redundancies “turf battles” No incentives to participate (and relinquish space) Formal plans are not translated into actual practice

Page 6: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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1. (Expectations and) realities

Common obstacles (cont.): Shortcomings in PRSs themselves

Lack operational details Lack of costing Lack of prioritization Inadequate indicators and targets

Deficit in evaluation and analysis Limited budget planning and PEM systems Weak demand (interest?) from decision-makers Donor requirements typically not aligned

Page 7: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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2. Organizing monitoring activities

Usually, formal plans exist… but not implemented Problem may be in process of design

Often narrow: some stocktaking, short consultations, design (consultant?)…no stakeholder analysis, no real participation

Details of system not worked out – roles, responsibilities, standards, modalities for cooperation

Limited buy-in from actors Limited accountability or compliance

Systems are consensual in nature, function only if participants find it useful and legitimate

w/o common purpose, formal obligations don’t workNeed more organic design, common commitment

Page 8: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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2. Organizing monitoring activities

Common building blocks Steering Committee: political support and oversight Coordination Unit or Secretariat: convening

meetings, managing processes, compiling data, drafting reports

Inter-agency committees and working groups: promote dialogue, inclusive membership, debate results

National Statistics Institute: key data producer, plus normative and technical-assistance role

Line ministries: liaison point (M&E Unit or individual)

Key issues are relationships and modalities

Page 9: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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2. Organizing monitoring activities

Lessons/considerations: 1. Leadership 2. Coordination3. Liaison with line ministries4. Role of national statistical agencies5. Involving local governments

Page 10: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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2.1. Leadership

Choice of institutional lead is critical Should be close to center of government/budget

process Range of locations:

Ministry of Finance (Mali, Niger, Uganda) close to budget Ministry of Planning (Malawi, Mauritania) better analysis Office of the (vice-)President (Tanzania) greater

authority Leadership more effective if in a single agency,

rather than an inter-agency committee A champion is important but danger that system

becomes tied to a personality In any case, leadership may need to change over

time, need for flexibility

Page 11: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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2.2. Coordination – the greatest challenge

Typically series of inter-agency committees (13 in Mali) but: Committee system often over-elaborate Run out of steam Incentives work against coordination Often lack concrete recommendations

Technical secretariats typically suffer from high turnover and limited resources and skills

Avoid burdensome structures, build working relationships

Effective secretariat is key to organize dialogue, work through the issues, assist its members

Process, advocacy, political leadership are critical Donors can:

Limit parallel demands which create wrong incentives Support the system by providing incentives

Page 12: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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2.3. Liaison with line ministries Most PRS-MS are “second-tier” systems: rely on routine

data from line ministries Usually a “liaison person” in ministry, but often w/o the

authority, time or incentives to play that role effectively Quality of sectoral data often an issue Project/donor-specific reporting often take precedence Promote monitoring within line ministries (for their

own management purposes) Change incentives (+capacity) Choose liaison persons with higher profile Requirements from PRS-MS aligned with sectoral

information systems Donors align their reporting requirements

Page 13: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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2.4. Role of statistical agenciesOften most institutionally advanced element of

PRS-MSBut issues: 1: PRS-MS arrangements sometimes duplicate existing

statistical structures (master plan). Potential rivalry between statistical system and PRS-MS. Limited links between central agency and line ministries

Ensure complementarity with existing systems and plans

2: Role of agency in setting standards, technical assistance, capacity building often not fully played. Often survey and administrative data not compatible.

Funding mechanism to leave space for this role. Donors to move away from supporting activities, towards supporting plans

3: Existing data typically not fully utilized outside the central agency

More dissemination, more training/statistical literacy

Page 14: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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2.5. Involving local governments

Communication within a sector often an issue Incentives differ with degree of decentralization Limited capacity (and numerous reporting obligations) No “best practice” examples

Limit indicators to reduce burden (make it easier to comply) Central quality control mechanisms Support and capacity-building Provide feedback to local level Build on local civil society (?) Encourage local accountability (dissemination) Options:

decentralized monitoring (e.g. Uganda, link to grant mechanism)

central monitoring of local governments (when capacity too low)

Page 15: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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3. Making use of PRS monitoring

In addition to organizing data supply, PRS-MS must build demand

Establish linkages with entry points in decision-making processes: Budget MTEF Planning Review/update PRS Parliamentary sessions Public dialogue Donor strategies and operations

Processes outside the PRS-MS, but should guide activities: Analysis and evaluation Outputs and dissemination Linking PRS monitoring and budget Role of parliament

Page 16: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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3.1. Analysis and evaluation

Analysis key to effective use of data Area of great deficit

Lack of capacity Lack of incentives (weak accountability)

Focus on APR production, w/o much analytical content

Often dedicated analytical unit (e.g.Tanzania, Uganda)Work when close to governmentWork when focused only on analysis Issue of funding and sustainability

Need greater capacity (and incentives) in sectoral agencies

Option: joint work with donors (e.g. PERs)

Page 17: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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3.2. Outputs and dissemination Information must be disseminated to have an

impact Within governments: pushing information back to

central agencies local and regional governments service providers

Outside governments: Parliament Media and general public Donors, etc.

Often not accessible Main focus is often donors Ensure right format/content for users, including

public Ensure right timing for key moments Dissemination strategy

Page 18: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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3.3. Linking with budget/planning

Most likely incentive for evidence-based policy-making

In practice, often weak link Experience to date:

requirement in rules for budget preparation (usually in countries with MTEF – Uganda, Tanzania)

Challenge function around budget preparation Ability to “sanction” often limited

Careful: Results can take time or can be due to exogenous

factors linking funds to ability to monitor or to ability to deliver? incentives to mis-report? Incentives to under-commit?

Difficult to operationalize, depends on maturity of MTEF and PEM system

Donors should strengthen the budget process, rather than bypass it (wrong incentives)

Page 19: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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3.4. Links with parliament

Relatively low participation in PRS process in most countries

Missed opportunity for oversight function Low capacity of committees for analysis Low resources Capacity building, economic literacy,

committees

Page 20: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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4. Organizing participation

Belongs to both the supply and demand side A means to strengthen the PRS-MS (producer) A means to increase accountability (user)

Experience varies greatly Issues of capacity and representativity Forms of participation

Carrying out monitoring activities (including “action-oriented”)

Participating in PRS-MS structures Analyzing and providing policy advice Disseminating information

Typically participation not very formalized

Page 21: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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Conclusions

Do not start from blank slate… build on existing Won’t happen overnight… gradual improvement Goal not an ideal system… but a process of

change Context evolves… build flexible arrangements Focus on relations, incentives and activities Demand needs to be stimulated… identify entry

points Users differ and need different formats and

content Donors can support or distort…

Thank you !

Page 22: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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Part 2: Talking about your issues

First, list main issues you face Second, let’s talk about one

problem you face, and what you can do about it – in concrete terms

Page 23: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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M&E (PRS) Issue Assessment: African Region

Issue% of Pts Rank

 

1 Coordination at the Central Level 13% 3*

2 Capacity Building: Central and Local Levels 19% 2

3 M&E Linkage to Budget 10% 6

4 Political Will/Leadership 29% 1

5 M&E Budget Allocated to M&E 9% 5

6Coordination of Central Level with Local Level 13% 3*

7 Legislation/Regulation 4% 6

8 Engagement with Civil Society 2% 7

Page 24: Institutional Arrangements for PRS Monitoring Markus Goldstein World Bank From Bedi, Coudouel, Cox, Goldstein and Thornton (2006) Beyond Numbers: Understanding.

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List of issues facing your monitoring system

Take cards on your table, write them down

Voting

After lunch, let’s talk about one particular issue, and 1-2 concrete steps you can take E.g. policy briefs, build a network that

meets x times per month, etc


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