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INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and...

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INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14
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Page 1: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISMReadings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142

Hay and Menon CH 14

Page 2: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Guiding Questions

What is the difference between presidential and parliamentary systems?

What is the confidence relationship? What are the pros and cons of

presidentialism? Parliamentarism? What is the difference between a

Westminster system? Consensus system? How should politics differ between the two? What is semi-presidentialism/premier

presidentialism?

Page 3: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Fused vs. Separated Powers

A long history in political theory. Rooted in part in political revolutions.

Associated with preventing the ability of unchecked executive or legislature rule.

Classic theories predicated on the US (presidential) and the UK (parliamentary) models.

Models posit very different relationships between the executive and the legislature.

Page 4: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Separated Powers: Presidentialism

In presidential systems, executive and legislative power are separated.

President and Cabinet constitute the executive branch President as head of state and head of

government. Executive and legislative branches are

elected separately (separate origin). Both branches are elected for a fixed term. Members of the executive do not sit in the

legislature Neither branch can remove the other

except in extraordinary circumstances (separate survival).

Page 5: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Fused Powers: Parliamentarism

In parliamentary systems, executive and legislative powers are fused.

Prime Minister and the Cabinet constitute the executive (collective executive).

Prime Minister as head of government. Monarch or a figurehead president serves as a head of state

Only the legislature is directly elected. Prime Minister and the Cabinet come from the legislature

(fused power-shared origin). PM is typically the leader of the largest political party in the

governing coalition. Terms for the executive and the legislature are typically not

fixed. Confidence relationship exists between the executive and

legislative branches (shared survival).

Page 6: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Confidence Relationship

Concept of responsible government defines parliamentary systems.

Governments stay in office until: 1) They lose a vote of confidence 2) The PM dissolves parliament 3) The upper bound of parliament is reached.

PM and his or her government must have the confidence of the chamber (majority support). Legislature possesses authority to express no confidence in

the executive. Governments must resign if they lose a vote of confidence.

Executive (PM) has powers of dissolution. PM can typically dissolve the parliament and call for new

elections at any time. Strong party discipline is critical in parliamentary systems.

Page 7: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

John Major and Maastricht

Maastricht treaty (EU) split his Conservative party. Conservatives (Tories)

historically Eurosceptic. Small majority: 18.

22 rebels. Labour saw Tory divisions

and smelled blood in the water. A major defeat could trigger

new elections. Government lost the vote:

324-316. Embarrassing defeat for the

government.

Page 8: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

John Major and Maastricht

Major strongly believed that Maastricht needed to be passed. But another loss would call his

leadership into question. Polls suggested Labour would

win a new election. Major knew this.

So did Labour. The next day, Major made

the vote on Maastricht a confidence vote. Had he lost, he would have

called new elections. Vote passed 339-299.

Page 9: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Critiques

Track record outside of the US is spotty.

Fixed terms create inflexibility. Suffers from immobilism due

to divided government. Unclear who to credit or blame

for policy. Winner take all logic hinders

stability. Direct elections creates

opportunities for outsiders or demagogues.

Direct elections provide more choice for voters (increases accountability and identifiability).

Legislators vote on party lines rather than on policy merit.

Parliamentary systems experience divided government in bicameral settings.

Majority governments in some parliamentary systems are often unchecked (winner take all).

Flexibility of parliamentarism problematic when stable governments cannot form.

PRESIDENTIALISM PARLIAMENTARISM

Page 10: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Comparing Institutions

While most European systems are parliamentary systems, they vary in terms of how authority is distributed.

Some vest more authority at the level of the central government (Westminster) while others disperse this authority to both the national and sub-national levels (consensus).

Both have advantages and disadvantages. Political context critical for determining when

power should be consolidated or dispersed. Institutional “logic” has important ramifications for

politics

Page 11: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Comparing Institutions

Executive authority concentrated in one party cabinets. One party controls the

government Executive dominance high.

Typically…. Two party systems Over-represent large parties

Use SMD-FPTP electoral systems

Unitary systems. Unicameral. Lack judicial review Constitutional “flexibility”

Easy to amend.

Executive authority shared within multiparty cabinets. Lower executive dominance

Typically …. Multiparty systems. Represent small parties

Use PR Federal. Bicameral. Have judicial review Constitutional rigidity.

Tough to amend

WESTMINSTER/MAJORITARIAN

CONSENSUS

Page 12: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Case Study: United Kingdom Westminster Executive dominance: HIGH

PMs rarely lose a vote of confidence. Coalition government is rare.

Current Con-Lib Dem coalition is an anomaly

“Two and a half” party system. Labour, Conservatives and the

Liberal Democrats Electoral system favors large parties. Unitary government

Devolution to regions can theoretically be rescinded.

Bicameral House of Lords veto power is

limited. Unwritten constitution. No judicial review.

New Supreme Court may change role of judiciary.

Page 13: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Case Study: Belgium Consensus Executive dominance: LOW

Cabinet duration low Coalition government the norm

Multiparty system. Multiple parties split along

ideological and linguistic dimensions.

Electoral system is fairly proportional. Federal system.

Current stalemate revolves around giving more authority to the subunits.

Bicameral legislature Constitutional rigidity

Changes require supermajorities within the legislature as well as within linguistic communities.

Judicial review Strong role in preserving linguistic

communities.

Page 14: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Semi-Presidentialism/Premier Presidentialism

Premier-Presidential systems possess a dual executive. Typically a president and a prime minister

President is directly elected and has significant powers. That is, separate origin (direct election) and separate

survival (no vote of confidence) Unlike parliamentary systems, the president is not a

figurehead A premier (PM) and cabinet exists subject to

parliamentary confidence. Fused survival; tenure in office depends on avoiding a loss

on a vote of confidence. Unlike presidential systems the government does not serve

a fixed term.

Page 15: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Case Study: France

Executive dominance: HIGH Coalition duration is high. Constitution gives executive a lot

of tools to override the legislature. Multiparty system

Although blocs of left-right organize politics.

Electoral system Runoff system does allow for

smaller parties to gain representation.

Unitary system Bicameral legislature

But Senate can be overridden. Constitutional rigidity

Mixed Judicial review

Weak

Page 16: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Divided Government in France Semi-presidential systems deal with divided government to

an extent not usually observed in parliamentary systems. Referred to as cohabitation

Legislative majority is of a different party then the President.

1986-1988 and 1993-1995 (under Mitterrand) and 1997-2002 (under Chirac). Decision to call elections “backfired”.

President takes over foreign/military affairs. PM takes over government agenda.

PM subordinate when majorities are the same. PM dominant when majorities are different.

Recent reforms intended to reduce the likelihood of cohabitation.

Page 17: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Arguments for Premier-Presidentialism President’s authority to dissolve the legislature

overcomes issues of deadlock/rigidity. Although in many systems, this authority is constrained.

Coalitions in the assembly reduce winner take all logic, forcing the president to work with diverse interests in the assembly. Cohabitation can force both the president and the

legislation to negotiate. Where roles are strictly defined, “outsiders” in the

presidency will not endanger the system. Expectation is that only experienced party leaders will run

for the presidency. Lack of veto authority maintains parliamentary party

discipline. No cross pressures for members of parliament to buck

their party vis-à-vis the president.

Page 18: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Problems with Premier-Presidentialism

Problem: Insulating the presidency from the assembly is problematic. Giving “residual powers” to the PM can

address this issue. Problem: Electoral calendar may increase

or decrease the legitimacy of the president or PM. Electoral timing is key to undercutting

dyarchic conflict. Problem: Stalemate/duplication of roles as

President and PM jockey for influence. Where executive roles are defined, difficulties

under cohabitation are reduced.

Page 19: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Conclusions

Efficiency: Easy to know who to

credit/blame Decisions can be made quickly Change/reform easily enacted.

Fairness: “Elected dictatorship” makes it

tough to stop a government with a large parliamentary majority.

Disproportionality in electoral system may not be fair. But if your side wins, you get

your turn at bat.

Fairness: Proportionality in electoral

systems gives each societal sector a voice

Decisions, once made, have widespread support.

Efficiency: But, in some instances,

needed reforms are blocked because support cannot be obtained.

Difficult to know who to credit/blame for policies.

WESTMINSTER CONSENSUS

Page 20: INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE I: PRESIDENTIALISM AND PARLIAMENTARISM Readings: Lijphart 1-8, 116-135, and 139-142 Hay and Menon CH 14.

Next Unit

Institutional Structure II Federalism and Bicameralism

Readings: Lijphart 185-215 and Russell Pay particular attention to:

What makes a system federal? What is the linkage between federalism and

bicameralism? What do second chambers do? How do we classify their strength?


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