Institutions for managing global climate change

Institutions for

Ensuring that treaties designed to manage global climate change are ‘implementable’ is an important negotiating challenge. Implementable agreements have a reasonable chance of being ratified by nation states that are the greatest contributors to the problem; are acceptable to parties with the resources to do something about it; and induce voluntary compliance. This article contends that, aside from domestic political characteristics, other factors contributing to effective implementation of international agreements are their structure, requirements, and expectations. Factors that optimize implementable agreements include: a sufficient number of relevant participants in negotiations to enhance their legitimacy; reliance on confidence-building to deter non-compliance; stating precisely the signatory obligations; and designing treaties to be renegotiable in the face of changing scientific, political, and economic conditions. Global environmental agreements most likely to obtain signatory compliance will avoid overly stringent standards; allow variable compliance and discretion in implementation; consult domestic interests at each stage of agreement ‘design’ and execution; permit transfers of resources and technology; and rely on ‘functional integration’ to build confidence.

The author is with the Energy Division, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Building 4500-N, Mail Stop 6206, PO Box 2008,

continued on page 44

managing global climate change

Compliance, fairness, and universal participation

David Lewis Feldman

A fundamental challenge facing international efforts to manage global climate change is ensuring that treaties designed to mitigate or prevent global warming are successfully implemented. A successfully implemented agreement is one that obtains the compliance of most signatories. Successful policy implementation is usually attributed to domestic political and economic factors such as availability of resources for enforcement, a competent bureaucracy to translate policy goals into rules, and an unwavering commitment by leaders to long-term problem management.’ There is another set of factors contributing to effective implementation of international agreements, however: the structure, requirements, and expectation of the agreements themselves.

Prior international environmental agreements provide precedents that highlight the problems confronting countries that seek to implement treaty goals. Through examining such agreements, this article contends that those which have been most effectively implemented share four characteristics in their original negotiations:

l A sufficient number of participants are included in negotiations to enhance their legitimacy, but not so many as to encumber negotiations with extraneous issues. Too many participants makes subsequent enforcement of agreements difficult since there is unlikely to be consensus upon what was agreed to during negotiation.

0 Means for verifying compliance, specified in agreements, rely on confidence-building instead of punishment. Confidence-building deters adverse behaviour through maximizing the probability that nations, sovereign countries, or other violators will be caught in ‘non-compliance’. It employs quiet persuasion and minimizes adverse publicity.

0 Obligations of signatories are stated precisely and unambiguously. Signatories (ie national governments) are permitted to exercise discretion in complying with negotiated treaty goals.

0959-3780/92/010043-l 6 @ 1992 Butterworth-Heinemann Ltd 43

Institutions for managing global climate change

con~nued from page 43 Oak Ridge, TN 37831-6206, USA, and Energy, Environment, and Resources Center, University of Tennessee, Knox- ville, TN 37996-0710, USA.

This article was prepared by the Global Environmental Studies Center of Oak Ridae National Laboratorv, Oak Ridae. TN 37831-6285, managed by’ Martin Martetta Systems, Inc for the US Department of Energy under contract No DE-ACOS- 840R21400. The US government retains a non-exclusive royalty-free licence to pub- lish or reproduce the published form of this contribution, or allow others to do so, for US government purposes.

‘Studies of environmental policy implementation typically are concerned with policy design’, the effectiveness of bureaucratic actions to attain legislative goals, and the obstacles and opportunities for compliance. See Randall B. Ripley, Policy Analvsis in Political Science, Nelson-Hall, -Chicago, IL, 1985; and Ran- dall B. Rialev and Grace A. Franklin. Bureaucracy and Poiky Implementation] Dorsey, Homewood, IL, 1982. Some recent studies on transnational environmental policy implementation include Peter M. llaas, Saving the ~ediferranean: The Puli- tics of International Environmental Coop- eration, Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 1990; and Harold K. Jacobson and Edith Brown Weiss, ‘Implementing and complying with international environmental accords: A framework for research’, paper presented at American Poli- tical Science Association meeting, San Francisco, CA, 30 August-2 September 1990. 2A handful of countries currently produce most of the carbon dioxide and other trace gases that contribute to global warming. The USA, the USSR and China account for 23, 18, and 9%, respectively, of global CO, production, or roughly 112 of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions. Similar- ly, it is estimated that three countries - Brazil, Indonesia, and Zaire - which collec- tively account for 48% of the world’s tropical rain forests, play a dispropo~ionate role in carbon sequestering due to their large forestry reserves. It would be difficult to imagine an international climate change agreement designed to address carbon sequestering that did not encompass these three countries. See Lester R. Brown and Edward C. Wolf, ‘Charting a sustainable course’, in Lester R. Brown et al, State of the World 1987: A ~orldwafch /nstit~te Report on Progress Toward A Sustainable Societv. W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1987, pp 196-213; Michael E. Grubb. The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets, Energy and Environ- mental Programme, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1989; Hilary F. French, ‘An Environmental Security Council?‘, Worldwatch, Vol 2, No 5,

continued on page 45

l Negotiations can be reopened and milestones modified as war- ranted by changing specific, political, and economic conditions discovered through the process of implementation. This built-in flexibility is enhanced by incorporating non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the formulation stage of agreements and in the process of monitoring their implementation.

After exploring these four characteristics of effective environmental agreements, I offer a typology of international environmental agreements according to their structure, requirements, and expectations - ranging from largely symbolic actions to formal conventions designed to enforce strict compliance with rules. The conclusion is that while each type of agreement has problems in implementation, agreements that are most likely to obtain signatory compliance avoid overly stringent standards; allow variable compliance and discretion in implementation; consult domestic interests at each stage of agreement ‘design’ and execution; permit transfers of resources and technology; and rely upon ‘functional integration’ to build confidence.

Optimal number of participants

Much of the debate over the number of countries that should be involved in climate change neogotiations is centred on the fact that a few developed or rapidly industrializing countries are currently the principal contributors to global warming (although this balance is likely to change by the second decade of the next century).’ In addition, less developed countries (LDCs) are likely to suffer disproportionately from climate change impacts3 From the standpoint of prevention and adaptation, LDCs have few energy options to which they can shift and even fewer options for alternative land use. 4 In short, they are ill-equipped to deal with the consequences of climate change. Because developed and developing countries would enter climate change negotiations with different advantages and disadvantages, perceptions as to what would constitute a fair agreement and acceptable standards for controlling the problem also will vary.

Given these differences between developed and developing countries, it is obvious that both sets of nations must be included in negotiations towards a climate change convention. The crucial question is: how many countries should be involved to ensure effective implementation? The answer depends on what signatories hope to achieve. During the Law of the Sea negotiations in the late 197Os,” seabed mining, anti-pollution, and territorial waters issues were included in the same negotiations in an attempt to appeal to numerous parties. This confounded the negotiation process by stretching it out interminably. It also made implementation largely ineffective since many major powers refused to ratify an agreement whose goals appeared nebulous or even contradictory.6 The USA viewed environmental externalities as collective problems but mineral exploration rights as national goods that should be regulated by traditional agreements.

On the other hand, in the formation of the International Energy Agency (IEA) by European Community and North American countries, and in the creation of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the addition of differentially valued, sometimes unre- lated issues enhanced the zone of agreement among parties, spread the risks of compliance among many signatories, and led to fairly rapid

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE March 1992

continued from page 44 September-October 1990, pp &7. 3P. Gleick, ‘Climate change and international politics: Problems facing developing countries’, Ambio, Vol 18, No 6, 1990, pp 333-339. “J. Goldemberg et al, Energy for Develop- ment, John Wiley and Sons, New York, NY, 1987. ‘On the Law of the Sea and its attempt to create an international mining, resource exploration, and pollution control regime, see James K. Sebenius, ‘Designing negotiations toward a new regime: The case of global warming’, international Security, Vol 15, No 4, Spring 1991, pp 111-148. 6Fen Osler Hampson, ‘Climate change: Building international coalitions of the like- minded’, international Journal, Vol XLV, Winter 1989-90, pp 3&74; also see Sebe- nius, op tit, Ref 5. 71bid. *Also see R.E. Benedick, Ozone Diploma- cy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet, Harvard University Press, Cam- bridge, MA, 1991. ‘Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Final Rule, US Environmental Protection Agen- cy, Washington, DC, 53FR 30566-30602, 12 August 1988; and Kerry Krutilla, ‘Un- ilateral environmental policy in the global commons’, Policy Studies Journal, forthcoming. ‘“lntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Policymakers Summary of the Formulation of Response Strateoies. Re- port prepared for ll%C by Working droup Ill, June 1990. “US Environmental Protection Agency, Policy Options for Stabilizing Glob>/ Cii- mate Change, Report to Congress, Office of Policy, Planning, and Evaluation, Washington, DC, 1990.

lnstirutions for managing global climate change

ratification and implementation of a series of agreements. In the case of IEA, energy security constituted an issue where all would ‘hang together or be hanged separately’ (ie all IEA countries depended upon the same sources of oil supply). A similar condition prevailed among

GATT signatories since they were all trading partners.7 Generally, the smaller the number of parties and issues, the greater

the likelihood of rapid implementation. Likewise, oligopolies among participants, as in the case of the Montreal Protocol, GATT, and IEA, where a limited number of producers or users dominate a market, enhances ratification and implementation.

Only a few countries were directly affected by the production of chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) compounds. This is one reason why the Montreal Protocol (a 1987 agreement establishing a production restric- tion for CFCs paired with a trade ban) was acceptab1e.s Signatory countries to the protocol are net exporters with respect to non- participant nations. Moreover, most CFC production and consumption takes place in these same countries. There is a modest trade surplus between signatory and non-signatory nations, with the former exporting approximately 8% of their aggregate CFC production.’ If net exporters can agree on a ban, are willing to develop substitutes, and agree to transfer technology for making those substitutes to non-signatory countries, reductions in CFCs can be achieved.

Fortunately, while the cohort of carbon dioxide emitters is much larger than is the case for CFCs, present principal emitters are few in number and include countries equipped with the resources to support massive transfer of efficient energy end-use technologies, as well as means to develop alternative energy sources. In the long term, of course, emissions in developed countries are likely to decline as the transition to a service-based economy continues with, hopefully, accelerated use of cleaner energy sources, improved forest management, and better energy end-use efficiencies. Meanwhile, developing country emissions are likely to decrease dramatically - offsetting gains made by developed country declines.‘” For example, India, Brazil, and China now contribute approximately 4%) 4%) and 7%) respectively, of total greenhouse gases. However, their contributions are expected to double or even triple within the next 20-30 years.” The point, however, is that in order to establish a credit agreement sooner rather than later, efforts by developed countries to take measures into their own hands now can heighten chances that developing countries will be willing to be included in an agreement later. This is because the former will be demonstrating sensitivity to the difficulties faced by the latter in making rapid reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions given their concentration on the development of economic infrastructure.

While the G-7 countries undertaking such an agreement would concentrate their efforts on reducing energy consumption, they could entice developing countries to enter into negotiations through offers of technology transfer. Many developing countries (eg China, India, Brazil) have stated that the developed countries are more responsible for the current state of global environment and should do more, especially in supplying technologies and financial assistance to developing countries, as a precondition for participation in such an agreement. China has proposed the concept of an international environment fund (capitalized by industrialized countries) to help developing countries with technological change. This fund would be an extension of the



‘*P.M. Morrisette and A.J. Plantinga, How the CO, Issue is Viewed In Different Coun- tries, Discussion Paper ENRSl-03, Energy and Natural Resources Division, Re- sources for the Future, Washington, DC, December 1990. 13Jan Schneider, World Public Order of the Environment: Towards an lntemational Ecological Law and Organization, Uni- versity of Toronto Press, Buffalo, 1979; Lynton K. Caldwell, lntemational Environ- mental Policy: Emergence and Dimen- sions, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1984; Arild Underdal, ‘Designing poli- tically feasible solutions: Notes on the political engineering of international cooperation’, 9th Triannual Convention of the Nor- dic Political Science Association, Reyk- javik, August 1990. “‘Lawrence C. Scheinman, The Nonprolif- eration Role of the International Atomic Energy Agency: A Critical Assessment, Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, 1985. 150ran R. Young, Compliance and Public Authoritv: A Theorv With International Ap- plicatiofk, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1989. ‘%ee, for example, W. Fischer, J.C. di Primio and G. Stein, A Convention on Greenhouse Gases: Towards the Design of a Verification System, Forschungszen- trum Julich GmbH, Julich, 1990.

46

technology transfer fund made available under the Montreal Protocol for CFC substitutes.

China’s position - similar to that of other LDCs - is that it is unethical to transfer the burden to reduce greenhouse gases to developing countries. Along these lines, the Chinese government has announced its willingness to participate in an international global warming treaty, but only if developed countries take principal responsibility for mitigating the problem through large reductions in their emissions and demons- trate a willingness to share the economic burdens of industrial and energy sector reductions in greenhouse gases equitably through resource transfers. Other LDCs have announced similar demands.‘*

Achieving compliance through confidence-building

Unless environmental agreements impose a high risk that violators of rules will be detected, few countries will be deterred from breaking them. The ability to ensure objectively that a country is complying with its obligations is termed ‘verification’. It reduces the likelihood that other countries will be threatened by a perceived free-rider, or, in other words, taken advantage of by nations that choose to make little sacrifice.‘” Environmental agreements that have been most effective in gaining the compliance of signatories rely principally on confidence- building measures rather than the threat of punitive action.

Confidence-building relies on quiet diplomatic pressure and persuasion, studiously follows rigorous criteria in proving or disproving a case of non-compliance, and avoids intrusive enforcement methods that can generate adverse publicity about a state’s behaviour.i4 Sanctions imposed on parties that fail to comply with their obligations include denials of certain economic or technological benefits from participation in an agreement. ” The most popular method used to achieve confidence- building in international agreements is termed ‘functional integration’ and generally occurs after the final stage of negotiations: the formulation of action-initiating protocols that require signatories to undertake mitigating actions and set explicit milestones for compliance.

Recent proposals for an international verification system for greenhouse-gas emissions recognize the need for confidence-building, as exemplified by recommendations to permit countries to make declarations of emissions that can be independently verified by an international agency.

Verification could be performed through space-based and other remote-sensing tools (for land use) and on-the-ground audits of national regulatory procedures and records (for industrial and energy sector activities). Not only would more intrusive means of compliance be resisted, but the quantities and types of emissions to be verified in a greenhouse-gas protocol are large and not amenable to precise measurement through on-site verification.i6

Balancing precise obligations with discretion

While precise obligations make implementability easier, since signatories know what is expected of them, permitting discretion in mitigation increases the likelihood of compliance because countries can comply with obligations in various ways. This is exemplified by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 1973 (CITES), which


17Jacobson and Weiss, op tit, Ref 1. 18Peter H. Sand, ‘The creation of transnational rules for environmental protection’, in M. Bathe, ed, Trends in Environ- mental Policy and Law, International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Gland, 1990, pp 31 l-320; P. Hulm, ‘The Regional Seas Program: What fate for UNEP’s crown jewels?‘, Ambio, Vol 12, No 1, 1983, pp 2-l 3. 19Peter Morrisette, ‘The evolution of policy responses to stratospheric ozone depletion’, Natural Resources Journal, Vol 29, 1989, pp 793-820; David Victor, ‘The science and politics of ozone depletion: some issues and lessons from a US perspective’, International Institute for Applied Sys- tems Analysis, Laxenburg, 1990.


bans exports and imports of endangered species, establishes an international trust fund to ensure continuing implementation of the agreement, and enforces trade restrictions through cooperation between the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Wildlife Fund, and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Resources. Other examples are provided by the International Tropical Timber Agreement of 1983, aimed at sustainable utilization of timber, and, to an extent, the Montreal Protocol. ”

Many potential signatories are not prepared to accept restraints on their behaviour perceived to have adverse economic consequences. This is one reason why standards articulated in conventions and protocols often reflect a low common denominator among signatory states and impose only relatively minor restraints upon behaviour, at least initially. Proponents of such agreements are willing to accept such a low common denominator in hopes that, by obtaining near unanimous approval, cooperative action will follow and the issue will gain a solid footing on national political agendas. This may hasten easier implementation of

practices that require considerable economic sacrifice. In practice, this process has been in evidence. As regards the

Montreal Protocol, for example, the USA is now committed to a production phase-out and trade ban to be imposed through an allocated quota system based on industry production and trade shares (as of 1986) in order to distribute equitably the economic burden according to firms’ ability to redirect their activities. The protocol did not specify how signatories were to achieve a CFC phase-out. Individual countries are free to pursue what best fits their political and economic priorities.

A similar strategy was pursued by proponents of the Mediterranean Action Plan, one of several UNEP regional anti-pollution agreements. Med Plan was launched by the Barcelona Convention of 1976 which called for a ban on the dumping of untreated wastes and commonly prescribed limits for exploiting the seabed, continental shelf, and subsoil of the Mediterranean basin. It required signatories to ratify at least one action-initiating protocol as a condition for becoming a party to the convention (eg multilateral aid in fighting oil spills, bans on dumping blacklisted substances, protection of sea-based endangered species, and explicit limits on industrial and municipal point source and agricultural non-point pollution). It also coordinates regional pollution research and emissions monitoring, promotes integrated basin-wide planning, and has a relatively high level of budgetary and administrative support for its joint activities (making it functionally integrated). After agreeing on basic reduction targets, Med Plan signatories arrived at their own means to enforce preventative and mitigative measures acceptable to their parliaments and enforceable by their environmental ministries.‘s

Adaptability through incorporation of NGOs

Implementable agreements are amenable to changes in scientific know- ledge and political and economic realities. Such agreements permit reopening negotiations in light of changes and usually include non- governmental organizations (NGOs) in both negotiation and monitoring of implementation because such organizations are likely to be sensitive to the danger of ‘fixed’ negotiating criteria.” Such flexibility and adaptability are exemplified by the Montreal Protocol.

The Protocol permits re-evaluation of its milestones in light of new

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE March 1992 47


“‘Morrisette, op tit, Ref 19; J.C. Randal, ‘Conference ends at odds on pace of ozone efforts’, Washington Post, 8 March 1989, p A30; also D. Dickson and E. Marshall, ‘Europe recognizes the ozone threat’, Science, Vol 243, 1989, p 1279; ‘Further ozone reductions’, Climate- Related Impacts International Network Newsletter, \/ol 6, No 1, Fall 1990, p 2. “Peter M. Morrisette, ‘The Montreal Pro- tocol: Lessons for formulating policies for global warming’, Policy Studies Journal, forthcoming. “Jamison Koehler and Scott A. Hajost, ‘The Montreal Protocol: A dynamic agreement for protecting the ozone layer’, Ambio, Vol 19, No 2, April 1990, pp 82-86. 230ur Common Future: From One Earth to One World, An Overview by the World Commission on Environment and De- velopment, Oxford University Press, Ox- ford, 1987. “‘Jill Jaeger, ‘Developing policies for re- soondina to climate chanae’, A Summary o? Wor&hops at Villach,- October, 1987 and Bellaaio. November. 1987. WMOTTD- 225, World ‘Meteorologkcal Organization, Geneva, 1988.

evidence (prognoses of the so-called Antarctic ozone hole) and economic considerations (the feasibility of CFC substitutes). Since entering into force in January 1989, the protocol has undergone continued refinement in light of both developments. Its original timetable has been renegotiated. The European Community and the USA have agreed to accelerate Montreal’s production phase-out requirement to eliminate CFC production by 2000. Revisions to the protocol concluded in London in June 1990 now require a total phase-out of CFCs 11, 12, 113, 114, and 115 by 2000 or earlier; the total elimination of production and consumption of halon compounds by 2000 - and the same for carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform (the latter by ZOOS); and the establishment of a $240 million technology transfer trust fund which was urged by the Group of 77 (the UN LDC voting bloc).20

Industry opposition to any agreement reducing the production of CFCs was vigorously articulated. Opposition declined only after it became clear that industrial giants such as Du Pont were positioning themselves to develop CFC-substitutes, that CFCs are not absolutely critical to the modern industrial economy, and that the right market conditions (dependent on economic and regulatory incentives) could make such substitutes competitive within five years or so. This about- face was made possible by close consultation between industry and the scientific-diplomatic community during and after negotiations for Montreal .2’

Montreal negotiations illustrate the need for diplomats to be able to relate effectively to domestic economic and political interests and agencies throughout the process of agreement. Without permitting growth in CFC production in LDCs to offset reductions by developed countries, there would have been no Montreal Protocol.22

Typology of international environmental agreements based on implementing criteria: symbol and substance

The form of an environmental agreement defines the scope of an environmental problem (as percevied by signatories), the obligations of signatories, and, thus, what is supposed to be implemented. Recent proposals for agreements to tackle the causes and consequences of potential global climate change take one of three general forms (see Table 1).

Hortatory action

Hortatory actions are rhetorical, symbolic declarations of a problem by high-ranking officials. Examples include calls urging a United Nations Declaration on Environmental Protection and Sustainable Develop- ment and ratification of a convention that would strengthen procedures for resolving environmental disputes.23 Patterned after the UN Declara- tion of Human Rights, such proposals seek to galvanize support for action by appealing to opinion leaders with governmental influence.

Actions that governments might be called upon to adopt in support of preventing or mitigating climate change are exemplified by the Villach and Bellagio Conference recommendations of 1987-88 and include increasing reforestation efforts, strengthening energy end-use efficiency, identifying areas vulnerable to sea-level rise, and enhancing coordination of global monitoring research.24

Because hortatory actions are ad hoc declarations, they do not



Table 1. International environmental agreements and their regimes relevant for managlng global climate change: policy design and implementation goals.

Type of agreement/regime

Hortatory action

Topical convention- protocol

Global/regional environmental authority

Goals

Rhetorical declaration of a problem leading to establishment of a new regime. Often calls for negotiation of a convention.

International consensus on action by setting specific goals to be followed by explicit measures and assessments.

Establish authoritative body with ability to render punitive actions; also arbitrate conflicts, transfer resources and set compliance standards.

Participants

Interministerial national meetings, usually ad hoc.

Interministerial national meetings: special conferences of nations, NGOs, scientific consultants usually sponsored by UN.

Interministerial national meetings; special conferences of nations, NGOs, scientific consultants, environmental groups usually sponsored by an ad hoc committee of nations.

Examples

Stockholm Declaration (1972); Brundtland Commission (1987); Hague Declaration (1989); UNEP Governing Council (1989); G-7 Summit (Paris, 1989; Houston, Texas, 1990); Bergen Ministerial Declaration (1990).

Vienna Convention (1985) and Montreal Protocol (1987); Washington Convention on Trade in Endangered Species (1973); Toronto Conference (1987); Base1 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (1989).

International Atomic Energy Agency (1956); Nuclear Non- proliferation Treaty (1970); EURATOM (1958); Med Plan (1975); Hague Declaration on the Global Environment (1989); IPCC (limited to scientific and policy study in cooperation with UNEP and WMO).

Chronology of implementation

International ad hoc declaration followed by independent state- party actions. No formal convention or protocol required If a formal regime is subsequently established, a separate convention must be negotiated.

Umbrella treaty (convention) is first negotiated at an international meeting. This is followed by a national ratification process. Subsequent ‘protocols’ (amend- ments to the convention) repeat this process and take effect following ratification by states. Implementation may be done by states alone, a special international organization, or both.

After a framework convention has been negotiated and ratified, a special international organization is established by a ‘preparatory commission’. State-parties then negotiate bilateral agreements between themselves and the organizations which set the conditions under which they will comply with the framework convention States may conclude a series of ‘subsidiary arrangements’, or other agreements to meet their obligations.

Sources: Our Common Future: From One Earth to One World, An Overview by the World Commission on Environment and Development, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987; Peter Morrisette, ‘The Evolution of policy responses to stratospheric ozone depletion’, Natural Resources Journal, Vol29, 1989, pp 793-820; Fen Osler Hampson, ‘Climate change: Building international coalitions of the like-minded’, international Journal. Vol XLV, Winter 1989-90, pp 36-74; William U. Chandler, ed, Carbon Emissions Control Strategies: Case Studies in international Cooperation - Executive Summary, World Wildlife Fund and the Conservation Foundation, Baltimore, MD, 1989; Patricia J. Scharlin, Fleshaping institutions to Meet Environmental Crises: Beyond Business as Usual, Report of the Fifth Taillores Seminar on International Environmental Issues. Tufts University, Lincoln Filene Center, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Center for Environmental Management, Medford, MA, May 1989; Hilary F. French, ‘An Environment Security Council?‘, Worldwatch, Vol 2, No 5, September-October 1990, pp 67; Goodman (1990); Wirth and Lashof (1990); Santos (1990).

*sin the USA, for example, there is a constitutional distinction between ‘self-

executing’ and ‘non-self-executing’ treaties. The former automatically take effect following ratification by the Senate, while the latter require special legislation to ensure that ‘private persons’ or ‘corporations’ required to do something by a treaty are provided with legal guidance. See Burrus Carnahan, Constitutional lmp/icatiot~s of Implementing a Chemical Weapons Con- vention, Prepared for the Office of Ams Control, US Department of Energy, under contract no DE-ACOl-88DP50066, Scien- ce Applications International Corporation, McLean, VA, 4 April 1990.

compel formal action under international law. If state parties opt for a special agreement to enforce standards, they must negotiate a convention to be ratified by states. This would be followed by passage of enabling legislation.2” The point to bear in mind about this process is that, until the point of passage of enabling legislation, implementation issues are not really addressed. Thus, hortatory actions must be seen as general agreements that rarely address implementation issues until they are handed over to individual national states. Hortatory actions do not provide a durable basis for implementing policy.

Topical convention followed by protocol

Following negotiation and subsequent ratification of an umbrella convention, a series of protocols could permit specific reduction strategies, measures for compliance, and eligiblity for technology transfer. The convention-protocol negotiating system permits a step-by-step approach to tackling complex global environmental problems.

The proposed 1988 Toronto Convention on the Environment urged establishment of a comprehensive global energy policy and creation of a world atmosphere fund funded by a fossil-fuel consumption tax through subsequent protocol. Its goal was to achieve a 50% reduction of carbon



26David Everest, The Greenhouse Effect: issues for Policy Makers, Joint Energy Programme, Policy Studies Institute, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1988; also, Hampson, op tit, Ref 6. %ex T. Ellington and Mark Meo, ‘De- velopment of a greenhouse gas emissions index’, Chemical Engineering Progress, Vol 86, No 7, 1990, pp 58-93; Rex T. Ellington and Mark Meo, ‘Global climate protection from greenhouse gases: A systems perspective’, World F&sources Re- view, Vol 2, No 3, 1991, pp 308-337; Alexander Cristofaro and Joel D. Scher- aga, Policy lmplicafions of a Comprehen- sive Greenhouse Gas Buduet. Office of Policy Analysis, Office of Poicy, Planning, and Evaluation, US Environmental Protec- tion Agency, Washington, DC, September 1990, unpublished draft. 28William U. Chandler, ed, Carbon Emis- sions Control Strategies: Case Studies in lntemational Cooperation - Executive Summary, World Wildlife Fund and the Conservation Foundation, Baltimore, MD, 1989. %ristofaro and Scheraga, op tit, Ref 27. 30NCP0 1991, Global Warminq Confer- ence Fails to Make 1991. - “Volker Prittwitz, ‘Multifaceted analysis of international environmental policy’, Indusf- rial Crisis Quarterly, Vol 3, No 1, 1989, pp 77-89; Hampson, op tit, Ref 6; also see M.H. Glantz, ‘Assessing the impacts of winners and losers in a global context’, Changing Climate and the Coast, NCAR 0101/90-4. Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, 1990; Hilary F. French, op tit, Ref 2; Miguel A. Santos, Managing Planet Earth: Perspective on Population, Ecology, and the Law, Bergin and Garvev. New York. NY, 1990: Patricia J. Scharlin: ‘Reshaping’lnsfifutionk to Meet Environmental Crises: Beyond Business as Usual, Report of the Fifth Taillores Seminar on International Environmental Issues, Tufts University, Lincoln Filene Center, Fletcher School of Law and Di- plomacy, Center for Environmental Man- agement, Medford, MA, May 1989.

50 GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE March 1992

dioxide emissions through increased end-use efficiency and fuel switch- ing to lower carbon-dioxide emitting fuels, nuclear energy, and renewables. *’ A variant of this p ro osal p would gear emissions- reductions goals to some type of ‘emissions index’ based upon each country’s ‘radiatively active trace’ (RAT) gas production. RAT gases contribute to global warming and have long residence times in the atmosphere.”

Taxes levied on signatories would be placed in a special technology transfer fund to be used by LDCs for obtaining greenhouse-gas reducing technologies and CFC substitutes. 28 One idea, without official standing, proposes wedding the ‘Global Warming Potential’ (GWP) index of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to an analysis that evaluates greenhouse-gas reduction strategies in accordance with their cost-effectiveness per volume-reduction level of GWP gases.*” The most economical strategies can be incorporated into a global convention which could establish tradeable emissions permits based on this GWP

index. Officially, the USA contends that a ‘comprehensive approach’ to

greenhouse-gas reduction, based on signatory contributions to all greenhouse gases (GHGs) as well as national contributions to their sequestering through afforestation or other efforts, should be incorporated in a climate change convention. Rejecting calls for commitments to specific reduction targets, dates of compliance, or financing mechanisms, however, the US position suggests the need for establishment of a comprehensive index that would permit comparisons of national contributions to GHG production, relying principally upon national means of verification, compliance, and monitoring.”

Regardless of the varying proposals put forth by proponents of a convention-protocol approach (ie whether to adopt a ‘comprehensive’ index of greenhouse gases or not) virtually all proponents cite the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (1987) as a useful point of departure. There is consensus that this agreement provides a valuable precendent for RAT-gas reduction because of its emphasis on variable compliance, its pragmatic approach to defining consumption, production, and export limits, and its permanent structure for consultation among scientists, diplomats, and industry.

Globallregional environmental authority

Some contend that anthropogenic climate change is an ‘environmental security’ crisis whose consequences may be so devastating as to alter the course of history. This crisis, they further contend, requires the establishment of a regional or single global Environmental Security Council or World Environmental Authority empowered to take punitive measures against states failing to curb greenhouse-gas emissions, somewhat along the lines of the UN Security Council.“’ As ethical imperatives, only time will tell if these proponents are correct. As practical political proposals, however, both contentions are impractical and unrealistic.

Experience shows that national, sovereign states will not surrender significant regulatory authority to a centralized world organization. Moreover, to equate environmental problems with problems of national security is to presume that all countries share a moral aversion towards greenhouse gases as strong as that toward total war or resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. Greenhouse gases are by-products of desirable industrial and agricultural activities. Thus, international fear and tre-


pidation are unlikely to become as strong as those toward nuclear

proliferation. Punitive measures proposed by exponents of a global/regional en-

vironmental authority could include trade embargoes, expulsion from the UN or other international organizations that bestow various benefits, and universal condemnation and suspicion of diplomatic recognition. Calls for this type of action are not confined to radical environmental groups. The 1989 ‘Hague Declaration on the Global Environment’, proposing an Environmental Security Council (ESC) within the UN system, was signed by the prime ministers of France, Norway, and The Netherlands. Violators coming before such a body could face potentially severe measures and referrals to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for arbitration. This ESC would also help finance and transfer energy efficient technologies and CFC substitutes to LDCs.?*

On a modest level, something approaching a regional environmental authority is offered by the comprehensive environmental policy of the European Community (EC). Launched in 1972, the EC’s Council of Ministers, comprised of representatives from all 12 member states, has passed over 150 regulations on storage, disposal and transfrontier shipment of hazardous and solid wastes, air and water pollution guidelines, and a unified statute on substances that deplete the ozone layer.-‘”

While ambitious in principle, the EC’s regional environmental policy has fallen short of aspirations due to reliance on good faith enforcement by member states, a tendency for countries to ignore some regulations of which they disapprove, and resistance from industry to regulation emanating from outside the borders of their own country - making consultation with regulators more difficult. In general, EC environmental policy implementation has been most effective in addressing regional environmental problems where there has been strong member state consensus over the seriousness of an environmental issue, recognition of the inability of single nations to manage the issue effectively, and reliance on community-wide enforcement and verification procedures rather than individual country enforcement. The EC’s transfrontier hazardous waste shipment policy meets these conditions. This policy relies upon an international surveillance system for monitoring of wastes in transit, a notification system for all transfrontier waste shipments, and directives aimed at standardizing hazardous waste information among countries.“4

A global/regional environmental authority also requires negotiation and ratification of a framework convention. The special organization established by this convention would take time to implement because of its potentially sweeping powers. In the case of the EC’s comprehensive environmental policy, for example, these powers are still evolving and may become more comprehensive as resources, capabilities, and the economic performance of EC member states become more comparable, a process likely to take time given the vast differences in regulatory infrastructure among northern and central European countries on the one hand and southern European states on the other.

To hasten implementation of a global/regional environmental authority, a preparatory commission typically is established to set up operating rules, procedures, staff appointments and budgetary instruments. When its work is over, and the special international agency has been established, states separately negotiate individual agreements with the agency

32French, op tit, Ref 2. %ara Lewis, Andrea Peirce and Nigel Davis, ‘1992: The European Community prepares for environmental unification’, Hazmar World, January 1990, pp 26-35. The 12 states are: Belgium; Denmark; France; Germany; Greece; Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg; The Netherlands; Portugal; Spain; and the UK. 341bid.



35David Fischer and Paul Szasz, Safe- guarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal, Taylor and Francis, London, 1985; Hans- Walter Schleicher, ‘Euratom: non- proliferation and safeguards’, lntemational Executive Conference: Non-Proliferation and Safeguards, American Nuclear Socie- ty, La Grange Park, IL, 1981, pp 89-94. %3erna~ional Energy Agency, Energy and the Environment: Policy Overview, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1989, p 178.

which set forth the specific terms for their compliance to agreements. Such terms typically encompass the types of verification procedures they will accept on their territory, the institutions they declare as falling under the jurisdiction of the organization (ie institutions defined as greenhouse-gas emitters) and, thus, eligible for imposition of verification measures, and certain national reporting requirements such as statistical measurement and/or sampling procedures.

Lessons from the typology

Avoid overly-stringent standards

The most ambitious type of agreement in principle (a global/regional environmental authority) may be the least effective in achieving its goals. Many regional intergovernmental organizations invested with punitive authority have weak standards and low expectations of compliance. For example, multilateral organizations such as the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANOL) and the European Atomic Energy Agency (EURATOM), designed to serve as nuclear non-proliferation organizations, have been criticized for not forcing signatories to establish verifiable safeguards inspection agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and for not forbidding signatories from developing military applications of nuclear energy. 3s When an agreement encompassing many countries has wide consensus, it is often the case that the rules of compliance established for participants are fixed at a low common standard in order to entice countries to ratify the agreement. This has proven to be as true on the global as on the regional level. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s safeguards system has often been criticized for not requiring ‘anytime, anywhere’ challenge inspections of nuclear facilities and for not permitting inspection of military installations. By not demanding strict adherence by signatories to high standards of compliance, near universal consent to a non-proliferation system has been obtained but, in the opinion of some, at the cost of strict verification.

Finally, if one were to consider the hypothetical case of an international organization imposing high standards of compliance through, for example, uniform environmental regulations, the results might be counterproductive from the standpoint of equity. In the case of carbon dioxide emissions, for example, such a strategy could actually penalize countries with low baseline emissions since they would have to expend disproportionate control costs.3”

Permit differential obligations

As has been noted, environmental agreements typically impose different obligations on signatories (ie easier means of compliance for some countries, or even allowance for later compliance). This allowance for different obligations may help or hinder the process of treaty implementation, depending on the context of the issue. For example, it is desirable to have a protocol that applies to all countries that produce and use CFCs. However, achieving such an accord, as shown by Montreal, is very difficult - for a variety of reasons, developing countries may not want to participate. However, if the goal of such an agreement is to eliminate production of those CFCs most harmful to the stratospheric ozone layer, it is not necessary for it to have ‘globality’


“In 1989, for example, 80 states, including several Montreal Protocol signatories, agreed to expand the list of controlled substances under the Protocol to include additional CFCs not originally banned by the agreement. They also agreed to ban methyl chloroform and carbon tetrachloride by 2000 (Victor, op tit, Ref 19; Krutilla, op tit, Ref 9). ?3mon Lyster, ‘Effectiveness of international regimes dealing with biological di- versity’, paper presented at International Governance and Global Environmental Change Conference, Dartmouth College, 16-19 June 1991. %ee Sand, op tit, Ref 18; also Fischer et al, op tit, Fief 16.


(the approval of all national states). Instead, it need only encompass the largest producing, consuming, and exporting countries. The point is that an agreement can be effective if, while waiting for non-signatories to comply, leverage can be exerted on the issue to make it unnecessary for their compliance to be seen as essential. In the case of Montreal, the agreement was designed with export controls to restrict trade in CFCs among countries. Such restrictions can be effective if non-signatories have few alternatives for obtaining the technology short of trade, and the agreement’s signatories are not only the largest producers of a regulated substance (in this case CFCs) but the countries that produce the most harmful substances regulated by the treaty (eg CFCs 11, 12, 113, 114, 115)”

Another example of how different obligations influence the success of

agreements is in the process of compliance (nation state approval of an agreement). Some international environmental agreements only require signatories to provide information on their behaviour to special international coordinating organizations that collect and synthesize statistical data from governments. On the one hand, these requirements appear to be very weak - they do not actually compel countries to behave in an expected way.

These coordinating organizations are designed to ensure compatibil- ity of practices between states. They have no independent enforcement powers. However, agreements establishing these organizations have been ratified in relatively short order and have made significant strides in environmental regulation through harmonizing trade policies. Thus,

while appearing weak in principle because of their lack of enforcement, they are powerful in practice because countries can be tripped up if they fail to report their behaviour accurately.

The 1973 Washington Convention on International Trade in En- dangered Species exemplifies this principle. The Convention places uniform control on signatories through a system of licensed ‘permits’ for trade in endangered animals. Currently, this agreement applies to 102 states. The Convention recommends standards for permit design while national governments issue the permits. A central coordinating office in Switzerland provides a clearinghouse for ensuring that each signatory’s permits are consistent and bona fide, and the verifiable records of permits are kept. Compliance with this agreement is very high due to fear of adverse publicity or even trade sanctions.38

In contrast, an agreement to establish an ‘Environmental Security Council’ could find itself imposing such stringent and uniform penalties upon signatories that many countries would be unlikely to implement them. Imposing stringent standards and uniform penalties in the field of arms control, coupled with intensive measurement efforts to ensure compliance (called ‘dense verification’) has led to resistance by nations to accepting the standards.“’

Consult domestic interests

In order to enhance the implementation of global environmental agreements pertaining to climate change, negotiators must consult domestic interests. One means of facilitating this consultation process is to link together regulatory systems at different levels, thus facilitating interactions between NGOs and different layers of authority. For example, state-level air pollution regulations could be incorporated into an international emissions trading scheme through the development of



4oL. Caldwell, lnfemational Environmental Policy, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1984, pp 189 ff. “‘Similar consortia have been formed between defense contractors and the Depart- ment of Defense, and EPA and the electro- nics industry in order to find, test, and introduce replacements for CFC-based solvent compounds. Formation of many of these consortia was made possible by initial cooperation between constituents of these same groups during the Montreal Protocol negotiations: see Stephen R. Seidel and Daniel P. Blank, ‘The Montreal Protocol: Pollution prevention on a global scale’, Ambio, Vol 19, October 1990, pp 301-304.

54

monitoring, enforcement, and other compliance mechanisms that incorporated a formalized consultation and coordination process with NGOs.

While international federations of meteorologists, or international environmental groups could be invited to interministerial-level meetings, national divisions of these same organizations could consult with environment ministries. To take the process further, subnational chap- ters of the same organizations (or affiliated organizations) could meet with appropriate authorities at lower levels to implement detailed aspects of the scheme. One international environmental agreement which provides ample precedent for this type of NGO role is the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). Trade restrictions under CITES are enforced by the United Nations Environment Programme, the World Wildlife Fund, and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Resources operating through a joint treaty compliance organization.40

As a result of the Montreal Protocol, new governmental-industrial

partnerships have arisen within the USA and other countries to hasten implementation of this agreement and to introduce CFC substitutes among economic sectors. Novel permutations abound, including bilateral technology transfer programmes for the development of CFC- substitutes - from the UK to India, Finland to China (by way of UNEP), Sweden and Norway to Kenya, and the USA to Mexico.

Within the USA, a special ‘Appliance Industry-Government CFC

Replacement Consortium’ has been formed to test alternative refrigera- tion technologies, alternative foam structures, and improved refrigera- tion cycles. Comprised of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Association of Household Appliance Manufacturers, this consortium provides an economically satisfactory way of jointly sharing research and testing data among companies, easing the economic transition away from CFC compounds, minimizing intrusive regulation as a means of gaining industry compliance with the Montreal Protocol, and hastening the establishment of new industrial standards likely to enhance the penetration of new substitutes into the marketplace.41

Engage in ‘functional integration’

‘Functional integration’ entails establishing special organizations to carry out clearly defined technical activities associated with verification and compliance. Staffed by specialists trained in law, engineering, and science, these organizations are a type of international ‘civil service’ not beholden to the interests of particular countries and less likely to be influenced by special interests or by an agenda oriented towards particular concerns.

The tasks or ‘functions’ performed by such organizations include providing a forum for setting standards, exchanging policy views, and formulating technical initiatives. ‘Integration’ refers to the fact that the task is performed by a permanent international organization that provides a means for consultation and coordination among state-parties for the deliberation and implementation of decisions. The decisions made by such an organization are standardized through a code of practice adhered to by signatories. Sanctions against non-compliance are generally internalized among participants: ie while the organization cannot physically compel a signatory to obey the strictures of an


42Familiar examples of functional integration include global weather forecasting and climatological data compilation, performed by the World Meteorological Organization, air traffic control, undertaken by the Inter- national Civil Aviation Organization, and safeguarding of nuclear mdterials. by the lnternationar Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nations pool onlv so much authority ai is requiied for execution of the agency’s tasks. The agency does not inter- fere with the sovereign rights of states. In addition, all stakeholders with the potential to gain or lose in the outcome of the agency’s activities are included in the agency’s operations. Each participant state should have a comparable voice in its operation and, ideally, contribute an equitable share of resources to ensure that the agency can perform its tasks. Activities performed by the agency generally are selected in accordance with considerations for technical capability, the number of states willing to participate, and the degree of trust these states display towards one another (see Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-St&e, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1964; also, Roy Macridis, ‘The European Economic Community: political and economic union’, in R.C. Mac- ridis, ed, Modern Political Systems: Europe, 6 ed, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1987, pp 347-372; David Mit- rany, A Working Peace System, Quad- rangle Books, Chicago, 1966; Patricia Bir- nie, ‘The role of international law in solving certain environmental conflicts’, in J.E. Carroll, ed, lnfemational Env!ronmenta/ Diplomacy: The Management and Resolu- tion of Transfrontier Environmental Prob- /ems, Cambridge University Press, Cam- bridge, 1989, pp 95-l 21. 43William Nitze, The Greenhouse Effect: formulating a Convention, Energy and En- vironmental Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1990. 44Scheinman, op tit, Ref 14. %/imate Issues: Synopsis of First Nego- tiating Sessions of the /NC for a Framework Convention on Climate Change and US lnsfitutional Involvement, National Climate Program Office, 1991,


agreement, parties consciously weigh the costs of non-compliance against the benefits of continued participation in the organization.

Because of this code of practice and set of professional standards, a functionally integrated organization can focus its attention on its designated tasks without becoming sidetracked by extraneous political issues dividing member states or even international political crises.“*

William Nitze suggests that to achieve functional integration for

implementation of a global climate change convention, a special organization must be established, comprising an executive council with representatives from LDCs as well as developed countries and an adequate budget to obtain technical information and to provide management assistance and the transfer of technology to countries. The convention establishing this organization would contain guidelines for preparing national plans that leave each party free to determine its own emissions-reduction strategy consistent with overall timetable and targets established by convention. Special subtargets could be established for CO2 stabilization, energy efficiency, and reversing deforesta- tion.

Following negotiation of a greenhouse convention, a conference of the parties (those countries directly involved in negotiations that have promised to seek rapid ratification by their governments) could form a special ‘assessment organization’ which would, in essence, duplicate the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Following this centralized assessment process, a set of initial targets and timetables for emission reductions would be negotiated through a separate convention.“3

Efforts would focus primarily (though not exclusively) on developed countries, particularly members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). A mechanism for overseeing transfers of technology, assisting LDCs in attaining their energy conservation and substitution goals, and administering the treaty organization would be established with a budget on the order of $100 million/ year. By means of comparison, this would be a slightly smaller budget for the performance of a range of activities comparable to those undertaken by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the field of nuclear non-proliferation,4” suggesting that the ambitious goals envisioned for such an agreement are not impractical.

An Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), formed within the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change framework is designed to provide negotiators with a vehicle for negotiation and implementation of a Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). In February 1991, at its first negotiating session attended by 102 countries and 95 UN, international and NGO bodies, INC convened two working groups: a commitments group to examine issues of aid, technical assistance, and technology transfer to LDCs, and an institutional mechanisms group for discussion of transnational scientific cooperation, monitoring and information exchange activities. A permanent secretar- iat will be established, supported by a trust fund of voluntary donations. A permanent headquarters for research and negotiating activities also will be established.45 Only time will tell if this organization’s operation mirrors its design as a functionally integrated organization for climate change negotiations and their implementation.

As this article is written, it appears that an emerging issue will be the degree to which any commitments to establish such a permanent



@Ibid. 470p tit, Ref 23. 48Prittwitz, op tit, Fief 31. “‘L. Scheinman, The lntemational Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, MD, 1987; J.F. Keeley and H.B. Schiefer, /AEA Safeguards as a Model for Verification of a Chemical Weapons Convention, Arms Control Verification Occasional Paper No 3, Arms Control and Disarmament Divi- sion, Department of External Affairs, Otta- wa, 1988; P.H. Sand, Marine Environment Law in the United Nations Environment Programme: An Emergent Eco-Regime, London, 1988.

organization are unlikely to be smooth. Moreover, some means of establishing the relative contributions of greenhouse gases among participants to a convention will be a precondition for negotiating an agreement. For example, the USA contends that a ‘comprehensive approach’ to greenhouse-gas reduction should be adopted based on signatory contributions to all GHGs as well as national contributions to their sequestering through afforestation or other efforts. Rejecting calls for commitments to specific reduction targets, dates of compliance, or even financing mechanisms to control GHGs, the US position suggests the need for establishment of a comprehensive index that would permit comparison of national contributions to GHG production, relying principally upon national means of verification, compliance, and monitoring - and rejecting calls for new institutions until their necessity and feasibility are demonstrated.46

Incorporate non-environmental issues as quidpro quo

To persuade LDCs to become parties to global climate change conventions - and to obey them - numerous non-environmental negotiating

criteria will be required. These criteria could include commodity price supports for agricultural goods critically affected by climate change, debt reduction strategies to assist in capital formation for financing adaptation strategies, and provision of other forms of technical and economic assistance and guaranteed development financing.47

An example of a commodity agreement that may serve as a useful precedent is the International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA). ITTA is significant because in addition to setting limits on exports of tropical timber, it includes ecological and non-ecological criteria in the same agreement. In exchange for limiting exports, LDCs are given guarantees of fair commodity prices for commodities in addition to timber (ie price supports for agricultural goods critically affected by climate change), access to debt-reduction strategies to assist in capital formation for financing adaptation strategies, and other forms of technical and economic assistance and guaranteed development financing.48

In the areas of reciprocal cooperation and technical assistance, the Med Plan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have been effective in transferring training programmes for protecting endangered species, pollution mitigating technologies from developed nations (eg France and Italy) to less developed countries (Egypt and Algeria), and other technical assistance programmes for risk management and risk reduction. They also have promoted exchanges of scientific and technical personnel, integrating pollution research by national environmental ministries and research universities, and banning hazardous substances through the assistance of the World Health Organization and basin

states. 4y Two issues p ertaining to the application of such precedents to climate change agreements should be addressed: can commodity agreements be based on the same approach as ITTA (eg providing compensa- tory financing to raw-material producing countries to offset economic price shocks), thus encouraging LDCs to take a longer-term view of the impact of overproduction of commodities on both prices and the environment? And, in the absence of oligopolies pertaining to forest commodities (ie a few countries that, through cartel arrangements, control commodity prices), can an effective and enforceable regulatory agreement be established?


Ensure structural equity


LDCs will probably demand that supranational institutions formed as a result of global climate change conventions and protocols impose

stringent conditions on developed countries. These constraints would revolve around energy use and conservation and would be as rigorous as the environmental constraints on development that LDCs may be expected to accept. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1970 (NPT) provides insight into this problem of equity.

Under the NPT, every non-nuclear weapon state signatory must

conclude an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to apply safeguards to all its peaceful nuclear facilities. The purpose of these so-called ‘full-scope’ safeguards is to verify that nuclear materials are not being diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. By contrast, nuclear weapon states are required only to accept safeguards on materials or equipment which they provide to non-nuclear weapon states and not on their own

facilities.“’ Nuclear weapon NPT signatories implicity agree to reduce the size of

their nuclear arsenals. However, non-nuclear weapon states surrender considerably more sovereignty because they explicitly agree to full- scope safeguards while the former merely promise to pursue negotiations leading toward nuclear arms control with no specific timetable.51 Non-nuclear weapon states generally accept this unequal arrangement because most do not wish to acquire nuclear weapons. Furthermore, most derive considerable benefit knowing that potential adversaries among NPT signatories agree to have their nuclear facilities inspected. However, most of these same countries have also made clear their dissatisfaction with such an unequal arrangement as a basis for other technological agreements or environmental negotiations.

Several issues pertaining to equity in climate change negotiations require further investigation. Can international agreements distinguish between internationally shared duties, wherein each nation is responsible for certain performance standards for emissions, as opposed to shared responsibilities, which would stipulate outcomes for which all nations would be responsible but would not require the performance of specific measures? The latter approach is favoured by most LDCs. Also, can the onerous burdens imposed by any emissions-reduction convention be made more equitable by taking effect when ratified by countries accounting for most of the carbon dioxide emissions, as opposed to taking effect only when a majority of countries ratify the agreement? This particular strategy of ‘production-weighted’ ratification was em- ployed for the first time in the Montreal Protocol, to good effect.52

If applied to a global carbon dioxide agreement, negotiations towards

such a convention could begin with the so-called G-7 countries that account for 40% of fossil-fuel consumption (the USA, the UK, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy), and could take effect when a majority of them (ie any four) ratified an emissions-reduction treaty. This would reduce pressure on industrializing countries to ratify the treaty immediately or risk holding up an agreement.

Finally, in the case of an emissions-trading scheme which might emerge from such negotiations (eg tradeable permits), a question likely to arise is: can industrializing countries be permitted to bank anticipated future emissions and trade them against more lenient current emissions limits so as not to slow their industrialization? Or, conversely, it is better

“‘IAEA Safeguards: Aims, Limitations, and Achievements. IAEA/SG/INF/4. Interna- tional Atomic’ Energy Agency’, Vienna, 1983; also, The T;katy- on _ the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weaoons (NPTI. signed in London, Moscow, and Washin& ton on 1 July 1968, entered into force on 5 March 1970. 5’Going Nuclear: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 7986-7987, Ballinger, Cam- bridge, MA, 1987; Office of Technology Assessment, Nuclear Proliferation and Safeguards, Praegar, New York, NY, 1977. 52Robert E. Goodin, ‘International ethics and the environmental crisis’, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol 4, 1990, pp 91- 106.


institutions for managing global climate change

53For example, Goldemberg (1990) has pointed out that while the industrialized world has made considerable progress in slowing the rate of growth of energy consumption, occasional spikes’ in energy growth occur when the infrastructure of heavy industry, roads, bridges, and homes are put into place. Assuming LDC energy growth follows a similar trend (as Goldem- berg hypothesizes), it is argued that once this infrastructure is built and the economy moves towards service industries, intensive energy use will decline. Following Goldemberg’s argument to its logical con- clusions, negotiations aimed at a global climate change convention should seek to target countries whose emissions are growing (such as Brazil, India, and China) through technology, rather than concentrate principally upon developed countries whose unilateral efforts are already mov- ing in a desirable direction. 54Peter H. Sand, ‘The rise of regional agreements for marine environment protection’, lntemafional Digest of Health Leg- islation, Vol 39, No 2, 1988, pp 499-511; Peter H. Sand, ‘Reshaping institutions to meet environmental crises: Beyond business as usual’, paper presented to the Fifth Taillores Seminar on International En- vironmental Issues, Tufts University, 14- 18 May 1989. ?See William C. Clark, ‘Managing Planet Earth’, Scientific American, Vol 261. No 3. September 1989, pp 46-57. 56Scheinman, op tit, Ref 14.

to concentrate reduction efforts on those countries which are not at present large producers of greenhouse gases but are likely to become so? If the latter strategy were chosen, the emphasis in implementation would need to shift from enforcement of emissions and conservation standards among a relative handful of countries to massive resource transfers from a few developed countries to a handful of developing nations.”

Other environmental agreements provide instructive precedents con- cerning the conditions for structural equity. Some regional environmental agreements (the Med Plan, for instance) have been effective in transferring training programmes for protecting endangered species and pollution - mitigating technologies from developed nations (eg France and Italy) to LDCs (Egypt and Algeria).“4 Regional targeting of greenhouse-gas reducing strategies (ie the tailoring of agreements to the prevailing economic conditions in a region that constrain the effectiveness of climate change mitigation strategies) income regions with high population density and Western Europe) can best afford specific require regional emissions permits.”

Conclusion

can also be used. High- (such as North America mitigation measures that

Even if climate change negotiations initially fail to reach agreement, the more divergent the interests encompassed in early negotiations, the greater the likelihood of consensus later on when agreements are formulated and countries are asked to implement their requirements. The Baruch Plan, drawn up by the USA during 1945-46, which prescribed establishment of a United Nations agency to safeguard nuclear materials and technology, is instructive.

The Baruch Plan was the first formal attempt to prevent nuclear proliferation during the Cold War through an international nuclear inspectorate. Its call for an international authority to manage the nuclear fuel cycle was far too ambitious given the climate of the early Cold War. It failed because the superpowers could not agree on a safeguards system (for example, should a commitment to nuclear weapons destruction precede implementation of on-site verification - the Soviet position - or must the design of a verification system first be agreed upon to ensure against cheating after stockpiles are destroyed - the US view?). By initially inviting parties opposed to stringent controls, however, negotiatiors ensured that significant obstacles to a nuclear non-proliferation agreement were publicly aired and, thus, made possible the implementation of modest international safeguards enforced through an international agency a decade later.sh

For global climate change, one lesson of this case is that bold, ambitious goals are entirely appropriate so long as divergent stakehol-

ders share some common interests, are patient, and are willing to settle for an initial agreement which, however imperfect, provides a baseline for expansion, modification, and extension of scope.


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Institutions for managing global climate change

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