Integrated Anti-tigerkidnapping Program · 2013. 6. 28. · Association (ECSA) organization. As...

IntegratedAnti-tigerkidnapping Program

About the “Integrated anti-Tigerkidnapping Program”

The AWDC Security Office, together with the Local Police of Antwerp, established an “Integrated Anti-Tigerkidnapping

Program”, specifically tailored to the Antwerp Diamond Area.

The primary objective of the “Integrated Anti-Tigerkidnapping Program” is to explain and assist in the prevention and the

reaction to a tigerkidnapping in progress.

This document is intended for:

• membersoftheFederalandLocalgovernmentservices,toinclude,butnotlimitedtothepoliceforcesand

prosecutor’s office;

• securitymanagersactivewithintheSecure-AntwerpDiamondArea(S-ADA);

• managementandsupervisorypersonnelofPrivateSecuritycompaniesand/orinternalPrivateSecurityservicesactive

within the S-ADA;

• thestakeholderswithintheinsuranceindustry:underwriters,brokers,surveyors.

INTEGRATED ANTI-TIGERKIDNAPPING | 3

About the AWDC Security Office

Today, in global terms, the diamond business represents more than $60 billion per annum, employs millions of skilled

individuals in all five continents. The axis revolves around Antwerp, the world’s largest diamond trading hub. Security is

one of the critical enablers of the Antwerp diamond business.

In 2012, AWDC established AWDC Security Office, formerly known as ADA-security. Its mission is to support and facilitate

the diamond business, and to protect the diamond community’s personnel, products, reputation, information and assets

against all internal, external, deliberate or accidental threats. The AWDC Security Office has its own Board of Directors

(http://www.ada-security.be/#About), currently chaired by Ari Epstein and Vice-Chairman Yvan De Mesmaeker.

The AWDC Security Office is fully committed:

• toenableandfacilitatethediamondtradewithintheSecure-AntwerpDiamondAreabyensuringasafeandsecure

environment to its employees, contracted personnel and third party persons active within this area;

• totreatallpeoplewithrespectanddignity,andtoaccordwiththeBelgianlawsandregulationsinalltheirapproaches

and actions;

• tocontinuouslyandeffectivelyidentifyandmanagerisksinadefined,structuredandcontrolledmanner;

• to establish security strategies, policies, plans, standards, procedures and guidelines to achieve the business

objectives of the Secure-Antwerp Diamond Area;

• to organize security programs to protect employees, contracted personnel and third party persons against all

internal, external, deliberate or accidental threats;

• tomaintainahighdegreeofprofessionalism,knowledge,integrityandawarenesstowardseverybodyworkingwithin

the Secure-Antwerp Diamond Area;

• toprovidethesecurityexpertiseandresourcesrequiredtodevelopasafeandsecureworkingenvironment;

• tobepreparedtorespondtoincidentswithappropriateandtestedmeasures;

• toinvestigateandanalyzesecurityincidents,totakeappropriateactionandcontinuouslyimproveitsmethods;

• tousetechnologywhichhasproventobesuccessful,toincreasethereliabilityandefficiencyofthesecurity

operations.

Since 18th February 2013, AWDC Security Office is managed by Stephan Van Hauwe, Senior Security Coordinator.

4 | INTEGRATED ANTI-TIGERKIDNAPPING

Stephan Van Hauwe

Stephan Van Hauwe has 16 years of experience in the fields of security, anti-crime, information security and anti-

terrorism. He is a skilled professional and well-known in the world of security.

He started his career at a private security company at the US Embassy in Brussels, where he became the ‘Guard Force

Commander’ of a team of 120 security officers.

Five years later, Stephan Van Hauwe became ‘Special Investigator’ at the US Embassy’s Regional Security Office (RSO)

in Brussels. At the US Embassy he managed the Local Guard Program, conducted investigations, coordinated special

events and performed executive protection missions. Furthermore, he was the formal instructor of security, anti-crime,

information security and anti-terrorism related topics.

For the past six years Stephan Van Hauwe held the position of ‘Contract Manager’ within a private security company.

He managed several departments within the Major Accounts Division: critical infrastructure, US military bases and

the European Parliament. Next to his day-to-day activities, he continued his work as a special instructor and advisor

for security, anti-crime, information security and anti-terrorism, and also managed the Security Scan and Red Team

programs.

For many years now, he manages the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) program for the European Corporate Security

Association (ECSA) organization. As ECSA OSINT coordinator, Stephan VanHauwe informs the ECSA network on

news, incidents, events and trends in the fields of crime, security, information security, terrorism, espionage, non-

proliferationandothertopicsthatmighthaveanadverseimpactonthesecurityofbusinessesandorganizations.

Since the outset of his career, he has continuously participated in trainings to develop his skills and invested in

numerous courses in the fields of security, investigations, leadership and management, not only in Belgium, but also

abroad in the United States, The Netherlands, Austria and Israel.


Stephan Van Hauwe is the ‘Single Point of Contact’ at AWDC Security Office for all security related topics and can be

contacted through AWDC:

Antwerp World Diamond Centre (AWDC)

AWDC Security Office (SO)

22 Hoveniersstraat

B-2018 Antwerp

+32 (0)3 222 05 11

[email protected]

www.awdc-securityoffice.be


About the Local Police of Antwerp

The Local Police of Antwerp is part of the Belgian integrated police services and responsible for all first line police tasks

in the metropolitan city of Antwerp.

Thepolicedivisioninchargeofthediamondsquaremileisthe“districtCentrum”.Nexttotheregularinterventionunits

andneighborhoodpolicing,thediamondsquaremilehasadedicatedpoliceforce,situatedinthediamondsquaremile.

Thispoliceforceisequippedwithseveralstateofthearttechnologicalmeanstosupporttheiractivities.

Thediamondsquaremilehasfullcameracoverage.Therealtimevideofootageismonitoredbytrainedpolicepersonnel

24/24 -7/7d. The city of Antwerp, Local Police and AWDC are working closely together to expand this coverage considerably

over the next few years. Intelligent technologies will be added to this camera network

Automatic Number Plate Recognition is in use on the police cars patrolling the diamond area.

Apoliceresponseteaminthediamondareaensuresaveryfastresponsetoeveryoccurringwithinthesquaremile.

Every possible type of incident will be dealt with in a structured way, adapted to the specificity of the diamond area.

Tigerkidnappings in the diamond community are one of the phenomenon’s Local Police of Antwerp are trying to combat

with a plan of action, aligned with the federal police and AWDC Security Office. The structures are prepared to tackle this

phenomenon, but this can only work with your help and full cooperation. The Local Police of Antwerp counts on your

cooperation.


Acknowledgements

We would like to extend our deepest gratitude to all those who have been involved in the research

process for this project. Many have willingly given time, resources, commitment and support, without

which any of this would have been possible.

It is difficult to single out individuals, but we would like to express special thanks to the following people:

Cathy Berx – Province of Antwerp

Bart De Wever – City of Antwerp

Ari Epstein – AWDC

Yvan de Mesmaeker – AWDC

Eddy De Raedt – Federal Police

Serge Muyters – Local Police of Antwerp

Koen Claus – Local Police of Antwerp

…


Content

01 | Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 11

1.1 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 11

1.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 11

1.3 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 12

02 | Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 12

2.1 Hostage taking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 12

2.2 Kidnap and ransom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 12

2.3 Tigerkidnapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 12

03 | Overview of tigerkidnappings over the past 10 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 13

3.1 Global . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 13

3.2 Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 14

3.3 Antwerp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 15

04 | Risk Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 17

4.1 Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 17

4.2 Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 17

4.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 17


05 | Modus operandi of tigerkidnappings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 18

5.1 Set out intentions and objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 19

5.2 Open source analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 20

5.3 Target selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 24

5.4 Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 25

5.5 Operational planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 28

5.6 Training and rehearsals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 28

5.7 Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 28

5.8 Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 29

5.9 Escape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 31

5.10 Sale of the diamonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 31

5.11 Remain out of hands of police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 31

06 | Stakeholders in Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 32

6.1 Federal Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 33

6.2 Federal Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 33

6.3 Public Prosecution Office in Antwerp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 33

6.4 Province of Antwerp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 33

6.5 City of Antwerp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 33

6.6 Local Police of Antwerp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 34

6.7 AWDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 34

6.8 AWDC Security Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 34

6.9 Insurance industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 34

6.10 Diamond Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 35

6.11 Private Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 35

6.12 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 35


07 | Integrated Security Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 36

7.1 Before – During – After . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 37

08 | Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 43

09 | Question and answers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 45

10 | List of sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 46

11 | Colophon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p. 47


01 | Introduction

1.1 ScopeThis guideline talks about tigerkidnappings. Tigerkidnapping is a violent, intrusive, traumatic and specific form of

serious organized crime!

There are still many misconceptions about tigerkidnappings. This can prevent individuals and organizations from

understanding the rationality of the crime, and lead to a poor appreciation of the role that preventative measures

can play in managing their own risks and lowering their susceptibility to tigerkidnappings. Overcoming such

misconceptions is important in promoting a preventative, opportunities-based policy for tackling tigerkidnappings.

It is important to build up a clear picture of the dynamics of tigerkidnapping: where it happens, who is at risk, who

the kidnappers are, how they operate and what motivates them.

1.2 Background Contrary to general beliefs tigerkidnapping is certainly no new phenomenon. The practice began as a twist on a tactic

usedbythe IrishRepublicanArmy(IRA),whichkidnappedpeople inordertocoercethemintoplacingcarbombs

against British government targets.

The first recorded crime that can be described as a tigerkidnapping occurred in 1972, but the term was coined in the

1980s and gained more widespread use in the following decade.

Sincetigerkidnapping is technically twocrimescommitted in tandem(i.e. robberyandhostagetaking),statistics

regarding their occurrence are difficult to compile on a global level.


1.3 ObjectivesWe will show that tigerkidnappers weigh up the risks of being caught and punished against the rewards on offer

to them if they are successful. We will show the factors that can affect the balance between the risks and efforts

versus the rewards for the tigerkidnappers. If we assume that tigerkidnappers make rational choices based on these

conditions, then it will be possible for us to direct our efforts towards re-balancing this equation in order to make the

crime a disadvantageous activity in which to be involved.

02 | Definitions

2.1 Hostage takingHostage taking is a modus operandi used by criminal and terrorist organizations and groups whereby they seize or

detain a person with the threat to kill, injure, or continue to detain that person in order to compel a third-person

or organization to do, or to abstain from doing, an act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the person

detained.

2.2 Kidnap and ransomTherearedifferentcategoriesofKidnapandRansom(K&R):traditional,express,terrorist,political,etc.Thetraditional

definition states that is a modus operandi used by criminal and terrorist organizations whereby they“pick up” a victim

and hold him or her hostage pending payment of a ransom by the family or employer. The most common outcome

–70%oftheknownincidents–isthatthevictimisreleasedonpaymentofaransom.Fewerthan10%arerescued

and fewer than 5 % are killed. The rest are released without payment or they escape

2.3 TigerkidnappingTigerkidnapping is the hostage taking, in the sense of an arrest, a loss of liberty or the abduction of one, or several

persons,withtheaimtooblige/constrain/forceanemployee (anauthorizedagent),aparentorallotherperson


to take immediate possession of a value, an important sum of money, or other form of ransom belonging to an

institution or firm.

Tigerkidnapping differs from other forms of kidnapping because the aim of the criminals is not to extort money from

the victim’s family, as is the norm in many kidnap for ransom cases, but instead to use the threat of violence against

the person as leverage to force another to participate in a crime.

NEW TREND?: “PSEUDO TIGERKIDNAPPINGS”

Perpetratorscallyouattheofficeandinformyouthattheyholdyourwifeand/orchildren,andthatyouneed

tobringthediamondstoaspecificlocation.Infacttheyarebluffinganddonothaveyourwifeand/orchildren.

03 | Overview of tigerkidnappings over the past 10 years

3.1 Global During the 1980s tigerkidnappings, which had once been a rare crime, began to increase in numbers. The original

targets were primarily cash-in-transit vehicle personnel.

In the 1990’s a shift was observed in the type of business targeted, with a move toward larger scale offences against

retail bank branches.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the tigerkidnapping threat evolved with a substantial increase in the number

of cases reported, the amounts of money taken, the range of businesses targeted, and the geographical locations in

which they occurred.


3.2 BelgiumAt the beginning of the 21st century tigerkidnappings first appeared in Belgium.

The original targets were primarily bank and postal offices. Several tigerkidnappings were executed in 2005 en 2006.

As soon as the government, in close collaboration with the targeted sectors, started to analyze the phenomenon and

to implement security counter measures. The security measures soon proved their positive impact with a drastic

decrease of tigerkidnappings in the respective sectors. An average of 33% of the cases were solved and perpetrators

arrested by the police.

Regrettably, the tigerkidnappings did not stop. In fact, the criminals started to divert to other high value and low risk

targets: the retail jewelry stores and diamond sectors. To date there are on average between 1 and 8 tigerkidnappings

per year in Belgium and primarily in the following cities: Antwerp, Charleroi, Mons, Liège, Nivelles and Brussels.

WHY IN BELGIUM?

Belgium is not the only country in which tigerkidnappings occur. There are however a couple of “enabling factors”:

1. Geo orientation of Belgium:

a. multiple and quick escape routes to neighboring EU countries

2. Successful precedents

a. high value loot

b. low risk

3. Relativelylowcaptureandconvictionrate(30-40%)

4. Relativelylimitedsentencingoncecaught


3.3 AntwerpAs mentioned above, the criminals shifted their attention from the financial sector to the jewelry and diamond sector.

Over thepast10years, criminalsused the tigerkidnappingMOthree (3) timesagainstmembersof thediamond

community:

Through an integrated approach between the bank and postal sectors, the government and the police were able to

seriously limit and decrease the threat of tigerkidnapping. It has primarily shifted to the retail jewelry stores.

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

0123456789

101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536

tigerkidnappings against the Diamond Community

tigerkidnappings in Belgium

(Source: Federal Police)


• 2009

o AdiamondtraderandhisfamilywerevictimsofatigerkidnappingattheirhomeinDilbeek.Three(3)maskedand

armed men penetrated his residence and forced the diamond trader to drive to his office in Antwerp to clear the

contentsofhissafe,estimatedat380.000euro.Two(2)threatenedthemananddrovewithhimtoAntwerp,one(1)

stayed with his family. After the robbery they returned to Dilbeek to pick up their accomplice and fled.

• 2010

o Criminals, speaking Italian, and dressed up as police officers, used a social engineering technique dressed as police

officers to penetrated the home of an Indian diamond trader in Wilrijk, took hostage his wife, daughter, son, nephew

andcook.Whenthehusbandcamehomefromworktheyforcedhimtopickupdiamonds,estimatedat4.5Meuro,

at his office in the Diamond square mile in Antwerp. The tigerkidnapping lasted 18 hours.

• 2012

o Criminals, speaking English, penetrated the apartment of a couple, whose husband was an employee at a diamond

company. Whilst holding the wife hostage, they sent the husband to go to the office and pick up diamonds, estimated

at 21 million euro, and return. The criminals left thereafter.

To date we notice that especially the Indian diamond community has been targeted by tigerkidnappers.


04| Risk Analysis

4.1 ThreatA threat is an expression of intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage. Threat is binary, meaning: it is present or not.

Tigerkidnapping is a clear and present threat to everyone active in the diamond community with direct or indirect

access to valuables. Therefore tigerkidnapping needs to be considered, analyzed and protected against.

4.2 RiskWe already determined that tigerkidnapping is indeed a viable threat to everyone active in the diamond community.

When we apply even the simplest form of risk analysis we can conclude that the frequency is medium to high and the

impact is very high to critical.

4.3 ConclusionAttention: any and all persons that have a regular, authorized and direct access to the actual diamonds, safes and

vault areas can be targeted for a tigerkidnapping. Examples: owners, staff such as secretaries, administrative staff, as

well as family members!

Criminals will select “the highest target(s) with the least amount of protection and the least level of risk for

the perpetrators.”


05 | Modus operandi of tigerkidnappings

Tigerkidnappings are typically meticulously planned and prepared to minimize risk and achieve the highest probability of

success.

Criminals avoid the target’s strengths and concentrate on the target’s weaknesses.

Detailed planning is a must!

Objectives

Surveillance

Open sourceAnalysis

OperationalPlanning

Do not get caught

Execution

Escape

Sale of the Loot Target Selection

Surveillance

ModusOperandi


Collection of information around the targeted trader, his staff and family members may continue for weeks or months

before an operation is decided upon. While some targets may be “soft” enough for shorter periods of observation, the

information gathering will still be intense. Operations planned or underway may be altered, delayed, or cancelled due to

changes to the target, perpetrators or local conditions.

The preparation of tigerkidnappings take quite some time, but once the actual tigerkidnapping is ongoing it’s relatively fast

and mobile.

Most tigerkidnappings are executed by:

• Wellorganizedandpreparedteamsof2to4persons.

• Perpetratorswhooftenspeakforeignlanguages(ex.EasternEuropean,Italian,French,English).

• Perpetratorswhoare“experienced”inothercrime(burglaries,robberies,heists,drugs,weapons,etc.).

• Perpetratorswhoaretrainedinhandlingandusingweapons.

• Perpetratorswhoarenotafraidtouseviolence,orthethreatthereof.

5.1 Set out intentions and objectivesThe first point on the criminals’ agenda is spell out their intentions and determine their objectives:

• Aone-timeandlargescaleoperationwithahigherrisk,butalsoahigherreward.

• Arepetitiveandsmallscaleoperationwithalowerrisk,butalsoalowerreward.

• ….

The level of difficulty and their “risk appetite” depends upon:

• thesizeofthegroup;

• theavailablefunding;

• thelevelofknowledgeandexperienceoftheindividualgroupmembers;

• theavailabletoolsandresources.


Once they have a clear idea on their intentions and objectives, they identify possible targets that meet their strategy

and they start their information collection operation.

5.2 Open source analysisThis phase is the collection of information on the list of potential targets. Collection is gathered from diverse,

primarily open, sources: the media, internet, social media, staff or contractors.

Collectors of that information may be members of the group, sympathizers, or people providing information without

knowledge of the intended purpose.

The number of preliminary targets that can be screened is limited only by the capabilities of the group to collect

information.

At least 80% of the information needed to plan their operation is provided through open sources!


5.2.1 Press (Newspapers and magazines)

Stories, statements, interviews, articles from newspapers, magazines and other media provide a lot of background

information. They have easy to access searchable databases which can searched on names, location, topics, etc.

(Source: Knack)

5.2.2 TV

The Diamond Community in Antwerp has been around for a very long time. Many local and foreign TV stations have

come and gone to make reports on profiles, the history, the festivities, security measures, incidents, etc. They too

have searchable databases in which the public, to include criminals, can search on names, location, topics, etc. This

is also a valuable source of information.


5.2.3 Internet

5.2.3.1 Websites

One of the easiest ways to collect information is using the Internet. It provides a wealth of data such as texts,

pictures, blue prints, and video information.

Many stakeholders within the Diamond Community have their own websites, providing a lot of interesting

information: structure, positions, names, addresses, stock, special actions, pricings, etc.

Another interesting source of information on the internet is the government’s KBO database of enterprises

(http://kbopub.economie.fgov.be/kbopub/zoekwoordenform.html?lang=nl). It is a free, public and searchable

database that provides centralized information on companies, statutes, personal addresses, financial information,

etc.Aswellasdetailsofthedirectors/shareholdersandtheirprivateaddresses.

The financial year report of every Belgian company, publicly accessible at the Belgian National Bank, also contains

very valuable information about the company’s activities and revenue.

5.2.3.2 Google Earth/Street View


Fromacriminal’sperspectiveGoogleEarth,Google Street View and similar programs such as Bing Maps, etc. are “a

gift from heaven”. Before these programs were available, the criminals had to physically go to the target residence,

work, places of leisure, etc. This poses a certain risk to their operation, because they have to expose themselves.

Now, by using these programs in-depth, they gather an enormous amount of information on the area, building, and

security measures, escape routes, etc.

We recommend to consider to contact these companies in order to blur out sensitive areas, to include the residences

and office buildings.

5.2.3.3 Social media

Socialmedia


The popularity of social networking sites has increased at astounding rate. There is no discussion about the usefulness

of sites such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn, etc. They can be used for professional networking and job

searches, as a means to increase sales revenue, as a tool to keep the public informed of safety and other issues or as

a way to reconnect with friends from way-back-when.

However, as with any new tool or application, it is always important to keep a close watch on its security implications.

Eachofthesetoolscomeswithitsownsetofsecurityconcernswhichcanputyoursecurityand/orpersonaldataat

risk.

Also within the Diamond Community the use of social media and networks are slowly but surely rising:

• meansofcommunication

• networkingandbusinesscontacts

• stockpresentations

• businesstransactions

• etc.

Keep a low profile! There is a direct correlation between your profile, your awareness and the required security

measures. The higher your profile, the higher your awareness and security measures need to be!

5.3 Target selectionThe criminals have collected the required information. They will analyze and compare the gathered information and

they’ll select target(s) that are considered vulnerable and which would further their goals for the next phase of their

planning process.

“Hard versus soft target”

A “hard target” is one which has considerable and effective protection or security; this means that a criminal attack

runs the risk of failing or of being foiled.

A “soft target” is one which has little or no protection or security and hence is an easy option for a criminal attack.


If you are perceived as a “hard target”, they move on to another target!

Nowthecriminalsclearlyidentifiedandzoomedintotheirtarget(s)theywillintensify their information gathering

operations.

5.4 SurveillanceSo far, the criminals collected their information using open sources. Now they have a clearly identified target, they

will have to change their modus operandi and go “in the field”.

They want to know EVERYTHING about you, your family, friends, residence, office, school, office staff, residence staff,

contractors, routines, procedures, habits, hobbies, travel, etc!

There are different categories of targets: aware, unaware, able, unable and combinations thereof. Most of the targets

identified by criminals within the Diamond Community are unaware and unable and therefore “easy prey”.

Surveillance confirms information gathered from previous surveillance and reconnaissance activities.

5.4.1 Initial

Surveillance is a skill: observing the target(s) without being seen.

They already have a good view and more than 80% of the required information on the target, the target area, the

business, etc. to plan their operation. Since they want to maximize their success and to minimize their risk they

will go after the other 20% in order to know everything about you. They’ll enter the surveillance phase: physical and

technicalsurveillance,observations,intrusion,infiltrations,groomingtheinsider,…


• Practices/Procedures/Routines–Forfacilitiesthisincludesscheduleddeliveries,workshiftchanges,identification

proceduresandotherobservable routines. For individuals, it can include regularly schedulederrands suchas

laundry pick up days or car parking locations.

• ResidenceandWorkplace–Thiscategoryappliesprimarilytothephysicallayoutandindividualactivitiesatthe

two places the target typically spends the most time.

• Transportation/RoutesofTravel–Forindividuals,thisisthemodeoftransportandcommonroutestoanyregular

destinationsuchashouse,work,gym,andschool.Forfacilities,itaddressesingressandegresspoints,typesof

vehicles allowed on the grounds, or availability of transportation into the target site.

• SecurityMeasures– This topic includes collectionareasdependingon the complexityof the security around

the target: presence of a guard force; the reaction time of response units; any hardening of structures, barriers,

or sensors; personnel, package, and vehicle screening procedures; and the type and frequency of emergency

reaction drills are examples of key collection objectives. This is one of the most important areas of information for

attack selection, since an intent is to bypass and avoid security measures and be able to strike the target during

any period.

5.4.2 Physical surveillance

Physical surveillance is a form of monitoring where the target(s) is kept under physical observation. It can be

combined with other modes of surveillance for complete coverage. This type of surveillance requires special skills and

is labor intensive, as perpetrators must be continually rotated to provide coverage, and it may be necessary to use an

arrayofobserverstoavoidattractingattentionfromthetarget(s)underobservation.

Inphysicalsurveillance,membersofasurveillanceteamwatchandtracktheirtarget(s).Sometimesthisisdonein

relatively close proximity, and in other cases, the person doing the surveillance may need to remain distant to avoid

attracting attention. The surveillance team works on foot, in vehicles, and using other methods of transportation as

necessaryandmustbehighlyalert,aswellasflexible,toidentifythemovementsofthetarget(s)andtakeappropriate

actions.

While executing their surveillance, the perpetrators often use technology to improve their efficiency, store the

gathered information and stay undiscovered.


5.4.3 The insider

An insider is a member of any group of people of limited number and generally have restricted access. The term

is used in the context of secret, privileged, hidden or otherwise esoteric information or knowledge: an insider is a

“member of the gang” and as such knows things only people in the gang know.

There are different categories of insider threats, based on the level of access the employee has. There are four types:

• Pure insider: an direct-hire employee with all the rights and access associated with being employed by the company

• Insider associate: they are not employees of the company and do not need full access, but they need limited access

• Insider affiliate: a spouse, friend, or even client of an employee who uses the employee’s credentials to gain access

• Outside affiliate: non-trusted outsiders who use open access to gain access to an organization’s resources.

Each of these categories also has different motives. Understanding each is a key to building proper preventive and

detective defenses.

5.4.4 Technical

Another method of surveillance is using “technical surveillance”. It plays an important role in intelligence gathering

operations.Thecriminalswillusetechnicalandtechnologicalequipmenttospyontheirtargets(s)toincludebutnot

limited to:

• CCTV:cameras,recorders,monitors

• hardwiredaudiomonitoring

• radiotransmittingdevices

• GPS

• cellularnetworktransmitters

• telephonemonitoring

• computer&datamonitoring>hacking of systems!

5.4.5 Conclusion

Report suspicious activities or persons immediately! Be a hard target!


5.5 Operational planningBefore starting their surveillance phase the criminals already had at least 80% of the required information. After

a well-executed surveillance phase they will have the other 20% and can now start planning the execution of the

actual tigerkidnapping:

• who,what,when,how,…

• approach

• target(s)handling

• datesandtiming

• actionplan

• resources

• escape

• saleoftheloot

• …

5.6 Training and rehearsalsAs with conventional military and business operations, rehearsals are conducted to improve the odds of success,

confirm planning assumptions, and develop contingencies.

Typical rehearsals include:

• equipmentandweaponstrainingandperformance

• stagingforfinalpreparatorychecks.

• deploymentintotargetarea

• actionsontheobjective

• escaperoutes

5.7 SurveillanceSince time has passed since their last information collection and surveillance, they reconfirm that the conditions

upon which they based their operational plan haven’t changed. They do this by conducting specific surveillance.

Againtheywilloperateinthetarget(s)area.Exposuretimewillbekepttotheminimum.


5.8 ExecutionOnce criminals reach this stage of their operation, the odds favor a successful operation against the target(s).

Criminals conducting planned operations possess important tactical advantages.

Since they are the attacker, they possess all the advantages of initiative and provide:

• useofsurprise

• choiceoftime,place,andconditionsofoperation

• employmentofdiversionsandsecondaryorfollow-upactions

Previous tigerkidnappings were primarily executed between:

04h00–09h00and21h00–01h00

Attention: The possibility exists that if security measures are focused too much on the after-hours tigerkidnappings,

the modus operandi will shift to business hours.

5.8.1 Approach at residence

Most tigerkidnappings start at the residence of the target(s). The criminals know the exact location, layout, ins and

outs, and also how exactly to approach the residence in order to avoid camera’s, curious neighbors, police and private

security, etc.

They often use the covers, uniforms, vehicles and id’s of utility firm employees, police officers or other known and

trusted professions. This MO falls into the category of “social engineering” and is best known as “the imposter”.

5.8.2 Penetration of residence

Oncetheyareattheresidenceandthetarget(s)openeddoor,ortheyforcedtheirwayin,theyuseviolenceorthe

threatofviolencetosurpriseand“subdue”thetarget(s).Inmostcasesthecriminalsusedweapons,suchashand

guns, machine guns and knives.


Frequently the familymembers are physically and psychologically separated from the actual targets within the

residence(bathroom,cellar,…).Thisincreasesthelevelsofuncertaintyfortheintendedtargetandgivesthemmore

power over the targets.

5.8.3 Hostage taking of family and friends

The hostage taking will last until the intended target meets their objectives and the criminals can escape. Having

been in a hostage situation is an extremely traumatic event, especially for children, and will have long lasting

negative psychological effects.

Forthetarget(s),primarilyfamilymembers,itisimportanttobeawareoftheproceduresandbestpracticesconcerning

hostage taking situations. You’ll find more information in the security measures section.

Donotresistyourattacker(s)anddonottrytobeahero.Donottelllies.Thiswillonlyaggravatethesituation.

While the family members are being separated, the intended target is being threatened. He or she is told there are

manyaccomplicesfollowingtheireverymoveandifhe/shedoesnotfullycomplywithallinstructionstheywillhurt

or even kill the hostages. The intended target is then briefed on the exact requirements and prepped with electronics:

• smallmobilecameras

• cellphones

• GPStracking

• etc.

Previous tigerkidnappings have shown that when the intended target fully complies and does not deviate from the

exact instructions of the criminals, the hostages and the intended target will be left unharmed, or only suffer minor

and limited injuries.

The prime and sole objective should be the well-being of the hostages!


During the last tigerkidnappings in the diamond community, the criminals equipped the intended targets with small,

mobile, wireless and remote controlled cameras so they could constantly monitor what the intended target was

doing.

5.8.4 Collection

The target is always instructed where, when and how to deliver the loot.

It is not uncommon that the perpetrators will instruct the victim collecting the loot to use a variety of transportation

means(fromownvehicletopublictransportation)andinstructthevictimtomovearoundinthecityorothercities

to make the final drop of the loot.

5.9 EscapeEscape plans are usually well rehearsed and executed. The criminals will pay close attention not to leave evidence at

the crime scenes.

5.10 Sale of the diamondsContrary to general belief, it is quite easy to sell rework or modify the rough or polished diamonds and to resell them.

Very few, if any, diamonds originating from a tigerkidnapping are ever recovered.

5.11 Remain out of hands of policeThe final phase of the criminals is to maintain operational security, stay out of the hands of the police and bear the

fruitsoftheircrime.FromthelastthreetigerkidnappingsintheDiamondCommunityone (1) resulted in an arrest.


06 | Stakeholders in Security

FederalGovernment

PublicProsecution

O�ce

PrivateSecurity

DiamondCommunity

AWDC

Provinceof

Antwerp

FederalPolice

Buildingowners

Contractors

Cityof

Antwerp

LocalPolice ofAntwerp

InsuranceIndustry

AntwerpDiamond

Area


6.1 Federal GovernmentTigerkidnapping falls under the shared authority of the Ministry of Interior (http://www.ibz.be/) (Federal and

Local Police for the operational investigation and prevention) and theMinistry of Justice (http://just.fgov.be/)

(Investigativejudgeandprosecutorfortheprosecution).

Tigerkidnapping is considered a priority for the respective ministries and both provide their support and resources to

prevent Tigerkidnappings and assign the required resources to identify and arrest the perpetrators.

6.2 Federal PoliceWithin the Federal Police thedirectorate DGJ/DJB “Fight crime against goods”, to include its section in Antwerp

(http://www.srp.be/federale-politie/algemene-directie-gerechtelijke-politie/directie-bestrijding-criminaliteit-tegen-

goederen/index.html)ismandatedandspecializedintheanalysisoftigerkidnappings.TheFederalPolice,theLocal

Police of Antwerp and the AWDC have organized several meetings about tigerkidnapping.

6.3 Public Prosecution Office in AntwerpTheInvestigativeJudgeandtheProsecutor’sofficeinAntwerp(http://www.pers-gerecht.be/document.php?document_id=81)

are the judicial authority leading and investigating the circumstances related to the tigerkidnappings.

6.4 Province of AntwerpOntheregionalleveltheProvinceofAntwerp(http://www.provant.be/)isalsoactivelyinvolvedintheprevention

of tigerkidnapping. Amongst other things by frequently organizing awareness sessions about “residential security”

related to the threat of tigerkidnapping. The Province, the City of Antwerp, the Local Police of Antwerp and the AWDC

are working closely together on this specific topic.

6.5 City of AntwerpOn a local,strategic and operational leveltheCityofAntwerp(http://www.antwerpen.be/),andmorespecifically

the Division “Actieve Stad”, works closely together with the Province, the Local Police of Antwerp and the AWDC in the

areas of economy, security, infrastructure, environment.


6.6 Local Police of AntwerpThe Diamond Square Mile falls within the jurisdiction of the Local Police of Antwerp, District Centrum. Because of the

special location, nature and threats the Local Police of Antwerp has created a dedicated Local Police section, called

“DIA/ISRA”,locatedandactivewithintheDiamondSquareMile,aswellastheJewishinstitutions.

On a daily basis there are contacts between the chief superintendent of the unit and the AWDC Security Office.

The Local Police of Antwerp also has dedicated personnel to perform effective, fast, free-of-charge, professional and

discrete security audits on residences and offices. And in the event of an actual tigerkidnapping the Local Police can

activate its victim support unit.

6.7 AWDCThe Antwerp World Diamond Centre is an industry-established foundation whose mission is to serve and support the

diamond business in Belgium. Headquartered in the heart of Antwerp’s diamond district, its Board of Directors is

elected directly by those who define the Antwerp Diamond Community.

6.8 AWDC Security OfficeIn 2012, AWDC established AWDC Security Office. Its mission is to support and facilitate the diamond business, and

to protect the diamond community’s personnel, products, reputation, information and assets against all internal,

external, deliberate or accidental threats. The AWDC Security Office is the Single Point of Contact(SPOC)forsecurity

related topics within the Diamond Square Mile for the diamond community and the authorities.

6.9 Insurance industryInsurance is the equitable transfer of the risk of a loss, from one entity to another in exchange for payment. It is a form

of risk management primarily used to hedge against the risk of a contingent, uncertain loss. The AWDC Security Office

has regular and proactive contacts on matters of security with the different stakeholders in the insurance industry:

theinsurers/underwriters,thebrokersandthelossadjusters.Theroleandresponsibilityofthe insuranceindustry

(insurer/underwriter/brokers/Lossadjusters)inthe“beforephase”isalsocrucial!Byimplementingbalanced and

efficient standardization and application of security measures by their insurance takers.


6.10 Diamond CommunityThe Diamond Community in Antwerp is very large and complex: diamond traders, bourses, mining companies, banks,

equipment retailers, etc. Additionally the activities of the approximately 1800 diamond companies are located in an

area of one square mile. This is a unique feature which provides many advantages, but entails also some security

risks. The Diamond Community plays a crucial role in securing the Diamond Square Mile. Awareness and vigilance

are everyone’s responsibility.

6.11 Private SecurityThe role of Private Security in deterring, detecting and defending against tigerkidnappings cannot be underestimated.

Their primary objective is to observe and report any suspicious activities, persons or incidents in and around to the

police.

6.12 Conclusion

Awareness

SecuritySurvey

Prevention

AntwerpDiamond

Area

Aftercare

Investigationand

Prosecution

IncidentManagement


07 | Integrated Security Approach

Security is a process designed to support and facilitate business and to protect the organization’s personnel, products,

reputation, information and assets against all internal, external, deliberate or accidental threats.

We differentiate five (5) important pillars within the security framework:

• organizationalsecuritymeasures:

awareness, policies, procedures,

• physicalsecuritymeasures:

construction material, windows, doors, locks, safe

• electronicalsecuritymeasures:

accesscontrol,biometrics,CCTV,firealarm,PersonalProtectionAlarm,…

• notificationandresponsesecuritymeasures:

telecomconnections,AlarmMonitoringCenter,MobileIntervention,…

• informationsecuritymeasures:

intrusion detection systems, firewalls, virus scanners

The organizational security measures are the most effective, as well as the least expensive!

Specifictothethreatoftigerkidnapping,aswellastheeffectivesecuritymeasureswedifferentiatethree(3)phases:

• Before the tigerkidnapping

- Focusondeterrenceandearlydetection


• During the tigerkidnapping

- Focusondefending,alarmingandreaction

• After the tigerkidnapping

- Investigation

- Focusonresilience

Security is not a cost, it’s an investment and an added value to protect what’s dearest to you!

Below we will provide an extensive list of security measures which can be implemented in a residential as well as office

setting to decrease the risk of tigerkidnapping.

7.1 Before – During – After

Before

During

After

Tigerkidnapping


7.1.1 Before

To date all tigerkidnappings started at the residence of the diamond trader.

Ensure that the security of your residence is at a high level!

• FeedingTigerkidnapping-database

Get in touch with the AWDC Security Office and fill in the personal information form. This form inventorises all the

information that is required by the special units of the police to handle an ongoing tigerkidnapping professionally.

This information will be stored in a secured database that is managed by the AWDC Security Office. The use of this

database is always logged; access is restricted to a limited number of persons at the AWDC Security Office.

The necessary and relevant information will be immediately sent to the police services when a tigerkidnapping is ongoing.

• Organizationalsecuritymeasures

- Lead by example!

- Try to maintain a low profile.

- Organizerecurrentawarenesstrainingfordiamondtraders,familymembers,residence/officestaffandcontractors.

- Considertoperforminitialandrecurrentvettingandscreeningof–new–residenceandofficestaffpersonnel(incl.

contractors).

- Limit, organize, and control the authorized persons having access to your diamonds, including the safe and vault

area.

- Considerthe“4-eyesprinciple”(morethanonepersonshouldberequiredtoprovideaccessthevaluables:thiscanbe

by physically having 2 people present, but also, for example, by having 2 persons physically seperated provide special

codestoopenthesafe):

- Consider different timings: day, night, weekend, holidays.

- Spread your stock over your office safe and the safe inside vault rooms located in many S-ADA buildings.

- Attention: please select a well-protected vault room!

- Consider a seperate visitor waiting room.

- Prevent non-authorised persons to have a clear and direct view on your safe.


- Considermonitoredandcontrolledafter-hoursentry/exitto/fromtheS-ADA.

- Consider to review and improve the residential security of all persons that have an authorized access to the diamonds,

safe or vault area.

- Create and implement clear and written security policies, procedures and standards – “lead by example” and ensure

compliance by diamond traders, family members, staff and contractors.

- Consider a “special code or sign” known only to you, your family members or staff to indicate there is a problem.

- Ensure you have a special procedure in the event that traders, family members, staff or contractors “request”

diamonds, because they are in the middle of a tigerkidnapping!

- Be aware of “Pseudo tigerkidnappings”!

• Usethetigerkidnappingprocedure.

- Personallyandproactivelycontactthelocalpoliceofyourcity/communetodiscussthethreatoftigerkidnapping

and ask for a technoprevention advice at your home or office. Maximize the variation in your routes, timings and

routines, try to be as unpredictable as possible.

- If desired you can also opt to hire a specialized security consultancy firm.

- Watch and pay attention to the surroundings around the residence and the office.

- Be aware and always report suspicious activities and incidents around the residence, on the routes and at around the

officetotheappropriateservices.YoucancalltheAntwerpLocalPolice24h/24at080012312.Orfillinasuspicious

incident form on www.ada-security.be.

- Use security stickers, signs and posters to create awareness and indicate the presence of security measures: CCTV,

time-/nightlock,alarmsystem,panic/holdupalarm,personalprotectionalarm,etc…

- Considertocreateandimplement“BIN(BuurtInformatieNetwerk)”networksinyourresidentialarea–TheAWDC

Security Office can assist and coordinate.

- Consider to join “consortium mobile guarding projects” within your residential area” – The AWDC Security Office can

assist and advise you.

- Consider full and appropriate insurance coverage for yourself, family members, residence and office staff.

- Alwaysaskan identificationdocument fromvisitorsandclients.Alsopeoplewearinganofficialuniform (Police,

Belgacom,etc.)shouldbeaskedforthisidentificationandmakesureyoucheckthatidentificationwiththecompany

they work for.


- Be vigilant when opening doors, before opening the door, identify who wants to enter.

- Be aware when people try to stop you on the road, even when they say they want to help you, because they claim

you have a problem with your car.

• Physicalsecuritymeasures

- Use solid and qualitative construction materials for your office and residence.

- If possible, compartmentalize your office and residence.

- Consider to identify, create, transfer a real or improvised “panic room”.

- Use certified doors, windows, shutters, gates and locks.

- Consider to put anti-burglary films on the glass of your windows.

- Consider to install or upgrade a mantrap system to control access to your office.

- Use certified safes, vaults and installers.

• Electronicalsecuritymeasures

- Consider to install a certified and professionally installed:

- access control system

- intercom system with integrated camera

- intrusion alarm system

- time and night lock on your safe or vault area

- biometric security systems

- CCTV system with recording capabilities

Maintain these systems as described in the manuals

- Considertoprovideallpersons,whohaveaccesstothevaluableswithaPersonalProtectionAlarm(PPA).

You can choose between a hardware device or a special App, which can be installed on your smartphone.

• Notificationandresponsesecuritymeasures

- Ensure you, your staff and family members have all emergency contact information: email, telephone and mobile

numbers of police, AWDC Security Office, etc.on hand and in the mobile phones.

- Consider to connect all your security systems to a recognized alarm monitoring center.

- Test these systems regularly to ensure proper operation.


• Informationsecuritymeasures

- Limit, manage and control the codes, users and passwords of your security systems – change frequently and apply

procedures for people leaving.

- Limit and control the information about yourself (incl. addresses, family, holiday plans, your vehicles, security

measures),stockinformation(diamonds,values,…),byphone,onyourinternetsite,socialnetworks,andinthe

generalpress(newspapers,magazines,…).

- Consider, limit, manage and control the trash leaving your residence and office.

- ContactGoogle/Bing/Yahoo/…companies“toblur”outyoursatellite,streetviewandphotoimages.

7.1.2 During


- Do not resist and do not try to be the hero!

- The well-being of your family, yourselves and staff are crucial and most important!

- Comply with and follow the instructions of the criminals.

- Only if you can safely and securely warn or alarm others by phone, SMS, email, in person, do so, if you have the

slightest doubt, do not do it, and report the tigerkidnapping as soon as you and your family are safe!

- Memorize as much information and details of the incident and criminals as possible:

- How many perpetrators

• physicaldescription:lookoutforspecificidentificationmarkssuchasscars,tattoosandthelike

• languagesused

- Information about the weapons used.

- Information about the vehicles used.

Response of the police ONCE alarmed or warned about an ONGOING tigerkidnapping:

- The police will NOT approach the residence or the office in force, with their blue lights and sirens.

Their objectives are prioritized:

• Thesafetyandsecurityofthediamondtrader,family,staff

• Therecoveryofthegoods

• Thearrestandprosecutionofthecriminals

- The police will instruct their special intervention units to:

• discretely and safely understand and observe the situation (location, layout, number of hostages,

perpetrators,…)

• plantheapproachandmodusoperandioffreeingthehostages


The primary objective for police and public prosecutor is the safety and security of the diamond trader, family, staff.

They will not intervene until they’re 100% sure that all victims are safe.

- Once the situation is safe and under control the police will send:

• victimsupportunits

• forensicteamstocollectevidence

- Make sure the police are the first to arrive at the scene of the crime.

- Calling in friends or relatives will only make forensic analysis more complicated and less reliable. If you

know the offenders have used the bathroom do not enter this area.

• Detectivesofthefederaljudicialpolice

7.1.3 After


- Don’t touch anything in the places where the tigerkidnappings have been.

- Always report a tigerkidnapping as soon as possible to the respective authorities. Don’t use the phones that have been

used by the tigerkidnappers, don’t make any other phone calls.

- Thisisalsorequiredifyouwanttointroduceaclaimwithyourinsurancebroker/insurerorunderwriter.

- Don’t try to work through the traumatic event alone. Try as best you can to continue to live normally.

- Request the presence and support of police victim support units.

- Analyze the events leading up to, and during the tigerkidnapping together with the AWDC Security Office.

- Review and or upgrade the presence and effectiveness of your security measures.

• Physicalsecuritymeasures

- Have damage to doors, windows, gates, alarm systems, CCTV and fences repaired as soon as possible.

• Informationsecuritymeasures

- Align your communication with the press through the AWDC Security Office.

- Allow them to be your spokesperson. They are there to represent and support you!


Check with respective federal, regional and local governments for premiums or tax reductions related to security

improvements at your residences or offices!

http://minfin.fgov.be/portail2/nl/themes/dwelling/protection/index.htm

08 | Conclusions

Rule of Thumb:

1. Keep a low profile > Be aware of your visibility!

a. Consider to use our “AWDC SO Security Awareness Quick Self-Assessment”.

2. Secure your residence and office effectively.

3. Be aware of your surroundings.

4. Report suspicious activities or persons immediately:

a. If urgent: call the police by dialing “101”.

b. If not urgent:

- through the Police:

“Blauwe lijn”: 0800 123 12

E-mail: [email protected]

- through AWDC SO:

“Security Hotline”: 0800 185 00


5. Register for the AWDC Security Office Anti-Tigerkidnapping Program.

6. In the event of an actual tigerkidnapping: apply the AWDC SO tigerkidnapping procedure.

a. Trust in the special police response.

b. Report a tigerkidnapping as soon as possible.

7. Consider after care: debriefing and victim support.

INTEGRATED ANTI-TIGER KIDNAPPING | 43


Local Police of Antwerp will:

• Organizestructuralawarenesssessionson“residentialsecurity”andothersecuritytopicsfordiamondtradersand

their families.

• Establishaprofessionalintegratedinterventionplanforongoingtigerkidnappings.

The AWDC Security Office, together with the City of Antwerp and the Local Police of Antwerp will:

• Organizelocal“BIN”intheresidentialneighborhoodsofthediamondtraders.

• Provideontherequestofthediamondtradersandfamiliesfreeofcharge“securityadvisors”toassessthesecurity

measures at their residences and propose improvements.

• Beona24/24-7/7basisstandbyforinstallationofacrisiscommandcenterforanongoingtigerkidnapping.

The AWDC Security Office will:

• Taketheinitiativetoworktogetherwithallstakeholderstoanalyzethesecurityrisksandarangeofminimumsecurity

recommendations.

• Organizestructuralandseparatesecurityawarenessbriefingsfordiamondtraders,officepersonnel,familymembers

and contractors.

• Createandprovidesecuritystickers,signsandposters.

• Setupa24/24SecurityHotline,tigerkidnappingprocedure,responseprotocol,24/7PrivateSecurity.

• Manageapersonaltigerkidnappingdatabasewithallinformationneededforanongoingtigerkidnappingon

a24/24–7/7base.

Sec_rity needs U!

Let us all work together and be a “hard target”, so that the criminals stop using this modus operandi in the

Diamond Community!


09 | Questions and answers

For questions and answers, please contact:

• AntwerpWorldDiamondCentreSecurityOffice

AntwerpWorldDiamondCentre(AWDC)

22 Hoveniersstraat

B-2018 Antwerp

Office:+32(0)32220511


Visit us at www.awdc-securityoffice.be

• LocalPoliceofAntwerp

22 Hoveniersstraat

B-2018 Antwerp

Office+32(0)32334028



10 | List of sources

http://www.polfed-fedpol.be/crim/crim_tips10_en.php

http://www.polfed-fedpol.be/police/panels/files_nl/brochure_tigerkidnapping_N.pdf

http://www.catlin.com/flipbook/kidnap-and-ransom-today/files/inc/342692550.pdf

http://www.zenzelesecurity.co.za%2Findex.php%3Foption%3Dcom_phocadownload%26view%3Dcategory%26id%3D11%3A

crime%26download%3D37%3Atiger-kidnap-the-threat-to-theukbankingsector%26Itemid%3D59&ei=66Q_Ue6qHYLXPcvWgJA

L&usg=AFQjCNFsQPDuFm--dB4NfUr4Mz0m3B4R-

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86829.pdf

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/threat

http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terrorism/guide.pdf

http://www.gfi.com/whitepapers/Social_Networking_and_Security_Risks.pdf

http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-physical-surveillance.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insider

http://www.darkreading.com/blog/227700748/different-flavors-of-the-insider-threat.html

http://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/w970707/p6.pdf

11 | Colophon

This anti-tigerkidnapping guide was created by:

Responsible publisher:

Antwerp World Diamond Centre (AWDC)

22 Hoveniersstraat

B-2018 Antwerp

Visit us at www.awdc.be

Date post:	02-Mar-2021
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