Integrity Management: Lessons Learned, Challenges

11

Integrity Management:Integrity Management:Lessons Learned, Lessons Learned,

ChallengesChallengesA Presentation by the A Presentation by the Hazardous Liquids Pipeline IndustryHazardous Liquids Pipeline Industry to the to the OPS Public Meeting on Integrity OPS Public Meeting on Integrity ManagementManagementMay 17-18, 2005May 17-18, 2005

22

OverviewOverview

Marty MathesonMarty MathesonAmerican Petroleum InstituteAmerican Petroleum Institute

33

The National NetworkThe National Network160,000 miles national transmission 160,000 miles national transmission

networknetwork Crude oil to refineriesCrude oil to refineries Refined products to end usersRefined products to end usersVolumes per yearVolumes per year 1.6 trillion barrel miles crude oil1.6 trillion barrel miles crude oil 1.7 trillion barrel miles refined products1.7 trillion barrel miles refined products 0.4 trillion barrel miles HVLs0.4 trillion barrel miles HVLs

1,600,000,000,000 barrel-miles crude oil1,700,000,000,000 barrel-miles refined400,000,000,000 barrel-miles HVL

44

BenefitsBenefitsEnergyEnergy HeatingHeating

Home heating oilHome heating oil PropanePropane

FuelsFuels AutomotiveAutomotive AviationAviation RailroadsRailroads Ships and bargesShips and barges Power plantsPower plants Military basesMilitary bases

Raw materialsRaw materials PharmaceuticalsPharmaceuticals PlasticsPlastics CosmeticsCosmetics FertilizersFertilizers Construction Construction

materialsmaterials

55

What do we do?What do we do?We transport We transport flammableflammable, hazardous, , hazardous, usefuluseful

products to customers under strict products to customers under strict federal and state requirements through federal and state requirements through townstowns, cities, , cities, neighborhoodsneighborhoods, and cross , and cross

country where country where peoplepeople live, work and play. live, work and play.

We MUST do it safely and reliably.We MUST do it safely and reliably.

66

Energy Pipeline OversightEnergy Pipeline Oversight

PipelineOperators

Federal OversightState/Local Oversight

Stakeholders/Consumers

PIPELINEOPERATORS ANDTHE PRIVILEGETO OPERATE

77

Our vision is an oil pipeline Our vision is an oil pipeline industry thatindustry that -- -- conducts operations safely and with conducts operations safely and with

respect for the environment;respect for the environment; respects the privilege to operate respects the privilege to operate

granted to it by the public; andgranted to it by the public; and provides reliable transportation of the provides reliable transportation of the

crude oil and refined products upon crude oil and refined products upon which America and all Americans rely.which America and all Americans rely.

88

Industry GoalsIndustry Goals NoNo deaths deaths NoNo injuries injuries NoNo releases to the environment releases to the environment NoNo operating errors operating errors Reliable serviceReliable service to our shippers, to our shippers,

customers and communitiescustomers and communities Full complianceFull compliance with requirements with requirements

99

Oil Pipeline Releases & Safety Oil Pipeline Releases & Safety Incidents Reported to DOTIncidents Reported to DOT

050

10015020025030019

8819

8919

9019

9119

9219

9319

9419

9519

9619

9719

9819

9920

0020

0120

0220

0320

04

Three Years Ending

Num

ber

50100150200250300

Thou

sand

s of

Bar

rels

Barrels

(3-Year Moving Average)

Number

1010

Oil Pipeline Fatalities & InjuriesOil Pipeline Fatalities & Injuries(Public, Employee, Contractor)(Public, Employee, Contractor)

05

1015202530

Three Years Ending

Num

ber

Injuries

Fatalities

(3-Year Moving Average)

1111

Baseline Assessments – Baseline Assessments – Voluntary CertificationVoluntary Certification

U.S. mileage – 160,000U.S. mileage – 160,000 Companies/systems certifying – 73 Companies/systems certifying – 73 Certifying companies –Certifying companies –

System miles – 130,113 (81% of US miles)System miles – 130,113 (81% of US miles) HCA “could affect” – 59,364 milesHCA “could affect” – 59,364 miles Baseline complete – 37,990 milesBaseline complete – 37,990 miles Additional miles assessed – 33,890 milesAdditional miles assessed – 33,890 miles

Total miles assessed – Total miles assessed – 71,880 miles71,880 miles

1212

Baseline Assessments – Baseline Assessments – Voluntary CertificationVoluntary Certification

100%100% of companies have completed 50% of companies have completed 50% 59%59% of companies have completed 65% of companies have completed 65% 27%27% of companies have completed 75% of companies have completed 75% 9%9% of companies have completed 80 - 100% of companies have completed 80 - 100%

of HCA “could affect” mileageof HCA “could affect” mileageAt half way point (Sept 2004)At half way point (Sept 2004)

of baseline assessment period (2001-2007)of baseline assessment period (2001-2007)

Of certifying companies --Of certifying companies --

1313

Results from AssessmentsResults from AssessmentsSource: PPTSSource: PPTS

10,000 conditions addressed per year10,000 conditions addressed per year Immediate repair conditions – Immediate repair conditions – 7%7% Other rule-based conditions – Other rule-based conditions – 21%21% Operator-definedOperator-defined conditions – conditions – 72%72%

AllAll injurious conditions injurious conditionsare addressed!are addressed!

1414

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

<5 Barrels 5-49Barrels

50+Barrels

System Location:System Location:Share of Releases by Spill Share of Releases by Spill

SizeSize

Updated 08/04Combo for All to OPS.xls

Includes only incidents that are reportable to OPS under criteria established 2/2002.

Location: Facilities piping & Location: Facilities piping & equip.: 52%; Onshore pipe: 40%equip.: 52%; Onshore pipe: 40%

Percent, 1999-2003

Facility Piping/Equip.59% 44% 25%

Onshore Pipe

32% 50% 63%

Location by size: Facilities piping & Location by size: Facilities piping & equip.: 25% of 50+ bbls; Onshore equip.: 25% of 50+ bbls; Onshore pipe: 63% of 50+ bbls pipe: 63% of 50+ bbls

1515

Onshore Pipe Incidents by Onshore Pipe Incidents by Cause, 1999-2003Cause, 1999-2003

Number of Incidents 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Corrosion 113322 130 135 110 5599 Equipment/ non-pipe 3333 43 26 25 2255 Operator error/ incorrect oper’n 1199 12 16 7 99 Pipe material/ seam/ weld 3311 30 16 13 99 Third party damage (curr./ past) 3355 47 39 30 1199 Rest of Causes 1199 17 22 11 1111 Total 226699 279 254 196 113322

Incidents occurring on “Onshore Pipelines, including valve sites” reported toPipeline Performance Tracking System. “Rest of Causes” is Natural Forces and “Other.”

1616

Onshore Pipe Incidents, Onshore Pipe Incidents, '99-'03'99-'03

050

100150200250300

'99 '00 '01 '02 '030

50

100

150

'99 '00 '01 '02 '030

1020304050

'99 '00 '01 '02 '03

01020304050

'99 '00 '01 '02 '0305

101520

'99 '00 '01 '02 '030

10203040

'99 '00 '01 '02 '03

TOTAL, ALL CAUSES CORROSION THIRD PARTY

EQUIP./NON-PIPE OPERATOR/OPER'N MAT'L/SEAM/WELD

1717

Line Pipe Accidents byLine Pipe Accidents byCause Category Cause Category (1999-2003)(1999-2003)

Corrosion accidents Corrosion accidents downdown 33rdrd party damage accidents party damage accidents downdown Equipment/non-pipe accidents Equipment/non-pipe accidents downdown Pipe material/seam failures Pipe material/seam failures downdown Operator/operational error Operator/operational error downdown

Focus on line pipe is a focus on where the Focus on line pipe is a focus on where the public and public safety impacts arepublic and public safety impacts are

1818

IMP is a Success StoryIMP is a Success Story Accelerated risk-based approachAccelerated risk-based approach Accelerated use of ILI toolsAccelerated use of ILI tools Accelerated investments in GIS, Accelerated investments in GIS,

information and data management toolsinformation and data management tools Accelerated investments in pipeline assetsAccelerated investments in pipeline assets Finding conditions and fixing themFinding conditions and fixing them Identifying emerging integrity issuesIdentifying emerging integrity issues

1919

Integrity Management: Not Integrity Management: Not Just Inspection and Testing Just Inspection and Testing

---- Public awareness and communicationPublic awareness and communication Security awareness and physical Security awareness and physical

upgradesupgrades Third party damage efforts and Common Third party damage efforts and Common

Ground AllianceGround Alliance Operator focus on performanceOperator focus on performance Stakeholder/public expectationsStakeholder/public expectations And much more …And much more …

Public awareness and communicationPublic awareness and communication Security awareness and physical Security awareness and physical

upgradesupgrades Third party damage efforts and Common Third party damage efforts and Common

Ground AllianceGround Alliance Operator focus on performanceOperator focus on performance Stakeholder/public expectationsStakeholder/public expectations And much more …And much more …

2020


050

100150200250300

'99 '00 '01 '02 '030

50

100

150

'99 '00 '01 '02 '030

1020304050

'99 '00 '01 '02 '03

01020304050

'99 '00 '01 '02 '0305

101520

'99 '00 '01 '02 '030

10203040

'99 '00 '01 '02 '03



2121

2222

Lessons LearnedLessons LearnedAPI/AOPL Pipeline Industry API/AOPL Pipeline Industry PanelPanel

2323

Where do the LessonsWhere do the LessonsCome From?Come From?

Operator’s own systems and experienceOperator’s own systems and experience PPTS data collection and analysisPPTS data collection and analysis OPS OPS (data, audits/inspections and enforcement (data, audits/inspections and enforcement

actions)actions) Meetings/conferences Meetings/conferences (OPS, API, AOPL, ASME, PRCI)(OPS, API, AOPL, ASME, PRCI) R&D R&D (company, OPS, PRCI)(company, OPS, PRCI) Standards work Standards work (1110, 1160, 1163, and more)(1110, 1160, 1163, and more) NTSB reports and accident investigationsNTSB reports and accident investigations OPS/EPA/DOJ investigations/consent decreesOPS/EPA/DOJ investigations/consent decrees

2424

Step ChangesStep ChangesProcessProcess Institutionalizing risk-based approachesInstitutionalizing risk-based approaches Institutionalizing data integrationInstitutionalizing data integration Institutionalizing knowledge sharingInstitutionalizing knowledge sharingOperationalOperational More (lots more) miles assessedMore (lots more) miles assessed Standardization of dig criteriaStandardization of dig criteria Application of data lessonsApplication of data lessonsInformation SharingInformation Sharing Operator cooperation and workshopsOperator cooperation and workshops IMP data work (in progress)IMP data work (in progress)

Risk-based

Data Lessons

Practice Sharing

Data Integration

StandardizationMiles Assessed

Knowledge Sharing

2525





2626

Onshore Pipe Incidents, 1999-Onshore Pipe Incidents, 1999-20032003

All Sizes 50 Barrels or More Number of Incidents ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03

Corrosion 132 130 135 110 59 15 20 17 14 13 Equipment/ non-pipe 33 43 26 25 25 1 5 4 1 4 Operator error/ incorrect oper’n 19 12 16 7 9 2 1 4 3 2 Pipe material/ seam/ weld 31 30 16 13 9 6 7 2 4 5 Third party damage (curr./ past)

35 47 39 30 19 25 29 18 15 11

Rest of Causes 19 17 22 11 11 7 4 3 1 1

Total 269 279 254 196 132 56 66 48 38 36

2727





2828

Lessons: CorrosionLessons: CorrosionObservationsObservations Dropped by over 50% Dropped by over 50% in 5 yearsin 5 years Vast majority are small and Vast majority are small and

getting smallergetting smaller Very little public safety impacts Very little public safety impacts LessonsLessons Tools find corrosion; mature tech.Tools find corrosion; mature tech. Manageable and predictable; risks Manageable and predictable; risks

from corrosion are being reducedfrom corrosion are being reduced Returns on MFL technology will Returns on MFL technology will

diminish related to detecting diminish related to detecting corrosioncorrosion

0102030405060708090

'99 '00 '01 '02 '03Nu

mbe

r of I

ncid

ents

<5 Bbls 5-49 Bbls 50+ Bbls

2929





3030

Lessons: Third Party Lessons: Third Party DamageDamage

ObservationsObservations Incidents >50 bbls have Incidents >50 bbls have dropped dropped

by ~50% by ~50% in 5 yearsin 5 years Public safety impacts are greatestPublic safety impacts are greatest ILI tools do not address preventionILI tools do not address preventionLessonsLessons Assessing line condition is only Assessing line condition is only

part of the answerpart of the answer Understanding where to look for Understanding where to look for

threats is importantthreats is important Greatest potentials for Greatest potentials for

improvement …improvement …

(Current and past damage)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

'99 '00 '01 '02 '03Nu

mbe

r of I

ncid

ents


3131

Example: Example: Frequency of ROW PatrolFrequency of ROW Patrol

Prevention strategyPrevention strategy: : Increased frequency of Increased frequency of ROW ground patrol ROW ground patrol (1997)(1997)

ResultResult: ILI indications of : ILI indications of top side deformations top side deformations fell from 22 in 1997 to fell from 22 in 1997 to 4 in 2004 4 in 2004

0

5

10

15

20

25

1997 2004

ILI Data IndicationsTop Side Deformations

3232

Example:Example:Centralized “One Call” Centralized “One Call”

SystemSystem Assists Operator in processing of:Assists Operator in processing of:

One call NoticesOne call Notices Direct call-insDirect call-ins Aerial reportsAerial reports

Benefits:Benefits: Positive response conformancePositive response conformance Standardize one call practicesStandardize one call practices Centralized one call ticket archivalCentralized one call ticket archival Optimization in one call processingOptimization in one call processing

3333

Centralized “One Call” Centralized “One Call” SystemSystem

3434



Corrosion 132 130 135 110 59 Equipment/ non-pipe failures 33 43 26 25 25 Operator error/ incorrect oper’n 19 12 16 7 9 Pipe material/ seam/ weld 31 30 16 13 9 Third party damage (curr./ past) 35 47 39 30 19 Rest of Causes 19 17 22 11 11 Total 269 279 254 196 132


3535

Lessons: Equipment/Non-Lessons: Equipment/Non-PipePipe

ObservationsObservations ILI does not address this type ILI does not address this type

of failure (valves, valve seats, of failure (valves, valve seats, traps)traps)

Data and industry focus on Data and industry focus on small spills has paid offsmall spills has paid off

LessonsLessons Incident investigation in Incident investigation in

addition to data and analysisaddition to data and analysis 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

'99 '00 '01 '02 '03Nu

mbe

r of I

ncid

ents


3636





3737

Lessons: Lessons: Material/Seam/WeldMaterial/Seam/Weld

ObservationsObservations ERW seam failure has been ERW seam failure has been

successfully addressedsuccessfully addressed Types and availability of crack Types and availability of crack

tools expandingtools expanding

LessonsLessons Crack tools are still in “proof Crack tools are still in “proof

of concept” phaseof concept” phase Pipe body, seams, welds can Pipe body, seams, welds can

be managed effectivelybe managed effectively0

5

10

15

20

25

'99 '00 '01 '02 '03Nu

mbe

r of I

ncid

ents


3838

ExampleExample

8.625” x 0.203” 5LX X52 8.625” x 0.203” 5LX X52 seamlessseamless

Deformation & Hi Res Deformation & Hi Res MFL indicated no defectMFL indicated no defect

Hydro to test seams in Hydro to test seams in adjacent ERWadjacent ERW

Seamless pipe failed at Seamless pipe failed at 1830 PSI1830 PSI

Investigation indicated Investigation indicated re-rounded re-rounded construction-era dent construction-era dent w/ stress concentratorw/ stress concentrator

Dent & metal loss Dent & metal loss dimensions were below dimensions were below threshold for ILI toolsthreshold for ILI tools

Lesson: Lesson: There may be times when hydro is There may be times when hydro is more appropriate to the risk than ILI.more appropriate to the risk than ILI.

3939

Onshore Pipe Incidents of 5 Onshore Pipe Incidents of 5 Barrels or More, by Cause, Barrels or More, by Cause,

1999-20031999-2003Number of Incidents 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Corrosion minus SCC 48 56 55 51 23 Stress Corrosion Cracking 2 2 1 0 2 Pipe material/ seam/ weld 11 14 7 5 6 Remaining Causes 56 63 55 39 31 Total 117 135 118 95 62

Incidents involving a release of 5 barrels or more (or a death, injury, fire or explosion)that occurred on “Onshore Pipelines, including valve sites” reported to Pipeline Performance Tracking System. Stress Corrosion Cracking detail is not available for smaller releases.

4040

Lesson: SCCLesson: SCCObservationsObservations SCC industry-wide knowledge has now SCC industry-wide knowledge has now

been aggregated and sharedbeen aggregated and shared SCC awareness has been raisedSCC awareness has been raised R&D now a priorityR&D now a priorityLessonsLessons Don’t over-react to “emerging” integrity Don’t over-react to “emerging” integrity

issuesissues Don’t under-react to “emerging” integrity Don’t under-react to “emerging” integrity

issuesissues

4141



Corrosion 132 130 135 110 59 Equipment/ non-pipe 33 43 26 25 25 Operator error/ incorrect operation 19 12 16 7 9 Pipe material/ seam/ weld 31 30 16 13 9 Third party damage (curr./ past) 35 47 39 30 19 Rest of Causes 19 17 22 11 11 Total 269 279 254 196 132


4242

Lessons: Lessons: Operator/OperationOperator/Operation

ObservationsObservations People People ANDAND procedures procedures

LessonsLessons Don't assume improper Don't assume improper

trainingtraining Incident investigation in Incident investigation in

addition to data and analysisaddition to data and analysis0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

'99 '00 '01 '02 '03Nu

mbe

r of I

ncid

ents


4343


Risk-based

Data Lessons

Practice sharing

Data integration

StandardizationMiles assessed

Knowledge sharing

4444

Data Integration – A Giant Data Integration – A Giant StepStep

Identifying conditions that cannot be Identifying conditions that cannot be identified from a single data set.identified from a single data set.

This concept is now engrained in This concept is now engrained in pipeline integrity managementpipeline integrity management ILI Data AnalysisILI Data Analysis Risk Assessment Risk Assessment Direct Assessment (ECDA, ICDA, SCC)Direct Assessment (ECDA, ICDA, SCC)

Driving integrity-related IT Driving integrity-related IT advancementsadvancements

4545

4646

4747

4848

Organizational Changes to Organizational Changes to Support IMP – Support IMP – Before:Before:

Operating division resources responsible for Operating division resources responsible for pipeline integrity pipeline integrity (NACE-certified Corrosion (NACE-certified Corrosion Specialist, reliability engineers, corrosion Specialist, reliability engineers, corrosion technicians, inspectors, etc.)technicians, inspectors, etc.)

Efforts led by Division IM Leader reporting to Efforts led by Division IM Leader reporting to Division Operations VP.Division Operations VP.

For the most part, division resources For the most part, division resources operated independently.operated independently.

Corporate support resources from parent Corporate support resources from parent company provided integrity-related capacity company provided integrity-related capacity and some coordination efforts.and some coordination efforts.

4949

Organizational Changes to Organizational Changes to Support IMP – Support IMP – Today:Today:

Division support organization Division support organization (IM expertise & (IM expertise & superior local knowledge).superior local knowledge). Fosters asset-specific Fosters asset-specific knowledge sharing & accountability.knowledge sharing & accountability.

Corporate support team reassigned to Corporate support team reassigned to pipeline operations group.pipeline operations group.

Coordinated by corporate IM Capability Coordinated by corporate IM Capability Leader reporting to VP of Pipeline Support.Leader reporting to VP of Pipeline Support.

Technical teams – subject matter Technical teams – subject matter development, improvement, assessment development, improvement, assessment and results. Representatives from each and results. Representatives from each division and corporate.division and corporate.

5050

Work Flow DiagramWork Flow DiagramProcessing Vendor ILI Reports

ILI Vendor Revise Draft ILI Report Issue RevisedDraft ILI Report Issue Final Report

Confirm Tool's Operational Performance

Legal Dept. Receive Final Report

Verify values, equations, andcriteria used by vendor

Verify calcuations performed by vendor

Senior Engineer

Can issues be rectifed with vendor?

Rectify issues with vendor and request revised Draft ILI Report

Receive revisedDraft ILI Report

Notify vendor that Draft ILI has been accepted

Immediate Condtions Identified?

Perform prelim validation of anomaly calls Validation digs identified? Draft ILI Report Accepted?

Create Company ILI Report: 1. Identify Conditions (Immed, 60, 180, Other). 2. Identify if in HCA. 3. Identify if previously dug.

Review recommended digs, dismissals, and

engineering analyses

Post Preliminary ResponsePlan and Notify Integrity

Assessment Team

Prepare for IAT Meeting

Complete "Dismiss" documentation or

receive from assigned party

TP-600/700feedback from excavation and

direct examination

Integrity EngineerDetermine appropriate response(excav, eng analysis, dismiss) Prepare Dig Packages Review validation dig findings

Rectify issues with vendor and request revised Final Report Can issues be rectified?

Receive Final Report Final Report Accepted?

Init iate pressure reductionsand/or shutdown

IntegrityAssessment

TeamMeeting

Assign responsiblities for documentation of dismissal

justificationAssess level of risk associatedwith missing or inadequate data Level of risk acceptable? Document justification for

conclusion

Integrity Assmt Team Review amd Approve Immediate Conditions

Assign responsibilities for Immed Conditions requiring Engineering

Analysis

Review and approveILI Response PlanRe-run ILI tool

(TP-200)

Assign responsiblities for documentation of dismissal

justification

Assign responsibilities for Immed Conditions requiring

Engineering Analysis

Construction Supervisor Prepare Dig PackagesReview recommended digs,

dismissals, and engineering analyses


GISReview recommended digs,



Program Admin. Make OPS Notificationif Necessary


engineering analysesPrepare for IAT Meeting Track

Pipeline Inspector & Excavation Crew Excavate TP-600 Submit Documentation

TP-600

CorrosionSupervisor


engineering analysesPrepare for IAT Meeting

RiskReview recommended digs,



Director, Corrosion & Maintenance


engineering analysesPrepare for IAT Meeting

Manager, Project Eng. Reduce pressure or shutdownTP-XX

N

N Y Y

NY

N Y

N

Y

Y

Excavate, Eng Analysis,

or Dismiss?

N

Y

Analysis

Dismiss

Excavate

N

Excavate,Eng Analysis, or Dismiss?

Analysis

Dismiss

25 26

28

2929

29

29

30

28

31, 32

30

33 33 3534

37 38

40

36

36

39

42

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43

49

50

51

55

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ILI VendorLegalSenior Eng.Integrity Eng.Integ. Assess. TeamConst. SupervisorGISProgram Admin.Pipeline InspectionCorrosionRiskDir., Corr. & Maint.Mgr., Proj. Eng.

ILI VendorILI Vendor

Integrity Eng.Integrity Eng.

5151

Corrosion

Pipeline Data

RiskMapping

SME’s, Data OwnersManagement, Engineering, OperationsView, Analyze, ConfigureView

GIS

Integrity Mgmt RDBMS

ILI Data Repairs

Integrity Data IntegrationIntegrity Data Integration

5252

Tapping Organizational Tapping Organizational Knowledge:Knowledge:

Never Learn It Never Learn It TWICETWICE Shared electronic tracking and Shared electronic tracking and

documentationdocumentation Photo documentationPhoto documentation Cross-functional Steering TeamCross-functional Steering Team Internal ConferencesInternal Conferences

Repair ConferenceRepair Conference Safety SummitSafety Summit

External ConferencesExternal Conferences

5353

050

100150200250300

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1020304050

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101520

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5454

Line Pipe Accidents byLine Pipe Accidents byCause Category Cause Category (1999-2003)(1999-2003)

Corrosion accidents Corrosion accidents downdown 33rdrd party damage accidents party damage accidents downdown Equipment/non-pipe accidents Equipment/non-pipe accidents downdown Pipe material/seam failures Pipe material/seam failures downdown Operator/operational error Operator/operational error downdown

Focus on line pipe is a focus on where the Focus on line pipe is a focus on where the public and public safety impacts arepublic and public safety impacts are

5555

5656

ChallengesChallenges

API/AOPL Pipeline Industry API/AOPL Pipeline Industry PanelPanel

5757

IMP Will Continue to be a IMP Will Continue to be a Success StorySuccess Story

Operators are committed to Operators are committed to risk-basedrisk-based approachapproach

Operators are committed to Operators are committed to zero incidents zero incidents and to continuing improvementand to continuing improvement

Technology will continue to evolve and there Technology will continue to evolve and there will continue to be limitations will continue to be limitations

Technology and IMP rules must be applied in Technology and IMP rules must be applied in the real worldthe real world

Greatest additional improvements may still lie Greatest additional improvements may still lie in in integrating and understandingintegrating and understanding information information

5858


Risk-based

Data Lessons

Practice sharing

Data integration

StandardizationMiles assessed

Knowledge sharing

5959

Challenge: Enforcement and Challenge: Enforcement and ComplianceCompliance

Observations: Observations: ProcessProcess Performance rule migrating toward Performance rule migrating toward

prescriptive; impact of protocolsprescriptive; impact of protocols Over-emphasis on inspection and testingOver-emphasis on inspection and testing Over-emphasis on HCA identification; Over-emphasis on HCA identification;

reinvention of oil spill planning detailreinvention of oil spill planning detailNeed: Need: DialogDialog

6060

Challenge: Enforcement Challenge: Enforcement and Complianceand Compliance

Observations: Observations: OperationalOperational Lack of inspection focus on “critical path” Lack of inspection focus on “critical path” Corrosion based understanding is not Corrosion based understanding is not

sufficientsufficient Company overall performance not part of Company overall performance not part of

enforcement view enforcement view

Need: Need: DialogDialog

6161

Challenge: Enforcement Challenge: Enforcement and Complianceand Compliance

Observations: Observations: Information SharingInformation Sharing Lack of opportunities for honest and open Lack of opportunities for honest and open

discussions about what works and what discussions about what works and what doesn’tdoesn’t

Second round of comprehensives feels like Second round of comprehensives feels like starting overstarting over

Most knowledgeable inspectors seem to be Most knowledgeable inspectors seem to be moving to enforcement of natural gas rulemoving to enforcement of natural gas rule

Need: Need: DialogDialog

6262

Request:Request:The hazardous liquid industry would The hazardous liquid industry would

like to sit down with OPS like to sit down with OPS headquarters, OPS regions, and OPS headquarters, OPS regions, and OPS

contractor for open exchange of contractor for open exchange of concerns and suggestions related to concerns and suggestions related to

inspection and enforcement.inspection and enforcement.

We need to listen to each other!!We need to listen to each other!!

6363

Challenge: Plain DentsChallenge: Plain DentsObservationsObservations Current rule repair criteria are unsupported Current rule repair criteria are unsupported

technicallytechnically Remediating some dents may do more harm than Remediating some dents may do more harm than

good depending on service, metallurgy, D/t ratiosgood depending on service, metallurgy, D/t ratios

NeedsNeeds Better methods for evaluating deformations and Better methods for evaluating deformations and

separating injurious from stable/non-injuriousseparating injurious from stable/non-injurious Flexibility from OPS in application of the rule to Flexibility from OPS in application of the rule to

some dent situations some dent situations

6464

Example: What is a Dent?Example: What is a Dent?SHARP A reduction span not exceeding 50% of one pipe diameter and containied mainly to one side of the pipe. FLAT

A reduction span that exceeds the sharp specification and is contained mainly to one side of the pipe with little or no ovality present.

This figure depicts the local reported by the vendor. The local is the change in the pipe radius minus the ovality. The ovality is determined by the amount the pipe radius increases 90 degrees from the deformation.

LOCAL =Depth-Ovality

“Sharp”“Flat”

Ovality

6565

Example: What is a Dent?Example: What is a Dent? No industry method on calculating No industry method on calculating

when a deformation is injurious (i.e., when a deformation is injurious (i.e., RSTRENG)RSTRENG)

Little correlation between depth of a Little correlation between depth of a dent and the damage to the pipedent and the damage to the pipe

Deformation may reround when Deformation may reround when excavated and residual dent depth is excavated and residual dent depth is affected by the line pressure at the affected by the line pressure at the time of measurementtime of measurement

6666

Example: Determining Example: Determining Injuriousness of DentsInjuriousness of Dents

Field Bends Identified as DentsField Bends Identified as Dents Multiple dent-like indications later Multiple dent-like indications later

determined to be field bendsdetermined to be field bends Smooth dents in low stress pipelinesSmooth dents in low stress pipelines

No technical basis for repair No technical basis for repair

6767


Examples of dent indication that turned out to be a field bend!

6868


Hydrotest immediately followed by Hydrotest immediately followed by caliper caliper ‘‘Actionable’ dents identified which Actionable’ dents identified which

survived Subpart E hydrotestsurvived Subpart E hydrotest Repair and/or pressure reduction versus Repair and/or pressure reduction versus

operating pressure hard to justify - dent operating pressure hard to justify - dent survived higher test pressuresurvived higher test pressure

6969


Examples of dents that survived Subpart E Hydrotest

7070

Challenge: Analysis of ILI Challenge: Analysis of ILI DataData

ObservationsObservations Equivalency of data and analysis vendor to Equivalency of data and analysis vendor to

vendor is not good enough vendor is not good enough (many formats, (many formats, different integration requirements)different integration requirements)

NeedsNeeds More standards setting for quality of ILI data More standards setting for quality of ILI data

and analytical methodsand analytical methods Better understanding of what tools can and Better understanding of what tools can and

cannot accomplish (inspectors and operators)cannot accomplish (inspectors and operators)

7171

Operator #1 ran early generation Hi-Res MFL Operator #1 ran early generation Hi-Res MFL in 1998in 1998

Same section experienced two corrosion leaks Same section experienced two corrosion leaks in two weeks in late 2003in two weeks in late 2003

Operator #2 ran new MFL tool from same Operator #2 ran new MFL tool from same vendorvendor

No consistent correlation between reportsNo consistent correlation between reports 1998 data could not be re-evaluated because 1998 data could not be re-evaluated because

vendor no longer supported the software.vendor no longer supported the software.

Operator #1 ran early generation Hi-Res MFL Operator #1 ran early generation Hi-Res MFL in 1998in 1998

Same section experienced two corrosion leaks Same section experienced two corrosion leaks in two weeks in late 2003in two weeks in late 2003

Operator #2 ran new MFL tool from same Operator #2 ran new MFL tool from same vendorvendor

No consistent correlation between reportsNo consistent correlation between reports 1998 data could not be re-evaluated because 1998 data could not be re-evaluated because

vendor no longer supported the software.vendor no longer supported the software.

Example: ILI ChallengeExample: ILI Challenge

7272

Challenge: Challenge: Applying IMP to FacilitiesApplying IMP to Facilities

ObservationsObservations Risk to the public is low: 90% remain on co. Risk to the public is low: 90% remain on co.

propertyproperty Already being addressed without enforcement focusAlready being addressed without enforcement focusNeedsNeeds Data-based recommendations for IM (underway)Data-based recommendations for IM (underway) Discussion/dialog between operators and inspectors Discussion/dialog between operators and inspectors

before compliance audits specific to facilitiesbefore compliance audits specific to facilities

7373

Facilities Piping and Facilities Piping and Equipment: High Numbers, Equipment: High Numbers,

Low ConsequencesLow Consequences Account for 52% of PPTS releases Account for 52% of PPTS releases Generally small: 76% <5 barrels Generally small: 76% <5 barrels DIVERSE: 56% caused by failure of DIVERSE: 56% caused by failure of

equipment or non-pipe componentequipment or non-pipe component

5-49 bbls5-49 bbls

<5 bbls 76%<5 bbls 76%

By SizeBy SizeRangeRange

50+ bbls50+ bbls

Oper. Err.Oper. Err.

By CauseBy CauseAll OtherAll OtherCorr.Corr. Equip/Equip/

Non-PipeNon-Pipe 56%56%

7474

Challenge: EFRDsChallenge: EFRDsObservationsObservations EFRDs only potentially impact large spillsEFRDs only potentially impact large spills EFRDs do not contribute to preventionEFRDs do not contribute to prevention EFRDs amount to another “hole” in the EFRDs amount to another “hole” in the

pipe and thus add as well as reduce risk pipe and thus add as well as reduce risk overalloverall

Value of EFRD is site specificValue of EFRD is site specific

EFRDs only potentially impact large spillsEFRDs only potentially impact large spills EFRDs do not contribute to preventionEFRDs do not contribute to prevention EFRDs amount to another “hole” in the EFRDs amount to another “hole” in the

pipe and thus add as well as reduce risk pipe and thus add as well as reduce risk overalloverall

Value of EFRD is site specificValue of EFRD is site specific

7575

Onshore Pipe Incidents, 2003Onshore Pipe Incidents, 2003Number of Incidents

All Sizes 50

Barrels or More

500 Barrels or More

Corrosion 59 13 3 Equipment/ non-pipe 25 4 2 Operator error/ incorrect oper’n 9 2 1 Pipe material/ seam/ weld 9 5 3 Third party damage (curr./ past) 19 11 4 Rest of Causes 11 1 0 Total 132 36 13

7676

Challenge: EFRDsChallenge: EFRDsObservationsObservations EFRDs only potentially impact large spillsEFRDs only potentially impact large spills EFRDs do not contribute to preventionEFRDs do not contribute to prevention EFRDs amount to another “hole” in the pipe and EFRDs amount to another “hole” in the pipe and

thus add as well as reduce risk overallthus add as well as reduce risk overall Value of EFRD is site specificValue of EFRD is site specificNeedsNeeds Simplified analysis that is sufficientSimplified analysis that is sufficient Reasonable expectations for EFRDs Reasonable expectations for EFRDs (installation, (installation,

capability to reduce spills size, and document)capability to reduce spills size, and document)

NeedsNeeds Simplified analysis that is sufficientSimplified analysis that is sufficient Reasonable expectations for EFRDs Reasonable expectations for EFRDs (installation, (installation,

capability to reduce spills size, and document)capability to reduce spills size, and document)

7777

Challenge: Preventive and Challenge: Preventive and Mitigative ActionsMitigative Actions

ObservationsObservations Operators have never done just the minimum; so Operators have never done just the minimum; so

existing actions may be enoughexisting actions may be enough Existing actions have resulted in the long term trend Existing actions have resulted in the long term trend

in accident reductionsin accident reductionsNeedsNeeds Reasonable expectations based on an already Reasonable expectations based on an already

improving record industry-wideimproving record industry-wide Don’t go overboard on evaluation or documentation; Don’t go overboard on evaluation or documentation;

let the operator’s performance be a significant let the operator’s performance be a significant portion of the documentation.portion of the documentation.

7878

Challenge: Challenge: Continuing ImprovementContinuing Improvement

ObservationsObservations PPTS and analytical capability in placePPTS and analytical capability in place Trends currently in the right directionTrends currently in the right directionNeedsNeeds Fight complacencyFight complacency Exploit data and informationExploit data and information Encourage experimentation and innovationEncourage experimentation and innovation

7979

What do we do?What do we do?We transport We transport flammableflammable, hazardous, , hazardous, usefuluseful

products to customers under strict products to customers under strict federal and state requirements through federal and state requirements through townstowns, cities, , cities, neighborhoodsneighborhoods, and cross , and cross

country where country where peoplepeople live, work and play. live, work and play.

We MUST do it safely and reliably.We MUST do it safely and reliably.

8080

Our vision is an oil pipeline Our vision is an oil pipeline industry thatindustry that -- -- conducts operations safely and with conducts operations safely and with

respect for the environment;respect for the environment; respects the privilege to operate respects the privilege to operate

granted to it by the public; andgranted to it by the public; and provides reliable transportation of the provides reliable transportation of the

crude oil and refined products upon crude oil and refined products upon which America and all Americans rely.which America and all Americans rely.

8181

1990-2004

50

100

150

200

25090 92 94 96 98

2000

2002

2004

Ann

l 000

Bar

rels

0

50

100

150

200

250

Ann

l Num

ber

Volume Number

Oil Pipeline Spill Oil Pipeline Spill PerformancePerformance

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Integrity Management: Lessons Learned, Challenges

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