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PhilosophicalFoundationsofCriminalLawR.A.DuffandStuartGreen

Printpublicationdate:2011PrintISBN-13:9780199559152PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:May2011DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.001.0001

IntentionasaMarkerofMoralCulpabilityandLegalPunishabilityMichaelSMoore(ContributorWebpage)

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.003.0009

AbstractandKeywords

Thischapterexaminestherolethatintentionplaysindefiningthemostseriousformsofcriminality.Itarguesthatthecriminallawasitnowexistspresupposeswhatisessentiallyafolkpsychologyofintention,andproposesasanalternativeamorenuancedandcomplexconceptionofintentionthatwouldtakeintoaccountrecentdevelopmentsinphilosophyofmind,cognitivescience,andmoralpsychology.

Keywords:criminallaw,intentions,criminality,moralresponsibility,folkpsychology

1THEROLESOFINTENTIONINASSESSINGRESPONSIBILITYINLAWANDMORALSTheconceptofanintentionservesfourimportantfunctionsintheattributionofbothmoralresponsibilityandlegalliabilityinthelawoftortsandofcrimes.Thefirstoftheseisasamarker(arguablythemarker)ofseriousculpabilityinthedoing(p.180) ofwrongfulactions.Asthelawsofbothcrimesandoftortsrecognize,doingsomewrongfulaction

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becauseoneintendedtodoitmeritsgreaterblameandmoreseveresanctionsthandoesdoingthatsamewrongfulactionrecklesslyornegligently.Thisimplicationofintentionforresponsibilityislearnedearlyonbychildren,whoframeseriousaccusationsofothersintermsoftheirdoingthingsonpurpose.AsJusticeHolmesfamouslyputit,evenadogknowsthedifferencebetweenbeingstumbledoverandbeingkicked.1Criminallawshareswithdogsandchildrenthisemphasisonintentionasessentialtoseriousblame.AstheUSSupremeCourtonceputit:Thecontentionthataninjurycanamounttoacrimeonlywheninflictedbyintentionisnoprovincialortransientnotion.Itisuniversalandpersistentinmaturesystemsoflaw[and]isalmostasinstinctiveasthechild'sfamiliarexculpatory,ButIdidn'tmeanto2

Thesecondofthesefunctionsdealswithwrongdoing,notculpability.Morespecifically,intentionplaysaroleinjustificationofotherwisewrongfulbehaviour.Itthusdealswithpermissibilityinthisrole,notculpability.Intentioniscommonlythoughttomarktheborderofpermissibleconsequentialistjustificationforotherwisecategoricallyforbiddenactions.ThisisthewellknownDoctrineofDoubleEffect,accordingtowhichgoodconsequencesmaybeusedtojustifythedoingofsomewrongsuchaskillingoftheinnocentsolongassuchkillingswereasideeffectorby-productoftheactor'schainofreasons;butifthekillingwasintended,eitherasanendorasameans,thosesamegoodconsequencesareineligibletobeusedtojustifysuchactions.3

Third,intentioniscommonlythoughttobeattherootofhumanagency.Thisistheideathattheverypossibilityofpersonsdoingactionsdependsonpersonshavingintentions.Theoldwayofputtingthiswastosaythateveryactionmustbeintentionalundersomedescriptionofit.Amoremodernrenditionistosaythateveryactionbeginswithanintention,inthesensethatintentionsmustbetheimmediatecauseofthosebodilymovementsthroughwhichpersonsact,forthosemovementstobeactionsatall.4

Fourth,intentionsarecruciallyinvolvedintheexerciseofnormativepowersbypersons.Anormativepowerisanabilitytochangethecontentofourrightsandresponsibilities.5WhenIpromisetodosomeactionA,forexample,itiscommonly(p.181) thoughtthatIhavechangedmyobligations:nowIamobligatedtodoA,whereasbeforemypromiseIwasfreenottodoA.Ihavevoluntarilycreatedsomethingthatwasnottherebefore,andmyabilitytodothisisapower.Intentionisboundupwithnormativepowersbecausethevalidexerciseofanormativepowerdepends,atleastinpart,ontheintentionoftheholderofthepower.Tocontinuetheexampleofpromising,utterancesthataccidentallyhavetheformofapromisedonothavetheforceofapromise:theutterermustintendtopromise.6Asthecontractlawyerssay,thereisnobindingpromiseifthereisanintentnottobebound.7Inthecontextofresponsibilityassessmentsfornon-promissoryobligations,thispowers-markingroleofintentionsappearsintheguiseofconsent.Whenavictimconsentstobetouchedbyanother,thewrongnessoftouchingevaporates.AsHeidiHurdcolourfullyputsit,thisisthemoralmagicofconsent:itchangesrapeintolove-making,batteryintosport,trespassintolicence,andslaveryintomarriage.8Butconsentdoesthis,asHurdalsoshows,9onlybyvirtueoftheintentoftheonewhoconsents.

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Interestingasareallfouroftheserolesofintentionvis--visresponsibility,Ishallfocusinthischapteronlyonthefirst,theuseofintentiontomarkseriousculpability.Toassessintention'sroleheremorepreciselyrequiresfirstthatwestepbacktosomemoregeneralconsiderationsabouttherelationsofresponsibilitytoculpability,whichIshallpursueinthenextsection.

2RESPONSIBILITY,CULPABILITY,ANDINTENTIONSWhenwesaythatintentionmarksmostseriousculpability,whatexactlyarewesaying?Wecouldbesayingthatdoinganactionintentionallyratherthannegligentlyincreasesoverallblameworthiness.Whilethisistrue,itdoesn'tcapturewhereintentionfitsintothecriteriabywhichweparceloutpraiseandblame.Toisolatemorepreciselytheroleofintentionhererequiresthatwedistinguishculpabilityfromresponsibility,whichInowproposetodo,startingfirstwiththemoregeneralnotion,thatofresponsibility.

Togetstartedwithresponsibility,considerthecartoonbelow.10(p.182)

Asthecartoonillustrates,responsibilityhasseveralusagesinidiomaticEnglish.Onecanhavecertainresponsibilities,inthesensethatonehascertainobligations;onecanberesponsibleinthesensethatonegenerallytakescareofhisobligations;onecanbearesponsibleadult,inthesensethatonehasthecapacities(rationalityandautonomy)tobeheldresponsibleforfailureindoingwhatoneisobligatedtodo.11Thesensepertinenthereisnoneofthese,however.Therelevantsenseisthatofbeingresponsibleforsomeharmorsomeotherunhappystateofaffairs.

Evenrestrictedtoresponsibilityforsomeharm,therearesomefurtherdistinctionstobedrawn.Wemightsay,thestormwasresponsibleforthelossoflife,andwemightsay,theshipownerwasheldresponsibleintortdamagesforthelossoflife.12Puttingasideprimitiveanimism,stormsarenotmorallyresponsibleforanything;allthatismeanthereisthatthestormwasacause(orthecause)ofthelossoflife.Likewise,theshipowner'sresponsibilityisbetterphrasedaslegalliability.Aliabilityis(inHohfeld'swell-knownlogic)

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theabsenceofanyimmunity.13Weneedasenseofresponsibilityforharmthatisdifferentfromeitherofthese.Whatwewanttoisolateisasenseofresponsibilitythatinajustlegalsystemgrounds(justifies)legalliabilityincriminallawandperhapsintorts;andasensethatisinturnpartlygrounded,butnotconstitutedby,causalresponsibility.Responsibilityinthesenserelevanthereisakindofliability,buttheliabilityistoamoral,notalegal,sanction:toberesponsibleforaharmistobemorallyblameworthyforthatharm.Theharm,(p.183) inotherwords,goesonone'smoralledger;inagoodnovel,orinStPeter'sreckoningattheGates,itshowsupasademerit.

Noticethattosaythisdoesnottellusanythingaboutwhensomeoneisresponsibleforsomeharm;itonlygivesalogicalconsequenceoftheirbeingsoresponsible,viztheyareblameworthyforit.Tosaywhensomeoneisblameworthyistohaveatheoryofresponsibility.ThedominanttheoryunderlyingAnglo-Americancriminallawisthisone.ApersonPisresponsibleforsomeharmHifandonlyif:14

A.Pisamoralagent,meaningthathehasthecapacities(ofrationality,autonomy,emotionality)thatanimals,theinsane,theveryyoung,andtheveryintoxicatedlack;andB.Pisguiltyofwrongdoing,meaningthat:

1.PperformedsomevoluntaryactionA;and2.A(infactandproximately)causedH;and3.CausingHisprimafacieprohibitedbyoneofmorality'sstringentprohibitions;and4.TherearenofeaturesofAcausingHthatdistinguishitfromrun-of-themillcasesofAcausingHandthatcouldjustifythecausingofHonthisoccasion(iePhadnoagent-relativepermissionorconsequentialistjustificationforviolatinghisprimafacieobligation);and

C.Pwasculpableinhiswrongdoing,meaningthat:1.PwasmotivatedbyanintentiontocauseH(alternatively:PbelievedAwouldcauseHwithsomedegreeoflikelihood,orPshouldhavesobelieved);and2.P'sintentionorpredictivebeliefin(1)wasformedincircumstanceswherehehadbothadequatecapacityandafairopportunitytousehiscapacities,nottodoA(iePhadnoexcuse).

Whenlegaltheoristsspeakoftherelationshipbetweenpunishmentandresponsibility,itisthissenseofresponsibilitythattheyhaveinmind.Turningnowtoculpability,thewordisoftenusedasasynonymforresponsibilityinthesensejustarticulated,vizmoralblameworthiness.Tobeculpable,inthissense,justistobeblameworthy.Moreusefulforourpurposesistodistinguishtwolessinclusivesenses,sensesthatcorrespondtothecriminallawtheoristsdistinctionsbetweenspecialandgeneralmensrea(guiltymind).15

ApersonPisculpable(inthespecialsenseoftheword)withrespecttohavingwronglycausedsomeparticularharmhwhen:

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1.PeitherintendssometypeofharmHtobecausedbyP'sactionA,orPbelievesthatHwillbesocaused,orPwouldbelievethisifhewerereasonable;and(p.184)2.theparticularharmhthatPhascausedisaninstanceofthetypeofharmHthatPintended;orhisaninstanceofthetypeofharmHthatPforesaw;orhisaninstanceofthetypeofharmHtheriskofwhichmadePnegligentonthisoccasion.16

Itisinthissenseofculpabilitythatcriminallawyersintendwhentheyspeakoftheculpabilityrequirementsofthecriminallaw,orwhentheysay,Pdidthewrongthingbuthehasnoculpability.17

Oneisculpableinthegeneralsensewhenconditionsofpossibleexcusearetakenintoaccount.Diminishedcapacitytoexercisesoundjudgment(byanagentgenerallypossessingsuchcapacitiesnoidiots,stones,mentallyill,orinfantsallowed)canarisebyvirtueofhumanthreats,naturalnecessities,overwhelmingemotionsoffear,anger,orhatred,thecravingsofaddiction,andthelike.Evenwhentheproverbialcoolhandhasnodiminishedcapacities,circumstancesmaybesuchthathehasnofairopportunitytoexercisehisundiminishedcapacities.18InanoldJackBennyskit,thehold-upmanthreatensBennywithyourmoney,oryourlife.Benny,playingonhisfamouscheapness,hesitates,saying,I'mthinking.WhenBennyhandsoverthemoneyhiscapacitiesarefine,onlyhedidnothavetheopportunitythattherestofushavetokeepbothhismoneyandhislife.Oneisculpableinthisgeneralsensewhereoneisculpableinthespecialsense(articulatedearlier)incircumstancesoffairopportunityandadequatecapacitytohavechosenotherwise.

Theroleofintentioninallofthisshouldbeplain.Intentionisamarkerofculpabilityinthespecialsensejustdistinguished.Moreover,intentionisatthetopofthescaleofculpabilityinthespecialsense:intendingtocausesomeharmHismoreculpablethanmerelyforeseeingthatsomeactAwillcauseH,orbeingwillingtoriskthatAwillcauseH.19Itisinthissensethatthefirstroleofintentionistobemorepreciselydefined.Itisinthiswaythatintentionisthemarkerofmostseriousculpability,anditisinthiswaythatintentionincreasesoverallblameworthiness(orresponsibility,inthesensedefined).

Intentionisofcoursenotaloneinitscapacitytoaffectoverallblameworthiness.Degreesofcausalcontribution,degreesofcounterfactualdependence,degreesofobjectiverisk,degreesofjustification,degreesofexcuse,degreesofmoralagency,alsohavethiscapacity.20Butintentionisaloneinthewayinwhichitaffectsoverall(p.185)blameworthiness:intentionaffectsculpabilityinthespecialsensejustdefinedandnoneoftheseotheritemsdo.

3ORDINARYANDLEGALCONCEPTSOFINTENTIONWhatareintentions?Anolderstyleofphilosophyofmindtranslatedsuchquestionsfromthematerialmodetowhatwascalledthelinguisticmode.Thequestionthenbecame,whatdowemeanbyourusagesoftheword,intention?.Despitetherefusalofcontemporaryphilosophytoequatethesetwomodes,askingafterthecommonconcept

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ofanintentionwillbeausefulplacetostart.21Findingthecriminallawtobeasinstructiveasordinaryspeech,Ishallinthissectionbrieflyminebothbodiesofdiscoursefortheirmeaning(s)ofintentandliketerms.

Givingthemeaningofatermusedinadiscretebodyofdiscourse(suchasordinaryspeechorthecriminallaw)isnotusuallyamatteroflocatingsomeauthoritativedefinition.Asempiricallinguisticsandordinarylanguagephilosophyareequallyfondofpointingout,givingsuchmeaningsisratheramatterofteasingouttheimplicitcontoursofsomeconceptfromthatconcept'susageinthewholebodyofdiscourse.Definitions(includingthoseprovidedinotherwiseauthoritativesourcessuchasdictionariesorpenalcodes)areonlysomeone'sfallible,contestabletheoryastotheshapeofthoseimplicitcontours.Whatfollowsisthusmyownreconstructionofthemeaningofintention,frombothordinaryandlegalusages,notingthedifferencebetweenthetwowhererelevant.

Itiscommontodistinguishusingintendandintentionasaverbornoun,ontheonehand,fromusingintentionalandintentionallyasanadjectiveoradverb.22Noticethedifferenceitmakesinscenarioslikethisone:23youandIareinsomegradeBAmericanWesternmovie(probablystarringRonaldReagan);wearecrouchedbehindsomerockssoastoavoiddetectionbythesavages,whoareallaroundus;arattlesnakeisnexttous,coiledtostrike,andI(knowingthatthesoundwillrevealourlocation)shootthesnakedeadsothatitdoesnotstrikeus.Ididnot,inordinary(p.186) speech,intend(verb)toalerttheIndians;norwastheintention(noun)withwhichIshottoalerttheIndians.Still,IdidalerttheIndianswithmyshot,asIknewIwould:didIalerttheIndiansintentionally(adverb),orunintentionally,orneither?WasmyactofalertingtheIndiansintentional(adjective),unintentional,orneither?

Ordinaryusageisdeterminateabouttheverb/nounmeaning:tohaveapredictivebeliefisnottohaveanintentionandtosobelieveisnottosointend.Ordinaryusageisindeterminateabouttheadverb/adjectivemeaning:foreseenconsequencesarenotcomfortablyregardedasintentionalorunintentional.24

Sometimesthequestionofintentionalityarises,notwithrespecttotheconsequencesofouractions(suchasalertingtheIndians),butwithrespecttocircumstances.25SupposeIshootandkillBill,asIintended;ifBillisapoliceofficer,didIintendtokillapoliceofficer?DoestheanswerchangeifIknewBillwasapoliceofficer?OrmustIbemotivatedbythatfact,asIwouldbeifIwereinacop-killingcontest,forexample?Ordinarylanguagehereisalsoindeterminate,evenwithrespecttonoun/verbusagesofintend.Inonesense(oftencalledthederesense)ofintend,ifBillisacopandIintendedtokillhim,Iintendedtokillacop;inanothersense(oftencalledthededictosense),evenbelievingthatBillisacopisnotenoughIhavetorepresentthestateofaffairsIintendtobringaboutasthekillingofacop.26

Anglo-Americancriminallaw(bothcommonlawandModelPenalCode)(1)recognizestheambiguityofthetwousagesastoconsequences;(2)resolvesthevaguenessoftheadverb/adjectiveusageastoconsequencesinfavorofintentionality;and(3)resolves(sortof)thedere/dedictoambiguityregardingcircumstances.Takingeachinorder.

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1.Thecriminallawrecognizestheambiguityofthetwousagesbydistinguishingspecificintentfromgeneralintent.Thedominantmeaning(thereareunfortunatelyothers)ofspecificintentisthatofafurtherintention,furtherinthesensethatitisanintentionhavingasitsobjectsomestateofaffairsbeyondtheactiondone.27Thefurther(specific)intentionwithwhichIshotthesnakewastopreventusgettingbitten.Correspondingly,ageneralintentionisjusttodotheactthecriminallawprohibits;intheexample,letthatbe,alertingthesavages.Mostcrimeshavingsomeformofintentionsasmensreaaregeneralintentcrimes,suchasrape,arson,andmurder;specificintentcrimestendtobeinchoatecrimes(wheretheevilthelawultimatelyseekstopreventneednothaveoccurred).Assaultwithintenttokill,breakingandenteringwithintenttosteal,takingthe(p.187) propertyofanotherwithintenttodeprivepermanently,arewell-wornexamplesofspecificintentcrimes.2.Thecriminallawstipulatesthat,onthefactsgiven,IalertedtheIndiansintentionally,ieIhadtherequisitegeneralintention.Inanutshell,predictivebelief(acognitivestate)issufficientforgeneralintention;forspecificintentitisnotenough,becausewhatisneededisamotivationalstate(withregardtoeitherendsormeans).283.Withregardtothecircumstanceelementsofvariouscrimessuchasthelackofthewoman'sconsentinrape/attemptedrapecasesthecriminallawiscomplicated.Theonesimpletruthisthatthelawnowhererequirestruepurposewithregardtosuchcircumstances.Thisiscertainlytrueofgeneralintentcrimessuchasrape:theactorneedonlyknowthatthewomanisconsenting,heneednotbemotivatedbythatfact(wantingonlyforcedsex,forexample).Butthisiseventrueforspecificintentcrimessuchasassaultwithintenttorape:theactorwhoassaultsintendingpenetrationisguiltyifhemerelybelievesthereisnoconsent,nolessthanifheismotivatedbythatfact.29

Thereislessagreementaboutwhatmentalstateisrequiredregardingcircumstances.Thecommonlawgenerallyindulgesthefiction(throughitsunreasonablemistakedoctrines)thatanunreasonablebeliefthatthereisconsentconstitutesageneralintentionthattherebenoconsent;30althoughthisfictionisnotindulgedforspecificintentcrimes,whichrequireknowledgeofcircumstanceelementssuchasthelackofconsent.31TheModelPenalCoderequiresbeliefastosuchcircumstancesforbothcrimesrequiringknowledgeaswellaspurpose,whatthecommonlawwouldcallgeneralandspecificintentcrimes,respectively.32EventheCode,however,wafflesawkwardlyforcertainspecificintentcrimeslikeattemptandcomplicity(arguablyrequiringonlythemensrearequiredfortheunderlyingcrimetobeheldtohavethesespecificintents).33

Criminalcodestypicallyprohibitthousandsofacttypes,fromkillingtotransportingcorrosiveliquidswithoutproperlabels.TheEnglishlanguageandthecriminallawarerichinwordswithwhichtodescribethemensrearequirementsattachedtothesethousandsofprohibitions:wemaybeforbiddentodosomeactionAifwe:intendA;doAintentionally;doAknowingly,orwilfully,orconsciously,or(p.188) beingawareorbelievingthatitisAwearedoing.Inaddition,someverbsofactionalsocontainwithin

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themnotonlyactionprohibitionsbutimplicitmensreaprovisionsaswell.Tolie,forexample,isnotonlytotellanuntruth;inaddition,onemustknowthatwhatoneissayingisfalse.Asanotherexample,someverbsofactionareintention-drenched34inthesensethatonecannotdosuchanactexceptwithacertainintention,suchasmotioningapedestrianacrossthestreet(one'sarmmustmovewithanintentiontososignal)35orendeavoringtoobstructjustice(one'sactmustbedonewithanintentiontoobstructjustice),36etc.

Thegeneralpartofthecriminallawissupposedtobringordertothisotherwiseriotousprolixitybyreducingallofthesesortsofmensrearequirementstoeithergeneralorspecificintentrequirements.37Othermensreaterms,however,arenotsupposedtobesoreduced,andtheyformaninformativecontrasttointention/intentional.

1.Deliberateandpremeditatedintentionality.Thisphrase,takenfromthedominantformofhomicidestatuteintheUnitedStates(whereitisaprerequisiteforfirstdegreemurder),hastwodifferentmeaningsincriminallaw,dependingonwhichstateoneisin.Considerthiswell-knowninference:IfdefendantDkilledintendingtokill,thenhiskillingwasdeliberate;ifhiskillingwasdeliberate,thenhedeliberatedaboutit;ifhedeliberatedaboutit,thenhiskillingwaspremeditated.Thereforeallintendedkillingsarealsodeliberateandpremeditatedkillings.38StateslikePennsylvaniaregardthisasatrueconclusion;39stateslikeCalifornia(themajority)donot.40Inthelatterstates,deliberateandpremeditatedrequiresthatthekillingbedeliberatetheyrequiremorethanthatthekillingbedeliberatedaboutinasensenotsynonymouswiththekillingbeingdeliberate.Suchdeliberationrequiresconsciousweighingofreasonsand/orconsiderationofmeansdatablementalprocesstoeitherprecedeorsucceedtheformingofanintentiontokill.2.Maliceaforethoughttheabsenceofpassionateintentionality.Thephrase,maliceaforethought,alsotakenfromthedominantformofhomicidestatuteintheUnitedStates(whereitisusedtodistinguishmurderfrommeremanslaughter),includesaspartofitsmeaningthattheintenttokillnotbeformedbecauseof(p.189) anunderstandablepassionarisingoutofareasonableprovocation(onecommonlawformulation)41orbecauseofextremementaloremotionaldisturbanceforwhichthereisareasonableexplanationorexcuse(thebroaderModelPenalCodeversion).42Hereagainadifferentmentalstatedistinctionispresupposed,distinctfromthedistinctionsbetweenintended/unintendedandintentional/unintentional.Thisdifferentdistinctionisbetweenintentionsformedbecauseofpassionandintentionsformedoutofeitherdispassionateimpulseorcooldeliberation.3.Involuntaryintentions.Bothordinaryspeechandthecriminallawrecognizethepsychologicaltruththatdecisionsmadeunderduresswhetherduetohumanthreatsornaturalnecessityarestilldecisions,ieintentions,andthattheactionsdoneyieldingtosuchthreats,whileinapopularsenseinvoluntary,43arenonethelessintentionalactions.Suchactionsmayormaynotbeexcusedbythedefenseofduress,butirrespectivetheseareintentionalactions.Involuntaryin

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thissensedoesnotnegativeintention.4.Intentionsaswilling/volition/voluntaryaction.Thesetermsrequireaveryparticularkindofintention:thedefendantmustintendthebasicact(usuallyabodilymovement)bywhichhebringsaboutthecomplexactthecriminallawforbids.44Wheredefendantkillsanotherbyshootinghim,forexample,thedefendantmustintend(will,haveastheobjectofhisvolition,bevoluntarywithrespectto)thebodilymovementsthatcausethetriggertomove.Notethatadefendantcanhavesuchintent(tomovehisfinger)andnothaveeitherageneraloraspecificintenttokill.Notealsothatadefendant'sactcanbevoluntaryinthistechnical,criminallawsenseandyetinvoluntaryornon-voluntaryinthepopularsenseofbeingunderduress.

Myowninterestinthischapterisnotondeliberate,impassioned,compelled,orvolitionalintentions;theseareadd-onstothemorebasicnotionofanintention.Moreover,myfocuswillbeonintentioninthesensethatcriminallawyerscallspecificintentandthatordinarylanguagephilosopherscallintentionwithwhichorfurtherintention.Itisnotthatdoingsomeactionintentionallylacksinterestforresponsibilitytheorists.Yetintentionalityinthissenseisnotanaturalkindasarethepsychologicalstatesofintentionandbelief;indeed,itisonlyaconstructionoutofintentioninmysense,soIshallfocusonthemorebasicitem.

Therearetwoquestionstoexploreaboutintentionssolimited.Oneisthequestionoftheirnature:towhatsortofmentalstatedoesintentionrefer?Thesecondisaquestionofcontent:howdowefix(andwhatsortofthingisitthatwearefixingwhenwefix)theobjectorcontentofanintention?Touseintentionasthemarkerofmostseriousculpabilitysupposesthatwehavesomeanswertobothofthesequestions.(p.190)

4SUPPOSITIONSABOUTTHENATUREOFINTENTIONINRESPONSIBILITYASSESSMENTSAtthemostgenerallevelusesofintentioninresponsibilityassessmentspresupposearealismaboutintentions.Asonecommonlawcourtputit,thelawsupposesthatthestateofaman'smindisasmuchafactasthestateofhisdigestion.45Wesupposethisinlawandinethicsbecauseanynaturalistviewoflegalandmoralqualitiesiscommittedtotherebeingsomenaturalpropertyonwhichmoralandlegalpropertiessupervene.46Therehavetobeintentionsforresponsibilitytodependonintentionalityinthewaythatitdoes.

Lessgenerally,ourassessmentofresponsibilityalsosupposesthatthefolkpsychologyofintentionisatleastroughlycorrect.Intention,inotherwords,notonlyexistsasadistinctkindofmentalstate,butitisthekindofmentalstatethatfolkpsychologypositsittobe.Oneseesthissuppositionplainlyinthewaythatthemensreadoctrinesofthecriminallawarebuiltentirelyonthebackofthatfolkpsychology.

Thefolkpsychologyinquestionisthatrelatingtopracticalrationality.Onthestandardviewofthispsychologytherearethreesortsofrepresentationalstatesthatcausethebehaviourofrationalagents:therearestatesofdesire,wherewerepresenttheworldaswewantittobe;statesofbelief,wherewerepresenttheworldaswebelieveitis;and

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therearestatesofintention,wherewerepresenttheworldasweintendtomakeit.47Forrationalaction,thesestatesneedtoberelatedintheircontentsaccordingtothefollowingschema:

1.Desires(q)(Motivationalpremise)2.Believes(ifp,thenq)48(Cognitivepremise)3.Intends(p)(Conationalpremise)4.Doestheactiondescribedinp.

Thegradingofculpability(betweenmostculpablestatesofpurposeorspecificintent,lessculpablestatesofknowledgeorgeneralintent,stilllessculpablestatesofrecklessnessandnegligence)donebythecriminallawisbuiltentirelyontheback(p.191) ofthisfolkpsychology.Onecanseethisclearlyifonechartsthemensreaconceptsofthecriminallawagainstthefolkpsychologyofdesires,intentions,andbeliefs.Considerfirstthegradingofculpabilityregardingtheresultelementsofcrimes.ThisisdepictedinFigure9.1.

AsFigure9.1shows,thelawusesthethreerepresentationalstatesofdesire,intention,andbeliefasthebaseintermsofwhichitdefinesthestatesthatgradeculpability.Thelawdoesnotdistinguishoffenderswhodesiresomeprohibitedresultforitsownsake,fromthosewhointendthatstateonlyasameanstoachievingsomethingelsedesiredforitsownsake.Thus,specificintentorpurposeisdefinedsoastoincludeeitherstate.Thelawdoesdistinguishpredictivebelieffromdesire/intention;thus,generalintentorknowledgeisdefinedsothatbelief(thatalegallyprohibitedresultwillbecausedbyone'saction)willsuffice,whereasitwillnotforspecificintentorpurpose.Furthermore,thereckless/knowledgeandthereckless/negligencelinesaredrawnintermsofbeliefs.Forthefirstline,belieftoapracticalcertainty(knowledge)isdistinguishedfrombeliefofasubstantialrisk(recklessness);forthesecondline,beliefthatthereisasubstantialrisk(recklessness)isdistinguishedfromabsenceofsuchabeliefwhenitwouldhavebeenreasonabletohaveformedsuchabelief(negligence).

Thelaw'suseofthefolkpsychologyisjustasevidentinitsdefinitionofthestatesthatgradeculpabilitywithrespecttothecircumstanceelementsofcrimes.Thelawitself,however,isabitmorecomplicated,asisshowninFigure9.2.

AsFigure9.2shows,forcircumstanceelementsthelawallowsanyofthethreerepresentationalstatestosufficeforthestateofhighestculpability,specificintentorpurpose.Thatis,oneisguiltyofassaultwithintenttokillapoliceman(aspecificintentcrime)if:(1)onewantedtokillacopasanendinitself;or(2)onewascompetinginacop-killingcontestandoneintendedthatthepersonkilledbeacopsothathiskillingcountedinthecontest;or(3)onewasindifferenttowhetherthevictimkilledwasorwasnotacop,althoughonebelievedwithcertaintythathewasacop.Althoughthelawallowsanyofthesestatestosufficeformostseriousculpability,evenhereitdefinesthatmostseriousculpabilityintermsofthesethreestates.Evenherethelaw'smensrearequirementsarethusbuiltontheconceptsofthefolkpsychology.

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Thisisalsotruewithregardtothedistinctionsinbeliefthelawdrawswithrespecttocircumstanceelements.Noticethecommonlawallowsmistakenbelieforabsenceofbelief(whenitwouldhavebeenreasonabletohavehadacertainbelief)tosufficeforgeneralintent49andmalice,aswellasfornegligence.Thecommonlawthushasasimplegradingschemeregardingcircumstances:belieftoapracticalcertaintyconstitutesspecificintent,andnothavingsuchabeliefwhenoneshouldhavesufficesforallothergradesofculpability.Thisdistinction,whilesimple,isstillwhollyintermsofthefolkpsychologicalconceptofbelief.(p.192)

Figure9.1 Mensreaconceptsreconsequences.

(p.193)

Figure9.2 Mensreaconceptsrecircumstances.

(p.194)

TheModelPenalCode'suseofbelieftogradeculpabilitywithregardtocircumstanceelementsismorecomplicatedthanthecommonlaw.Withitsnotionofwilfulblindness,theCodeintroducesabelieftoahighprobabilitybetweenbelieftoapracticalcertainty(knowledge)andbeliefofasubstantialrisk(reckless),andthenallowstheintermediatebelieftosufficeforknowledge.50TheCodealsodistinguishesunreasonableabsenceofbelief(negligence)fromthehavingofabeliefthatthereisasubstantialriskthatsome

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circumstanceispresent(recklessness).Buttheonlypointhereisthatthesedistinctionsarewhollydrawnintermsofthefolkpsychologicalnotionofbelief.

Thereareanumberofothersuppositions(aboutintentions)thatresponsibilityassessmentsarecommonlythoughttomake,inadditiontosupposingthebasicbelief/desire/intention(BDI)psychologyofrationalactionjustsketched.Ishallconsiderthreeofthem.Thefirstisthatintentionsarecausallyefficacious.Morespecifically,theideaisthatintentions(sometimes,atleast)causetheactsthataretheirobject.WhenIgodowntownbecauseIintendedtogodowntown,thebecauseismeantcausally.

Itisoftenurgedthatsomethingmorethancausationisrequiredhere.Thisisthoughttobeshownbydeviantcausalchainskindsofcase.51SupposeIintendtorunyoudownwithmycar;yetthisintentioncausessuchexcitementinme,suchconflict,etc,thatItremble,myfootslipsoffthebrake,hitstheaccelerator,andmycardoesindeedrunyoudown.Youarerundownbecauseofmyintention,butmyrunningyoudownwasstillanaccident.Sowemustamendthesuppositionhere:theintentionmustcausetheactintherightway,52orbetter,theactionmustbedoneinexecutionoftheintention.Inanycase,howeverthisisput,atleasttheintentionmustcausetheactionforonetoberegardedasseriouslyculpablebecauseoneintendedthewrongdone.

Incriminallawthissuppositionissometimesputasatemporalsupposition,asimultaneityrequirement.53Onthisconstrualtherequirementisthattheactandtheintentbesimultaneouswithoneanother.Yetthistemporalcriterionisonlydoingproxywork;whatisreallyrequiredisthekindofcausalconnectionwegetwhenanactisdoneinexecutionofanintention.Giventhetemporalproximityofintentionswiththeactsthatexecutethem,suchactsandintentionswillbeclosetosimultaneous.Yettheconverseisnottrue:Icanintendtorunyoudown,andstarttheactionofrunningyoudownatthesametime,yetnotdothatactinexecutionofthatintention.Forexample,Ialsointendtoescapethelargetruckbearingdownbehindme,andaccelerateforthatreason.(p.195)

Howeverput,ataminimumintentionsneedtocausetheactionsthataretheirobjectsinorderforintentiontobeamarkerofseriousculpability.Thereisalivelydebateincontemporaryneuroscienceaboutwhethersuchcausalconnectioncanexist,54thosedenyingthisdefendingthealternativeconclusionthatintentionsaremerelyepiphenomenalwiththebehaviourtheyputativelycause.Butourresponsibilityassessmentsplainlysupposeotherwise.

Thesecondadditionalsuppositionthatresponsibilityassessmentsaresaidtomakehastodowiththecausesofintentionsratherthatwhatintentionscancause.Thesuppositionisthatintentionsarefreeinthesenseofuncaused.Theideaisthatintentionsareaspeciesofchoice,decision,andwilling,andthatalloftheseprocessesmustbefree,elsetheywouldnotbewhattheyare.Thisisofcoursenothinglessthanthesuppositionoffreewill.

Thiswouldbeanextraordinarysuppositionforouruseofintentioninourblamingpracticestomake.Thinkofit:somethingthatcancausethingslikeactionstooccur,butthatisitselfuncaused.TheBigBangissupposedtobelikethat,onsomecosmologies;

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Godissupposedtobelikethat,onsometheologies.Butitisludicroustothinkthateachhumanchoiceislikethat.Fortunatelynothingintheuseofintentiontomarkseriousculpabilityinlawormoralitydemandsthisextraordinarypostulate.55

Thethirdadditionalsuppositionhastodowithconsciousness.Manythinkthatonecanhaveanintentiononlyifoneisconsciousofwhatthecontentofthatintentionis.56(Alternatively,onemightthinkthatalthoughonecanhaveunconsciousintentions,theonlyintentionsthataffectone'sculpabilityareconsciousintentions.57)This(p.196) isamuchmorenuancedsuppositionaboutintentionsandresponsibilitythanweretheprevioustwo;forwiththemitwasablackandwhiteyesornoastowhethersuchasuppositionismade.Heretherearenuancedshadesofgrey.

Ithelpstobeclearwhatonemeansbyconsciousness.Ifonemeansthephenomenological,experientialnotionthestreamofconsciousnessofJoyceanfictionthenprettyplainlytheuseofintentiontomarkculpabilitydoesnotrequireit.Manyoftheactionsthatwedo,intendingtodothem,andbeingrightlyblamedfordoingthem,aredonewhileweliterallyhaveourmindsonsomethingelse.Theexerciseofwell-honedskills,allformsofhabitualbehaviour,andthelike,areintendedbutdonotrequireconsciousattentiontoperformthemcompetently.58Thisiswhytheoverlayofpremeditatedanddeliberaterequiredforfirstdegreemurder(asabovediscussed)isatrueadditiontotherequirementofintentionalityformurderitself;forintentionitselfdoesnotrequirethatsuchdatableprocessesinconsciousnessoccur.

However,itispreferabletounderstandconsciousheretorefertoanability,adisposition.Thisistheabilitytoturnone'sattentiontotheintendedactioniftheneedarises,andtheabilitytostatewhatwasintendedifthatneedarises.59Suchabilitiesdonotdependontherebeingsilentsoliloquiesgoingonearlierintheheadsofthosewhohaveintentions.Itismuchmoreplausibletothinkeitherthatintentionswithoutconsciousnessinthissenseareimpossible,oratleastthatthereisnoresponsibilityforintentionsthatdonotmeetthisconsciousnesscondition.

5SUPPOSITIONSABOUTTHECONTENTOFINTENTIONINRESPONSIBILITYASSESSMENTSLikeallrepresentationalmentalstates,intentionstakeobjects.Onedoesn'tjustintend,fullstop,anymorethanonejustdesiresorbelieves,fullstop.Necessarily,weintendthatsomethingbethecase.ThesomethingiswhatIhavebeencallingthecontentof(p.197)anintention.Becauseintentionshavecontent,itisneverenoughtoknowthatsomeonehadanintention(asopposedtosomeotherkindofmentalstate);wealsoneedtoknowwhatsheintended.Ithusmovefromthenatureofintentiontoquestionsofcontent.

Inusingintentiontomarkseriousprimafacieculpabilitywehavetoaskandanswertwoquestionsrelatedtothecontentofintentions.Thefirstisaquestionofcomparingwhatthedefendantintendedonaparticularoccasion,theintention-token,withthetypeofintentionlegalormoralnormsrequireforconvictionorblame.Thequestioniswhetherthedefendant'sintention-tokenisaninstanceofthetypeofintentionlegallyormorallyrequired.Thesecondisaquestionofcomparingwhatthedefendantintendedona

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particularoccasionwiththeactthedefendantactuallydidonthatoccasion.Thequestioniswhetherthedefendant'sactionisaninstanceofthetypeofactionthatheintendedtodoornot.60

Thesearebothquestionsregardingtherepresentationalcontentofintentions.Theybothrequirethatwefixwhatthedefendantintendedonsomeoccasionasamatterofpsychologicalfact,andthencomparethatcontentwith:eitherthetypeofcontentthelawormoralityrequires,forthefirstquestion;ortheactiondonebythedefendantinexecutionofthatintention,forthesecondquestion.

Theneedtoaskthefirstofthesequestionsisprobablyobvious.Afterall,toapplylegalormoralnormstoparticularfactsalwaysrequiresustoaskquestionsaboutparticularfactsinstantiatinggeneralnorms.Theneedforaskingthesecondquestionmaybelessobvious,however.Yetaskingsuchaquestionisalsoindispensableinusingintentiontomarkmostseriousprimafacieculpability.SupposedefendantDshootsandhitshisvictimV.IfwewishtoknowwhetherthehittingofVwasintended,weneedtoknowtheobjectofD'sintentioninshootingonthisoccasion:ifitwastohitV,ortowoundV,ortokillV,thenthebatteryonVwasintended;ifitwastoscareV,ortohittheappleonV'shead,ortohitatarget,thenthehittingofVwasunintended.Inthelattercase,thehittingofVmayhavebeenforeseen,orconsciouslyrisked,inwhichcaseDissomewhatculpableforthewrongofshootingV.ButtobemostseriouslyculpablefortheintendedhittingofV,thecontentoftheintentionofD's(thatcausedhimtoshoot)musthavebeenoneoftheformerrepresentations.Usingintentionstogradeculpabilitythusrequiresthatweaskbothofthesematchingquestionsaboutwhatthedefendantintended.

Bothofthesequestionsmayseemtobenotmuchdifferentthantheomnipresentclassificationquestionslawyersandmoralistsalwaysfaceinapplyinggeneralnormstoparticularfacts.Todecidewhetheradefendantviolatedsomeruleagainstdriving(p.198) avehiclethroughthecitypark,forexample,wehavetodecidewhetherwhatthedefendantdidamountedtodriving,whetherwhathedroveconstitutedavehicle,andwhetherthelandonwhichhedrovewascityparkland.Whilethereareproblemshere,theyarethefamiliarproblemsoffixingtheextensionofthepredicatesusedintherelevantrules:problemsofvagueness,ambiguity,corecases,thepenumbra,letterversusspirit,andthelike.61

Ourtwomatchquestionsaboutintentionsraisedifferent,andharder,problemsofclassification.Forwiththeseintention-relatedquestionswearebereftoftheusualresources(ofidentityandinstantiation)onwhichwerelyfornormalclassificatoryquestions.WecanseethisviatwooldexamplesofEdwinKeedy's.62Keedywasapplyingthecommonlawruleforlegallyimpossibleattempts:ifthedefendantdidallheintendedtodoandyetwhatthedefendantdidwouldstillnothavebeencriminal,thenhisattemptwaslegallyimpossibleandnotpunishable.Keedygavetwoexamplesinapplicationofthiscommonlawrule:

1.Defendantintendedtotaketheumbrellainhishand;hebelievedthatthatumbrellawasthepropertyofanother;infactthatumbrellawashisown.

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Therefore,Keedyconcluded,sincetheumbrellainhishandwashisownumbrella,thedefendantdidnotintendtotakethepropertyofanother(andisnotguiltyofattemptedtheft).2.Defendantintendedtoshootatwhathethoughtwasaperson;infactthethingshotatwasastump;therefore,defendantdidnotintendtoshootataperson,andisnotguiltyofattemptedmurder.

Theseareprettyobviouslydaffyinferences.Butnoticetheywouldnotbesosillyifwewerenotclassifyingintentions,butwereclassifyingactions;forthenwecouldusethetrueidentities(theumbrellainhishandisthetaker'sownumbrella,thistargetisastump)tomakeanalogousinferences(ifthedefendanttooktheumbrellainhishand,thenhetookhisownumbrella;ifthedefendantshotthatperson-lookingobject,thenheshotastump.)

Whenclassifyingintentionsbytheirrepresentationalcontent,wecannotrelyontrueidentities,extensionalequivalences,ornormalinstantiations.Rather,wehavetorelyonhowthedefendantrepresentedwhathewastryingtoachieveinhismind.Putsimply,herethedescriptionsmatter,notjusttheunderlyingidentitiesoftherealworldthingsthosedescriptionsseeminglydescribe.

Thislong-noticedfactaboutintentions(andotherrepresentationalmentalstates)isoftencalledtheirIntentionality.63NoticehowhardtheIntentionalityofintentions(p.199)makesourclassificatoryquestions.Takethefirstofthem.Supposethedefendantdrivesacitybusthroughthepark,andsupposeitisclearthatbusesarevehiclesforpurposesofthisordinance(aswellasinnormalEnglish);thendefendantdroveavehiclethroughthecitypark.Butdidheintendtodriveavehiclethroughthepark?Supposeweknowheintendedtodriveabusthroughtheparkthefactthatbusesarevehiclesinrealitydoesnotmeanthattheyaresuchinhisownmind,sowecannoteasilyinferheintendedtodriveavehicle.Afterall,hemightregardbuses(bothinnormalEnglishandinthelaw)asnon-vehicles,inwhicheventhewouldsaythatwhatheintendedwasnottodriveavehicleinthepark(and,givenconsistencyofintentions),thereforeitisnotthecasethatheintendedtodriveavehiclethroughthepark.64

OrconsiderIntentionality'seffectonthesecondquestion.Supposeweknowthatthedefendantdidrepresentwhatheintendedas,killingahumanbeing(oneintentionsufficientforconvictionofmurderistointendtokillahumanbeing).Wealsoknowthatwhathedidwasshootandkillamemberofanotherrace,aracethatdefendantregardsasnon-humanorsub-human.Hewas,wemaysuppose,shootingatamemberofhisownracebutmissed,hittinginsteadthedifferent-racevictim.Ifwefixtheextensionofhisrepresentationofhumanbeingaswefixtheextensionofthewords,humanbeing,thisisaneasycase.Yetisthissoclearfordefendant'srepresentation?Byhisownlights,hefailedtoachievewhathesetouttoachieve,whichwastokillaninstanceofwhatheregardedasahumanbeing.

Inmoralitybutevenmoreinthelawwehavesomedetailedgeneralizationstohelpwiththeseotherwiseintractableclassificationquestionsaboutintentions.Letmeconsidereach

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questionseparately,beginningwiththefirst.Thefirstquestion,aswehaveseen,requiresacomparisonoftwothings:thetypeofintentionrequiredbylawormorality;andtheintention-tokenhadbysomedefendantonsomeoccasion.

Asastart,considerthisoldinjunctionofPhillippaFoot'sinethics:askwhetheranactionisintentionalunderthatdescriptionofitscontentthatmakesitbad.65Inmyownlanguage:weareprimafacieculpablewhenweactunderarepresentationoftheworldthatwouldmakeouractionwrongfuliftherepresentationweretrue.66Thisrequiresthatwefirstdiscoverthetypesofactionsthatarewrongful(becauseviolativeofthenormsofnegativeobligation);andthenaskifthedefendanthadsuchtypeofactionasthecontentofhisintention.Culpableintentionsareinthiswayconceptuallyparasiticonthedeonticnormsofwrongdoing.

Thecriminallaw,hereaselsewhere,sharpensthismoralpoint.GiventhestatutorynatureofcontemporaryAnglo-Americancriminallaw,findingoutwhatis(p.200) wrongiseasy:webutopenupBentham'sgreatbookoflaws67toseewhatactionsandwhatfurtherintentionsareprohibitedbystatute.Callthisourfirstmaximinconstruingwhattypeofintentionisrequiredforconviction:theintentionmusthaveasitsobjecttheactusreusofsomestatutoryoffence,or,inthecaseofspecificintentcrimes,someotherlegallyprohibitedstateofaffairs.

Oursecondmaximmakesthefirstmoreprecise.Itisthattheactusreuswemustlooktoinconstruingthetypeofintentionrequiredforconvictionmustbetheactusreusofthecrimecharged.Onedoesn'tgettomixandmatch,anymoreherethanwithapairofsocks.Ifthedefendantischargedwitharsonsay,burningdownashipitwillnotdotofindthatheintendedtheactusreusofsomeotheroffence,suchastheft.68Primafacie,theobjectoftheprohibitedintentionmustmatchtheactusreusofthetypeofoffencecharged,notanyotheroffence.

Thethirdmaximisaqualificationofthesecond.Manystatutoryactusreusprohibitionshaveelementswithinthemthatareirrelevanttothemoralwrongthatunderliesthestatutoryactusreus.69Asanexample,theCaliforniaPrivacyActprohibitsonefromintentionallyrecordingaconfidentialcommunicationwithouttheconsentofallparticipantsbymeansofanyelectronicamplifyingorrecordingdevice,excludingaradio.70Whatifonemistakenlybelievesheisrecordingviaaradioisthatrelevant?Doesthestatutorymensrearequirethatoneintentionallyrecordedwithanon-radiodevice?Thereisnothingmorallyworseaboutrecordingwithoutaradiothanwithone;thenotaradiorequirementisinthestatuteforjurisdictionalreasons,namely,toavoidpre-emptionofastatestatutebyfederalcommunicationslaw.Soweshouldeliminateanyrepresentationofradio-hoodfromtheobjectoftheintentionrequiredtobeconvictedunderthisstatute.Thiswillbetoapplythethirdmaxim.

Thefourthmaximhastodowiththetrickyproblemofconditionalintentions.Aconditionalintentionisnotpresentwhenitisonlytrueofsomedefendantthat,ifmoneywerefoundonthepavement,hewouldformtheintentiontotakeit.71Theretheconditionisexternaltohisintention,andisaconditionprecedenttohishavinganyintentiontosteal.Atrue

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conditionalintentioniswheretheconditioniswithintheobjectofsomepresentintentionofthedefendant.Forexample:thedefendantnowintendsthat,ifthemoneyisstillonthepavementwherehesawitanhourago,hewilltakeit.

Theissuewithconditionalintentionsiswhethertheycarrywiththemthesamedegreeofculpabilityasdounconditionalintentionstodothesamething.Thelaw(p.201) purportstogivemorehelpherethanitactuallycandeliver.Thecommonlawmaximwasthatifthecondition(whencommunicatedtothevictimasademand,asiscommon)wasonethedefendantwasnotentitledtomake,thenaconditionalintentionistobetreatedasaninstanceofthetypeofintentionrequiredforconviction.72TheModelPenalCodeversionofthismaximisevenbroader,equatingconditionalwithunconditionalintentionsacrosstheboard.73AsJusticeScaliaobserved,thiscannotberight:thedoctrineofconditionalintentcannotreasonablybeappliedacross-the-boardtothecriminalcode.74Themostweshouldconcludeisthatpresumptively,thatanintentionisconditionalinitscontentmakesnoculpabilitydifference,recognizingthatthiswillnotalwaysbetrue.

Thefifthmaximisactuallyacollectionofadhocsubstitutionrules.Iviewtheseasadhocexceptionstothesecondmaximabove.Herearesomeexamples.

a.Thelegalwrongdoctrine:thedefendantneednotintendtheactusreusofthecrimehedidsolongashedidintendtheactusreusofsomeothergradeofthatcrime(asindoingafirstdegree,night-timeburglary,thinkingitwasasecondorthirddegree,day-timeburglary).75b.Thefelony/murderrule:thedefendantneedn'tintendtokilltobeconvictedofmurder,eventhoughkillingistheactusreusofmurder,solongasthedefendantintendedtodosomeotherfelonyandduringthatfelonythevictimdied.76c.Thegrievousbodilyharmmurderdoctrine:thedefendantneedn'tintendtokillformurder,eventhoughkillingistheactusreusofmurder,solongasheintendedthevictimgrievousbodilyharm,andthevictimdiedasaresultofthatharm.77d.Thebattery-assaultinterchange:thedefendantneedn'tintendtohit(causecontactwith)thevictim,eventhoughhittingistheactusreusofbattery,solongasthedefendantdidintendtofrighten(causeapprehensionofcontactby)thevictim;conversely,thedefendantneedn'tintendtoscarethevictim,eventhoughcausingapprehensionistheactusreusforassault,solongasdefendantdidintendtohitthevictim.78(p.202)e.Themayhemsubstitutionrule:thedefendantneedn'tintendtodisfigurethevictimeventhoughdisfigurementistheactusreusofmayhem,solongasthedefendantdidintendtohitthevictimandthathitdidcausedisfigurement.79

Theseandotherrulessubstituteonetypeofintentionforthatwhichwouldnormallyberequiredbythesecondmaximabove(theonerequiringthattheobjectoftheintentionrequiredforconvictionbetheactusreusofthecrimechargedandnottheactusreusofsomeothercrime),apparentlyontherationalethattointendthesubstitutedthingiscloseenoughinculpabilitytobetreatedasifitweretointendtheactualwrongdoingoftheoffence.80

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ThesixthmaximisintendedtodealdirectlywiththeproblemsraisedbytheIntentionalityofintentions.Themaximisusuallyputasashortandsnappyaphorism,ignoranceofthelawisnoexcuse.81Whatisreallybeingsaid,however(inthetermsrelevanthere),isthatthedefendantneednotrepresentwhatheintendstodoorachieveintheliterallanguageofthelawdescribingtheactusreusoftheoffence.82Toreverttotheearlierexampleofthenovehiclesintheparkordinance,thedefendantneednotrepresentwhatheintendstodriveasavehicle;hemaybeignorantthatbusesarevehicles,orevenmistakeninabeliefthatbusesarenotvehicles,andstillhavetheintentionrequiredforconviction.83

Thedoctrineisbasedonthereasonableenoughassumptionthatfewoffendersformulatetheobjectsoftheirintentionsinthelegalterminologyusedbystatutes.Evenlawyersdon'tintend,forexample,tocauseasportationofpropertyofanother(theoldcommonlawactusreusoftheft)whentheysteal.Wehavetoallowmanyotherrepresentationstoqualifyasprohibitedintentions,inadditiontotheoccasionalinhaecverbarepresentationthatwemayencounter.Theunresolvedproblem,however,ishowwearetoclassifyparticularrepresentationsunderthismoresensiblyrelaxedrequirement.BecauseoftheIntentionalityofintentions,wecannotconfidentlyrelyontheordinaryextensionsofthetermsusedinthecontentoftheprohibitedintentions.Butwithoutthis,whatshouldbeourguide?

Lawyerscommonlythinktheycananswerthiswithaseventhmaxim:representationsofadefendantthatarenotinhaecverbaoftherelevantstatutewillbesufficientforconvictionifbasedonsomeerroneouslegalbeliefbythedefendant,notifbasedonsomeerroneousfactualbeliefbythedefendant.Theearlierhypothesizeddefendantwhoerroneouslybelievesbusesarenotvehicleswouldgetoffifhebelievedbusestolackmotors(whenmotorsareanecessaryconditionoflegal(p.203) vehicle-hood),afactualerror;notifhebelieved(erroneously)thatthelawexemptedmodesofpublictransportfromitsprohibitiononvehicles.Yethowdoessuchadistinctionhandletheracistkillerwhointendstokillamemberofanotherrace,believingthatmembersofsuchracelacksomeessentialcriterionoflegalpersonhood(suchasmembershipinthespecies,homosapiens)?Seeminglysucharacistkillercannotbeconvictedofintendingtokillahumanbeing,yetIdoubtanycourthasorwouldsohold.Morebroadly,themaxim'sdistinctioninvitesalloftheproblemsofdistinguishinganalyticfromsyntheticjudgmentssomuchthefocusofpost-WorldWarIIphilosophy.84

Despitealloftheseproblems,inbothlawandmoralitywedoseemtomuddlealonginformulatingthetypeofintentionthatcanmarkseriousculpability.Yetnoticethatonlygivesushalfofwhatweneedtoanswerthefirstmatchquestiondistinguishedearlier.Wealsoneedtoknowasamatterofpsychologicalfactwhatadefendantintendedonagivenoccasion.Weneed,moreover,aratherpreciseformulationofthecontentoftheintentionwithwhichhedidsomeprohibitedaction.Weneedthisinordertomatchituptothepreciselydetailedtypeofintentionrequiredbyoursevenearliermaxims.Bothlawandmoralityplainlysupposethatpsychologycandeliverupsometruthsherethatmakethecomparisoninquestionpossible.

Whetherpsychologyisuptothisisofcourseahotlycontestedmatter.85Bothlawand

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moralitysupposethattheoptimisticsideofthisdebateisright,andthinkthescepticalsideiswrong.Theysupposethatthereisalanguageofthoughtinthebrain,86anincorrigibleandtransparentaccuracyintheverbalbehaviorofself-reporting,87aninfalliblestreamofconsciousness,acomplexarrayofcounterfactualsabouthypotheticalbehaviour,orsomeotherbasisforformulatingwithprecisionwhatapersonintendsonagivenoccasion.Whetherthisisawell-foundedsuppositionoflawandmoralityremainstobeseen.

Thesecondmatchquestionaskedaboutthecontentofintentionswas,howwelldoestheactionthedefendantdidinexecutionofsomeintentionmatchthetypeofactionthatwastheobjectofthatintention?Herealsolawyersandmoralistsreceivesomehelpfromthecriminallaw.Thebestknownofthesecriminallawaidsisthetransferredintentrule.88Whilesometimesconstruedtobearulehelpingwiththefirstmatchquestion,89thisisinactualityaruleaimedathelpingwiththesecond.(p.204) Whattherulesaysisthatdifferencesintheidentityofthevictimdon'tcountwhenassessingwhetherwhatthedefendantdidmatchesthetypeofactheintendedtodocloselyenoughtobegradedanintendedwrongdoer.

Suppose(arealifunreportedcase,asitturnsout)thatsomeskierataskiresortrestaurantmakesanoff-colourcommenttothewaitress.Sheissoincensedthatshehurlsaheavyglassashtrayattheoffendingskier'shead.Withquickreflexes,however,heducksintimeandtheashtrayhitsanotherskiersittingbehindthefirst.Thetransferredintentrulessaythatthewaitressisguiltyoftheintentionaltort(andcrime)ofbattery.True,shedidnotinfactdowhatsheintendedtodo:sheintendedtohittheoffendingskier,andsheinfacthitanotherskier.Butthetransferredintentruleholdsthistobegoodenoughforgovernmentwork,ieadequateforconviction.Sheotherwisedidwhatsheintendedtodo,andthedifferenceintheidentityofthevictimisputasideasimmaterial.

Sucharuleatmostcreatesasafeharbourwhereweknowcertaindifferencesdon'tmatter.Leftunaidedbysuchrulesareallotherdifferences.Forexample,thedefendantintendstohitvictimwithastick,butdoesnotintendtoinjurethevictimwithsuchalightblow(thevictimis,unbeknownsttodefendant,peculiarlysusceptibletoinjury),90orthedefendantintendstoputoutthevictim'slefteyewithablowfromastick,butinsteadputsoutthevictim'srighteye;91orthedefendantintendstoscareavictimintothinkingthatthedefendantwantstokillherbydoinganactwithsomeriskofkillingher,butthatactactuallydoeskilltheintendedtargetofscaring.92Incasessuchasthese,whethertheactdoneinexecutionofsomeintentioncomescloseenoughtothetypeofactintendedisleftopenbythetransferredintentrule.

Indeed,thisruledoesnotevencreatethesafeharbouritpurportstocreate.Supposeadefendantintendstohithisgirlfriend,whohappenstobeholdingtheirbaby;sheturnstoavoidtheblow,whichlandsonthebabyinstead.93Normallythetransferredintentrulewouldsaythatthetypeofactthedefendantintendeddifferedonlyintheidentityofthevictimfromtheactdone,andthisisgoodenoughtobeadjudgedculpableforintendedhittingofthechild.Yetthismaywellnotbetruewherebatteryonanadultisregardedlightly(amisdemeanour),whereasbatteryonachildisregardedmuchmoreseriously(a

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felony).Ifthedifferenceinthemoralwrongnessofthesetwoacttypesisasgreatassuchstatutorygradingschemesassume,thenoneshouldbereluctanttotransfertheintentinthemannercontemplatedbythetransferredintentdoctrine.94Thedefendantonlynegligentlyorperhapsrecklesslyhitthechild,evenifhealsoattemptedtohitthegirlfriend.(p.205)

Noticethatthissecondmatchquestionagainsupposesthatpsychologycandeliverupratherpreciseformulationsofwhatitisthatsomedefendantintendedonaparticularoccasion.Evenwithsuchpreciselyformulatedobjectsofintentionswehavetheclassificatorydifficultiesadvertedto,butwithoutsuchformulationsthecomparisonishopelesstobeginwith.

6CONCLUSIONThelawoftortsandofcrimes,togetherwiththemoralityofblamingbehindboth,thusmakesalotofassumptionsaboutwhatistrueinpsychology.TheyassumethatpersonsactbecauseofrepresentationalstatesthatreallyexistandthatexhibitIntentionality,thatthosestatesareofthreedistinctkinds,thatthosekindsarerelatedtooneanotherinthedistinctivepatternofpracticalrationalitychartedearlier,thatintentionsareapartofthatschema,thatthereisadifferenceinkindbetweenintentions(orintentionscumdesires)andbeliefs,thatintentionscanbecausallyefficacious,thatsomeformofprivilegedaccessexistswithrespecttoanintentionbyitsholder,thatthereisafactofthematteraboutwhatsomeoneintendsonaparticularoccasion,andthatthiscanbeformulatedwithsufficientprecisiontoallowthetwocomparisonsresponsibilityassessmentsrequireinordertogradeculpabilitybyintentions.Atallorder,tobesure,butalotwecareaboutbesidesusingintentionstomarkmostseriousculpabilitygoesbytheboardifpsychology/neurosciencecannotdeliveronsuchanorder.

Notes:(1)OliverWendellHolmes,Jr,TheCommonLaw(Boston:Little,Brown,1881),7.

(2)MorissettevUnitedStates,342US246(1952).

(3)IexplorethedoctrineofdoubleeffectinMSMoore,PatrollingtheBordersofConsequentialistJustifications:TheScopeofAgent-RelativeRestrictions(2008)27LawandPhilosophy3596,reprintedasch3ofMSMoore,CausationandResponsibility(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009);seealsoLAlexanderandMSMoore,DeontologicalEthics(2007)StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,http://plato.stanford.edu.

(4)IexplorethisthesisatlengthinMSMoore,ActandCrime:ThePhilosophyofActionanditsImplicationsforCriminalLaw(Oxford:Clarendon,1993),ch6.

(5)Onthegeneralideaofanormativepower,seeJRaz,PracticalReason(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1976).

(6)SeeCFried,ContractasPromise(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1982).

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(7)EgEAllanFarnsworth,Contracts(3rdedn;NewYork:Aspen,1999),120.Thismatteriscomplicatedbytheobjectivetheoryofcontractsandbydoctrinesofpromissoryestoppel,whereanunreasonablycreatedappearanceofapromisemaycreateapromise-likeobligation.

(8)Hurdsexamples,inherTheMoralMagicofConsent,(1996)LegalTheory2,12146.

(9)Ibid.

(10)Withthewrittenpermissionoftheauthor,TomBatiuk.

(11)ThesesensesarefruitfullydistinguishedinHLAHart,Postscript:ResponsibilityandRetribution,inhisPunishmentandResponsibility(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1968),21112.

(12)Ibid.

(13)WHohfield,FundamentalLegalConceptions(NewHaven,Conn:YaleUniversityPress,1919).

(14)ExploredinmuchgreaterdetailbymeinMSMoore,LawandPsychiatry:RethinkingtheRelationship(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1984),ch2;MSMoore,PlacingBlame:AGeneralTheoryoftheCriminalLaw(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1997),3545,1913.

(15)SpecialandgeneralmensreaaredistinguishedinSKadish,TheDeclineofInnocence(1968)26CambridgeLawJournal273.

(16)ThissecondrequirementofculpabilityinthespecialsenseiscodifiedintheAmericanLawInstitutesModelPenalCode,2.03(2)and2.03(3)(Philadelphia:ALI,1962).Asappliedtonegligence,therequirementisveryproblematic.SeeHHurdandMSMoore,NegligenceintheAir(2002)3TheoreticalInquiriesinLaw333411,reprintedinMoore,CausationandResponsibility,chs79.

(17)Thedistinctionofculpabilityfromwrongdoingisawatershedissueinresponsibilitytheory,boundupwiththedistinctionbetweenjustificationandexcuse.SeegenerallyMoore,PlacingBlame:AGeneralTheoryoftheCriminalLaw,19193.

(18)Onthecapacity/opportunitytheoryofexcuse,seeibidch13.

(19)Asometimesdisputedprint.Foritsdefence,seeibid40810.

(20)AsIargueinCausationandResponsibility,chs3and18.

(21)AsJLAustinprescientlysaid,ordinarylanguagewillnotbethelastwordinmetaphysicsbutsometimesitwillbethefirstword.JLAustin,APleaforExcuses(1956)57ProceedingsoftheAristotelianSociety130.AsAustinalsosaw,thelawisoftena

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fertilegroundfromwhichtominetheinsightsofcommonsense.Ibid.

(22)Asin,eg,GEMAnscombe,Intention(2ndedn;Ithaca,NY:CornellUniversityPress,1963);andHLAHart,IntentionandPunishment,inhisPunishmentandResponsibility.

(23)FromHMorris(ed),FreedomandResponsibility(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1961),160.

(24)SeeHart,IntentionandPunishment,122;AMeleandPMoser,IntentionalAction(1994)28Nous3968,at45.

(25)Theconsequence/circumstancedistinctionisexploredinMoore,ActandCrime,197213.

(26)Thelocusclassicusofthedere/dedictodistinction(althoughnotputintheseterms,andnotappliedtointentionsspecifically)isWVOQuine,WordandObject(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1960).

(27)PeoplevHood,1Cal3d444,462P2d370(1969).

(28)JDressler,UnderstandingCriminalLaw(2ndedn;NewYork:MathewBender,1995),10507.IamgiventounderstandthatEnglishlawislessuniformonthispoint.

(29)TheModelPenalCodeaccomplishesthisresultbydefiningitstermforspecificintent,purpose,asmereknowledgewithrespecttocircumstances(whereasforconsequences,purposeisdefinedmotivationallyasconsciousobject).ModelPenalCode,2.02(2)(a).

(30)Dressler,UnderstandingCriminalLaw,1389.TheHouseoftheLordssoughttochangetheEnglishcommonlawonthispoint,inRvMorgan[1976]AC182.

(31)Ibid137.

(32)ModelPenalCode,2.04(1).

(33)ModelPenalCode,2.06,5.01(1).

(34)Moore,ActandCrime,1989.

(35)SmithvBocklitz,344SW2d97(Mo1961).

(36)18USCode,1503.

(37)Otherpopularterms,suchasheedlessly,maliciously,carelessly,etc,aretoberegimentedtothelegalcategoriesofrecklessnessornegligence.

(38)BCardozo,LawandLiterature:AndOtherEssaysandAddresses(NewYork:Harcourt,Brace,andWorld,1931),97101.Cardozosactualchainofinferencewas:Therecanbenointentwithoutchoice,yetthechoicewithoutmoreisenoughtojustify

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theinferencethattheintentwasdeliberateandpremeditatedIfintentisdeliberateandpremeditatedwheneverthereischoice,thenintruthitisalwaysdeliberateandpremeditated,sincechoiceisinvolvedinthehypothesisoftheintent.

(39)CommonwealthvCarroll,194A2d911,917(Pa1963).

(40)PeoplevAnderson,447P2d942(Cal1968).

(41)Dressler,UnderstandingCriminalLaw,4908.

(42)ModelPenalCode,210(1)(b).

(43)Oratleastnotvoluntary.SeeGRyle,TheConceptofMind(London:Hutchinson,1949),6974.

(44)Moore,ActandCrime,ch6.

(45)EdingtonvFitzmaurice,LR29ChDiv459,483(1882).

(46)DefendedinMSMoore,ObjectivityinLawandEthics(Aldershot,UK:AshgatePress,2004),ch6.

(47)IhaveadoptedMichaelBratmansversionofpracticalrationalityinseparatingintentionfromdesire.SeeMBratman,Intention,PlansandPracticalReason(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1987).Theolderviewistolumpintentionsinwithdesiresasageneralproattitude.SeeegDDavidson,Intention,inhisEssaysonActionsandEvents(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1980).

(48)Thesufficiencyofpforqistoostrong.Intention/beliefconsistency(astrandofpracticalrationality)onlyrequiresthatitnotbethecaseonebelievesitimpossiblethattheactiondescribedbypwillbringaboutthestateofaffairsdesired(q).

(49)Onthis,seethequalificationforlaterEnglishcommonlawinn30above.

(50)ModelPenalCode,2.02(5)defineswilfulblindnessasbelieftoahighprobabilitythatsomefactexists,solongasonedoesnotbelievethatitdoesnotexist.

(51)SeeegAGoldman,ATheoryofHumanAction(EnglewoodCliffs,NJ:PrenticeHall,1970),5563.

(52)Ibid61.

(53)AsinDressler,UnderstandingCriminalLaw,1779.

(54)Oneimportantstrandoftheargumenthereisbasedonthefindingthataction-initiatorsinthebrainareformedbeforethesubjectisawareofhisintentiontomove;ifoneidentifiesintentionsonlywithawareness,onegetstheepiphenomenalconclusionquickly.ThedebatebeginswiththeworkofthelateBenjaminLibetandhisassociates.See

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egBLibet,CAGleason,EWWright,andDKPearl,TimeofConsciousIntentiontoActinRelationtoOnsetofCerebralActivity(ReadinessPotential).TheUnconsciousInitiationofaFreelyVoluntaryAct(1983)106Brain623642.RelatedistheworkofDWegner(TheIllusionofConsciousWill(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,2002))andHaggard(PHaggardandMElmer,OntheRelationsBetweenBrainPotentialsandtheAwarenessofVoluntaryMovements(1999)126ExperimentalBrainResearch12833).ThemostrecententryistheworkofJohn-DylanHaynes(J-DHaynesetal,ReadingHiddenIntentionsintheHumanBrain(2007)17CurrentBiology3238;UnconsciousDeterminantsofFreeDecisionsintheHumanBrain(2008)11NatureNeuroscience5435).Thisworkinneuroscienceissubjecttovastlydifferentappraisalsintermsoftheefficacyofintentionsincausingbehaviour.Seethediscussionsin:thesymposiumonLibet,in(1985)8BehavioralandBrainSciences;SPockett,WPBanks,andSGallagher(eds),DoesConsciousnessCauseBehavior?(Cambridge:MA:MITPress,2006).MyownentryinthefrayisLibetsChallenge(s)toResponsibleAgency,inLNadelandWSinnott-Armstrong(eds),ConsciousWillandResponsibility:ATributetoBenjaminLibet(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010).

(55)Orsowecompatibilistshavelongargued.SeeMoore,PlacingBlame,ch12.

(56)SeeegFSiegler,UnconsciousIntentions(1967)10Inquiry5167.

(57)IdefendaversionofthisthesisinMSMoore,ResponsibilityandtheUnconscious(1980)53SouthernCaliforniaLawReview1563675,rewrittenaschs7,9,10ofLawandPsychiatry.Theessentialideaisthatweneedmentalstatesofpersonstohavesomeconnectiontoconsciousnessinsomesenseifwearetodistinguishsuchstatesfromthesub-personalstatesofbrainfunctioningthatarenotatallaccessibletoconsciousness.

(58)Inpartbecausehabitualandskilledroutinesuseadifferentuppermotorpathwaythandoconsciouslyplannedroutines,manyneuroscientistsclassifysuchroutinesasunintended.Morality,commonsensepsychology,andthecriminallawbuiltonbothclassifysuchroutinesasintended.ModelPenalCode,2.01(2)(d).

(59)InLawandPsychiatry,ch7,Idistinguishweakerfromstrongersensesofprivilegedaccesstoourownmentalstates;allformsarecashedoutintermsofverbaldispositions,however.Ialsoallowthatonemighthavedeferredprivilegedaccesstounconsciousmentalstates.

(60)Noticethatalthoughtheintentionthedefendanthadonaparticularoccasionisaparticular,itsobjectisarepresentationofatypeofaction.ThisisontheQuineansuppositionthatintentionsandpredictivebeliefsneverrefertoparticularact-tokensthatwilloccurinthefuture,onlytotherebeinginthefuturesomeinstanceofanacttype.Thisadmittedlyfliesinthefaceofordinaryspeech(heintendedthekilling,hepredictedthefire)butisanecessaryregimentationtoavoidheavydutyuseofpossibleworldsandtrans-worldidentityclaims.SeeMSMoore,IntentionsandMensRea,inPlacingBlame,461,n27.

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(61)IexploretheseproblemsinlegalinterpretationinMSMoore,TheSemanticsofJudging(1981)54SouthernCaliforniaLawReview151294,andTheNaturalLawTheoryofInterpretation(1985)58SouthernCaliforniaLawReview277398.

(62)EKeedy,CriminalAttemptsatCommonLaw(1954)102UniversityofPennsylvaniaLawReview4647.

(63)Intentionality(withacapitalI)isatermofart.Itwasrediscovered(fromitsearlyusebytheScholasticsintheMiddleAges)byFranzBrentano,whomystifieditwithhisnotionsofIntentionalinexistence.Forsomehistory,seeDDennett,ContentandConsciousness(London:Routledge,1969),ch2.Foranupdate,seeJPerry,Intentionality,inSGuttenplan(ed),BlackwellsCompaniontothePhilosophyofMind(Oxford:Blackwells,1994),38695.

(64)Weinfer,thatis,I(p)fromI(p)viaapremiseofconsistentintentions,namely,(I(p)andI(p)).

(65)FrommymemoryofthelatePhillippaFootesEthicsclassatUC-Berkeleymanyyearsago.

(66)MSMoore,PrimaFacieMoralCulpability,inPlacingBlame,405.

(67)JBentham,TheLimitsofJurisprudenceDefined(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1945),343.

(68)RvFaulkner,13CoxCrimCas550,555,557(1877).

(69)Ishallhereignorewhateverdifferencesmayexistbetweenthecommonlawsmoralwrongdoctrine(RvPrince,2CrownCasesReserved154(1875))andtheModelPenalCodesmaterialelementsdoctrine(whereanelementismaterialifandonlyifitaffectstheevilsoughttobepreventedbythelawdefiningtheoffense:ModelPenalCode,1.13(10)).Forwhateverthenuanceddifferenceshere,bothdoctrineseliminateelementsofoffencesfrommensreaconsiderationonmoralgrounds.

(70)CaliforniaPenalCode,632.

(71)GYaffe,ConditionalIntentandMensRea(2007)10LegalTheory277.

(72)TheUSSupremeCourtadoptedthisversionofthemaximinthecar-jackercase,wheretheintentwasassaultwithadeadlyweaponifthevictimdidnotgiveuphercar.HollowayvUnitedStates,526US1(1999).

(73)ModelPenalCode,2.02(6)simplyprovidesthat:Whenaparticularpurposeisanelementofanoffense,thatelementisestablishedalthoughsuchpurposeisconditional,unlesstheconditionnegativestheharmorevilsoughttobepreventedbythelawdefiningtheoffense.

(74)HollowayvUnitedStates,526US1(1999)(ScaliaJdissenting).

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(75)SeegenerallyDressler,UnderstandingCriminalLaw,1412.Thecommonlawholdstheoffendertothegreaterdegreeofthecrimeheinfactdid;theModelPenalCode(s2.04(2))holdstheoffendertothelesserdegreeofthecrimehethoughthewasdoing.

(76)SeegenerallyDressler,UnderstandingCriminalLaw,47989.

(77)DirectorofPublicProsecutionsvSmith[19603]AllER161.

(78)Theassault/batteryinterchangeismostforthrightlyacknowledgedbytheRestatementofTorts(Second),13,18,21.

(79)StatevHatley,72NM377,384P.2d252(1963).

(80)Iignoretheutilitarianrationalizationssometimesproducedindefenceofthesedoctrines.

(81)UnitedStatesvInternationalMineralsandChemicalCorp,402US558,563(1971).

(82)TheModelPenalCodeseeswithadmirableclaritythisfact:thedoctrinethatignoranceofthelawdoesnotexcuseisnotreallyaboutexcusesatall;itisaboutwhatmentalstatesarerequiredforguilt.TheCodealsoseesthatforguilttheaccusedneedholdthecorrectinterpretationofthelawsnomorethanheneedhaveknowledgeofsuchlawsexistence.ModelPenalCode,2.02(7).

(83)PeoplevMarrero,69NY2d382,507NE3d1068(1987).

(84)LarryAlexanderhasagoatdisentanglingsomeoftheseissuesinhisInculpatoryandExclupatoryMistakesandtheFact/LawDistinction(1993)12LawandPhilosophy3370.

(85)Fortheneuroscientificchallengestothefolkpsychology,seeSMorse,DeterminismandtheDeathofFolkPsychology:TwoChallengestoResponsibilityfromNeuroscience(2008)9MinnesotaJournalofLaw,Science,andTechnology135.Forthechallengesfromwithinphilosophy,seeJGreenwood(ed),TheFutureofFolkPsychology(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991).

(86)JFodor,TheLanguageofThought(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1975);Fodor,Psychosemantics:TheProblemofMeaninginthePhilosophyofMind(Cambridge,MA:MITPress,1987).

(87)SeethecitationsinMoore,LawandPsychiatry,25265.

(88)SeegenerallyWProsser,TransferredIntent(1967)45TexasLawReview65062.

(89)SeeegDressler,UnderstandingCriminalLaw,109.

(90)ThefactsofVosburgvPutney,78Wis84,47NW99(1890);80Wis523,50NW403

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(1891).

(91)DiscussedinMoore,IntentionsandMensRea,4756,n50.

(92)SeetheamazingfactsofHyamvDirectorofPublicProsecutions[1974]2AllER41,particularlyasconstruedintheopinionofLordHailsham.

(93)ThefactsofStatevCantua-Ramirez,718P2d1030(Ariz,1986).

(94)AswerethethreedissentingmembersoftheArizonaSupremeCourtinCantua-Ramirez,ibid.

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