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Interests Aren’t Everything: An Exploration of Economic Explanations of Immigration Policy in a New Destination Julie Stewart* and Kenneth P. Jameson** ABSTRACT Current debates around US immigration policy are playing out against a backdrop that has changed significantly in the past 20 years: immigrants have increasingly gravitated towards ‘‘new destinations’’; a large and growing portion of immigrants are undocu- mented; and the federal vacuum in responding to the promise and problems of these new immigration trends has devolved policy to the states. As a result, we have seen inno- vation on the state level as policymakers seek to accommodate, welcome or resist immi- gration, with varying degrees of success. In this paper, we explore the case of Utah as a new immigration destination, seeking to understand its transformation from a state with very inclusive immigrant policies as late as 1999 to one currently adopting highly restric- tive immigrant policies. To explain this trajectory, we test three prominent materialist theories of public policy: instrumentalism, structuralism and strategic-relational approaches. We draw on a decade’s worth of primary data – including data on state- level legislation, key economic indicators, public statements concerning immigration from the private business sector and the LDS Church, and the editorial content of the state’s two major newspapers regarding immigration – to examine the policy explana- tions that grow out of interest-based theories of the state. Whereas these theories provide robust explanations for a large and diverse array of public policies, we find that they fall short in explaining immigration policy. While conventional wisdom – and extensive scholarly research – suggests that economic interests drive policy, we find that the poli- cies around immigrants challenge this economic reductionism, suggesting the need for more complex and ideational accounts of this important phenomenon. INTRODUCTION As debate in the United States (USA) again focuses on comprehensive immigration reform, scholars, policy pundits and politicians confront three recent immigration trends. First, we have witnessed a surge in immigration to the USA in the last decade of the twentieth * Department of Sociology, University of Utah. ** Department of Economics, University of Utah. Ó 2012 The Authors Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., International Migration Ó 2012 IOM 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, International Migration and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. ISSN 0020-7985 doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2012.00765.x
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Page 1: Interests Aren’t Everything: An Exploration of Economic Explanations of Immigration Policy in a New Destination

Interests Aren’t Everything:An Exploration of Economic

Explanations of Immigration Policy ina New Destination

Julie Stewart* and Kenneth P. Jameson**

ABSTRACT

Current debates around US immigration policy are playing out against a backdrop thathas changed significantly in the past 20 years: immigrants have increasingly gravitatedtowards ‘‘new destinations’’; a large and growing portion of immigrants are undocu-mented; and the federal vacuum in responding to the promise and problems of thesenew immigration trends has devolved policy to the states. As a result, we have seen inno-vation on the state level as policymakers seek to accommodate, welcome or resist immi-gration, with varying degrees of success. In this paper, we explore the case of Utah as anew immigration destination, seeking to understand its transformation from a state withvery inclusive immigrant policies as late as 1999 to one currently adopting highly restric-tive immigrant policies. To explain this trajectory, we test three prominent materialisttheories of public policy: instrumentalism, structuralism and strategic-relationalapproaches. We draw on a decade’s worth of primary data – including data on state-level legislation, key economic indicators, public statements concerning immigrationfrom the private business sector and the LDS Church, and the editorial content of thestate’s two major newspapers regarding immigration – to examine the policy explana-tions that grow out of interest-based theories of the state. Whereas these theories providerobust explanations for a large and diverse array of public policies, we find that they fallshort in explaining immigration policy. While conventional wisdom – and extensivescholarly research – suggests that economic interests drive policy, we find that the poli-cies around immigrants challenge this economic reductionism, suggesting the need formore complex and ideational accounts of this important phenomenon.

INTRODUCTION

As debate in the United States (USA) again focuses on comprehensive immigration reform,scholars, policy pundits and politicians confront three recent immigration trends. First, wehave witnessed a surge in immigration to the USA in the last decade of the twentieth

* Department of Sociology, University of Utah.

** Department of Economics, University of Utah.

� 2012 The AuthorsPublished by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., International Migration � 2012 IOM9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, International Migrationand 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. ISSN 0020-7985

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2435.2012.00765.x

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century, largely in response to the nation’s growing prosperity. Annual immigration grewthroughout the 1990s and peaked in 1999–2000 (Passel and Suro, 2005). Immigrationaccounted for one-third of the US population increase during the 1990s, as foreign-bornresidents increased from 20 million to over 31 million (Martin and Midgley, 2006: 16).The second trend revolves around the changing geography of immigration destinations.

While in the past, immigrants mostly settled in six states – California, New York, New Jer-sey, Illinois, Texas and Florida – newer migrants have dispersed much more widely, movingto cities and states with little recent experience of foreign in-migration. These ‘‘New Destina-tions’’ (Massey, 2008) or ‘‘New Gateways’’ (Singer 2004) include cities and towns in theSouth, the Mid-West and the Inter-Mountain region.Finally, there is a change in who migrates, with undocumented or illegal migrants now out-

numbering authorized migrants. Between 1992 and 1997, the level of annual unauthorizedimmigration was just over three-quarters of legal, permanent immigration. In 1999–2000, itexceeded legal immigration by 2 per cent, and by 2002–2004 it was 7 per cent greater (Passeland Suro, 2005: 2).While the USA has always been a ‘‘nation of immigrants’’, it has never offered a consistent

policy for immigrant integration. Immigration strikes fear into some people’s hearts, whileothers embrace it as an energizing economic force. The three changes noted above complicatethis already contested issue. Immigration policy is further confounded because in the pastdecade, the federal government has failed to pass comprehensive immigration reform. Thisfederal vacuum has pushed policy to the state level, and many individual states have craftedimmigration policies to grapple with the promise and problem of immigration.State governments have displayed an unprecedented level of activity around immigration

in recent years. Between 2005 and 2008, the number of proposed state-level immigration lawsincreased from 300 to 1,305 bills annually (NCSL, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009). These bills rangefrom the welcoming – such as providing in-state tuition benefits to the children of undocu-mented residents – to the repressive. Laws to deputize local law enforcement personnel to actas immigration agents – as has occurred in Georgia, Oklahoma and Utah – are a casebookexample of the latter. Unfortunately for new migrants, the trend across states is away fromreceptive policies towards repressive ones. Arizona’s 2010 law – which grants police theauthority to stop anyone suspected of being present in the country illegally – is a recentexample of this trend.How can we explain this trend in state-level immigration policy? Why have states moved

from inclusive to restrictive policies? The immigration policy history of one state that mirrorsthe main migration trends identified earlier can provide some answers. When Mormon set-tlers arrived in Utah in 1847, their leader Brigham Young declared, ‘‘This is the Place.’’ Mor-mon migrants quickly set to work creating an oasis in the desert. Today, Utah remains theplace for newcomers, but in this case as a new migration magnet. In recent decades, growingmigration flows have created increasing pockets of ethnic diversity. For example, the foreign-born population of the Salt Lake City–Ogden metropolitan area grew by 174 per cent duringthe 1990s (Singer, 2004: 21). Nationally, Utah also had the sixth highest increase in the rateof foreign-born residents in the 1990s (Kochhar, 2006: 3). Research based on census andother data indicates that up to 50 per cent of the new international immigrants into Utahwere undocumented (Passel, 2005).Utah also exemplifies state-level immigration policy trends, both the tremendous increase

in legislation and the direction of its change. In the beginning year of this study – 1999 – theUtah Legislature passed only one bill related to immigration. In 2008, lawmakers consideredno fewer than 30 immigration bills.1 Cumulatively, the Utah Legislature discussed 65 billsrelated to immigration. Of those, 83 per cent (N = 54) specifically provided policy responsesto the surge of undocumented residents and the vast majority became increasingly negative

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towards this group as time progressed.2 A snapshot of Utah’s first and most important immi-gration policy, and a look at a more recent one, illustrates this shift.In 1999, Utah Governor Michael Leavitt signed ‘‘House Bill 36 (HB36) – Driver Identifica-

tion Law’’, paving the way for ‘‘undocumented’’ residents to acquire a driver’s licence usingan Individual Tax Identification Number (ITIN) from the IRS. This identification documentallowed them to drive legally, acquire car insurance, open bank accounts, access state servicesand engage in a range of consumer activities. The law was an important mechanism forimmigrant integration; between 1999 and April of 2008, 98,355 persons obtained driver’slicences or Driver Privilege Cards under the programme.3

However, by 2008, Utah had changed from being a state that welcomed immigrants to onethat sought to repel them. That year, the Utah Legislature passed ‘‘Senate Bill 81 (SB81) onIllegal Immigration’’, one of the most restrictive immigration-related bills to date. In particu-lar, SB81 mandated that:

• Public employers and state contractors must verify the citizenship status of allemployees.

• It is illegal to fire a legal citizen while retaining an undocumented worker.• Local law enforcement may carry out immigration law (cross-deputization clause).• County sheriffs must make a reasonable effort to determine citizenship status of

inmates.• It is a criminal offence to transport an undocumented immigrant more than 100 miles.

The bill that passed was actually more moderate than the original. The original bill alsowould have:

• Penalized all businesses for employing undocumented workers.• Provided penalties for people transporting, sheltering or ‘‘harbouring’’ undocumented

residents, including churches and philanthropic organizations.• Repealed in-state college tuition for eligible children of undocumented residents.

How can we understand these dramatic policy changes in Utah’s migration milieu? Canthese findings illuminate our understanding of similar shifts in other states? Finally, to whatdegree can state-level findings shape how we research and debate immigration on the nationallevel?To address these questions, in this paper we utilize several interest-based explanations of

the state (normally the nation-state, but in this case, the federalist state). ‘‘Interests’’ are spe-cific, material advantages that an actor or group will gain from a particular policy and arecentral in explaining many public policy decisions (Cohen and Rogers, 1983; Zysman, 1983).Typically, interest-based explanations highlight the influence that economically powerfulactors within the private sector wield, or they may focus on broader trends within the econ-omy that shape public policy. More recently, interest-based explanations have broadened toexplore how status groups influence the political realm.In this paper, we apply three interest-based theories – instrumentalism, structuralism and

strategic-relational approaches – to examine Utah’s immigration policy trajectory. To opera-tionalize these three approaches, we explore the relationship between immigration laws andsuch factors as unemployment measures, the state’s general economic health and the influ-ence of high-status groups. Whereas interest-based theories have provided robust explana-tions for a large and diverse array of laws, we find that they fall short in explaining Utah’simmigration policies. Our analysis challenges economic reductionism, demonstrating the

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limitations of singular, causal explanations. Instead, in this paper we demonstrate that weneed further research on why immigration policy is an exception to this general theoreticalprinciple. As other states – and the nation – discuss comprehensive immigration reform, it iscritical to understand the forces that drive immigration policy – and those that don’t.Whereas conventional wisdom might prioritize the economic interests behind immigration,we suggest that this approach will provide little traction.4 Discussion now turns to a fullerdiscussion of interest-based theories of the state.

INTEREST-BASED THEORIES OF THE STATE

To understand the origins and outcomes of public policy, one must navigate the delicate bal-ance between interests and ideas. Interest-orientated explanations of public policy suggestthat they originate in the material or economic advantages that an individual or group willgain from a law. Typically, these accounts highlight the influence of economically powerfulactors, or they focus on broader economic trends which shape public policy; a third accountsees ‘‘the state’’ as a matrix of competing interests, but not necessarily exclusively in the eco-nomic realm (Schirm, 2009). These three understandings of the public sector – instrumental-ism, structuralism and strategic-relational approaches – share a focus on interests and anunderstanding of state actors as holding secondary power in the struggles that define politics.Instrumentalism argues that the state is fundamentally a tool that the economically power-

ful wield. Public policies are typically pro-business and outcomes tend to reinforce pre-exist-ing economic advantages. Miliband (1969) and Domhoff (1979) have argued that thecapitalist class is over-represented at all levels of public power and in institutions of opinionformation. Accordingly, persuasion or pay-offs are hardly necessary, given the self-reinforc-ing relationship between the business interests of the capitalist class and public officials. Morerecent research has affirmed the over-representation of wealthy interests in the higher levelsof the public sector (Green, 2007).Instrumentalist theories also point to the power that the economically influential have to

essentially buy or block key votes and public policies. The ‘‘pay to play’’ thesis of politicsexplains how lobbyists use campaign contributions to curry the favour of those who setpolicy agendas. Powerful interests can sometimes literally ‘‘buy enough votes’’ (Koger andVictor, 2009: 485) to achieve their goals. For example, identifying the key interest groups thatblocked the 1993–1994 attempt to reform health care in the USA is essential to understand-ing why it failed. Similarly, the support of groups representing hospitals, pharmaceuticalcompanies and physicians was central to the successful passage of national health care reformmore than 15 years later (McKay and Clark, 2009). Clawson et al. (1998), Mizruchi (1989)and Hall and Deardorff (2006) have documented the disproportionate influence that well-organized and wealthy business interests have on US public policy in such areas as taxation,transportation, energy and the environment.While instrumentalism argues that public policies result from the influence of economically

powerful actors, structuralism argues that who ‘‘controls’’ the state is largely irrelevantbecause in a capitalist economy, politics will correspond to capitalist interests almost natu-rally. This primary insight encouraged Miliband to amend his theory of the state to explainthat ‘‘the state acts on behalf of the dominant ‘ruling’ class’’, but not necessarily ‘‘at thebehest of that class’’ (1973: 85, n.4). As developed by Althusser (1969) and Poulantzas(1973), and later explored by Cohen and Rogers (1983) and Przeworski (1985), there arethree main reasons the state will favour capitalists’ interests even without overt influence.First, state revenues depend on a healthy private sector, one that is favourable to investment

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and profits. If the economic climate sours and tax revenue drops, the ability to implementgovernment policies falters.Second, when there is broad economic distress, unemployment goes up and demands on

state services increase, putting state actors in an unenviable position of having to do morewith less. Finally, as most politicians know, once you are elected, your chances of beingre-elected are strongly shaped by the how well the economy does during your tenure.Although this is truer of politics at the executive level (Atkeson and Partin, 1995; Markus,1988), so-called sociotropic explanations of voting patterns suggest that changing macroeco-nomic conditions strongly shape electoral outcomes (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2009).Together, these arguments demonstrate why there is an elective affinity between capitalisteconomies and public policies.While maintaining a belief in the power of money to shape politics, strategic-relational

approaches – developed by Poulantzas (1978) and expanded by Jessop (1990, 2001) – see thestate as less monolithic. Instead, these neo-Marxian approaches explore the state as a matrixof competing social relations, filled with conflict and contradiction. For them, the statereflects the balance of power between both class and non-class forces. This approach createsmore space to consider the influence that status-orientated groups – religions, professionalgroups and opinion-makers – have on state policy. While not ignoring the impact oftraditionally economically powerful groups, it includes a wider range of influences.

INTEREST-BASED EXPLANATIONS OF IMMIGRATION POLICY IN UTAH

Some studies of migrants’ decisions and attitudes towards migrants support an interest-basedexplanation. For example, Cheng’s (2009) study of net migration across states concluded thatpeople’s choices are consistent with foundational economic theories: they are more likely tolook for jobs and settle in richer states. Similarly, Fennelly and Federico’s (2008) research onrural attitudes towards migration policy concluded that the level of perception that immi-grants are an economic burden on the USA is the most important single predictor of supportfor restrictive immigration policies.We will now explore three interest-based explanations for Utah’s recent immigrant policy

trends. The first revolves around the labour needs of powerful economic interests in Utah. Itis no secret that low-wage immigrant labour is key to profit-maximization within the service,agricultural and construction sectors of the economy. This helps explain the broad alliance ofimmigrant-dependent industry associations headed by the US Chamber of Commerce thatformed the Essential Worker Immigration Coalition. Representing health care, hotels, chainrestaurants, retailers and builders, this group lobbied the past Bush administration for amore liberal immigration policy and against employer sanctions for hiring undocumentedworkers (Tichenor, 2009). In Utah, the service, agriculture and construction sectors alsodepend on immigrant labour. In recent years, immigrants (both documented and undocu-mented) comprise 16 per cent of the state’s workforce (Passel and Cohn, 2009; US CensusBureau, 2007), and are heavily employed in agriculture, manufacturing, construction andtrade (Holzner et al., 2006).Interest-based theories argue that public policy will defend private-sector interests, particu-

larly labour needs. This has been demonstrated on the national level, where we have histori-cally seen increases in anti-immigrant initiatives during periods of high unemployment(Espenshade and Belanger, 1998; Newton, 2005).Given the centrality of immigrant labour to Utah’s economy, in this paper we will test the

following hypothesis:

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The private sector’s labour needs will drive state-level immigration legislation; during timesof low unemployment, there will be pressure to liberalize immigration policies and practices,while during times of high unemployment, we will expect more restrictive immigrationlegislation.

The second hypothesis grows out of structuralist predictions that public policy reflects thebroad needs of the economy. As it applies to immigration policy, it analyses the role ofimmigrants beyond filling jobs. To examine how this applies to Utah, it is necessary to takea broad look at their economic impact. It has been estimated that if all unauthorized immi-grants left Utah, the state would lose $2.3 billion in expenditures, $1 billion in economic out-put and approximately 14,219 jobs, even accounting for eventual market adjustments (ThePerryman Group, 2008). Looking at Mexican immigrants in particular, local researchers haveestimated that they own property valued at more than $984 million, have more than $1 bil-lion in purchasing power, and paid more than $67 million in state and local taxes in 2000(Holzner et al., 2006).While the above demonstrates the broad benefits that immigrants bring to Utah, some

immigration opponents point to the economic costs of immigration. The conventional wis-dom is that higher concentrations of new immigrant labour depress wages and displacenative-born workers (Schlosser, 2004). However, more recent research suggests that overall,immigration offers economic benefits. A new study of 50 years of data finds that for eachpercentage increase in the foreign-born proportion of the workforce, average state-widewages increase by 0.5 per cent (Peri, 2009). A further argument against immigration is thatimmigrants utilize public services – education, health and welfare – to which they don’t con-tribute. However, non-citizens are not eligible for the most common public services such asMedicare, Medicaid, Social Security and TANF (cash assistance). Non-citizens and their chil-dren do utilize K-12 education, emergency medical care and certain preventative healthservices.The question is, do non-citizens pay more taxes than they receive in benefits? A full answer

to this question is beyond the scope of this paper, but a few summary points may illuminatethis issue. First, even non-citizens working under the table pay property taxes, user fees andsales taxes (University of Utah Honours Think Tank, 2007). Second, many immigrants useforged social security cards to acquire work. As a result, immigrants annually contributeapproximately $7 billion to the social security system that they will never receive back(Porter, 2005). These findings may explain why in a recent survey of prominent economists,74 per cent polled said that it had a positive effect, while 11 per cent said it was neutral(Lipman, 2006). Finally, in the only in-depth study of the economic impact of undocumentedimmigrants on a state’s economy, a report commissioned by the Texas Comptroller of PublicAccounts found that undocumented immigrants produced $1.58 billion in state revenue,which exceeded the $1.16 billion received in the form of state services (Strayhorn, 2006).It appears that immigration provides a net advantage to Utah’s economy, and probably

nationally. Government officials face two structural economic imperatives: to have sufficienttax revenue to support public programmes and to foster economic affluence, an importantfactor shaping one’s chances for re-election. Given the powerful influence that immigrantshave on the economy, in this paper we test a second hypothesis:

State-level immigration legislation will protect the economic activity of immigrants.

Finally, strategic-relational approaches to the state urge us to consider the impact of cul-tural and religious influences on public policy. In Utah, the dominant religion is the Churchof Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (LDS), commonly referred to as the Mormon Church.

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As of 2009, Mormons comprised 58 per cent of the population (Pew Forum on Religion &Public Life, 2009), while 80 per cent of the Utah Legislature is Mormon (Bernick andBulkeley, 2008). The LDS Church is also a powerful economic actor in the state, given itsextensive real estate holdings, financial investments and ownership of major media outlets(Ostling and Ostling, 2007).The Mormon Church strongly influences public policy and even has direct access to state

policymakers. Before each year’s legislative session, GOP and Democratic leaders in theHouse and Senate meet with the LDS special affairs committee to discuss legislative items ofmutual interest (Bernick and Bulkeley, 2008). The Church’s influence has been linked to statepolicies such as restrictive liquor laws, daily release from high school to attend religiouseducation, and strict prohibitions against gambling.Immigration is a clear interest for the LDS Church, both because of its membership and

the Church’s proselytizing mission. Latinos make up 30 per cent of all current MormonChurch members, with roughly 2.5 million Latin American members. By 2020, demographersproject that Latinos will be more than 50 per cent of all Mormon Church members(Bardsley, 2005). There are 114 Spanish-speaking congregations in the state (el Nasser, 2006).This constituency will grow, given the higher fertility rates associated with immigrants fromMexico (Perlich 2009). The LDS Church weighs in directly on federal immigration policybecause foreign missionaries proselytizing in the USA are a ‘‘vital part of the missionaryeffort’’ (Davidson, 2000: B6). This is possible thanks to the religious worker visa programme,which the Church has long supported (Burr and Gehrke, 2005; Davidson, 2000).A second cultural influence in the state is the editorial content of the state’s two main newspa-

pers: the Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret Morning News, respectively, the two most widelyread dailies in Utah. Together, they have a peak circulation of nearly 224,000 people in a stateof 2.7 million. The mainstream media – and newspapers in particular – help shape publicopinion on nearly every public policy (Kinder, 1998; Schram and Soss, 2001). Immigration hascertainly been no exception. During the decade of research that this study covers, these twonewspapers published 123 editorials or ‘‘op-ed’’ pieces exclusively on immigration issues.Strategic-relational approaches to the state urge us to consider the religious and cultural

influences that may shape the public policy matrix. Both the LDS Church and the state’sdominant newspapers have specific interests in immigration policies. Accordingly, this paperexplores a third hypothesis:

State-level immigration legislation will reflect the influence of the LDS Church and ⁄or thesentiment expressed in the area’s dominant newspapers.

DATA AND METHODS

To test these hypotheses, in this paper we draw upon primary documents that span a decade,including data on state-level legislation, key economic indicators, public statements from theprivate business sector and the LDS Church, and the editorial content of the state’s twomajor newspapers regarding immigration.

Dependent variables: legislative activity

In this paper, we analyse all immigration legislation (N = 65) proposed, debated and ⁄orpassed by either the Utah House of Representatives or Utah Senate between 1999 and 2008.5

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These bills range from the receptive to the restrictive, with two notable changes over time.The first is quantitative. The level of activity in the first 5 years is relatively low and stable,producing a total of just six immigration bills. In the second half of the study – between2004 and 2008 – there is a nearly tenfold increase in legislative activity, producing 59 bills, asFigure 1 illustrates.The second notable change is qualitative. We coded each bill as welcoming, neutral or neg-

ative in terms of the message it sends to immigrants. Examples of welcoming bills are thosesuch as HB36 and HB144, the legislation that allowed undocumented residents to apply for adriver’s licence and the law that granted in-state tuition benefits to children who came hereillegally with their parents, provided that they attended three years of high school in Utah.SB97 is an example of a neutral bill, one that would create a task force to study and makerecommendations on current and proposed federal and state policy that relates to illegalimmigration. Negative bills restrict immigrant mobility or access to employment or services,or further criminalize the act of residing in a place without authorization. The previously dis-cussed SB81 is a textbook example of this. Standard coding of these 65 bills revealed a dra-matic change in their content. In the first half of the study, there are four positive bills, noneutral bills and two negative bills, for a 2:1 ratio in favour of positive immigration legisla-tion. In the second half of the time period under consideration, there are six positive, fiveneutral and 48 negative bills, producing a greater than 6:1 ratio in favour of negative immi-gration legislation. To explain this shift, we now discuss the independent variables connectedto interest-based theories of the state.

Independent variables

To explore the relationship between immigration legislation and economic interests, in thisstudy we draw on two complementary measures. The first measures employment, given theimportance that interest-based theories place on the supply of cheap and available workers.6

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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

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igra

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FIGURE 1

IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION, 1999–2008

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For the period under consideration, unemployment ranged from a low of 2.7 per cent to ahigh of 5.8 per cent. The second, broader economic measure includes data on employment,inventory levels, production, new orders, prices and reported levels of confidence within thebusiness community.7 Any number higher than 50 indicates expansion, while a number lowerthan 50 indicates constriction. During the relevant period, we see a low of 50.5 and a high of67.The next section examines the more direct influence wielded by Utah’s business commu-

nity. In particular, we searched for evidence of a relationship between immigration legislationand public statements issued by private-sector leaders on the subject. We searched the state’stwo main newspapers for stories in which private-sector leaders commented on immigration.We analysed the relevant articles (N = 96) and did a standard coding, highlighting activities– public appearances, statements and official interview data – which illustrated the activities,attitudes and interests of the business community on immigration.8 While we explore theactual content of the articles below, we note that the frequency of articles is similar to thatof immigration legislation. We found that 75 per cent (N = 72) of the articles were from2004–2008; while between 1999 and 2003, only 24 relevant articles were identified.To explore the influence of the LDS Church on immigration policy, we conducted a similar

content analysis of news reports (N = 93) of relevant activities – public appearances, state-ments at church meetings and official interview data – of LDS Church leaders published inthe state’s two major newspapers.9 As with the other data presented, a temporal patternemerges, with approximately 5 per cent (N = 5) of the articles appearing in the first half ofthe study, while the remaining articles (N = 88) appeared in the second half.To test the final cultural influence on immigration policy, we turned again to the Salt Lake

Tribune and the Deseret Morning News, but this time to measure the influence of the newspa-pers themselves. We analysed the editorial content of 123 articles, 109 editorials and 14op-eds, respectively, and coded them as either supportive or critical of immigration trends ingeneral and of Utah legislation in particular.10 Again, the pattern of little activity between1999 and 2003 (N = 21) and an explosion of activity in the second half (N = 102), emerges.

RESULTS

A labour market orientated hypothesis of the relationship between immigration policy andunemployment trends would predict more restrictive immigration policies during times ofhigh unemployment, when there is already an adequate ‘‘reserve army of the poor’’: desper-ate workers who are willing to accept low wages. Conversely, during times of low unemploy-ment – when business owners are desperate for workers – we would expect to see moreliberal immigration policies to attract migrants to the state.As the data demonstrate, no straightforward relationship exists between immigration policy

and employment trends in Utah. For example, the highest unemployment levels are between2002 and 2004. During this time, there was a low level of legislative action on immigration,as only eight bills were debated. Further, between 2002 and 2003, of the three bills debated,two were welcoming to immigrants and one of them – that which granted in-state tuition toundocumented students – was passed. So the relationship is the reverse of a labour marketexpectation.Unemployment levels are lowest between 2006 and 2008. This coincides with the period in

which immigration legislation exploded, as 47 bills were debated. Of these bills, 37 were nega-tive, which further confirms the inadequacy of a labour market explanation. During thesethree years, the ratios of negative to positive immigration bills are 5:0, 8:1 and 6:1,

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respectively, always favouring the negative bills. This period culminated in the passage ofSB81, the omnibus anti-immigration bill. Contrary to predictions, the height of negative immi-gration legislation happened precisely when the state most needed workers, as Figure 2 shows.The next hypothesis asserts that policymakers will try to protect the economy’s structural

well-being. Given the magnitude of immigrant economic contributions to the state, we wouldpredict that anti-immigrant legislation would be least likely during economic downturns.When the economy is vulnerable, it needs all the workers, taxpayers and consumers it canget. Between 1999 and 2008, Utah enjoyed a robust economy and tremendous growth. Then,in 2008, Utah began to experience the national economic downturn. However, this is pre-cisely the time at which anti-immigrant legislation peaked, contrary to structuralist predic-tions. As Figure 3 shows, there is no discernable relationship between immigration legislationand Utah’s economic health, until the final year, when one rises and the other falls indirections that are the opposite of the theoretical predictions.Another way to measure the policy influence of economic actors is to explore the public

opinions and demands of business leaders. Our analysis concluded that in nearly 95 per centof the public statements (N = 91), the private sector engaged in at least one, but frequentlyall three, of the following activities:

• Defended its right to employ immigrant labour.• Opposed employer sanctions for employing undocumented workers.• Worked to moderate punitive immigration policies.

To illustrate, we highlight a sample of the published statements by business leaders and theresponses from politicians. In 2003, three dozen business leaders met with US RepresentativeChris Cannon on immigration policy. Both newspapers covered the event and quoted Repre-sentative Cannon expressing his desire to work with the private sector: ‘‘This is just thebeginning of what we see as a grass-roots effort to find a legal, clear and consistent way foremployers to hire immigrant workers’’, Cannon stated (Sullivan, 2003: C2).

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Anti-Immigrant Bills Pro-Immigrant Bills Unemployment

FIGURE 2

UTAH LEGISLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT

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In 2006, all of the state’s significant organized business interests united to oppose a pro-posal that employers police the immigration status of their employees, including associationsrepresenting owners of hotels, restaurants, farms and manufacturing interests. Defendingtheir business practices, Utah Restaurant Association President Melva Sine argued, ‘‘We hirepeople based on good faith.’’ She labelled any increased demands on employers as ‘‘one morepolice duty we can’t accept’’ (Oberbeck, 2006: E1).In 2008, representatives of hotels, restaurants, tourism, agriculture, manufacturing, con-

struction, international trade and education united to oppose SB81. This was the largestorganized business effort to oppose proposed legislation in decades. While the business com-munity did not receive everything it wanted, the SB81 Supplemental Bill that had beenpassed had removed all penalties for businesses employing undocumented workers. The bill’ssponsor – Utah Senator Bill Hickman – explained, ‘‘We’re trying to get this bill to be [as]business friendly as possible’’ (Gehrke and Sanchez, 2008: B1).While this demonstrates the private sector’s influence in public policy, it is a pattern of

moderate accommodation. Politicians listen to business leaders and try to incorporate theiropinions and needs, but this is a far cry from instrumentalist claims that powerful economicactors dictate public policy. We have evidence that when businesses oppose particular facetsof immigration legislation, politicians listen to them and remove the strictest penalties. Butthe business community is not driving this legislation. At best, it occasionally slows it down.We next explore whether immigration policy can be better explained by the influence of

the LDS Church, a central Utah institution. All 100 per cent of the public statements(N = 93) have urged moderation in immigration legislation. Historically, the MormonChurch has defended a federal religious worker visa programme. In his congressional testi-mony, Church leader Elder Ralph W. Hardy explained the essential role that long-term reli-gious exchanges across borders have played, bringing ‘‘many benefits to the missionaries, thechurch and to the United States’’ (Davidson, 2000: B6). Five years later, LDS Church leaderslobbied Congress to reject pending immigration legislation that would criminalize religions

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Economic Average Anti-Immigrant Bills

FIGURE 3

ECONOMIC AVERAGE AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT BILLS BY YEAR

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that support undocumented religious workers, and then helped pass federal legislation thatinsulated churches from criminal sanctions for using the volunteer services of undocumentedmembers (Burr and Gehrke, 2005: B4).Closer to home, the Mormon Church has displayed a similarly supportive attitude towards

immigrants. In 2004 and 2005, as anti-immigrant legislation proliferated, church leaderssought to assure undocumented immigrants that they were not backing efforts to limit theiropportunities in Utah. On multiple occasions, the LDS leadership said it did not supportefforts to deprive undocumented workers of driver’s licences or their children of in-statetuition (Burr and Gehrke, 2005; Loftin and Benson, 2004).More recently, in a 2008 inter-faith forum on immigration, Church leader Elder Marlin K.

Jensen stated: ‘‘If there is a church that owes a debt to the immigrant and the principle ofimmigration, it is the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints’’ (Bulkeley, 2008). WhenChurch leaders met with Utah House and Senate leaders prior to the 2008 legislative session,they urged lawmakers to ‘‘approach this subject [immigration] with compassion’’ (Bernickand Bulkeley, 2008). They also successfully lobbied to exempt churches from an original pro-vision of SB81, which would have penalized anyone transporting, sheltering or ‘‘harbouring’’undocumented residents (Bulkeley, 2008).The pattern of Church influence on immigration legislation is similar to that of the busi-

ness community. While the Church is officially ‘‘neutral’’ on immigration policy, it has pub-licly pronounced the benefits it derives from immigration. It has defended its interests inimmigration. Accordingly, the Church has frequently moderated immigration policy. Ithelped reduce the most draconian provisions of SB81 and urged compassion as the UtahLegislature advanced its agenda. While there is no evidence that the Church is dictating thislegislation behind the scenes, our data suggest that the Church occasionally alters its course.Finally, we explore the influence of the editorial content of the state’s two major newspa-

pers on immigration legislation. There was an explosion of editorial content around immigra-tion in the second period of this study. But while we see a pattern of growth in botheditorial content and state policies around immigration, they move in opposite directions, asFigure 4 illustrates.Our qualitative analysis of editorial content revealed an 8:1 ratio supporting liberal immi-

gration policies and criticizing the legislative attempts to restrict them. Editorials highlightedimmigrant contributions to the state and reminded readers of the state’s immigrant back-ground. For example, when immigration issues were heating up in 2005, one newspaperpublished an editorial celebrating Mexican contributions to the state:

The facts and figures roll on, but the implication is clear. Once relegated to the periphery ofsociety in the United States, Hispanic people are now rowing in the mainstream. Some peo-ple see that as troubling, others view it as inevitable. The wisest – we feel – see it as a greatopportunity. (Deseret Morning News, 2005)

Both newspapers have supported provisions that support immigrants – such as in-statetuition and driving privileges – and have opposed measures to repeal them. In defence ofUtah’s policy that extends in-state tuition benefits to qualified children of undocumentedimmigrants, one editorial argued:

Less than 1 percent of students in Utah’s System of Higher Education have used the tuitionwaiver. These students are few and far between because most children of illegal immigrantsstruggle to complete high school, let alone go on to college. Shouldn’t a nation that prizesthat opportunity extend it to all who qualify? (Deseret Morning News, 2006)

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When legislators sought to repeal the policy that allows unauthorized residents to acquiredriving privilege cards, another editorial defended this policy:

It makes no sense to repeal a law that ensures people who drive on Utah’s roadways, regard-less of immigration status, are proficient drivers and have knowledge of Utah’s laws, let alonehave auto insurance. (Deseret Morning News, 2008)

Finally, the editorial content of both newspapers adamantly opposed the anti-immigrantSB81. They specifically highlighted the possible fallout from deputizing law enforcementofficers as immigration agents:

The bill would enlist state and local law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigra-tion laws, a proposal that would shatter bonds between the immigrant communities andpolice officers, who rely on the cooperation of victims and witnesses to do their jobs. Andit contains provisions that would make it more difficult for undocumented residents to con-tinue to make valuable contributions to our culture and economy. (Salt Lake Tribune,2008)

We find that the area’s newspapers have done little to shape immigration policy. Contraryto some accounts that highlight the powerful influences of the mainstream media, when itcomes to the politics of immigration, the printed word has mainly moderated policy. There isno evidence of it holding a central, driving interest.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Interest-based theories of the state have gained traction because of their success in analysingmany public policies, from health care to taxes to energy. Whether because of explicit

0

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Bill

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FIGURE 4

EDITORIAL COVERAGE OF IMMIGRATION AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT LEGISLATION, 1999–2008

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pressure or implicit influence, economic interests and status groups can drive public policy.But not every policy. As we have demonstrated in this study, interest-based theories of thestate – instrumentalism, structuralism and strategic-relational approaches – poorly predict thetrajectory of immigration policy in Utah.First, in this study we find no support for the instrumentalist hypothesis that immigration

policy will reflect the state’s need for cheap and abundant labour. Even though immigrantlabour contributes centrally to Utah’s economy, immigration policy and unemploymenttrends move in opposite directions. Contrary to labour market expectations, when unemploy-ment peaked, the legislative milieu for immigrants was welcoming. When unemployment waslowest – and conceivably employers were more desperate for workers – we see the oppositetrend: the tremendous growth of anti-immigrant legislation. When we factor in the influenceof the private sector, we find that business interests do, indeed, moderate immigration policy.They successfully lobbied for the removal of provisions deemed most unfriendly to employ-ers. But this is quite a deviation from the claim that private interests drive public policy.Structuralism maintains that politicians will almost naturally make decisions to safeguard

the overall health of the economy. Whether due to their desire to be re-elected, or becausethey want adequate tax revenue for existing programmes, politicians try to make policy deci-sions that boost economic bottom lines. As workers, taxpayers and consumers, there is broadevidence that immigrants contribute to general prosperity. Thus, politicians should protectthese contributions. However, in this study we demonstrate that when the state reached itshighest point of economic vulnerability in a decade, anti-immigrant policy proposals peaked– exactly the opposite of the theory’s prediction. As such, structuralism does little toilluminate immigration policy in Utah.Finally, we review strategic-relational explanations of immigration policy, focusing on two

institutions with considerable status: the LDS Church and local newspapers. With its immi-grant past and its growing reliance on immigrant members, the Mormon Church has manymotivations to support inclusive immigration policies. And the record indicates that it has.Yet its actual influence with the Utah Legislature has been less powerful than expected. Itsucceeded in eliminating one SB81 provision that would have significantly damaged its prose-lytizing practices. But the anti-immigrant trend in Utah state policy continues, even asChurch leaders have called for compassion. The same is true of the influence of the areanewspapers. Both newspapers have supported pro-immigrant policies and criticized punitivepolicies. Yet there is little evidence that these editorials have had a significant impact. Atbest, it seems that the mainstream media helped moderate some of the more radical provi-sions of immigration policies, yet never played a central role in shaping the terms of theimmigration debate.While these data highlight the inability of interest-based theories of the state to explain

immigration policy, they face limitations. First, these data do not incorporate other meth-ods to measure influences on policymakers, such as interviews with lobbyists. Second, weknow that activist organizations can fundamentally shape policy outcomes (Amenta andCaren, 2004; Bernstein, 2003). During the past decade, a plethora of organizations haveattempted to influence immigration politics, ranging from the Utah Minute Men on theRight to Proyecto Latino on the Left. These are important influences that deserve seriousstudy. We do not incorporate these two approaches in this study because the literaturesexplaining these policy influences work under different suppositions than those on whichinterest-orientated theories of the state are based. Accordingly, they are important subjectsfor future analysis.Our findings identify a major shortcoming of interest-orientated explanations of public pol-

icy. Even the broadest interpretations of this theory only help explain the margins of immi-gration policy. While every public policy is complex, immigration policy may be unique in

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helping divide pre-existing coalitions. As Tichenor (2009) explained, immigration divides peo-ple on the political Left. Those who favour inclusive immigration policies believe that bordersunjustly prohibit people from pursuing economic security and human rights protections. Yetothers on the Left view immigration as a threat to the minimum wage and workplace regula-tions that US union activists have achieved. On the political Right, we see confrontationsbetween pro-business expansionists and border hawks, between cultural protectionists thatwould limit immigration and traditional family values groups that oppose deportationbecause of its effect on family unity. Immigration seems to be one of the most divisive policyareas.However, as the pendulum of immigration policy swings further to the punitive side, vari-

ous factions may coalesce to support a more humane approach. Arizona’s enforcement-onlyimmigration law initially polarized people in Utah. But before the 2011 legislative sessionbegan, a broad coalition of business leaders, community advocates, church leaders of everyfaith and politicians from both parties signed an immigration compact to guide future discus-sions. The Utah Compact emphasizes empathy, highlights the economic contributions madeby undocumented workers, criticizes the separation of families and urges the federal govern-ment to create policy around immigration. One veteran policy analyst said that the compacteffectively renders some of the more punitive immigration bills ‘‘DOA’’ as they head into thelegislative session (Montero, 2010: A1). In Utah, extremists are pushing more people to pro-actively support immigration moderation and to forge coalitions to fight a perceived‘‘common enemy’’.Several questions remain for future research. First, are the trends that we have identified

apparent in other new destination states, such as North Carolina, Tennessee and Colorado?Until recently, Utah was one of the most ethnically and racially homogenous states in theUSA, with the bulk of its growth in diversity occurring in the past two decades (Perlich,2009). Utah is also dominated by one religion, as more than 60 per cent of the state’s popu-lation is Mormon. Given that other new immigration states have a history of greater reli-gious and racial ⁄ ethnic diversity, it is important to see if their immigration-related policiesare equally impervious to economic influences. Likewise, we could explore how these trendscompare to more traditional immigration destinations such as California, New York andTexas. Next, we could ask if immigration policy is a sui generis phenomenon that requires itsown, customized theory, or whether there is another general theory to explain the contradic-tions of immigration policy. Finally, are there other public policy areas – health care, theenvironment, transportation or education – in which we find that interest-based theories alsofall short? We might take clues from Frank’s (2004) evocative exploration of political behav-iour and attitudes in Kansas. He also finds that people are less politically motivated by their‘‘interests’’ and more compelled by emotions, moral values and cultural solidarity. Perhapsthis is also true of state legislators. Future research could build on these findings by movingin one of these directions.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We received financial support for this study from the Russell Sage Foundation for theauthors’ project ‘‘Integration of the Undocumented and Documented in a New Destination:Utah’’. We gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Marti Morris for her help in data collec-tion and Melissa Goldsmith for her help in data preparation. For feedback on earlier draftsof this paper, we wish to thank the members of the University of Utah Department ofSociology Brownbag Research Colloquia.

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NOTES

1. We chose to study the period between 1999 and 2008 because 1999 was the first year in whichlegislation was passed that focused specifically on the challenges of the new wave of undocumentedimmigrants coming to the state. The study ends in 2008 because we argue that was the year inwhich the policy pendulum had moved from one extreme to another – from welcoming to punitivetowards undocumented immigrants.

2. After compiling a list of all bills with the word ‘‘immigrant’’ or ‘‘immigration’’ in the bill title ordescription, we then coded them as either general immigration bills or those pertaining specificallyto undocumented residents. Of the 65 bills identified, 54 bills included ‘‘undocumented’’, ‘‘illegal’’or ‘‘unlawfully present’’ in their title or description.

3. Between 1999 and 2005, 78,851 people took advantage of HB36 and obtained a driver’s licence utiliz-ing an ITIN. After a 2005, the driver’s licence was replaced with a Driver Privilege Card, which allowspeople to legally drive and acquire car insurance, yet is not accepted as a legal form of identification.Between 2005 and the end of 2008, 19,504 additional people had acquired a Driver Privilege Card.

4. Our conclusion resonates with a newly emerging literature that finds interest-based theories ofpolitics less than adequate. See, for example, Frank (2004).

5. Information on Utah’s immigration legislation comes from the public website of the Utah StateLegislature, which contains a searchable database of all legislation proposed, debated and ⁄ or pas-sed between 1999 and 2008. It may be accessed at http://www.le.state.ut.us/. To identify relevantlegislation, we conducted a targeted search utilizing search terms such as ‘‘immigration’’ and‘‘immigrant’’ for the bill’s title or description.

6. Unemployment data come from Utah’s Department of Workforce Service, a state-level office thatcollects and analyses employment data in coordination with the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.The state’s Department of Workforce Service home page may be accessed at http://jobs.utah.gov/opencms/wi/pubs/une/

7. These data come from a monthly state-wide survey compiled by Creighton University economistErnie Goss. We offer special thanks to Ernie Goss and his assistant Susan Stiles for sharing datathat are not publicly available on Goss’s website. Most the data presented here are accessible athttp://www.ernestgoss.com

8. Utilizing the LexisNexis newspaper database, we searched the state’s two main newspapers. We dida directed search of headlines and topic descriptors, utilizing such terms as ‘‘immigration’’ ⁄ ’’immi-grant’’ and ‘‘business’’ ⁄ ’’private sector’’. Our search yielded a wealth of articles (N = 434), whichwe read for inclusion in the study. We discarded articles of tangential importance (N = 338),which left 96 articles for analysis.

9. Using LexisNexis, we conducted a targeted search of headlines and topic descriptors, utilizing suchsearch terms as ‘‘immigration’’ ⁄ ’’immigrant’’ and ‘‘LDS Church’’ ⁄ ’’Mormon Church’’. We identi-fied and reviewed 470 articles, discarding 377 due to tangential importance. We analysed theremaining articles (N = 93).

10. Again using LexisNexis, we searched for editorial content on immigration, utilizing the searchterms ‘‘opinion’’ and ‘‘immigrant’’ ⁄ ’’immigration’’. We identified 152 articles, divided between theeditorials, op-eds and letters to editors submissions. We eliminated the letters to editors (N = 29),as they tend to reflect more extreme views on either side of the spectrum and are not representativeof the media institutions themselves. We analysed the remaining articles (N = 123).

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