NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE (FORTY THIRD COURSE 2003)
INTERFACE BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE: A CASE FOR THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT
By
BRIGADIER GD BAKSHI, SM, VSM
Senior Directing Staff Incharge – Rear Admiral IK Saluja, VSM, SDS (Navy)
(A Thesis Submitted to the National Defence College, New Delhi)
INTERFACE BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE: A CASE FOR THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT
CONTENT SHEET
Sl. No.
Subject Pages
1.
Abbreviations ii-iv
2. Synopsis
v-xii
3. Introduction (a) Hypothesis (b) Aim and Scope
01-06
4.
Chapter I -Examination of Theoretical Aspects: Coercion, Compellence and Deterrence
07-15
5.
Chapter II -Escalation Dynamics: Herman Kahn’s Theories and their Applicability to the Indian Context
16-22
6.
Chapter III -Recent Developments in Military Technology that could generate Conventional Options in the Subcontinent
23-28
7.
Chapter IV -Escalation Models for Conventionalising the Conflict in the Subcontinent
29-42
8.
Chapter V -Limited Conventional War against a Nuclear Backdrop
43-51
9.
Chapter VI -A Recommended Escalation Model for the Indian Context
52-58
10.
Bibliography 59-64
11. Appendices 65-66
ii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABM - Anti Ballistic Missile.
ALCM - Air Launched Cruise Missile.
ARN - Army Reserve North.
ARS - Army Reserve South.
AWACs - Airborne Warning and Control System.
BARC - Bhabha Atomic Research Centre.
C31 - Command, Control, Communication & Intelligence.
CEP - Circular Error of Probability.
DAE - Department of Atomic Energy.
DGMO - Director General Military Operations.
DIPAC - Defense Image Processing & Analysis Centre.
DARPA - Defence Advanced Projects Research Agency (USA).
DRDO - Defence Research and Development Organisation (India).
ECM - Electronic Counter Measures.
FAV - Fast Attack Vehicle
FMCT - Fissile Material Cut off Treaty.
FR - Flexible Response.
GHQ - General Head Quarters (Pakistan).
GZ - Ground Zero.
GPS - Global Positioning System.
Pakistani Formations
iii
HE - High Explosive.
IAF - Indian Air Force.
IGMDP - Integrated Guided Missile Development Plan (India).
ICBM - Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles.
IRBM - Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles.
ISI - Inter Services Intelligence (Pakistan).
JSTARS - Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (USA)
KT - Kilotons.
LC - Line of Control.
LAC - Line of Actual Control.
MBT - Main Battle Tank.
MBRL - Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher
MT - Megatons.
NCA - National Command Authority.
NCP - National Command Post.
NWS - Nuclear Weapon State.
Op - Operation
OOTW - Operation Other Than War.
PAF - Pakistan Air Force
POK - Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.
PAL - Permissive Action Link.
PMO - Prime Minister’s Office.
iv
R&D - Research & Development.
RAW - Research & Analysis Wing (India).
SLBM - Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile.
SAM - Surface to Air Missile.
SF - Special Forces
SSM - Surface to Surface Missile.
TAMER - Technology Advanced Mini-eye-safe Laser Range Finder. (Laser range finding and target designation binoculars used
by US Special Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq)
TMD - Theatre Missile Defence.
UAV - Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
v
SYNOPSIS
INTERFACE BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE: A CASE FOR THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT
Introduction
1. India and Pakistan achieved overt nuclear status in 1998. Nuclear
Theorists of the Kenneth Waltz school had felt that nuclear symmetry would
usher in an era of stability on the subcontinent. Possibly India’s peace overtures
at Lahore were prompted by this analysis. However, in May 1999, the two
countries fought a sharp limited war in Kargil. Two years later in Dec 2001,
terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament’ led to Op PARAKRAM, a full scale
mobilization of the Indian Armed forces for war.
2. Michel Kreepon and Chris Gagne have highlighted two opposing view
points:-
(a) Nuclear Optimists. Theorists led by Kenneth Waltz state that
off setting nuclear weapon capabilities are stabilizing because they
make war too costly to contemplate.
(b) Nuclear Pessimists. Theorists led by Scott Sagan refute this
formulation. They claim the potential danger of nuclear weapons far
outweigh any stabilizing effect. The Initial phase after nuclearisation
is most dangerous.
vi
3. Initial Phase of Nuclearisation. Michel Kreepon also highlights that
the most dangerous phase to control comes in the year immediately after
nuclearisation. The nuclear balance is unclear and tolerance thresholds and red
lines have not been refined.
4. Stability-Instability Paradox. This results in the Stability-Instability
Paradox. Chris Gagne defines it as “to the extent that the military balance is
stable at the level of nuclear war, it will become unstable at the lower levels of
violence”.
5. Pakistani Response. The initial Pakistani response after Chagai was
one of hubris. They felt their nuclear capacity totally negated India’s
conventional superiority. Traditionally high levels of subjectivity led the
Pakistani Generals to peg the sub-continental nuclear threshold at absurdly low
levels. The strong Indian reaction in Kargil, however, had a major sobering
influence. Even as the Cuban Missile crisis had forced the USA to transit from
“Massive Response” to a “Flexible Response Strategy”, Kargil saw the
articulation of Graduated escalation strategies by Pakistan. A spasmodic
nuclear release in response to a conventional Indian offensive, was not a tenable
proposition. However, the levels of subjectivity in Pakistani military thought
are dangerous and could lead to miscalculations. Our perceived restraint during
Op PARAKRAM could have sent the wrong message that could aggravate the
high risk orientation of the Pakistani military elite.
vii
6. Hypothesis. Ever since Pakistan developed its nuclear capability, it has
been acting from a base line presumption that India’s conventional superiority
has been totally negated by the nuclear symmetry. Nuclear weapons inject low
order instability and encourage the Pakistani military elite to intensify the
ongoing Proxy War in J&K. This could have catastrophic consequences. It is
vital therefore to establish the interface between conventional and nuclear
deterrence on the Indian subcontinent through precise escalation models that
generate credible conventional responses to the Proxy War.
7. Scope. The scope of this study encompasses the following:-
(a) Examination of Theoretical Aspects: Coercion, Compellence
and Deterrence.
(b) Herman Kahn’s Theories of Escalation and their application in
the Sub continental Context.
(c) Survey of Recent Developments in Military Technology that
could generate Conventional Options.
(d) Escalation Models for conventionalizing the conflict.
(e) Limited Conventional Wars against a nuclear backdrop.
(f) A Recommended Escalation Model.
8. Aim. To establish the relationship between conventional and Nuclear
Deterrence in the Sub continental context and explore escalation models that
generate credible conventional responses to Pakistan’s Proxy War.
viii
Chapter-I: Examination of Theoretical Aspects
9. Coercion. Daniel L. Bayman and Mathew.C.Waxman define coercion
as the use of threatened force, including the limited use of actual force to back
up the threat to induce an adversary to behave differently than it otherwise
would. Bayman and Waxman argue that coercion can be differentiated into two
distinct categories:-
(a) Deterrence. Stopping an undesired action from occurring (e.g.
US forcing Iraq not to invade Kuwait).
(b) Compellence. Reversing an undesired action (e.g. US forcing
Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait).
10. In the sub-continental case, it is India’s lack of a clear conventional edge
that has failed to deter Pakistan from its Proxy War in J&K. India has to resort
to compellence strategies to force it to abort and roll back the Proxy War.
Chapter-II: Escalation Dynamics: Herman Kahn’s Theories
11. This chapter examines Herman Kahn’s theories on escalation and their
applicability to the Indian context. Kahn defines escalation as a competition in
risk taking. In specific, it deals with the violation of “local” and “central
sanctuaries”, in a limited conflict and the strategy of calculated irrationality.
Kahn had formulated the concept of Escalation Ladders as scenario generators
and examined the metaphor of the “Game of Chicken”. An escalation ladder
ix
traces the precise series of steps that graduate from a cold start to skirmishes,
limited war, full scale conventional war and finally to a nuclear exchange.
Chapter-III: Survey of Recent Developments in Military Technology that
could Generate Conventional Options
12. This chapter surveys the impact of the current RMA with its transparency
revolution and Precision Munitions and the highly lethal impact of Air Power.
It examines some conventional force multipliers which could enhance the
credibility of our conventional responses and generate more response options.
In specific it looks at AWACs, Smerch MBRL Systems, TAMER target
designation Binoculars, Micro and light weight UAVs and Fast Attack Vehicles.
The demonstrated lethality of the Airpower-Special Forces combination offers
us a number of options short of war.
Chapter-IV: Escalation Models
13. This chapter examines the current Pakistani escalation model as
articulated by Lt Gen Sardar FS Lodhi and shows this to be a very cautious and
graduated response in sharp contrast to the pre-Kargil Pakistani rhetoric. Gen
Lodhi has now articulated precise and specific nuclear responses to an Indian
conventional attack that are realistic.
14. It then examines the Indian Escalation models in the form of Escalation
Ladders that could act as scenario generators. The basic options are:-
x
(a) Mobilisation Model.
(i) Partial Mobilisation (Op VIJAY).
(ii) Complete Mobilisation (Op PARAKRAM).
(b) Creep Model. Use of Special Forces (SF) to direct air strikes
on terrorist camps in POK and employment of Smerch MBRLS to
engage such targets. India would have to generate and manage a
limited conflict to coerce Pakistan.
(c) Air War Model. Intensify India’s edge in Air Power by
acquisition of AWACs. Air power is employed ostensibly to attack
terrorist training camps. The actual aim would be to tempt the
Pakistan Air Force (PAF) into major air battles, where AWACs and
air superiority fighters could be used to inflict significant attrition on
the PAF, gain air superiority and thereby set the stage for ground
action.
(d) Deception Model: Conventional War Option. This model is
premised upon surprise gained by an asymmetry of intent. Under the
guise of limited actions across the LC, India graduates in a seamless
fashion to a limited war in J&K. This would suck in Pakistani
reserves Northwards and create strategic imbalance in Pakistan. This
could be exploited by major Strike Corps operations in the
Desert/Semi-desert sectors in a deliberate escalation to a decisive
conventional conflict. Any Pakistani nuclear attack on the Strike
xi
Corps is responded to by a decapacitating Counter Force Strike. This
model has inbuilt phase lines wherein the option to escalate/descalate
could be taken, based upon the reactions by Pakistan and the response
of other global/regional players.
Chapter-V: Limited Conventional War against a Nuclear Backdrop
15. This chapter examines the option of a Limited War in the subcontinent
based upon a Nuclear backdrop. As an information strategy/signalling process,
this option was deliberately highlighted by India in the wake of the Kargil
conflict. This also examines the Chinese “Teach a Lesson” model of Limited
Wars against India in 1962 and against Vietnam in 1979 and studies their
applicability in the existing context.
Chapter-VI: Recommended Escalation Model
16. The current Indian failure to deter the Pakistani Proxy War in J&K stems
from the lack of a credible conventional edge/differential between India and
Pakistan. India will consciously have to embark upon an armament race that
generates such a conventional edge. Such an arms race could cause the
Pakistani economy to collapse. For a graduated escalation model, India should
opt for the Deception War Model that leads to a seamless interface and
transition from low level strikes across LC to a Limited War in J&K and (if the
xii
opportunity presents itself ) to a decisive Conventional War against a nuclear
backdrop.
INTERFACE BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE: A CASE FOR THE INDIAN SUB-CONTINENT
Introduction
1. Background: The Stability-Instability Paradox. India and Pakistan
became overt nuclear powers with their series of explosions in May 1998. This
was an epochal event that has transformed the Paradigm of global security
forever. Theorists of the Kenneth Waltz School felt that nuclear symmetry
would usher in an era of stability on the Indian subcontinent1. However, just a
year later in May 1999, the two countries fought a sharp but limited
conventional conflict in Kargil. The Indian armed forces carried out a partial
mobilization and Pakistan suffered a tactical defeat. The situation was defused
with American mediation. Two years later, in Dec 2002, Pakistani terrorists
attacked the Indian Parliament leading to Op PARAKRAM, a full scale
mobilization of the Indian Armed Forces for war.
2. Michel Kreepon and Chris Gagne2 have highlighted the two opposing
view points amongst nuclear theorists:-
(a) Nuclear Optimists. Theorists led by Kenneth Waltz aver that
off setting nuclear weapon capabilities are stabilizing because they
make war too costly to contemplate. It was probably based upon this
1 Michel Kreepon and Chris Gagne (Eds). “Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia”. Henery.L.Stimson Centre, 2003. Published in India by Vision Books. Gagne quoted on pp.300. 2 Ibid’ Chris Gagne. pp.53.
2
Waltzian paradigm that India made the bold Lahore Peace initiative in
the wake of nuclear testing and overt weaponisation of the
subcontinent. 3
(b) Nuclear Pessimists. Theorists led by Scott Sagan refute this
formulation. They claim that the potential danger of nuclear weapons
far outweigh any stabilizing effect they may usher. The initial phase
after nuclearisation is most dangerous and destabilizing and serious
miscalculation or accidents can occur in this period. Thus the Indian
peace initiative at Lahore received a rude jolt in Kargil.4
3. The Initial Phase Syndrome. Michel Kreepon5 also highlights that the
most dangerous time to control escalation usually comes in the years
immediately after nuclearisation of both adversaries. This initial phase has the
following characteristics:-
(a) Tolerance thresholds and redlines have not been defined.
(b) The nuclear balance is unclear.
(c) The risk-reduction arrangements have not been implemented.
4. Stability Instability Paradox. This results in what nuclear theorists call
the “Stability-Instability Paradox”. Chris Gagne6 defines this as under–
3 Ibid’ Chris Gagne. pp.54. 4 Ibid Chris Gagne pp.54 5 Ibid’ Michel Kreepon pp.300. 6 Ibid’ Chris Gagne. pp.54.
3
(a) “To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of
all out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of
violence.
(b) Michel Kreepon elaborates; “nuclear weapons can generate risk
taking because they presumably provide an insurance policy against
escalation”7.
5. The Pakistani Military Mindset. The prime element of danger in
South Asia, is the highly subjective Pakistani military mindset. Very high
levels of subjectivity and a failure to think through an option have characterized
Pakistani military planning in the last half century8. Both in 1965 and 1971 and
later in 1999, Pakistani strategists failed to factor in the probability of a strong
Indian response. The dominance of the Pakistani Army in that nation polity,
unfortunately stifles any objective debate and analysis and competing view
points cannot emerge in any psychophantic hierarchy. Pakistan’s post nuclear
belligerence and brinkmanship however, could easily have been anticipated.
Almost two decades before nuclearisation, Pakistani military officers had
confided to Stephen P.Cohen that acquisition of nuclear capability would totally
negate the Indian conventional superiority9. Islamic nuclear doctrines spoke
of striking terror into the hearts of enemies. They theorized that the Indian’s
would be so terrified of a nuclear holocaust that they would not dare to exercise
7 Ibid’ Michel Kreepon. pp.300. 8 Brian Cloughly. “A History of the Pakistan Army” Reprint by Lancer Publishers, New Delhi, 1998. 9 Stephen. P.Cohen. “The Pakistan Army” 2nd ed. Oxford University Press 1998 pp141-68.
4
a conventional military response to Pakistani provocations. Ergo sum, this
would give Pakistan a free hand to settle the Kashmir dispute by an
intensification of the Proxy War at the sub conventional or Low Intensity
Conflict (LIC) level. This Pakistani mindset was further fuelled by her
experience in Afghanistan where the Soviets failed to punish Pakistan for its
support to the Mujahideen. Media reports indicate that the plan for the Kargil
intrusions had been drawn up almost a decade earlier (when Gen Musharaff was
the Commanding General of the Frontier Command Northern Area and later
when he was the Director General Military Operations). Musharaff merely
executed it, the moment he was in charge (as COAS). Reeta Choudhari
Tremblay and Julian Schofield have speculated that the Kargil adventure was
the resultant vector of a civilian-military face off in the Pakistani polity.10
6. Aggravation of High Risk Orientation. What is extremely dangerous
therefore is this Pakistani military mindset about the correlation between the
Nuclear and conventional deterrence in the subcontinent. As long as the
Pakistani military elite is convinced that conventional war is ruled out by
nuclear symmetry, it will continue to behave in a highly irresponsible and
belligerent fashion. The Pakistani military elite have a very high risk
orientation premised upon inordinately high levels of subjectivity. Nuclear
weapons, as Kreepon highlights, can generate risk taking because they
presumably provide an insurance against escalation. Nuclear weapons therefore 10 Reeta Chowdhury Tremblay and Julian Schofield “Hybrid Governments and Pakistan: Nuclear Weapons and Conflict over Kashmir”. Aakrosh Apr 2001. Vol 4. No.11 pp.30-31.
5
initially aggravated this high risk orientation of the Pakistani military elite (Gen
Musharaff even recently refused to rule out the occurrence of more Kargil type
conflicts in a media interview to Pronnoy Roy of NDTV). This could prove to
be catastrophic. There is a need therefore to examine the escalation dynamics in
the Indian subcontinent and clearly establish the interface between nuclear and
conventional deterrence.
7. Hypothesis. Ever since Pakistan developed its nuclear capability, it has
been acting from a base line presumption that India’s conventional superiority
has been totally negated by the nuclear symmetry. Nuclear weapons inject low
order instability and encourage the Pakistani military elite to intensify the
ongoing Proxy War in J&K. This could have catastrophic consequences. It is
vital therefore to establish the interface between conventional and nuclear
deterrence on the Indian subcontinent through precise escalation models that
generate credible conventional responses to the Proxy War.
8. Scope. The scope of this study encompasses the following:-
(a) Examination of Theoretical Aspects: Coercion, Compellence
and Deterrence.
(b) Herman Kahns Theories of Escalation and their application to
the Sub continental Context.
(c) Survey of Recent Developments in Military Technology that
could generate Conventional Options.
(d) Escalation Models for Conventionalizing the Conflict.
6
(e) Limited Conventional Wars against a Nuclear Backdrop.
(f) A Recommended Escalation Model.
9. Aim. To examine the relationship between conventional and Nuclear
Deterrence in the Sub continental context and explore escalation models that
generate credible conventional responses to Pakistan’s Proxy War.
10. Theoretical Framework. To achieve the above, it would first be
essential to examine some basic theoretical concepts regarding Coercion,
Compellence and Deterrence.
7
CHAPTER I
EXAMINATION OF THEORETICAL ASEPCTS:
COERCION, COMPELLENCE AND DETERRENCE
Failure of Coercion Strategies
11. The behavioural aspects of a nation state entity is guided by its historical
experience. The traumatic defeat of 1971 had been a highly traumatic and
sobering experience for one generation of Pakistani officers. Unfortunately, the
CIAs intervention against the USSR in Afghanistan, made Pakistan a key
surrogate of the USA. The apparent “victory” of the ISI in the Afghan war gave
the Pakistani military elite a triumphalist mindset. In the Low Intensity Conflict
genre of Jehad, they found a new foreign policy force multiplier that was
especially effective in a symmetric nuclear setting that checkmated the
conventional response capabilities of much stronger antagonists.11
Emboldened by its Afghan experience, the Pakistani military-ISI elite went all
out to destabilize India by promoting insurgency/terrorism in its key border
states of Punjab and J&K. Subsequently this Jehad based terrorism was sought
to be spread to the Indian depth areas as far afield as Bombay and Chennai in
the South. This has amounted to an ideological cum sub conventional assault
11 Brig GD Bakshi, VSM “Afghanistan the First Fault in War” Lancers Publishers, New Delhi, 2002 pp.80. For a fuller treatment of the impact of the Afghan war on the Pakistani military mindset and the onset of hubris and triumphalism.
8
upon the Indian nation state, culminating in a highly symbolic attack on the key
institution of its democratic polity the Parliament itself.
12. Given the nuclear backdrop, the most prudent course for India has been to
coerce Pakistan into ceasing/calling off this proxy war by the threat of
conventionalizing the conflict. This coercive threat has so far failed to carry
conviction. India has experimented with a series of options short of war (or
what the American euphemistically call Operations Other than War-OOTW) to
coerce Pakistan into stopping its Proxy War. Pakistan’s continuing
intransigence seems to highlight the apparent lack of success or possibly only
the partial success of these coercion strategies. It is therefore essential to
examine these basic concepts in more detail.
13. Coercion. Daniel L. Byman and Mathew C.Waxman have defined
coercion as the use of threatened force, including the limited use of actual force
to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to behave differently than it
otherwise would. 12
14. Bayman and Waxman argue that coercion can be differentiated into two
distinct categories:-
(a) Deterrence. They define this as stopping an undesired action
from occurring (eg. The USA forcing Iraq not to invade Kuwait).
12 Daniel L.Byman and Mathew. C. Waxman. “Confronting Iraq: US Policy and the use of Force Since the Gulf War”. National Defence Research Institute RAND-2000. Arlington USA, pp.xi. Paper is useful for its analysis of theoretical concepts against the backdrop of a live crisis situation in Iraq.
9
(b) Compellence. Compellence is reversing an undesired action
that has already taken place. (eg. Forcing Iraq to withdraw from
Kuwait)13.
15. In practice, however, it is difficult to differentiate compellence from
deterrence and this neat compartmentalization may not always be feasible.
Bayman and Waxman argue that coercion is a dynamic process. Even as the
USA or India or any other coercers tries to shape the adversaries behaviour, so
too the adversary tries to reduce the pressure imposed on it. Adversaries
typically try to counter coerce the coercer.14
16. Measuring Coercive Success. They point out that measuring coercive
success is often very difficult. The same action can have both positive or
negative effects, particularly when long term ramifications are taken into
account. Thus it may be very difficult to accurately gauge the success of Op
PARAKRAM in coercing Pakistan. The full scale Indian mobilization for war
did force Pakistan to publically condemn terrorism and ban the LET/JEM and
for a period, scale down its support to the terrorists. However coercion being a
dynamic process, it is difficult to sustain such effects for extended durations.
Absolute binary matrices of success or failure therefore cannot be employed in
coercion strategies. It would be essential to use simple cost-benefit analysis
model for heuristic assessments of coercive measures.15 In the absence of
13 Ibid pp.xi 14 Ibid pp xii 15 Ibid pp.xii
10
precise data it may be premature to pass any value judgements on Op
PARAKRAM. The whole standpoint of judgement changes dramatically if this
mobilization was not for coercive purposes but had an actual offensive design of
compellence. It is, therefore a matter of “intent”. No details of actual intent are
available in open literature or are likely to appear in the foreseeable future. Any
value judgements or measurements of coercive success would, therefore, be
premature at this stage.
17. Factors Effecting the Coercive Process. Bayman and Waxman have
highlighted some key factors effecting the coercive process. These are:-
(a) Recognising Adversaries Centres of Gravity16. It is essential to
identify the adversaries centres of gravity which if destroyed (or
seriously degraded) would cause the enemy resistance to collapse. For
Iraq they identified the centre of Gravity as “Saddam relationship with
his power base”. In the end, key Republican Guard Commanders
were simply bribed off by the CIA and Iraq’s military resistance
collapsed. The Centre of Gravity had been correctly established.
(b) Recognising that Coercion is a Dynamic Process.17 Coercion
is not a single event (e.g. Op PARAKRAM). It is a dynamic and ever
evolving process that must take into account the adversaries reactions
and counter measures.
16 Ibid. pp. xviii 17 Ibid pp. xviii
11
(c) Understanding What cannot be Affected.18 The coercer can
control the level of pain it inflicts, not the adversaries willingness to
accept that pain threshold. The US found that coercing populations to
revolt or adversaries to carry out a coup was extremely difficult in
Iraq.
(d) Improving Long Term Planning.19 There is a need for
continued “low probability-high impact analysis” and employing.
“Red Teams”, to explore the range of possible outcomes and make
policy planning more objective and realistic.
(e) Recognising Self Imposed Limits20. Lastly, it is essential to
recognize the self imposed limits and constraints generated by
political or diplomatic concerns. These self imposed limits are often
far more effective in undermining coercion than any measures taken
by the adversary. Thus the decision not to cross the LC was a self
imposed limit during the Kargil War.
18. Risks of Coercion. The risks of coercion are identified as the “potential
for backfire”.21 Threatening an adversary could well provoke an increase in
unwanted behaviour.
18 Ibid pp. xviii 19 Ibid pp. xviii 20 Ibid pp. xviii 21 Ibid pp. xviii
12
Communication and the Deterrence Process
19. The Israeli Analyst Zeev Maoz has highlighted the triad of
Communicability, Credibility and Feasibility as central to the process of
deterrence.22 This is shown below in digramatic form.
20. Communicability. The threat held out must be unambiguous and
communicable. The adversary must be convinced about the existence of the
threat namely:-
(a) The conditions under which it will be carried out.
(b) Political, economic and military consequences of carrying out
that threat.23
21. Credibility. The threat must be credible. Credibility is a function of
capability and intent. The political will to carry out the threat must be made
22 Zeev Maoz “Paradoxes: On the Art of National Self Entrapment”. Unwin Hyman, Boston; 1996, pp.32. 23 Ibid pp. 33
Deterrence
Communicability
Feasibility Credibility
13
clearly evident. It is as important and critical as having the military capability
to execute the threat.24
22. Feasibility. This defines the extent to which the deterring nations can
respond to a given violation of the status quo. Historically this has generally
failed with low order threats to the status quo e.g. the USA in Vietnam and the
USSR in Afghanistan.25
Application of Theoretical Framework to the Indian Context
23. India’s existing conventional threat/superiority has failed to deter
Pakistan from challenging the status quo in Kashmir through its low cost/no
cost Proxy War. India therefore has to think of:-
(a) Compellence Strategies. To force Pakistan to halt and roll
back its Proxy War.
(b) Deterrence. Deter Pakistan from escalating the Proxy War
beyond existing levels and from employing nuclear weapons should
India chose to conventionalize the conflict in response.
Credibility
24. As far as the Proxy War is concerned, therefore, Indian deterrence has
failed in Kashmir because Pakistan has already launched its Proxy War. India,
therefore, has to adopt a compellence strategy. The reason for the failure of 24 Ibid pp. 33 25 Ibid pp. 34
14
Indian conventional deterrence is its lack of credibility. Credibility is a function
of capability and intent. Pravin Swahney writes “Few understand the reality
that the conventional forces of India and Pakistan are matched or nearly
matched”. In all the wars fought between the two, Pakistan has never been
defeated in the Eastern Sector by India. This explains why military officers from
both sides rarely take the impending nuclear holocaust Scenario painted by the
scholars very seriously.26 The Indian conventional forces currently do not have
the overmatching edge which could engender credibility. Pakistan is also
skeptical about Indian political resolve to cross the LC/IB.
25. Pakistani Centres of Gravity. Swahney’s argument is that India
cannot conventionalize the conflict because no credible and overmatching
conventional capability that could yield decisive results is currently available.
We must first and foremost, acquire such a conventional edge before we
threaten to press it home. The next question is against what do we apply this
conventional force? What are the Pakistani centres of gravity that if addressed
could cause its collapse? These could be:-
(a) The Pakistani city complexes of Islamabad and Rawalpindi
(The National Capital Complex with key command and control
nodes).
(b) The Pakistani Nuclear weapons and reactors and means of
delivery. 26 Pravin Swahney. “The Defence Makeover: 10 Myths that Shape India’s Image” Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2002. pp.175.
15
(c) The Punjabi heartland with the core cities of Lahore and
Sialkot.
(d) The Port City of Karachi.
(e) The Pakistani Economy.
(f) The Pakistani Strategic Reserves (Army Reserve North and
Army Reserve South).
(g) On the Iraqi pattern, the relationship of Pervez Musharaff with
his power base, viz the 12 corps commanders is also a key Centre of
Gravity in Pakistan’s case.
16
CHAPTER II
ESCALATION DYNAMICS: HERMAN KAHN’S THEORIES AND
THEIR APPLICABILITY TO THE INDIAN CONTEXT
On Escalation
26. Herman Kahn is to nuclear thought what Calusewitz is to conventional
warfare. Kahns magnum opus on ‘Thermonuclear War’ is still a standard text
for strategic Nuclear thought. However, Kahn’s other seminal work, “On
Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios” is not as well known.27 Nonetheless, it
has useful inputs that suit the Sub-continental context.
27. Escalation. Kahn cites Thomas Schelling who coined the phrase
“Escalation is a Competition in risk taking”.28
28. Escalation Dominance. Escalation Dominance is not mere military
superiority. It is complex concept in which military calculations are only one
element. It also encompasses the assurance, morale, commitment, resolve and
internal discipline of both principle antagonists and their allies.”29
29. Intensifying Escalation. Herman Kahn cites the example of two nuclear
armed adversaries amongst whom a “limited conflict” or “agreed battle” is
27 Herman Kahn. “On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios”, Pall Mall Press London 1965. 28 Ibid. pp.3 29 Ibid. pp.4
17
going on. There are three possible ways in which one antagonist can escalate
the conflict (i.e. increase or threaten to increase his efforts).30:-
(a) Increase the Intensity. Increase the intensity of the ongoing
conflict (by doing more of what one is already doing-perhaps send in
more troops and equipment, send better equipment or attack new
targets). An example would be Pakistan intensifying the proxy war by
inducting shoulder fired SAMs31 into Kashmir.
(b) Widening the Area: Violate Local Sanctuary. Kahn
postulates that a “local sanctuary” could be violated (e.g. crossing of
the Yalu river in the Korean war, retaliatory raids or bombings of
North Vietnam or hot pursuit operations. This entails a permanent
widening of the area of conflict or ongoing battle. 32 In the Sub
continental context, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) is a local
sanctuary. India launching hot-pursuit operations into POK would be
violating a local sanctuary.
(c) Compounding the Escalation: Violate Central Sanctuary.
Finally one of the adversaries can escalate by precipitating a new
crisis or conflict in an area other than in the local area. Thus the
escalator could violate a “Central Sanctuary” or attack an ally or client
30 Ibid. pp4 31 Ibid. pp3 32 Ibid. pp3
18
of the principle opponent. In the Indian context an attack across the
IB could violate a “Central Sanctuary”.33
30. Nuclear Chicken: Calculated Irrationality. Kahn used the metaphor
of the game of “chicken” played by teenagers for describing escalation
dynamics.34 He pointed out the symmetrical character of many escalation
situations. Game Theorists like Steve.J.Brams and Kilgour have built
mathematical models to calculate payoffs and probabilities of various options in
Game of Chicken and in Deterrence situations.35 During escalations’, national
leaders sometimes deliberately employ the tactic of “calculated irrationality” 36
to scare the adversary into backing off. (Pretend to be highly emotive and hence
make rational calculations unreliable for the adversary). This raises the level of
uncertainity and forces a rational actor to back down. Pakistan initially tried to
play the calculated irrationality card in Kargil.
31. In international relations, theorises Kahn, escalation is used to facilitate
negotiations or to put pressure on one side to settle a dispute without recourse to
war.37 However Bayman and Waxman feel that escalation could involve limited
use of force. This is vital in our context.
33Ibid. pp.3 34Ibid. pp.9 35 Steve.J.Brams and D.Marc Kilgour “Game Theory and National Security”. Basil Blackwill, New York, 1988. 36 Ibid. pp.11 37 Ibid. pp.12
19
Applications in the Indian Context
32. Herman Kahns theories on escalation provide a logical framework for
analysing the escalation dynamics and option matrices in the Indo-Pakistan
context. As per the Kahn thesis India’s options are:-
(a) Intensification of Counter Terrorist Operations. India could
intensify the Counter Terrorist (CT) operations in J&K by inducting
additional formations and employing attack helicopters, Lancer
gunships and use field artillery and mortars while tackling terrorist
concentrations in remote areas (as encountered in operation Sarp
Vinash). So far the design of our CT operations in J&K has been on
the Afghan model with primary emphasis on securing lines of
communication and key communication centres. The intensification
option implies a manifold increase in the density of the counter
terrorist grid to expand operations and tackle terrorist concentrations
in remote base areas like Hilkaka. 38 The move of additional troops
and resources for this stated aim would also set the stage for more
proactive trans LC operations.
(b) Violate Local Sanctuary. In the Indo-Pakistan context,
Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) constitutes the local Sanctuary
which has so far remained immune from Indian retaliation. Kargil
provided us a major opportunity to retaliate across the LC. However in
38 Pravin Swami. “The Hype and the Folly”, Frontline Magzine 04 Jul 03 issue. pp.4
20
view of the nuclear backdrop, it was decided to confine operations on
to own side of the LC. This entailed heavy casualties and time
penalties but India gained mileage internationally as a mature and
responsible nuclear power. Pakistan’s military regime attempted a
posture of “calculated irrationality” and courted adverse international
reaction. However, in retrospect, Indian restraint only emboldened the
Pakistani military elite to intensify the Proxy War in Kashmir and
even extend terrorist violence to other states of India. The next major
stand off occurred in Dec 2001 with the attack on the Indian
Parliament. Once again the Indian response of a total mobilization for
war was partially successful. It forced General Pervez Musharaff to
denounce terrorism and ban LET/JEM but overtime, the credibility of
the Indian threat wore off. In case of any future Pakistani
provocations, Indian is now left with no option but to violate the local
sanctuary of PoK with trans LC operations.
(c) Violate Central Sanctuary. In the Indo-Pakistan context,
attacks across the IB would constitute a violation of the “Central
Sanctuary”. In 1965, India had followed this escalation ladder. In
response to Op GIBRALTER of Pakistan’, it had launched a series of
attacks across the ceasefire line. Pakistan had responded by Op
GRANDSLAM (a division sized offensive in Akhnur). In response
India had launched major corps sized offensives across the IB. The
21
1965 war, however, was a military stalemate because India lacked a
decisive edge in conventional force ratios. Unfortunately, much the
same situation of parity exists today (albeit at a much higher force
level). As such, this option will not become credible till India
develops an overmatching conventional capability vis a vis Pakistan.
Analysts like Praveen Swahney have clearly highlighted this
stalemated situation.39 A major conventional attack across the IB
should not merely generate a stalemate but a distinctly favourable end
state (severe attrition/destruction of Pakistani Strategic reserves/war
making capability and a total blow to the Pakistan economy that
prevents rearmament). It is this conventional parity factor (even more
than the nuclear dimension) that is currently fuelling Pakistani
intransigence. Only a major rearmament programme to generate a
visible conventional military edge will make a threat to
conventionalize the conflict credible to Pakistan.
Escalation Ladders as Scenario Generators
33. Perhaps one of the most valuable contribution of Herman Kahn has been
the concept of Escalation Ladders as scenario generators. In the 1950s he had
drawn Escalation Ladders for a hypothetical conflict between the USA and
USSR that highlighted the various rungs, event plateau levels and decision 39 Praveen Swahney. “The Defence Makeover: 10 Myths that shape India’s Image”. Sage Publications, New Delhi 2002. pp.175
22
points where the national leadership could decide to move up or down the
escalation ladder based on the adversaries reactions, the international response
and domestic compulsions. It is imperative that we generate a series of
escalation ladder options. These will constitute the multiple war gaming
scenarios that can enable us to crystallize an effective response to the Pakistani
Proxy War. It is argued that Escalation Ladders trace the evolution of any
conflict from a cold start to border skirmishes, to a limited conflict in a specific
theatre that proceeds to full fledged conventional war and the possible nuclear
release as a consequence thereof. Thus the precise interface between
conventional and nuclear deterrence can best be defined by such exhaustive
escalation ladders that detail each step of the graduated responses and counter
moves. The Escalation Ladder is, therefore, a most valuable theoretical tool in
our study of this uncharted territory.
23
CHAPTER-III
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
THAT COULD GENERATE CONVENTIONAL OPTIONS
IN THE SUB-CONTINENT
General: Impact of the RMA
34. We are currently in the throes of an ongoing Revolution in Military
Affairs (RMA) that has been generated by the application of information
technology to war-fighting.40 This has resulted in:-
(a) A Transparency Revolution. Surveillance satellites, Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Synthetic Aperture Radars on airborne
platforms (Airborne Early Warring-AEW and Airborne Early Warning
and Control – AWACS as well as J STARS) have all created a
transparency revolution. This enables the attacker to look deep in the
enemy rear and reduce the fog of war.41 AWACS flying deep in own
territory can direct the air battle over enemy areas.
(b) Precision Attack. Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) like
Laser Guided Bombs, TV Guided Munitions, GPS guidance kits on
traditional gravity bombs etc have exponentially increased the
precision and lethality of aerial attacks from altitudes well beyond the
40 Michel.L.Brown in “Revolution in Military Affairs”. Paper in “Cyber Wars Security Strategy and Conflict in the Information Age”. Ed by Alan.D.Campen. Indian reprint by Book Mart Publishers, New Delhi, 2000. 41 Ibid. p.43.
24
existing SAM envelope. This has led to a phenomenal increase in the
lethality and effectiveness of air power which is transforming the very
nature of war. It is this ability which is at the heart of the current
RMA. 42 Though the RMA is much discussed in our armed forces, we
still have a long way to go before we can actualize it in our context.
This RMA itself could generate for us the conventional edge that we
need in the subcontinent.
35. US Experience: Afghanistan and Iraq. Current US military
campaigns have highlighted the increasing usage of PGMs in successive
campaigns e.g.
Campaign Percentage of PGMs Employed
(a) Op Desert Storm (Gulf War I) 10%
(b) Op Allied Force (Serbia) 35%
(c) Op Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) 60%
(d) Op Iraqi Freedom (Gulf War-II) 70%43
36. Air Power-Special Forces Combine. The most significant lesson to
emerge from the US campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq has been the
tremendous effectiveness of the new Air-Power-Special Forces combine.
Precision munitions require equally precise intelligence for effective
engagements. US Special Forces teams equipped with TAMERs (Technology 42 Ibid. pp. 43 Michel Sirak “Flexibility key to Weapon Mix “Janes Defence Weekly. 18 Jan 2003 pp.45.
25
Advanced Mini Eye-safe Laser Range finders, a very light weight but accurate
GPS based laser range finder and target designator ) could operate in the
enemies rear and paint targets for precise and lethal air attacks. It highlighted
that backed by precise and responsive airpower, very small ground forces could
achieve results wholly disproportionate to their size. 44 These target designation
binoculars and light weight air to ground communications have, therefore,
generated a new revolution in war-fighting which has very pertinent
applications in the trans LC context.
Specific Weapon System Applications
37. AWACs. Catering for the Chinese frontier’, the conventional ground
forces of India and Pakistan are at near parity levels. The Indian Air Force
however, with its SU-30, Mig-29, Mig-27, Jaguar and Mirage aircraft has a
distinct edge over the Pakistani air fleet. However, even with this current edge,
our Air Force can achieve only local air superiority for limited durations. Iraq,
Yugoslavia and Afghanistan have clearly demonstrated the war-winning
potential of air superiority. For any conventional threat to be credible, the IAF
must be given this decisive edge over the PAF. The greatest force multiplier for
them would be AWACs. Media reports indicate that India is about to receive
the Israeli Phalcon radar. This could be mounted on IL-76 platforms and
44 Brig GD Bakshi, VSM. “End Game in Afghanistan: Military Lessons from the Campaign”. Indian Defence Review, Vol 16(4) Oct-Dec 2001. pp.63. For a fuller treatment of the enabling impact of such force multipliers on combat.
26
provide our Air Force with a most significant force multiplier that can usher in
the RMA on the subcontinent. 45 Specific applications of the AWACs will be
discussed in the proposed Escalation Ladders.
38. Tamer Class Laser Designating Binoculars. A key piece of
technology that enabled US Special Forces to accurately acquire and designate
targets for the US Air Force in Afghanistan and Iraq are the very light weight
TAMER designation binoculars. These were developed by the US Defence
Advanced Projects Research Agency (DAPRA). It uses laser beams to
accurately measure distance and bearing of targets and uses GPS to instantly get
their precise eight figure grid references. These enabled the precision attack
ability of the USAF to be optimally exploited.46 In our case, small Special
Forces teams equipped with TAMER binoculars could infiltrate across the LC
and accurately designate targets (Terrorist Camps) for engagement by own Air
Force and/or artillery of 155 mm and higher calibers. Equivalent Israeli System
are Lachross Binoculars. The lethality of such SF teams would be enhanced
exponentially with this capability. Small tactical teams could thus have a huge
strategic impact.
39. SMERCH Multiple Rocket Launcher System (MRLS). This 300 mm
caliber Russian MRLS has a range of upto 70 kms.47 It could be used to engage
terrorist training camps across the LC as well as command and control centres
45 Rahul Bedi. “Divided Interests” Janes Defence Weekly. 21 May 03 Issue, pp.22. 46 John Barry, “A New Breed of Soldiers”, Article in Newsweek. 10 Dec 2001. pp.20-21. 47 Nicholai Makorovets. “Multiple Rocket Launchers” Indian Defence Review, Vol.16(4) Oct-Dec 2001. pp.43.
27
like divisional and corps headquarters and launch pads for infiltration. This
system is within the existing restraint envelope as both sides have been using
artillery for trans LC engagements. Its far higher throw weight and range would
constitute a new rung on the escalation ladder and clearly make a statement of
intent.
40. Mini UAVs. The American DAPRA is currently working on hand held
Micro UAVs, Weighing between 200-500 gms, with a range of upto 10 kms and
endurance of upto one hour. These could be mass produced and issued down to
the infantry battalion level on the LC. These would greatly enhance
transparency and permit accurate acquisition and engagement of targets in PoK.
The Israeli’s Firm Elbit Systems have produced light weight UAVs (5.5 kgs,
with 2 hours endurance) called Skylark and Seagull.48
41. Fast Attack Vehicles. These are very light weight but high mobility
vehicles for the Special Forces that can be inserted/extracted by helicopters.
They carry two/three man crews, a Machine gun, Automatic Grenade Launcher
and Antitank Missiles. They have long endurance and range (500-700 kms) and
power to weight ratios that are higher than those of all Main Battle Tanks. They
have low noise and heat signatures which give them virtual stealth capabilities.
Their cross country mobility is superior to that of MBTs and ICVs. These
could be used by our Special Forces in the plains/desert sectors for acquiring
targets (tagging strategic reserves) and for lethal raids/ambushes deep in the
48 Craig Hoyle. Israels Elbit System. Janes Defence Weekly. 18 Jun 2003. pp.31.
28
enemies rear. They could be effectively employed in the plains sector of J&K.
Such enhanced capabilities with our Special Forces can open up a whole range
of options for trans LC/IB raids/missions that can be employed as new steps in
the escalatory ladder that utilize smaller number of troops but have a vastly
disproportionate impact. The actual employment of limited but precise and
lethal violence could send a strong signal of political intent that is far more
coercive than mere deployments on own side of the border. There is an urgent
need therefore to greatly strengthen our Special Forces capability.49
49 Dr Bhashyam Kasturi. “Military Special Forces in the Indian Context” Indian Defence Review. Vol 16(4) Oct-Dec.2001.
29
CHAPTER-IV
ESCALATION MODELS FOR CONVENTIONALISING THE
CONFLICT IN THE SUBCONTINENT
Escalation Ladders: Scenario Generators
42. To generate various war gaming scenarios and define the precise
relationships between conventional and nuclear war in the subcontinent, it
would be essential to trace out specific escalation ladders. These escalation
ladders define the precise space between conventional and nuclear war in our
context and help us to chart the steps that span the transition between these
conflict modes.
43. Pakistani Views of Escalation. Before we design our own Escalation
Ladders/Scenarios, it would be useful to examine the Pakistani thinking on this
subject. In Pakistan, the initial reaction to acquiring an overt nuclear capability
was euphoric. In the wake of the Chagai explosions, Pakistani responses
seemed to stem from a belief that India’s conventional superiority was totally
negated. During the Kargil conflict, the Pakistani military pegged the sub-
continental nuclear threshold at absurdly low levels50. It was characteristic of
the highly subjective modes of thought in the Pakistani military establishment.
However, the strong Indian response in Kargil was highly sobering for the
Pakistani Generals. The traditional cautious approach of the GHQ Islamabad
50 Rear Admiral K.Raja Menon. “A Nuclear Strategy for India”. Sage Publications, New Delhi 2000. pp.197
30
resurfaced soon thereafter. Would the Pakistani response to an Indian
conventional attack across the LC/IB be a spasmodic nuclear release? A study
of recent Pakistani military literature now suggests that this may no longer be
the case.
Pakistan’s First Use Doctrine: Escalation Scenarios
44. Pakistan has clung to its “first use doctrine”. However, the sobriety
engendered by the Kargil war is now clearly visible. Pakistani strategists are
now talking of a “graduated response” as opposed to a “massive response” or
spasmodic release. Thus Lt Gen Sardar FS Lodhi of the Pakistan Army writing
in the Defence Journal51 clearly articulated a Pakistani view of the escalation
ladder as under:-
(a) Conditions for Nuclear Release. “In a deteriorating military
situation, when an Indian Conventional Attack is likely to break
through our defences or has already breached the main defence line –
causing a major set back to defences which cannot be restored by
conventional means at our disposal, the govt would be left with no
option except to use nuclear weapons to stabilize the situation. India’s
superiority in conventional arms and manpower would have to be
51 Lt. Gen (retd) Sardar FS Lodhi. “Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine”. Pakistan Defence Journal, Karachi. Apr 1999.
31
offset by nuclear weapons. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine therefore
would essentially revolve around the first strike option.52
(b) Graduated Escalation. Gen Lodhi States, “this would entail a
stage by stage approach in which the nuclear threat is increased at
each step to deter India from attack.53
(c) Fist Step. Public or Private Warning.54
(d) Second Step. Demonstration explosion of a small nuclear
weapon on Pakistani soil.55
(e) Third Step. Use of a few nuclear weapons on its own soil
against Indian conventional forces.56
(f) Fourth Stage. Nuclear weapons employed against critical but
purely military targets in India across the border from Pakistan,
probably in thinly populated areas in the desert or semi-desert causing
less collateral damage.57
(g) Counter Value. Some weapons would be in reserve for the
counter value role.58
45. Lt Gen KM Arif has stated that both India and Pakistan are not crazy
countries. If the strategy of deterrence works in other parts of the world, it is
bound to work in this region as well. It is highly doubtful if either country 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid 55 Ibid 56 Ibid 57 Ibid 58 Ibid
32
would use nuclear weapons against each other.59 Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai of the
Strategic Plans Division of the Pakistan Army defined the nuclear threshold as
under:-
(a) Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India.
(b) In case deterrence fails they will be used under following
conditions:-
(i) Space Threshold. India attacks Pakistan and conquers
large part of its territory.
(ii) Military Threshold. India destroys a large part of its
land or air forces.
(iii) Economic Threshold. India proceeds to the economic
strangulation of Pakistan. This would include Naval Blockade
and stoppage of Indus waters.
(iv) Internal Threshold. India pushes Pakistan into
political destabilisation or creates large scale internal
subversion in Pakistan.60
(c) The Kidwai thesis is largely academic. Lt Gen Lodhi’s thesis is
far more specific and could well represent Pakistan’s nuclear
escalation options.
59 Lt Gen KM Arif. “Working with Zia” Oxford University Press Karachi, pp.362-363. 60 Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai cited in Landau Report on Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan. Prepared by Prof PC Ramusino and M Matellini.
33
46. Analysis of Pakistani Escalation Ladder. Analysis of the Pakistani
escalation ladder clearly highlights the sobering effects of Kargil. The
conditionalities for nuclear release are ambiguous. They stretch from
“breaching the main defence line to actual breach. It next graduates to major
set back which cannot be restored by conventional means”. The Pakistani
nuclear threshold therefore has a very elastic bandwidth. The absurdity of the
massive response strategy was highlighted to the USA in the Cuban Missile
Crisis of 1962. The Kargil war has similarly forced Pakistan into a flexible
response strategy. Gen Lodhis Escalation Ladder is clearly graduated. It
commences with a “nuclear shot across the bow” and then graduates to a purely
military use of nuclear weapons, first on its own soil and only then on ours. The
anxiety to avert a devastating counter value Indian response is clearly evident.
Use against military targets in semi-desert/desertic regions of low population
density, is also designed to mitigate international criticism and increase
plausibility of such nuclear release.
Indian Escalation Options
47. Macro Models. India has four major escalation models to respond to
Pakistan’s ongoing Proxy War in J&K.
(a) Mobilisation Model. India carried out partial mobilization for
conventional war in Op VIJAY and complete mobilization during Op
PARAKRAM.
34
(b) Creep Model. Series of low level ground based responses
based upon employment of Special Forces (SF) in a trans LC mode,
use of Smerch MBRL strikes against terrorist camps and launch pads
followed by company and battalion sized attacks across the LC.
(c) Air Power Model. Partial mobilization of forces followed by
Air attacks on Terrorist Camps/launch pads. Indian Special Forces
could vector in precise strikes on selected targets.
(d) Deception War Model. Initial probes/attacks launched under
cover of such limited/localized air and ground actions. These would
be designed to set the stage for rapid transition to a full scale
conventional war with well defined stages where the choice to
escalate/descalate can be taken based upon Pakistani responses and
international reactions. Such a conventional war could even be
punctuated with a series of ceasefires (a la Ariel Sharons trans Suez
offensive in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war). It may be advisable to spread
out such a conflict by punctuating it with repeated cease fires. This
would obviate the time pressure which can force a weaker antagonist
into panic responses.
Analysis of Models
48. Mobilisation Model. This model has already been employed twice by
India. Mobilisation could be partial or complete.
35
(a) Partial Mobilisation. The mobilisaton was partial during Op
VIJAY. However, it carried greater credibility and coercive value due
to a raging limited war in Kargil where Indian military and air power
were actively employed in a concentrated manner.
(b) Complete Mobilisation. In the wake of the terrorist attack on
the Indian Parliament on 13 Dec 2002, India mobilized all three
Services for war. Initially the mobilization was credible and
convincing and Gen Musharaff was forced to denounce terrorism and
ban LET/JEM. However overtime (10 months period) the credibility
declined and the cost effectiveness of that option was increasingly
questioned. An in-depth analysis of Op PARAKRAM has been carried
out by S.Kalyanraman in the Strategic Analysis. He feels that the
needless extended persistence of the mobilization was unproductive
and said that coercion was not likely to work as Pakistan’s stake in
Kashmir is extremely high.61 However, the actual option for a
conventional war could only be actualised by such a mobilization. As
stated earlier, unless the actual “intent” of Op PARAKRAM comes
into the open domain, it would be premature to pass value judgements
or determine the coercive success or otherwise of this exercise. The
entire terms of reference of such an analysis changes completely if the
intent of the deployment was a conventional war and not mere 61 S.Kalyana Raman. “Operation Parakram: An Indian Exercise in Coercive Diplomacy”. Strategic Analysis Vol 26 No 4. Oct-Dec 2002 pp.479-482, 483-485.
36
coercion. A diagramatic analysis of the event line in Op
PARAKRAM is attached as Appendix ‘A’ to the Thesis. It places the
coercive actions and Pakistani responses in a time perspective.
(c) Future Potential. The full mobilization model is costly not just
in terms of financial implications but also wear and tear on men and
machines. It can not be repeated indefinitely, for it would seriously
undermine our reputation for resolve. It could send wrong signals of
weakness of political resolve to cross the LC/IB and encourage
adventurism in the Pakistani military elite. Such a partial or total
mobilization option is credible only if accompanied by a limited level
of actual combat in J&K. That however, compounds the risk of
unplanned escalations.
49. Creep Model.
(a) The creep model seeks a low order violation of the LC by large
scale employment of Special Forces and by Smerch rocket strikes on
terrorist training camps in POK.
(b) It generally seeks to operate within the existing restraint regime.
The SF actions would have a low media profile, whereas a very high
media profile could be accorded to Smerch strikes on Pakistani
command and control centres (Divisional/Corps headquarters).
37
(c) Based on Pakistani responses, limited (company and Battalion
sized) attacks could be launched all along the LC (ostensibly to create
a sanitized zone to prevent infiltration). In effect it would serve to
mask the location of subsequent main thrusts and tie down Pakistani
reserves.
(d) Indian Armed Forces would carry out a Partial Mobilisation all
along the IB to deter any Pakistani surprise response.
(e) Large scale trans LC operations could be progressed based upon
Pakistani responses and international reaction.
(f) This would be a very attrition oriented model. A Kashmir
centric conflict may suit Pakistan and progress of own offensive
operations in the mountains and hills would be slow and costly.
(g) The Chinese invasion of North Vietnam in 1979 serves as a
Limited War Model that could result from this “creeping escalation”.
(h) India’s overall strategy would be to “generate and manage” a
limited conflict as a credible coercive tool for convincing Pakistan
(and the international community) to de-escalate/roll back the Proxy
War in J&K.
50. Air War Model.
(a) Catering for Indian force levels that have to be deployed against
China, India has a virtual parity with Pakistan in land forces. India’s
edge exists primarily between the two Air Forces and Navies. (The
38
Navy in fact has a 5:1 edge). This model seeks to exploit the existing
conventional edge in the Air and Sea dimensions.
(b) The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon (Bekka Valley) in 1982 serves
as the Model. Israeli Air Force launched air attacks on Syrian Sam
Batteries in the Bekka Valley using radiation homing missiles. The
Syrian Air Force rose to the defence of the beleaguered Sam battries.
Israeli Air Force air superiority fighters were waiting in ambush.
Directed by AWACs they were able to shoot down over 80 Syrian Mig
fighters in a single day over the Bekka Valley.
(c) In this model the Indian Air Force would launch air strikes on
Terrorist Training Camps in PoK. The PAF is bound to scramble to
their defence. The actual target would not be the terrorist training
camps but the PAF.
(d) AWACS. AWACS would be the single force multiplier that
could enable the IAF to manage a major air battle across the LC and
decimate the PAF in this area.
(e) If local air superiority is gained as envisaged, India could
exploit this to press home ground attacks in selected sectors of the LC.
(f) SF teams equipped with TAMER Binoculars could vector in
accurate air strikes on selected targets in PoK.
39
(g) The payoffs and impact of such operations would be far higher
than in the creep model. However escalation may tend to spiral out of
control due to rapidity of responses.
(h) A partial mobilization along the IB would have to be factored in
as a precautionary measure prior to launching air attacks.
51. Deception War Model. This model would seek to synthesise and
harmonise our responses. Instead of disjointed low key actions that seek to
engender minor violations of the status quo to achieve escalation, this model
would seek to weave them into a seamless continuum that is deliberately
structured to graduate to a decisive conventional conflict. The mindset in the
subcontinent is premised upon the base line assumption that neither India or
Pakistan wants a major conventional conflict. The normal Pakistani tendency
would be to treat minor military infringements of the LC as a purely posturing
exercise. This mindset could be encouraged and reinforced by deliberate media
leaks. Wresting and gaining control of the air is an essential precursor to any
major Air-Land conflict. The design of this model would therefore be as
under:-
(a) Special Forces are inducted across the LC to locate Terrorist
Camps, launch pads and command and control nodes.
(b) The IAF attacks these trans LC Camps. This is merely a pretext
to draw in and decimate the PAF in major air battles across the LC
that are managed by AWACs.
40
(c) Full mobilization by the IAF is accompanied by partial
mobilization by the Army (along the IB) and the Navy (both Eastern
and Western Fleets).
(d) Once air superiority is gained over PoK probing attacks are
launched all along the LC, ostensibly to sanitize a border belt to
prevent infiltration.
(e) Divisional sized attacks are launched to exploit lodgments
gained on the LC. This is the first stage of decision. Depending upon
Pakistani and international reactions, India could exercise the option to
escalate or descalate at this stage.
(f) A mountain strike corps is used to exploit success gained by one
of the divisional sized offensives.
(g) A Mechanised Strike Corps is launched to exploit this success
in suitable terrain in J&K. Pravin Sawhney in his book “The Defence
Makeover” has outlined a very credible conventional war scenario
which forms the basis of this proposed escalation ladder.62
(h) This would be the second event plateau phase where India could
exercise the option to escalate or descalate depending upon the
situation.
(j) Such a scenario will lead to a suction of Pakistani reserves
towards Punjab and J&K. Pak media had reported such Northwards 62 Pravin Sawhney. “The Defence Makeover:10 Myths that Shape India’s Image”. Sage Publications. New Delhi-2002 p.190, p.207 and specifically pp.212 to 215.
41
move of reserves during the Kargil conflict. Pakistani air assets
sucked in should be comprehensively destroyed in air battles that
exploit our AWAC and superior fighter fleet capability.
(k) This J&K centric move of Pakistani reserves, is likely to create
a situation of strategic imbalance for Pakistan.
(l) India could exploit this by launching both her strike corps in the
Semi Desert/Desert Sectors.
(m) Should Pakistan use nuclear weapons against our mechanized
strike corps in the Desert/Semi Desert sectors, India could launch a
counter force strike to destroy the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, the
missiles and F-16 Base complexes in a single decapcitating strike.
The alternative option would be a graduated tit for tat response in
kind.
(n) India should keep the bulk of its nuclear arsenal in reserve to
deter China and act as a counter value threat to Pakistani cities.
(o) This high risk model aims to seek a decisive victory even
against a nuclear backdrop. It has a number of escape lines/clauses
along event plateaus or phases of this graduated conflict where we
could retain control and exercise the option to go up or down the
escalation ladder based upon the resultant situation at the regional and
global level.
42
(p) Deception is achieved by the asymmetry of intent. The
expectation set of a limited war is exploited to launch full scale war
responses that can serve to dislocate the minds of the Pakistani
commanders and seek a decisive victory in a rapid time frame. It was
precisely this asymmetry of intent that yielded strategic surprise in the
1971 war. Pakistan was convinced that India would not go for Dacca
but try to seize a border enclave to resettle the refugees. Air
supremacy in the East and rapid ground exploitation served to ensure
total victory.
43
CHAPTER-V
LIMITED CONVENTIONAL WAR AGAINST
A NUCLEAR BACKDROP
Background: Strategic Hubris to Restraint
52. In the wake of the Chagai nuclear tests, the Pakistani military elite
showed clear signs of “strategic hubris”. Nuclear parity for them translated into
conventional nullity. They irrationally pegged the sub continental nuclear
threshold at absurdly low levels and undertook the intrusion in Kargil, confident
that India would not respond conventionally.
53. The Kargil conflict therefore is analogous to the Cuban Missile crisis of
1962 between the USA and USSR. The Americans had premised their
deterrence on the Strategy of “Massive Response”. Even a minor infringement
of the status quo by the USSR was to be responded to by an all out nuclear
attack. The actual crisis of 1962 showed the massive response strategy to be
highly untenable. It was thereafter replaced by a “Flexible Response” or
“Graduated Response” strategy.
54. The Kargil conflict seems to have had a similar sobering effect on the
Pakistani military establishment. India’s determined conventional response
highlighted that the sub-continental nuclear threshold was far higher than
Pakistan presumed. Pakistan’s military rehtoric thereafter, has also shifted to a
graduated strategy as described in Chapter IV.
44
55. In the wake of the Kargil conflict, the Indian strategic community thought
it essential to send clear signals to Pakistan that any further violations of the
status quo on the LC would be met with a determined conventional response.
Accordingly, the erstwhile Indian Army Chief articulated the Strategy of
Limited Wars against a Nuclear backdrop.63 This was followed by a prominent
seminar by the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) in Mar 2000,
where the Defence Minister Shri George Fernandez, further held out the veiled
threat of a limited war below the nuclear threshold. These clear signals were
designed to convey the threat that Pakistan sponsored terrorism could escalate
into a limited war.64 Mr George Fernandez reminded Pakistan that Kargil has
demonstrated that India can fight and win a limited war even at a time and
place of Pakistan’s choosing.65
56. Maj Gen (Retd) Ashok Mehta wrote that these articulations amounted not
only to a new doctrine of fighting a limited conventional war but also expressed
India’s readiness to risk fighting one under a nuclear environment. It was
obvious that the Indian threat was meant to disabuse Pakistans “serious error of
judgement” that its nuclear shield would paralyse Indian response to its proxy
war.66
63 Maj Gen (Retd) Ashok Mehta “Limited War: Reflection of Frustration” . Pioneer 16 Mar 2000 issue. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid.
45
57. In pursuance of this approach India held large scale conventional military
exercises (Ex Shiv Shakti) under considerable media glare and has gone ahead
with massive purchases of conventional weapons (eg. SU-30 and T-90 deals and
others in the pipeline). These have brought about ample misgivings in the
Pakistani higher command echelons. Like the USA in the Cuban missile crisis,
they have realized that threats to unleash a nuclear response to conventional
challenges are not viable. Hence they have been forced to strengthen their
conventional capabilities and talk in terms of graduated responses.
58. Mathematical Game theories have clearly highlighted the untenability of
a nuclear response to a limited provocation. The nuclear response could risk the
annihilation of the weaker state.67 In purely rational terms it would be safer for
it to accept the damage inflicted by a conventional war, rather than risk total
annihilation in a nuclear exchange with an adversary with the bigger arsenel.
Nuclear response becomes a ‘logical’ consideration only when the weaker state
faces a threat to its national survival per se in the conventional sphere.
Limited War: Doctrinal Aspects
59. Is a Limited war below the nuclear threshold viable in the subcontinental
context? Kargil showed it was viable. However Kargil was confined to own
side of the LC. Once again during Op PARAKRAM, India went to
extraordinary lengths to avoid violating the LC or IB. This in ordinate level of
67 Steve J.Brams and D.Marc Kilgour “Game Theory and National Security” Basil Blackwill New York 1988.
46
restraint in the crisis leading to Op PARAKRAM could have diluted the signals
of Political resolve and will clearly communicated in the Kargil crisis. The
terrorist attack of 11 Sep (9/11) have clearly transformed the geopolitical
situation. However, once again Pakistan has managed to recruit itself as a
frontline state in this global war against terrorism. It did this to save itself from
American retribution and safeguard its strategic nuclear assetts. The American
military presence on Pakistani soil introduces manifold complexities in the
situation. Overtime it could be interpreted by the Pakistani military
establishment as a major restraint factor in the subcontinent. Would that be
interpreted as tacit American approval and permit it to continue its Proxy War in
J&K at current scales (albeit in a less visible fashion that seeks to carry on the
terrorist crusade behind a cloak of deniability and secrecy)? To prevent this,
India has no option but to make the threat of Limited War credible.
60. In the wake of the Wars in Korea and Vietnam, much doctrinal work was
done on the aspect of Limited Wars. American Strategists talked of three kinds
of Limited Wars68:-
(a) Limited Nuclear Wars.
(b) Limited Conventional Wars.
(c) Low Intensity Conflict Operation or Guerilla wars.
68 Swaran Singh “Limited War: The Challenge of US Military Strategy” . Lancer Books.New Delhi. 1995
47
61. Limitations in War. Yale scholars Bernard Brodie and William
Kaufman contributed substantially to the evolution of limited war theories.69
Kaufman theorized that the Communists would test the limits of Amercian
tolerance. The US would have to put up or shut up.70 In response to this,
Kaufman developed the theory of limited wars that gave options short of a
nuclear holocaust or retreat. The flexible response theory was Kaufman’s
brainchild. It is pertinent to point out that the USA suffered 1,37,000 casualties
in the Korean war. Limitations in war are of three kinds:-
(a) Limitations of Space.
(b) Limitations of Force Levels.
(c) Limitations of Weapons (Nuclear/Non-nuclear) or Air power
employed or not employed (eg 1962 war).
(d) Limitations in the Aim and Scope of War.
62. Nuclear Thresholds. Kaufman popularized the concept of Nuclear
thresholds which defined the most sensitive line of demarcation between limited
war and all out nuclear war.71 In the US-USSR confrontation however, limited
wars were fought in areas of secondary/tertiary significance to the super powers
and primarily with proxies. A direct US-Soviet clash was avoided at all costs.
The Indo-Pakistan context is direct and hence markedly different. The only
other precedent of nuclear capable states in direct conventional conflict is the
69 Bernard Brodie and William Kaufman quoted in Swaran Singhs Book. Refer to note 65. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid.
48
Amur-Ussuri clash between the Soviet Union and China in March 1969. The
critical question in an Indo-Pakistani conventional war, therefore, is “where
does the nuclear threshold lie?” Is it a line in Pakistani territory running at a
particular depth, the crossing of which would entail a spasmodic nuclear
release?
63. Pakistani Nuclear Thresholds. Apart from a geographic context such a
nuclear threshold has a primarily psychological context. In Pakistan’s case it
may not be credible to talk of a thin red line or “Lakshman Rekha”. Rather we
could think of the threshold in a series of circles around critical target
complexes such as:-
(a) The capital city or key command and control nodes of
Islamabad-Rawalpindi.
(b) The key West Punjab cities of Lahore and Sialkot.
(c) The Pakistani Nuclear arsenal and its means of delivery. If these
are threatened directly by a counter force strategy, Pakistan may well
be panicked into a “use them or loose them response”.
(d) The key Port City of Karachi.
(e) The defeat of its Army Reserve North (ARN) or South (ARS)
64. The certainity of an Indian counter value response however, could
equally act as a restraint against crossing the nuclear threshold in any form.
Mathematical models that calculate rational payoffs of decisions clearly
highlight that none of the Pakistan’s targets mentioned in para 62 (a) to (e) in
49
themselves constitute such a catastrophe as an all out Indian nuclear attack
against 10 or more Pakistani cities would engender. There is a tendency in
Indian strategic circles to give undue credence to the emotive volatility and
irrationality of the Pakistani military elite. This overestimation is dangerous.
True, they are prone to subjective planning in situations where they deem their
opponents as meek or lacking in will to respond ruthlessly. Once convinced on
this score, the Pakistani Military bureaucracy exhibits all the traditional caution
of bureaucracies the world over. It must be kept in mind that even a maniac like
Hitler was deterred from using Chemical and Biological weapons in the Second
World War due to the threat of retaliation in kind. Here was a maniac who had
systematically gassed six million Jews. Yet he continued to exercise chemical
and Biological restraint even when the fighting was pushed home to Berlin and
the Feuherers’ Bunker (Wolfs Schanze) itself. Hitler committed suicide but did
not order a Chemical or Biological release. The Pakistani Military Brass cannot
be expected to behave differently in such circumstances. Even maniacs
understand the military language of deterrence. The greatest danger, when
faced with such adversaries, is to display weakness of will or the Munich
Syndrome.
The Chinese “Teach a Lesson” Model
65. In conclusion it would be pertinent to point out a highly successful
limited war model that has been practiced successfully by the Chinese. They
50
launched limited conventional wars against India (In 1962) and against Vietnam
(in 1979). Major Chinese ground offensives were accompanied by loudly stated
war aims of just teaching a lesson. This implies a primary and clearly
articulated limitation in the aim/scope of the war. It also enunciates that capture
of territory will be temporary and the war will be limited or confined in space
and time. The Chinese attack in 1962 deterred any Indian support for the
Khampa rebellion in Tibet. In 1979, the Chinese launched a similar Limited
War to teach a lesson to the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese defence was skillful
and tenacious and the Chinese ended up learning a lot of lessons themselves.
However, Vietnam was clearly deterred from any further adventurism against
China. Relations have been peaceful since then. It was a superb demonstration
of military resolve by the Chinese. They consciously aimed at an attrition
oriented, “meat-grinder” war. Even against a nuclear backdrop, it serves as a
role model for a similar limited war by India to “teach Pakistan a lesson”, for
the Proxy War.
66. The loudly stated aim of just “teaching a lesson” serves to limit
escalation, both regionally and globally. However, rhetoric must match
capability or the coercer would be the one that learns unpleasant lessons. To
actualizes the concept of “teach a lesson wars”, we have to undertake a major
programme of conventional force modernization with the prime emphasis of an
overmatching capability in the air. We must acquire AWACs and increase our
inventory of Precision Munitions and Special Forces capabilities. To ensure
51
that such signals of resolve, capability and intent are conveyed to all sections of
the Pakistani military-bureaucratic complex, we need a clearly articulated
Limited War Doctrine, that lays emphasis on teaching a lesson. Large scale and
well publicized conventional military exercises will lend credibility to this
doctrine.
52
CHAPTER-VI
A RECOMMENDED ESCALATION MODEL
FOR THE INDIAN CONTEXT
Conclusion
67. In conclusion, it would be pertinent to reiterate certain key deductions:-
(a) Based on the Waltzian Paradigm, Indian Strategists expected
nuclear weapons to stabilize the situation in the subcontinent.
Probably that prompted the Lahore Peace Initiative.
(b) Nuclearisation, however generated undue hubris’ in the
Pakistani military. They felt it totally negated Indian conventional
superiority. They pegged the sub-continental nuclear threshold at
absurdly low levels. That explains the Kargil adventure just one year
after nuclearisation.
(c) India’s determined conventional response to Kargil was highly
sobering for the Pakistan military establishment. Just as the Cuban
Missile crisis forced a change from the Strategy of “Massive
Response” to “Flexible Response” in the American context, Kargil
forced the Pakistanis to talk in terms of graduated responses in the
subcontinent.
(d) An analysis of the mobilization during Op VIJAY and Op
PARAKRAM indicates that only mobilization (partial or full)
accompanied by the actual use of limited force can be adequately
53
credible and coercive. The future escalation model in the subcontinent
may well centre on Partial mobilizations accompanied by the limited
use of force in J&K.
Recommendations
68. Need for Conventional Build Up. The interface between conventional
and nuclear deterrence in the subcontinent will have to be established by
defining precise escalation ladders. The current Indian conventional edge has
failed to deter Pakistan from launching and proceeding apace with its Proxy
War in Kashmir. India therefore has to adopt a strategy of compellence aimed
at forcing Pakistan to abort and roll back the Proxy War. This implies a clearly
visible Indian programme to seek a conventional military edge. This alone will
make the threat of a conventional response to the Proxy War credible. India
must focus on maximizing its Air Power (with Force Multipliers like AWACs)
and technologically advanced Special Forces. India must seek to engage
Pakistan in a conventional arms race that could ruin it economically. Even if it
fails to collapse the Pakistani economy, it will provide India a demonstrable
conventional military edge that is credible and convincing.
69. Escalation Dominance.
(a) Counter Value Strategy. Indian Declaratory Nuclear Doctrines
must emphasise a counter value strategy. The use of nuclear weapons
in war must be regarded as a “crime against humanity”. Any state that
54
crosses the nuclear threshold will be severely punished by a massive
Counter Value response that imperils its existence as a viable nation
state. This threat must be clearly articulated by the national and
military leadership in a manner that it reaches all levels of the
Pakistani decision making architecture.
(b) Counter Force. Though this may be its publically articulated
doctrine, India should be prepared to conduct a decapacitating Counter
Force strike against the Pakistani Nuclear arsenal.
(c) Conventional War Options.
(i) India may have to violate the local sanctuary in PoK to
put escalation pressure on Pakistan. This could take the form
of:-
(aa) Special Forces vectored Air and Artillery strikes on
Terrorist training camps, launch pads and command and
control centres in PoK.
(bb) Smerch MBRL strikes against the above targets, in
specific on command and control nodes.
(ii) India’s overall strategy must be one of seamless
interface between the limited war moves and the graduated
moves up the conventional Escalation Ladder. Each rung of
the Escalation ladder must neatly set the stage for the next.
55
(iii) Primacy of Air Power. India enjoys a significant
differential in Air and Naval Power. This must be enhanced
further. AWACs are the most potent force multiplier and their
acquisition must be speeded up. India must seek to exploit
this edge in Air Power. The aim should be to seek a level of
technological asymmetry that can generate clear air
superiority (if not air supremacy). That implies a preferential
allocation of resources to this end.
(iv) Air Ambush. The initial moves of the escalatory
ladder, therefore, must seek to gain air superiority. Thus
attacks on Terrorist Training Camps in PoK should be
designed to lure the PAF in to air battles with the IAF. Our
air Superiority Fighters waiting in Ambush, (and vectored by
AWACs), could hope to inflict heavy attrition on the PAF.
This could be accompanied by a Partial Mobilisation all along
the IB and on sea.
(v) Probes. Once Air superiority is gained, the entire LC
could be activated with a series of Battalion sized attacks,
ostensibly aimed at establishing a sanitized zone. These
would mask the projected thrust lines for major offensives and
tie down enemy reserves.
56
(vi) Main Thrusts. Division Sized Thrust could be
launched in selected sectors of the LC, depending upon initial
footholds gained.
(vii) Mountain Strike Corps. A Mountain Strike Corps
(culled from Dual Tasked formations) could exploit the
success of one of the Divisional thrust lines. The overall
design for this war could generally follow the scenario
outlined by Pravin Swahney in his book “The Defence
Makeover”.72 The same has been utilized in this escalation
model.
(viii) Imposing Strategic Imbalance by a J&K Centric War.
India could call off the escalation at any of the above two
stages. However, if the regional and global situation is
favourable – India could strategically imbalance Pakistan by a
J&K Centric conflict that sucks up all Pakistani reserves
Northwards.
(ix) Once this strategic imbalance occurs, India could
exploit this by launching both her mechanized Strike Corps in
either the desert or semi desert sectors.
(x) Any Pakistani attempts to stall this offensive by using
nuclear weapons in her own territory should be responded to 72 Pravin Swahney “The Defence Makeover: 10 Myths that Shape Indian Image” Sage Publications. New Delhi. 2002. pp. 212-215.
57
with a decapacitating Counter Force strike to destroy the
Pakistani nuclear arsenal, Missiles and F-16 Bases. SF should
specially be tasked to locate and destroy the Pakistani Ballistic
Missiles. If such targeting opportunities do not present
themselves, India could adopt a reciprocal or tit for tat
approach of matching each nuclear strike in kind. This could
provide time to the conventional forces to complete their
operations.
(xi) India should keep the bulk of her nuclear arsenal in
reserve for counter value targets in Pakistan and to deter China
from intervention.
70. The Indian Escalation Ladder therefore, must be designed for a smooth
transition from preliminary Special Forces actions and air strikes, to a limited
J&K centric war and if the opportunity presents itself, a decisive Conventional
War. The proposed escalation model is diagrammatically represented in
Appendix ‘B’. Only such an escalation design will ensure escalation
dominance and carry credibility. There should be no gaps or phase wise
disjuncts in our escalation ladder. Each move must be carefully calibrated and
designed to graduate smoothly to the next level of conflict. India must strive to
create this conventional overmatching capability. If Pakistan seeks to keep
pace in such an arms race, its economy could collapse. If it fails to match up, it
would provide India an opportunity to press home its conventional edge. It was
58
the post 1962 military build up that paid such dividends in the 1971 war. Today
we need to consciously begin such a deliberate armament programme that could
yield payoffs in a three to five years time frame. India may need to stabilize the
Pakistani front before China acquires the status of a super power. Otherwise it
will face the strategic nightmare of a two front war scenario in the future.
59
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
1. Arif KM (Lt Gen) “Working with Zia” Oxford University Press, Karachi.
2. Bajpai Kanti (Ed). “Brass tacks and Beyond. Perception Management of
Crisis in South Asia” Manohar Publishers. New Delhi 1995.
3. Brams Steve. J and Kilgour Marc “Game Theory and National Security”
Basil Blackwil, New York 1998.
4. Bakshi GD (Brig) “Afghanistan:The First Faultline War”. Lancer
Publishers. New Delhi 2002.
5. Campen. Alan.D. “Cyber Wars, Security, Strategy and Conflict in the
Information Age”. Indian Reprint by Book Mart Publishers. New Delhi 2000.
6. Cohen. Stephen P. “The Pakistan Army” Oxford University Press
Karanchi 1998.
7. Cloughly Brian(Col-retd) “A History of the Pakistan Army” Oxford
University Press. Karachi. 1999.
8. Kahn Herman “On Escalation:Metaphors and Scenarios” Pall Mall Press,
London 1965.
9. Khan. Gul Hasan (Lt Gen – retd) “Memoirs” Oxford University Press
Karachi. 1993.
10. Kanwal Gurmeet (Brig) “Nuclear Defense: Shaping the Arsenal”
Knowledge World. IDSA Publications. New Delhi 2000.
60
11. Kreepon Michael and Gagne Chris. “Nuclear Risk Reduction in South
Asia”. Henery.L.Stimrson Centre Book. Indian Publication by Vision India.
Delhi 2003.
12. Hawksley Humphrey “Dragon Fire” McMillan London 2000.
13. Maoz Zeev. “Paradoxes: On the Art of National Self Entrapment” Unwin
Hyman. Boston 1996.
14. Menon Raja K.(Rear Admiral retd). “A Nuclear Strategy for India” Sage
Publications. New Delhi 2000.
15. Paul T.V. “Asymetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers”
Cambridge University Press – London 1994.
16. Rehman Atiqur (Lt Gen-retd) “Our Defense Cause: An Analysis of
Pakistan’s Past, Present and Future Military Role” White Lion London 1976.
17. Rappoport Anatole “Fights, Games and Debates” University of Michigan
Press. 1960.
18. Singh Swaran “Limited War: The Challenge of US Military Strategy”
Lancer Books, Delhi-1995.
19. Swahney Praveen “The Defense Makeover: 10 Myths that Shape India’s
Image” Sage Publications, New Delhi 2002.
20. Perkovich George “India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact of Global
Proliferation”. University of California Press. 1999.
21. Sudarji K (Gen-retd). “Blind Men of Hindostan:Indo-Pak Nuclear War”
UBSPD Publishers, New Delhi 1993.
61
22. Raghvan VR (Lt Gen-retd) “Indian Need for Strategic Balance: Security
in the Post-Cold War World”. Delhi Policy Group, New Delhi.1996.
Documents
23. Draft Report of the National Security Advisory Board on the Indian
Nuclear Doctrine, 17 Aug 1999 (Unclassified)
www.Indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/unclear-doctrine.Aug171999.html.
24. Kargil Review Committee Report “From Surprise to Reckoning”. Sage
Publications, New Delhi 2000.
Articles/Papers
25. Bayman Daniel L. and WC Waxman. “Confronting Iraq: US Policy on
the use of Force Since the Gulf War” National Defense Research Institute
Paper.
26. Barry John. “A New Breed of Soldiers” Article in Newsweek, 10 Dec
2001 issue.
27. Bedi Rahul “Divided Interests” Janes Defense Weekly. 18 Jun 2003.
28. Bakshi GD (Brig) “End Game in Afghanistan: Military Lessons from the
Afghan Campaign”, Indian Defense Review. Vol 16 (4) Oct-Dec 2001.
29. Farooqi Ahmad “Failure in Command: Lessons from Pakistan’s Indian
Wars: 1947-1999” International Affairs. Vol 78 No.1. Jan 2002.
62
30. Haiman Leo “Lesson from the War in Kashmir” Military Review. Feb
1996.
31. Hoyle Craig “Israeli Elbit Systems” Janes Defense Weekly. 18 Jun 2003.
32. Ismat Saeed (Brig-retd) “Strategy for Total Defense: A Conceptual
Nuclear Doctrine” Pakistan Defense Journal. Karachi. Mar 2000.
33. Haniffa Aziz. “India will Finish Pakistan: Pentagon Study”. Report in
Pioneer 01 Apr 1998 issues citing Rand Corporation Report on “Sources of
Conflict in the 21st Century”.
34. John. Wilson. “IAF can Cripple Missile Sites in Hours” Pioneer. New
Delhi. 09 Apr 1998.
35. Kalayanaraman S. “Operation Parakram: An Indian Exercise in Coercive
Diplomacy” Strategic Analysis. Vol 26 No 4 Oct-Dec 2002.
36. Kasturi Bhasyam (Dr) “Military Special Forces in the Indian Context”.
Indian Defense Review. Vol 16 (4) Oct-Dec 2001.
37. Khalid Kidwai (Lt Gen) cited in London Report on “Nuclear Safety,
Nuclear Stability and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan” prepared by Professors PC
Ramusino and M.Matellini.
38. Makarovets Nikolai “Multiple Rocket Launchers” Indian Defense
Review Vol.16(4). Oct-Dec 2001.
39. Lodhi Sardar FS (Lt Gen-retd) “Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine”. Pakistan
Defence Journal Karachi Apr1999.
63
40. Mehta Ashok (Maj Gen-retd). “Limited War: Reflections of Frustration”
Pioneer 16 Mar 2000.
41. Naqvi M.B. “In the Shadow of Kargil: Security Inferences” Pakistan
Defense Journal. Nov 1999.
42. Shaikh Farzan “Pakistan’s Nuclear Bomb: Beyond the Non Proliferation
Regime” International Affairs. Vol.78.No.1. Jan 2002.
43. Sirak Micheal. “Flexibility: Key to Weapons Mix” Janes Defense
Weekly. 18 Jun 2003.
44. Sundarji K (Gen-retd) “Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine for India” Trishul.
Dec 1992 (Vol 5. No.2).
Sources from Internet
45. The Associated Press. “Nuclear History in India Pakistan”, available at
http/www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/inral/nuchist.html.
46. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists “South Asia”, available at http/www.the
bulletin.org/index.html.
47. Chari PR. “The Nuclear Doctrine”. 24 Aug 1999 available at
http/www.ipcs.org/issuesofarticles/252-ndi-chari-htm.
48. Cordesman Anthony “Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
“Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Global Nuclear Balance: A Qualitative
Arms Control Analysis”(Dec 2001) Available at http//www.cdi.org.
64
49. Ibid. “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces 2001”. January/February 2002 Vol.58
No.1 pp.70-71 Available at http/www.thebulletin.org/index.html.
50. NRDC. “Nulcear Note Book at
http//www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/jfo2nukenote.html.
“Escalation is a competition in risk taking”
Thomas.C.Schelling “To the Extent that the Military Balance is Stable at the Level of Nuclear War, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence”.
Chris Gagne
“Nuclear Weapons can generate risk taking because they presumably provide an insurance policy against escalation”
Michel Kreepon
“Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including your steeds of war, to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies of Allaha and your enemies and others besides, whom you may not know.”
The Holy Koran
Appendix A 65
ANALYSIS OF COMPELLENCE & RESPONSE
OP PARAKRAM (13 DEC 01 – 16 OCT 02)
DEC 2002
JAN 2002
JUL 2003
AUG 2003
SEP 2003
FEB 2002
MAR2003
APR 2003
MAY2003
JUN 2003
OCT 2003
Esc
alat
ion
Lad
der
Mili
tary
N
on M
ilita
ry
Lay Mine Fields
Move Aircraft and Prithvi Msls to
Contingency Positions
Move Eastern Fleet to Arabian Sea
Move of DT FMAS
Move of Strat Res
Move of Defensive Fmns
Reduction of Strength of Diplomatic Staff
Recall of High Commissioner
Severance of Rail and Road Links
Issue Demarche 14 Dec 02
Denial of Indian Air Space to Pak Air Lines
PAK 24-25 Dec 02 Freeze Assetts LET Arrest JEM ldrs
PAK 12 Jan 03 Musharaff
Speech to stop X border
infiltration
May 03 Pak Test Fired 3xBallistics
Missiles in 4 days
Early Jun03 Musharaff issued orders to
GoCxCorps to curb infiltration
India recalled Warships from Arabian Sea
India Opened skies to Pakistan Airlines
India held Election in J&K
Called off Op Prakram 16 Oct 2002
Visible returns Diminishing returns
CRISIS TIME LINE
Appendix B
66
PROPOSED ESCALATION MODEL
ESC
AL
AT
ION
INT
EN
SIT
Y
Partial Mob along IB
SF infit into POK
SF Vector Air Strikes on Camps
Air Superio-rity Gained Over POK
IAF air ambush with AWACs. PAF Mauled
Bn Sized Attacks all along LC
Div Sized Attacks across LC
2xMech Strike Corps Launched in Desert/Semidesert
Pak uses Nuc Wpns on Strike corps
Decapacita-ting Counter Force Strike
Conven-tional Attack Resumed
Naval Strikes Karachi Harbour
Corps sized Attack across LC
DP= Decision Point Choice to Escalate/Descalate Exercised.
TIME AXIS
DP 2
DP 1
DP 3
DP 4
DP 5
DP 6
