FINAL REPORT

Sunni Militancy in India:An Analytical Atlas

Stanford IPS/MPP Practicum ProjectforJoint Intelligence Task Force – Combating TerrorismDefense Intelligence Agency March 18, 2011

Prepared by:Katherine HoffmannJiro KoderaPeter LeFrancoisCharles NicasJackson Reed

TABLE OF CONTENTSI. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................................................iII. 1. INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................1III. 2. METHODOLOGY........................................................................................5IV. 3. BACKGROUND..........................................................................................7V. 4. TRENDS IN TERRORISM COMMITTED BY SUNNI GROUPS............................14VI. 5. PROFILES OF SUNNI MILITANT GROUPS IN INDIA......................................17

a. DEFINITIONS OF CATEGORIES AND TERMS......................................................................17b. ALL-INDIA GROUPS...................................................................................................22

Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)..................................................................................23Indian Mujahideen (IM)................................................................................................................27Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF).............................................................................................29

c. NORTHEAST INDIAN GROUPS.......................................................................................30Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA)...................................................................32Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA)....................................................................35People’s United Liberation Front (PULF)....................................................................................36Islamic Liberation Army of Assam (ILAA)....................................................................................38Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA)..................................................................................39United Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (UMLFA)....................................................................40Islamic United Reformation Protest of India (IURPI)...................................................................41Muslim Volunteer Force (MVF).....................................................................................................42

d. SOUTH INDIAN GROUPS.............................................................................................43Jihad Committee............................................................................................................................45Al-Ummah......................................................................................................................................45Islamic Defense Force...................................................................................................................46Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS).............................................................................................................49

e. KASHMIRI GROUPS....................................................................................................51Jamiat-ul-Mujahedin (JuM)...........................................................................................................53Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DeM)............................................................................................................55Banat-ul-Islam...............................................................................................................................57Muslim Khawateen Markaz (MKM)..............................................................................................58

f. PAKISTANI GROUPS...................................................................................................60Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)...................................................................................................................61Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM).............................................................................................................63Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)................................................................................................................65Islami Inqilabi Mahaz (IIM)..........................................................................................................67Harkat ul-Mujahideen...................................................................................................................68VII. 6. EXTERNAL ACTORS’ INFLUENCE ON SUNNI MILITANCY IN INDIA.................70

a. PAKISTAN’S INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (ISI).................................................70b. AL QAEDA...............................................................................................................71c. GULF DONORS AND THE HAWALA SYSTEM.....................................................................72d. TABLIGHI JAMAAT......................................................................................................73

VIII. 7............................................................................SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS.............................................................................................................74

IX. 8. CONCLUSION..........................................................................................82X. 9. APPENDICES.............................................................................................i

a. MAJOR SECONDARY SOURCES......................................................................................... ib. REFERENCES.............................................................................................................. iiLIST OF FIGURESXI.

XII. 1. List of Militant Groups..................................................................................3XIII. 2. Profile Components......................................................................................4XIV. 3. States of India..............................................................................................7XV. 4. Indian States with the largest percentage of Muslim residents, 2001..........8XVI. 5. Indian States with the largest Muslim populations, 2001.............................8XVII. 6. Incidents and Deaths with Known Sunni Perpetrators................................14XVIII. 7. Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir 1988-2010..............................................16XIX. 8. Terrorism by Suspected Sunni Militant Groups 1988-2010.........................16XX. 9. Overview of Profiled Groups.......................................................................19XXI. 10. Terrorism Incidents and Deaths by All-India Groups.................................22XXII. 12. Terrorism Incidents and Deaths by Northeast Indian Groups....................31XXIII. 14. Terrorism Incidents and Deaths by South Indian Groups..........................44XXIV. 16. Terrorism Incidents and Deaths by Kashmiri Groups................................52XXV. 18. Terrorism Incidents and Deaths by Pakistani Groups................................60XXVI. 20. Relations Between Militant Groups...........................................................74XXVII.................................................................21. Social Network Overview

....................................................................................................................... 77XXVIII........................22. Front, Joined, Merged, Offshoot, Predecessor, and Same

....................................................................................................................... 78XXIX. 23. Funding, Guidance, Influence, and Support..............................................79XXX. 24. Degree Centrality.....................................................................................80XXXI. 25. Betweenness............................................................................................81

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As the U.S.-led effort against Sunni militancy in South Asia enters its second decade, the issue of Sunni militancy in India, the region’s largest country, remains under-examined. The following report responds to this gap by exploring the nature and implications of Sunni militancy in India. Compiled with guidance from the Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the report aims to understand Sunni militancy in India by answering the following questions: What are the major Sunni militant groups in India? What are their ideologies, links with other actors, and capacities for violence? What are the salient characteristics (e.g., political, economic, ethnic, religious) of the populations that support these groups? What are the trends and causes of Sunni militancy in India and their implications?

We approach these questions in three complementary ways: a quantitative overview of Sunni terrorism incidents and deaths for India as a whole; in-depth qualitative profiles of individual militant groups; and a social network analysis of the connections between the groups. We find that the most active and violent of these Sunni militant groups are generally related to Pakistan or the long-running conflict between Pakistan and India in Kashmir. However, entirely indigenous factors also play an important role.In order to complete the profiles we developed the following definition for militant group. A militant group is an organization that advocates, materially supports, enables or uses unlawful violent action against persons or property so as to further a political, religious or ideological agenda. This definition allows a wide range of groups to be evaluated, including those that may not directly engage in violent acts or terrorism themselves. We identified and researched 24 Sunni militant groups with operations in India.BACKGROUND

We begin by situating Sunni militancy within the broader social and political environment in India, a large and diverse country with a complex history. India’s Muslim population is estimated to be approximately 160 million, only 13 percent of the national total, but large enough in absolute terms to be the third largest Muslim population in the world. India’s Muslims are overwhelmingly Sunni, and they constitute an important part of the political and cultural landscape. Understanding militancy in this community requires looking at not only the militant groups themselves but also the national and regional dynamics affecting the community’s interests.

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One of these dynamics is the rise of Hindu nationalism in India, a decades-old movement that has long viewed India’s Muslim population with suspicion. Hindu-Muslim strife manifested itself most violently in the early 1990s after the destruction of the Babri Masjid by Hindu extremists. Many of the Sunni militant groups included in this report cite incidents of anti-Muslim violence as motivation for their own violent acts, and they often function in opposition to India’s Hindu nationalist groups. Perceptions of Hindu nationalist parties among Muslims throughout India and the history of violence between radical nationalists and Muslims is a critical piece of the story of Sunni militancy in India.Another critical dynamic is the long-standing territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir. The defining moment in the rise of terrorism in Kashmir was the alleged manipulation of the results of India’s 1987 State Assembly elections. Pakistan then began covertly supporting Indian and Pakistani terrorist groups in Kashmir and importing Pakistani mujahideen returning from the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan. Violence in Jammu and Kashmir has dominated the terrorism component of Sunni militancy in India ever since.RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

Our nationwide assessment of Sunni terrorism in India does not show a clearly increasing trend over the past few years. Rather, the data show two competing trends. On one hand, Sunni terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir has been declining, in terms of both incidents and deaths, since 2005. On the other hand, Sunni terrorism outside Jammu and Kashmir has been marked by sporadic, highly lethal attacks in India’s major cities since the early 1990s. The next section of the report includes profiles describing each group’s background, demography, and capacity. The profiles are organized geographically because regional context appears to be a critical factor in determining a group’s particular motivations. Consistent with this schematic, the three groups without a clear regional delimiter are the most focused on national changes. These groups are characterized as All-India groups. The geographic categories for the other groups are Northeast India, South India, Kashmir and Pakistan. The report also devotes a section to a discussion of external influences on Sunni militancy in India, focusing most notably on Pakistan’s intelligence services, Al Qaeda and donors from the Persian Gulf.Using the qualitative information contained in the profiles, we conduct a social network analysis of the Sunni militant groups active in India to explore the links between them. A preliminary evaluation of the overarching network indicates a highly interconnected space. While groups tend to affiliate with each other according to regional ties (with for example the

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South Indian groups forming a small cluster of their own, connected to the rest of India by a single group), some actors – such as Pakistan’s intelligence service – act as links across multiple regions. In fact, according to almost every metric, our social network analysis suggests Pakistani organizations are critical to understanding Sunni militancy in India.CONCLUSIONS

Our research shows that the vast majority of Sunni attacks in India take place in the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir. Outside Kashmir, attacks by Sunni groups in India tend to be less frequent and more lethal. For example, three notable attacks, New Delhi in October 2005 and Mumbai in July 2006 and November 2008, account for 50 percent of the total deaths from Sunni attacks outside Kashmir since 2004. Sunni militant incidents in India as a whole have been decreasing since 2008, with Kashmiri militancy starting to fall even earlier in 2005.The motivations of domestic Indian militant groups can be divided three broad categories: territorial grievances, relevant in Kashmir and Northeast India; the threat of communal violence, especially versus Hindu nationalist groups, relevant for All-India and South India groups; and the appeal of Islamist ideology, relevant for all of the groups.Among the domestic groups, the Indian Mujahideen and the Students Islamic Movement of India have been most closely associated with terrorism, especially medium and high-mortality attacks in India’s cities. However, these groups are closely linked with Pakistani intelligence and Pakistan-based groups. The Pakistan-based groups are directly involved in both the high-frequency attacks in Kashmir and the highly lethal attacks in Indian cities. As a result, we view these groups as the primary instigators of Sunni terrorism in India. Because almost all of the Pakistan-based groups had – or have – ties to elements within Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment, we believe the adversarial relationship between the governments of India and Pakistan to be a central factor fueling this violence. The India-Pakistan conflict has served as a primary motivation for the Pakistani state to support Sunni terrorism, and for Pakistani militants to launch attacks in India. It is not the only motivation, and it complements and competes with others, including religious or jihadist ideology. Nevertheless, at present our research shows a decisive Pakistani influence on Sunni militancy in India, and this leads us to accord a central explanatory role to the territorial dispute in Kashmir and the broader political-religious conflict between India and Pakistan that predates their partition. The non-terrorism component of Sunni militancy in India, on the other hand, continues to be influenced by domestic Indian actors. The riots of 1992 and

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1993, street protests in Jammu and Kashmir and communal mobilization in South India are all a response to domestic territorial or communal griev-ances and show limited Pakistani involvement. In the future, the domestic grievances of Sunni Muslims in India, combined with the limited but never-theless potent appeal of jihadist ideologies, could lead the development of a self-sustaining, widespread, indigenous movement of Sunni militancy in In-dia. For now, however, Sunni militancy in India—and Sunni terrorism in par-ticular—is closely linked to neighboring Pakistan.

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1. INTRODUCTION

This report represents our completed efforts to construct an atlas of Sunni militant groups in India for the Joint Intelligence Task Force – Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The project also serves as the Practicum component of the graduate programs in International and Public Policy at Stanford University.During preliminary discussion, JITF-CT identified Sunni militancy in India as a topic about which they lacked organizational knowledge. The goal of the project is to fill this knowledge gap with a document that can serve as a primer for junior personnel and as a working reference piece for senior analysts at DIA. To serve these functions, the document answers six key questions posed by JITF-CT:

What are the major Sunni militant groups in India? What are their ideologies? What are their interactions with other actors? What are the salient characteristics (e.g., political, economic, ethnic, tribal) of the populations that support these groups? What is the group’s capacity for violent action? What trends are there in Sunni militancy in India and why is it important?

To answer these questions, we profiled 24 Sunni militant groups that operate in India. Section 2 describes the methodology used to research the groups profiled. Section 3 is a brief background on elements of the Indian policy environment relevant to the study of Sunni militancy, including overviews of Muslim demographics, the Hindu nationalist movement and communal violence in the country, and a brief history of the conflict in Kashmir. A description of the general trends observed in Sunni militancy over time is found in section 4. Section 5 contains a table highlighting the major details of each group and the group profiles themselves. Section 6 provides a concise description of the role of external influences on Sunni militancy in India. The social network analysis in section 7 depicts the relationships that exist between the groups and other actors. The report concludes with section 8 and our analysis of why Sunni militancy in India is important and its role in a national, regional, and international context.The definition we selected for militant group considered the connection between militancy and terrorism, the use of violence, and the group’s goals. In conjunction with JITF-CT, we developed the following project-specific definition: an organization that advocates, materially supports, enables or uses unlawful violent action against persons or property so as to further a political, religious or ideological agenda.

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This definition of militancy allows a wide range of groups to be evaluated, including those that may not directly engage in violent acts or terrorism themselves, but that, through rhetorical or logistical support, create an en-vironment in which it is easier for violent groups to operate.Guided by these criteria, we sought to identify every Sunni militant group with operations in India, whether foreign or domestically based. JITF-CT re-viewed the groups identified by this process and divided them into high and low priority lists, based on whether JITF-CT already possessed substantial knowledge of a group in question (primarily an issue with well known Pak-istan-based groups such as Lashkar-e Taiba).1 We then followed our re-search methodology to complete profiles on 22 of the 25 groups in the high-priority list. The three high-priority groups not profiled were the Muslim Tiger Force, Revolutionary Muslim Commandos, and the United Liberation Tigers of Assam. Available information on these groups was insufficient for profile compilation. After a preliminary investigation, and based on our ear-lier experiences with similarly undocumented groups, like the Islamic United Reformation Protest of India, we decided to forgo profiling them al-together.We also profiled two groups from the low-priority list. The first, Lashkar-e-Taiba, was so integral to the environment of Sunni terrorism in India that we found it expedient to compile a profile, despite JITF-CT’s expertise on the group. The second group, Muslim Khawateen Markaz was included in both the original low and high priority lists and was included for thourough-ness. The high and low priority lists and the list of the groups profiled can be seen in Figure 1 below. As mentioned above, several of the profiles are quite short due to information unavailability. We have decided to include these profiles to address as completely as possible our list of militant groups.Based on the needs of JITF-CT we sought to compile certain information in each group profile. The availability of information varied widely between groups, and as such, the following profile components (detailed in Figure 2 below) served as a guide for our research.

1 In other words, high priority status only reflects the fact that JITF-CT knows relatively little about the groups so classified and nothing about their intrinsic importance.

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FIGURE 1. LIST OF MILITANT GROUPSHIGH-PRIORITY (LESSER KNOWN) GROUPS LOW-PRIORITY (BETTER KNOWN) GROUPS

Al-Ummah Asif Reza Commando Force Banat-ul-Islam Dukhtaran-e-Millat Harakat-ul-Mujahideen Indian Mujahideen Islami Inqilabi Mahaz Islamic Defense Force Islamic Liberation Army of Assam Islamic Sevak Sangh Islamic United Reformation Protest of India Jaish-e-Mohammad Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen Jihad Committee Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Muslim Security Council of Assam Muslim Tiger Force* Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam Muslim Volunteer Force People’s United Liberation Front Revolutionary Muslim Commandos* Students Islamic Movement of India United Liberation Tigers of Assam2* United Muslim Liberation Front of As-sam

All Parties Hurriyat Conference* Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami* Hizbul Mujahideen* Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front* Lashkar-e-Taiba Muslim Khawateen Markaz3

* Not profiled.

2 Note: Not a Sunni militant group.3 Originally listed by JTIF as both high and low priority.

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FIGURE 2. PROFILE COMPONENTSBACKGROUND DEMOGRAPHY CAPACITY

Date formed and dis-banded Front companies, aliases, or political fronts Predecessors Founding story Goals Ideology Brief history Key events Leadership

Geographic base of sup-port Demographic base of support Relationship with com-munity Interaction with other ac-tors Legal status

Size Resources Recruitment strategy and base Means of mobilizing support Capacity for carrying out violent action Mode of operation 

 

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2. METHODOLOGY

CONDUCTING RESEARCH INTO INDIAN MILITANT GROUPS IS AN OFTEN COMPLEX ENDEAVOR THAT PRESENTS CONFLICTING ACCOUNTS OF EVENTS FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES, WHOSE VERACITY CANNOT ALWAYS BE ASCERTAINED. IN CONSIDERATION OF THAT, WE EXAMINED AS MANY SOURCES AS WE COULD TO CONSTRUCT AN ACCURATE PROFILE OF THE GROUPS IN QUESTION.TO CONSTRUCT THE BODY OF MILITANT GROUP PROFILES, SELECTED GROUPS (SEE SECTION 5) WERE DIVIDED USING ROUGH GEOGRAPHICAL CRITERIA AND ASSIGNED TO INDIVIDUAL RESEARCHERS. THE DECISION TO ASSIGN WHOLE PROFILES, AS OPPOSED TO PROFILE COMPONENTS, TO INDIVIDUAL RESEARCHERS WAS MADE TO MINIMIZE REDUNDANCY OF EFFORT, GIVEN THAT INDIVIDUAL SOURCES OFTENTIMES CONTAIN INFORMATION RELEVANT TO MULTIPLE PROFILE COMPONENTS OF A SINGLE GROUP.The study of militancy in India is characterized by information scarcity. The clandestine and unlawful nature of militant activity contributes to this situation, as do the information security measures of the government agencies that investigate and combat militancy. For our U.S.-based, English-speaking research team, the inability to access physical archives in India or to translate vernacular sources was an additional barrier. The fact that our research was possible, in spite of these difficulties, is due chiefly to the existence of India’s English-language news media, whose reports constitute the sole primary source available to the research team, and the basis of almost all secondary-source writing on Sunni militancy in India. However, articles on Sunni militancy frequently quote casualty and incident figures without citing sources and publications repeat the reporting of their competitors so that independent corroboration of key claims is oftentimes impossible. We have tried to highlight discrepancies and information gaps throughout the report, but readers should keep in mind that the open-source study of militancy in India rests on a great deal of uncertainty. In addition to news articles, the report relies on a number of secondary sources. The most important of these is the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), an online source of information and analysis on terrorism and political conditions across South Asia maintained by the Institute for Conflict Management, an Indian think tank. Although SATP does not cite individual sources, and its profiles of militant groups are not always internally consistent, its documents are sourced in part from media reports that do not appear in the LexisNexis database, making them a valuable, if problematic reference.Other secondary publications do not cite their sources at all and are included with the lack of sourcing highlighted, with the assumption being that their anonymous source may be providing information that is unavailable elsewhere. The Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs), maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) at the University of Maryland, are an

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example of one such source (see Appendix for a descriptive table of major secondary sources).In addition to the secondary sources, we used two databases to assess trends in terrorism by Sunni militant groups in India, both regionally and nationally: the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), maintained by the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), maintained by START. Each consist of terrorism incident records that including the date, suspected perpetrators, victims and casualties of attacks, in addition to other variables. The GTD is based primarily on media reports, while WITS relies on unspecified open sources. The databases each use different definitions of terrorism, and their exact methodologies, while not entirely transparent, appear to differ as well. These differences are substantial enough to generate significant discrepancies in incident and casualty counts for the four years in which their coverage overlaps. As such, information from each source is represented separately in the charts in sections 4 and 5 that utilize GTD and WITS data.Finally, a social network analysis was performed using the qualitative data collected and used for the individual profiles. Social Network Analysis is a useful means of visualizing and identifying key organizations and regional trends in terrorist activity in India. In fact, social network analysis has already been applied to the study of terrorism in India by Aparna Basu of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDHA) in New Delhi. Basu used the co-occurrence of group names in the Terrorist Tracker database’s report of terrorist incidents to identify the strength of ties between different organizations.4Our social network analysis focused on the narrower topic of Sunni militancy in India. A study of the links between different organizations and the betweenness and degree centrality of the different groups addressed in the report has allowed us to identify the most active and influential groups in the network. The findings of this analysis, as well as a detailed discussion of the specific methodological challenges faced, are in section 7.

4 Aparna Basu. Social Network Analysis of Terrorist Organizations in India (New Delhi: Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, 2004).

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3. BACKGROUND

MUSLIM POPULATIONS IN INDIA

In 2009, the Pew Research Center estimated that India was home to roughly 161 million Muslims, or 10 percent of the world’s total Muslim population. According to these data, India has more Muslim residents than all other countries except Indonesia and Pakistan. Nonetheless, only about 13 percent of Indians are Muslim.5 As of 2001, Muslims lived in every state and union territory of India, and constituted a religious minority in all but two (see Figure 4 ).FIGURE 3. STATES OF INDIA

Source: India State Basemap: A Georeferenced GIS Database for India, 2008.5 Estimates from 2009 were taken from 2001 census data. Mapping the Global Muslim Population, Pew Research Center, 2009, 28.

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The largest Muslim populations live in populous northern states, but substantial numbers can be found across the south as well (see Figure 5).6

FIGURE 4. INDIAN STATES WITH THE LARGEST PERCENTAGE OF MUSLIM RESIDENTS, 2001FIGURE 5. INDIAN STATES WITH THE LARGEST MUSLIM POPULATIONS, 2001

STATE/UT MUSLIM RESIDENTSMUSLIMS AS SHARE OF STATE/UT POPULATION*

STATE/UT MUSLIM RESIDENTSSHARE OF INDIAN MUSLIM POPULATION*Lakshadweep 57,903 96% Uttar Pradesh 30,740,158 22%Jammu & Kashmir 6,793,240 67% West Bengal 20,240,543 14%

Assam 8,240,611 31% Bihar 13,722,048 10%West Bengal 20,240,543 25% Maharashtra 10,270,485 7%Kerala 7,863,842 25% Assam 8,240,611 6%Uttar Pradesh 30,740,158 19% Kerala 7,863,842 6%Bihar 13,722,048 17% Andhra Pradesh 6,986,856 5%Jharkhand 3,731,308 14% Jammu & Kashmir 6,793,240 5%Karnataka 6,463,127 12% Karnataka 6,463,127 5%Uttaranchal 1,012,141 12% Total 138,188,240 100%Source: Census of India data, 2001.*Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding.In 2009, the Pew Center estimated India’s Muslim population to be between 85 and 90 percent Sunni. The remaining 10 to 15 percent of the population was predominantly Shia, with less than .07 percent of Muslims not affiliated with either major sect.7 Since the Census of India does not record Sunni or Shia affiliation, Pew developed these estimates by relying on expert academic opinion to infer the likely sectarian affiliation of different ethno-linguistic groups across India;8 consequently, they should be taken as a rough guide only. Thus far, we have been unable to determine the geographic distribution of Shia and Sunni populations within India.9

6 “Population by Religious Communities,” Census of India, accessed October 9, 2010. 7 Mapping the Global Muslim Population, 10.8 Mapping the Global Muslim Population, 38.9 Ibid., and “Religion and Survey (survey level),” World Religion Database, accessed October 10, 2010.

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HINDU NATIONALISM AND COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN INDIA

Many of the Sunni militant groups included in this report cite incidents of anti-Muslim violence as motivation for their own violent acts and oftentimes function in opposition to India’s Hindu nationalist groups. Given these connections, and to limit repetition in the profiles, we provide below an overview of the Hindu nationalist movement and its connection to major incidents of communal violence in India, followed by a brief description of the three most important Hindu nationalist parties: the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS).The Hindu nationalist movement now led by these organizations began gaining mass appeal in the early 1980s, a time when socialism and secularism were losing popularity in the country. Initially, it was the Congress party that mobilized Hindu identity for electoral purposes, relying on violent anti-Sikh sentiment among Hindus in the wake of a Sikh separatist insurgency in Punjab and the related murder of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by her Sikh bodyguards, to sweep the 1984 elections.10 When compared with the three main Hindu nationalist organizations, however, the Congress party was organizationally and ideologically ill-placed to reap the benefits of deploying Hinduism politically, and the BJP won enough seats in the 1989 elections to support the Janata Dal party in forming India’s first non-Congress government.11

By the early 1990s, the communalist anger of Hindu nationalists had shifted from Sikhs to Muslims. Controversy centered on the Babri Masjid, a 16th century mosque in the small town of Ayodhya, in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh (see Figure 3). Hindu nationalists maintained that the mosque, which was dedicated to Babur, the first Mughal emperor of India, rested on the foundations of an ancient mandir (Hindu temple) marking the birthplace of the Hindu god Ram. The controversy culminated in the destruction of the mosque by a large crowd of Hindu pilgrims in December 1992. RSS, BJP and VHP leaders were present during the rioting that destroyed the mosque, although they deny having instigated its destruction. This incident was followed by Hindu-Muslim violence across India, in which thousands died over subsequent months.12 This violence led the Home Minsitry to temporarily ban the RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal (a third Hindu nationalist group), along with the Muslim Jamaat-e-Islami Hind and Islamic Sevak Sangh, all of which were accused of exacerbating communal tensions.13The destruction of the Babri Masjid and ensuing violence continue to affect communal politics in India, and the disputed Ayodhya site remains 10 Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, Modern South Asia (London: Routledge, 1998), 225.11 Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, 227.12 Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, 227-229.13 Sanjoy Hazarika, “India Issues a Ban on Five Rival Groups,” New York Times. December 11, 1992. LexisNexis.

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controversial. In the past decade, the worst communal violence occurred in 2002, following a deadly fire on a train at Godhra in Gujarat state. The train was carrying Hindu pilgrims from Ayodhya to Ahmedabad, the capital of Gujarat.14 Some pilgrims on the train alleged that Muslim terrorists lit the fire. The cause of the fire was subsequently disputed, with an investigative committee appointed by the central government finding that the fire was accidental, and a Gujarat state government-appointed panel finding that a conspiracy of local Muslims was responsible.15 However, the immediate consequences of the fire were anti-Muslim riots across BJP-governed Gujarat, in which 1,000 to 2,000 Muslims were killed.16 The perception of Hindu nationalist parties and groups among Muslims throughout India and the history of violence between radical nationalists and Muslims is a critical piece of the story of Sunni militancy in India. The following descriptions of the BJP, VHP, and RSS provide important context for the group profiles and the rest of the report. BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY (THE INDIAN PEOPLE’S PARTY, OR BJP) Along with the Indian National Congress, the BJP is one of two major national political parties in India. It led the country’s government between March 1998 and May 2004 under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.17 Then party-leader L.K. Advani was instrumental in mobilizing mass support for the Babri Masjid demolition (see overview above). VISHWA HINDU PARISHAD (THE WORLD HINDU COUNCIL, OR VHP)

The professed goals of the VHP are to work for the cohesion of Hindu society and protect the religion from malign influences.18 The organization has a global presence and advocates in favor of Hindu causes. In India, the VHP campaigns for the construction of the Sri Ram Janmabhumi Mandir (temple) on the site of the demolished Babri Masjid in Ayodhya.19

RASHTRIYA SWAYAMSEVAK SANGH (THE NATIONAL VOLUNTEER ASSOCIATION, OR RSS)14 “Timeline, India,” BBC News, updated October 6, 2010.15 “Sabarmati Express Fire Was an Accident, Says UC Banerjee,” Hindustan Times, March 3, 2006; and “Uproar in House Over Nanavati Report,” United News of India, September 29, 2008.16 “Timeline, India,” BBC News.17 “Vajpayee Celebrates Narrow Victory,” Courier Mail (Australia), March 30, 1998, 14; “India Country Profile,” BBC News, accessed October 6, 2010.18 “Swagatam,” Vishwa Hindu Parishad, accessed November 18, 2010.19 “Know About Shri Ram Janmabhumi Mandir,” Vishwa Hindu Parishad, accessed November 18, 2010.

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The RSS was founded in 1925 to work for India’s independence as a Hindu nation. It maintains a national association that organizes Hindu youth and attempts to instill mental and physical discipline in its members. The RSS is one of the oldest Hindu nationalist groups in India and its former members have founded or led many allied organizations, including the BJP and VHP. These latter two groups also look to RSS leaders for legitimacy.20

HISTORY OF THE KASHMIR CONFLICT

Violence in Jammu and Kashmir has dominated the terrorism component of Sunni militancy in India for the past two decades. This violence is inextricably tied to the history of India and Pakistan’s conflict over the disputed territory, which began shortly after independence and is ongoing.From the mid-nineteenth century through its disputed accession to independent India in 1947, Jammu and Kashmir was a “princely state”, meaning that its rulers enjoyed titular autonomy from the British East India Company and Crown as long as they supported the former’s interests in the territory. During this period, predominantly Muslim Jammu and Kashmir was ruled by a dynasty of Hindu maharajas (kings), whose domestic reign relied on severe repression of the majority population.21

Because of the territory’s autonomous status, the Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, had the opportunity to choose whether to accede to Pakistan or India at the time of partition. The situation was complicated by the fact that the princely state’s population was still majority Muslim and highly discriminated against.22 These demographic and political factors suggest that a majority of the state’s population would have favored accession to Pakistan; however, the situation was further complicated by the fact that Sheik Mohammad Abdullah, the foremost leader of Kashmir’s anti-monarchy reform movement in the 1930s and 1940s, favored the Indian National Congress over Pakistan’s Muslim League on the larger question of independence from Britain and partition. The territory’s Muslim majority was also concentrated in the Kashmir valley, while the sub-regions of Jammu and Ladakh were and are majority Hindu and Buddhist, respectively.23

After a period of indecision, Singh ultimately decided on accession to India after thousands of armed Pathans (Pashtuns) entered Kashmir from Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province. Indian forces were airlifted into the 20 “Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS),” Encyclopædia Brittanica Online, accessed November 18, 2010.21 Robert Huttenback, Kashmir and the British Raj 1847-1947 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 5-6.22 Huttenback, 136-137, 161.23 Huttenback, 151.

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state just before Pathan forces captured Srinagar airport as there was no road from India to the Kashmir valley, and Abdullah became premier of an Emergency Administration.Nehru agreed in principle to a British stipulation that, because of the demographics, the final question of Jammu and Kashmir’s status should be decided by plebiscite, once the invaders were expelled;24 however, Indian and Pakistani leaders could not agree on the terms of such a plebiscite, and went directly to war over the issue in 1948, with the Pakistan retaining control over some territory in the eastern part of the contested state.In 1953, Sheik Abdullah fell out of favor with the Congress government and was imprisoned for twenty-two years. In 1975 he was released and his party, the National Conference went on to win elections in 1977 and 1983, only to be removed from power again by another Congress government. A subsequent agreement between the National Conference and New Delhi led to the election of 1987, which was widely perceived as fraudulent. Outrage over the election rigging initiated militancy in the state.25

WHY IS SUNNI MILITANCY IMPORTANT? THE NATIONAL CONTEXT

Central to understanding any issue in India is the recognition of the fact that it is a large, diverse, complicated country with an equally long and complex history. This is particularly relevant when studying the Muslim population in India. The role of Sunni militancy in India and its importance in the national context is manifested in two key components: 1) the ways in which Sunni militancy affects the state’s view of its minority Muslim population; and 2) the extent to which the militant tactics of many Sunni militant groups can undermine the liberalism of the Indian state.The Indian state’s response to recent terrorist incidents can be understood through its legislative actions. Both the Terrorist and Disruption Activities (Prevention) Act of 1985 (TADA) and the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2002 (POTA) were measures passed in reaction to major terrorist incidents, and both have since been repealed due to popular dissent against their draconian nature. However, after the 2008 bombings and attacks in Mumbai the 1967 Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) was amended to include many of the provisions of POTA and TADA. The amendments include:

A vague definition of terrorism; Expanded powers to ban organizations identified as terrorist;

24 Huttenback, vii, 162-163.25 Bose and Jalal, Modern South Asia, 226 and “Kashmir; A Rethink,” The Economist, 8 October 1994. LexisNexis.

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The ability to prosecute suspected members of terrorist organi-zations on a broad definition of membership, rather than on the basis of complicity in an act of terrorism; Provisions to grant security forces broad powers not authorized under the Indian Criminal Code, giving the police the power to make arrests and conduct searches and seizures based on “per-sonal knowledge” of a committed offense; A provision for courts to double the maximum period of deten-tion from 90 to 180 days without charge for terrorism suspects; A provision requiring the denial of bail for anyone charged as a terrorist; The automatic shift of the burden of proof to the accused to prove innocence if the accused is found to be in possession of arms, explosives or other specified items believed to be used in a committed offense or if fingerprints or other definitive evi-dence suggesting involvement is found at the site or in connec-tion with anything used in the offense.26

The above amendments run counter to the Indian Criminal Code, general Indian law, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. While the earlier repeal of both TADA and POTA illustrates the extent of popular opposition to such explicit powers, the amendments represent an attempt to reintegrate previously rejected provisions. The amendments allow authorities to classify political opponents and opposition groups as terrorist, limiting the right to assembly and the organizational capacity of groups, particularly those associated with a minority position or population. There is also the potential for prolonged pretrial detention, limitations on the right to a fair trial, and wrongful prosecution. The amendments to UAPA clearly run counter to the liberal nature of the Indian constitution and to the international treaties India is party to.A 2011 Human Rights Watch report on the arbitrary detention and torture of terrorism suspects in India depicts how the 2008 amendments to UAPA are representative of a larger trend in India. Indian police are shown to have routinely taken action that extends beyond the defined parameters of Indian law. For example, the report describes incidents of torture and forced confessions in police custody, beatings in jail, the arrests of relatives to coerce surrenders or obtain information, extended stays in police custody beyond the proscribed limit, mass arrests for questioning, and denial of access to lawyers and family members in the aftermath of the 2008 bombings. The majority of these incidents were reported by Muslims, targeted suspected members of Muslim militant groups, and focused on Muslim communities.27 It is difficult to link the police response targeting Muslim communities and the reports of police abuse to the actions of Sunni 26 “The ‘Anti-Nationals’ Arbitrary Detention and Torture of Terrorism Suspects in India,” Human Rights Watch, 2011.27 “The ‘Anti-Nationals’ Arbitrary Detention and Torture of Terrorism Suspects in India,” Human Rights Watch, 2011.

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militant groups directly. However, it is not difficult to surmise that the continued targeting of Muslim communities and an anti-terrorism legal framework that facilitates that action will contribute to an increase in tensions with India’s Muslim population, ultimately creating an environment where militancy will remain and perhaps increase.

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4. TRENDS IN TERRORISM COMMITTED BY SUNNI GROUPS

The majority of Sunni militant groups profiled in this study have engaged in terrorism at some point in their history. For many groups, terrorism appears to be the dominant form of violent activity. Section 5 contains the profiles of the individual groups and details their involvement in acts of terrorism. This section will discuss the more general trends we have observed in the terrorism committed by Sunni militant groups.We have used data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) to conduct our analysis. As discussed in the Methodology Section, both GTD and WITS consist of terrorism incident records. GTD is based primarily on media reports, while WITS relies on unspecified open sources. The databases each use different definitions of terrorism, and their exact methodologies, while not entirely transparent, appear to differ as well. GTD’s records only cover until 2008. The lack of GTD data for 1993 is due to the loss of the note-cards containing that data when the data was moved to a new location. WITS did not begin compiling data until 2004. To gain a more complete picture of Sunni terrorist incidents in India we used both databases. The differences between GTD and WITS are substantial enough to generate significant discrepancies in incident and casualty counts for the four years in which their coverage overlaps. As such, information from each source is represented separately in the charts in this section.Based on our analysis of the data, several characteristics of Sunni terrorism in India are clear. First, Jammu and Kashmir dominates the phenomenon of Sunni militancy. When only incidents with known perpetrators were considered, this state, which accounts for just under one percent of India’s population,28 accounted for 78 percent of Sunni perpetrated incidents listed in the GTD and 59 percent of deaths in such incidents. For WITS, 95 percent of Sunni-perpetrated incidents occurred in Jammu and Kashmir, and 42 percent of victim deaths in such incidents were attributable to the state (see Figure 6). The discrepancy between the two datasets on Kashmir’s share of deaths in Sunni-perpetrated incidents may be due to the fact that the WITS data covers a period when terrorism in Jammu in Kashmir was declining and which included several highly lethal Sunni attacks in India’s large cities.

FIGURE 6. INCIDENTS AND DEATHS WITH KNOWN SUNNI PERPETRATORSGTD WITSPercent of total Sunni-perpetrated 78% 95%

28 Census of India data, 2001.

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incidents that occurred in Jammu and KashmirPercent of total Sunni-perpetrated deaths that occurred in Jammu and Kashmir 59% 42%

Second, Sunni terrorism in India does not show a clearly increasing trend over the past few years. Rather, the data shows two competing trends. On the one hand, Sunni terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir has been declining, in terms of both incidents and deaths, since 2005 (see Figure 7). On the other hand, Sunni terrorism outside Jammu and Kashmir has been marked by sporadic highly lethal attacks in India’s major cities since the early 1990s. Such incidents are visible in the scatterplots (see Figure 8) as spikes in deaths in 1992, 2006 and 2008.

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FIGURE 7. TERRORISM IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR 1988-2010

1988 1993 1998 2003 20080

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

GTD In-cidents

GTD Deaths

WITS Inci-dentsWITS Deaths

Year

Inic

iden

ts a

nd D

eath

s

Source: Global Terrorism Database and Worldwide Incident Tracking SystemFIGURE 8. TERRORISM BY SUSPECTED SUNNI MILITANT GROUPS 1988-2010

1988 1993 1998 2003 20080

100200300400500600700800900

GTD In-cidents

GTD Deaths

WITS Inci-dentsWITS Deaths

Year

Inci

dent

s an

d D

eath

s

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Source: Global Terrorism Database and Worldwide Incidents Tracking System

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5. PROFILES OF SUNNI MILITANT GROUPS IN INDIA

This section contains the Sunni militant group profiles organized geographically, because regional context is an important factor in determining a group’s particular motivations and organizational links. Within each region, the groups are ordered by importance. Table 3 summarizes the main profile components for each group, and the individual profiles follow.Each profile starts with a paragraph in italics summarizing the team’s estimates of each group’s: size, resources, mode of operation, capacity for violent action, means of mobilizing support, recruitment strategy and recruitment base. DEFINITIONS OF CATEGORIES AND TERMSALIASES – Alternate or front names for the group. Does not include instances of re-naming or merging with other groups (see Predecessors and Successors). IDEOLOGY/GOALS – The group’s ideology, terms include:

ISLAMIST A generic term for groups which believe that social and political life should be governed by some set of Islamic principles. Groups falling into this category may be influenced by ostensibly competing schools of Islamism such as Maulana Maududi’s modernism or Deobandi traditionalism. MODERNISTGroups that look to the Quran as the source of Islamic principles and minimize the importance of Islamic Scholars and traditional Islamic thought, especially those following the teachings of Maulana Sayyid Abu’l Al’a Maududi. DEOBANDI Groups that look to traditional Islamic scholarship to define Islamic principles. Especially those associated with Pakistan’s Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam.29

29 Both the Deobandi groups profiled here and the JUiI in Pakistan form the politically active fringe of a traditionalist Islamic reform movement that began among India’s Islamic scholars in the 19th century. The movement focuses on close study of the hadith for revelation of religious truth, and its mainstream is apolitical. During India’s independence movement a minority of Deobandi scholars became politically engaged, supporting the Muslim League’s efforts to create Pakistan. Following partition and independence, this minority faction became

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FEMALE-FOCUSEDRefers to groups that are or were primarily concerned with the welfare, rights or behavior of women. SEPARATISTIndicates that the group desires some kind of increased autonomy for a region or people, but not secession from India as such. SECESSIONISTIndicates that the group that seeks the secession of a particular territory from the Republic of India. SELF-DETERMINATIONDesires that the final status of Kashmir be determined by plebiscite, but does not rhetorically favor a particular outcome.

ATTACKS – Has the group been blamed for specific acts of terrorism?BANNED – Is the group banned by any State or Union Territory of India, the government of Pakistan, or listed under one of the following instruments? India’s Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967 Common Position 2001/931/CFSP of the European Union U.S. Department of State’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations U.S. Department of State’s Terrorist Exclusion List

the JUiI, one of Pakistan’s smaller religious parties. Barbara D. Metcalf, “’Traditionalist’ Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs,” Social Science Research Council. After September 11th Archive, accessed February 21, 2011.

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FIGURE 9. OVERVIEW OF PROFILED GROUPSGROUP NAME ALIASES DATE FOUNDED

PREDECESSORS IDEOLOGY ATTACKS BANNEDALL-INDIA GROUPS

STUDENTS ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF INDIA (SIMI) IM 1977 Jamaat-e-Isla-mi Hind, Ja-maat-e-Islami Islamic re-vivalist Yes Indian Govern-ment 2001INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN (IM) n/a

First claimed at-tack in 2005SIMI, Asif Reza Com-mando Force Islamist Yes Indian Govern-ment 2010

ASIF REZA COMMANDO FORCE (ARCF) n/a 2001 HUJI Islamist Yes NoNORTHEAST INDIAN GROUPSMUSLIM UNITED LIBERATION TIGERS OF ASSAM (MULTA)

n/a 1996 n/a Separatist No NoMUSLIM UNITED LIBERATION FRONT OF ASSAM (MULFA) n/a 1994 n/a Separatist n/a No

PEOPLE’S UNITED LIBERATION FRONT (PULF) n/a 1993 or 1995 n/a Separatist Yes NoISLAMIC LIBERATION ARMY OF ASSAM (ILAA) n/a 1993 n/a Separatist n/a NoMUSLIM SECURITY COUNCIL OF ASSAM (MSCA) n/a n/a n/a Separatist n/a No

UNITED MUSLIM n/a Earli- n/a Separatist No No

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LIBERATION FRONT OF ASSAM (UMLFA)est ref-erence 2000

ISLAMIC UNITED REFORMATION PROTEST OF INDIA (IURPI) n/a Earli-est ref-erence 2004 n/a n/a n/a n/aMUSLIM VOLUNTEER FORCE (MVF) n/a Earli-est ref-erence 1998 n/a n/a n/a n/a

GROUP NAME ALIASES DATE FOUNDEDPREDECESSORS IDEOLOGY ATTACKS BANNED

SOUTH INDIAN GROUPSJIHAD COMMITTEE (JC)

All India Jihad Commit-tee 1986 n/a Islamist, separatist Yes Tamil Nadu State 1998AL-UMMAH (AU) n/a 1993 n/a Islamist, separatist Yes Tamil Nadu State 1998

ISLAMIC DEFENSE FORCE (IDF) n/a 1997 n/a Islamist, separatist Yes NoISLAMIC SEVAK SANGH (ISS) n/a 1990 n/a Islamist Yes Indian Govern-ment 1992KASHMIR BASED GROUPS

JAMIAT-UL-MUJAHIDEEN (JUM) n/a 1990-1991 HuM, Ansar ul-Is-lamIslamist, Deobandi, separatist, pro-Pak-istan

Yes US TEL

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DUKHTARAN-E-MILLAT (DEM)Sus-pected front for Lashkar-e-Jabbar

1987 Jamaat-e-Is-lamiIslamist, fe-male-fo-cused, se-cessionist Yes No

BANAT-UL-ISLAM (BUI) n/a mid-1990s Hizbul Mu-jahideen, Ja-maat-e-Islami n/a n/a No

MUSLIM KHAWATEEN MARKAZ (MKM)

Some-times also: Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Khawa-teen Markaz

1989 n/aSelf-deter-mination for Jammu and Kash-mir, human rights

No No

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GROUP NAME ALIASES DATE FOUNDEDPREDECESSORS IDEOLOGY ATTACKS BANNED

PAKISTAN BASED GROUPS

LASHKAR-E-TAIBA (LET)

Jamat ud-Dawa, Falah-e-In-saniyat, Tehrik-e-Taha-fuz Qi-bla Awal

Late 1980s or early 1990sMarkaz Dawa ul-Irshad

Ahle Ha-dith, pro-Pakistan, Kashmiri succession-ist

Pakistani govern-ment, In-dian gov-ernment, US FTO

JAISH-E-MOHAMMAD (JEM)Tehrik al-Furqan, Jamaat-e-Furqa

2000 HuM Deobandi YesUS FTO 2001; Pakistani Govern-ment 2002

LASHKAR-E-JHANGVI (LEJ) n/a mid-1990s Sipah-e-Sa-haba Pakistan Anti-Shia, Deobandi YesPakistani Govern-ment 2001; US FTO 2003

ISLAMI INQILABI MAHAZ (IIM) n/a 1990s n/a Islamist No NoHARAKAT-UL-MUJAHIDEEN (HUM) Al Faran 1985 Harkat ul-Ji-had-i-Islami, Harkat ul-Ansar

Pro-Pak-istan, Kash-miri Seces-sionist Yes Indian Govern-ment, US FTO

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ALL-INDIA GROUPS

The three groups profiled below are included in this section because neither their bases nor operations are limited to a particular region of India. The groups also share close organizational links. The Asif Reza Commando Force essentially became part of Indian Mujahideen, and many of Indian Mujahideen’s members appear to have been drawn from the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). The groups’ national presence is probably due in large part to the nationwide support base that SIMI built prior to being banned in 2001. These groups are also explicitly Islamist, rhetorically embracing the desire to see India governed by Quranic principles, but are also highly motivated by anti-Muslim communal violence in the country. These are the groups also support Pakistan-based groups in executing attacks in major Indian cities (see Figure 10).

FIGURE 10. TERRORISM INCIDENTS AND DEATHS BY ALL-INDIA GROUPS

1999

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

0

50

100

150

200

250

GTD In-cidents

WITS In-cidents

GTD Deaths

WITS DeathsInci

dent

s an

d D

eath

s

Year

Source: Global Terrorism Database and Worldwide Incidents Tracking System

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STUDENTS ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF INDIA (SIMI)Founded: 1977 by Mohammad Ahmadullah SiddiqiPredecessors: Jamiat-e-Islami Hind, Jamaat-e-IslamiSuccessors: Indian Mujahideen30Ideology: Islamic revivalistKey Personalities: Mohammed Islam, Safdar Nagori, Shahid Badar FalahAliases: Indian Mujahideen31Links: Lashkar-e Taiba, Jaish-e MohammedAttacks: Yes (logistical assistance for LeT, IM attacks) Bans: Indian Government, 2001 Estimates of SIMI’s current resources cannot be made with any confidence. Several hundred to several thousand former members dispersed around the country probably remain willing to engage in militancy, based on pre-ban strength and recent government reports, but overall level of organization probably low, given ban. The current MO is logistical assistance to other groups, but given connections with IM and Pakistan-based groups, capacity for at least low-lethality terror attacks is likely. Given the now longstanding ban, mobilization of support probably relies on informal connections between trusted members of the group, possibly in disparate sub-networks around India. Mass mobilization very unlikely. Any recruitment strategy probably relies similarly on informal connections made by former members. According to two un-sourced think-tank profiles, the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) was founded in 1977 at Aligarh University by Mohammad Ahmadullah Siddiqi.32 SIMI was initially affiliated with Jamaat-e-Islami Hind, the independent, reorganized Indian remnant of Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi’s Jamaat-e-Islami, but split from the parent group within its first few years.33 Ideologically, SIMI appears to have been influenced by Mawdudi’s version of Islamic revivalism, which maintains that Quranic principles should organize social and political life and minimizes the importance of the Ulema (Islamic Scholars).34

30 Some sources maintain that Indian Mujahideen (IM) is a SIMI front, while others say that IM is SIMI’s militant wing, a now separate splinter group, or a separate body founded in part by former SIMI members (see IM profile).31 See note 27.32 “Students Islamic Movement of India,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, Animesh Roul, “Students Islamic Movement of India: A Profile,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 4, No. 7 (2006).33 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) and Roul, “Students Islamic Movement of India.”34 Nasr, Mawdudi, 49-52, and Roul, “Students Islamic Movement of India.”

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According to an interview with a former SIMI member, the group’s early activities consisted largely of efforts to spread revivalist ideology among India’s young Muslims, but that the organization’s focus changed to countering the rhetoric and activities of rising Hindu nationalist groups in the late 1980s.35 The oldest article in the LexisNexis database is a 1984 Associated Press report covering, in part, SIMI’s third all-India conference, where revivalist rhetoric was reportedly mixed with anger over violence against the country’s minorities. The conference was reportedly attended by 20,000 delegates, while the organization claimed a total registered membership of 17,000 and a further 80,000 sympathizers and donors.36The second-oldest article on SIMI in LexisNexis is a 1998 report on the Srikrishna Commission, which investigated the Babri Masjid demolition and its aftermath and concluded (five years after the fact) that SIMI’s efforts to counter Hindu nationalist propaganda increased the level of communal violence in Mumbai following the demolition; however, SIMI was not one of the five religious groups (both Muslim and Hindu) subjected to a temporary Home Ministry ban during the 1992 violence.37The exact nature of SIMI’s activities between 1992 and 1998 are not clear, but, based on articles from 1999 and 2000, SIMI does appear to have become more militant, possibly forging links with Pakistan-based militant groups. One news article from 1999 (during the beginning of the Kargil conflict) lists SIMI as having rhetorically embraced violence as a legitimate means for spreading Islam.38 According to a March 2000 article, SIMI made efforts that month to impose a conservative dress code on Muslim women in the northern city of Kanpur, through unspecified means.39 In March 2001, SIMI activists in Kanpur were part of a riot that killed a district official. The impetus for the violence was an alleged Quran burning by Hindu nationalists in Delhi.40 SIMI also began to rhetorically identify itself with Al-Qaeda during this period. As early as October 2000, Safdar Nagori made public statements questioning the labeling of Osama bin Laden as a terrorist, and following the 9/11 attacks, SIMI activists allegedly distributed bin Laden posters at several Indian universities.4135 “Seeds of Extremism is in Communal Riots: Sayeed Khan,” TwoCircles.net, accessed February 16, 2011.36 “Mrs. Gandhi Says U.S. Base Poses Threat to Region,” The Associated Press, October 28, 1984. LexisNexis. 37 “Srikrishna Panel Nails Naik Govt, Hindutva Parties,” The Statesman, August 6, 1998. Lexis Nexis (ACC: B0IIBKRAFKWR) and Sanjoy Hazarika, “India Issues a Ban on Five Rival Groups,” The New York Times, December 11, 1992. 38 “India- RS Meet Will Only Help Enemy- CM,” The Hindu, June 23, 1999. LexisNexis.39 Rahul Bedi, “Girls Beaten For Defying Dress Codes, The New Zealand Herald, March 22, 2000. LexisNexis.40 Indranil Singh, “10 Die in India Security Clashes,” Associated Press Online, March 17, 2001 and “ADM Among 6 Killed in Kanpur,” The Statesman, March 16, 2001. LexisNexis.41 “SIMI Terms Jammu and Kashmir a ‘Vexed’ Issue,” The Press Trust of India, October 12, 2000 and “Govt Bans SIMI, Sets Off Violent Protests in Lucknow, 3 Dead,” The Press Trust of India, September 27, 2001. LexisNexis.

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SIMI’s first alleged connection to terrorism in the English-language media came in August of 2000, when SIMI activists were linked to Independence Day terrorism in Uttar Pradesh, though the exact nature of the link is unclear. Uttar Pradesh police blamed SIMI members for planning bombings in Kanpur, Lucknow, Agra, and on several trains.42 Ten days earlier, Agra city police had blamed one of the train bombings, which killed 10 people on a pair of Kashmir-trained Indian militants with links to Hizbul Mujahideen and unspecified connections to SIMI.43 A third report listed the two arrestees as being actual SIMI members.44 This apparent uncertainty over the group’s links to the attacks may explain why the group was not banned, either in Uttar Pradesh, or by the BJP-controlled central government, despite calls to do so by several organizations.45 Politicians’ fears of alienating Uttar Pradesh’s large Muslim population may also have played a role.46The Global Terrorism Database first lists SIMI as a suspected perpetrator of terrorism in a non-lethal August 2001 Independence Day attack that wounded two people.47 On September 27 of that year, SIMI was banned under India’s Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967 for engaging in anti-national activities, presumably including the two alleged terror attacks and other forms of militancy.48 Following the ban, SIMI activists’ alleged involvement in terrorism increased dramatically; the GTD records contain 11 such incidents between the ban and 2008 (the last year covered in the GTD’s records for India). Five of the incidents resulted in fatalities, of which there were 87 total. Lashkar-e-Taiba is also listed as a perpetrator in all of the lethal incidents. Indian Mujahideen is also listed as a suspected perpetrator in three lethal incidents and four non-lethal. In the worst incident specified, the August 2003 Gateway of India bombings in Mumbai, LeT operatives are recorded as having actually detonated the explosives. The GTD was also unable to confirm that SIMI has ever claimed responsibility for an incident of terrorism.49 The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), which covers 2004-2010, includes an additional four incidents in which SIMI is listed as a potential perpetrator. In one, the 2006 Mumbai train bombings, SIMI’s claim of responsibility is considered 42 “SIMI Planned Bomb Blasts in UP: Police,” The Press Trust of India, September 14, 2000.43 “Two Former AMU Students Arrested in Connection with Blasts,” The Press Trust of India, September 5, 2000.44 “UP Govt Considering Imposing Ban on SIMI,” The Press Trust of India, September 9, 2000.45 “VHP Demands Ban on SIMI, Jamaat,” The Press Trust of India, October 3, 2000 and “UP BJP for Ban on SIMI,” The Press Trust of India, September 22, 2000.46 Aman Sharma, “SIMI Banned Till ‘12 Though UP Stays Mum,” Mail Today, August 4, 2010.47 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed November 18, 2010.48 “SIMI Banned, Hundreds Nabbed,” The Press Trust of India, September 27, 2010, and Utkarsh Anand. “Delhi HC Tribunal Upholds Ban on SIMI,” Indian Express, August 4, 201049 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed November 18, 2010.

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spurious (LeT is widely believed responsible), in two others, accounting for a total of three fatalities, SIMI’s involvement is speculative, and in the final incident, which killed 31, SIMI is listed as having assisted the primary perpetrator, LeT.50These incident reports suggest a strong link to Lashkar-e Taiba. The South Asia Terrorism Portal, which does not specify sources, corroborates this connection and alleges others, with Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami, and the group’s branches in Bangladesh and Nepal, Hizbul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammed, HuJI-Bangladesh, and the ISI. The nature of the links is not specified. SATP also believes that SIMI receives funding from the Riyadh-based World Assembly of Muslim Youth and Kuwait-based International Islamic Federation of Students’ Organizations.51Despite the 2001 ban SIMI has apparently retained at least some minimal level of organization. SIMI leader Safdar Nagori was only arrested in 2008 and India’s Ministry of Home Affairs was concerned about the group’s reorganization efforts as recently as March 2, 2011.52 Multiple media and police sources indicate that SIMI members were instrumental in the founding of Indian Mujahideen, sometime before 2008, and other reports maintain that SIMI has provided IM with logistical support in many of its terror attacks.53 SIMI itself is not listed as a terrorist group by the European Union or U.S. Department of State.54While SIMI’s ability to mobilize large numbers of supporters was once significant, the central government ban appears to have severely reduced its organizational capacity. Nevertheless, SIMI’s current and former membership will remain a recruiting pool for other Sunni militant groups in India and a base of support for Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups that seek to operate there.

50 WITS, (ICN: 200693218, 200693769, 200808439, 200910944) accessed March 6, 2011. 51 “SIMI,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed November 18, 2010.52 “Top SIMI Leaders held in Indore,” Hindustan Times, March 27, 2008 and “After MHA Alert, States Hunt for 80 SIMI Men,” Indian Express, March 2, 2011. LexisNexis.53 Utkarsh, “Delhi HC tribunal upholds ban on SIMI.”54 “Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, accessed November 18, 2010; and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.

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INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN (IM)Founded: Approximately 2005Predecessors: SIMI, Asif Reza Commando ForceSuccessors: n/aIdeology: IslamistKey Personalities: Amir Reza Khan, Riyaz Shahbandri, Abdul Subhan QureshiAliases: n/aLinks: ISI, Lashkar-e TaibaAttacks: Yes (bombings, approximately 180 killed)Bans: Indian Government 2010IM’s size is probably in the hundreds, including members drawn from other groups. Its resource pool is potentially quite large given LeT connection. IM’s MO includes: terrorism, low and medium lethality bombings against civilian, including Western, targets. The capacity to carry out high-lethality attacks is likely, given past actions. IM mobilizes support from the SIMI network and Pakistan and Bangladesh-based groups. The recruitment strategy is unknown but recruitment base includes former SIMI members, possibly Bengali-speaking.

Indian Mujahideen’s (IM) exact origins are obscure. The organization first came into the public view when it claimed responsibility for a series of bomb blasts in September 2008;55 however, the organization has subsequently been blamed for earlier attacks, starting with a February 2005 Varanasi that injured eight.56 Most Indian police agencies, newspapers, and think tanks now believe that IM is intimately connected with SIMI, though the exact relationship is disputed. The SATP considers IM to be a SIMI front group, while others say that IM is SIMI’s militant wing, a now separate splinter group, or a separate body founded in part by former SIMI members.57According to an unattributed report in The Economic Times, the pressure of the 2001 Central Government ban exacerbated tensions between radical and moderate SIMI factions, creating an internal crisis which came to a head following the post-Godhra riots in Gujarat.58 According to this narrative, the radical wing of SIMI was led by Safdar Nagori, who oversaw the ISI and LeT-supported founding of IM by Amir Reza Khan, Riyaz Shahbandri and Abdul Subhan Qureshi. The connection with Amir Reza 55 Phil Hazlewood, “India Blast Was ‘Terrorist Attack’: Police,” Agence France Presse, September 30, 2008. LexisNexis.56 “IM Declared a Terror Outfit,” The Statesman, June 4, 2010. 57 “E-mail Threatening Delhi Attacks Traced to Mumbai’s Borivali Area,” Asian News International, September 21, 2010; and “Students Islamic Movement of India, (SIMI),” South Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed November 18, 2010. 58 “Indian Mujahideen Declared Terror Unit,” The Economic Times, June 5, 2010.

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Khan led Delhi anti-terror police to suspect, as of September 2008, that the IM was a renamed Asif Reza Commando Force, which had reportedly ceased operations after the 2002 arrest of Aftab Ansari, one of its senior leaders.59Direct information on IM’s ideology is not available in open sources, but the Economic Times report indicates that many of its initial members were Kashmiri students studying at Deobandi madrassas in South Gujarat.60 Assuming that IM’s connection with SIMI is real, the group’s leaders are likely to have been influenced by the thought of modernist Islamic revivalist Mawlana Sayyid Abu’l-A’la Mawdudi as well. The fact Deobandism is a movement of the Ulema should place it in conflict with Mawdudi’s anti-clericalism (see SIMI profile), suggesting that IM ascribes to a more generic form of Islamism that accommodates these two competing ideologies.IM emails sent to TV stations minutes before the September 2008 bombings in Delhi indicated that the attacks were revenge for the Babri Masjid demolition.61 Similar email messages sent before the 2007 bombings in Varanasi, Faizabad, and Lucknow cited the post-Godhra anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat as motivation.62As of June 2010, anonymous Home Ministry officials maintained that IM had been involved in 10 bombings across India, killing several hundred people.63 The Global Terrorism Database lists IM as a suspect in seven incidents of terrorism, all in 2008 (the last year of data available under the GTD), accounting for only 24 fatalities.64 The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System lists IM as a suspected perpetrator in only four incidents that year, but those incidents killed 151 people. WITS also lists a division of IM as claiming joint responsibility with a division of LeT for the September 2010 German Bakery attack in Pune.65 This attack is significant because, like the 2008 Mumbai shootings, it targeted a facility frequented by Westerners. Ilyas Kashmiri, an Al-Qaeda-affiliated Pakistan-based militant leader purportedly implied his organization’s involvement in the attack in an email, without directly claiming responsibility.66

59 “Is Indian Mujahideen Actually the Asif Reza Commando Force?,” Indian Express, September 30, 2008. 60 “Indian Mujahideen Declared Terror Unit,” The Economic Times.61 Rahul Bedi, “Police Raids Lead to Arrests in New Delhi Bombings,” The Irish Times, September 15, 2008.62 “Gujarat Constant, Kashmir New in IM Mails,” Indian Express, September 22, 2010.63 “IM Declared a Terror Outfit,” The Statesman.64 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed November 18, 2010.65 WITS also lists IM as claiming responsibility for a 2008 series of bombings in Assam, but suggests the claim is spurious. WITS, (ICN: 200715490, 200806036, 200808449, 200810255, 200810972, 201005732, 201014504), accessed March 8, 2011.66 “Ilyas Kashmiri Warns Sportspersons Against Visiting India,” The Press Trust of India, February 16, 2010. LexisNexis.

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According to newspaper reports, on June 4, 2010 the Indian Government banned IM as a terrorist organization under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967.67 The group is not listed as a terrorist group by the European Union or U.S. Department of State (FTO or TEL).68 Anonymous Indian Home Ministry officials have stated that IM is under direct ISI control.69 ASIF REZA COMMANDO FORCE (ARCF)Founded: 2001Predecessors: HUJISuccessors: Indian MujahideenIdeology: IslamistKey Personalities: Amir Reza Khan, Aftab AnsariAliases: n/aLinks: HUJIAttacks: Yes (one only, shooting at American Center, Kolkata)Bans: NoARCF is defunct and believed to be part of IM. The sole independent ARCF attack targeted an U.S. Consular facility.Created with the help of HUJI in 2001, the Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF) was a small India-based Sunni militant group that was only active under the ARCF name in late 2001 and early 2002. The group had three primary figures: Aftab Ansari and two brothers, Asif and Amir Reza Khan.70 In October 2001, while the group was still being formed, Asif Reza Khan was killed by Indian security forces during a prison escape attempt, giving the group its name.71The ARCF’s only known activity was the January 2002 shooting of police officers at the American Center (part of the U.S. Consulate) in Kolkata.72 67 “IM Declared a Terror Outfit,” The Statesman.68 “Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, accessed November 18, 2010; and”Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July 2010,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010. 69 “IM Declared a Terror Outfit,” The Statesman.70 Devesh K. Pandey, “Bangladesh Blasts Confirm a Suspicion,” The Hindu, August 24, 2005. 71 Pandey, “Bangladesh Blasts Confirm a Suspicion;” South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Asif Reza Commando Force;” Vicky Nanjappa, “Gujurat-born Amir Could be the Next Hafiz Saeed,” Rediff, March 3, 2010.72 Madhuparna Das. “Eight Years After Terror Attack, Kolkata American Center Loses Its Barricades,” Indian Express, November 4, 2010 and Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.

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Around the same time, Ansari was arrested, leaving Amir to assume control.73 The group was never active again, however, and Amir reportedly went on to co-found Indian Mujahideen.74 One of the alleged shooters in the American Center incident was also later associated with Indian Mujahideen, suggesting that whatever assets ARCF had following the 2002 incident were folded into IM.75 Early reports of the American Center incident indicated HUJI involvement in the incident.76 HUJI’s leadership denied involvement, but, given the links between HUJI and ARCF’s leaders, the former may have been providing some logistical support.

73 Pandey, “Bangladesh Blasts Confirm a Suspicion.”74 Chauhan, Neeraj. “Is Indian Mujahideen Actually the Asif Reza Commando Force?” Indian Express, September 30, 2008.75 “’02 US Centre Blast Accused is IM Founder: Police,” Hindustan Times, November 10, 2008.76 “Shooting at American Center in Calcutta Leaves Four Dead, 20 Wounded,” The Associated Press, January 22, 2002. LexisNexis.

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NORTHEAST INDIAN GROUPS

Sunni militant groups in Northeast India have a common goal of greater independence for Muslims in the region. Their tactics include armed attack, extortion, kidnapping, manufacturing and smuggling of illegal weapons and explosives, and sale of illegal drugs. However, the region’s level of violence is quite low (see Figure 12); only three people per year were killed between 2005 and 2008, and no one has been killed since 2009. This small number is surprising given that Northeast India is one of the country’s most violent regions. Assam’s Home Ministry estimated that militants as a whole killed over 1,700 people in Assam alone between 2001 and July 2010.77The Pakistani ISI has allegedly been supporting the region’s many small Sunni militant groups with money and training and has also allegedly been attempting to organize them under two umbrella organizations: the United Liberation Front of Seven Sisters (ULFSS), which covers all seven states and union territories in the region, and the All Muslim United Liberation Forum of Assam (AMULFA), which is subordinate to the former and includes only Assam-based groups. However, neither of these coordinating bodies appears to have any significant power. A number of media and government sources believe that the ISI also supports several non-Sunni militant groups in the region, and that the relationship extends to outright control in the case of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), one of the larger and more deadly militant groups in the region.78 If this analysis is correct, the ISI may be using the Northeast’s Sunni groups as revenue generating and supply bodies for ULFA (see MULTA and MULFA profiles, below) and discouraging them from engaging in terrorism.

77 “1549 Civilians, 205 Securitymen, 1,703 ultras killed during 2001-10,” Hindustan Times, July 12, 2010. LexisNexis.78 “Talking to ULFA,” The Statesman, July 10, 2005. LexisNexis (ACC A20050709108-BF62-GNW) and “ULFA Has Links with ISI, Says Govt,” Indian Express, July 8, 2009.

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FIGURE 12. TERRORISM INCIDENTS AND DEATHS BY NORTHEAST INDIAN GROUPS

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010012345

GTD In-cidentsWITS In-cidentsGTD DeathsWITS Deaths

Incidents

and Death

s

Year

Source: Global Terrorism Database and Worldwide Incidents Tracking System79

79 WITS includes MULTA and PULF, GTD includes only PULF. All attacks from PULF, except one of MULTA.

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MUSLIM UNITED LIBERATION TIGERS OF ASSAM (MULTA)Founded: 1996Predecessors: n/aSuccessors: n/aIdeology/Goals: Greater Independence for Assamese MuslimsKey Personalities: Abdur Rahman, Rustom Ali, Moon Chaudry, Nazrul Haque, Hussain MubarakAliases: n/aLinks: AMULFA, DGFI, HUJI-B, HuM, ISI, IURPI, JeI, NSCN-IM, SSP, ULFA, ULFSSAttacks: No (Most MULTA cadres were arrested for illegal arms trade, manufacture, and possession)80Bans: NoAccording to unsourced academic estimates, MULTA has approximately 1500 members. MULTA’s resources are extortion, the manufacture and sale of illegal weapons, and the sale of illegal drugs. Its MO includes: criminal enterprises, including weapons manufacture. The capacity for low to medium-lethality armed attack is low given past criminal activities.81 MULTA’s means of mobilizing support and recruitment strategy are unknown and its recruitment base is Northeast Indian Muslims.

Formed in 1996,82 the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA) is the most active of the roughly 15 Sunni militant groups in Northeast India.83 MULTA’s stated objective is to fight for the “cause of Muslims” and to establish a “greater independent Islamistan” for the Muslims of Assam, comprising the districts of Nagaon, Dhubri, Kamrup, Karimganj, and 80 For more details, see the chronology at the bottom of the “Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA)” in South Asia Terrorism Portal. The MULTA is reported to be responsible for kidnapping one civilian and later killing him by unknown means in July, 2007. But this assassination has been the only murder case so far which the MULTA allegedly committed.81 MULTA has killed no one (or, possibly one person) over the past few years.82 “Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA),” South Asia Terrorism Portal. In contrast, some reports say that MULTA was formed in 1993, e.g. Jaideep Saikia, “Terror sans Frontiers: Islamic Militancy in North East India,” ACDIS Occasional Paper series, (Champaign: Research of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, 2003); Renaud Egreteau, “Instability at the Gate: India’s Troubled Northeast and its External Connections,” CSH Occasional Paper, No. 16 (2006), 83; and Ved Parakash, Terrorism in India’s North-East: a Gathering Storm (Delhi: Singhal Print Media 2008), 179.83 This number ranges from 11 to 22 depending on the source and which groups are considered active or defunct.

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Hailakandi.84 According to an anonymous security source, referenced by the SATP, as of July 25, 2010, the chairman of MULTA was Abdur Rahman, then residing in Bangladesh.85MULTA’s specific goals include:

Establishing a university for Islamic studies and a Muslim court in Assam; Ensuring a 30-percent reservation for Muslims in government services and educational institutions (this corresponds to Muslims’ share of the total state population);86 Reserving seats in the Legislative Assembly for the Muslims of the Barak Valley district; Stopping the deletion of names of Muslims from the voters list; Providing full protection to the lives and property of Muslims; Ensuring the allotment of adequate funds for the maintenance of madrassas and mosques.87

How MULTA plans to achieve these goals is not clear. According to a 2003 academic source, MULTA finances its activities through extortion, the manufacture and sale of illegal weapons, and the sale of illegal drugs.88 However, according to SATP, MULTA has no activities beyond these fundraising efforts.89Along these lines, despite MULTA’s widespread identification as a terrorist group, there are essentially no accounts of MULTA committing acts of terrorism.90 WITS and SATP list MULTA as having kidnapped and then killed a civilian in 2007; however, this was likely a failed extortion attempt, whose primary purpose was revenue generation. The event is not listed in the Global Terrorism Database, whose definition of terrorism excludes revenue generation.91 The SATP also blames MULTA for the 2002 murder of the son of a local police official, but leaves the event out of their list of incidents involving MULTA.92 The incident does not appear in English-language news media or either of the databases.In April 2000, then Chief Minister of Assam, Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, made a speech before the State Assembly, where he presented undisclosed 84 “Muslim Terrorist Groups,” Assam Chronicle, March 15, 2010, and Parakash, Terrorism in India’s North-East, 179.85 “MULTA,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.86 See Table 2, p. 2.87 Saikia, “Terror sans Frontiers.”88 Saikia, “Terror sans Frontiers,” Appendix One.89 “MULTA,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.90 Ibid., and 91 The GTD’s definition of terrorism excludes criminal acts whose primary goal is raising revenue. Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011, and WITS, (ICN: 200710513), accessed February 19, 2011.92 “MULTA,” SATP.

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evidence that Pakistan’s ISI was supporting and directing MULTA, along with other groups in the state .93 The SATP claims that the ISI is providing training to MULTA and other groups in the Syleth district of Bangladesh under the command of Rustom Ali, a former Pakistani Army officer.94Media reports indicate that MULTA is also linked to the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), Bangladesh’s foreign intelligence agency.95 The report suggests that MULTA is connected with terrorist groups, such as Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami- Bangladesh (HUJI-B), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), the National Socialist Council of Nagland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM), Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), and the Islamic United Reformation Protest of India (IURPI).96 According to an Indian think-tank report, MULTA is one of the main suppliers of weapons to the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA).97According to one report from a U.S. academic research institute, MULTA had approximately 1,500 members as of 2003. Of these, 150 had reportedly been trained in Bangladesh and Pakistan; however, the report does not specify the definition of membership, the nature of the training, nor the source of the figures.98 The SATP lists MULTA’s strength as unknown, but, according to one 2008 media report, 150 MULTA members were in Assam’s prisons as of that date.99According to anonymous security sources referenced by the SATP, as of July 25, 2010 MULTA was not very active.100 MULTA has not been banned by the Indian government and is not on the FTO, TEL, or the EU list of terrorist organizations.101

93 “India: Mahanta Presents Proof of ISI Mischief,” The Hindu, April 7, 2000.94 “MULTA,” SATP.95 Maloy Krishna Dhar, “Assam: The Bangla hand,” Rediff India Abroad, January 19, 2007. 96 “MULTA,” SATP.97 Samir Kumar Das, “ULFA, Indo-Bangladesh Relations and Beyond,” Center for Security Analysis.98 Saikia, “Terror sans Frontiers,” Appendix One.99 “MULTA,” SATP, and “234 Ultras from Muslim Groups in Assam Jails,” Indian Express, April 2, 2008. 100 “MULTA,” SATP.101 “Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July 2010,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.

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MUSLIM UNITED LIBERATION FRONT OF ASSAM (MULFA)Founded: 1994Predecessors: n/aSuccessors: n/aIdeology/Goals: Greater Independence for Assamese MuslimsKey Personalities: Rustom AliAliases: n/aLinks: AMULFA, DGFI, ISI, MULTA, ULFA, ULFSSAttacks: n/aBans: NoMULFA is believed to be inactive.Formed in 1994,102 the Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA) is one of the approximately 15 Sunni militant groups operating in the state.103 Like MULTA, MULFA demands the creation of a separate Muslim state, protection and preservation of Muslim Personal Law and 30 percent reservation for Muslims in government services and educational institutions.104Like MULTA, MULFA is said to be part of the umbrella All-Muslim United Liberation Forum of Assam (AMULFA- see regional overview) and the chief suppliers of arms for the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) through Bangladesh.105MULFA is also connected with Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), which reportedly trains its members. A newspaper report also indicates that MULFA receives support from the Bangladeshi DGFI.106The details of MULFA’s leadership, membership, strength, resources, and modus operandi are unknown. MULFA is not listed in the Global Terrorism Database, and, according to anonymous security sources referenced by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, as of July 25, 2010, MULFA was believed to be

102 Parakash, Terrorism in India’s North-East, 180.103 “MULTA,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.104 Parakash, Terrorism in India’s North-East, 180.105 Samir Kumar Das, “ULFA, Indo-Bangladesh Relations and Beyond,” Center for Security Analysis. 106 Krishna Dhar. “Assam: The Bangla hand.”

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largely inactive.107 MULFA is not on the FTO, TEL, or EU list of terrorist organizations.108PEOPLE’S UNITED LIBERATION FRONT (PULF)Founded: 1993 or 1995Predecessors: n/aSuccessors: n/aIdeology/Goals Greater Independence for Muslims in Northeastern IndiaKey Personalities: Home Secretary Raffisuddin (Former the Islamic National Front (INF) chairman); Deputy Finance Secretary Mustaffa; Publicity Secretary Seikh Sahid Ahmed; Assistant Publicity Secretary A.E. QureshAliases: n/aLinks: ISI, MULTA, MULFA, NSCN-IM, LeTAttacks: Yes (12 killed since 2004)109Bans: NoPULF’s size isless than 150. Its resources are gained from extortion, ransom for kidnappings, and smuggling of arms and explosives. PULF’s MO includes: low-lethality armed attack. The capacity for medium-lethality armed attack is likely given past attacks. Means of mobilizing support and recruitment strategy are not known. PULF’s recruitment base is Muslims in Manipur and Assam.

Accounts differ as to the year (1993 or 1995) and details of the founding of the People’s United Liberation Front (PULF).110 Nevertheless, it is the second most active Sunni militant group in Northeast India, following MULTA.111 PULF merged with another Islamist outfit operating in Manipur, the Islamic National Front (INF), on May 30, 2007, increasing PULF’s tactical capabilities and strength by about 50 cadres.112 However, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) PULF has suffered from 107 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011 and “MULTA,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.108 “Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July 2010,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.109 Author’s calculation based on the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS).110 “People’s United Liberation Front” profile in South Asia Terrorism Portal states that PULF was founded in 1993 after a communal clash between the dominant Meiteis and the Pangals (Muslims in Manipur state) over monetary transaction leading to approximately 150 deaths. In contrast, the Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPs) in the National Consortium for Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) states that the PULF was formed in 1995, allegedly with arms and training supplied by the Naga separatist National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM).111 M. Amarjeet Singh points out that the most active among Sunni militant groups in Northeastern India are the MULTA and the PULF. Considering MULTA’s large number of cadres and level of violence, the author judged the PULF as the second most active Sunni militant group.

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factionalism since the beginning of that year. At least one group led by “Azad” is involved in narcotics trafficking outside the control of PULF’s top leadership.”113 PULF’s membership is mainly drawn from the Muslim community in Manipur and Assam.114PULF’s goal is to establish an independent Islamic state in Northeastern India for the sake of the interest of the Pangals (Muslims in Manipur state), many of whom are migrants from Bangladesh.115 PULF also envisions a society based on Islamic values. For this purpose, PULF has banned the consumption of alcohol among Manipuri Muslims since 2004, punished several people for peddling drugs, and asked Manipuri Muslims to wear traditional Islamic attire.116According to unspecified official sources referenced by the SATP, PULF is linked with Pakistan’s ISI as well as other Sunni militant groups operating in India’s Northeast.117 Local newspaper accounts corroborate the link; however, it is unclear if these reports are independent of SATP’s official sources.118Although PULF maintained close links with the NSCN-IM for arms and training in its formative years, the extent of its linkages with the outfit at present is not known.119In 2006, Delhi Police interrogation of several Manipuri LeT activists allegedly revealed a link between an LeT module based in Bangladesh and PULF.120PULF’s membership is reported to be less than 150.121 Armed attacks, extortion, ransom for kidnappings, and smuggling of arms and explosives are PULF’s most common tactics.122 The primary targets of PULF are individuals representing the Indian government, Indian security forces, and non-Muslim civilians in the area.123 The group is listed as a suspected perpetrator in four incidents of terrorism in the Global Terrorism Database, 112 “Peole’s United Liberation Front,” South Asia Terrorism Portal. The INF was established in the 1980s and its cadres were reportedly trained by the Kuki National Front (KNF) in the Churachandpur district.113 Azad’s identity is not specified. “People’s United Liberation Front,” SATP.114 The Times of India, “Excl: ISI-Manipur separatist group link exposed.”115 Pathak Das, “Militancy in Manipur” and “PULF,” TOPs.116 Singh, “The Emerging Islamic Militancy in North-East India.”117 “People’s United Liberation Front” South Asia Terrorism Portal. In addition, a police report on December 24, 2006 says that the “PULF had tied up with the MULTA and MULFA, and extended its operation to Barak Valley.” (“MULTA” South Asia Terrorism Portal.)118 The Times of India, “Excl: ISI-Manipur separatist group link exposed.”119 “People’s United Liberation Front,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.120 Singh, “The Attack on Migrants in Manipur.”121 “People’s United Liberation Front,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.122 “PULF,” TOPs, and “People’s United Liberation Front,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.123 “PULF,” TOPs.

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resulting in 1 injury and no fatalities. All incidents occurred in Manipur, in 2008.124 According to WITS, PULF is suspected of 35 incidents of terrorism, between 2005 and 2009, accounting for 14 fatalities.125Although PULF possessed only rusty and locally-made weapons in its formative years, with the help of NSCN-IM the PULF is reported to possess an unspecified number of AK-series rifles, stun guns, and carbines.126PULF's major area of operation is in Manipur, especially in the Imphal Valley and the hill districts of Chandel, Thoubal (Lilong is its stronghold) and Churchandpur, though it has also been active in the adjoining districts of Assam, Nagaland and Meghalaya.127 A local newspaper reported that PULF has bases in the Barak Valley, Lakhimpur, Nagoan, and Barpeta in Assam, but as of December 2010, SATP considered PULF inactive in Assam but active in Manipur.128 PULF is not on the FTO, TEL, or EU list of terrorist organizations.129

ISLAMIC LIBERATION ARMY OF ASSAM (ILAA)Founded: 1993Predecessors: n/aSuccessors: n/aIdeology/Goals Greater Independence for Assamese MuslimsKey Personalities: Arif MuhammadAliases: n/aLinks: n/aAttacks: n/aBans: NoILAA is believed to be inactive.Formed in 1993, The Islamic Liberation Army of Assam (ILAA) is one of the lesser-known Sunni militant groups in the state, and the South Asia Terrorism Portal considers it inactive.130 Several English-language 124 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.125 WITS, (Various ICN’s).126 “People’s United Liberation Front,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.127 Singh, “The Emerging Islamic Militancy in North-East India.”128 101 “Terrorist/Insurgent Groups of Assam” and “Terrorist / Insurgent Groups of Manipur,” South Asia Terrorism Portal. 129 “Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July 2010,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.130 “Terrorist/Insurgent Groups of Assam,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.

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newspaper articles list the ILAA as one of the many militant groups in Northeast India; however, details of the organization’s philosophy, leadership, membership, strength, or resources are not known. ILAA is not on the FTO, TEL, or EU lists of terrorist organizations, nor is it listed in the Global Terrorism Database.131

MUSLIM SECURITY COUNCIL OF ASSAM (MSCA)Founded: n/aPredecessors: n/aSuccessors: n/aIdeology/Goals Greater Independence for Assamese MuslimsKey Personalities: n/aAliases: n/aLinks: n/aAttacks: n/aBans: NoMSCA is believed to be inactive.The Muslim Security Council of Assam (MSCA) is one of the lesser-known Sunni militant groups in the state, and the South Asia Terrorism Portal considers it inactive.132 MSCA appears to have sought greater independence for Muslims in the state.133 The date of formation and the details of MSCA’s philosophy, goals, leadership, membership, strength, resources, and modus operandi are unknown. MSCA is not on the FTO, TEL, or EU list of terrorist organizations,134 and is not listed in the Global Terrorism Database.135

131 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011 and “Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July 2010,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.132 “Terrorist/Insurgent Groups of Assam,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.133 Nava Thakuria, “ISI in Northeast India,” Assam Times, December 30, 2007; and “ISI Spreads a Net in Northeast India,” American Chronicle, January 29, 2008. 134 “Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July 2010,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.135 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.

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UNITED MUSLIM LIBERATION FRONT OF ASSAM (UMLFA)Founded: Earliest reference 2000Predecessors: n/aSuccessors: n/aIdeology/Goals Greater Independence for Assamese MuslimsKey Personalities: n/aAliases: n/aLinks: DGFI, ISIAttacks: n/aBans: NoUMLFA is believed to be inactive.The United Muslim Liberation Front of Assam (UMLFA) is one of the lesser-known Sunni militant groups in the state, and the South Asia Terrorism Portal considers it inactive.136 Newspaper reports indicate that UMLFA received support from the Pakistani ISI and the Bangladeshi DGFI.137 The details of UMLFA’s philosophy, goals, leadership, membership, strength, resources, and modus operandi are unknown. UMLFA is not on the FTO, TEL, or EU list of terrorist organizations,138 and is not listed in the Global Terrorism Database.139

136 “Terrorist/Insurgent Groups of Assam,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.137 M.V. Kamath, “Kohima to Kashmir: On the Terrorist Trail,” The Organiser, October 14, 2001; and Krishna Dhar. “Assam: The Bangla hand.”138 “Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July 2010,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.139 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.

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ISLAMIC UNITED REFORMATION PROTEST OF INDIA (IURPI)Founded: Earliest reference 2004Predecessors: n/aSuccessors: n/aIdeology/Goals: n/aKey Personalities: n/aAliases: n/aIURPI is believed to be inactive.The Islamic United Reformation Protest of India (IURPI) is one of the lesser-known Sunni militant groups in Assam, and the South Asia Terrorism Portal considers it inactive.140 At least one English-language Indian newspaper article mentions the organization in passing, and two scholarly articles list it as one of roughly 15 Islamic militant groups in Northeast India.141 According to available media reports and the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs website (which was last updated in 2008) the IURPI is not banned under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967, nor is it listed as a terrorist group by the EU or U.S. Department of State.142 The group is also not listed as a perpetrator in the Global Terrorism Database.143

140 “Terrorist/Insurgent Groups of Assam,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.141 “Another Conference Another Warning,” Indian Express, October 12, 2004; and Jaideep Saikia, “The ISI Reaches East: Anatomy of a Conspiracy,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 25: 3 (2002): 185-197; and Subir Bhaumik, “Ethnicity, Ideology and Religion: Separatist Movements in India’s Northeast,” Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004), accessed November 29, 2010. 142 “Banned Organisations,” Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, updated May 5, 2008; and “Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July 2010,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010.143 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.

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MUSLIM VOLUNTEER FORCE (MVF)Founded: Earliest reference 1998Predecessors: n/aSuccessors: n/aIdeology/Goals: n/aKey Personalities: n/aAliases: n/aMVF is believed to be inactive.Publicly available information on the Muslim Volunteer Force (MVF) is extremely scarce and the South Asia Terrorism Portal considers it inactive.144 India’s English-language media made passing reference to the organization as early as December 1998,145 and a number of subsequent newspaper articles list the MVF as one of the roughly 15 Muslim militant organizations operating in Northeast India; however, no founding date is given for the organization. According to several articles, the MVF’s operations are, or were, concentrated in the Barpeta district of western Assam.146 As of April 2000, the state government of Assam listed the MVF as one of eleven Muslim militant organizations through which Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate might foment unrest in Northeast India.147 According to available media reports and the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs website (which was last updated in 2008) the MVF is not banned under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967, nor is it listed as a terrorist group by the EU or U.S. Department of State, nor is it listed in the Global Terrorism Database.148

144 “Terrorist/Insurgent Groups of Assam,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.145 “Ministry’s Paper Blames Poor Governance for N-E Militancy,” Hindustan Times, December 30, 1998. 146 “Assam’s Dark Day Reflects Siege Within,” The Statesman, October 31, 2008. 147 “India: Mahanta Presents Proof of ISI Mischief,” The Hindu, April 7, 2000.148 “Banned Organisations,” Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, updated: May 5, 2008, and “Terrorist Designation Lists,” U.S. Department of State, “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP of 12 July 2010,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010, and Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.

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SOUTH INDIAN GROUPS

The major Sunni militant groups in the South Indian states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Their creation was a response to the growing influence of Hindu nationalism and the increased presence of the RSS in the region. Extremist, Islamist rhetoric and minor communal incidents of violence characterized the early stages of Sunni resistance. The destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in 1992 galvanized the increasingly radicalized minority. The Kerala based group, Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS), played a leading role in the violence in the aftermath of the mosque’s destruction, resulting in a ban by the Indian government and its dissolution.Rallying around the mosque’s destruction, the leading militant groups in Tamil Nadu, al-Umma and the Jihad Committee, increased their violent activity by inciting communal violence and targeting the RSS and government offices they deemed complicit to RSS goals. The violence peaked with the 1998 serial bombings in the Tamil Nadu city of Coimbatore that resulted in over 70 deaths and over 200 injuries (see Figure 14). Al-Umma and the Jihad Committee, credited with the bombings, were subsequently banned by the Tamil Nadu state government. Investigations linked the former leader of the ISS, Abdul Nasser Madani, to the bombings resulting in his arrest and a nine year incarceration before his acquittal. The state response targeted the two groups and effectively broke apart their leadership structure and capacity.The state response to Sunni militancy in Southern India led to the dismantling of the major militant groups in the region, and no major attacks have occurred since the 1998 bombings and no new militant groups have established themselves. However, the underlying causes that fueled al-Umma, the Jihad Committee, and the ISS remain present in both Kerala and Tamil Nadu as seen in reports that link former ISS members to a 2008 bombing in Bangalore, militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the claim that Kerala is becoming a training ground for militants that support the violence in Kashmir. As long as the situation in Kashmir remains unresolved and the communal strife between Muslims and Hindus continues, there will remain a disaffected population within the Muslim community in Southern India that will advocate a militant response both locally and nationally.The three Tamil Nadu-based groups Jihad Committee, Al Ummah, and Islamic Defense Force have been covered in one profile because their extremely close organizational and operational linkages would have made separate profiles highly repetitive.

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FIGURE 14. TERRORISM INCIDENTS AND DEATHS BY SOUTH INDIAN GROUPS

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 200101020304050607080

GTD In-cidentsGTD Deaths

Incidents

and Death

s

Year

Source: Global Terrorism Database. Worldwide Incidents Tracking System contained no such incidents149

149 The deaths and incidents represented in the charts are not explicitly linked to either al-Umma or the Jihad Committee in the GTD but are linked to Islamic militants

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JIHAD COMMITTEEFounded: 1986Predecessors: n/aSuccessors: n/aIdeology/Goals: Islamist, separatist, Key Personalities: Ahmed Ali (alias Palani Baba), Imam Ali, Hyder AliAliases: All India Jihad CommitteeLinks: al-UmmahAttacks: Yes (bombings)Bans: Tamil Nadu State, 1998

AL-UMMAHFounded: 1993Predecessors: n/aSuccessors: n/aIdeology/Goals: Islamist, separatistKey Personalities: Syed Ahmad (S.A.) BashaAliases: n/aLinks: Jihad Committee, Islamic Defense ForceAttacks: Yes (bombings)Bans: Tamil Nadu State, 1998

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ISLAMIC DEFENSE FORCEFounded: 1997Predecessors: n/aSuccessors: n/aIdeology/Goals: Islamist, separatistKey Personalities: Mohammed (Erwadi) KasimAliases: n/aLinks: al-UmmaAttacks: Yes (bombings)Bans: n/aJihad Committee, Al-Ummah, and Islamic Defense Force believed defunct.The Jihad Committee, Al-Ummah, and the Islamic Defense Force represent a contingent of Islamic militant groups based in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu. While the three groups have different leadership and varying levels of involvement in the sectarian violence that developed in Tamil Nadu from the late 1980s through the 1990s, similar causes led to their formation and adoption of militancy.Prior to the 1980s, little to no sectarian violence and no noteworthy presence of Islamist organizations existed in Tamil Nadu.150 The rise of Sunni militant groups in Tamil Nadu coincided with the spread of Hindu nationalism. The conversion of Dalits (the lowest members of the Hindu caste system) to Islam throughout the state in the early 1980s led to increases in Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) activity and presence there.151Throughout the 1980s, local and national Hindu leaders mobilized anti-Muslim sentiment within Tamil Nadu152 in response to expanding sectarian tensions.The Jihad Committee is believed to have been formed in 1986,153 and al-Ummah (though not officially founded until 1993) can trace its origins to the early 1980s.154 Less is known about the founding of the Islamic Defense 150 P.G. Rajamohan, “Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism,” South Asia Terrorism Portal: Faultlines, 16 (2004).151 Rupal Oza, “The Geography of Hindu Right-Wing Violence in India,” in Violent Geographies: Fear, Terror, and Political Violence, eds. Derek Gregory and Allen Pred (New York: Routledge, 2007), 162.152 P.G. Rajamohan, “Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism.”153 “Jihad Committee Profile,” Terrorist Organization Profiles (TOPS), START.154 P.G. Rajamohan, “Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism.”

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Force, which appeared in 1997.155 The increase in the occurrence and severity of violent acts perpetrated by Islamist groups in Tamil Nadu is largely attributed to the destruction of the Babri Masjid (mosque) at Ayodhya.156The leadership of al-Ummah, the Jihad Committee, and the Islamic Defense Force is associated with different individuals. However, the sectarian violence that erupted in Tamil Nadu in the 1990s is often sourced to all three organizations conjointly, illustrating the close ties between them. All three groups were motivated by a desire to protect Muslims and their interests from Hindu forces that they perceive as predatory.157 Pursuit of their goals revolves around attacks against Hindu nationalists and the state structures and institutions that are believed to work towards Hindu nationalist ends.158

Leadership of the individual groups has been identified as follows: al-Ummah: Syed Ahmad (S.A.) Basha, founder.159 Jihad Committee: Ahmed Ali (alias, Palani Baba), founder160 Imam Ali and Hyder Ali, prominent members.161 Islamic Defense Force: Mohammed (Erwadi) Kasim, founder.162

The first major act of violence after the Babri Masjid destruction was the bombing of the RSS office in Chennai. The bombing was reputedly carried out by al-Ummah under the leadership of S.A. Basha,163 but it has also been attributed to the Jihad Committee, with Imam Ali identified as critical to the planning and bomb making.164 The RSS office bombing was followed by frequent acts of violence throughout the 1990s. During this time, al-Ummah rose to prominence as the leading Islamist group in Tamil Nadu.165 Multiple violent acts were attributed to al-Ummah during this time period, though none are listed in the Global Terrorism Databse.166 The most prominent were:155 “Islamic Defense Force Profile,” TOPS.156 P.G. Rajamohan, “Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism,” and “Masjid Demolition Caused Backlash in Tamil Nadu,” The Hindu, May 12, 1998.157 “Jihad Committee Profile,” TOPS.158 “Jihad Committee Profile,” TOPS.159 T.S. Subramanian, “Behind the Coimbatore Tragedy,” Frontline, March 7-20, 1998.160 “Four Acquitted in RSS Blast,” The Statesman, June 22, 2007.161 Ibid.162 “Train Bomb Blast Chargesheet Filed,” The Hindu, July 24, 1998.163 “The Rise and Fall of a Fundamentalist,” Indian Express, August 3, 2007.164 “Four Acquitted in RSS Blast,” The Statesman, June 22, 2007; and Sayantan Chakravarty, “ISI: Terror’s Hidden Face,” India Today, November 5, 2002.165 P.G. Rajamohan, “Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism.”166 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.

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An explosion at the Hindu-Munnani (Hindu extremist organization) office in Chennai, April 1995. A parcel bomb in Nagore, July 1995. A petrol bomb attack on the office of the DIG of Prisons in the Central Jail in Chennai, April 1996.

The most intense period of sectarian violence in Tamil Nadu lasted from late 1997, to February 1998. The escalation began in November 1997, when a group of Muslim youths killed a policeman in the city of Coimbatore. This event was followed by clashes between Hindu and Muslim rioters. According to media sources, the Coimbatore police responded in openly an anti-Muslim manner, further exacerbating the violence.167 An Indian civil and human rights organization report alleged that Hindu militants and a section of the Coimbatore police made a coordinated attack on Muslim businesses causing the death of 18 people.168The Islamic Defense Force is a minor group that emerged during this period of escalating sectarian violence to carry out one terrorist attack. In December 1997, on the fifth anniversary of the destruction of the Babri Masjid, a series of train bombings occurred across Tamil Nadu. Pamphlets discovered by police after the fact named the Islamic Defense Force in conjunction with one of the blasts. After investigation, police concluded that the Islamic Defense Force was formed in conjunction with al-Ummah to carry out the train bombings.169 The Islamic Defense Force has not been linked to any other incidents and was a minor group, if indeed it ever existed separately from al-Ummah.170 The violence peaked on February 14, 1998 a series of 13 to 19 separate bombings (according to various accounts) occurred in Coimbatore. Investigations and arrests linked al-Ummah and the Jihad Committee to the bombings, which resulted in around 70 deaths and over 200 injured.171 In response to the bombings, both al-Ummah and the Jihad Committee were banned by the state of Tamil Nadu.172 The lethality of the bombs led to an aggressive response by the Tamil Nadu Police and the creation of a special investigation team to combat religious fundamentalists. Al-Ummah, the Jihad Committee, and the Islamic Defense Force were all successfully suppressed by this police body.173167 “Coimbatore in Focus,” The Hindu, February 24, 1998.168 People’s Union for Civil Liberties report, referenced in T.S. Subramanian, “Behind the Coimbatore Tragedy.”169 “Al-Uma Behind Train Blasts?” The Hindu, December 12, 1997.170 “Islamic Defense Force Profile,” TOPS.171 K.P.S. Gil and Ajai Sahni, “Extremist Islamist Terror and Subversion in South Asia,” in Muhammad’s Monsters: A Comprehensive Guide to Radical Islam for Western Audiences, ed. David Bukay (Green Forest, AR: Galfour, 2004), 176 and T.S. Subramanian, “Behind the Coimbatore Tragedy.”172 “Fresh Blasts Rock Coimbatore, Toll Rises to 87,” The Statesman, February 15, 1998.173 Tamil Nadu Police Department, “Policy Note 2006-07, Demand no. 22, Ch. 9: Special Units in Tamil Nadu Police.”

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According to media sources, all three groups have been largely inactive since the 1998 Coimbatore bombings, with most of their leadership either dead or in prison.174 As such, Sunni militancy in Tamil Nadu appears to have been contained; nevertheless, a major national or South-Indian anti-Muslim incident could lead to a resurgence of such activity in the region in the future.175

ISLAMIC SEVAK SANGH (ISS)Founded: 1990Predecessors: n/aSuccessors: People’s Democratic Party (PDP)Ideology: IslamistKey Personalities: Abdul Nasser MadaniAliases: n/aLinks: SIMI, National Democratic Front, Lashkar-e TaibaAttacks: No (primary activity: mass-mobilizations)Bans: Indian Government, 1992ISS is believed to be defunct, but former members may serve as a recruiting and support network for SIMI, IM (by extension) and LeT.Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) was founded in 1990 by Abdul Nasser Madani in the state of Kerala.176 The ISS was formed to counter the growing RSS influence in the region.177 Led by Madani’s extremist rhetoric of, the ISS developed into a militant pan-Islamic group.178 The ISS was banned in 1992 by the Ministry of Home Affairs for its role in the violence in the aftermath of the Ayodhya mosque destruction.179 Following the ban, Madani dissolved the ISS and established the People’s Democratic Party (PDP).174 “Four Acquitted in RSS Blast,” The Statesmen, June 22, 2007; and “Al-Umma a Feared Outfit of the 1990s,” Indo-Asian News Service, August 1, 2007.175 P.G. Rajamohan, “Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism,” and “Jihad Committee Profile,” TOPS.176 “Bus hijacked, torched in Kerala in bid to free Islamic extremist,” Indian Express, September 11, 2005.177 Sanjoy Hazarika, “India Issues a Ban on Five Rival Groups,” New York Times, December 11, 1992.178 “Bus hijacked, torched in Kerala in bid to free Islamic extremist,” Indian Express, September 11, 2005179 Hazarika, “India Issues a Ban.”

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Since its inception, Madani has claimed that the PDP does not support militancy or violence and he has attempted to gain political legitimacy by building ties with the leading political coalition in Kerala. PDP’s political success and Madani’s claim to be a reformed radical have both been affected by accusations of ongoing involvement in terrorism.180Madani was arrested in 1998 for his alleged involvement in the Coimbatore bombings (see Tamil Nadu group profiles above) and held in a Coimbatore jail until his acquittal in 2007. He was subsequently implicated in a series of LeT-perpetrated bombings in Bangalore in July 2008, though he was not arrested until August 2010.181The ISS, despite its formal dissolution and Madani’s claim to political legitimacy and non-violence, has left a network of former members with links to SIMI and Lashkar-e-Taiba182 and a radicalized group of militants linked to attacks throughout India.

180 Shaju Philip, “Terror ties come back to haunt Madhani,” Indian Express, December 20, 2009.181 “Kerala cannot shirk responsibility in Bangalore blasts,” Indo-Asian News Service, December 7, 2009 and “Former Madhani follower is now terror accused,” Indian Express, December 1, 2009, and TA Johnson, “Based on Nasir’s statements, cops to probe Madani LeT links,” Indian Express, August 18, 2010.182 “Madani has confessed hand in Bangalore IPL venue blasts: Minister,” Times of India, August 25, 2010 and A. Vinod Kumar, “Kerala’s Emergence as a Terror Hub: Repeated Warnings Ignored,” Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses Comment, November 11, 2008.

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KASHMIRI GROUPS

The defining moment in the rise of terrorism in Kashmir was the alleged manipulation of the results of India’s 1987 State Assembly elections, which gave rise to a domestic secessionist insurgency and an allied political movement. Pakistan soon became involved, covertly supporting Indian and Pakistani terrorist groups and the importation of Pakistani Mujahideen returning from the Soviet conflict in Afghanistan. The peak of political organization in Kashmir occurred during the 1990s, when a number of new groups formed and articulated secessionist aims.Kashmir is one of the most violent regions of India, plagued by frequent, low-level terrorist attacks and periodic outbursts of political violence. The types of actions perpetrated vary by group and range from grenade attacks and suicide bombings to acid attacks and the defacement of property, with Pakistan-based groups generally mobilizing heavier weaponry and causing higher casualties per incident.Kashmiri groups tend to espouse one or more of the following goals: increased autonomy or self-determination for Kashmir, a reunion with Pakistan-administered Kashmir and accession to the Pakistani state, and/or membership in the global Islamic community and a transnational Islamic state. Some groups encourage accession to Pakistan as an intermediate goal to attaining the latter objective.By the mid-1990s, militancy in Kashmir came to be dominated by well-equipped Pakistan-based organizations that have used Kashmir as a rallying point for broader domestic and transnational ambitions and espouse extremist religious rhetoric.183 Sunni militant organizations are essentially divided into well-organized and smaller homegrown independence movements that focus more on the human side of the conflict, including several women’s movements working to support the families of martyrs and advocating the “rights” of female Kashmiri Muslims, which are often articulated to include freedom from the abuses of Indian occupation. Many of the more moderate groups have been coordinated under the political banner of the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference, and demonstrations by domestic groups against Indian rule over Kashmir continue.Pakistani support for Kashmiri separatists has led to the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan and the occasional exchange of fire across their common border. Nevertheless, this support has waned somewhat in recent years, either because Pakistan-based groups have turned to domestic activities or Pakistan’s government is reining in its 183 Peter Chalk. “Pakistan’s Role in the Kashmir Insurgency,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Rand Corporation, September 1, 2001 and “Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front,” SATP, accessed March 8, 2011.

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proxies.184 In 2008, the conflict death toll was at its lowest point since 1989 (see Figure 16), leading some analysts to argue that the conflict had begun to take on a fundamentally more peaceful tone.185

FIGURE 16. TERRORISM INCIDENTS AND DEATHS BY KASHMIRI GROUPS

1988199

0199

2199

4199

6199

8200

0200

2200

4200

6200

8201

00

10

20

30

40

50

60

GTD IncidentsWITS IncidentsGTD DeathsWITS Deaths

Inci

dent

s an

d D

eath

s

Year

Source: Global Terrorism Database and Worldwide Incidents Tracking System186

184 Jamal Afridi. “Kashmir Militant Extremists,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 9, 2009.185 Yaroslav Trofimov. “A New Tack in Kashmir: Peaceful Protest Gains in Separatist Fight,” The Wall Street Journal, December 15, 2008. 186 GTD includes attacks with DeM-front Lashkar-e-Jabbar's involvement suspected. All attacks from JuM, except one of DeM in WITS.

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JAMIAT-UL-MUJAHEDIN (JUM)Founded: 1990-1991 by Hilal Ahmed Mir (alias Nasir ul-Islam)Predecessors: HuM, Ansar ul-Islam (“Helpers of Islam”)Successors: n/aIdeology/Goals: Islamist, Deobandi, secessionist, pro-PakistanKey Personalities: Hilal Ahmed Mir, Ghulam Rasool Shah (alias General Abdullah/Mohammad Ramzan Sofi), Sheikh Abdul Basit, Mohammed SalahAliases: n/aLinks: DeM, LeTAttacks: Yes (suicide bombings, armed attacks)Bans: Terrorist Exclusion ListJuM’s size is probably between tens and several hundred and it resources are unknown. JUM’s MO includes: low-lethality explosive and armed attacks. The capacity to execute medium-lethality attacks is likely based on JUM’s history. JUM’s support and recruitment base is increasingly in Pakistan.

Jamiat-ul-Mujahedin is believed to be a descendant of Ansar ul-Islam, a group formed in the 1980s by Hilal Ahmed Mir. Ansar ul-Islam was a militant Islamic group that strove to turn the largely secular Kashmiri separatist movement into a religious one. Ansar ul-Islam was succeeded by Hizb-ul-Mujahideen in 1989, but after a split in the group Mir’s supporters went on to form JuM. Mir was succeeded by Ghulam Rasool Shah (alias General Abdullah/Mohammad Ramzan Sofi).187 Other prominent leaders include Chief Sheikh Abdul Basit and Mohammed Salah.JuM is one of the most hard-line Kashmiri militant organizations. It does not support negotiations over Kashmir and it actively tries to obstruct the political process. As a result, JuM frequently clashes with groups like the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference over their more moderate positions on a political solution to the Kashmir problem.188 Nevertheless, JuM’s inflexibility and its unwavering hostility towards India seem to appeal to extremist elements of the pro-Pakistan movement in Kashmir.189 There is evidence of cooperation between JuM and LeT.190187 Charlotte Fleishman, “In the Spotlight: Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JuM),” Center for Defense Information, April 4, 2005, “Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, and Arif Jamal, “A Guide to Militant Groups in Kashmir,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 5 (February 4, 2010)188 “Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.189 “Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen Claims Responsibility for Lal Chowk Attack,” Daily News and Analysis, January 6, 2010; and Fleishman, “In the Spotlight.”190 Arif Jamal, “A Guide to Militant Groups in Kashmir,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 5 (February 4, 2010).

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Tactically, JuM favors high-profile, though not necessarily high-lethality, suicide attacks. For example, at the beginning of this year two operatives launched a midday attack in central Srinagar, throwing grenades and firing indiscriminately at civilians before occupying the Punjab Hotel.191 The siege lasted for 23 hours before the militants were killed by security forces; the death toll also included one civilian and one policeman.192 In another incident in 1997, JuM detonated a bomb in a rickshaw approaching the Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister’s house, wounding ten and killing four.193Nevertheless, in recent years JuM’s authority has been waning. The group’s cavalier attitude towards civilian deaths has led to a decline in its local popularity,194 and a wave of arrests in 2003 targeted several of the group’s key members.195 The organization has been forced to rely increasingly on Pakistani recruits,196 a marked change from its initial Kashmiri-only policy.197 While some sources claim that JuM’s membership numbers in the hundreds, others estimate that it is far smaller.198JuM is listed as a suspected perpetrator by the Global Terrorism Database in 17 incidents of terrorism between 1996 and 2006, resulting in 92 deaths. Four of the attacks used firearms exclusively, while the rest involved explosives of some kind. All incidents occurred in Jammu and Kashmir, and all but three listed other groups as suspects, including Jaish-e-Mohamad, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Al-Mansoorian, and Tehreek-e-Jihad-e-Islami and Harkat ul Jihad e-Islami.199

191 “Srinagar Gunbattle: JUM Claims Responsibility, 100 Evacuated,” The Times of India, January 6, 2010. 192 “Lal Chowk Siege Ends After 23 Hours, 4 Killed,” Kashmir Press Service, January 7, 2010. 193 Fleishman, “In the Spotlight.”194 Fleishman, “In the Spotlight.”195 Anupama Airy, “J-K Police Claim to Have Neutralized Jamiat-el-Mujahideen,” Express India, February 8, 2003. 196 “Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.197 “Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.198 Jamal, “A Guide to Militant Groups in Kashmir;” “Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen,” South Asia Terrorism Portal. 199 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.

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DUKHTARAN-E-MILLAT (DEM)Founded: 1987 by Asiya AndrabiPredecessors: Jamaat-e-IslamiSuccessors: n/aIdeology/Goals: Islamist, feminist, pro-Pakistan, secessionistKey Personalities: Asiya AndrabiAliases: Lashkar-E-Jabbar (hypothesized)200Links: APHC, HuM, JuM, LeJ, ISI, RAWAttacks: Yes (unofficially accused of logistically supporting one bomb attack)Bans: n/aDeM’s size is probably in the hundreds. Its resources unknown and its MO includes: vandalism, assault/battery, logistical support for other groups. The capacity for low and medium lethality terror attacks is likely given DeM’s connections to Pakistan-based terror groups. Its means of mobilizing support, recruitment strategy and recruitment base are unknown.

Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DeM), or Daughters of the Community, is a Kashmir-based women’s group founded in the late 1980s, by activist Asiya Andrabi.201 The initial mandate of the group was the use of Islam to promote women’s rights.202 However, over time the group has radicalized and adopted a broader political agenda, which includes support for jihadist campaigns to gain Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan.203 Long-term goals include the Islamization of Pakistan and the formation of a global Muslim state.204DeM’s membership is estimated at around 350 women.205 The organization has not been directly involved in acts of political terrorism,206 and Andrabi claims that women cannot execute military operations.207 However, she supports the use of violence against the Indian state and its security forces,208 and the group is believed to be linked to the bomb that killed Agence France Presse reporter Mushtaq Ali in 1995.209 DeM has been 200 This information could not be confirmed.201 “Dukhtaran-e-Millat Profile,” Terrorist Organizations Profiles (TOPS), START.202 M. Mazharul Haque, “Asiya Andrabi: Warrior in Veil,” The Milli Gazette.203 Haque, “Asiya Andrabi.”204 Haque, “Asiya Andrabi,” and Andrew Whitehead, “Daughter of Faith Who Will Fight the Holy War Forever,” The Guardian, April 23, 2001.205 “Dukhtaran-e-Millat,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.206 “Dukhtaran-e-Millat,” SATP.207 Haque, “Asiya Andrabi.”208 Whitehead, “Daughter of Faith.”209 “Dukhtaran-e-Millat Profile,” TOPS, START.

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suspected of providing logistical support such as money laundering and arms transport to a wide range of other militant groups (listed below).210The first notable actions of DeM included protests against Indian military violence in Jammu and Kashmir and the defacement of movie posters with graphic images of women.211 Other activities have included arson attacks on liquor stores212 and attempts to enforce wearing of the hijab by women in Srinigar, which at the extreme have involved splashing paint213 and acid214 on the faces of uncovered women and teenagers. DeM is not listed as a perpetrator for any incidents in the Global Terrorism Database; however, DeM appears in the notes field for one incident.215A key spokesperson and driver of the group, Andrabi has spent much of the past two decades in and out of prison under India’s Public Safety Act.216 She has close ties to the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference and Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, of which her husband Muhammad Quasim (alias Aashiq Husain Faktoo) was once a leader.217 Furthermore, it is suspected that DeM is the actual force behind the Lashkar-e-Jabbar women’s terrorist group, which has been involved in acid attacks on uncovered women and attempts to compel Kashmiris to wear clothing that identifies their religious affiliations.218 Other suspected connections include the ISI, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, the World Kashmiri Freedom Movement, and even the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of the Indian Prime Minister’s Office, India’s external intelligence agency.219

210 “Dukhtaran-e-Millat,” SATP.211 Haque, “Asiya Andrabi.”212 Altaf Hussain, “Kashmir Women Fight ‘Obscenity,’” BBC News, August 31, 2005. 213 Hussain “Kashmir Women Fight ‘Obscenity.’”214 Haque “Asiya Andrabi.”215 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.216 Arif Shafi Wani, “Aasiya Andrabi, Aide Arrested,” Greater Kashmir, August 29, 2010.217 Wani, “Aasiya Andrabi, Aide Arrested.”218 “Dukhtaran-e-Millat,” SATP, and “India,” Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, March 4, 2002.219 “Dukhtaran-e-Millat,” SATP, and Bhaduri, “Inshallah, Kashmir Will Become Part of Pakistan,” Hindu Vivek Kendra: A Resource Center for the Promotion of Hindutva.

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BANAT-UL-ISLAMFounded: mid-1990sPredecessors: Hizbul Mujahideen, Jamaat-e-IslamiSuccessors: n/aIdeology: n/aKey Personalities: Fatima Shafi, Umi ArifaAliases: n/aLinks: HuM, JeMAttacks: n/aBans: n/aBanat-ul-Islam has very limited available information.Little information is publicly available about Banat-ul-Islam. Conflicting media reports maintain that it is the women’s wing of either the Hizbul Mujahideen or Jamaat-e-Islami Jammu and Kashmir.220 (In Arabic, Banat-ul-Islam translates as Girls of Islam; thus, both of these organizations may have women’s wings with that title.) Its leaders include Fatima Shafi221 and Umi Arifa, while its activities include providing support for the families of martyrs.222According to the Asia times, during the 1990s the group encouraged women not to participate directly in attacks because of their reproductive role, but rather to volunteer their sons for the cause.223 Banat -ul-Islam is not listed in the Global Terrorism Database.224

220 “Spawning Militancy: The Rise of Hizbul,” Indian Express, May 22, 2003; and Sudha Ramachandran, “Helping Women Balance Family Life, Jihad,” Asia Times, September 15, 2004.221 Ved Prakash, Terrorism in Northern India: Jammu and Kashmir and the Punjab (Gyan Publishing House, 2008).222 “Spawning Militancy: The Rise of Hizbul,” Indian Express, May 22, 2003.223 Sudha Ramachandran. “Helping Women Balance Family Life, Jihad,” Asia Times Online, September 15, 2004.224 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.

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MUSLIM KHAWATEEN MARKAZ (MKM)225Founded: 1989 by Yasmeen RajaPredecessors: n/aSuccessors: n/aIdeology: Self-determination for Jammu and Kashmir, human rightsKey Personalities: Yasmeen Raja, Zamrooda Habib (sometimes also Anjum Zamruda Habib), Ayesha ShahAliases: Sometimes also: Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Khawateen MarkazLinks: HuM, JeMAttacks: n/aBans: n/aMKM has very limited available information.Muslim Khawateen Markaz (Muslim Women’s Center, known also as the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Khawateen Markaz) is a women’s political group based in Jammu and Kashmir. Its primary activities include protests advocating human rights for the women of Jammu and Kashmir.226Although MKM has a website, little information about its ideology or activities is publicly available. The group’s declared goals include “the self-determination and betterment of the women of Jammu and Kashmir.”227 MKM is not listed in the Global Terrorism Database.228Notable figures include chairpersons Zamrooda Habib and Yasmeen Raja, as well as former acting chairperson Ayesha Shah.229 Raja is the daughter of Ghulam Nabi Bhat, a Kashmiri activist who served with the Civil Secretariat of Jammu and Kashmir and several local political movements.230 Habib, has 225 MKM does not appear to fit our definition of militancy, as they appear non-violent. We did not fully realize this fact until after the profile had been included in several drafts of the report. For the sake of continuity and the interesting role that the group plays in Jammu and Kashmir, we have left the profile in the final report. 226 “Kashmiris to Take Martyrs’ Mission to its Logical End: Yasmeen Raja,” Kashmir Media Service, Jammu Kashmir People’s League, accessed February 7, 2011.227 Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Khawateen Markaz, “About Us,” accessed February 7, 2011.228 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.229 “Interference in Religious Affairs by Authorities Condemned,” Kashmir Media Service, accessed February 7, 2011.230 Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Khawateen Markaz, “About Us,” accessed February 7, 2011.

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published a book/booklet entitled Our Widows, which asserts that 15,000-40,000 women have been widowed by the conflict in Kashmir.231The group is a member of the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference and has strong ties to the organization, with Habib and Raja both having served in the APHC leadership.232 In 2003 the Pakistani Charge d’Affaires was embroiled in controversy when he was charged with funneling Rs. 370,000 (approximately US$ 8,000) to the APHC with the help of Zamrooda Habib.233Given that there are currently two different websites for the group, MKM may exist in two factions, one led by Yasmeen Raja, and the other by Zamrooda Habib, though the small amount of information on the group makes this difficult to determine.

231 Zamrooda Habib’s Muslim Khawateen Markaz Women’s Concern, “Chastity of 90,000 Women Outraged in 10 years; 40,000 widows in Kashmir: MKM,” accessed February 7, 2011.232 Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Khawateen Markaz, “About Us,” accessed February 7, 2011.233 Praveen Swami, “APHC: The Nexus with Terror,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed February 7, 2011; and Mahendra P. Lama, “Terrorism and Insurgency in India: Economic Costs and Consequences,” ICSSR Journal of Abstracts and Reviews, Political Science, 33:1&2 (2007).

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PAKISTANI GROUPS

Though not based in India, Sunni groups from Pakistan play a central role in militancy there. As our research shows, many of the most active Indian groups receive support from Pakistani counterparts such as LeT. Pakistani groups such as LeT, JeM, and HuM are directly responsible for many of the attacks in Indian-controlled Kashmir, and these groups have also launched attacks in India's major cities, both on their own and in collaboration with Indian groups, especially IM and SIMI. These groups account for a large number of India’s fatalities due to terrorism (See Figure 18). Pakistani groups may be motivated by the conflict between India and Pakistan, centered on the dispute in Kashmir, as well as Islamist ideology that calls for the establishment of an Islamic state in India as part of a sub-continental caliphate. Within India, the Pakistani groups' activities are generally confined to the realm of terrorism; they do not take direct part in the more political elements of militancy, except to the extent that they support Indian-based groups that do.FIGURE 18. TERRORISM INCIDENTS AND DEATHS BY PAKISTANI GROUPS

1998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010050100150200250300350400

GTD In-cidentsWITS In-cidentsGTD DeathsWITS Deaths

Incidents

and Death

s

Year

Source: Global Terrorism Database and Worldwide Incidents Tracking System234234 GTD -- Includes JeM and LeT (and HuM, which only had 3). IIM not in database, and the two LeJ attacks in India were actually misattributed -- it was Lashkar-e-Jabber, not LeJ. WITS -- Includes JeM, HuM, LeT, IIM and LeJ (although there were no India attacks from the last two in WITS).

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LASHKAR-E-TAIBA (LET)Founded: Late 1980s to early 1990sPredecessors: Markaz Dawa-ul-IrshadSuccessors: n/aIdeology: Ahle Hadith, pro-Pakistan, Kashmiri secessionistKey Personalities: Hafez SaeedAliases: Jamaat ud-Dawa, Falah-e-Insaniyat, Tehrik-e-Tahafuz Qibla AwalLinks: ISI, JeM, LeJ, SIMI, IMAttacks: Yes (bombings, armed attacks, over 200 killed)Bans: Pakistani Government, Indian Government, US List of Foreign Terrorist OrganizationsLeT’s size cannot be estimated with confidence. Its resources are likely high given state support from ISI and support from private charities. LeT’s MO in India includes medium and high-lethality terror attacks. The capacity to execute high-lethality terror attacks is confirmed. LeT’s recruitment and primary support base is in Pakistan and its support base in India includes SIMI, IM and regional militant groups.

LeT is a Pakistan-based international terrorist organization that has actively funded and supported a number of Indian terrorist groups. The organization began in the 1980s with a focus on Jammu and Kashmir. At a time when many Kashmiri political movements made secular demands for autonomy or self-determination, LeT put forward a religious argument in favor of Kashmir’s accession to a broader pan-Islamic state and advocated the Islamicization of India.235LeT recruits through an extensive network of madrassas and religious centers located throughout Pakistan.236 The group has a broad base of financial support, including its own charity, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which has raised money for LeT under the pretense of providing relief for the 2005 Pakistan earthquake.237 Other sources of support include Pakistani expats in the US, the UK, and the Middle East; local Kashmiri and Pakistani businessmen; gulf donors such as Saudi Arabia; and the Pakistani ISI.238235 South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Lashkar-e-Toiba, ‘Army of the Pure,’” accessed February 7, 2011.236 Bajoria. “Background: Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Pure) (a.k.a. Lashkar e-Tayyiba, Lashkar e-Toiba, Lashkar-i-Taiba).” Council on Foreign Relations. January 14, 2010.237 Bajoria. “Background: Lashkar-e-Taiba." 238 Bajoria. “Background: Lashkar-e-Taiba."

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LeT is also connected to larger transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban,239 and has been associated with activities in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Iraq in its effort to create a pan-Islamic state.240 Consequently, LeT has been banned by the US, the UN, the UK, India, and Pakistan.241In India, LeT provides support for a range of groups, is believed to have perpetrated attacks alongside LeJ and JeM,242 and works closely with IIM. In fact, some scholars hypothesize that the two groups have joined.243 LeT was involved in the founding of IM and has co-perpetrated attacks with the group244 and also cooperates with SIMI, with SIMI providing logistics and support and LeT responsible for actually executing the attacks.245 Finally, there is evidence of LeT involvement with attacks claimed by JuM, suggesting that these groups may also be linked.246The failure or unwillingness of the Pakistani government to curtail LeT’s activities in India has been a major source of tension between the two governments.247 Currently, the South Asia Terrorism Portal estimates that LeT has conducted attacks in Bangalore, Gujarat, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Mumbai, New Delhi, and Varanasi, and that with the help of the ISI is involved with Islamic extremism and/or terrorist activity in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal.248 LeT has been connected to the 2001 parliamentary attacks in New Delhi, the 2003 Gateway of India bombing in Mumbai, and the 2005 New Delhi bombings.249 The Global 239 For example, Al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubayda was caught at an LeT safe house. See Bajoria. “Background: Lashkar-e-Taiba." 240 Bajoria. “Background: Lashkar-e-Taiba." 241 Bajoria. “Background: Lashkar-e-Taiba." 242 Sometimes, JuM and LeT together are known as The Save Kashmir Movement, while JeM, LeJ, and LeT together are known as Lashkar-e-Omar or al-Qanoon; see Globalsecurity.org, “Military: Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.”243 Arif Jamal, “A Guide to Militant Groups in Kashmir,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 5 (February 4, 2010); South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Lashkar-e-Toiba, ‘Army of the Pure,’” accessed February 7, 2011.244 “Is Indian Mujahideen Actually the Asif Reza Commando Force?,” Indian Express, September 30, 2008. 245 C. Christine Fair, “Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Attack Upon Several Targets in the Indian Mega-City of Mumbai,” Testi-mony before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, 11 March 2009, Rand Corportation, p. 10.246 Arif Jamal, “A Guide to Militant Groups in Kashmir,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 5 (February 4, 2010). 247 Bajoria. “Background: Lashkar-e-Taiba." 248 South Asia Terrorism Portal. “Lashkar-e-Toiba, ‘Army of the Pure,’” accessed February 7, 2011.249 Bajoria. “Background: Lashkar-e-Taiba" and Sanjoy Majumder, “Who Is Behind the Delhi Bombings?” BBC News, October 31, 2005; “Islamic Militants May Be Behind Indian Bombings,” CBC News, October 30, 2005; and “Group Says It Staged Indian Blasts,” Associated Press, October 31, 2005.

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Terrorism Database lists LeT as a perpetrator in 14 attacks (if the 2008 Mumbai shootings are considered one event) accounting for 193 fatalities.250 In addition to its high death toll, the Mumbai attack was significant because it specifically targeted hotels frequented by Western tourists as well as a Jewish residential facility hosting several Israelis.251While LeT has a wide range of connections to local groups in Jammu and Kashmir and beyond, it is important to consider the global scope of the organization and the contrast between LeT and the more homegrown style of terrorism practiced by many Indian outfits. As some scholars have noted, LeT has proven fairly successful in building partnerships with local organizations and in importing its own trained militants from Pakistan-administered Kashmir and other parts of Pakistan to execute its activities;252 however, its role in building the capacity of local Indian organizations and recruiting Indians to join the global jihad is less prominent.

JAISH-E-MOHAMMAD (JEM)Founded: 2000 Predecessors: HuMSuccessors: Khaddam ul-IslamIdeology: DeobandiKey Personalities: Masood AzharAliases: Tehrik al-Furqan, Jamaat-e-FurqaLinks: ISI, Al Qaeda, Afghan & Pakistan Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-e-JhangviAttacks: Yes (Bombings, armed attacks, approximately 60 killed)Bans: US List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 2001; Pakistani Government, 2002JeM’s size cannot be estimated with confidence. Its resources are likely high given its ISI links. JeM’s MO includes: low-lethality terror attacks with heavily guarded targets like the Indian Parliament as well. The capacity for at least medium-lethality attacks is likely given JeM’s history. Its recruitment and support base is in Pakistan.

Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) is one of the most violent Deobandi groups in South Asia and has carried out many deadly attacks in Kashmir, India and 250 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.251 “Mumbai Still Under Siege, 200 Still Trapped in Oberoi,” The Press Trust of India, November 27, 2008.252 Arif Jamal, “A Guide to Militant Groups in Kashmir,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 5 (February 4, 2010).

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Pakistan. JeM is believed to receive support from the ISI.253 JeM is also believed to have links with a number of other groups, including Al Qaeda,254 the Afghan255 and Pakistani Taliban,256 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),257 Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan258 and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.259JeM was created by Masood Azhar in January 2000.260 Azhar, a former leader of another Pakistani militant group, Harkat ul-Mujahideen (HuM), had recently been released from an Indian prison. Azhar had been in custody since 1994, when he was arrested in Kashmir in connection with HuM attacks on Indian forces there. In December 1999, HuM operatives hijacked an Indian Airlines flight and held its occupants hostage in Afghanistan; in exchange for the hostages’ safety, the hijackers demanded the release of a host of jailed militants, including Azhar. A few weeks after his release, Azhar announced that he was leaving HuM to form a new group, JeM.Since its formation, JeM has carried out a number of high-profile attacks, including the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament building in conjunction with LeT261 and the January 2002 murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl.262 JeM is listed as a suspected perpetrator by the Global Terrorism Database in 19 incidents of terrorism in India, resulting in a total of 60 fatalities. The incidents occurred between 2003 and 2007, and all but two occurred in Jammu and Kashmir.263 WITS lists JeM as a perpetrator in 40 incidents of terrorism in India between 2004 and 2009, accounting for 57 deaths. All but one of the incidents took place in Jammu and Kashmir.264JeM was added to the U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in 2001 and was banned by the Pakistani government in 2002. As JeM came under increasing scrutiny, it reportedly changed its name to Tehrik al-Furqan265 (also reported as Jamaat-e-Furqa266). In 2003, the group reportedly split into 253 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 65; and Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 29.254 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 64, 66.255 Ibid., 66.256 Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2, No. 4 (April 2009), 1.257 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 107.258 Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, 30; and Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban,” 1.259 Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban,” 1.260 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 65-66; and Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, 28-29 (these citations apply to the entire paragraph).261 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 107.262 Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, 59.263 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.264 WITS, (various ICNs).265 Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, 30.266 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 67.

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two factions: Khaddam ul-Islam headed by Azhar and another headed by the JeM chief in Karachi, Abdullah Shah Mazhar.267

267 Zahab and Roy, Islamist Networks, 31-32.

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LASHKAR-E-JHANGVI (LEJ)Founded: mid-1990sPredecessors: Sipah-e-Sahaba PakistanSuccessors: n/aIdeology: Anti-Shia, DeobandiKey Personalities: Riaz Basra (deceased), Akram LahoriAliases: n/aLinks: Al Qaeda, Tehrik-e-Taliban PakistanAttacks: Yes (low-lethality and infrequent in India)Bans: Pakistani Government, 2001 ; US List of Foreign Terrorist Organizations 2003LeJ’s size or resources cannot be estimated with confidence. LeJ is almost entirely Pakistan focused with an MO of low lethality attacks on Muslim minorities. The Capacity for at least medium-lethality attacks is likely. LeJ’s recruitment and support base is Pakistan’s Deobandi adherents.

Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) is an anti-Shia Deobandi jihadi group in Pakistan with ties to Al Qaeda.268 Since it was founded in the early to mid-1990s, LeJ has launched dozens of attacks against non-Sunni minorities in Pakistan and, in recent years, has increasingly targeted the Pakistani state. LeJ founder Riaz Basra, who was killed by Pakistani police in 2003, developed ties to Al Qaeda while training alongside its members in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan in the late 1990s.269 In the years since 9/11, LeJ has strengthened these ties and has become increasingly enmeshed in a broader militant network led by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.270LeJ is an offshoot of the anti-Shia sectarian group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), which was founded in the 1980s with support from the Pakistani government of Zia ul-Haq.271 LeJ also received state support in its early years.272 These groups were used by the Pakistani state to counter the rising 268 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008), 227.269 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 94-96.270 Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban,” 1; and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan Attacks Show Tighter Militant Links,” The New York Times, October 15, 2009.271 Describing the split with LeJ, Chairman of the SSP’s Supreme Council Zia ul-Haq Qasmi said: “We parted ways because Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’s way of pursuing its policies were different from the SSP’s. The Lashkar does not like our moderate policies” (Mariam Abou Zahab, “The Regional Dimension of Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan,” in Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2002), 127, n. 15).272 S.V.R. Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2000),

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influence of Iran’s revolutionary Shiism.273 In the late 1990s, however, the Pakistani government of Nawaz Sharif began cracking down on some homegrown militant groups, including SSP and LeJ. In response, the groups began directly targeting police and military installations. LeJ was officially banned by the Pakistani government in 2001 but continues to operate from strongholds in Karachi, central Punjab, and North Waziristan.274LeJ was placed on the U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations in January 2003.275 The U.S. alleges that LeJ was responsible for the March 1995 attack on U.S. consulate officials in Karachi, which killed two people. That attack was said to be in response to a U.S. request that Pakistan extradite Ramzi Yousuf, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.276LeJ is listed as a suspected perpetrator by the Global Terrorism Database in two incidents of terrorism in India, which resulted in two injuries and no fatalities. Both incidents occurred in Jammu and Kashmir. For reference, LeJ is listed in 17 incidents in Pakistan.277

157.273 C. Christine Fair, “Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al Qaeda and Other Organizations,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 27 (2004), 492; and Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2005), 205.274 Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban,” 3.275 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 96.276 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 96.277 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.

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ISLAMI INQILABI MAHAZ (IIM)Founded: 1990sPredecessors: n/aSuccessors: LeTIdeology: IslamistKey Personalities: Zulfikar Ali ShahAliases: n/aLinks: n/aAttacks: Yes (Responsibility disputed)Bans: NoIIM’s size and resources are unknown. It’s MO is terrorism. The capacity for independent violence is unknown given the probability of LeT involvement in IIM-attributed terror attacks. IIM’s recruitment and support base is in Pakistan.

Islami Inqilabi Mahaz (IIM) is a Sunni militant group with long-standing ties to LeT. The group was founded by Pakistani veterans of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, who set up base in Lahore, Pakistan, in the early 1990s.278 In 1992 or 1993, the group shifted its activities to the Poonch district, near the Line of Control in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, where it carried out joint operations with LeT.279IIM leader Zulfikar Ali Shah, a Pakistani from Hyderabad, was arrested by Indian authorities in February 1993.280 In 1999, Shah was among 36 militants whose release was demanded by the hijackers of an Indian airlines flight.281 Although some jailed militants were released to end the hijacking, Shah’s name was dropped from the list late in negotiations, and he currently remains in custody.282 It is not clear why he was dropped from the list.IIM has claimed responsibility for at least two high-profile attacks, although the veracity of either claim has not been determined. The first of these was the fatal shooting of four American employees of a U.S. petroleum company in Karachi in November 1997.283 A previously unknown group also claimed responsibility for the attack.284 Both groups said it was in retaliation for the 278 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997, “Asia Overview,” April 1998. 279 “Inqilabi Just Another Name for LeT,” Times of India, October 30, 2005.280 Praveen Swami, “Terror Links,” Frontline, Volume 17, Issue 01 (January 8-21, 2000).281 Swami, “Terror Links.”282 Saikat Datta, “Delhi Blasts: Cinder Ash,” Outlook India, November 14, 2005.283 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997.284 “In Wake of Karachi Killing, Americans Keep Low Profile,” New York Times, November 14, 1997.

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U.S. conviction of Mir Aimal Kansi, who shot and killed two CIA employees outside the agency’s headquarters in 1993.285 IIM also claimed responsibility for series of bombings in New Delhi on the eve of Diwali celebrations in 2005, an attack that killed approximately 60 people and wounded more than 200. This is the group’s only listing in the GTD.286 Ajai Sahni, the director of SATP, argues that IIM has merged with LeT and that IIM’s claim on the 2005 Delhi bombings was an attempt to obscure LeT’s involvement.287

HARKAT UL-MUJAHIDEENFounded: 1985Predecessors: Harkat ul-Jihad-i-Islami, Harkat ul-AnsarSuccessors: Harkat ul-AnsarIdeology: pro-Pakistan, Kashmiri secessionistKey Personalities: Sajjad Afghani, Nasrullah Mansur Langrayal, Maulana Masood AzharAliases: Al FaranLinks: ISIAttacks: Yes (Bombings, armed attacks, approximately 50 killed)Bans: Indian Government, US List of Foreign Terrorist OrganizationsHarkat ul-Mujahideen’s size and resources cannot be estimated. Its MO in India is low-lethality terrorism. The capacity for violence is unknown given the possibility that JeM has drawn resources away. HuM’s recruitment and support base is in Pakistan.

According to un-sourced newspaper and South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) reports, Harkat ul-Mujahideen was founded in Afghanistan in 1985 to fight against the Soviet occupation. The organization subsequently shifted operations to Jammu and Kashmir.288The SATP maintains that Harkat ul-Mujahideen was a splinter of another jihadist group, the Harkat ul-Jihad i-Islami, and was renamed the Harkat ul-Ansar (HuA) in 1993 by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Directorate. 285 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1997.286 Sanjoy Majumder, “Who Is Behind the Delhi Bombings?” BBC News, October 31, 2005; “Islamic Militants May Be Behind Indian Bombings,” CBC News, October 30, 2005; and “Group Says It Staged Indian Blasts,” Associated Press, October 31, 2005 and Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed February 17, 2011.287 Ajai Sahni, “Shadow Over the Festival of Lights,” South Asia Intelligence Review, October 31, 2005. 288 “Hostages ‘Will Die if Rescue is Attempted’,” The Guardian, 19 August 1995 and “Harkat-ul-Mujahideen,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.

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HuA reverted to Harkat ul-Mujahideen in 1997 following the group’s listing as a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department.289 According to India’s Ministry of Home Affairs, Harkat ul-Mujahideen is banned under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, where Harkat-ul-Ansar and “Harkat-ul-Jehad-e Islami” appear to be listed as aliases.290According to media reports and the SATP, the group’s three key early leaders were Sajjad Afghan, Nasrullah Mansur Langrayal, Maulana Masood Azhar. All three were arrested by Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir in the early 1990s. Azhar was released following the hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight, and went on to found Jaish e-Mohammad,291 while Afghani is dead292 and Langrayal reportedly remains in prison.293As of November 2010, Harkat ul Mujahideen was listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. Department of State, but not by the European Union.294According to the Global Terrorism Database, Harkat ul Ansar and “Harakat ul-Mujahidin” committed a total of 17 terror attacks in India prior to 2008, killing 50 people, including militants. The group’s preferred tactic appears to be bombing; however, they have carried out shootings and kidnappings as well. Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkatul Jihad e-Islami, the Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front, and the Lashkar e-Jhangvi are listed as suspected perpetrators in at least one of the listed incidents.295 The South Asia Terrorism Portal reports that Harkat ul-Mujahideen’s capacity was much reduced after the founding of Jaish e- Mohammad, but Harkat militants have been reported killed in encounters with police as recently as July 2010.296

289 “Harkat-ul-Mujahideen,” South Asia Terrorism Portal.290 “Home Ministry Clarifies On Banned Organisations,” Hindustan Times, December 14, 2004. LexisNexis.291 “Jaish: Small But Not to be Ignored,” The Statesman, 8 October 2001. LexisNexis.292 “Sajjad Afghani Died in Prison Riot,” The Statesman, 28 December 1999. LexisNexis.293 “How a Former Pakistani Commando Became a Terrorist,” Rediff News, 20 September 2009, accessed 2/2/2011294 “Terrorist Designation Lists”, U.S. Department of State, accessed November 18, 2010, and “Council Decision 2010/386/CFSP,” Official Journal of the European Union, July 13, 2010. 295 Global Terrorism Database, START, accessed 2/2/2011.296 “Top Militant Killed in Sopore,” The Pioneer, 22 July 2010. LexisNexis and “Harkat-ul-Mujahideen,” South Asia Terrorism Portal..

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6. EXTERNAL ACTORS’ INFLUENCE ON SUNNI MILITANCY IN INDIA

SUNNI MILITANCY IN INDIA IS INFLUENCED BY OUTSIDE ACTORS IN SIGNIFICANT WAYS. TO VARYING DEGREES, THESE NON-INDIAN ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDE FINANCIAL SUPPORT, INSPIRATION, AND GUIDANCE TO INDIA’S SUNNI MILITANT GROUPS. WE BEGIN BY LOOKING AT PAKISTAN’S INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, WHICH HAS A LONG HISTORY OF PROVIDING MATERIAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR MILITANT GROUPS THAT ADVANCE ITS POLICY OBJECTIVES. THEN WE EXAMINE SEVERAL OTHER INFLUENCES, INCLUDING AL QAEDA, WHOSE ROLE IS LARGELY LIMITED TO IDEOLOGICAL INSPIRATION; INDIVIDUAL DONORS FROM ACROSS THE REGION, WHO OFFER FINANCIAL SUPPORT VIA THE HAWALA BANKING SYSTEM; AND TABLIGHI JAMAAT, A SECRETIVE MISSIONARY ORGANIZATION, WHOSE INFLUENCE IS HARDER TO DISCERN.PAKISTAN’S INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (ISI)

The Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) is Pakistan’s foreign intelligence service. As an inter-services directorate of the military, the ISI draws personnel from the Army, Navy and Air Force. The ISI, and the military more broadly, play an important role in determining Pakistan’s foreign policy.297 Pakistan’s primary foreign policy concern for all of its independent history has been conflict with India, with which Pakistan has fought four wars, in: 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999. Except for the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, these conflicts have centered on Kashmir. The ISI’s involvement in militancy in Kashmir began in 1988 or 1989, when popular outrage over the fraudulent elections of 1987 led to the outbreak of organized violence against Indian authorities. According to American journalists and think tanks, the ISI, with the consent of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, used resources from the waning anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan to support Kashmiri insurgents with weapons, supplies and training. When the number of native Kashmiri militants proved insufficient, the ISI began equipping and infiltrating Afghan, Pakistani and Arab fighters into Kashmir to harass Indian forces.298

While most sources agree on the origins of the ISI’s involvement in Jammu and Kashmir, the organization’s support for Sunni militancy elsewhere in India is sometimes disputed. According to Indian media, think tank and government sources, every Sunni militant group profiled in this report as well as many non-Sunni militant organizations receives assistance from the 297 “Inter-Services Intelligence,” The New York Times, updated February 10, 2011, and Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 100.298 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin, 2004), 221, 292, and Mark Roberts, “Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate.”

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ISI. In these accounts, the ISI seeks to promote indiscriminate violence in India by supporting as many Indian militant groups as possible.299

A second major issue relates to ISI support for the Pakistan-based groups such as Jaish e-Mohammad and Lashkar e-Taiba that have carried out highly lethal attacks in India in the past decade, including the 2001 Parliament incident, the 2006 Mumbai train bombings, and the 2008 Mumbai shootings. While these organizations’ roots as ISI proxies are rarely disputed, it is unclear if these highly lethal urban attacks are directly supported by the ISI, either at the top, or by rogue lower-level officers, or if the groups themselves are operating independently.Despite these uncertainties, Pakistan continues to be an important source of manpower, supplies and funding for terrorist attacks in India, especially the most lethal such incidents.AL QAEDA

Al Qaeda is not known to have directly provided material or financial support to India-based militant groups, but Pakistan-based LeT has a long-standing relationship with Al Qaeda and Osamabin Laden. LeT’s precursor organization was founded in the 1980s with the help of Abdullah Azzam, bin Laden’s mentor,300 and bin Laden himself reportedly donated money to help LeT build its headquarters in Muridke, Pakistan.301 Bonds between the groups grew stronger in 1998, when LeT joined Al Qaeda’s World Islamic Front.302Lacking direct ties to Sunni Indian groups, Al Qaeda and bin Laden nevertheless offer inspiration.303 Al Qaeda’s inspiration is particularly apparent with LeT-allied groups such as SIMI. In the past, SIMI leaders have expressed their support for Al Qaeda and propagated its message. SIMI official Safdar Nagori admitted to disseminating bin Laden’s speeches

299 “India: Mahanta Presents Proof of ISI Mischief,” The Hindu, April 7, 2000. LexisNexis.300 C. Christine Fair, “Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Attack Upon Several Targets in the Indian Mega-City of Mumbai,” Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, 11 March 2009, Rand Corporation, p. 6.301 Ryan Clarke, “Lashkar-i-Taiba: Roots, Logistics, Partnerships, and the Fallacy of Subservient Proxies,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 22, Issue 3 (July 2010): p. 395.302 Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection (London: Hurst & Company, 2004), p. 60.303 Animesh Roul, “Hybrid, Homegrown and Transnational: The Indian Mujahideen and the Islamist Terror Matrix,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 8, Issue 3, January 21, 2010.

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via audio cassette;304 while others have admitted to hanging posters of bin Laden in Gujarat.305

Some evidence suggests Al Qaeda is increasingly interested in targeting India. After the February 2010 attack in Pune, India, Al Qaeda operational commander and 313 Brigade leader Illyas Kashmiri claimed responsibility for the attack and vowed to continue launching them “across India until the Indian Army leaves Kashmir and gives Kashmiris their right to self-determination.”306 “The entire Muslim community is one body and we will take revenge for all injustices and tyranny,” Kashmiri said, citing the 1993 demolition of the Babri Mosque and deaths of Muslims in Gujarat.307 In 2010, Defense Secretary Bob Gates warned that an Al Qaeda-led syndicate of South Asian terrorist groups was intent on destabilizing the region and might go so far as to provoke war between India and Pakistan.308

GULF DONORS AND THE HAWALA SYSTEM

Indian officials widely view the private citizens and organizations of wealthy Persian Gulf countries as sources of financial support for Muslim militancy in India, especially in Kashmir.309 Indian Government sources also allege that funds sent from Saudi Arabia to Kashmir are often routed through the Saudi Arabia-based Muslim World League (Rabita al-Alam al Islami) and Pakistan-based World Muslim Congress (Motamar al-Alam al-Islami), two large, reputable Islamic associations whose involvement with militancy is contested. The aforementioned sources maintain that these organizations make donations to Kashmiri groups for promotion of the Islamic faith, but that these funds are diverted to militant groups without the donor’s knowledge.310Individuals who financially support militancy in India need not rely on large intermediary organizations, however. Much of the attention that has been paid to the external financing of Sunni militancy in India centers around the informal hawala (also known as hundi in South Asia) money transfer system, which relies on trusted networks of hawaladars (hundiwalas) to effect remittances with almost no paperwork and very little cross border currency movement. The system is predominantly used to transfer legally-earned 304 Animesh Roul, “Students Islamic Movement of India: A Profile,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, Vol.4, Issue 7, April 6, 2006.305 South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI),” Terrorist Groups in India.306 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Al-Qaeda Chief Delivers a Warning,” Asia Times Online, February 13, 2010. 307 Ibid.308 Yochi J. Dreazen, “Gates Warns of Militants in South Asia,” The Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2010.309 B. Raman, “The Saudi Connection, Outlook India, March 2, 2010.310 “J&K Hawala Cloud Over Charity for A [sic – rest of headline missing from database],” The Statesman, July 29, 2002.

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funds; however, its informal nature and minimal paper trail also make it an attractive method for financing illicit activities, including militancy, and make it very difficult to amass evidence against the sources of illicit funds.Indian press reports have linked hawala financing to a variety of Sunni militant groups, including the Dawood Ibrahim organization, Hizbul Mujahideen, Dukhtaran-e-Millat, and Jaish-e-Mohammad. Indian officials sometimes refer to hawala as a source of funding for secessionist activity in Kashmir generally. According to a 2002 Indian newspaper article, India’s central government has investigated a number of expatriate Kashmiri groups as suspected funding sources including the Kashmir-American Council (US), Kashmir Study Group (Canada), Friends of Jammu and Kashmir (UK), and the World Kashmir Freedom Movement (UK).311

As an example of the difficulty that authorities oftentimes have in interdicting the flow of funds, in 2002, Jammu and Kashmir Police made arrests in a hawala militancy-financing case involving the alleged transfer of $300,000 from Ayub Thakur, head of the World Kashmir Freedom Movement in London, to Asiya Andrabi, head of the militant group Dukhtaran-e-Millat and Sayyid Ali Shah Geelani, separatist leader and former chairman of the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference. Geelani was held for allegedly forwarding the money to Hizbul Mujahideen, a banned group;312 however, Geelani apparently never stood trial in the case, possibly because of a lack of police evidence on the latter claim.313 Dukhtaran-e-Millat is not a banned group in India, and as such the transfer of funds to Andrabi was apparently not illegal.TABLIGHI JAMAAT

Tablighi Jamaat, the Pakistan-based international association of lay Muslim proselytizers, does not appear to be involved in funding Sunni militancy in India, consistent with the group’s public refusal to engage in political activity; however, investigators in the United States and France allege that Tablighi’s activities facilitate contact between young European Muslims and international jihadist groups.314 Some members of the organization have been known to hold membership in militant groups such as JeM and LeT, but there is no evidence that the organization as a whole has decided to support these groups or others with operations in India.315

311 “J&K Hawala Cloud,” The Statesman.312 Scott Baldauf, “The War on Terror’s Money,” Christian Science Monitor, July 22, 2002.313 “Kashmir Leader Geelani Released from Jail on Health Grounds,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 8, 2003.314 Craig Smith, “French Islamic Group Offers Rich Soil for Militancy,” The International Herald Tribune, April 29, 2005.315 Nicolas Howenstein, “Islamist Networks: The Case of Tablighi Jamaat,” United States Institute of Peace, October 2006.

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7. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

To conclude our analysis of Sunni militancy in India, we have performed a social network analysis of the relationships between Sunni militant groups and other relevant actors. Using the qualitative information contained in the group profiles, we have populated a matrix of links between groups and characterized these links according to the parameters listed below (see Figure 20).FIGURE 20. RELATIONS BETWEEN MILITANT GROUPS316

RELATIONSHIP DESCRIPTIONATTRIBUTION Groups listed as co-perpetrators in at least one attackFORMED One group involved in the formation of the otherFRONT One group a front for the otherFUNDING One group funds the otherGUIDANCE One group exerts concrete, directional influence over the actions of anotherINFLUENCE One group has influenced the other ideologicallyINTERMEDIARY One group acts as an intermediary for the other (perhaps channeling funds or supplies)JOINED One group has joined the other or an umbrella organization represented by the otherLINKED Groups linked in an unspecified fashionMERGED Groups have merged, or one group has been absorbed into anotherOFFSHOOT One group is an offshoot of the otherPREDECESSOR One group is the predecessor of the otherSAME Groups believed to be the sameSUPPORT One group provides material or logistical support for the otherTRAINING One group has trained members of the other or group members have trained togetherUsing this dataset, we were able to use UCINET’s Netdraw application to visually analyze the Sunni militant space in India; examples of the output produced are contained below (see Figures 21 – 25).317 This process has 316 These links can be uni- or multidirectional and are not mutually exclusive; for example, an organization may provide both guidance and training for another. 317 Groups were arranged using the spring embedding function, with small manual changes made to increase clarity and visibility of the network.

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yielded a number of insights to support and enhance our descriptive findings.First, as Figure 21 indicates, Sunni militancy in India operates in a highly interconnected space. Sunni militant groups maintain large numbers of national and transnational ties with a diverse range of actors. For example, a brief look at a Kashmiri group like Dukhtaran-e-Millat (DeM) indicates that it has been linked to state institutions like India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Pakistan’s ISI; Pakistani groups like HuM and JuM; political fronts like APHC; and its own extremist front organization, Lashkar-e-Jabbar. A broad range of associations such as these is characteristic of many of the larger Sunni militant groups.Nevertheless, it is clear that many of the domestic groups in India remain regionally oriented. The figures below were produced with the spring embedding function, which positions groups according to how closely they are related to each other. As Figure 21 demonstrates, this strategy yields considerable clustering, with the South Indian groups in neon green at the bottom right corner, the Northeast Indian groups in dark green at the top right corner, and the Kashmiri groups in bright blue on the left. On the other hand, the Pakistani groups and the all-India groups seem to have closer trans-regional ties, placing them at the center of the network. This suggests a distinctly regional flavor to domestic militancy in the South, the Northeast, and Kashmir, consistent with our qualitative findings.Third, the militant landscape in India has seen considerable change over time. While the available data is not specific or comprehensive enough to create meaningful inter-temporal analysis, a brief look at the evolution of Sunni militant groups to date, as represented by trends such as the emergence of fronts and offshoots and the joining and merging of groups, indicates that the identity of these groups evolves frequently (see Figure 22). Notable actors in this space include Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami, which has split to yield a number of spinoffs, as well as the Pakistani groups HuM, JeM, LeT, and LeJ, which have a broad range of fronts, offshoots, and successors, most likely as a result of the size of their operations and their efforts to evade government bans.Finally, the role of Pakistan and Pakistani groups in supporting Sunni militancy in India is particularly evident in the connections between groups. As Figure 23 demonstrates, Pakistan’s ISI has been implicated in supporting organizations ranging from PULF, MULTA, MULFA, and AMULFA to LeJ, JeM, HuM, LeT, and IM. From Figure 24, which includes nodes sized according to their degree centrality (i.e. the number of links they maintain with other actors in the network), we see that the ISI has the most number of links of all of the groups in the network. Pakistani groups such as HuM, JeM, and LeT have the second highest degree centrality measures, followed by significant Indian domestic actors like SIMI, MULTA, and DeM. As

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indicated by Figure 25, the ISI also ranks high in betweenness , or the ability to act as a link between otherwise disconnected groups; it is followed by SIMI and less significantly, HuM, JeM, and LeT.Ultimately, this analysis is far from authoritative. In particular, our need to rely on open-source news reports to compile the relationship database poses the threat of omission bias due to the under-reporting of less “interesting” links and the lack of information on clandestine groups. It is also limited by potential media bias, with Pakistan’s ISI possibly overrepresented as a result of the Indian news media’s eagerness to find a Pakistani operative behind every attack. Nevertheless, this social network analysis is consistent with our intuitive and quantitative findings regarding the importance and lethality of all-Indian groups and their Pakistani collaborators, and as such provides useful support for our previous conclusions.

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FIGURE 21. SOCIAL NETWORK OVERVIEW

Al-Qaeda

Al-Ummah

ARCF

Banat ul-Islam

DeM

HuM

IDF

IIM

IM

Pakistan's ISI

ISS

JeM

J ihad Committee

JuMLeJ

LeT

MKM

MULFA

MULTA

PULF

SIMI

UMLFA

HUJI-B

HuAAl-Faran

National Democratic Front

PDP

Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir

Jamaat-e-Islami

Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh

Jamaat-e-Islami (Hind)

Ansar ul-Islam

Lashkar-e-Jabbar

Tehrik al-Furqan

Jamaat-e-Furqa

AMULFA

ULFSS

Bangladesh's DGFI

HUJI

NSCN-IM

SSP

IURPI

ULFA

Islamic National Front

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen

APHC

India's RAW

World Kashmiri Freedom Movement

Afghan Taliban

Khaddam ul-Islam

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

Pakistani state

JKIF

Jamaat-ud-Dawa

Lashkar-e-Omar

al-Qanoon

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Riyadh)

International Islamic Federation of Student's Organizations (Kuwait)

REGION (NODE COLOR)• All-India • Northeast India • South India• Kashmir• Miscellaneous Indian• Pakistani • Pakistan (official)• InternationalRELATIONSHIP ─ Attribution─ Formed─ Front─ Funding─ Guidance─ Influence─ Intermediary─ Joined─ Linked ─ Merged─ Offshoot─ Predecessor─ Same─ Support─ TrainingPROFILE STATUS (LABEL FONT)

Sunni militant groups maintain large numbers of national and transnational ties with a diverse range of actors. While South India, Northeast India, and All-India groups cluster by region, All-India groups and Pakistani groups appear to maintain broader ties.

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Core profile External actorNot profiled

FIGURE 22. FRONT, JOINED, MERGED, OFFSHOOT, PREDECESSOR, AND SAME

Al-Qaeda

Al-Ummah

ARCFBanat ul-Islam

DeM

HuM

IDF

IIM

IMPakistan's ISI

ISS

JeM

Jihad Committee

JuM

LeJLeT

MKM

MULFA

MULTA

PULF

SIMI

UMLFAHUJI-B

HuA

Al-Faran

National Democratic Front PDP

Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir

Jamaat-e-Islami

Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh

Jamaat-e-Islami (Hind)

Ansar ul-Islam

Lashkar-e-Jabbar

Tehrik al-Furqan

Jamaat-e-Furqa

AMULFA

ULFSS

Bangladesh's DGFI

HUJI

NSCN-IM

SSP

IURPIULFA

Islamic National Front

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen

APHC

India's RAW

World Kashmiri Freedom Movement

Afghan Taliban

Khaddam ul-Islam

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

Pakistani stateJKIF

Jamaat-ud-Dawa

Lashkar-e-Omar

al-Qanoon

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Riyadh)International Islamic Federation of Student's Organizations (Kuwait) REGION (NODE COLOR)

• All-India• Northeast India• South India• Kashmir• Miscellaneous Indian• Pakistani• Pakistan (official)• InternationalRELATIONSHIP ─ Front─ Joined─ Merged─ Offshoot─ Predecessor─ SamePROFILE STATUS (LABEL FONT)Core profileExternal actorNot profiled

86 | P a g eThe militant landscape in India has seen considerable change over time. In particular, Jamaat-e-Islami and other Pakistani groups like HuM, JeM, LeT, and LeJ have a broad range of fronts, offshoots, and successors.FIGURE 23. FUNDING, GUIDANCE, INFLUENCE, AND SUPPORT

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Al-Qaeda Al-Ummah

ARCFBanat ul-Islam

DeM

HuM

IDF

IIM

IM

Pakistan's ISI

ISS

JeM

Jihad CommitteeJuM LeJ

LeT

MKM MULFAMULTA

PULF

SIMI

UMLFAHUJI-BHuAAl-FaranNational Democratic FrontPDPJamaat-e-Islami Kashmir

Jamaat-e-Islami

Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh

Jamaat-e-Islami (Hind)Ansar ul-IslamLashkar-e-JabbarTehrik al-FurqanJamaat-e-Furqa

AMULFA

ULFSS

Bangladesh's DGFI

HUJI

NSCN-IM

SSP

IURPI

ULFA

Islamic National FrontHizb-ul-Mujahideen

APHC

India's RAW

World Kashmiri Freedom Movement

Afghan Taliban

Khaddam ul-IslamTehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

Pakistani state

JKIFJamaat-ud-DawaLashkar-e-Omaral-Qanoon

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Riyadh)

International Islamic Federation of Student's Organizations (Kuwait)

REGION (NODE COLOR)• All-India • Northeast India • South India• Kashmir• Miscellaneous Indian• Pakistani • Pakistan (official)• InternationalRELATIONSHIP ─ Funding─ Guidance─ Influence─ SupportPROFILE STATUS (LABEL FONT)Core profile External actorNot profiled

Pakistan’s ISI has been implicated in supporting many Sunni militant organizations in India, ranging from PULF, MULTA, MULFA, and AMULFA to LeJ, JeM, HuM, LeT, and IM.FIGURE 24. DEGREE CENTRALITY

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Al-Qaeda

Al-Ummah

ARCF

Banat ul-Islam

DeM

HuM

IDF

IIM

IM

Pakistan's ISI

ISS

JeM

J ihad Committee

JuMLeJ

LeT

MKM

MULFAMULTA

PULF

SIMI

UMLFA

HUJI-B

HuAAl-Faran

National Democratic Front

PDP

Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir

Jamaat-e-Islami

Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh

Jamaat-e-Islami (Hind)

Ansar ul-Islam

Lashkar-e-Jabbar

Tehrik al-Furqan

Jamaat-e-Furqa

AMULFA

ULFSS

Bangladesh's DGFI

HUJI

NSCN-IM

SSP

IURPI

ULFA

Islamic National Front

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen

APHC

India's RAW

World Kashmiri Freedom Movement

Afghan Taliban

Khaddam ul-Islam

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

Pakistani state

JKIF

Jamaat-ud-Dawa

Lashkar-e-Omar

al-Qanoon

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Riyadh)

International Islamic Federation of Student's Organizations (Kuwait)

REGION (NODE COLOR)• All-India • Northeast India • South India• Kashmir• Miscellaneous Indian• Pakistani • Pakistan (official)• InternationalRELATIONSHIP ─ Attribution─ Formed─ Front─ Funding─ Guidance─ Influence─ Intermediary─ Joined─ Linked ─ Merged─ Offshoot─ Predecessor─ Same─ Support─ TrainingPROFILE STATUS (LABEL FONT)Core profile External actorNot profiled

The ISI has the highest measure of degree centrality, followed by Pakistani groups like HuM, JeM, and LeT and then significant Indian domestic actors like SIMI, MULTA, ISS, and DeM.

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Al-Qaeda

Al-Ummah

ARCF

Banat ul-Islam

DeM

HuM

IDF

IIM

IM

Pakistan's ISI

ISS

JeM

Jihad Committee

JuMLeJ

LeT

MKM

MULFAMULTA

PULF

SIMI

UMLFA

HUJI-B

HuAAl-Faran

National Democratic Front

PDP

Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir

Jamaat-e-Islami

Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh

Jamaat-e-Islami (Hind)

Ansar ul-Islam

Lashkar-e-Jabbar

Tehrik al-Furqan

Jamaat-e-Furqa

AMULFA

ULFSS

Bangladesh's DGFI

HUJI

NSCN-IM

SSP

IURPI

ULFA

Islamic National Front

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen

APHC

India's RAW

World Kashmiri Freedom Movement

Afghan Taliban

Khaddam ul-Islam

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

Pakistani state

JKIF

Jamaat-ud-Dawa

Lashkar-e-Omar

al-Qanoon

World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Riyadh)

International Islamic Federation of Student's Organizations (Kuwait)

REGION (NODE COLOR)• All-India • Northeast India • South India• Kashmir• Miscellaneous Indian• Pakistani • Pakistan (official)• InternationalRELATIONSHIP ─ Attribution─ Formed─ Front─ Funding─ Guidance─ Influence─ Intermediary─ Joined─ Linked ─ Merged─ Offshoot─ Predecessor─ Same─ Support─ TrainingPROFILE STATUS (LABEL FONT)Core profile External actorNot profiled

ISI also ranks high in betweenness, followed by SIMI, HuM, JeM, and LeT

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8. CONCLUSION

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

In this report, we have studied Sunni militancy in India using three principal approaches: a quantitative overview of Sunni terrorism incidents and deaths for India as a whole; in-depth qualitative profiles of individual militant groups; and a social network analysis of the connections between these groups.Our research shows that the vast majority of Sunni terror attacks in India take place in the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir, which has been at the center of the conflict between India and Pakistan for more than 60 years. Outside Kashmir, attacks by Sunni groups in India tend to be less frequent and more lethal. For example, three attacks, New Delhi in October 2005 and Mumbai in July 2006 and November 2008, account for 50 percent of the total deaths from Sunni attacks outside Kashmir since 2004. Sunni terrorism incidents and fatalities in India as a whole have been decreasing since 2008, with Kashmiri terrorism starting to fall even earlier, in 2005.The motivations of domestic militant groups can be divided three broad categories. Regional and territorial grievances are most relevant in Kashmir and Northeast India, while the threat of communal violence, especially versus Hindu nationalist groups, motivates All-India and South-India groups. Islamist ideology is a driver for groups in all regions, including Pakistan, though not to the same degree for each group. Among domestic groups, IM and SIMI have been most closely associated with terrorism, especially medium and high-mortality attacks in India’s major cities.Less operationally robust than their Pakistani counterparts, Indian groups lack the ability to perpetrate attacks beyond India’s borders and rely in many ways on support and guidance from groups based in Pakistan. The Pakistani groups offer assistance and, in turn, leverage Indian groups to spread their influence and launch attacks in India. These Pakistan-based militant groups are directly involved in both the high-frequency attacks in Kashmir and the medium and high lethality attacks in Indian cities. As a result, we view these Pakistan-based groups as the primary instigators of Sunni terrorism in India.Because almost all the Pakistan-based groups have had ties to elements within Pakistan's military and intelligence establishment, we believe the adversarial relationship between the governments of India and Pakistan to be a central factor fueling the terrorism component of Sunni militant violence in India. The India-Pakistan conflict has served as a primary motivation for the Pakistani state to support Sunni terrorism, and for Pakistani militants to launch attacks in India. It is not the only motivation,

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and it complements and competes with others, including religious or jihadist ideology. Nevertheless, at present our research shows a decisive Pakistani influence on Sunni terrorism in India, and this leads us to accord a central explanatory role to the territorial dispute in Kashmir and the broader political-religious conflict between India and Pakistan that predates their partition.The non-terrorism component of Sunni militancy in India, on the other hand, is dominated by domestic Indian actors. The riots of 1992 and 1993, violent street protests in Jammu and Kashmir and violent communal mobilization in South India are all militant responses to domestic territorial or communal grievances and show limited Pakistani involvement.In the future, the domestic grievances of Sunni Muslims in India will continue to fuel non-terrorist forms of militancy, and as long as India and Pakistan's conflict persists, there will be Pakistani actors willing to carry out terrorism in India and Sunni militant groups in India willing to assist them.IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS

Two elements of the Sunni militancy environment in India directly implicate U.S. interests. The first and most acute is the anti-Western thread that has emerged in some Sunni terror attacks in India and in the rhetoric of some Indian Sunni groups. The second is the connection between Pakistan-based elements of Sunni militancy in India and the broader India-Pakistan conflict, which has serious implications for the U.S. effort in Afghanistan and Pakistan.Anti-Americanism has surfaced several times in our study of Sunni militancy in India; first with SIMI’s praise for Osama bin Laden in the late 1990s, followed by the Asif Reza Commando Force’s fatal shooting outside Kolkata’s American Center in 2002, and subsequently with the direct targeting of Westerners in the LeT-perpetrated 2008 Mumbai attacks. Another incident, the 2010 German Bakery bombing in Pune, India, is especially significant because, while most Indian media sources and WITS list IM as the perpetrator, Al-Qaeda commander Ilyas Kashmiri also implied his organization’s involvement in the incident. Kashmiri has expressed a desire to export Mumbai-style combined-arms attacks to European cities, suggesting that the influence of global jihadism on militancy in India could also work in the opposite direction.318 Taken together, these disparate incidents suggest that the ethos of anti-Western global jihadism is creeping into the terrorism component of Sunni militancy in India. As such, policymakers should prepare for the possibility that a future outbreak of Sunni terrorism in India could target Western interests to an even greater extent than in the past.318 Tim Lister, “Ilyas Kashmiri: The Most Dangerous Man on Earth?”, CNN.com, November 10, 2010. LexisNexis.

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Secondly, Given Pakistan's geostrategic importance, Pakistan’s engagement with Sunni militancy in India has direct implications for US national security interests. The US mission to disrupt, defeat, and dismantle Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan cannot easily succeed without active support from the Pakistani military, and yet the military of Pakistan continues to view India as its primary threat.319 Crises such as the 2001 mobilization of forces along the India-Pakistan border, and the Sunni militant attacks that precipitated them, increase tensions between India and Pakistan, consume the attention of Pakistani forces and therefore inevitably distract from Pakistan’s willingness and ability to fully assist U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the border region with Afghanistan. Sunni militancy in India is a problem not just for India, but also for the U.S.

319 Steve Coll, "War By Other Means," The New Yorker, 24 May 2010, p. 51.

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9. APPENDICES

MAJOR SECONDARY SOURCES

DATABASE/SOURCE PROPRIETOR YEARS NO. OF EVENTS/ RECORDS TYPE OF INFORMATIONWITSWORLDWIDE INCIDENTS TRACKING SYSTEMhttps://wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/index.do?N=0

U.S. National Counter-terrorism Center2004 – present 5,947

Date, location, number of casualties, type of event/weapon/ victim/ perpetrator /target/facilityGTDGLOBAL TERRORISM DATABASEas of May 2008, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/in Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism http://www.start.umd.edu/start/

University of Maryland & DHS1970 – 2008 Over 87,000

Date, location (region/country), perpetrator, casualties/fatalities, nature of weapon, attack, and target

TOPSTERRORIST ORGANIZATION PROFILESas of March 1, 2008, http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/

University of Maryland, DHS, and Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT)

Present 856

Bases of operation, date formed, strength (# of members), classifications (nationalist/separatist/ religious), financial sources, founding philosophy, current goals, key leaders, related groups, US and other government designationsSATP SOUTH ASIA TERRORISM PORTAL http://www.satp.org/

Institute for Conflict Management New DelhiPresent

Data and analysis on terrorism and political conditions across South Asia

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REFERENCES

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